52 KiB
52 KiB
Security Architecture - RuVector Scipix OCR
Executive Summary
This document outlines the comprehensive security architecture for the ruvector-scipix OCR system, designed with defense-in-depth principles, zero-trust assumptions, and Rust's memory-safety guarantees at its core.
Security Posture: Multi-layered protection spanning authentication, authorization, data privacy, input validation, secure processing, transport security, and supply chain integrity.
Target Threat Model: Protection against unauthorized access, data exfiltration, denial-of-service attacks, code injection, malicious file uploads, and supply chain attacks.
1. Authentication System
1.1 API Key Management
Key Generation Strategy
use argon2::{Argon2, PasswordHasher};
use rand::Rng;
use base64::{Engine as _, engine::general_purpose};
pub struct ApiKeyManager {
pepper: [u8; 32],
}
impl ApiKeyManager {
/// Generate cryptographically secure API key
pub fn generate_api_key(&self) -> Result<ApiKey, SecurityError> {
let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
let mut key_bytes = [0u8; 32];
rng.fill(&mut key_bytes);
// Format: rvx_live_<base64url>_<checksum>
let key_data = general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(&key_bytes);
let checksum = self.compute_checksum(&key_bytes)?;
let key_string = format!("rvx_live_{}_{}", key_data, checksum);
Ok(ApiKey {
key: key_string,
hash: self.hash_key(&key_bytes)?,
created_at: chrono::Utc::now(),
expires_at: None,
})
}
/// Hash API key for secure storage
fn hash_key(&self, key_bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<String, SecurityError> {
let mut combined = Vec::new();
combined.extend_from_slice(key_bytes);
combined.extend_from_slice(&self.pepper);
let salt = argon2::password_hash::SaltString::generate(&mut rand::thread_rng());
let argon2 = Argon2::default();
let hash = argon2.hash_password(&combined, &salt)
.map_err(|e| SecurityError::HashingFailed(e.to_string()))?;
Ok(hash.to_string())
}
/// Verify API key without timing attacks
pub fn verify_key(&self, provided_key: &str, stored_hash: &str) -> Result<bool, SecurityError> {
use argon2::PasswordVerifier;
use subtle::ConstantTimeEq;
// Parse and extract key bytes
let key_bytes = self.parse_key(provided_key)?;
let mut combined = Vec::new();
combined.extend_from_slice(&key_bytes);
combined.extend_from_slice(&self.pepper);
let parsed_hash = argon2::PasswordHash::new(stored_hash)
.map_err(|e| SecurityError::InvalidHash(e.to_string()))?;
// Constant-time verification
match Argon2::default().verify_password(&combined, &parsed_hash) {
Ok(_) => Ok(true),
Err(_) => Ok(false),
}
}
}
pub struct ApiKey {
pub key: String, // Never logged or displayed
pub hash: String, // Stored in database
pub created_at: chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc>,
pub expires_at: Option<chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc>>,
}
Key Rotation Policy
- Automatic rotation: Every 90 days for high-privilege keys
- Manual rotation: Available at any time via API
- Grace period: 7 days overlap for seamless transition
- Revocation: Immediate invalidation with audit trail
1.2 Token Generation and Expiry
JWT Implementation
use jsonwebtoken::{encode, decode, Header, Algorithm, Validation, EncodingKey, DecodingKey};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct Claims {
sub: String, // Subject (API key ID)
exp: usize, // Expiry timestamp
iat: usize, // Issued at
nbf: usize, // Not before
jti: String, // JWT ID (for revocation)
scopes: Vec<String>, // Permission scopes
// Custom claims
rate_limit_tier: String,
max_image_size: usize,
}
pub struct TokenManager {
encoding_key: EncodingKey,
decoding_key: DecodingKey,
revoked_tokens: Arc<DashSet<String>>, // Distributed revocation list
}
impl TokenManager {
/// Generate short-lived access token
pub fn generate_access_token(&self, api_key_id: &str, scopes: Vec<String>) -> Result<String, SecurityError> {
let now = chrono::Utc::now();
let expiry = now + chrono::Duration::minutes(15); // 15-minute expiry
let claims = Claims {
sub: api_key_id.to_string(),
exp: expiry.timestamp() as usize,
iat: now.timestamp() as usize,
nbf: now.timestamp() as usize,
jti: uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
scopes,
rate_limit_tier: "standard".to_string(),
max_image_size: 10 * 1024 * 1024, // 10MB
};
encode(&Header::new(Algorithm::EdDSA), &claims, &self.encoding_key)
.map_err(|e| SecurityError::TokenGenerationFailed(e.to_string()))
}
/// Validate and decode token
pub fn validate_token(&self, token: &str) -> Result<Claims, SecurityError> {
// Check revocation list first (fast path)
if self.is_revoked(token) {
return Err(SecurityError::TokenRevoked);
}
let mut validation = Validation::new(Algorithm::EdDSA);
validation.set_required_spec_claims(&["exp", "sub", "iat"]);
let token_data = decode::<Claims>(token, &self.decoding_key, &validation)
.map_err(|e| SecurityError::InvalidToken(e.to_string()))?;
// Double-check JTI in revocation list (defense in depth)
if self.revoked_tokens.contains(&token_data.claims.jti) {
return Err(SecurityError::TokenRevoked);
}
Ok(token_data.claims)
}
/// Revoke token immediately
pub fn revoke_token(&self, jti: &str) {
self.revoked_tokens.insert(jti.to_string());
// Also propagate to distributed cache (Redis/etc)
}
}
1.3 Client-Side vs Server-Side Keys
Key Classification
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum KeyType {
/// Server-side keys: Full API access, never exposed to browsers
ServerSide,
/// Client-side keys: Limited scope, rate-limited, domain-restricted
ClientSide,
/// Service keys: M2M communication, specific service scopes
Service,
}
pub struct KeyConfig {
key_type: KeyType,
allowed_domains: Vec<String>, // CORS whitelist
allowed_ips: Vec<IpNet>, // IP whitelist
max_requests_per_minute: u32,
allowed_scopes: Vec<Scope>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum Scope {
// Read-only scopes (safe for client-side)
ReadEquations,
ReadImages,
// Write scopes (server-side only)
WriteEquations,
ProcessBatch,
AccessAnalytics,
// Admin scopes (highly restricted)
ManageKeys,
AccessAuditLogs,
}
impl KeyConfig {
/// Validate scope is allowed for key type
pub fn validate_scope(&self, scope: &Scope) -> bool {
match self.key_type {
KeyType::ClientSide => {
// Client-side keys restricted to read-only operations
matches!(scope, Scope::ReadEquations | Scope::ReadImages)
},
KeyType::ServerSide => {
// Server-side keys can access all non-admin scopes
!matches!(scope, Scope::ManageKeys | Scope::AccessAuditLogs)
},
KeyType::Service => {
// Service keys have explicit scope list
self.allowed_scopes.contains(scope)
}
}
}
}
2. Authorization System
2.1 Permission Levels
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
use std::collections::HashSet;
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
pub enum Permission {
// Basic permissions
ProcessImage,
ProcessEquation,
// Batch operations
ProcessBatch,
// Analytics
ViewUsageStats,
ViewDetailedAnalytics,
// Administration
ManageApiKeys,
ViewAuditLogs,
ConfigureRateLimits,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub enum Role {
Free,
Standard,
Premium,
Enterprise,
Admin,
}
impl Role {
pub fn permissions(&self) -> HashSet<Permission> {
use Permission::*;
match self {
Role::Free => {
vec![ProcessImage, ProcessEquation].into_iter().collect()
},
Role::Standard => {
vec![
ProcessImage,
ProcessEquation,
ProcessBatch,
ViewUsageStats,
].into_iter().collect()
},
Role::Premium => {
vec![
ProcessImage,
ProcessEquation,
ProcessBatch,
ViewUsageStats,
ViewDetailedAnalytics,
].into_iter().collect()
},
Role::Enterprise => {
vec![
ProcessImage,
ProcessEquation,
ProcessBatch,
ViewUsageStats,
ViewDetailedAnalytics,
ManageApiKeys,
].into_iter().collect()
},
Role::Admin => {
vec![
ProcessImage,
ProcessEquation,
ProcessBatch,
ViewUsageStats,
ViewDetailedAnalytics,
ManageApiKeys,
ViewAuditLogs,
ConfigureRateLimits,
].into_iter().collect()
}
}
}
}
pub struct AuthorizationService {
role_cache: Arc<DashMap<String, Role>>,
}
impl AuthorizationService {
pub fn check_permission(&self, user_id: &str, permission: Permission) -> Result<(), AuthError> {
let role = self.role_cache
.get(user_id)
.ok_or(AuthError::UserNotFound)?;
if role.permissions().contains(&permission) {
Ok(())
} else {
Err(AuthError::InsufficientPermissions {
required: permission,
user_role: role.clone(),
})
}
}
}
2.2 Rate Limiting Per Key
Token Bucket Algorithm with Distributed State
use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
use dashmap::DashMap;
pub struct RateLimiter {
buckets: Arc<DashMap<String, TokenBucket>>,
tiers: Arc<DashMap<String, RateLimitTier>>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct RateLimitTier {
requests_per_second: u32,
burst_size: u32,
daily_quota: Option<u64>,
}
struct TokenBucket {
tokens: f64,
capacity: f64,
refill_rate: f64,
last_refill: Instant,
daily_count: u64,
daily_reset: Instant,
}
impl RateLimiter {
pub fn new() -> Self {
let mut tiers = DashMap::new();
tiers.insert("free".to_string(), RateLimitTier {
requests_per_second: 1,
burst_size: 5,
daily_quota: Some(100),
});
tiers.insert("standard".to_string(), RateLimitTier {
requests_per_second: 10,
burst_size: 50,
daily_quota: Some(10_000),
});
tiers.insert("premium".to_string(), RateLimitTier {
requests_per_second: 100,
burst_size: 500,
daily_quota: Some(1_000_000),
});
tiers.insert("enterprise".to_string(), RateLimitTier {
requests_per_second: 1000,
burst_size: 5000,
daily_quota: None, // Unlimited
});
Self {
buckets: Arc::new(DashMap::new()),
tiers: Arc::new(tiers),
}
}
/// Check and consume tokens (returns remaining tokens or error)
pub async fn check_limit(&self, key_id: &str, tier: &str, cost: u32) -> Result<u64, RateLimitError> {
let tier_config = self.tiers
.get(tier)
.ok_or(RateLimitError::UnknownTier)?;
// Initialize or get bucket
let mut bucket_ref = self.buckets.entry(key_id.to_string()).or_insert_with(|| {
TokenBucket {
tokens: tier_config.burst_size as f64,
capacity: tier_config.burst_size as f64,
refill_rate: tier_config.requests_per_second as f64,
last_refill: Instant::now(),
daily_count: 0,
daily_reset: Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(86400),
}
});
let bucket = bucket_ref.value_mut();
// Refill tokens based on elapsed time
let now = Instant::now();
let elapsed = now.duration_since(bucket.last_refill).as_secs_f64();
bucket.tokens = (bucket.tokens + elapsed * bucket.refill_rate).min(bucket.capacity);
bucket.last_refill = now;
// Reset daily counter if needed
if now >= bucket.daily_reset {
bucket.daily_count = 0;
bucket.daily_reset = now + Duration::from_secs(86400);
}
// Check daily quota
if let Some(quota) = tier_config.daily_quota {
if bucket.daily_count >= quota {
return Err(RateLimitError::DailyQuotaExceeded {
quota,
reset_at: bucket.daily_reset,
});
}
}
// Check if enough tokens available
if bucket.tokens >= cost as f64 {
bucket.tokens -= cost as f64;
bucket.daily_count += cost as u64;
Ok(bucket.tokens as u64)
} else {
Err(RateLimitError::RateLimitExceeded {
retry_after: Duration::from_secs_f64((cost as f64 - bucket.tokens) / bucket.refill_rate),
})
}
}
}
#[derive(Debug)]
pub enum RateLimitError {
RateLimitExceeded { retry_after: Duration },
DailyQuotaExceeded { quota: u64, reset_at: Instant },
UnknownTier,
}
2.3 Feature Access Control
Feature Flags with Permission Gating
pub struct FeatureGate {
features: DashMap<String, FeatureConfig>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct FeatureConfig {
name: String,
enabled: bool,
required_role: Role,
required_permissions: Vec<Permission>,
beta_access: bool,
}
impl FeatureGate {
pub fn can_access_feature(&self, user_id: &str, feature: &str) -> Result<(), FeatureError> {
let config = self.features
.get(feature)
.ok_or(FeatureError::UnknownFeature)?;
if !config.enabled {
return Err(FeatureError::FeatureDisabled);
}
// Check role requirement
let user_role = self.get_user_role(user_id)?;
if !self.role_satisfies(&user_role, &config.required_role) {
return Err(FeatureError::InsufficientRole);
}
// Check beta access
if config.beta_access && !self.has_beta_access(user_id)? {
return Err(FeatureError::BetaAccessRequired);
}
Ok(())
}
}
3. Data Privacy
3.1 Image Data Handling
Zero-Persistence Default Policy
pub struct ImageProcessor {
temp_storage: TempStorage,
max_retention: Duration,
}
impl ImageProcessor {
/// Process image with automatic cleanup
pub async fn process_image(&self, image_data: Vec<u8>, request_id: &str) -> Result<OcrResult, ProcessingError> {
// Create temporary storage with auto-cleanup
let temp_file = self.temp_storage.create_temp_file(request_id, image_data)?;
// Ensure cleanup on drop
let _cleanup_guard = CleanupGuard::new(temp_file.path());
// Process image
let result = self.run_ocr(&temp_file).await?;
// Explicit cleanup (guard ensures it happens even on panic)
drop(_cleanup_guard);
Ok(result)
}
}
/// RAII guard for automatic cleanup
struct CleanupGuard {
path: PathBuf,
}
impl CleanupGuard {
fn new(path: PathBuf) -> Self {
Self { path }
}
}
impl Drop for CleanupGuard {
fn drop(&mut self) {
// Secure deletion: overwrite before removal
if let Ok(mut file) = std::fs::OpenOptions::new()
.write(true)
.open(&self.path)
{
let metadata = file.metadata().ok();
if let Some(meta) = metadata {
let size = meta.len();
let zeros = vec![0u8; size as usize];
let _ = file.write_all(&zeros);
let _ = file.sync_all();
}
}
// Remove file
let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&self.path);
}
}
/// Optional persistent storage (opt-in only)
pub struct OptInStorage {
enabled: bool,
encryption_key: [u8; 32],
retention_policy: RetentionPolicy,
}
impl OptInStorage {
pub async fn store_if_enabled(&self, user_consent: bool, data: &[u8]) -> Result<(), StorageError> {
if !self.enabled || !user_consent {
return Ok(()); // Skip storage
}
// Encrypt before storage
let encrypted = self.encrypt_data(data)?;
// Store with retention metadata
self.persist_encrypted(encrypted, self.retention_policy.duration).await?;
Ok(())
}
}
3.2 GDPR Compliance
Data Subject Rights Implementation
pub struct GdprCompliance {
data_registry: Arc<DashMap<String, UserDataRecord>>,
deletion_queue: Arc<Mutex<VecDeque<DeletionRequest>>>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct UserDataRecord {
user_id: String,
data_locations: Vec<DataLocation>,
processing_purposes: Vec<ProcessingPurpose>,
consent_given: bool,
consent_timestamp: chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc>,
}
impl GdprCompliance {
/// Right to Access (Article 15)
pub async fn export_user_data(&self, user_id: &str) -> Result<UserDataExport, GdprError> {
let record = self.data_registry
.get(user_id)
.ok_or(GdprError::UserNotFound)?;
let mut export = UserDataExport::new(user_id);
for location in &record.data_locations {
let data = self.retrieve_data(location).await?;
export.add_data(location.category.clone(), data);
}
Ok(export)
}
/// Right to Erasure (Article 17)
pub async fn delete_user_data(&self, user_id: &str, reason: DeletionReason) -> Result<(), GdprError> {
let record = self.data_registry
.remove(user_id)
.ok_or(GdprError::UserNotFound)?;
// Queue deletion across all storage locations
for location in record.1.data_locations {
self.deletion_queue.lock().await.push_back(DeletionRequest {
user_id: user_id.to_string(),
location,
reason: reason.clone(),
requested_at: chrono::Utc::now(),
});
}
// Process deletions
self.process_deletion_queue().await?;
// Audit log
self.log_deletion(user_id, reason).await?;
Ok(())
}
/// Right to Rectification (Article 16)
pub async fn update_user_data(&self, user_id: &str, updates: DataUpdates) -> Result<(), GdprError> {
// Implementation for data correction
todo!()
}
/// Right to Data Portability (Article 20)
pub async fn export_portable_format(&self, user_id: &str) -> Result<PortableData, GdprError> {
let export = self.export_user_data(user_id).await?;
// Convert to machine-readable format (JSON)
Ok(PortableData {
format: "application/json".to_string(),
data: serde_json::to_vec(&export)?,
})
}
}
3.3 Data Retention Policies
Automated Retention Management
pub struct RetentionPolicy {
default_retention: Duration,
category_policies: HashMap<DataCategory, Duration>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Hash, Eq, PartialEq)]
pub enum DataCategory {
ProcessedImages, // 0 seconds (immediate deletion)
ApiLogs, // 90 days
AuditLogs, // 7 years
UserProfiles, // Until account deletion
BillingRecords, // 7 years (legal requirement)
}
impl RetentionPolicy {
pub fn retention_period(&self, category: DataCategory) -> Duration {
self.category_policies
.get(&category)
.copied()
.unwrap_or(self.default_retention)
}
pub async fn enforce_retention(&self, storage: &dyn Storage) -> Result<(), RetentionError> {
for (category, period) in &self.category_policies {
let cutoff = chrono::Utc::now() - chrono::Duration::from_std(*period)?;
// Delete data older than retention period
storage.delete_older_than(category, cutoff).await?;
}
Ok(())
}
}
3.4 Audit Logging
Tamper-Proof Audit Trail
use sha2::{Sha256, Digest};
pub struct AuditLogger {
log_chain: Arc<Mutex<Vec<AuditEntry>>>,
storage: Arc<dyn AuditStorage>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize)]
pub struct AuditEntry {
timestamp: chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc>,
event_type: AuditEventType,
user_id: String,
ip_address: IpAddr,
user_agent: String,
action: String,
resource: String,
result: ActionResult,
previous_hash: String,
current_hash: String,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize)]
pub enum AuditEventType {
Authentication,
Authorization,
DataAccess,
DataModification,
DataDeletion,
ConfigChange,
SecurityEvent,
}
impl AuditLogger {
/// Log event with chain verification
pub async fn log(&self, event: AuditEvent) -> Result<(), AuditError> {
let mut chain = self.log_chain.lock().await;
let previous_hash = chain.last()
.map(|e| e.current_hash.clone())
.unwrap_or_else(|| "genesis".to_string());
let entry = AuditEntry {
timestamp: chrono::Utc::now(),
event_type: event.event_type,
user_id: event.user_id,
ip_address: event.ip_address,
user_agent: event.user_agent,
action: event.action,
resource: event.resource,
result: event.result,
previous_hash: previous_hash.clone(),
current_hash: String::new(), // Computed below
};
// Compute hash of current entry
let current_hash = self.compute_hash(&entry)?;
let mut entry = entry;
entry.current_hash = current_hash;
// Append to chain
chain.push(entry.clone());
// Persist to storage
self.storage.append(entry).await?;
Ok(())
}
fn compute_hash(&self, entry: &AuditEntry) -> Result<String, AuditError> {
let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
hasher.update(entry.timestamp.to_rfc3339().as_bytes());
hasher.update(entry.user_id.as_bytes());
hasher.update(entry.action.as_bytes());
hasher.update(entry.previous_hash.as_bytes());
Ok(format!("{:x}", hasher.finalize()))
}
/// Verify audit log integrity
pub async fn verify_integrity(&self) -> Result<bool, AuditError> {
let chain = self.log_chain.lock().await;
for i in 1..chain.len() {
if chain[i].previous_hash != chain[i-1].current_hash {
return Ok(false); // Chain broken
}
// Verify current hash
let computed = self.compute_hash(&chain[i])?;
if computed != chain[i].current_hash {
return Ok(false); // Hash mismatch
}
}
Ok(true)
}
}
4. Input Validation
4.1 Image Size Limits
pub struct ImageValidator {
max_file_size: usize,
max_dimensions: (u32, u32),
max_pixel_count: u64,
}
impl ImageValidator {
pub fn new() -> Self {
Self {
max_file_size: 10 * 1024 * 1024, // 10 MB
max_dimensions: (8192, 8192), // 8K resolution
max_pixel_count: 50_000_000, // 50 megapixels
}
}
pub fn validate_size(&self, data: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ValidationError> {
if data.len() > self.max_file_size {
return Err(ValidationError::FileTooLarge {
size: data.len(),
max_size: self.max_file_size,
});
}
Ok(())
}
pub fn validate_dimensions(&self, image: &DynamicImage) -> Result<(), ValidationError> {
let (width, height) = (image.width(), image.height());
if width > self.max_dimensions.0 || height > self.max_dimensions.1 {
return Err(ValidationError::DimensionsTooLarge {
dimensions: (width, height),
max_dimensions: self.max_dimensions,
});
}
let pixel_count = width as u64 * height as u64;
if pixel_count > self.max_pixel_count {
return Err(ValidationError::TooManyPixels {
count: pixel_count,
max_count: self.max_pixel_count,
});
}
Ok(())
}
}
4.2 File Type Validation
pub struct FileTypeValidator {
allowed_types: HashSet<ImageFormat>,
}
impl FileTypeValidator {
pub fn validate(&self, data: &[u8]) -> Result<ImageFormat, ValidationError> {
// Check magic bytes
let format = self.detect_format(data)?;
if !self.allowed_types.contains(&format) {
return Err(ValidationError::UnsupportedFormat {
detected: format,
allowed: self.allowed_types.clone(),
});
}
// Additional format-specific validation
match format {
ImageFormat::Png => self.validate_png(data)?,
ImageFormat::Jpeg => self.validate_jpeg(data)?,
ImageFormat::WebP => self.validate_webp(data)?,
_ => {}
}
Ok(format)
}
fn detect_format(&self, data: &[u8]) -> Result<ImageFormat, ValidationError> {
if data.len() < 12 {
return Err(ValidationError::FileTooSmall);
}
// Check magic bytes
match &data[0..4] {
[0x89, b'P', b'N', b'G'] => Ok(ImageFormat::Png),
[0xFF, 0xD8, 0xFF, _] => Ok(ImageFormat::Jpeg),
[b'R', b'I', b'F', b'F'] if &data[8..12] == b"WEBP" => Ok(ImageFormat::WebP),
_ => Err(ValidationError::UnknownFormat),
}
}
}
4.3 Malicious File Detection
pub struct MalwareScanner {
yara_rules: yara::Rules,
suspicious_patterns: Vec<Pattern>,
}
impl MalwareScanner {
pub async fn scan(&self, data: &[u8]) -> Result<ScanResult, ScanError> {
let mut threats = Vec::new();
// YARA scanning
let matches = self.yara_rules.scan_mem(data, 30)?;
for m in matches {
threats.push(Threat {
severity: Severity::High,
description: format!("YARA rule matched: {}", m.identifier),
});
}
// Check for polyglot files
if self.is_polyglot(data) {
threats.push(Threat {
severity: Severity::Medium,
description: "Polyglot file detected (valid as multiple formats)".to_string(),
});
}
// Check for embedded executables
if self.contains_executable(data) {
threats.push(Threat {
severity: Severity::Critical,
description: "Embedded executable code detected".to_string(),
});
}
// Check for steganography indicators
if self.has_steganography_markers(data) {
threats.push(Threat {
severity: Severity::Low,
description: "Possible steganographic content".to_string(),
});
}
Ok(ScanResult { threats })
}
fn is_polyglot(&self, data: &[u8]) -> bool {
// Check if file is valid as multiple formats
let mut valid_formats = 0;
if self.is_valid_png(data) { valid_formats += 1; }
if self.is_valid_jpeg(data) { valid_formats += 1; }
if self.is_valid_gif(data) { valid_formats += 1; }
valid_formats > 1
}
fn contains_executable(&self, data: &[u8]) -> bool {
// Check for PE header
if data.windows(2).any(|w| w == b"MZ") {
return true;
}
// Check for ELF header
if data.starts_with(b"\x7fELF") {
return true;
}
// Check for Mach-O header
if data.starts_with(&[0xFE, 0xED, 0xFA, 0xCE]) ||
data.starts_with(&[0xCE, 0xFA, 0xED, 0xFE]) {
return true;
}
false
}
}
4.4 Path Traversal Prevention
pub struct PathValidator {
allowed_base_dir: PathBuf,
}
impl PathValidator {
pub fn validate_path(&self, user_path: &Path) -> Result<PathBuf, ValidationError> {
// Canonicalize to resolve '..' and symlinks
let canonical = user_path.canonicalize()
.map_err(|_| ValidationError::InvalidPath)?;
// Ensure path is within allowed directory
if !canonical.starts_with(&self.allowed_base_dir) {
return Err(ValidationError::PathTraversal {
attempted: canonical,
allowed_base: self.allowed_base_dir.clone(),
});
}
// Check for suspicious components
for component in canonical.components() {
match component {
std::path::Component::ParentDir => {
return Err(ValidationError::SuspiciousPath("Contains '..'".to_string()));
}
std::path::Component::Normal(s) => {
if s.to_string_lossy().contains('\0') {
return Err(ValidationError::SuspiciousPath("Contains null byte".to_string()));
}
}
_ => {}
}
}
Ok(canonical)
}
}
5. Secure Processing
5.1 Sandboxed Inference
use nix::unistd::{fork, ForkResult};
use nix::sys::wait::waitpid;
pub struct SandboxedInference {
resource_limits: ResourceLimits,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct ResourceLimits {
max_memory: usize,
max_cpu_time: Duration,
max_file_descriptors: u64,
}
impl SandboxedInference {
pub async fn run_in_sandbox<F, T>(&self, f: F) -> Result<T, SandboxError>
where
F: FnOnce() -> T + Send,
T: Send,
{
match unsafe { fork() } {
Ok(ForkResult::Parent { child }) => {
// Parent process: wait for child with timeout
let timeout = self.resource_limits.max_cpu_time;
match tokio::time::timeout(timeout, async {
waitpid(child, None)
}).await {
Ok(Ok(status)) => {
if status.success() {
// Read result from shared memory or pipe
Ok(todo!()) // Retrieve result
} else {
Err(SandboxError::ProcessFailed)
}
}
Ok(Err(e)) => Err(SandboxError::WaitFailed(e)),
Err(_) => {
// Timeout: kill child
let _ = nix::sys::signal::kill(child, nix::sys::signal::SIGKILL);
Err(SandboxError::Timeout)
}
}
}
Ok(ForkResult::Child) => {
// Child process: set resource limits and execute
self.apply_resource_limits()?;
let result = f();
// Write result to shared memory or pipe
std::process::exit(0);
}
Err(e) => Err(SandboxError::ForkFailed(e)),
}
}
fn apply_resource_limits(&self) -> Result<(), SandboxError> {
use nix::sys::resource::{setrlimit, Resource};
// Memory limit
setrlimit(
Resource::RLIMIT_AS,
self.resource_limits.max_memory as u64,
self.resource_limits.max_memory as u64,
)?;
// CPU time limit
let cpu_secs = self.resource_limits.max_cpu_time.as_secs();
setrlimit(
Resource::RLIMIT_CPU,
cpu_secs,
cpu_secs,
)?;
// File descriptor limit
setrlimit(
Resource::RLIMIT_NOFILE,
self.resource_limits.max_file_descriptors,
self.resource_limits.max_file_descriptors,
)?;
Ok(())
}
}
5.2 Memory Isolation
pub struct IsolatedMemoryPool {
pool: Arc<Mutex<Vec<Vec<u8>>>>,
max_pool_size: usize,
}
impl IsolatedMemoryPool {
/// Allocate isolated memory region
pub fn allocate(&self, size: usize) -> Result<IsolatedBuffer, MemoryError> {
if size > self.max_pool_size {
return Err(MemoryError::AllocationTooLarge);
}
// Allocate page-aligned memory
let layout = std::alloc::Layout::from_size_align(size, 4096)
.map_err(|_| MemoryError::InvalidAlignment)?;
let ptr = unsafe { std::alloc::alloc_zeroed(layout) };
if ptr.is_null() {
return Err(MemoryError::AllocationFailed);
}
// Lock pages to prevent swapping (sensitive data)
#[cfg(unix)]
unsafe {
libc::mlock(ptr as *const libc::c_void, size);
}
Ok(IsolatedBuffer {
ptr,
size,
layout,
})
}
}
pub struct IsolatedBuffer {
ptr: *mut u8,
size: usize,
layout: std::alloc::Layout,
}
impl Drop for IsolatedBuffer {
fn drop(&mut self) {
unsafe {
// Zero memory before deallocation
std::ptr::write_bytes(self.ptr, 0, self.size);
// Unlock pages
#[cfg(unix)]
libc::munlock(self.ptr as *const libc::c_void, self.size);
// Deallocate
std::alloc::dealloc(self.ptr, self.layout);
}
}
}
unsafe impl Send for IsolatedBuffer {}
unsafe impl Sync for IsolatedBuffer {}
5.3 Resource Limits
pub struct ResourceGovernor {
cpu_limit: CpuLimit,
memory_limit: MemoryLimit,
time_limit: TimeLimit,
}
pub struct CpuLimit {
max_threads: usize,
max_cpu_percent: f32,
}
impl CpuLimit {
pub fn enforce(&self) -> Result<(), ResourceError> {
// Set CPU affinity
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
{
let max_cores = (num_cpus::get() as f32 * self.max_cpu_percent / 100.0).ceil() as usize;
let mut cpu_set = nix::sched::CpuSet::new();
for i in 0..max_cores {
cpu_set.set(i)?;
}
nix::sched::sched_setaffinity(nix::unistd::Pid::from_raw(0), &cpu_set)?;
}
Ok(())
}
}
pub struct MemoryLimit {
max_heap: usize,
max_stack: usize,
}
impl MemoryLimit {
pub fn enforce(&self) -> Result<(), ResourceError> {
use nix::sys::resource::{setrlimit, Resource};
// Heap limit
setrlimit(Resource::RLIMIT_DATA, self.max_heap as u64, self.max_heap as u64)?;
// Stack limit
setrlimit(Resource::RLIMIT_STACK, self.max_stack as u64, self.max_stack as u64)?;
Ok(())
}
}
pub struct TimeLimit {
max_duration: Duration,
}
impl TimeLimit {
pub async fn enforce<F, T>(&self, future: F) -> Result<T, ResourceError>
where
F: Future<Output = T>,
{
tokio::time::timeout(self.max_duration, future)
.await
.map_err(|_| ResourceError::TimeoutExceeded)
}
}
6. Transport Security
6.1 TLS 1.3 Enforcement
use rustls::{ServerConfig, ClientConfig};
use rustls::version::TLS13;
pub struct TlsConfigBuilder {
cert_resolver: Arc<dyn ResolvesServerCert>,
}
impl TlsConfigBuilder {
pub fn build_server_config(&self) -> Result<ServerConfig, TlsError> {
let mut config = ServerConfig::builder()
.with_safe_default_cipher_suites()
.with_safe_default_kx_groups()
.with_protocol_versions(&[&TLS13])? // TLS 1.3 only
.with_no_client_auth()
.with_cert_resolver(self.cert_resolver.clone());
// Disable session resumption (enforce fresh handshakes)
config.session_storage = Arc::new(rustls::server::NoServerSessionStorage {});
// Enable ALPN for HTTP/2
config.alpn_protocols = vec![b"h2".to_vec(), b"http/1.1".to_vec()];
Ok(config)
}
pub fn build_client_config(&self) -> Result<ClientConfig, TlsError> {
let mut config = ClientConfig::builder()
.with_safe_default_cipher_suites()
.with_safe_default_kx_groups()
.with_protocol_versions(&[&TLS13])? // TLS 1.3 only
.with_root_certificates(self.load_root_certs()?)
.with_no_client_auth();
// Enable certificate transparency verification
config.enable_sct = true;
Ok(config)
}
}
6.2 Certificate Management
use x509_parser::prelude::*;
pub struct CertificateManager {
cert_store: Arc<DashMap<String, Certificate>>,
renewal_threshold: Duration,
}
impl CertificateManager {
/// Check certificate expiry and auto-renew
pub async fn check_and_renew(&self, domain: &str) -> Result<(), CertError> {
let cert = self.cert_store.get(domain)
.ok_or(CertError::CertificateNotFound)?;
let expires_at = cert.validity_period.not_after;
let now = chrono::Utc::now();
let time_until_expiry = expires_at.signed_duration_since(now);
if time_until_expiry < self.renewal_threshold {
// Renew certificate via ACME
let new_cert = self.renew_via_acme(domain).await?;
self.cert_store.insert(domain.to_string(), new_cert);
}
Ok(())
}
async fn renew_via_acme(&self, domain: &str) -> Result<Certificate, CertError> {
// ACME protocol implementation
todo!()
}
/// Validate certificate chain
pub fn validate_chain(&self, cert_chain: &[Certificate]) -> Result<(), CertError> {
for i in 0..cert_chain.len() - 1 {
let cert = &cert_chain[i];
let issuer = &cert_chain[i + 1];
// Verify signature
if !self.verify_signature(cert, issuer)? {
return Err(CertError::InvalidSignature);
}
// Check validity period
if !cert.is_valid_at(chrono::Utc::now()) {
return Err(CertError::CertificateExpired);
}
// Check revocation status (OCSP)
if self.is_revoked(cert).await? {
return Err(CertError::CertificateRevoked);
}
}
Ok(())
}
}
6.3 CORS Policies
use axum::http::Method;
use tower_http::cors::{CorsLayer, AllowOrigin};
pub struct CorsConfigBuilder {
allowed_origins: Vec<String>,
}
impl CorsConfigBuilder {
pub fn build(&self) -> CorsLayer {
CorsLayer::new()
// Specific origins (no wildcard for credentials)
.allow_origin(AllowOrigin::list(
self.allowed_origins.iter()
.map(|o| o.parse().unwrap())
))
// Allowed methods
.allow_methods([Method::GET, Method::POST, Method::OPTIONS])
// Allowed headers
.allow_headers([
"Authorization",
"Content-Type",
"X-Request-ID",
])
// Expose headers
.expose_headers([
"X-RateLimit-Remaining",
"X-RateLimit-Reset",
])
// Max age for preflight cache (1 hour)
.max_age(Duration::from_secs(3600))
// Allow credentials
.allow_credentials(true)
}
}
7. Dependency Security
7.1 Cargo Audit Integration
# .github/workflows/security-audit.yml
name: Security Audit
on:
schedule:
- cron: '0 0 * * *' # Daily
pull_request:
push:
branches: [main]
jobs:
audit:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
- name: Install cargo-audit
run: cargo install cargo-audit
- name: Run audit
run: cargo audit --deny warnings
- name: Check for yanked crates
run: cargo audit --deny yanked
- name: Generate SBOM
run: cargo install cargo-sbom && cargo sbom > sbom.json
- name: Upload SBOM
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v3
with:
name: sbom
path: sbom.json
7.2 Supply Chain Security
// build.rs - Verify dependency integrity at build time
use std::process::Command;
fn main() {
// Verify cargo.lock exists and is committed
if !std::path::Path::new("Cargo.lock").exists() {
panic!("Cargo.lock must exist and be committed");
}
// Run cargo-deny checks
let output = Command::new("cargo")
.args(&["deny", "check"])
.output()
.expect("Failed to run cargo-deny");
if !output.status.success() {
panic!("cargo-deny checks failed");
}
// Verify no git dependencies (security risk)
let cargo_toml = std::fs::read_to_string("Cargo.toml")
.expect("Failed to read Cargo.toml");
if cargo_toml.contains("git =") {
panic!("Git dependencies are not allowed in production");
}
}
# deny.toml - cargo-deny configuration
[advisories]
vulnerability = "deny"
unmaintained = "warn"
yanked = "deny"
notice = "warn"
[licenses]
unlicensed = "deny"
allow = [
"MIT",
"Apache-2.0",
"BSD-3-Clause",
]
deny = [
"GPL-3.0",
"AGPL-3.0",
]
[bans]
multiple-versions = "warn"
wildcards = "deny"
[sources]
unknown-registry = "deny"
unknown-git = "deny"
allow-git = []
7.3 Minimal Dependencies
# Cargo.toml - Minimal dependency strategy
[dependencies]
# Use feature flags to minimize attack surface
tokio = { version = "1", default-features = false, features = ["rt", "net"] }
serde = { version = "1", default-features = false, features = ["derive"] }
# Prefer well-audited crates
rustls = "0.21" # Instead of openssl
ring = "0.17" # Cryptography
# Avoid unnecessary dependencies
# ❌ regex = "1" # Heavy dependency
# ✅ Use stdlib when possible
[dev-dependencies]
# Development dependencies don't affect production binary
criterion = "0.5"
8. Error Handling
8.1 Safe Error Messages
use thiserror::Error;
#[derive(Error, Debug)]
pub enum ApiError {
#[error("Authentication failed")]
AuthenticationFailed, // Don't leak why
#[error("Resource not found")]
NotFound, // Don't leak what
#[error("Invalid input")]
InvalidInput, // Don't leak specifics
#[error("Internal error occurred")]
InternalError, // Don't leak implementation details
#[error("Rate limit exceeded")]
RateLimitExceeded { retry_after: Duration }, // Safe to expose
}
impl ApiError {
/// Convert to user-facing error response
pub fn to_response(&self) -> ErrorResponse {
match self {
ApiError::AuthenticationFailed => ErrorResponse {
code: "AUTH_FAILED",
message: "Authentication failed".to_string(),
details: None, // No details
},
ApiError::InternalError => ErrorResponse {
code: "INTERNAL_ERROR",
message: "An internal error occurred".to_string(),
details: None, // Never expose internals
},
ApiError::RateLimitExceeded { retry_after } => ErrorResponse {
code: "RATE_LIMIT",
message: "Rate limit exceeded".to_string(),
details: Some(json!({
"retry_after_seconds": retry_after.as_secs()
})),
},
_ => ErrorResponse {
code: "ERROR",
message: "An error occurred".to_string(),
details: None,
}
}
}
/// Internal error with full details (for logging only)
pub fn internal_details(&self) -> String {
// Full details only in logs, never in responses
format!("{:?}", self)
}
}
8.2 Logging Without PII
use tracing::{info, warn, error};
pub struct SafeLogger;
impl SafeLogger {
/// Log request without PII
pub fn log_request(&self, request: &Request) {
info!(
request_id = %request.id,
method = %request.method,
path = %self.sanitize_path(&request.path),
ip = %self.anonymize_ip(&request.ip),
user_agent_hash = %self.hash_user_agent(&request.user_agent),
"Request received"
);
}
fn sanitize_path(&self, path: &str) -> String {
// Remove potential PII from path parameters
path.split('/')
.map(|segment| {
if self.looks_like_pii(segment) {
"[REDACTED]"
} else {
segment
}
})
.collect::<Vec<_>>()
.join("/")
}
fn anonymize_ip(&self, ip: &IpAddr) -> String {
match ip {
IpAddr::V4(ipv4) => {
let octets = ipv4.octets();
format!("{}.{}.0.0", octets[0], octets[1])
}
IpAddr::V6(ipv6) => {
let segments = ipv6.segments();
format!("{:x}:{:x}::", segments[0], segments[1])
}
}
}
fn hash_user_agent(&self, ua: &str) -> String {
use sha2::{Sha256, Digest};
let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
hasher.update(ua.as_bytes());
format!("{:x}", hasher.finalize())[..8].to_string()
}
fn looks_like_pii(&self, segment: &str) -> bool {
// Email pattern
if segment.contains('@') {
return true;
}
// UUID pattern
if uuid::Uuid::parse_str(segment).is_ok() {
return true;
}
// Long numeric strings (potential IDs)
if segment.len() > 10 && segment.chars().all(|c| c.is_numeric()) {
return true;
}
false
}
}
9. Open Source Considerations
9.1 License Compliance
# Cargo.toml
[package]
name = "ruvector-scipix"
license = "Apache-2.0"
license-file = "LICENSE"
[dependencies]
# All dependencies must have compatible licenses
# Verified via cargo-deny
// src/lib.rs
//! # License
//!
//! Copyright 2024 RuVector Contributors
//!
//! Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
//! you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
//! You may obtain a copy of the License at
//!
//! http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//!
//! Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
//! distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
//! WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
//! See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
//! limitations under the License.
9.2 Security Disclosure Process
# SECURITY.md
## Reporting Security Vulnerabilities
**Please do not report security vulnerabilities through public GitHub issues.**
Instead, please report them via email to security@ruvector.io
Include:
- Description of the vulnerability
- Steps to reproduce
- Potential impact
- Suggested fix (if any)
## Response Timeline
- **24 hours**: Initial response acknowledging receipt
- **7 days**: Assessment and severity classification
- **30 days**: Fix development and testing
- **90 days**: Public disclosure (coordinated)
## Security Updates
Security updates are released as patch versions and announced via:
- GitHub Security Advisories
- Release notes
- Security mailing list
## Supported Versions
| Version | Supported |
| ------- | ------------------ |
| 0.x.x | :white_check_mark: |
## Security Best Practices
### For Users
- Always use the latest version
- Enable automatic updates
- Use API keys, not hardcoded credentials
- Rotate keys regularly
- Monitor audit logs
### For Contributors
- Run `cargo audit` before submitting PRs
- Never commit secrets or credentials
- Follow secure coding guidelines
- Add security tests for new features
9.3 Responsible Defaults
pub struct SecurityDefaults;
impl SecurityDefaults {
/// Secure-by-default configuration
pub fn production_config() -> Config {
Config {
// TLS required
tls_enabled: true,
tls_min_version: TlsVersion::Tls13,
// Strong authentication
require_api_key: true,
allow_anonymous: false,
// Data protection
auto_delete_temp_files: true,
max_file_retention: Duration::from_secs(0), // Immediate deletion
encrypt_at_rest: true,
// Rate limiting
rate_limit_enabled: true,
default_rate_limit: RateLimitTier::Free,
// Audit logging
audit_enabled: true,
log_level: LogLevel::Info,
// Resource limits
max_request_size: 10 * 1024 * 1024, // 10MB
max_processing_time: Duration::from_secs(30),
// Security headers
cors_enabled: true,
cors_allow_credentials: false, // Safer default
hsts_enabled: true,
csp_enabled: true,
}
}
/// Development configuration (less restrictive)
pub fn development_config() -> Config {
let mut config = Self::production_config();
// Relax some constraints for development
config.tls_enabled = false; // Allow HTTP for localhost
config.rate_limit_enabled = false; // Easier testing
config
}
}
Security Testing
Automated Security Tests
#[cfg(test)]
mod security_tests {
use super::*;
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_sql_injection_prevention() {
let malicious_input = "'; DROP TABLE users; --";
let result = process_user_input(malicious_input).await;
assert!(result.is_err());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_path_traversal_prevention() {
let malicious_path = "../../etc/passwd";
let result = validate_file_path(malicious_path);
assert!(matches!(result, Err(ValidationError::PathTraversal { .. })));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_rate_limiting() {
let limiter = RateLimiter::new();
// Exhaust rate limit
for _ in 0..100 {
let _ = limiter.check_limit("user123", "free", 1).await;
}
// Next request should be blocked
let result = limiter.check_limit("user123", "free", 1).await;
assert!(matches!(result, Err(RateLimitError::RateLimitExceeded { .. })));
}
#[test]
fn test_constant_time_comparison() {
use subtle::ConstantTimeEq;
let secret1 = b"correct_password";
let secret2 = b"correct_password";
let wrong = b"wrong_password!!";
// Correct comparison
assert_eq!(secret1.ct_eq(secret2).unwrap_u8(), 1);
// Wrong comparison
assert_eq!(secret1.ct_eq(wrong).unwrap_u8(), 0);
}
}
Security Checklist
Pre-Release Security Audit
- All dependencies audited (
cargo audit) - No hardcoded secrets or credentials
- TLS 1.3 enforced
- Rate limiting tested
- Input validation comprehensive
- Error messages don't leak information
- Audit logging enabled
- GDPR compliance verified
- Security tests passing
- Penetration testing completed
- Security documentation updated
- Incident response plan in place
Deployment Security
- Secrets managed via environment variables or vault
- Firewall rules configured
- Monitoring and alerting enabled
- Backup and recovery tested
- Access controls reviewed
- Security headers configured
- HTTPS enforced
- Regular security updates scheduled
Conclusion
This security architecture provides defense-in-depth protection for the ruvector-scipix OCR system through:
- Strong Authentication: API keys with Argon2 hashing and JWT tokens
- Granular Authorization: RBAC with feature gating and rate limiting
- Privacy by Design: GDPR compliance and minimal data retention
- Secure Processing: Sandboxing, resource limits, and memory isolation
- Transport Security: TLS 1.3 with certificate management
- Supply Chain Security: Dependency auditing and minimal dependencies
- Responsible Defaults: Secure-by-default configuration
Security is not a feature—it's a foundational requirement. This architecture must be maintained and updated as new threats emerge and best practices evolve.