Adding Secure Lock to lock the device with a random 256 bit key.

This is an extra layer of security to avoid brute force attacks if PIN is too weak.
At every hard reset (on device plug), the device must be unlocked prior any other command. Once unlocked, the device can be used as usual.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
This commit is contained in:
Pol Henarejos
2022-10-31 15:09:54 +01:00
parent eda8b53949
commit 00279da8d5
5 changed files with 215 additions and 4 deletions

View File

@@ -15,14 +15,20 @@
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "common.h"
#include "mbedtls/ecdh.h"
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "hardware/rtc.h"
#include "files.h"
#include "random.h"
#include "kek.h"
#include "mbedtls/hkdf.h"
#include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h"
int cmd_extras() {
if (P2(apdu) != 0x0)
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
if (P1(apdu) == 0xA) { //datetime operations
if (P2(apdu) != 0x0)
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
if (apdu.nc == 0) {
datetime_t dt;
if (!rtc_get_datetime(&dt))
@@ -52,6 +58,8 @@ int cmd_extras() {
}
}
else if (P1(apdu) == 0x6) { //dynamic options
if (P2(apdu) != 0x0)
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
if (apdu.nc > sizeof(uint8_t))
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
uint16_t opts = get_device_options();
@@ -66,6 +74,86 @@ int cmd_extras() {
low_flash_available();
}
}
else if (P1(apdu) == 0x3A) { // secure lock
if (apdu.nc == 0) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
if (P2(apdu) == 0x01) { // Key Agreement
mbedtls_ecdh_context hkey;
mbedtls_ecdh_init(&hkey);
mbedtls_ecdh_setup(&hkey, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1);
int ret = mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public(&hkey.ctx.mbed_ecdh.grp, &hkey.ctx.mbed_ecdh.d, &hkey.ctx.mbed_ecdh.Q, random_gen, NULL);
mbedtls_mpi_lset(&hkey.ctx.mbed_ecdh.Qp.Z, 1);
ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary(&hkey.ctx.mbed_ecdh.grp, &hkey.ctx.mbed_ecdh.Qp, apdu.data, apdu.nc);
if (ret != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdh_free(&hkey);
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
memcpy(mse.Qpt, apdu.data, sizeof(mse.Qpt));
uint8_t buf[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES];
size_t olen = 0;
ret = mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret(&hkey, &olen, buf, MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES, random_gen, NULL);
if (ret != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdh_free(&hkey);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf));
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
ret = mbedtls_hkdf(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256), NULL, 0, buf, olen, mse.Qpt, sizeof(mse.Qpt), mse.key_enc, sizeof(mse.key_enc));
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf));
if (ret != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdh_free(&hkey);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&hkey.ctx.mbed_ecdh.grp, &hkey.ctx.mbed_ecdh.Q, MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED, &olen, res_APDU, 4096);
mbedtls_ecdh_free(&hkey);
if (ret != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
mse.init = true;
res_APDU_size = olen;
}
else if (P2(apdu) == 0x02 || P2(apdu) == 0x03 || P2(apdu) == 0x04) {
if (mse.init == false)
return SW_COMMAND_NOT_ALLOWED();
int ret = mse_decrypt_ct(apdu.data, apdu.nc);
if (ret != 0) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
if (P2(apdu) == 0x02 || P2(apdu) == 0x04) { // Enable
uint16_t opts = get_device_options();
uint8_t newopts[] = { opts >> 8, (opts & 0xff) };
if ((P2(apdu) == 0x02 && !(opts & HSM_OPT_SECURE_LOCK)) || (P2(apdu) == 0x04 && (opts & HSM_OPT_SECURE_LOCK))) {
uint16_t tfids[] = { EF_MKEK, EF_MKEK_SO };
for (int t = 0; t < sizeof(tfids)/sizeof(uint16_t); t++) {
file_t *tf = search_by_fid(tfids[t], NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
if (tf) {
uint8_t *tmp = (uint8_t *)calloc(1, file_get_size(tf));
memcpy(tmp, file_get_data(tf), file_get_size(tf));
for (int i = 0; i < MKEK_KEY_SIZE; i++) {
MKEK_KEY(tmp)[i] ^= apdu.data[i];
}
flash_write_data_to_file(tf, tmp, file_get_size(tf));
free(tmp);
}
}
}
if (P2(apdu) == 0x02)
newopts[0] |= HSM_OPT_SECURE_LOCK >> 8;
else if (P2(apdu) == 0x04)
newopts[0] &= ~HSM_OPT_SECURE_LOCK >> 8;
file_t *tf = search_by_fid(EF_DEVOPS, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
flash_write_data_to_file(tf, newopts, sizeof(newopts));
low_flash_available();
}
else if (P2(apdu) == 0x03) {
memcpy(mkek_mask, apdu.data, apdu.nc);
has_mkek_mask = true;
}
}
}
else
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
return SW_OK();