wifi-densepose/vendor/ruvector/examples/edge-net/docs/security

@ruvector/edge-net Security Review

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive security analysis of the edge-net distributed compute network. The system enables browsers to contribute compute power and earn credits, creating a P2P marketplace for AI workloads.

Security Classification: HIGH RISK

A distributed compute network with financial incentives presents significant attack surface. This review identifies threats, mitigations, and remaining risks.

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Table of Contents

1. Threat Model
2. Attack Vectors
3. Security Controls
4. QDAG Currency Security
5. Cryptographic Choices
6. Remaining Risks
7. Security Recommendations
8. Incident Response

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1. Threat Model

1.1 Assets at Risk

Asset	Value	Impact if Compromised
User credits	Financial	Direct monetary loss
Task payloads	Confidential	Data breach, IP theft
Compute results	Integrity	Incorrect AI outputs
Node identities	Reputation	Impersonation, fraud
Network state	Availability	Service disruption
QDAG ledger	Financial	Double-spend, inflation

1.2 Threat Actors

Actor	Capability	Motivation
Script kiddie	Low	Vandalism, testing
Fraudster	Medium	Credit theft, fake compute
Competitor	Medium-High	Disruption, espionage
Nation-state	Very High	Surveillance, sabotage
Insider	High	Financial gain

1.3 Trust Boundaries

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                        UNTRUSTED ZONE                                   │
│                                                                         │
│   ┌─────────────┐        ┌─────────────┐        ┌─────────────┐        │
│   │  Malicious  │        │   Network   │        │   Rogue     │        │
│   │   Client    │        │   Traffic   │        │   Worker    │        │
│   └──────┬──────┘        └──────┬──────┘        └──────┬──────┘        │
│          │                      │                      │                │
├──────────┼──────────────────────┼──────────────────────┼────────────────┤
│          │            TRUST BOUNDARY                   │                │
├──────────┼──────────────────────┼──────────────────────┼────────────────┤
│          ▼                      ▼                      ▼                │
│   ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐      │
│   │                    EDGE-NET NODE                             │      │
│   │                                                              │      │
│   │  ┌──────────┐   ┌──────────┐   ┌──────────┐   ┌──────────┐  │      │
│   │  │ Identity │   │  QDAG    │   │   Task   │   │ Security │  │      │
│   │  │ Verify   │   │  Verify  │   │  Verify  │   │  Checks  │  │      │
│   │  └──────────┘   └──────────┘   └──────────┘   └──────────┘  │      │
│   │                                                              │      │
│   │  ┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐   │      │
│   │  │              WASM SANDBOX (Trusted)                   │   │      │
│   │  │  ┌────────────┐  ┌────────────┐  ┌────────────┐      │   │      │
│   │  │  │  Compute   │  │   Credit   │  │   Crypto   │      │   │      │
│   │  │  │  Execution │  │   Ledger   │  │   Engine   │      │   │      │
│   │  │  └────────────┘  └────────────┘  └────────────┘      │   │      │
│   │  └──────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘   │      │
│   │                                                              │      │
│   └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘      │
│                                                                         │
│                         TRUSTED ZONE                                    │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

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2. Attack Vectors

2.1 Sybil Attacks

Threat: Attacker creates many fake identities to:

• Claim disproportionate compute rewards
• Manipulate task verification voting
• Control consensus outcomes

Mitigations Implemented:

// Browser fingerprinting (privacy-preserving)
BrowserFingerprint::generate() -> unique hash

// Stake requirement
const MIN_STAKE: u64 = 100_000_000; // 100 credits to participate

// Rate limiting
RateLimiter::check_allowed(node_id) -> bool

// Sybil defense
SybilDefense::register_node(node_id, fingerprint) -> bool (max 3 per fingerprint)

Residual Risk: MEDIUM

• Fingerprinting can be bypassed with VMs/incognito
• Stake requirement helps but motivated attackers can acquire credits
• Recommendation: Add proof-of-humanity (optional) for high-value operations

2.2 Free-Riding Attacks

Threat: Attacker claims compute rewards without doing real work:

• Returns random/garbage results
• Copies results from honest workers
• Times out intentionally

Mitigations Implemented:

// Redundant execution (N workers verify same task)
task.redundancy = 3; // 3 workers, majority wins

// Spot-checking with known answers
SpotChecker::should_check() -> 10% of tasks verified
SpotChecker::verify_response(input, output) -> bool

// Execution proofs
ExecutionProof {
    io_hash: hash(input + output),
    checkpoints: Vec<intermediate_hashes>,
}

// Reputation consequences
ReputationSystem::record_penalty(node_id, 0.3); // 30% reputation hit

Residual Risk: LOW-MEDIUM

• Redundancy provides strong protection but costs 3x compute
• Spot-checks effective but can be gamed if challenges leak
• Recommendation: Implement rotating challenge set, consider ZK proofs

2.3 Double-Spend Attacks (QDAG)

Threat: Attacker spends same credits twice:

• Creates conflicting transactions
• Exploits network partitions
• Manipulates cumulative weight

Mitigations Implemented:

// DAG structure prevents linear double-spend
tx.validates = vec![parent1, parent2]; // Must reference 2+ existing tx

// Cumulative weight (similar to confirmation depth)
cumulative_weight = sum(parent_weights) + 1;

// Proof of work (spam prevention)
pow_difficulty = 16; // ~65K hashes per tx

// Cryptographic signatures
tx.signature_ed25519 = sign(hash(tx_content));

Residual Risk: MEDIUM

• DAG is more complex than blockchain, edge cases possible
• No formal verification of consensus properties
• Recommendation: Model with TLA+ or similar, add watchtower nodes

2.4 Task Injection Attacks

Threat: Attacker submits malicious tasks:

• Exfiltrate worker data
• Execute arbitrary code
• Denial of service via resource exhaustion

Mitigations Implemented:

// Task type whitelist
match task.task_type {
    TaskType::VectorSearch => ..., // Known, safe operations
    TaskType::CustomWasm => Err("Requires explicit verification"),
}

// Resource limits
WasmTaskExecutor {
    max_memory: 256 * 1024 * 1024, // 256MB
    max_time_ms: 30_000,           // 30 seconds
}

// Payload encryption (only intended recipient can read)
encrypted_payload = encrypt(payload, recipient_pubkey);

// Signature verification
verify_signature(task, submitter_pubkey);

Residual Risk: LOW

• WASM sandbox provides strong isolation
• Resource limits prevent DoS
• CustomWasm explicitly disabled by default
• Recommendation: Add task size limits, implement quota system

2.5 Man-in-the-Middle Attacks

Threat: Attacker intercepts and modifies network traffic:

• Steal task payloads
• Modify results
• Impersonate nodes

Mitigations Implemented:

// End-to-end encryption
task.encrypted_payload = aes_gcm_encrypt(key, payload);

// Message authentication
signature = ed25519_sign(private_key, message);

// Node identity verification
verify(public_key, message, signature);

Residual Risk: LOW

• E2E encryption prevents content inspection
• Signatures prevent modification
• Recommendation: Implement certificate pinning for relay connections

2.6 Denial of Service

Threat: Attacker overwhelms network:

• Flood with fake tasks
• Exhaust relay resources
• Target specific nodes

Mitigations Implemented:

// Rate limiting
RateLimiter {
    window_ms: 60_000,  // 1 minute window
    max_requests: 100,  // 100 requests max
}

// Stake requirement (economic cost to attack)
min_stake: 100_000_000

// PoW for QDAG transactions
pow_difficulty: 16 // Computational cost per tx

// Task expiration
expires_at: now + 60_000 // Tasks expire in 1 minute

Residual Risk: MEDIUM

• Distributed nature helps absorb attacks
• Relays are still centralized chokepoints
• Recommendation: Deploy multiple relay providers, implement circuit breakers

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3. Security Controls

3.1 Control Matrix

Control	Type	Status	Effectiveness
Ed25519 signatures	Cryptographic	Implemented	High
AES-256-GCM encryption	Cryptographic	Implemented	High
WASM sandboxing	Isolation	Implemented	High
Rate limiting	Availability	Implemented	Medium
Stake requirement	Economic	Implemented	Medium
Reputation system	Behavioral	Implemented	Medium
Sybil defense	Identity	Implemented	Low-Medium
Spot-checking	Verification	Implemented	Medium
Audit logging	Detection	Implemented	Medium

3.2 Defense in Depth

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Layer 1: Network (Rate limiting, PoW, Geographic diversity)            │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Layer 2: Identity (Ed25519, Fingerprinting, Reputation)                │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Layer 3: Economic (Stake, Credits, Penalties)                          │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Layer 4: Cryptographic (AES-GCM, Signatures, Hashing)                  │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Layer 5: Isolation (WASM sandbox, Resource limits)                     │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Layer 6: Verification (Redundancy, Spot-checks, Proofs)                │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Layer 7: Detection (Audit logs, Anomaly detection)                     │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

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4. QDAG Currency Security

4.1 Consensus Properties

Property	Status	Notes
Safety	Partial	DAG prevents simple double-spend, but lacks formal proof
Liveness	Yes	Feeless, always possible to transact
Finality	Probabilistic	Higher weight = more confirmations
Censorship resistance	Yes	No miners/validators to bribe

4.2 Attack Resistance

Attack	Resistance	Mechanism
Double-spend	Medium	Cumulative weight, redundancy
51% attack	N/A	No mining, all nodes equal
Sybil	Medium	Stake + fingerprinting
Spam	Medium	PoW + rate limiting
Front-running	Low	Transactions are public

4.3 Economic Security

Attack Cost Analysis:

Scenario: Attacker wants to double-spend 1000 credits

1. Stake requirement: 100 credits minimum
2. PoW cost: ~65K hashes × transaction fee (0) = ~$0.01 electricity
3. Detection probability: ~90% (redundancy + spot-checks)
4. Penalty if caught: Stake slashed (100 credits) + reputation damage

Expected Value:
  Success (10%): +1000 credits
  Failure (90%): -100 credits (stake) - reputation

  EV = 0.1 × 1000 - 0.9 × 100 = 100 - 90 = +10 credits

PROBLEM: Positive expected value for attack!

Mitigation needed:
- Increase stake requirement to 200+ credits
- Add delayed finality (1 hour) for large transfers
- Require higher redundancy for high-value tasks

4.4 Recommended Improvements

1. Increase minimum stake to 1000 credits for contributor nodes
2. Implement time-locked withdrawals (24h delay for large amounts)
3. Add transaction confirmation threshold (weight > 10 for finality)
4. Watchdog nodes that monitor for conflicts and alert

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5. Cryptographic Choices

5.1 Algorithm Selection

Use Case	Algorithm	Key Size	Security Level	Quantum Safe
Signatures	Ed25519	256-bit	128-bit	No
Encryption	AES-256-GCM	256-bit	256-bit	Partial
Hashing	SHA-256	256-bit	128-bit	Partial
Key exchange	X25519	256-bit	128-bit	No

5.2 Quantum Resistance Roadmap

Current implementation is NOT quantum-safe. Mitigation plan:

Phase 1 (Current): Ed25519 + AES-256-GCM

• Sufficient for near-term (5-10 years)
• Fast and well-tested

Phase 2 (Planned): Hybrid signatures

pub struct HybridSignature {
    ed25519: [u8; 64],
    dilithium: Option<[u8; 2420]>,  // Post-quantum
}

Phase 3 (Future): Full post-quantum

• Replace X25519 with CRYSTALS-Kyber
• Replace Ed25519 with CRYSTALS-Dilithium
• Timeline: When NIST standards are finalized and WASM support available

5.3 Key Management

Key Type	Storage	Lifecycle	Rotation
Identity private key	localStorage (encrypted)	Long-term	On compromise only
Task encryption key	Memory only	Per-task	Every task
Session key	Memory only	Per-session	Every session

Recommendations:

1. Add option to export/backup identity keys
2. Implement key derivation for sub-keys
3. Consider hardware security module integration

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6. Remaining Risks

6.1 High Priority

Risk	Likelihood	Impact	Mitigation Status
QDAG double-spend	Medium	High	Partial - needs more stake
Relay compromise	Medium	High	Not addressed - single point of failure
Fingerprint bypass	High	Medium	Accepted - layered defense

6.2 Medium Priority

Risk	Likelihood	Impact	Mitigation Status
Quantum computer attack	Low (5+ years)	Critical	Planned - hybrid signatures
Result manipulation	Medium	Medium	Implemented - redundancy
Credit inflation	Low	High	Implemented - max supply cap

6.3 Accepted Risks

Risk	Rationale for Acceptance
Browser fingerprint bypass	Defense in depth, not sole protection
Front-running	Low value per transaction
Denial of service on single node	Network is distributed

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7. Security Recommendations

7.1 Immediate (Before Launch)

1. Increase minimum stake to 1000 credits

   • Current 100 credits allows profitable attacks
   • Higher stake increases attacker cost

2. Add time-locked withdrawals for large amounts

   if amount > 10_000 {
       withdrawal_delay = 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000; // 24 hours
   }
   

3. Implement relay redundancy

   • Use 3+ relay providers
   • Implement failover logic
   • Monitor relay health

4. Add anomaly detection

   • Monitor for unusual transaction patterns
   • Alert on reputation drops
   • Track geographic distribution

7.2 Short-Term (1-3 Months)

1. Formal verification of QDAG consensus

   • Model in TLA+ or similar
   • Prove safety properties
   • Test with chaos engineering

2. Bug bounty program

   • Engage external security researchers
   • Reward vulnerability disclosure
   • Range: $500 - $50,000 based on severity

3. Penetration testing

   • Engage professional red team
   • Focus on economic attacks
   • Test at scale

7.3 Long-Term (3-12 Months)

1. Post-quantum cryptography migration

   • Implement Dilithium signatures
   • Implement Kyber key exchange
   • Maintain backward compatibility

2. Hardware security module support

   • WebAuthn integration for identity
   • Secure key storage
   • Biometric authentication

3. Decentralized relay network

   • Run relay nodes on-chain
   • Incentivize relay operators
   • Eliminate single points of failure

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8. Incident Response

8.1 Incident Categories

Category	Examples	Response Time
P1 - Critical	Double-spend, key compromise	< 1 hour
P2 - High	Relay outage, spam attack	< 4 hours
P3 - Medium	Reputation manipulation, minor bugs	< 24 hours
P4 - Low	Performance issues, UI bugs	< 1 week

8.2 Response Procedures

P1 - Critical Incident:

1. Pause network (if possible)
2. Assess damage scope
3. Identify root cause
4. Deploy fix
5. Restore service
6. Post-mortem

Contacts:

• Security lead: security@ruvector.dev
• Emergency: See internal runbook
• Bug bounty: hackerone.com/ruvector (pending)

8.3 Disclosure Policy

• Private disclosure preferred for critical vulnerabilities
• 90-day disclosure window before public release
• Credit and bounty for responsible disclosure
• CVE assignment for significant vulnerabilities

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Appendix A: Security Checklist

Pre-Launch

• Minimum stake increased to 1000 credits
• Time-locked withdrawals implemented
• Multi-relay support tested
• Rate limits tuned for production
• Audit logs reviewed for gaps
• Key backup/recovery tested
• Incident response tested

Post-Launch

• Bug bounty active
• Penetration test completed
• Formal verification started
• Monitoring dashboards live
• On-call rotation established

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Appendix B: References

1. NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography: https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/post-quantum-cryptography
2. Ed25519 specification: https://ed25519.cr.yp.to/
3. AES-GCM: NIST SP 800-38D
4. DAG-based consensus: IOTA Tangle, Avalanche
5. Sybil attack mitigation: https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/586110.586124

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This document should be reviewed quarterly and updated after any security incident.

Last reviewed: [DATE] Next review: [DATE + 90 days]