wifi-densepose/examples/edge-net/docs/SECURITY_QUICK_REFERENCE.md

Edge-Net Relay Security Quick Reference

Last Updated: 2026-01-03 Component: WebSocket Relay Server (/relay/index.js) Security Status: ✅ SECURE (development) | ⚠️ NEEDS SIGNATURES (production)

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🔒 Security Features Summary

Feature	Status	Implementation
Task Assignment Verification	✅ SECURE	Tracked in assignedTasks Map
Replay Attack Prevention	✅ SECURE	completedTasks Set with pre-credit marking
Credit Self-Reporting Block	✅ SECURE	ledger_update rejected, relay-only crediting
QDAG Ledger (Firestore)	✅ SECURE	Server-side source of truth
Rate Limiting	✅ IMPLEMENTED	100 msg/min per node
Message Size Limits	✅ IMPLEMENTED	64KB max payload
Connection Limits	✅ IMPLEMENTED	5 per IP
Origin Validation	✅ IMPLEMENTED	CORS whitelist
Signature Verification	❌ NOT IMPLEMENTED	Placeholder only

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🎯 Attack Vector Status

✅ PROTECTED

1. Task Completion Spoofing

   • Nodes cannot complete tasks not assigned to them
   • Verified via assignment.assignedTo === nodeId

2. Replay Attacks

   • Tasks cannot be completed twice
   • completedTasks Set prevents duplicates

3. Credit Self-Reporting

   • Clients cannot claim their own credits
   • ledger_update messages rejected

⚠️ PARTIALLY PROTECTED

4. Public Key Spoofing
   • ✅ Cannot steal credits (assigned at task time)
   • ⚠️ Can check another user's balance (read-only spoofing)
   • ❌ No cryptographic proof of key ownership

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🚨 Critical Issues for Production

1. Missing Signature Verification (CRITICAL)

Current Code (Lines 281-286):

function validateSignature(nodeId, message, signature, publicKey) {
  // TODO: In production, verify Ed25519 signature from PiKey
  return nodes.has(nodeId); // Placeholder
}

Required Fix:

import { verify } from '@noble/ed25519';

async function validateSignature(message, signature, publicKey) {
  try {
    const msgHash = createHash('sha256').update(JSON.stringify(message)).digest();
    return await verify(signature, msgHash, publicKey);
  } catch {
    return false;
  }
}

// Require on sensitive operations
case 'task_complete':
  if (!message.signature || !await validateSignature(message, message.signature, ws.publicKey)) {
    ws.send(JSON.stringify({ type: 'error', message: 'Invalid signature' }));
    break;
  }

Priority: 🔴 CRITICAL - Must implement before production

2. Unbounded Memory Growth (MEDIUM)

Issue: completedTasks Set grows forever

Fix:

// Add timestamp tracking
const completedTasks = new Map(); // taskId -> timestamp

// Cleanup old completed tasks
setInterval(() => {
  const CLEANUP_AGE = 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000; // 24 hours
  const cutoff = Date.now() - CLEANUP_AGE;
  for (const [taskId, timestamp] of completedTasks) {
    if (timestamp < cutoff) {
      completedTasks.delete(taskId);
    }
  }
}, 60 * 60 * 1000); // Every hour

Priority: 🟡 MEDIUM - Implement before long-running deployment

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🧪 Security Test Suite

Running Tests

cd /workspaces/ruvector/examples/edge-net/tests
npm install
npm test

Test Coverage

• ✅ Task completion spoofing (2 tests)
• ✅ Replay attacks (1 test)
• ✅ Credit self-reporting (2 tests)
• ✅ Public key spoofing (2 tests)
• ✅ Rate limiting (1 test)
• ✅ Message size limits (1 test)
• ✅ Connection limits (1 test)
• ✅ Combined attack scenario (1 test)

Total: 12 security tests in relay-security.test.ts

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📋 Security Checklist

Before Development Deployment

• Task assignment tracking
• Replay attack prevention
• Credit self-reporting blocked
• QDAG Firestore ledger
• Rate limiting
• Message size limits
• Connection limits
• Origin validation
• Security test suite

Before Production Deployment

• Ed25519 signature verification (CRITICAL)
• Challenge-response on registration (CRITICAL)
• Completed tasks cleanup (MEDIUM)
• Global connection limit (MEDIUM)
• API key for non-browser clients (MEDIUM)
• Rate-limit balance queries (LOW)
• Generic error messages (LOW)
• Firestore security rules validation (LOW)

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🔍 Code Review Findings

Security Strengths

1. QDAG Architecture - Excellent design

   • Firestore as single source of truth
   • Credits keyed by public key (identity-based)
   • Server-side only credit increases
   • Persistent across sessions

2. Task Assignment Security - Well implemented

   • Assignment tracked with metadata
   • Node ID verification on completion
   • Public key stored at assignment time
   • Task expiration (5 minutes)

3. Defense in Depth - Multiple layers

   • Origin validation (CORS)
   • Connection limits (per IP)
   • Rate limiting (per node)
   • Message size limits
   • Heartbeat timeout

Security Weaknesses

1. No Cryptographic Verification - Major gap

   • Public key ownership not proven
   • Allows read-only spoofing
   • Required for production

2. Memory Leaks - Minor issues

   • completedTasks grows unbounded
   • Easy to fix with periodic cleanup

3. Distributed Attacks - Missing protections

   • No global connection limit
   • Vulnerable to distributed DoS
   • Can be mitigated with cloud-level protections

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🛡️ Security Best Practices

For Developers

1. Never trust client input

   • All credits server-generated
   • Task assignments server-controlled
   • Ledger state from Firestore only

2. Validate everything

   • Check task assignment before crediting
   • Verify node registration before operations
   • Rate-limit all message types

3. Defense in depth

   • Multiple security layers
   • Fail securely (default deny)
   • Log security events

For Operations

1. Monitor security metrics

   • Failed authentication attempts
   • Rate limit violations
   • Connection flooding
   • Unusual credit patterns

2. Configure Firestore security

   • Validate security rules
   • Restrict ledger write access
   • Enable audit logging

3. Network security

   • Use TLS/WSS in production
   • Configure firewall rules
   • Enable DDoS protection

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📊 Security Metrics

Current Implementation

Metric	Value	Status
Authentication	Public key (unverified)	⚠️ Development only
Authorization	Task assignment tracking	✅ Secure
Credit System	Firestore QDAG	✅ Secure
Rate Limiting	100 msg/min	✅ Good
Max Message Size	64KB	✅ Good
Connections per IP	5	✅ Good
Connection Timeout	30s	✅ Good
Task Expiration	5 min	✅ Good

Recommended Production Values

Metric	Development	Production
Authentication	Public key	Ed25519 signature
Rate Limit	100 msg/min	50 msg/min + adaptive
Max Connections	5 per IP	3 per IP + global limit
Task Timeout	5 min	2 min
Completed Tasks TTL	None	24 hours

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📚 Related Documentation

• Full Audit Report: /docs/SECURITY_AUDIT_REPORT.md
• Test Suite: /tests/relay-security.test.ts
• Test README: /tests/README.md
• Relay Source: /relay/index.js

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🆘 Security Incident Response

If you suspect an attack:

1. Check relay logs for suspicious patterns
2. Query Firestore for unexpected credit increases
3. Review rate limit logs for flooding attempts
4. Audit task completions for spoofing attempts
5. Contact security team if confirmed breach

Emergency shutdown:

# Stop relay server
pkill -f "node.*relay/index.js"

# Or send SIGTERM for graceful shutdown
kill -TERM $(pgrep -f "node.*relay/index.js")

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Security Contact: [Your security team contact] Last Security Audit: 2026-01-03 Next Scheduled Audit: After signature verification implementation