When numa runs as non-root on a system with a privileged default
data_dir (e.g. /usr/local/var/numa on macOS), TLS CA setup fails with
a raw "Permission denied (os error 13)" and HTTPS proxy is silently
disabled. The user sees a cryptic warning with no path forward.
Detect std::io::ErrorKind::PermissionDenied on the tls error, print a
diagnostic naming the data_dir and offering two fixes (install as
system resolver, or point data_dir at a writable path), and keep the
graceful-degradation behavior — DNS resolution and plain-HTTP proxy
continue to work without HTTPS.
All other TLS setup errors fall through to the existing log::warn!.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: cross-platform CA trust (Arch/Fedora + Windows)
Closes#35.
trust_ca_linux now detects which trust store the distro ships and
runs the matching refresh command, instead of hardcoding Debian's
update-ca-certificates. Detection walks a const table in priority
order, picking the first whose anchor dir exists:
- debian: /usr/local/share/ca-certificates (update-ca-certificates)
- pki: /etc/pki/ca-trust/source/anchors (update-ca-trust extract)
- p11kit: /etc/ca-certificates/trust-source/anchors (trust extract-compat)
Falls back with a clear error listing every backend tried.
Adds Windows support via certutil -addstore Root / -delstore Root,
removing the silent CA-trust gap on numa install (previously the
service installed but the trust step quietly errored, leaving every
HTTPS .numa request throwing browser warnings).
Refactor: trust_ca and untrust_ca are now thin dispatchers calling
per-platform helpers. CA_COMMON_NAME and CA_FILE_NAME are centralized
in tls.rs and reused from system_dns.rs and api.rs. untrust_ca_linux
no longer pre-checks file existence (TOCTOU) and skips the refresh
when no file was actually removed.
Test: tests/docker/install-trust.sh runs the install/uninstall
contract against debian:stable, fedora:latest, and archlinux:latest
in containers, asserting the cert lands in (and is removed from)
the system bundle. All three pass locally.
README notes the Firefox/NSS limitation (separate trust store).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* style: rustfmt fixes for trust_ca_linux helpers
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test: macOS CA trust contract test (manual)
Adds tests/manual/install-trust-macos.sh — a sudo bash script that
mirrors trust_ca_macos / untrust_ca_macos against a fixture cert with
a unique CN. Designed to coexist with a running production numa:
- Refuses to run if a real "Numa Local CA" is already in System.keychain
(fail-closed protection for dogfood installs)
- Uses a unique CN ("Numa Local CA Test <pid-timestamp>") so the test
cert can never collide with production
- Mirrors the by-hash deletion loop from untrust_ca_macos
- Trap-cleanup on success or interrupt
Lives under tests/manual/ to signal "host-mutating, dev-only" — distinct
from tests/docker/install-trust.sh which is hermetic.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test: relax bail-out in macOS trust test (safe alongside production)
The bail-out was overly defensive. The test cert uses a unique CN
("Numa Local CA Test <pid-ts>") that is strictly longer than the
production CN, so `security find-certificate -c $TEST_CN` cannot
substring-match the production cert. All deletes are by-hash, which
can only target the test cert's specific hash. Coexistence is
provably safe; document the reasoning in the header comment block
and replace the refusal with an informational notice.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Reverts the NUMA_DATA_DIR env var added in the previous commit and
replaces it with a [server] data_dir TOML field. Numa already has a
well-developed config system; adding a parallel env-var mechanism
for a single knob was wrong.
The principle: TOML is for application behavior configuration. Env
vars are for bootstrap values (HOME, SUDO_USER to discover paths
before config loads) and standard ecosystem conventions (RUST_LOG).
data_dir is neither — it's an app knob, so it belongs in the TOML.
Changes:
- lib.rs::data_dir() reverts to the platform-specific fallback only
- config.rs adds `data_dir: Option<PathBuf>` to ServerConfig
- main.rs resolves config.server.data_dir with fallback to
numa::data_dir() and passes it to build_tls_config, then stores the
resolved path on ctx.data_dir for downstream consumers
- tls.rs::build_tls_config takes `data_dir: &Path` as an explicit
parameter instead of calling crate::data_dir() behind the caller's
back. regenerate_tls and dot.rs self_signed_tls now pass
&ctx.data_dir, honoring whatever path the config resolved to
- tests/integration.sh Suite 6 uses `data_dir = "$NUMA_DATA"` in its
test TOML instead of the NUMA_DATA_DIR env var prefix
- numa.toml gains a commented-out data_dir example
No behavior change for existing production deployments (the default
path is unchanged). Test harness is now fully config-driven, and
containerized deploys can override data_dir via mount+config without
needing env var injection.
127/127 unit tests pass, Suite 6 passes end-to-end.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two DoS/interop hardening items:
1. Bound write_framed by WRITE_TIMEOUT (10s) so a slow-reader
attacker can't indefinitely hold a worker task and its connection
permit. Symmetric to the existing handshake timeout.
2. Advertise ALPN "dot" per RFC 7858 §3.2. Required by some strict
DoT clients (newer Apple stacks, some Android versions). rustls
ServerConfig exposes alpn_protocols as a pub field so we set it
after with_single_cert:
- load_tls_config (user-provided cert/key): set directly
- self_signed_tls (new, replaces fallback_tls): builds a fresh
DoT-specific TLS config via build_tls_config with the ALPN list
build_tls_config now takes an `alpn: Vec<Vec<u8>>` parameter so
DoT and the proxy can pass different ALPN lists while sharing the
same CA. Proxy callers pass Vec::new() (unchanged behavior).
Dropped the ctx.tls_config reuse branch: we can't mutate a shared
Arc<ServerConfig> to add DoT-specific ALPN, and reusing the proxy
config was already quietly broken re: SAN (proxy cert covers
*.{tld}, not the DoT server's bind hostname/IP).
Added dot_negotiates_alpn test that asserts conn.alpn_protocol()
returns Some(b"dot") after handshake. 126/126 tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
HTTPS proxy certs were generated once at startup. Services added at
runtime via API or LAN discovery got "not secure" in the browser
because their SAN wasn't in the cert. Now the cert is regenerated
on every service add/remove and swapped atomically via ArcSwap.
In-flight connections are unaffected.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Cross-platform paths: config_dir() uses %APPDATA%, data_dir() uses
%PROGRAMDATA% on Windows. TLS cert directory uses data_dir() instead
of hardcoded /usr/local/var/numa. Windows DNS discovery via ipconfig.
Fixed cfg gates from not(macos) to explicit linux to prevent Linux
code compiling on Windows. Added Windows target to CI and release
workflows with zip packaging.
System integration (numa install/service) not yet supported on Windows
— users run numa.exe manually.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
