476 Commits
v1.6 ... v3.4

Author SHA1 Message Date
Pol Henarejos
ccfe7ca8a8 Upgrade to version 3.4
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-04 14:38:28 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
d2d038f14d Upgrade to version 3.4
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-04 14:35:33 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
1a05d7b51f Fix conditional interface compilation.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-04 14:16:59 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
fa60ed5049 Update code style.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-04 14:05:51 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
35aec06391 Adding support for CCID GET, SET and RESET PARAMS.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-20 13:17:32 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
61359c7ebd Add key derivation tests (HKDF, PBKDF2 and X963).
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-17 23:54:40 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
20c01eb08d Fix name of x963 function.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-17 23:54:06 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
0b71bf693d Added CMAC tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-17 22:46:16 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
a1f478239d Added HMAC tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-17 22:43:28 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
420e55901c Fix HMAC computation.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-17 22:43:09 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
414cab78e3 Enabling entropy and ctr_drbg for emulation mode.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-16 23:43:11 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
36e5282d19 Update codeql.yml
Enable CodeQL to development branch.
2023-02-16 23:36:08 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
367651fe75 Upgrade to mbedtls v3.3.0
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-16 23:34:13 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
7b62ca5327 Upgrade to mbedtls v3.3.0 2023-02-16 23:33:13 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
9be176e523 Fixes for Pico SDK 1.5
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-16 22:55:36 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
b24e109a3c Fix error message when no card is detected.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-16 22:50:53 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
f61d0dd677 Update codeql.yml
Added development branch to CodeQL workflow.
2023-02-15 19:55:13 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
215fdca9f8 Added AES cipher tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-15 19:47:16 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
9279773073 Removed printf
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-15 19:46:42 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
d5b718ca58 Move pointer again...
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-15 00:14:37 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
cd6e280f4f Switching to new style.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-15 00:10:35 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
e7495d11f2 Moving pointer.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-14 23:25:13 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
daaa5bf402 Harmonize coding style.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-14 23:13:46 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
cab72f200a Moving pointer
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-14 23:12:48 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
380d47faa1 Renaming for avoiding confusions
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-14 23:05:37 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
962d1c6916 When runing a test, load a initial flash image that contains KEYDEV.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-14 22:53:30 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
d81d51d6fc Fix get public key.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-14 21:51:46 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
319000df1a Add challenge tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-14 21:38:06 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
5508e531a0 Added key domain tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-14 18:52:12 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
1e846600dd Add test info
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-14 18:51:50 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
43a49d2a14 Return reference not found when deleting a key domain.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-14 18:51:30 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
3b9c2d159b Fix returning existing key domain.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-14 18:47:43 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
14c7852143 Fix returning shared secret.
I do not know why a 0x04 was prepended.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-14 11:28:27 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
407110def4 Added ECDH tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-14 11:25:02 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
79d86a335c Adding more tests and renaming old ones.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-13 23:54:41 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
0685be5f1e EE_CERTIFICATE is added when importing key.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-13 23:53:41 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
8f6ae52c70 Added routines for import key.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-13 23:52:58 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
af16be64a2 Adding checks on ec import.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-13 23:30:27 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
68071825c2 Fix EC public key computation when importing.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-13 23:24:04 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
fbabb81acd Fix asymmetric decrypt for OAEP. It only supports SHA256.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-12 21:53:47 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
8bc4b133ca Adding routine for asymmetric decryption.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-12 21:53:19 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
2ce458dad5 Adding BP curves and RSA 4k to signature test.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-12 21:53:01 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
478b186094 Finally it seems to work.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 16:09:57 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
ab71b3163b Adding sleep just in case.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 16:07:41 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
c4de88e6c6 Moving pointer
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 15:39:31 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
3b0e34f465 More tries...
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 13:23:39 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
9077e78315 More flags to debug
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 13:15:04 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
2f5fcd1f14 Start pcscd with debug flag to get more debug info.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 13:09:17 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
24d430a3ac Updating pointer to include aesni
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 13:04:34 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
307eb63ee5 Init submodules in actions.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 12:59:03 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
07f85dc4b8 Add warning removal
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 12:18:18 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
a4026e0ca0 Submodules must be pulled.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 12:09:46 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
ebd8dc7bb8 Add apt-utils package.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 12:08:16 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
bac15d5472 Removing TTY from docker.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 12:05:03 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
8540fdcf19 Updating pointer.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 12:01:20 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
fc8d39882f Add missing build file.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 12:00:57 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
ca093eb81e Add emulation and test workflow.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 11:59:26 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
35c42bccb4 List PRKD if exist.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 01:25:25 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
52114b2d85 Added initialization on each keypairgen.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 01:25:05 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
8f593f6357 Added support for build emulation in Apple and Linux.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 01:24:35 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
6f8769ee8d Added scripts for testing in a docker container.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 01:24:10 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
1af461c206 Add first battery of tests.
It contains keypair generation for ECC and RSA, PIN blocking and signature generation and verification.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-17 13:41:10 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
8976dc1f79 Added support for RSA-PKCSv15-SHA224, SHA384 and SHA512. Also added support for RSA-PSS-SHA224, SHA384 and SHA512.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-17 00:41:46 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
9d47e62041 Fix signature for secp521r1.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-17 00:05:46 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
0daddfd477 Fix ECDSA-SHA384 and ECDSA-SHA512.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-17 00:05:31 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
89d617110f Add asn1_build_prkd_rsa()
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-16 18:54:28 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
17941397e9 Fix exporting large ECC key.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-16 18:54:20 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
f2aa4aae79 Moving pointer to latest bug fixes.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-14 00:41:23 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
e29b3143ed Moving pointer
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-13 18:49:08 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
5419ff74ee Using file_has_data() to check contents.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-13 18:07:50 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
723011078c Using file_has_data() instead of data directly.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-12 20:06:31 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
fe7c0333ab Some emulation fixes.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-12 20:06:11 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
c01940b62b Fix accessing way to data.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-12 20:05:59 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
7195a8f3ec Fix headers in emulation mode.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-12 20:05:46 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
7764de4e10 Unused headers.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-12 20:05:16 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
e05c526b4d Fix printf format.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-12 20:04:55 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
bc20f98b44 In emulation, return always 1mb of memory.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-12 20:04:44 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
742c3f3e3c RTC command is not available in emulation.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-12 20:04:23 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
9793977ffc Fixed double counter increment.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-12 20:04:05 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
6c85772fff Added emulated build capability.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-12 20:03:42 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
9ff3254a4c Update to latest HSM SDK.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-12-22 22:50:54 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
7d906851dd Updating to newer version of Pico HSM SDK.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-12-20 23:51:49 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
691aa3308c Fix when importing a dkek and it fails.
Now the dkek state is returned to the previous one.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-12-06 20:11:26 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
6a57e67629 Fix importing dkek twice.
It is not allowed anymore.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-12-06 20:04:18 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
202c8a4b22 Credentials are not necessary when importing DKEK.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-12-06 20:00:32 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
f2874ae3ef Fix when ping is provided during the initialization.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-12-06 20:00:19 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
9e9cf9b768 Upgrading version to v3.2.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-12-06 19:00:44 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
c95dee84f2 Changing backend service url.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-12-06 19:00:35 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
65cde9960f Upgrading version to v3.2.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-12-04 17:42:03 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
7ca96178fb Moving HSM SDK pointer to latest release.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-28 18:54:22 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
020feaf325 Update README.md
Fix header
2022-11-15 22:42:43 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
e70461e551 Merge branch 'master' into development 2022-11-15 17:40:29 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
0e918434a2 Update README.md 2022-11-15 17:38:33 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
63c85000d0 Added support for kdf.
It supports HKDF, PBKDF2 and X963, with multiple MD (SHA family), salt/nonces and configurable output size.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-15 00:15:59 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
4113f6a65d Fix parsing PBKDF2 params.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-15 00:14:39 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
f98d744076 Add apdu.ne check for large buffers.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-14 18:04:44 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
bb4c293736 Adding subparsers for subcommands.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-14 16:27:51 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
aa8b1e6efe Added support for X963 KDF.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-14 15:38:16 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
0cb2e8ec2e Added PBES2 key derivation with encryption and decryption support.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-14 13:07:49 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
0e96753ccb Added support for PBKDF2.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-14 12:01:27 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
2b2df22d75 Added support for configurable HKDF.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-14 10:14:54 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
f65167e3c7 Adding support for keypair generation for Curve25519 and Curve448.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-11 17:10:34 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
8fe2677a56 Fix cofactor return with cvc.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-11 17:08:36 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
d09a7cf9c8 If self-signature fails, puts all-0.
When generating a keypair and returns a self-signed CVREQ, the signature might fail for Curve25519 and Curve448. Instead of returning null, it puts zeros in order to return what is expected to return.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-11 17:04:17 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
6bf72e5a59 Added support for HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA224, HMAC-SHA256, HMAC-SHA384 and HMAC-SHA512.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-08 17:26:32 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
7c877ebea2 Using file_out parameter.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-07 22:31:19 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
e1983f7bcc Now is possible pipe encrypt & decrypt commands.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-07 22:16:10 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
a5e025a4e5 If no applet is selected, then select it.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-07 21:37:42 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
a7682d2639 Adding Extended Cipher feature.
With this new subcommand, Pico HSM will support newer cipher algorithms.
ChaCha20-Poly1305 is the first. It will be based on a custom P2 subcommand to support an arbitrary structure with multiple parameters (AAD, IV, etc.)

pico-hsm-tool.py shall be used.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-07 21:37:11 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
30301c68f1 Linux uses the generic interface. Needs deep testing.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-07 13:14:37 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
abf980d84e Fixes in windows backend.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-03 18:41:02 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
8718f55df2 Adding secure_key for windows.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-03 18:26:35 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
d1a3a24527 Import secure_key only when needed.
Now, it does not block anymore the entire execution of pico tool.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-03 16:09:42 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
f363b77a07 Adding secure_key for macOS.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-03 16:06:06 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
d5899a90c1 Merge pull request #10 from rrottmann/small-fixes
Small fixes
2022-11-03 16:05:56 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
f1058ea611 Merge branch 'master' into small-fixes 2022-11-03 15:48:33 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
00279da8d5 Adding Secure Lock to lock the device with a random 256 bit key.
This is an extra layer of security to avoid brute force attacks if PIN is too weak.
At every hard reset (on device plug), the device must be unlocked prior any other command. Once unlocked, the device can be used as usual.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-31 15:09:54 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
eda8b53949 Memory cleanup on ECDH.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-31 12:54:44 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
cfc0cc8f6e Some optimizations.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-31 00:38:30 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
ab61b2a2d5 Fix returning public key of koblitz curve secp_k1.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-31 00:38:21 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
f79a6ed30a Do not override Ne.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-30 23:42:12 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
4313722b06 Fix memory free on keygen ecc.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-30 23:15:22 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
eec4612a6f Fix when secure message cannot be correctly processed.
It is discarded.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-30 21:11:06 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
b2ac893efc Fix general authentication with AES.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-30 21:09:41 +01:00
Reiner Rottmann
14e8d9cd04 Fixing typo in command. 2022-10-30 08:52:28 +01:00
Reiner Rottmann
1a6cfd17cb Small fix in ModuleNotFoundError handling. 2022-10-30 08:51:57 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
3835507e00 Fix displaying error message if pycvc is missing.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-29 11:35:54 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
4536589e2c Added error message if package is missing.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-10 11:02:07 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
1e39558fbc Typo
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-10 00:39:32 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
a089cc279b Adding support for changing SO-PIN.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-10 00:37:56 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
84f646dbad Fix storing SO-PIN session when checking PIN with SO-PIN.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-10 00:37:33 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b9ec473aaa Fix critical bug saving SO-PIN securely.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-10 00:27:46 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b7eb0dff02 Upgrade to Version 3.0.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-09 22:27:11 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
06f550cc04 Update usage.md 2022-10-09 22:26:45 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
1752b1aec7 Update usage.md 2022-10-09 22:25:35 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
67ea640a14 Fix endianness of patcher (again)
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-09 22:20:41 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
f593060007 Moving delete_file() outside.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-09 22:07:21 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
8504eed35c Adding fixes and moving to Mbedtls 3.2.1
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-09 22:07:10 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
8b29b137a8 Small fixes.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-09 22:04:30 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
08d3ca6d27 Update README.md 2022-10-09 19:57:52 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
e6767f4c0a Moving pointer.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-09-25 23:25:16 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
9e5d65706e Merge pull request #2 from rrottmann/master
Building pico-hsm using Linux containers
2022-09-25 18:42:37 +02:00
Reiner Rottmann
61d7b6da38 Added Dockerfile for building pico-hsm and updated README.md with instructions. 2022-09-23 20:36:05 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
6affe64ec5 Adding missing file to pico-hsm-sdk. 2022-08-31 14:19:32 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
ab75718927 Using pico_hsm_sdk library instead. 2022-08-31 14:10:04 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
9e1747e539 Upgrading pico-hsm-sdk version to v3.0 2022-08-31 14:09:02 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
a7396dc698 Fix the endianness of vid/pid patcher. 2022-08-31 14:08:29 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
67699bd24c Before initializing, we select the applet. 2022-08-30 17:55:56 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
62c72c48a5 Moving to new pico-hsm-sdk. 2022-08-30 17:55:42 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
3944c8437a Moving to pico-hsm-sdk 2022-08-30 17:54:38 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b7d603342e Upgrading pico-ccid 2022-08-29 11:32:39 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
6e5db3c292 Upgrading pico-ccid to version 2.2 2022-08-29 11:31:47 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
4fb26559f4 Adding --so-pin flag for initialize command.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-25 13:47:42 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c366c1d1a3 Added datetime and options menu to manipulate the RTC and options (press-to-confirm button and optional counter for each key).
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-25 13:38:09 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
e8cc6a169e Try to recover MKEK twice: with previous PIN/SO-PIN or after setting the new PIN/SO-PIN just in case some is the same as previous.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-25 01:51:16 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
7d7b6b88ba Trying to recover MKEK to preserver device private key. If not, all are generated again.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-25 01:51:16 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
138af5c113 Adding --pin parameter for initialization.
If provided, it unlocks MKEK before initialization.
If not, it will generate a new MKEK and device certificate.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-25 01:51:16 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b3bcad9ce6 Making MKEK persistent.
It must be persistent as it encrypts device private key and therefore it must survive across reinitializations.
However, if no PIN is provided to unlock it, it will be lost, as with device private key.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-25 01:51:16 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
cd6f898f8e Fix storing certs in DER format.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-25 01:51:16 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
9ef088971b Integrate all commands to a single script
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-25 01:51:16 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
e399b1c0b1 Renaming the tools and moving to tools/ folder.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-25 01:51:16 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
59bacaf5b4 Update scs3.md
Updated patch.
2022-08-24 14:11:14 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d872a156c1 Update scs3.md
Updated CA certs.
2022-08-24 14:04:14 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c5e4583762 Add a tool for attestation of a private key.
It looks for a particular private key and generates a report with some useful information and validates the source of the private key, whether it is generated in this device or outside.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-23 14:54:38 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
38b9c06138 Reformat oids.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-23 14:52:44 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
df18a1e917 Added header.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-23 00:50:07 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
2bc40771ca Fix generating CVC REQ.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-23 00:50:06 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
5696c7a5da Update public_key_authentication.md 2022-08-22 14:24:53 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c5f980fc98 Fix curve for ECDH key.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-22 01:13:08 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
aebb68724a Removing trailing spaces.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-19 01:44:27 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
1f2ccd8c1c Not used.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-19 01:40:13 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
874058d86a Pull last changes in pico-ccid.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-19 00:03:09 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
8fccb80295 New burn-certs is called after compilation, not before. Not needed anymore.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 23:58:38 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c9c60575c7 Removed 3DES as it is unsecure.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 23:55:21 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
7e6ed20b26 Not downloading nested submodules for tinyusb
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 23:53:49 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
52c7be4e16 Also clone nested submodules
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 23:38:50 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
36d250fc2b Github does not clone submodules. So, let's do it
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 23:33:52 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
84ba0e03de Fix missing TinyUSB submodule
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 23:31:17 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
7d27c4b546 Fix autobuild
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 23:28:29 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
80b2bab0f8 Granting root to apt
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 23:23:58 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
79372ced2f Just install the SDK in the workflow
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 23:21:42 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
6fc91962bd Update codeql.yml 2022-08-18 23:13:02 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
fb76c23694 Let's try our autobuild
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 23:00:09 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
fc6c852e09 When used this tool, the device is always reset to default state.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 20:09:23 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
82f61ff1d4 When initialized, the device key (EF_KEY_DEV) is only generated if not found.
To generate a new device key, it must be wiped.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 20:08:54 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
64052f4f70 Marked EF_DEV files as persistent to remain permanent.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 20:08:11 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
36c8150f25 Enhanced the procedure for burning the device certificate.
When initialized, the device generates a private key in place and stores it encrypted. The publick key is recovered and sent to our PKI, which generates a CV certificate. This CV certificate is stored inside the device, jointly with the DV CVC.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 18:17:48 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
cb492728ec Device key now uses SECP256R1 curve.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 18:17:48 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
fec02ca733 Removing cvcerts.h dependency.
A python script gets the public key of the device (EF_EE_DEV) and requests to our PKI for a CVC. Once got, it is updated to EF_TERMCA (0x2f02).
termca_pk is now on EF_KEY_DEV and termca is on EF_TERMCA (concat with DICA).

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 18:17:48 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
4e01a78286 Fix OID names.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 18:17:48 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
538b39386b List keys returns the DEV key if exists.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 18:17:48 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
977aced343 Fix OID names.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 18:17:48 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
83b5753bb5 Fix saving DEV key.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 18:17:48 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
a57c3b691f Fix passing DEBUG_APDU flag.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 18:17:48 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
648a374ebb Create codeql.yml 2022-08-17 18:27:55 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c3568e1211 Create the terminal private key with id = 0.
This is the terminal private key, which will be signed by our PKI.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-14 01:20:54 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
6a16d4d55c Fix returning store_keys();
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-14 01:17:06 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
ab2e71cc40 By default, all CVC are self-generated (chr=car).
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-14 01:16:53 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
f79fe9f7d0 Fix when no DKEK is present.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-14 01:16:33 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
6956587106 Add newline at the end of file.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-13 23:31:09 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
349df56b09 Missing header.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-13 15:00:05 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
e6f082d512 Splitting cmd_xxx() functions in separate files.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-13 14:59:27 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
87feed1222 Renaming KEK files.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-13 13:47:43 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
55c8a66613 Fix wrap/unwrap keys with specific allowed algorithms.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-13 02:58:36 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
2e88422c86 Fix deleting KEK when a key is present in the key domain.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-13 00:50:22 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
da841b82d4 Fix deleting KEK.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-13 00:48:05 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
9256a72c3e Added XKEK derivation to save the KEK from XKEK key domain.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-13 00:43:55 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
69120cc961 Added cvc_get_ext() to find CVC extensions.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-13 00:43:35 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
06aaf58f0b Added extension optional parameter to be included in the CVC body.
This field should be a concatenation of tag 73, which should include an OID and a context.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-13 00:07:24 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
12e5a586d2 Adding support for XKEK CVC extension.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-12 22:18:21 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
0e76ed7077 Adding OID for CVC extensions.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-12 21:12:56 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
be911a7aa7 Clearing hash, just in case.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-12 19:55:07 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
0556a528f3 Fix DKEK key domain creation.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-12 19:51:59 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
de789cef66 Fix Key Domain deletion.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-12 19:46:08 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
7208d01547 Adding XKEK Key Domain creation.
It validates the membership and creates a XKEK Key Domain. XKEK Key Domains can only be created based on memberships for THAT device. A device can only create XKEK Key Domains with memberships issued for itself.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-12 19:36:10 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
46cb0a455d Fix DKEK are only created when requested and not by default.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-12 14:01:19 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
300e19b612 Moving to mbedtls_platform_zeroize() for better zeroization.
Also added more zeroization when a private/secret key is loaded in memory.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-12 01:52:37 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
2666573050 Fix dkek status report when device is initialized without dkek.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-12 01:00:27 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
5506b46c9d Fix finding MKEK file.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-12 00:57:08 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
7b27cb7a1c MKEK is also stored with SO encryption.
A copy of MKEK is also stored but encrypted with SO-PIN. Thus, we always ensure that we have an operative copy of MKEK, either with PIN and/or SO-PIN. If user resets PIN, the MKEK is loaded with SO-PIN and stored with the derived key from new PIN.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-12 00:41:04 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
84a70a1de0 Adding MKEK_SO file descriptor.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-12 00:39:25 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
1756ec49ad When user resets retry counter and sends the SO-PIN (P1=0x0) it becomes authenticated in this session.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-12 00:29:34 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
7b286b04b1 Introducing MKEK (Master Key Encryption Key).
MKEK is used to encrypt all keys in the device, regardless of Key Domains or DKEK. From now on, all keys are encrypted using an AES 256-bit secret key. MKEK is also encrypted and stored based on a derived key from PIN. When user introduces the PIN, the MKEK can be unlocked to load the stored private/secret keys.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-12 00:20:02 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
a731e88c78 Adding MKEK ef id.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-11 22:59:54 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
ffd31f2ea7 Memset kcv to 0 always when called.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-10 23:58:01 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
356eeea505 Added support for ECDH_XKEK.
Note that it is unfinished. ECDH_XKEK is utilized for deriving and setting the KEK, based on the calc DH secret. It should not return anything, just SW_OK (this is not what is happening right now).

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-10 23:51:41 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
34d9469157 When creating XKEK domain, it returns key domain UID.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-10 23:29:08 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
36b1bf9875 Added ECDH algorithms for XKEK and AUT.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-10 23:28:44 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
7badd19a07 Upgrading PICO SDK to v1.4 and adding new boards.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-09 01:28:39 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
f122a9ab28 Upgrade to version 2.6.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-09 00:42:58 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
14dbad4dd7 Do not return PIN unitialized if PKA is enabled.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-09 00:27:53 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
cdce9ab50b Adding pka_enabled() to check whether the device is configured with PKA.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-09 00:26:56 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
30d3270e1d Adding clarification on setting PKA and PIN with SCS3.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-09 00:26:35 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
157923decc Clafiricate docs about PKA and PIN
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-06 01:44:24 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
7bbcbc57eb Removing unnecessary debug.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-06 01:36:03 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
9074463f4e Added clarification on PKA and PIN
DKEK is protected in the device with a derived key from the PIN number. Unfortunately, SCS3 does not support the combination of PKA and PIN but OpenSC does. This is explained here.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-06 01:27:51 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
3ebf4fdff5 User authentication is unlinked from session_pin
Due to PUK Authentication, user authentication is not linked to having a valid session_pin anymore. In case of enabled PUK Auth, session_pin is used only for unlocking DKEK, but not for granting auth privileges, as they only are granted when PUK Auth succeeds.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-06 01:13:09 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
77e5fa2d2b Added static files for device key and certiticate.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-15 15:57:54 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
6bd2e65459 Add function for building PrKD asn1
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-15 15:38:11 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
3363e9ad0c Updating ccid.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-14 19:12:31 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d1f0f45525 Added support for native PKCS1.5 and OEP decryption.
It is not tested, as it is not supported by pkcs11 modules. For instance, OpenSSL implements OEP in local side, calling a RAW decryption on the device.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-14 17:00:23 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
efc1b4a4ae Fix meta deletion.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-14 16:45:06 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
a45303d9e6 Added support for specific purposes. Added support for SHA512 operations.
Keys can only be used for the specific purpose provided during the keypair generation.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-14 16:12:04 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
871ff69f56 Fix critical bug.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-14 11:46:44 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d4b4289c0b Update extra_command.md
Added explanation for Key usage counter.
2022-06-14 11:27:49 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
32af000435 Upgrading to version 2.4.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-13 19:39:35 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
64178192ad Update README.md
Added PKA description.
2022-06-13 15:03:46 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
598752956f Update scs3.md
Added macOS notes.
2022-06-13 14:58:09 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
4dce0e5958 Update public_key_authentication.md
Added screenshots.
2022-06-13 14:33:33 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
9f02aef930 Add PKA doc.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-13 14:28:09 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
0c25b0968b Update scs3.md
Added a patch.
2022-06-13 11:59:28 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
ddc0bd7202 Updated SCS3 doc.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-13 11:57:33 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
20727e1508 Point to last checkout.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-12 18:10:59 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
3afc1964dc Store in dynamic memory PUK authentication.
When a PUK is authenticated, session PIN is set to true.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-12 18:10:37 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
914020fd36 Added PUK authentication.
Surprisingly, it works from the very beginning.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-12 17:43:50 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
168a8cd5a6 Fix selecting PUK for AUT.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-12 17:42:21 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
eb94ed7806 Separated routines for verifying and parsing CV certificates.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-10 20:04:48 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
db6b3ec427 Added select MSE for puk AUT.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-10 20:04:32 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
32d0cdcea7 Save cached challenge length.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-10 18:58:35 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
332fe8c884 Generated challenges are cached and dev_name (ESTERMXXXXX) based on terminal certificate.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-10 16:40:51 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
59f0cf7732 Fix CA certificates selection.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-10 16:33:53 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b803505287 When a certificate is verified, the corresponding certificate description and the certificate are cached and saved.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-10 16:30:19 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
3542062ecd Added function to write the ASN1 certificate description.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-10 16:29:28 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
824c327a2c Added function to obtain EC params from root CA cert.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-10 16:28:55 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
76a41dffa1 Store all verified certificates (INS MSE) into CA_PREFIX files.
When a certificate is sent for verification, it is always cached and saved onto a CA_PREFIX.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-10 11:59:06 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
65482cad9c Added dynamic public key references.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-10 11:09:39 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
a17a4c0a3c Finished key public registration.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-10 11:09:25 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
2437cf09d1 Added EF for PUKs
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-10 11:08:47 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c4c394845d Updated pico-ccid.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-09 21:25:33 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
a4d4f9a944 Fix outer CAR value.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-09 21:25:17 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
5eb086935e Added INS_PSO.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-09 19:02:59 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
83a583a33f Fix CVC verification.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-09 19:02:22 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
143c2d279b Added cvc_verify to verify a cvcert with other CA cvcert.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-09 14:16:17 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
08dd596883 Added cvc_get_pub().
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-09 14:15:35 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
a4ffcebb0f Added variable puk_store.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-09 14:15:17 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
8a14c22056 Added OID compilation.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-09 11:53:58 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
39f7b5284a Added OID definitions.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-09 11:53:35 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
4f58cd255b Adding PUK store.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-08 20:01:37 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d96d7a533e Added procedure for verifying CVC (unfinished).
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-08 20:01:23 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
0e59166c64 Added MSE for B6 CRT.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-08 17:35:30 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
6d8161de73 Added functions to retrieve CAR and CHR from certs.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-08 17:34:17 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
494df64674 Added CVCA to burnt certificates.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-08 17:33:48 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d057729675 Fix returning the status of PIN1 when it is not initialized.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-07 19:58:21 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b14a323ef8 Added INS PUK with status query.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-07 19:44:47 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
f2b66468ec Adding Public Key Authentication file template.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-07 19:44:33 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
a48dfbbaf4 Some fixes with RAPDU.
When C0 is sent, pointers were not set properly.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-06 14:27:33 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
61625c4c5e Update README.md
Fix typos.
2022-06-06 11:53:39 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
3124f5e565 Upgrading build tool to version 2.2.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-06 00:29:55 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
48a05f9afc Upgrading to version 2.2.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-06 00:13:08 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
26fdf8b00c Upgrading Pico CCID to version 2.0.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-06 00:12:32 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
34cb360d62 Updated docs.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-05 20:40:41 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
4bf5a80a7a Added key usage counter to decryption operations.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-03 20:13:18 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
40efcd71c3 Added device option KEY_COUNTER_ALL.
When it is set, it enables the key usage counter for all keys when generated.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-03 20:10:53 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
aca291da9e Key usage counter is added for every generated key.
When a key is generated, a key usage counter is added. It starts from 2^32-1 and is decremented for every sign request. Once it reaches 0, it forbids more signatures for this key.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-03 20:04:14 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
7f6bcdfb11 Addded fast crc32 checksum for DKEK storage.
It is for checking the integrity of the DKEK and thus, the scret keys, as they are encrypted with DKEK.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-03 15:51:52 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
696110a5b0 Key domain deletion and kek deletion are only allowed when key domain is empty.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-03 11:36:32 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
73fb61070f Added kek deletion in a particular key domain.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-03 11:30:08 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
23da8047bc Fix deleting key domain.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-03 11:22:15 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
bf70a08c9f Added key domain deletion.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-03 11:16:40 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
ce410dae65 Fix when setup a key domain.
Now the dkek is cleared before imports.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-03 11:01:21 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
94a42c4267 Fix changing PIN with multiple domain.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-02 20:09:43 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
f4cc1fed36 Fix meta parsing.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-06-02 19:30:09 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
7c27be784b Fix parsing meta data on key generation. 2022-06-02 14:12:11 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
7d1b22c337 Added meta information for symmetric keys. 2022-06-02 12:12:12 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
1e550c8866 Using custom mbedtls configuration file. 2022-06-01 12:58:19 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
2febbe2795 Fix missing comma. 2022-06-01 12:57:42 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
299516f576 Fix set point A.
mbedtls does not set point A for some curves.
2022-06-01 11:51:33 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
6edeab6f85 Signatures in CVC are in plain format.
Plain format concatenates r||s.
2022-06-01 10:30:20 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
7b79d7ffde Moving CVC procedures to a separate file. 2022-06-01 09:46:23 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c4f06ccead Not used anymore. 2022-06-01 08:58:58 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
541d5b3c19 Fix CVC signature length.
Since it is variable, it needs to be recomputed every time.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-05-31 20:38:30 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
e0b9a68fad Deregistering OpenSC.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-05-31 19:28:03 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d0098015fe Removing OpenSC dependency.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-05-31 19:26:00 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
3660a35c2c Implementing own functions for cvc manipulation.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-05-31 18:51:43 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
9132dd16f0 Fix decoding asn1 integer.
It caused overflow.
2022-05-31 01:14:09 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
652551269e Using own asn1 int decoder. 2022-05-31 00:40:29 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
81730f37a9 Removing sc_pkcs1_strip_digest().
It is hard coded here (taken from OpenSC).
2022-05-31 00:25:54 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
4b86e96660 Removing card_context from store_keys().
It does not generate PRKD, as it will be stored by the client.
2022-05-31 00:14:30 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
271240f11c Fix initializing device. 2022-05-31 00:09:21 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
00e8596a0e Adding asn1_find_tag() for searching for a tag in a asn1 string. 2022-05-30 23:31:17 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
39ab429c88 Adding key domain to key generation, wrap, unwrap, export and import.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-05-30 16:13:51 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
96175c9fd3 Adding usb descriptors
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-05-30 16:13:20 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
cee3e83077 Moving again to tinyUSB
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-05-29 01:53:01 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
4fa8d4ba64 Fix warnings
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-05-27 20:58:45 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
1ac4402f99 res_APDU SHALL NOT BE moved, only memcpied or memmoved.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-05-27 00:58:35 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
8554262aaf Migrating away from tinyUSB.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-05-27 00:36:33 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d4d989e562 Moving from tinyUSB to low level custom solution. 2022-05-26 14:16:55 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d2766b2225 Using printf instead of TU 2022-05-26 14:16:32 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
f124ee52ce Do not add FMD in FCI.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-05-24 23:31:46 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
2167d28514 Add meta files.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-05-24 22:57:59 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
80792dc555 Private/secret keys can be selected.
It returns FCP when a private/secret key is selected but it is not allowed to read them.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-05-24 13:06:00 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
080337f847 Added key domain setup
It accepts different dkek shares for each key domain.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-05-24 11:08:29 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
5e20c830fd Return key domain not found only when they are prepared.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-05-24 10:48:22 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b754fdb449 Refactoring initialize command to support no dkek, random dkek, dkek shares and key domains.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-05-24 10:44:00 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
a926239613 Returning not initialized key domains.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-05-24 09:24:54 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c80b723112 Using dynamic dkek number and current shares, for each key domain.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-05-24 09:18:35 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
a062b92dad Replacing low level data access to high level routines.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-05-24 00:30:42 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
89d40b7c94 Extending DKEK and key storage to key domains.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-05-24 00:29:19 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
7b5cb48dcc Added key domains for device initialization and dkek import.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-05-23 20:06:06 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
7de0121db5 Introducing MANAGE KEY DOMAIN (INS 52)
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-05-23 14:26:36 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
cb338af8fb Return SW 6600 when button timeouts.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-05-05 22:30:07 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
89bb5d2815 Fix val returned on wait_button()
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-05-05 22:27:38 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
fffe2fb451 Now press-to-confirm button has a timeout of 15 secs.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-05-05 20:56:28 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
373a3ce491 Fix patch_vid version, which now uses ccid version.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-05-05 20:56:04 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
0a798b9f9a Upgrading pico-ccid.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-05-05 20:10:35 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
5f0b15b5e9 Fix returning wrong pin retries.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-04-22 19:21:41 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
9a93c8afe0 Adding new features of 2.0.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-04-19 19:41:44 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
fe990100d9 I am not sure why is being modified. 2022-04-19 19:41:09 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
df15a27ceb Removing mbedtls submodule 2022-04-19 19:38:42 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
5f4aafed37 Introducing version 2.0 with the following enhancements:
- Added Secure Messaging.
- Added Session PIN.
- Added tool to burn CVCerts onto the firmware, like a PKI.
2022-04-19 19:26:34 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
86298f3421 Upgrading to version 2.0. 2022-04-19 19:24:10 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
77971ac7e6 Using MBEDTLS from pico ccid.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-04-19 19:19:16 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
302f287967 Moving EAC and crypto to core.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-04-19 19:16:29 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b9c08d72c4 Update .gitmodules
Updating module for pico-ccid
2022-04-19 18:42:48 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
522860f736 Splitting the core onto another repo, which can be reused by other smart applications.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-04-19 18:39:52 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b09fc75913 CVCert is burn only if it does not exist. This check is only executed for first configuration.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-04-14 18:31:39 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
1b010c8a68 Specifying POST method
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-04-14 17:11:51 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
e2f424d4ab No more in the repo
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-04-14 01:06:50 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b9fb224d62 Adding a tool to burn device CVC. It generates a new keypair and sends the public key to Pico HSM CA, which signs the request. The certificate, CA and private key are burned onto the firmware.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-04-14 01:03:03 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
69e869852e Rewritten keypair_gen response (more friendly).
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-04-13 19:03:33 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
618966b742 Sanity check for keypair gen.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-04-13 18:49:13 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b68920ff45 Added walker function for TLV parsing.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-04-13 16:55:34 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
9dfe0ee7b3 Clear session pin on unload and new session.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-04-13 14:25:44 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
da6c578973 Fix tag_len computation for all TLV.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-04-13 14:14:06 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
49d9ec7cf9 Session pin is randomized.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-04-13 14:12:14 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
af07f1d549 Added INS for session pin generation (needs randomization).
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-04-11 19:47:43 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
db5f5fd435 When working with SM, wrap() manipulates res_APDU. Thus, we cannot change the pointer of res_APDU anymore. Everything must be memcpy-ed.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-04-11 15:11:42 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
7232625bab Merge branch 'master' into eac 2022-04-11 15:09:33 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
1557a4a039 Fix when generating keypair, which could produce wrong flash save in particular cases of concurrency.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-04-11 15:09:20 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b61575bbc3 Adding some mutex to improve concurrency.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-04-11 15:08:10 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
3781777138 Adding some kind of permanent flash memory that does not wipe out when initializing.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-04-11 11:37:41 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
2f1f8e0c90 Fix parsing TLV in signatures.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-04-11 01:44:18 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c4c2bf86ba Fix response APDU in secure channel.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-04-11 01:38:15 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
f26668b81d Fixed IV computation. IV is computed encrypting macCounter with a initial IV=0x0000.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-04-11 01:16:20 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
964af6a064 Adding wrap() to encrypt and sign response APDU.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-04-10 20:58:54 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c3a93a46ba Adding unwrap(), to decrypt and verify secure APDU.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-04-10 20:23:36 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
57d593561a Moving all SM stuff to EAC.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-04-10 19:00:52 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c098d80524 Adding private key of termca. It is the worst thing I can do, but first I need to develop the secure channel, which uses the private key of device. Later, I will figure out how to generate the private key and certificate during initialization, but it will be difficult, as it needs to be signed by the CA.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-04-10 01:55:57 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
6c892af9f1 Adding authentication command. Not finished. Needs lot of work.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-04-09 23:44:45 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b545a1618b Added Manage Security Environment command.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-04-09 20:50:00 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
dec3d54ddd Adding more SW codes.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-04-09 20:29:13 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
ce4d0bf102 INS 54h is also occupied too... let's try with 64h.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-04-08 00:38:03 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
4e6bada892 Fix first AID load.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-04-08 00:29:15 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
98ad2e3d55 Fix returning card data when selected AID.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-04-07 23:32:56 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
e686b42934 Merge branch 'master' into eac 2022-04-07 18:34:40 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
239e01c3f8 Update extra_command.md
Using new extra INS, from 0x88 to 0x54
2022-04-07 18:34:14 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
0d839c3136 Merge branch 'master' into eac 2022-04-07 18:32:49 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
4a57698173 Moving out INS_EXTRAS from 0x88 (taken by ISO 7816) to 0x54 (presumably free).
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-04-07 18:32:31 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
cc3bfad00a Merge branch 'master' into eac 2022-04-07 18:18:50 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
468051288c Upgrading to version 1.12.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-04-07 18:18:24 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
565ea12d88 Added dynamic option to enable/disable press to confirm.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-04-07 18:18:24 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
1c7ef50568 Added custom INS (named EXTRAS) to support different extra commands. At this moment:
- 0xA: gets/sets the datetime.
- 0x6: enables/disables press to confirm (BOOTSEL). It allows other dynamic device options. At this moment, only press to confirm option is available.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-04-07 18:18:24 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
878eae9787 Added press button to confirm. Everytime a private/secret key is loaded, the Pico HSM waits for BOOTSEL button press. This mechanism guarantees that no private/secret operations are made without user consent. To confirm the operation, the user must press the BOOTSEL button. In the meanwhile, the device gets into waiting state and no other operation is performed. After release the button, the operation continues normally.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-04-07 18:18:24 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
24b1d6807b Added support for reading binary data.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-04-07 18:18:24 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
6bc081a1e1 Added support to write arbitrary data EF.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-04-07 18:18:24 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
afb16fff65 Fix with ASN1 encapsulation for keypair generation. It only affects RSA 4096 bits.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-04-07 18:18:24 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
cf81a82645 Added a new custom APDU (88h) for setting and retrieving datetime.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-04-07 18:18:24 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
dc820a60ae Fixed class with USB-ICC specs, for legacy reasons.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-04-07 18:18:24 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c57cc139f6 Update README.md 2022-04-07 00:10:09 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
79426f35cd Update extra_command.md
Added dynamic options and press-to-confirm enabling/disabling.
2022-04-07 00:06:44 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
502a7ba81c Create store_data.md 2022-04-06 23:56:29 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
deef209687 Update README.md
Added press-to-confirm description.
Added links to storage binary data.
Added links to extra command to enable/disable button.
Added links to setting/getting datetime.
2022-04-06 19:52:10 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
bb09f212d2 Create extra_command.md
Add get/set datetime explanation.
2022-04-06 19:51:05 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
1e6556ebdd Upgrading to version 1.12.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-04-06 19:16:28 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
cfd86df45e Update README.md
Added led blink meaning.
2022-04-06 17:25:07 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c16a7a3c5c Added dynamic option to enable/disable press to confirm.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-04-06 15:14:23 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
7060d2d2ca Added custom INS (named EXTRAS) to support different extra commands. At this moment:
- 0xA: gets/sets the datetime.
- 0x6: enables/disables press to confirm (BOOTSEL). It allows other dynamic device options. At this moment, only press to confirm option is available.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-04-06 14:41:09 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
532d79bcc5 Added press button to confirm. Everytime a private/secret key is loaded, the Pico HSM waits for BOOTSEL button press. This mechanism guarantees that no private/secret operations are made without user consent. To confirm the operation, the user must press the BOOTSEL button. In the meanwhile, the device gets into waiting state and no other operation is performed. After release the button, the operation continues normally.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-04-06 14:38:22 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
770097d6ab Added support for reading binary data.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-04-05 18:07:20 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
ce2a1c21de Added support to write arbitrary data EF.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-04-05 17:28:22 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d16c9b2324 Update README.md
Adding operation time for RSA (signature and decrypt). It is relevant for RSA 3K and 4K.
2022-04-04 22:27:33 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
6e1c47ddf4 Fix with ASN1 encapsulation for keypair generation. It only affects RSA 4096 bits.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-04-04 22:00:29 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
f1630023c7 Update README.md
Added keygen time for 3k and 4k.
2022-04-04 21:56:40 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d49e7be972 Added a new custom APDU (88h) for setting and retrieving datetime.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-04-04 15:48:04 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
13d17fc4f7 Fixed class with USB-ICC specs, for legacy reasons.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-04-04 15:46:53 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d41a488eda Adding support for Transport PIN.
Adding support for initialize options.
2022-04-04 10:07:23 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
375a18ebac Update README.md
Fix RSA 4096 doc link.
2022-04-04 10:04:47 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
20216ac4ba Update README.md 2022-04-04 10:01:16 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d27d8b0c5b Upgrading to version 1.10
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-04-04 09:57:19 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
a619527482 Adding P1=0x2 and P1=0x3 for reset retry counter.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-04-03 20:59:50 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
85ff92c4de Adding check for device options whether it can reset retry counter with PIN or without.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-04-03 20:40:16 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b1121718db Adding capability to reset retry counter without new PIN
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-04-03 20:37:16 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
2905dcc8c0 Adding custom command to set datetime.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-04-03 19:57:56 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c9855f7214 Fix displaying device options.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-03-31 19:43:33 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
853b8f29a2 Fix returning kcv when pin is not provided. It always return 0x0
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-03-31 19:31:56 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d5378ffa41 If has_session_pin is true, it returns sw_ok
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-03-31 19:31:22 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
4400eba974 Fix returning kcv
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-03-31 19:31:02 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
0cc656c6c0 Adding transport PIN option. It does not allow to authenticate and returns sw code 0x6984
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-03-31 19:12:56 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c9b32ab5d0 Fix return pin blocked sw code.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-03-31 18:59:54 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
f9ffd39661 Adding EF_DEVOPS to store the device options during the initialization.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-03-31 18:56:42 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
bfc12d6856 Renaming files
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-03-31 18:27:00 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
11874b52de Merge branch 'master' into eac 2022-03-31 14:46:28 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b4e928588e Updating tools to 1.8
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-03-31 14:32:57 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
33a2222cd8 Revert "PIN remaining tries only returned when user is not logged in. If so, it returns always OK."
This reverts commit 86e38419ac.
2022-03-31 14:30:50 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
923e05a36c Revert "Also for SOPIN."
This reverts commit ad66170379.
2022-03-31 14:30:50 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b5cc4d6fd7 Update README.md 2022-03-31 13:32:18 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
25291f978f Create rsa_4096.md 2022-03-31 13:23:02 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
ad66170379 Also for SOPIN.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-03-31 13:18:56 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
86e38419ac PIN remaining tries only returned when user is not logged in. If so, it returns always OK.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-03-31 13:17:16 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
1a5e6a7edc Merge branch 'eac'. Support for PKCS#12 imports with SCS3. 2022-03-31 11:37:50 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
7cf166d615 Upgrading to version 1.8
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-03-31 11:18:52 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
413c3e0208 Fix update ef when offset is required.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-03-31 01:08:39 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
7410498df1 Fix with RSA CRT import mode (keytype 6).
In RSA CRT import, the N parameter shall not be imported. Otherwise, mbedtls will fail (it is deduced from N=PQ).

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-03-31 00:24:50 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
7aee18110e Fix kmac and kenc computation.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-03-30 23:59:06 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
7aca7b323a Fix loading kcv, kenc and kmac.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-03-30 23:21:23 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
4651a0e224 Adding AES wrapping/unwrapping
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-03-30 01:33:54 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d018e3b9b9 Adding RSA and EC wrap/unwrap, compatible with SC HSM wrap format.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-03-30 00:59:37 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
1c272842a7 Adding dkek_decode_key for unwrapping.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-03-29 20:18:08 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
0141e0ab4e Adding ec curve find from prime.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-03-29 20:17:42 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
e7d8695394 Added length checks.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-03-29 19:16:15 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
6876edea5a Some fix in encode key
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-03-29 19:06:00 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
2e655d6341 Fixes with AES encryption
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-03-29 18:25:47 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
2f4cca19c4 Moving some dkek crypt stuff to dkek.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-03-29 13:45:28 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
5eb74d8ca3 Adding encode_key with dkek (for wrapping).
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-03-29 13:45:07 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
7b0d5a6700 Fix loading aes key in decrypt function
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-03-29 09:35:06 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
427260663f Replacing CFB to CBC AES proc
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-03-29 09:34:44 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
047a443536 Adding dkek procedures to wrap/unwrap.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-03-28 17:38:15 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
7a9ee8145d Adding headers to random.h
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-03-28 17:38:02 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
2535d0e537 Adding generic aes encryption/decryption.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-03-28 17:37:53 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
6fe7d7991b Len of CMAC is always 16.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-03-28 17:37:24 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d061958f90 Moving hash to other file.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-03-28 16:02:28 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
3112200eb6 Merge branch 'eac' 2022-03-28 14:04:05 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
69a406832d Adding hsm initializing options
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-03-28 01:37:36 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
cd4ceb0a61 Fix returning current dkeks when the device is initialized without dkeks.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-03-28 01:37:19 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
450ec5dec1 Also list PRKD files.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-03-27 20:47:11 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c7abd1a067 Adding DKEK report
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-03-27 20:27:10 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c6d87756ab Adding SOPIN verification.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-03-27 19:00:21 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
0916489388 Initialization now returns free memory if no parameters are given.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-03-27 18:53:41 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b1e83c92e9 Adding cvcerts and dica
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-03-27 18:15:16 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d01e06aa11 2F02 returns terminal's cvcert and DICA.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-03-27 18:15:06 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
464107b13f Adding tag 85 for FCP when selecting applet
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-03-27 12:26:36 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
e431b25fc1 Not used
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-03-27 12:26:36 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
e4ed917c1c Updating to v1.6
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-03-27 12:26:35 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
ade3e6d2fb Added sanity check for some boards without led.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-03-27 12:26:35 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d12d18261f Changing name of generic pico.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-03-27 12:26:35 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
525b4439c9 Update README.md 2022-03-25 16:56:53 +01:00
135 changed files with 9844 additions and 17495 deletions

72
.github/workflows/codeql.yml vendored Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
# For most projects, this workflow file will not need changing; you simply need
# to commit it to your repository.
#
# You may wish to alter this file to override the set of languages analyzed,
# or to provide custom queries or build logic.
#
# ******** NOTE ********
# We have attempted to detect the languages in your repository. Please check
# the `language` matrix defined below to confirm you have the correct set of
# supported CodeQL languages.
#
name: "CodeQL"
on:
push:
branches: [ "master", "development" ]
pull_request:
# The branches below must be a subset of the branches above
branches: [ "master", "development" ]
schedule:
- cron: '23 5 * * 4'
jobs:
analyze:
name: Analyze
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
actions: read
contents: read
security-events: write
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
language: [ 'cpp', 'python' ]
# CodeQL supports [ 'cpp', 'csharp', 'go', 'java', 'javascript', 'python', 'ruby' ]
# Learn more about CodeQL language support at https://aka.ms/codeql-docs/language-support
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@v3
# Initializes the CodeQL tools for scanning.
- name: Initialize CodeQL
uses: github/codeql-action/init@v2
with:
languages: ${{ matrix.language }}
# If you wish to specify custom queries, you can do so here or in a config file.
# By default, queries listed here will override any specified in a config file.
# Prefix the list here with "+" to use these queries and those in the config file.
# Details on CodeQL's query packs refer to : https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/code-scanning/automatically-scanning-your-code-for-vulnerabilities-and-errors/configuring-code-scanning#using-queries-in-ql-packs
# queries: security-extended,security-and-quality
# Autobuild attempts to build any compiled languages (C/C++, C#, or Java).
# If this step fails, then you should remove it and run the build manually (see below)
# - name: Autobuild
# uses: github/codeql-action/autobuild@v2
# Command-line programs to run using the OS shell.
# 📚 See https://docs.github.com/en/actions/using-workflows/workflow-syntax-for-github-actions#jobsjob_idstepsrun
# If the Autobuild fails above, remove it and uncomment the following three lines.
# modify them (or add more) to build your code if your project, please refer to the EXAMPLE below for guidance.
- run: |
echo "Run, Build Application using script"
./workflows/autobuild.sh
- name: Perform CodeQL Analysis
uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@v2

36
.github/workflows/test.yml vendored Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
# For most projects, this workflow file will not need changing; you simply need
# to commit it to your repository.
#
# You may wish to alter this file to override the set of languages analyzed,
# or to provide custom queries or build logic.
#
# ******** NOTE ********
# We have attempted to detect the languages in your repository. Please check
# the `language` matrix defined below to confirm you have the correct set of
# supported CodeQL languages.
#
name: "Emulation and test"
on:
push:
branches: [ "master", "development" ]
pull_request:
# The branches below must be a subset of the branches above
branches: [ "master", "development" ]
schedule:
- cron: '23 5 * * 4'
jobs:
build:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Checkout repository and submodules
uses: actions/checkout@v3
with:
submodules: recursive
- name: Build in container
run: ./tests/build-in-docker.sh
- name: Start emulation and test
run: ./tests/run-test-in-docker.sh

9
.gitmodules vendored
View File

@@ -1,6 +1,3 @@
[submodule "OpenSC"]
path = OpenSC
url = https://github.com/polhenarejos/OpenSC
[submodule "mbedtls"]
path = mbedtls
url = https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls
[submodule "pico-hsm-sdk"]
path = pico-hsm-sdk
url = ../pico-hsm-sdk

317
.uncrustify.cfg Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,317 @@
#
# Uncrustify Configuration File
# File Created With UncrustifyX 0.4.3 (252)
#
# Code-Modifying
# --------------
## Braces
# Braces on single-line do statement
mod_full_brace_do = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Braces on single-line else statement
mod_full_brace_if = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Braces on single-line for statement
mod_full_brace_for = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Braces on single-line while statement
mod_full_brace_while = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
## Parentheses
# Remove unnecessary parentheses on return statement
mod_paren_on_return = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Comments
# --------
## Other
# Remove leading spaces from multi-line comments
cmt_multi_check_last = false # boolean (false/true)
# General
# -------
## Other
# Input tab size
input_tab_size = 4 # number
# Indentation
# -----------
## Indentation Size
# Indentation column size
indent_columns = 4 # number
# Indentation size between case and switch
indent_switch_case = 4 # number
## Other
# Align strings broken by backslash
indent_align_string = true # boolean (false/true)
# Indent with tabs
indent_with_tabs = 0 # number
# Line-Splitting
# --------------
## Splitting
# Code width
code_width = 100 # number
# Split long for statements at semicolons
ls_for_split_full = true # boolean (false/true)
# Split long function prototypes/calls at commas
ls_func_split_full = true # boolean (false/true)
# Newlines
# --------
## Newline Between
# Newline between assignment and open brace
nl_assign_brace = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Newline between close brace and else
nl_brace_else = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Newline between close brace and while
nl_brace_while = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Newline between do and open brace
nl_do_brace = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Newline between else and open brace
nl_else_brace = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Newline between enum and open brace
nl_enum_brace = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Newline between for and open brace
nl_for_brace = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Newline between function call and open brace
nl_fcall_brace = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Newline between function signature and open brace
nl_fdef_brace = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Newline between if and open brace
nl_if_brace = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Newline between struct and open brace
nl_struct_brace = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Newline between switch and open brace
nl_switch_brace = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Newline between union and open brace
nl_union_brace = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Newline between while and open brace
nl_while_brace = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
## Other
# Newline count at end of file
nl_end_of_file_min = 1 # number
# Newlines at end of file
nl_end_of_file = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Newlines at start of file
nl_start_of_file = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Spacing
# -------
## Space After
# Space after address-of operator
sp_addr = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space after cast
sp_after_cast = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space after comma
sp_after_comma = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space after dereference operator
sp_deref = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space after final semicolon in empty for statement
sp_after_semi_for_empty = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space after invert operator
sp_inv = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space after not operator
sp_not = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space after pointer star
sp_after_ptr_star = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space after pointer star followed by function
sp_after_ptr_star_func = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space after semicolon
sp_after_semi = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space after semicolon in non-empty for statements
sp_after_semi_for = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space after sign in assignment
sp_sign = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space after type
sp_after_type = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
## Space Around
# Space around arithmetic operators
sp_arith = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space around assignment operator
sp_assign = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space around boolean operators
sp_bool = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space around compare operators
sp_compare = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space around increment/decrement operators
sp_incdec = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space around member operators
sp_member = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space around preprocessor concatenation operator
sp_pp_concat = ignore # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space around ternary condition colon
sp_cond_colon = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space around ternary condition question mark
sp_cond_question = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
## Space Before
# Space before backslash-newline at end of line
sp_before_nl_cont = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space before case colon
sp_before_case_colon = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space before comma
sp_before_comma = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space before if/for/switch/while open parenthesis
sp_before_sparen = force # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space before pointer star
sp_before_ptr_star = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space before semicolon
sp_before_semi = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space before semicolon in empty for statement
sp_before_semi_for_empty = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space before semicolon in for statements
sp_before_semi_for = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
## Space Between
# Space between __attribute__ and open parenthesis
sp_attribute_paren = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between close brace and else
sp_brace_else = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between close brace and typedef name
sp_brace_typedef = force # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between closing parenthesis and open brace
sp_fparen_brace = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between defined and open parenthesis
sp_defined_paren = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between else and open brace
sp_else_brace = force # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between function name and open parenthesis
sp_func_call_paren = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between function name and open parenthesis in declaration
sp_func_proto_paren = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between function name and open parenthesis in function definition
sp_func_def_paren = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between if/for/switch/while close parenthesis and open brace
sp_sparen_brace = force # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between macro and value
sp_macro = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between macro function close parenthesis and value
sp_macro_func = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between nested parentheses
sp_paren_paren = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between pointer stars
sp_between_ptr_star = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between preprocessor else and comment
sp_endif_cmt = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between return type and function name
sp_type_func = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between sizeof and open parenthesis
sp_sizeof_paren = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
## Space Inside
# Space inside braces
sp_inside_braces = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space inside cast parentheses
sp_inside_paren_cast = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space inside empty function parentheses
sp_inside_fparens = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space inside enum braces
sp_inside_braces_enum = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space inside function parentheses
sp_inside_fparen = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space inside if-condition parentheses
sp_inside_sparen = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space inside non-empty square brackets
sp_inside_square = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space inside parentheses
sp_inside_paren = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space inside parentheses in function type
sp_inside_tparen = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space inside struct/union braces
sp_inside_braces_struct = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)

View File

@@ -1,141 +1,105 @@
#
#
# This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
# Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
#
# This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
#
# This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
# the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
#
# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
# WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
# WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
# General Public License for more details.
#
# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
# along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
#
cmake_minimum_required(VERSION 3.13)
if(ENABLE_EMULATION)
else()
include(pico_sdk_import.cmake)
endif()
project(pico_hsm C CXX ASM)
set(CMAKE_C_STANDARD 11)
set(CMAKE_CXX_STANDARD 17)
if(ENABLE_EMULATION)
else()
pico_sdk_init()
endif()
add_executable(pico_hsm)
if (NOT DEFINED USB_VID)
set(USB_VID 0xFEFF)
endif()
add_definitions(-DUSB_VID=${USB_VID})
if (NOT DEFINED USB_PID)
set(USB_PID 0xFCFD)
endif()
add_definitions(-DUSB_PID=${USB_PID})
set_source_files_properties(
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/OpenSC/src/libopensc/ctx.c
PROPERTIES COMPILE_DEFINITIONS "PACKAGE_VERSION=\"0.22.0\";OPENSC_CONF_PATH=\".\""
)
target_sources(pico_hsm PUBLIC
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/hsm2040.c
set(SOURCES ${SOURCES}
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/sc_hsm.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/usb/usb_descriptors.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/fs/file.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/fs/flash.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/fs/low_flash.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/rng/random.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/rng/neug.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/mbedtls/library/sha256.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/mbedtls/library/aes.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/mbedtls/library/sha512.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/mbedtls/library/rsa.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/mbedtls/library/bignum.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/mbedtls/library/platform_util.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/mbedtls/library/md.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/mbedtls/library/oid.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/mbedtls/library/rsa_alt_helpers.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/mbedtls/library/constant_time.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/mbedtls/library/ecdsa.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/mbedtls/library/ecp.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/mbedtls/library/ecp_curves.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/mbedtls/library/asn1write.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/mbedtls/library/hmac_drbg.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/mbedtls/library/md5.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/mbedtls/library/ripemd160.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/mbedtls/library/sha1.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/mbedtls/library/ecdh.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/mbedtls/library/cmac.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/mbedtls/library/cipher.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/mbedtls/library/cipher_wrap.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/mbedtls/library/chachapoly.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/mbedtls/library/camellia.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/mbedtls/library/chacha20.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/mbedtls/library/aria.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/mbedtls/library/poly1305.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/mbedtls/library/gcm.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/mbedtls/library/ccm.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/mbedtls/library/des.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/mbedtls/library/nist_kw.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/mbedtls/library/hkdf.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/OpenSC/src/libopensc/pkcs15.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/OpenSC/src/libopensc/pkcs15-prkey.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/OpenSC/src/libopensc/pkcs15-algo.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/OpenSC/src/libopensc/pkcs15-cert.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/OpenSC/src/libopensc/pkcs15-data.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/OpenSC/src/libopensc/pkcs15-pin.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/OpenSC/src/libopensc/pkcs15-pubkey.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/OpenSC/src/libopensc/pkcs15-sec.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/OpenSC/src/libopensc/pkcs15-skey.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/OpenSC/src/libopensc/asn1.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/OpenSC/src/libopensc/log.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/OpenSC/src/libopensc/errors.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/OpenSC/src/libopensc/sc.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/OpenSC/src/libopensc/ctx.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/OpenSC/src/libopensc/pkcs15-sc-hsm.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/OpenSC/src/libopensc/padding.c
)
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_select.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_list_keys.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_read_binary.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_verify.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_reset_retry.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_challenge.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_external_authenticate.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_mse.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_initialize.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_key_domain.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_key_wrap.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_keypair_gen.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_update_ef.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_delete_file.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_change_pin.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_key_gen.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_signature.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_key_unwrap.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_decrypt_asym.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_cipher_sym.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_derive_asym.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_extras.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_general_authenticate.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_session_pin.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_puk_auth.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_pso.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cvc.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/files.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/kek.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/oid.c
target_include_directories(pico_hsm PUBLIC
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/fs
)
set(USB_ITF_CCID 1)
include(pico-hsm-sdk/pico_hsm_sdk_import.cmake)
set(INCLUDES ${INCLUDES}
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/rng
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/usb
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/opensc/src
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/mbedtls/include
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/mbedtls/library
)
target_sources(pico_hsm PUBLIC ${SOURCES})
target_include_directories(pico_hsm PUBLIC ${INCLUDES})
target_compile_options(pico_hsm PUBLIC
-Wall
-Werror
)
if(ENABLE_EMULATION)
target_compile_options(pico_hsm PUBLIC
-fdata-sections
-ffunction-sections
)
if(APPLE)
target_link_options(pico_hsm PUBLIC
-Wl,-dead_strip
)
else()
target_link_options(pico_hsm PUBLIC
-Wl,--gc-sections
)
endif (APPLE)
else()
pico_add_extra_outputs(pico_hsm)
#target_compile_definitions(pico_hsm PRIVATE MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC=1)
target_link_libraries(pico_hsm PRIVATE pico_stdlib tinyusb_device tinyusb_board pico_multicore hardware_flash hardware_sync hardware_adc pico_unique_id)
#
#project(flash_nuke C CXX ASM)
#add_executable(flash_nuke nuke.c)
#target_link_libraries(flash_nuke
# pico_stdlib
# hardware_flash
# )
#pico_set_binary_type(flash_nuke no_flash)
#
#pico_add_extra_outputs(flash_nuke)
#project(memory C CXX ASM)
#add_executable(memory memory.c)
#target_link_libraries(memory
# pico_stdlib
# hardware_flash
# )
#pico_set_binary_type(memory no_flash)
#
#pico_add_extra_outputs(memory)
target_link_libraries(pico_hsm PRIVATE pico_hsm_sdk pico_stdlib pico_multicore hardware_flash hardware_sync hardware_adc pico_unique_id hardware_rtc tinyusb_device tinyusb_board)
endif()

54
Dockerfile Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
FROM debian:bullseye
ENV DEBIAN_FRONTEND noninteractive
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y \
build-essential \
git \
cmake \
gcc-arm-none-eabi \
libnewlib-arm-none-eabi \
libstdc++-arm-none-eabi-newlib \
python3 \
python3-pip
RUN useradd -m builduser
USER builduser
WORKDIR /home/builduser
VOLUME /home/builduser/release
ARG VERSION_PICO_SDK 1.4.0
RUN mkdir -p /home/builduser/Devel/pico
RUN cd /home/builduser/Devel/pico \
&& git clone https://github.com/raspberrypi/pico-sdk.git \
&& cd pico-sdk \
&& git checkout $VERSION_PICO_SDK \
&& git submodule update --init --recursive
RUN pip install cryptography
ARG VERSION_MAJOR 2
ARG VERSION_MINOR 6
RUN cd /home/builduser \
&& git clone https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm.git \
&& cd pico-hsm \
&& git checkout v${VERSION_MAJOR}.${VERSION_MINOR} \
&& git submodule update --init --recursive \
&& mkdir build_release
ENV PICO_SDK_PATH /home/builduser/Devel/pico/pico-sdk
ARG USB_VID 0xfeff
ARG USB_PID 0xfcfd
ARG PICO_BOARD waveshare_rp2040_zero
RUN cd /home/builduser/pico-hsm \
&& cd build_release \
&& cmake .. -DPICO_BOARD=$PICO_BOARD -DUSB_VID=${USB_VID} -DUSB_PID=${USB_PID} \
&& make -kj20

1
OpenSC

Submodule OpenSC deleted from 1320393a7e

240
README.md
View File

@@ -2,39 +2,143 @@
This is a project to create a Hardware Security Module (HSM) with a Raspberry Pico. It converts your Pico board into a HSM which is able to generate and store private keys, encrypt or decrypt with AES or signing data without to disclose the private key. In detail, the private key never leaves the board and it cannot be retrieved as it is encrypted in the flash memory.
## Capabilities
- Key generation and encrypted storage.
- RSA key generation from 1024 to 4096 bits.
- ECDSA key generation from 192 to 521 bits.
- ECC curves secp192r1, secp256r1, secp384r1, secp521r1, brainpoolP256r1, brainpoolP384r1, brainpoolP512r1, secp192k1 (insecure), secp256k1.
- SHA1, SHA224, SHA256, SHA384, SHA256 digests.
- RSA-PSS, RSA-PKCS and raw RSA signature.
- ECDSA raw and hash signature.
- ECDH key derivation.
- EC private key derivation.[^1]
- RSA-OEP and RSA-X-509 decryption.
- AES key generation of 128, 192 and 256 bits.
- AES-CBC encryption/decryption.
- AES-CMAC authentication.[^1]
- AES secret key derivation.[^1]
- PIN authorization.
- PKCS11 compliant interface.
- HRNG (hardware random number generator).
- Device Key Encryption Key (DKEK) shares.
- DKEK n-of-m threshold scheme.
- USB/CCID support with OpenSC, openssl, etc.
- Extended APDU support.
### > Key generation and encrypted storage
Private and secret keys are stored with a master AES 256 key (DKEK). The DKEK is, at the same time, encrypted with a hashed and salted version of the PIN.
**No private/secret keys, DKEK or PIN are stored in plain text ever. Never.**
### > RSA key generation from 1024 to 4096 bits
RSA key generation in place for 1024, 2048, 3072 and 4096 bits. Private keys never leave the device.
### > ECDSA key generation from 192 to 521 bits
ECDSA key generation in place for different curves, from 192 to 521 bits.
### > ECC curves
It supports secp192r1, secp256r1, secp384r1, secp521r1, brainpoolP256r1, brainpoolP384r1, brainpoolP512r1, secp192k1 (insecure), secp256k1 curves. Also Curve25519 and Curve448.
### > SHA1, SHA224, SHA256, SHA384, SHA512 digests
ECDSA and RSA signature can be combined with SHA digest in place.
### > Multiple RSA signature algorithms
It supports RSA-PSS, RSA-PKCS and raw RSA signatures.
### > ECDSA raw and hash signature
ECDSA signatures can be in raw or pre-hashed formats.
### > ECDH key derivation
It supports the calculation of shared secrets with ECDH algorithm.
### > EC private key derivation
It allows ECDSA key derivation.[^1]
### > RSA-OEP and RSA-X-509 decryption
It allows private decryption in place with RSA-OEP and RSA-X-509 algorithms.
### > AES key generation
It supports AES key generation in place with keys of 128, 192 and 256 bits.
### > AES-CBC encryption/decryption
AES encryption and decryption is performed in place.
### > CMAC
It supports AES-CMAC authentication.[^1]
### > AES derivation
It supports AES secret key derivation.[^1]
### > PIN authorization
Private and secret keys cannot be used without prior PIN authentication. It supports alphanumeric PIN.
### > PKCS11 compliant interface
The module can be interfaced with PKCS11 standard.
### > HRNG (hardware random number generator)
It contains a harware random number generator properly modeled to guarantee maximum entropy.
### > Device Key Encryption Key (DKEK) shares
It supports DKEK share imports. DKEK are used to wrap, unwrap and encrypt private and secret keys in the device.
### > DKEK n-of-m threshold scheme
It supports a n-of-m threshold scheme to minimize outage when a DKEK custodian is not available during the import process.
### > USB/CCID support with OpenSC, openssl, etc.
Pico HSM has a full USB CCID stack to communicate with the host via OpenSC and PCSC. It allows the use of frontend applications such as OpenSSL via PKCS11 module.
### > Extended APDU support
It supports extended APDU packets, which allows up to 65535 bytes.
### > CV Certificates
Pico HSM manipulates CVC certificates and requests to minimize the storage of internal certificates.
### > Attestation
Every generated key is attached to a certificate, signed by an external PKI to ensure that a particular key is effectively generated by this specific device.
### > Import external private keys and certificates
It allows private key and certificates import via WKY or PKCS#12 files.[^2][^3]
### > Tranport PIN
It allows transport PIN for provisioning and forcing to set a new PIN.[^2] It is a tampered mechanism that ensures the device has not been unsealed during the transportation from the issuer to the legitimate user.
### > Press-to-confirm button
It allows the use of BOOTSEL button to confirm operations with private/secret keys, such as signatures and decryption. When a private/secret key is loaded, the user has 15 seconds to press the button to confirm the operation.
This feature protects the user from unwanted uses from background applications that may sign data without user notice.
### > Store and retrieve binary data
It allows the storage of arbitrary files with binary data.
### > Real time clock (RTC)
Pico HSM has a RTC with external datetime setting and getting.
### > Secure Messaging (secure channel)
Pico HSM supports secure channel, where the data packets between the host and device are encrypted to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks.
### > Session PIN
A specific session PIN can be set during the session opening to avoid the systemmatic use of PIN.
### > PKI CVCert remote issuing for Secure Message
Secure channel messages are secured with a certificate issued by an external PKI.
### > Multiple key domains
Key domains are domains to store separate private/secret keys. Each domain is protected by a DKEK, independent from the other domains. Private/secret keys can be generated in different key domains to be used with separated DKEK.
Therefore, a single device may contain different domains with independent keys.
### > Key usage counter
A key usage counter is a counter that is reduced by 1 everytime that the private/secret key is used for signing, decrypting, derivation, etc. When it reaches 0, the key is disabled and cannot be used anymore.
Key usage can also be used to perform and auditory and track the usage of a particular key.
### > Public Key Authentication
Public Key Authentication (PKA) allows to authenticate by using a secondary device with a private key and a registered public key in the primary device. A challenge is generated by the primary Pico HSM and given to the secondary for signature. The secondary device signs the challenge and returns the signature. Then, the primary device verifies the signature with the registered public key and if it is valid, it grants full access, as normal PIN authentication.
In PKA, the PIN is used for protecting the DKEK, as classic method with only PIN, and PKA is used for adding an extra security layer. Therefore, this mechanism provides a higher degree of security, since it needs a secondary Pico HSM to authenticate the primary one.
### > Secure Lock
An extra layer can be added to the device by adding a private key stored on the computer to lock that Pico HSM to the specific computer. The content will be completely encrypted with a private key only available from a specific computer.
### > ChaCha20-Poly1305
This is a novel fast and efficient symmetric encryption algorithm. Similarly to AES, it can be used to cipher your private data.
### > X25519 and X448
Both cruves Curve25519 and Curve448 are supported for doing DH X25519 and X448. Remember that cannot be used for signing.
### > Key Derivation Functions: HKDF, PBKDF2 and X963-KDF
It supports symmetric key derivations from different standards and RFC.
### > HMAC
It supports performing HMAC from a secret key on a arbitrary data with SHA digest algorithm.
[^1]: PKCS11 modules (`pkcs11-tool` and `sc-tool`) do not support CMAC and key derivation. It must be processed through raw APDU command (`opensc-tool -s`).
[^2]: Available via SCS3 tool. See [SCS3](/doc/scs3.md "SCS3") for more information.
[^3]: Imports are available only if the Pico HSM is previously initialized with a DKEK and the DKEK shares are available during the import process.
## Security considerations
All secret keys (asymmetric and symmetric) are stored encrypted in the flash memory of the Raspberry Pico. DKEK is used as a 256 bit AES key to protect private and secret keys. Keys are never stored in RAM except for signature and decryption operations. All keys (including DKEK) are loaded and cleared every time to avoid potential flaws.
All secret keys (asymmetric and symmetric) are stored encrypted in the flash memory of the Raspberry Pico. DKEK is used as a 256 bit AES key to protect private and secret keys. Keys are never stored in RAM except for signature and decryption operations and only during the process. All keys (including DKEK) are loaded and cleared every time to avoid potential security flaws.
At the same time, DKEK is encrypted with doubled salted and hashed PIN. Also, the PIN is hashed in memory during the session. Hence, PIN is never stored in plain text neither in flash nor in memory. Note that PIN is conveyed from the host to the HSM in plain text if no secure channel is provided.
If the Pico is stolen the contents of private and secret keys cannot be read without the PIN, even if the flash memory is dumped.
## Download
Please, go to the Release page and download the UF2 file for your board.
Please, go to the Release page and download the UF2 file for your board.
Note that UF2 files are shiped with a dummy VID/PID to avoid license issues (FEFF:FCFD). If you are planning to use it with OpenSC or similar, you should modify Info.plist of CCID driver to add these VID/PID or use the VID/PID patcher as follows:
`./patch_vidpid.sh VID:PID input_hsm_file.uf2 output_hsm_file.uf2`
@@ -56,12 +160,36 @@ Note that `PICO_BOARD`, `USB_VID` and `USB_PID` are optional. If not provided, `
After `make` ends, the binary file `pico_hsm.uf2` will be generated. Put your pico board into loading mode, by pushing `BOOTSEL` button while pluging on, and copy the UF2 to the new fresh usb mass storage Pico device. Once copied, the pico mass storage will be disconnected automatically and the pico board will reset with the new firmware. A blinking led will indicate the device is ready to work.
### Docker
Independent from your Linux distribution or when using another OS that supports Docker, you could build a specific pico-hsm version in a Linux container.
```
sudo docker build \
--build-arg VERSION_PICO_SDK=1.4.0 \
--build-arg VERSION_MAJOR=2 \
--build-arg VERSION_MINOR=6 \
--build-arg PICO_BOARD=waveshare_rp2040_zero \
--build-arg USB_VID=0xfeff \
--build-arg USB_PID=0xfcfd \
-t pico-hsm-builder .
sudo docker run \
--name mybuild \
-it pico-hsm-builder \
ls -l /home/builduser/pico-hsm/build_release/pico_hsm.uf2
sudo docker cp mybuild:/home/builduser/pico-hsm/build_release/pico_hsm.uf2 .
sudo docker rm mybuild
```
## Usage
The firmware uploaded to the Pico contains a reader and a virtual smart card. It is like having a physical reader with an inserted SIM card.
We recommend the use of [OpenSC](http://github.com/opensc/opensc/ "OpenSC") to communicate with the reader. If it is not installed, you can download and build it or install the binaries for your system. The first command is to ensure that the Pico is detected as a HSM:
```
opensc-tool -an
````
```
It should return a text like the following:
```
Using reader with a card: Free Software Initiative of Japan Gnuk
@@ -80,9 +208,65 @@ For backup, restore and DKEK share management, check [doc/backup-and-restore.md]
For AES key generation, encryption and decryption, check [doc/aes.md](/doc/aes.md).
For 4096 bits RSA support, check [doc/scs3.md](/doc/scs3.md).
For storing and retrieving arbitrary data, check [doc/store_data.md](/doc/store_data.md).
For extra options, such as set/get real datetime or enable/disable press-to-confirm button, check [doc/extra_command.md](/doc/extra_command.md).
For Public Key Authentication, check [doc/public_key_authentication.md](/doc/public_key_authentication.md).
## Operation time
### Keypair generation
Generating EC keys is almost instant. RSA keypair generation takes some time, specially for `3072` and `4096` bits.
| RSA key length (bits) | Average time (seconds) |
| :---: | :---: |
| 1024 | 16 |
| 2048 | 124 |
| 3072 | 600 |
| 4096 | ~1000 |
### Signature and decrypt
| RSA key length (bits) | Average time (seconds) |
| :---: | :---: |
| 1024 | 1 |
| 2048 | 3 |
| 3072 | 7 |
| 4096 | 15 |
## Press-to-confirm button
Raspberry Pico comes with the BOOTSEL button to load the firmware. When this firmware is running, the button can be used for other purposes. Pico HSM uses this button to confirm private/secret operations. This feature is optional and it shall be enabled. For more information, see [doc/extra_command.md](/doc/extra_command.md).
With this feature enabled, everytime that a private/secret key is loaded, the Pico HSM awaits for the user confirmation by pressing the BOOTSEL button. The Led of the Pico HSM will remain almost illuminated, turning off quickly once a second, indicating that the user must press the button to confirm the operation. Otherwise, the Pico HSM waits indefinitely. See [Led blink](#press-to-confirm) for a picture of the blinking sequence. When in this mode, the Pico HSM sends periodic timeout commands to the host to do not trigger the timeout operation.
This feature is an extra layer of security, as it requires the user intervention to sign or decrypt and it ensures that any application will use the Pico HSM without user awareness. However, it is not recommended for servers or other environments where operations are authomatized, since it requires a physical access to the Pico HSM to push the button.
## Led blink
Pico HSM uses the led to indicate the current status. Four states are available:
### Press to confirm
The Led is almost on all the time. It goes off for 100 miliseconds every second.
![Press to confirm](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/55573252/162008917-6a730eac-396c-44cc-890e-802294be30a3.gif)
### Idle mode
In idle mode, the Pico HSM goes to sleep. It waits for a command and it is awaken by the driver. The Led is almost off all the time. It goes on for 500 milliseconds every second.
![Idle mode](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/55573252/162008980-d5a5caad-072e-400c-98e3-2c606b4b2af9.gif)
### Active mode
In active mode, the Pico HSM is awaken and ready to receive a command. It blinks four times in a second.
![Active](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/55573252/162008997-1ea8cd7e-5384-4893-9dcb-b473153fc375.gif)
### Processing
While processing, the Pico HSM is busy and cannot receive additional commands until the current is processed. In this state, the Led blinks 20 times in a second.
![Processing](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/55573252/162009007-df45111e-2473-4a92-97c5-15c3cd19babd.gif)
## Driver
Pico HSM uses the `sc-hsm` driver provided by [OpenSC](https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/ "OpenSC") or the `sc-hsm-embedded` driver provided by [CardContact](https://github.com/CardContact/sc-hsm-embedded "CardContact"). This driver utilizes the standardized PKCS#11 interface to communicate with the user and it can be used with many engines that accept PKCS#11 interface, such as OpenSSL, P11 library or pkcs11-tool.
Pico HSM uses the `sc-hsm` driver provided by [OpenSC](https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/ "OpenSC") or the `sc-hsm-embedded` driver provided by [CardContact](https://github.com/CardContact/sc-hsm-embedded "CardContact"). This driver utilizes the standardized PKCS#11 interface to communicate with the user and it can be used with many engines that accept PKCS#11 interface, such as OpenSSL, P11 library or pkcs11-tool.
Pico HSM relies on PKCS#15 structure to store and manipulate the internal files (PINs, private keys, certificates, etc.) and directories. Therefore, it accepts the commands from `pkcs15-tool`. For instance, `pkcs15-tool -D` will list all elements stored in the Pico HSM.
@@ -90,14 +274,12 @@ The way to communicate is exactly the same as with other cards, such as OpenPGP
For an advanced usage, see the docs and examples.
Pico HSM also supports SCS3 tool for advanced use and multiple key domain. See [SCS3](/doc/scs3.md) for more information.
### Important
OpenSC relies on PCSC driver, which reads a list (`Info.plist`) that contains a pair of VID/PID of supported readers. In order to be detectable, you must patch the UF2 binary (if you just downloaded from the [Release section](https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm/releases "Release section")) or configure the project with the proper VID/PID with `USB_VID` and `USB_PID` parameters in `CMake` (see [Build section](#build "Build section")). Note that you cannot distribute the patched/compiled binary if you do not own the VID/PID or have an explicit authorization.
## Credits
Pico HSM uses the following libraries or portion of code:
- OpenSC for ASN1 manipulation.
- mbedTLS for cryptographic operations.
- gnuk for low level CCID procedures and OpenPGP support.
- TinyUSB for low level USB procedures.
In the case of gnuk, it is intended to work with STM32 processor and its family. Part of the code of CCID procedures are ported and adapted to run with Pico.

View File

@@ -1,21 +1,53 @@
#!/bin/bash
VERSION_MAJOR="1"
VERSION_MINOR="6"
VERSION_MAJOR="3"
VERSION_MINOR="2"
rm -rf release/*
cd build
cd build_release
for board in adafruit_feather_rp2040 adafruit_itsybitsy_rp2040 adafruit_qtpy_rp2040 adafruit_trinkey_qt2040 arduino_nano_rp2040_connect melopero_shake_rp2040 pimoroni_interstate75 pimoroni_keybow2040 pimoroni_pga2040 pimoroni_picolipo_4mb pimoroni_picolipo_16mb pimoroni_picosystem pimoroni_plasma2040 pimoroni_tiny2040 pybstick26_rp2040 sparkfun_micromod sparkfun_promicro sparkfun_thingplus vgaboard waveshare_rp2040_lcd_0.96 waveshare_rp2040_plus_4mb waveshare_rp2040_plus_16mb waveshare_rp2040_zero
for board in adafruit_feather_rp2040 \
adafruit_itsybitsy_rp2040 \
adafruit_kb2040 \
adafruit_macropad_rp2040 \
adafruit_qtpy_rp2040 \
adafruit_trinkey_qt2040 \
arduino_nano_rp2040_connect \
datanoisetv_rp2040_dsp \
eetree_gamekit_rp2040 \
garatronic_pybstick26_rp2040 \
melopero_shake_rp2040 \
pico \
pico_w \
pimoroni_badger2040 \
pimoroni_interstate75 \
pimoroni_keybow2040 \
pimoroni_motor2040 \
pimoroni_pga2040 \
pimoroni_picolipo_4mb \
pimoroni_picolipo_16mb \
pimoroni_picosystem \
pimoroni_plasma2040 \
pimoroni_servo2040 \
pimoroni_tiny2040 \
pimoroni_tiny2040_2mb \
seeed_xiao_rp2040 \
solderparty_rp2040_stamp \
solderparty_rp2040_stamp_carrier \
solderparty_rp2040_stamp_round_carrier \
sparkfun_micromod \
sparkfun_promicro \
sparkfun_thingplus \
vgaboard \
waveshare_rp2040_lcd_0.96 \
waveshare_rp2040_plus_4mb \
waveshare_rp2040_plus_16mb \
waveshare_rp2040_zero \
wiznet_w5100s_evb_pico
do
rm -rf *
PICO_SDK_PATH=~/Devel/pico/pico-sdk cmake .. -DPICO_BOARD=$board
PICO_SDK_PATH=~/Devel/pico/pico-sdk cmake .. -DPICO_BOARD=$board
make -kj20
mv pico_hsm.uf2 ../release/pico_hsm_$board-$VERSION_MAJOR.$VERSION_MINOR.uf2
done
rm -rf *
PICO_SDK_PATH=~/Devel/pico/pico-sdk cmake ..
make -kj20
mv pico_hsm.uf2 ../release/pico_hsm-$VERSION_MAJOR.$VERSION_MINOR.uf2
done

View File

@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ Once a secret AES key is generated, a content can be encrypted and decrypted sym
```
$ echo "This is a text." | sc-tool -l --pin 648219 --encrypt --id 12 --mechanism aes-cbc > crypted.aes
````
```
The file `crypted.aes` contains the ciphered string with the AES key generated previously.
@@ -54,5 +54,4 @@ Using decrypt algorithm AES-CBC
This is a text.
```
AES-CBC it is a block operation and it requires an input size multiple of 16 bytes. Thus, for a trivial data, a padding operation has to be performed beforehand.
AES-CBC it is a block operation and it requires an input size multiple of 16 bytes. Thus, for a trivial data, a padding operation has to be performed beforehand.

View File

@@ -24,12 +24,12 @@ This algorithm uses the PKCSv1.5 padding. It is considered deprecated and insecu
First, we encrypt the data with the public key:
```
$ openssl rsautl -encrypt -inkey 1.pub -in data -pubin -out data.crypt
$ openssl rsautl -encrypt -inkey 1.pub -in data -pubin -out data.crypt
```
Then, we decrypt with the private key inside the Pico HSM:
```
```
$ pkcs11-tool --id 1 --pin 648219 --decrypt --mechanism RSA-PKCS -i data.crypt
Using slot 0 with a present token (0x0)
Using decrypt algorithm RSA-PKCS
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ $ openssl rsautl -encrypt -inkey 1.pub -in data_pad -pubin -out data.crypt -raw
Then, we decrypt with the private key inside the Pico HSM:
```
$ cat data.crypt|pkcs11-tool --id 4 --pin 648219 --decrypt --mechanism RSA-X-509
$ cat data.crypt|pkcs11-tool --id 4 --pin 648219 --decrypt --mechanism RSA-X-509
Using slot 0 with a present token (0x0)
Using decrypt algorithm RSA-X-509
This is a test string. Be safe, be secure.
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ This is a test string. Be safe, be secure.
```
## ECDH-DERIVE
ECC keys do not allow ciphering operations. Instead, the ECDH scheme provides a mechanism to exchange a shared symmetric key without transmitting it to the remote part. The shared key is composed by multiplying the local private key and the remote public key.
ECC keys do not allow ciphering operations. Instead, the ECDH scheme provides a mechanism to exchange a shared symmetric key without transmitting it to the remote part. The shared key is composed by multiplying the local private key and the remote public key.
First, we create the remote part, Bob, by generating an ECC keypair and getting the public key:
```
@@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ No output is displayed if both are equal.
You can also view the contents of both keys:
```
$ xxd -p bob-mine.der
$ xxd -p bob-mine.der
9874558aefa9d92cc051e5da6d1753987e5314925d6d78bf
$ xxd -p mine-bob.der
$ xxd -p mine-bob.der
9874558aefa9d92cc051e5da6d1753987e5314925d6d78bf
```

View File

@@ -29,15 +29,15 @@ symbols.
Please keep the generated DKEK share file in a safe location. We also recommend to keep a
paper printout, in case the electronic version becomes unavailable. A printable version
of the file can be generated using "openssl base64 -in <filename>".
Enter password to encrypt DKEK share :
Enter password to encrypt DKEK share :
Please retype password to confirm :
Please retype password to confirm :
Enciphering DKEK share, please wait...
DKEK share created and saved to dkek.pbe
```
The generated file `dkek.pbe` contains the DKEK. Technically, it contains a share. But if a device is initialized with one share, it is equivalent to contain the full DKEK.
The generated file `dkek.pbe` contains the DKEK. Technically, it contains a share. But if a device is initialized with one share, it is equivalent to contain the full DKEK.
Keep these file in a safe place. If this file is lost, you can export the private keys but you will not be able to import into another device or in the same device if it is initialized again.
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ At this moment, the Pico HSM expects the DKEK. It is loaded with the following c
```
$ sc-hsm-tool --import-dkek-share dkek.pbe
Using reader with a card: Free Software Initiative of Japan Gnuk
Enter password to decrypt DKEK share :
Enter password to decrypt DKEK share :
Deciphering DKEK share, please wait...
DKEK share imported
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ And finally, all are imported one after the other, without special order:
```
$ sc-hsm-tool --import-dkek-share dkek-share-1.pbe
Using reader with a card: Free Software Initiative of Japan Gnuk
Enter password to decrypt DKEK share :
Enter password to decrypt DKEK share :
Deciphering DKEK share, please wait...
DKEK share imported
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ DKEK import pending, 2 share(s) still missing
$ sc-hsm-tool --import-dkek-share dkek-share-2.pbe
Using reader with a card: Free Software Initiative of Japan Gnuk
Enter password to decrypt DKEK share :
Enter password to decrypt DKEK share :
Deciphering DKEK share, please wait...
DKEK share imported
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ DKEK import pending, 1 share(s) still missing
$ sc-hsm-tool --import-dkek-share dkek-share-1.pbe
Using reader with a card: Free Software Initiative of Japan Gnuk
Enter password to decrypt DKEK share :
Enter password to decrypt DKEK share :
Deciphering DKEK share, please wait...
DKEK share imported
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ DKEK key check value : 4B7DA256ACD4EF62
### DKEK n-of-m threshold scheme
This scheme provides an extra level of flexiblity, as not all custodians are necessary to import the DKEK share. For instance, with the previous schemes, if a custodian gets unavailable, the initialization will block until the missing custodian can got to finalize the initialization.
With n-of-m threshold scheme, it flexibilizes the number of required custodians to reduce failure points. If a share is lost, the DKEK can still be recovered without major implications.
With n-of-m threshold scheme, it flexibilizes the number of required custodians to reduce failure points. If a share is lost, the DKEK can still be recovered without major implications.
This scheme is not a replacement of DKEK shares. Instead, it splits the DKEK share encryption password amongst the n-of-m threshold scheme. For instance, if you define 2 shares and a scheme of 3-of-5 threshold for each share, it will imply 10 different custodians, where 6 are necessary to load both shares. You can also mix one share with traditional passphrase and the other with the n-of-m threshold scheme.
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ Using reader with a card:Free Software Initiative of Japan Gnuk
The DKEK will be enciphered using a randomly generated 64 bit password.
This password is split using a (3-of-5) threshold scheme.
Please keep the generated and encrypted DKEK file in a safe location. We also recommend
Please keep the generated and encrypted DKEK file in a safe location. We also recommend
to keep a paper printout, in case the electronic version becomes unavailable. A printable version
of the file can be generated using "openssl base64 -in <filename>".
@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ Private RSA Key [Certificate]
...
```
Note that `Key ref` and `ID` may be different. Whilst different keys may share the same `ID` (highly discouraged), the `Key ref` is a value internally computed and unique.
Note that `Key ref` and `ID` may be different. Whilst different keys may share the same `ID` (highly discouraged), the `Key ref` is a value internally computed and unique.
To export and wrap the private key:
@@ -199,10 +199,10 @@ To export and wrap the private key:
$ sc-hsm-tool --wrap-key wrap-key.bin --key-reference 1 --pin 648219
```
A file named `wrap-key.bin` is created with the private key encrypted securely with the DKEK.
A file named `wrap-key.bin` is created with the private key encrypted securely with the DKEK.
## Restore
To restore the wraped key, a device initialized with the same DKEK is mandatory.
To restore the wraped key, a device initialized with the same DKEK is mandatory.
To unwrap the key:

115
doc/extra_command.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
# Extra command
Pico HSM supports a customized extra command to use with different options. Since the drivers in the market do not support the following features, a raw APDU command shall be sent.
To send a raw APDU command, `opensc-tool -s <APDU>` can be used. The `APDU` parameter is a string of hexadecimal numbers and it takes the following form:
```
8064XX00YYZZZZRR
```
It composed by the following fields:
- `80` to indicate that it is a custom vendor type command.
- `64` is the `INS` custom command.
- `XX` is the command to execute. It varies depending on the targeted command.
- `00` is the parameter of the command. At this moment, no commands support parameters.
- `YY` is the length of the data. If no data is provided, this field is absent.
- `ZZZZ` is the data to be sent. Optional. The length is variable.
- `RR` is the length of the expected response. If no response is expected, this field is absent.
## Real time clock and datetime
Pico HSM has an internal real time clock (RTC) which can track precisely the date and the time. However, when it is reset or powered down, the Pico HSM is reset to the initial datetime: 2020 January 1, 00:00:00.
### Getting the datetime
To obtain the current datetime (referenced to 00:00:00 2020/01/01), the `XX` parameter must be set to `0A`. There is no data and, thus, `YY` and `ZZZZ` are absent. The expected response is 8 bytes length.
For example, to obtain the current datetime:
```
$ opensc-tool -s 80640A0008
Using reader with a card: Free Software Initiative of Japan Gnuk
Sending: 80 64 0A 00 08
Received (SW1=0x90, SW2=0x00):
07 E6 04 06 03 13 29 1E ......).
```
The response is composed by 8 bytes:
- The first two bytes are the current year, MSB first. Hence, `07E6h` equals to `2022`.
- 1 byte for the current month, `01h` is January and `0Ch` is December.
- 1 byte for the current day, from `01h` (1) to `1Fh` (31).
- 1 byte for the day of the week, `00h` is Sunday, `01h` is Monday, etc.
- 1 byte for the hours, from `00h` (0) to `17h` (23).
- 1 byte for the minutes, from `00h` (0) to `3Bh` (59).
- 1 byte for the seconds, from `00h` (0) to `3Bh` (59).
If the command is correctly received, `SW1=0x90` and `SW2=0x00`. Other values mean that an error has ocurred.
### Setting the datetime
To set the reference datetime, a datetime string must be provided. For example:
```
$ opensc-tool -s 80640A000807E6040603132917
Using reader with a card: Free Software Initiative of Japan Gnuk
Sending: 80 64 0A 00 08 07 E6 04 06 03 13 29 17
Received (SW1=0x90, SW2=0x00)
```
will set the reference datetime to `Wednesday, 2022 April 6th, 19:41:23`.
## Dynamic options
Pico HSM support initialize options, such as setting Transport PIN or reset retry counter options. However, once it is initialized, these options cannot be modified anymore, without a new initialization (loosing all stored keys). Pico HSM offers the chance to define a set of dynamic options that can be enabled/disabled dynamically without initializing the device at every moment.
To specify a set of options, the `XX` parameter shall be set to `06`. The data parameter shall be 1 byte, where the options are combined with the or operand `|`. The length `YY` shall be set to `01`.
Available options (counting from LSB):
- Bit `0`: enable/disable press-to-confirm button.
- Bit `1`: enable/disable key usage counter for all keys.
### Press-to-confirm button
Press-to-confirm button offers an extra security layer by requiring the user confirmation everytime that a private/secret key is loaded. This avoids ghost applications thay may perform hidden opperations without noticing the user, such as signing or decrypting. Pico HSM will inform the user that is awaiting for a confirmation by making almost a fixed Led blink.
This feature is disabled by default but can be enabled rapidly by setting the LSB bit to 1:
```
$ opensc-tool -s 806406000101
Using reader with a card: Free Software Initiative of Japan Gnuk
Sending: 80 64 06 00 01 01
Received (SW1=0x90, SW2=0x00)
```
At this moment, when a private/secret key is loaded, the Pico HSM will wait for the pressed BOOTSEL button to confirm the operation.
To disable, the LSB bit must be set to 0:
```
$ opensc-tool -s 806406000100
Using reader with a card: Free Software Initiative of Japan Gnuk
Sending: 80 64 06 00 01 00
Received (SW1=0x90, SW2=0x00)
```
### Key usage counter by default
Pico HSM supports a key usage counter to audit the usage of a particular key. For every operation with the key, the counter is reduced by 1. When it reaches 0, the key is disabled and cannot be used.
This option is disabled by default. When enabled, each generated key in the device is attached to a counter, starting at `2^32-1` (`FFFFFFFEh`). Therefore, it allows to count how many times a key is used for signing or decryption.
The counter can be viewed by using the SCS3 tool. More info at [doc/scs3.md](/doc/scs3.md).
This feature is disabled by default but can be enabled rapidly by setting the 2nd LSB bit to 1:
```
$ opensc-tool -s 806406000102
Using reader with a card: Free Software Initiative of Japan Gnuk
Sending: 80 64 06 00 01 01
Received (SW1=0x90, SW2=0x00)
```
At this moment, when a private/secret key is loaded, the Pico HSM will wait for the pressed BOOTSEL button to confirm the operation.
To disable, the LSB bit must be set to 0:
```
$ opensc-tool -s 806406000100
Using reader with a card: Free Software Initiative of Japan Gnuk
Sending: 80 64 06 00 01 00
Received (SW1=0x90, SW2=0x00)
```

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
# Public Key Authentication
Public Key Authentication (PKA) is a mechanism to authenticate a legit user without introducing any PIN (see Notes below). The authentication is performed by signing a challenge and checking the signature result.
1. A Pico HSM #A contains a private key, whose public key will be used for authentication.
2. The public key of #A is registered into a second Pico HSM #B.
3. When a user wants to login into #B, #B generates a challenge that is passed to #A for signature.
4. #A signs the challenge and returns the signature.
5. #B verifies the signature against the challenge with the public key of #A, previously registered.
6. If the signature is valid, #B grants access to the user.
To enable PKA, the device must be initialized beforehand. In case the device has secret/private keys, all shall be exported and reimported when the set up is finished.
## Requirements
To take advantage of PKA, the following is required:
1. Two Pico HSM: one will be used only for authentication (it can be any device able to generate a private key and sign arbitrary data).
2. [SCS3](/doc/scs3.md "SCS3") tool to authenticate the user. At this time, OpenSC does not support PKA, only initialization.
3. A secret key of ECC 256 bits.
## Usage
Before using SCS3, it must be patched [scs3.patch.txt](https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm/files/8890050/scs3.patch.txt). See [SCS3](/doc/scs3.md "SCS3") for further details.
### Generate the authentication key
On a secondary device, generate a private key, on the ECC 256 bits (`brainpoolP256r1` or `secp192r1`). Label it with an easy name, such as "Authentication".
<img width="1037" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/55573252/173353764-4620ece4-0d82-4a23-a153-99bf912621a7.png">
Once finished, export the public key.
<img width="350" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/55573252/173353732-63f40572-a42f-4e5c-a9ab-6e52a083956b.png">
### Initialization
On the primary device, initialize it. When prompting for an authentication mechanism, select "Public Key Authentication".
<img width="412" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/55573252/173353661-17caf6db-0c76-4903-9b70-5afa79f5ae54.png"><img width="1037" alt="Captura de Pantalla 2022-06-13 a les 12 14 48" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/55573252/173353822-310219dc-7c7d-4ece-9fd9-c7835c2688df.png">
Once finished, register the exported public key. A message of `0 authenticated public key(s) in 1 of 1 scheme` will appear if it is properly registered.
<img width="342" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/55573252/173353917-f3f99405-c7ff-43ce-8914-6f3b713df952.png"><img width="1037" alt="Captura de Pantalla 2022-06-13 a les 12 16 17" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/55573252/173353946-ee7eacf9-cead-4804-ac7a-57848f7c822b.png">
### Authentication
Plug the secondary device that stores the private key (do not load the device in the SCS3 tool) and initiate the public key authentication.
<img width="321" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/55573252/173353998-8f418ec6-d90d-4168-801f-51008c78824d.png">
Select the secondary card and the Authentication private key (or the name you labeled it).
<img width="435" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/55573252/173354044-50163113-829e-4d80-bbda-7b589849af73.png">
Introduce the PIN of the secondary device.
If the private key matches with the registered public key, the primary device will grant access and it will display `User PIN authenticated (9000)` (despite no PIN is provided).
From now on, you have full access and can operate normally with the primary device.
## Notes on DKEK
Pico HSM uses the PIN to protect the DKEK, which is lately used to protect private/secret keys and wrap/unwrap. However, when PKA is enabled, the authentication is not performed by introducing any PIN.
Authenticated privileges are granted when PKA succeeds, regardless of PIN, which is optional.
Nevertheless, **it is extremely recommended to combine PKA with PIN**. Note that when combined, only PKA grants authenticated privileges. Therefore, if both schemes are setup, it is necessary to unlock the DKEK with PIN verification.
Otherwise, it will not be possible to operate with private/secret keys despite the user will be logged in.
With this scheme, multiple custodians may authenticate the device individually and remotely and, when fully authenticated, the master user can unlock the DKEK with the PIN.
Moreover, with this approach the device is kept safe and neither the DKEK nor the private/secret keys are stored in plain text in the device.
Even though the flash memory is dumped by an attacker, it will not be possible to decipher any sensitive data or key.
Initialization of the device with PKA **and** PIN can be achieved with SCS3 or OpenSC:
**Note:** do not import any DKEK share or DKEK operation before PKA and PIN setup.
### With OpenSC
Use the following command (or similar), which accepts the use of PIN parameter **and** PKA configuration:
```
sc-hsm-tool -X --so-pin 1234567890123456 --pin 648219 -K 1 -n 1 -s 1
```
and PKA and PIN are enabled, jointly with DKEK protection.
### With SCS3
Unfortunately, SCS3 does not allow to initialize the device with PKA and PIN at the same time, though it can be achieved in separated steps:
1. Initialize the device with PKA. When done, the PIN will not be initialized but it will advice that 3 attemps can be performed.
2. There is NO default PIN. So, DO NOT attempt to log in yet. A reset PIN shall be requested.
3. Click on ``Reset User-PIN``, introduce the SO-PIN configured during the initialization and introduce the desired User-PIN.
When done, the device will be configured with PIN **and** PKA.

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@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
# SCS3 tool
SCS3 tool is a specific tool developed by CardContact to manage HSM. Thanks to its interface, Pico HSM can be enhanced with more advanced functionalities, not present in the PKCS11 module:
- Import PKCS12 private keys and certificates.
- Import private keys and certificates from other Pico HSM devices in WKY format.
-
Unfortunately, there is no pkcs11 tool or equivalent capable to perform the import. Since it uses the SC-HSM driver, it also supports the communication with the [SCS3 tool](https://www.openscdp.org/scsh3/ "SCS3 tool"). It can be downloaded from [here](https://www.openscdp.org/scsh3/download.html "here").
However, SCS3 only works with those HSM manufactured by CardContact. The check is performed by means of trust store against the manufacturing certificates. For obvious reasons, these certificates can only be signed with the private keys of the Certificate Authorities listed in the trust store.
Pico HSM is shipped with its own CA certificates. To load this certificate onto the trust store of SCS3, the following line has to be appended to `SmartCardHSM.rootCerts` variable, near line `235` in the file `scs3/scsh/sc-hsm/SmartCardHSM.js`.
```
ESPICOHSMCA00001: new CVC(new ByteString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
```
Therefore, the whole variable becomes:
```
SmartCardHSM.rootCerts = {
DESRCACC100001: new CVC(new ByteString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
UTSRCACC100001: new CVC(new ByteString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
ESPICOHSMCA00001: new CVC(new ByteString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
}
```
Similarly, replace the line `1531` in file `scs3/keymanager/keymanager.js` with:
```
assert(devcert.verifyWith(this.crypto, dicacert.getPublicKey(SmartCardHSM.rootCerts.ESPICOHSMCA00001.getPublicKey()), dicacert.getPublicKeyOID()));
```
Alternatively, this patch [scs3.patch.txt](https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm/files/9415877/scs3.patch.txt) can be applied.
After this ammendment, the program can be started and the KeyManager can be invoked (CTRL+M) and it will output something similar to:
```
>load("keymanager/keymanager.js");
SmartCard-HSM Version 2.6 on JCOP Free memory 215512 byte
Issuer Certificate : CVC id-AT DV (official domestic) CAR=ESPICOHSMCA00001 CHR=ESPICOHSMDV00001 CED=18 / dagost / 2022 CXD=14 / de juny / 2023
Device Certificate : CVC id-AT Terminal CAR=ESPICOHSMDV00001 CHR=ESPICOHSMTRYZRGW CED=22 / dagost / 2022 CXD=22 / dagost / 2023
Default Key Domain : 223CD8D8F794889AC163305881BF8C04960BBB8658120491F1C0601F6BF97183
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Please right-click on nodes in the outline to see possible actions.
For most operations you will need to authenticate first using a
mechanism from the User PIN context menu.
>
```
The SCS3 tool is ready to import private keys and certificates, wraped in WKY files or in PKCS#12 format. Also, all stored keys can be exported, combined with their respective certificates. Note that the user has to be previously logged in.
## macOS users
In macOS, the PCSC must be explicitly specified. Otherwise, the reader will not be found.
It can be executed in a Terminal via
```
java -Dsun.security.smartcardio.library=/System/Library/Frameworks/PCSC.framework/Versions/Current/PCSC -Dorg.bouncycastle.asn1.allow_unsafe_integer=true -Djava.library.path=./lib -classpath 'lib/*' de.cardcontact.scdp.scsh3.GUIShell
```
## DKEK requirement
In order to perform the import, private keys must be wrapped with the same DKEK present in the Pico HSM. Thus, the Pico HSM must be previously initialized with at minimum of 1 DKEK share. This share will be used to wrap the private key before import.
Note that the DKEK share shall be available before the import. In this way, all custodians must be present during the import process, since they will have to introduce their respective DKEK.
## RSA 4096 support
Generating 4096 bits key in the Pico HSM is highly expensive. It may take minutes or hours to finish the generation. Therefore, it is extremely recommendable to generate the key in the host and import it into the Pico HSM.

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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# Sign and verify
Pico HSM supports in place signature of arbitrary data. It supports the following algorithms:
* RSA-PKCS
* RSA-PKCS
* RSA-X-509
* SHA1-RSA-PKCS
* SHA256-RSA-PKCS
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ $ openssl rsa -inform DER -outform PEM -in 1.der -pubin > 1.pub
At this moment, you are able to verify with the public key in `1.pub`. The signature is computed inside the Pico HSM with the private key. It never leaves the device.
## RSA-PKCS
This algorithm is used to sign raw data.
This algorithm is used to sign raw data.
To sign the data:
```
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ This algorithm uses the RSA-PKCS with PSS salt to randomize the signature. Pico
To sign the data:
```
$ pkcs11-tool --id 1 --sign --pin 648219 --mechanism RSA-PKCS-PSS -i data.sha1 -o data.sig
```
```
To verify the signature:
```
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ This algorithm takes the file as the input and sends its hash for signing with t
To sign the data:
```
$ pkcs11-tool --id 1 --sign --pin 648219 --mechanism SHA1-RSA-PKCS-PSS -i data -o data.sig
```
```
To verify the signature:
```
@@ -118,14 +118,14 @@ This is a raw ECDSA signature, which is usually used to sign a hashed message. `
To sign the data:
```
$ pkcs11-tool --id 11 --sign --pin 648219 --mechanism ECDSA -i data.sha1 -o data.sig --signature-format openssl
$ pkcs11-tool --id 11 --sign --pin 648219 --mechanism ECDSA -i data.sha1 -o data.sig --signature-format openssl
Using slot 0 with a present token (0x0)
Using signature algorithm ECDSA
```
To verify the signature:
```
$ openssl pkeyutl -verify -pubin -inkey 11.pub -in data.sha1 -sigfile data.sig
$ openssl pkeyutl -verify -pubin -inkey 11.pub -in data.sha1 -sigfile data.sig
Signature Verified Successfully
```
@@ -143,11 +143,6 @@ Using signature algorithm ECDSA-SHA256
The signature is verified with the hash:
```
$ openssl pkeyutl -verify -pubin -inkey 11.pub -in data.sha1 -sigfile data.sig
$ openssl pkeyutl -verify -pubin -inkey 11.pub -in data.sha1 -sigfile data.sig
Signature Verified Successfully
```

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@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
# Store binary data
Pico HSM has a internal flash which can store binary data. With this approach, you can save different files, encrypt into the Pico HSM and retrieve them after.
## Maximum size
Due to internal constraints with the flash components, the maximum file size is `4096` bytes. This mechanism is mainly used to store small files, such as keys in plain text, certificates, credentials, etc.
## Store a file
Before writting a file into the Pico HSM, we generate the data file with the following text:
```
$ echo 'Pico HSM is awesome!' > test
```
Then, we can store the data file with the following command:
```
$ pkcs11-tool --pin 648219 --write-object test --type data --id 1 --label 'test1'
Using slot 0 with a present token (0x0)
Created Data Object:
Data object 1236368320
label: 'test1'
application: 'test1'
app_id: <empty>
flags: modifiable
```
This file can also be protected with the PIN. In this case, use the previous command with the `--private` flag:
```
$ pkcs11-tool --pin 648219 --write-object test --type data --id 2 --label 'test2' --private
Using slot 0 with a present token (0x0)
Created Data Object:
Data object 1329612320
label: 'test2'
application: 'test2'
app_id: <empty>
flags: modifiable private
```
Always provide a unique `--label`, as it will be used to index and reference the file for retrieving.
## Retrieve a file
To view the stored file, we can use the following command with the same label we employed:
```
$ pkcs11-tool --read-object --type data --label 'test1'
Using slot 0 with a present token (0x0)
Pico HSM is awesome!
```
Note that if the `--private` flag is not provided during the writting stage, the file can be accessed without the PIN.
To retrieve a private file with the PIN:
```
$ pkcs11-tool --read-object --type data --label 'test2' --pin 648219
Using slot 0 with a present token (0x0)
Pico HSM is awesome!
```
## Using `pkcs15-tool`
PKCS15 tool can be used to list the stored files. For instance:
```
$ pkcs15-tool -D
Using reader with a card: Free Software Initiative of Japan Gnuk
PKCS#15 Card [Pico-HSM]:
Version : 1
Serial number : ESTERMHSM
Manufacturer ID: Pol Henarejos
Flags : PRN generation, EID compliant
PIN [UserPIN]
Object Flags : [0x03], private, modifiable
Auth ID : 02
ID : 01
Flags : [0x812], local, initialized, exchangeRefData
Length : min_len:6, max_len:15, stored_len:0
Pad char : 0x00
Reference : 129 (0x81)
Type : ascii-numeric
Path : e82b0601040181c31f0201::
Tries left : 3
PIN [SOPIN]
Object Flags : [0x01], private
ID : 02
Flags : [0x9A], local, unblock-disabled, initialized, soPin
Length : min_len:16, max_len:16, stored_len:0
Pad char : 0x00
Reference : 136 (0x88)
Type : bcd
Path : e82b0601040181c31f0201::
Tries left : 15
Data object 'test1'
applicationName: test1
Path: e82b0601040181c31f0201::cf00
Data (21 bytes): 5069636F2048534D20697320617765736F6D65210A
Data object 'test2'
applicationName: test2
Path: e82b0601040181c31f0201::cd01
Auth ID: 01
```
As expected, the public file is displayed (in hexadecimal string). The private file contains the `Auth ID` flag and it is not displayed.
## Delete a file
A stored file can be deleted with the following command:
```
$ pkcs11-tool --login --pin 648219 --delete-object --type data --application-label test1
```

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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# Usage
## Tools
We use multiple tools and PKCS#11 drivers and modules, depending on the purpose.
We use multiple tools and PKCS#11 drivers and modules, depending on the purpose.
* **pkcs11-tool**: from OpenSC. It interfaces with the HSM via PKCS#11 interface. It supports different drivers and modules.
* **sc-tool**: an alias of pkcs11-tool with the sc-hsm-embedded module. It is mainly used for AES management and it is defined as:
```
@@ -22,20 +22,20 @@ init=0
PIN=648219
```
`opensc-pkcs11.so` can be replaced by `libsc-hsm-pkcs11.so` if desired.
* **sc-hsm-tool**: from OpenSC. Used to initialize the device.
* **pico-hsm-tool**: Used to initialize the device.
* **opensc-tool**: from OpenSC. Used to list and detect the reader with the HSM.
[^1]: `openssl version -a` will return the `OPENSSLDIR`, which contains `openssl.cnf` file and `ENGINESDIR`, which contains the p11 engine.
## Initialization
The first step is to initialize the HSM:
The first step is to initialize the HSM. To do so, use the `pico-hsm-tool.py` in `tools` folder:
```
$ sc-hsm-tool --initialize --so-pin 3537363231383830 --pin 648219
$ python3 pico-hsm-tool.py initialize --so-pin 3537363231383830 --pin 648219
```
The PIN number is used to manage all private keys in the device. It supports three attemps. After the third PIN failure, it gets blocked.
The PIN number is used to manage all private keys in the device. It supports three attemps. After the third PIN failure, it gets blocked.
The PIN accepts from 6 to 16 characters.
The SO-PIN is used to unblock the PIN. It accepts 15 attemps. After 15 failed attempts, the device will be completely blocked and will be necessary to initialize again, erasing all private keys and losing the access. Therefore, keep the SO-PIN in a safe place.
The SO-PIN is used to unblock the PIN. It accepts 15 attemps. After 15 failed attempts, the device will be completely blocked and will be necessary to initialize again, erasing all private keys and losing the access. Therefore, keep the SO-PIN in a safe place.
The SO-PIN is always 16 hexadecimal characters.
## PIN and SO-PIN management
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ To generate a RSA 2048 bits, use the following command:
$ pkcs11-tool -l --pin 648219 --keypairgen --key-type rsa:2048 --id 1 --label "RSA2K"
Using slot 0 with a present token (0x0)
Key pair generated:
Private Key Object; RSA
Private Key Object; RSA
label: RSA2K
ID: 1
Usage: decrypt, sign
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ The ID parameter is an internal hexadecimal number for easy identification. The
Pico HSM accepts RSA of 1024 (`rsa:1024`), 2048 (`rsa:2048`) and 4096 bits (`rsa:4096`).
**Caution**: RSA 2048 bits may take more than 20 seconds. RSA 4096 bits may take more than 20 minutes. The Pico HSM will work as normally and neither the HSM nor the host will block. But, in the meantime, the Pico HSM will not accept any command.
**Caution**: RSA 2048 bits may take more than 20 seconds. RSA 4096 bits may take more than 20 minutes. The Pico HSM will work as normally and neither the HSM nor the host will block. But, in the meantime, the Pico HSM will not accept any command.
An alternative is to generate the private key locally and import it to the HSM. This approach, however, is less secure as it does not use a True RNG or HRNG like Pico HSM. Use this approach if you have plugged a TRNG or you are not worried about obtaining the highest entropy.
Pico HSM also accepts ECDSA keypairs:
@@ -157,9 +157,9 @@ Certificate:
a0:30:b2:ec:d3:d6:0d:58:f3
Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
98:07:DA:13:B0:8E:A0:5C:97:83:68:FE:4A:25:8D:50:C4:DC:16:FA
X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
keyid:98:07:DA:13:B0:8E:A0:5C:97:83:68:FE:4A:25:8D:50:C4:DC:16:FA
X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ Certificate:
99:2b:b2:82:66:c1:06:a7:2c:62:af:e2:e4:93:42:36:66:8d:
c5:3f:e1:ec:5f:9a:f8:5f:b3:6a:8f:0e:12:5d:c9:46:38:ea:
0b:08
```
```
The resulting file `cert.pem` contains the signed certificate in PEM format. Convert it into DER format and load it into the Pico HSM:

Submodule mbedtls deleted from d65aeb3734

1
pico-hsm-sdk Submodule

Submodule pico-hsm-sdk added at 599e5edbd1

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@@ -1,466 +0,0 @@
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "file.h"
#include "tusb.h"
#include "hsm2040.h"
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "libopensc/card-sc-hsm.h"
#include <string.h>
extern const uintptr_t end_data_pool;
extern const uintptr_t start_data_pool;
extern int flash_write_data_to_file(file_t *file, const uint8_t *data, uint16_t len);
extern int flash_program_halfword (uintptr_t addr, uint16_t data);
extern int flash_program_word (uintptr_t addr, uint32_t data);
extern int flash_program_uintptr (uintptr_t addr, uintptr_t data);
extern int flash_program_block(uintptr_t addr, const uint8_t *data, size_t len);
extern uintptr_t flash_read_uintptr(uintptr_t addr);
extern uint16_t flash_read_uint16(uintptr_t addr);
extern uint8_t flash_read_uint8(uintptr_t addr);
extern uint8_t *flash_read(uintptr_t addr);
extern void low_flash_available();
//puts FCI in the RAPDU
void process_fci(const file_t *pe) {
uint8_t *p = res_APDU;
uint8_t buf[64];
res_APDU_size = 0;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = 0x6f;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = 0x00; //computed later
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = 0x81;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = 2;
if (pe->data) {
if ((pe->type & FILE_DATA_FUNC) == FILE_DATA_FUNC) {
uint16_t len = ((int (*)(const file_t *, int))(pe->data))(pe, 0);
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = (len >> 8) & 0xff;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = len & 0xff;
}
else {
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = pe->data[1];
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = pe->data[0];
}
}
else {
memset(res_APDU+res_APDU_size, 0, 2);
res_APDU_size += 2;
}
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = 0x82;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = 1;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size] = 0;
if (pe->type == FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF)
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] |= 0x08;
else if (pe->type == FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF)
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] |= pe->ef_structure & 0x7;
else if (pe->type == FILE_TYPE_DF)
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] |= 0x38;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = 0x83;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = 2;
put_uint16_t(pe->fid, res_APDU+res_APDU_size);
res_APDU_size += 2;
res_APDU[1] = res_APDU_size-2;
}
const uint8_t cvca[] = {
0x6A, 0x01,
0x7f, 0x21, 0x82, 0x01, 0x65, 0x7f, 0x4e, 0x82, 0x01, 0x2d, 0x5f,
0x29, 0x01, 0x00, 0x42, 0x0e, 0x45, 0x53, 0x48, 0x53, 0x4d, 0x43,
0x56, 0x43, 0x41, 0x32, 0x30, 0x34, 0x30, 0x31, 0x7f, 0x49, 0x81,
0xdd, 0x06, 0x0a, 0x04, 0x00, 0x7f, 0x00, 0x07, 0x02, 0x02, 0x02,
0x02, 0x03, 0x81, 0x18, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfe, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x82, 0x18, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xfe, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfc, 0x83,
0x18, 0x64, 0x21, 0x05, 0x19, 0xe5, 0x9c, 0x80, 0xe7, 0x0f, 0xa7,
0xe9, 0xab, 0x72, 0x24, 0x30, 0x49, 0xfe, 0xb8, 0xde, 0xec, 0xc1,
0x46, 0xb9, 0xb1, 0x84, 0x31, 0x04, 0x18, 0x8d, 0xa8, 0x0e, 0xb0,
0x30, 0x90, 0xf6, 0x7c, 0xbf, 0x20, 0xeb, 0x43, 0xa1, 0x88, 0x00,
0xf4, 0xff, 0x0a, 0xfd, 0x82, 0xff, 0x10, 0x12, 0x07, 0x19, 0x2b,
0x95, 0xff, 0xc8, 0xda, 0x78, 0x63, 0x10, 0x11, 0xed, 0x6b, 0x24,
0xcd, 0xd5, 0x73, 0xf9, 0x77, 0xa1, 0x1e, 0x79, 0x48, 0x11, 0x85,
0x18, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0x99, 0xde, 0xf8, 0x36, 0x14, 0x6b, 0xc9, 0xb1, 0xb4,
0xd2, 0x28, 0x31, 0x86, 0x31, 0x04, 0x4d, 0x28, 0x34, 0x67, 0xb5,
0x43, 0xfd, 0x84, 0x22, 0x09, 0xbd, 0xd2, 0xd6, 0x26, 0x27, 0x2d,
0x53, 0xa7, 0xdf, 0x52, 0x8f, 0xc2, 0xde, 0x7c, 0x9a, 0xcd, 0x1f,
0xf2, 0x10, 0x42, 0x7c, 0x13, 0x44, 0x03, 0xb0, 0xa5, 0xdf, 0x8a,
0xd4, 0x59, 0xd1, 0x86, 0x4b, 0xde, 0x33, 0xb1, 0x60, 0x17, 0x87,
0x01, 0x01, 0x5f, 0x20, 0x0e, 0x45, 0x53, 0x48, 0x53, 0x4d, 0x43,
0x56, 0x43, 0x41, 0x32, 0x30, 0x34, 0x30, 0x31, 0x7f, 0x4c, 0x12,
0x06, 0x09, 0x04, 0x00, 0x7f, 0x00, 0x07, 0x03, 0x01, 0x02, 0x02,
0x53, 0x05, 0xc0, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x5f, 0x25, 0x06, 0x02,
0x02, 0x00, 0x02, 0x01, 0x09, 0x5f, 0x24, 0x06, 0x03, 0x00, 0x01,
0x02, 0x03, 0x01, 0x5f, 0x37, 0x30, 0x26, 0x2d, 0x6f, 0xa6, 0xd0,
0x52, 0x01, 0xf1, 0x41, 0x1e, 0xe9, 0x33, 0x29, 0x19, 0x42, 0x42,
0x9b, 0xb0, 0xeb, 0xf7, 0x46, 0x20, 0xcb, 0x81, 0xfe, 0xda, 0xd7,
0xab, 0x2b, 0xdc, 0xa7, 0x38, 0xf4, 0xc8, 0xec, 0x4c, 0x66, 0xb4,
0x0a, 0x2d, 0x16, 0xfb, 0xf3, 0x79, 0xe9, 0x93, 0xc8, 0x25
};
const uint8_t token_info[] = {
0x28, 0x00, //litle endian
0x30, 0x26, 0x2, 0x1, 0x1, 0x4, 0x4, 0xd, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xc, 0xd, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x20, 0x48, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x61, 0x72, 0x65, 0x6a, 0x6f, 0x73, 0x80, 0x8, 0x48, 0x53, 0x4d, 0x20, 0x32, 0x30, 0x34, 0x30, 0x3, 0x2, 0x4, 0xf0
};
extern const uint8_t sc_hsm_aid[];
extern int parse_token_info(const file_t *f, int mode);
file_t file_entries[] = {
/* 0 */ { .fid = 0x3f00 , .parent = 0xff, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_DF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = 0, .acl = {0} }, // MF
/* 1 */ { .fid = 0x2f00 , .parent = 0, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} }, //EF.DIR
/* 2 */ { .fid = 0x2f01 , .parent = 0, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} }, //EF.ATR
/* 3 */ { .fid = 0x2f02 , .parent = 0, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF,.data = (uint8_t *)cvca, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} }, //EF.GDO
/* 4 */ { .fid = 0x2f03 , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF | FILE_DATA_FUNC,.data = (uint8_t *)parse_token_info, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} }, //EF.TokenInfo
/* 5 */ { .fid = 0x5015 , .parent = 0, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_DF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = 0, .acl = {0} }, //DF.PKCS15
/* 6 */ { .fid = 0x5031 , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} }, //EF.ODF
/* 7 */ { .fid = 0x5032 , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} }, //EF.TokenInfo
/* 8 */ { .fid = 0x5033 , .parent = 0, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} }, //EF.UnusedSpace
/* 9 */ { .fid = 0x1081 , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0xff} }, //PIN (PIN1)
/* 10 */ { .fid = 0x1082 , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0xff} }, //max retries PIN (PIN1)
/* 11 */ { .fid = 0x1083 , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0xff} }, //retries PIN (PIN1)
/* 12 */ { .fid = 0x1088 , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0xff} }, //PIN (SOPIN)
/* 13 */ { .fid = 0x1089 , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0xff} }, //max retries PIN (SOPIN)
/* 14 */ { .fid = 0x108A , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0xff} }, //retries PIN (SOPIN)
/* 15 */ { .fid = EF_DKEK , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0xff} }, //DKEK
/* 16 */ { .fid = EF_PRKDFS , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} }, //EF.PrKDFs
/* 17 */ { .fid = EF_PUKDFS , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} }, //EF.PuKDFs
/* 18 */ { .fid = EF_CDFS , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} }, //EF.CDFs
/* 19 */ { .fid = EF_AODFS , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} }, //EF.AODFs
/* 20 */ { .fid = EF_DODFS , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} }, //EF.DODFs
/* 21 */ { .fid = EF_SKDFS , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} }, //EF.SKDFs
///* 22 */ { .fid = 0x0000, .parent = 0, .name = openpgpcard_aid, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} },
/* 23 */ { .fid = 0x0000, .parent = 5, .name = sc_hsm_aid, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} },
/* 24 */ { .fid = 0x0000, .parent = 0xff, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_UNKNOWN, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = 0, .acl = {0} } //end
};
const file_t *MF = &file_entries[0];
const file_t *file_last = &file_entries[sizeof(file_entries)/sizeof(file_t)-1];
const file_t *file_openpgp = &file_entries[sizeof(file_entries)/sizeof(file_t)-3];
const file_t *file_sc_hsm = &file_entries[sizeof(file_entries)/sizeof(file_t)-2];
file_t *file_pin1 = NULL;
file_t *file_retries_pin1 = NULL;
file_t *file_sopin = NULL;
file_t *file_retries_sopin = NULL;
#define MAX_DYNAMIC_FILES 64
uint16_t dynamic_files = 0;
file_t dynamic_file[MAX_DYNAMIC_FILES];
bool card_terminated = false;
bool is_parent(const file_t *child, const file_t *parent) {
if (child == parent)
return true;
if (child == MF)
return false;
return is_parent(&file_entries[child->parent], parent);
}
file_t *get_parent(file_t *f) {
return &file_entries[f->parent];
}
file_t *search_by_name(uint8_t *name, uint16_t namelen) {
for (file_t *p = file_entries; p != file_last; p++) {
if (p->name && *p->name == apdu.cmd_apdu_data_len && memcmp(p->name+1, name, namelen) == 0) {
return p;
}
}
return NULL;
}
file_t *search_by_fid(const uint16_t fid, const file_t *parent, const uint8_t sp) {
for (file_t *p = file_entries; p != file_last; p++) {
if (p->fid != 0x0000 && p->fid == fid) {
if (!parent || (parent && is_parent(p, parent))) {
if (!sp || sp == SPECIFY_ANY || (((sp & SPECIFY_EF) && (p->type & FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF)) || ((sp & SPECIFY_DF) && p->type == FILE_TYPE_DF)))
return p;
}
}
}
return NULL;
}
uint8_t make_path_buf(const file_t *pe, uint8_t *buf, uint8_t buflen, const file_t *top) {
if (!buflen)
return 0;
if (pe == top) //MF or relative DF
return 0;
put_uint16_t(pe->fid, buf);
return make_path_buf(&file_entries[pe->parent], buf+2, buflen-2, top)+2;
}
uint8_t make_path(const file_t *pe, const file_t *top, uint8_t *path) {
uint8_t buf[MAX_DEPTH*2], *p = path;
put_uint16_t(pe->fid, buf);
uint8_t depth = make_path_buf(&file_entries[pe->parent], buf+2, sizeof(buf)-2, top)+2;
for (int d = depth-2; d >= 0; d -= 2) {
memcpy(p, buf+d, 2);
p += 2;
}
return depth;
}
file_t *search_by_path(const uint8_t *pe_path, uint8_t pathlen, const file_t *parent) {
uint8_t path[MAX_DEPTH*2];
if (pathlen > sizeof(path)) {
return NULL;
}
for (file_t *p = file_entries; p != file_last; p++) {
uint8_t depth = make_path(p, parent, path);
if (pathlen == depth && memcmp(path, pe_path, depth) == 0)
return p;
}
return NULL;
}
file_t *currentEF = NULL;
file_t *currentDF = NULL;
const file_t *selected_applet = NULL;
bool isUserAuthenticated = false;
bool authenticate_action(const file_t *ef, uint8_t op) {
uint8_t acl = ef->acl[op];
if (acl == 0x0)
return true;
else if (acl == 0xff)
return false;
else if (acl == 0x90 || acl & 0x9F == 0x10) {
// PIN required.
if(isUserAuthenticated) {
return true;
}
else {
return false;
}
}
return false;
}
#include "libopensc/pkcs15.h"
void initialize_chain(file_chain_t **chain) {
file_chain_t *next;
for (file_chain_t *f = *chain; f; f = next) {
next = f->next;
free(f);
}
*chain = NULL;
}
void initialize_flash(bool hard) {
if (hard) {
const uint8_t empty[8] = { 0 };
flash_program_block(end_data_pool, empty, sizeof(empty));
low_flash_available();
}
for (file_t *f = file_entries; f != file_last; f++) {
if ((f->type & FILE_DATA_FLASH) == FILE_DATA_FLASH)
f->data = NULL;
}
dynamic_files = 0;
}
void scan_flash() {
initialize_flash(false); //soft initialization
if (*(uintptr_t *)end_data_pool == 0xffffffff && *(uintptr_t *)(end_data_pool+sizeof(uintptr_t)) == 0xffffffff)
{
printf("First initialization (or corrupted!)\r\n");
const uint8_t empty[8] = { 0 };
flash_program_block(end_data_pool, empty, sizeof(empty));
//low_flash_available();
//wait_flash_finish();
}
printf("SCAN\r\n");
uintptr_t base = flash_read_uintptr(end_data_pool);
for (uintptr_t base = flash_read_uintptr(end_data_pool); base >= start_data_pool; base = flash_read_uintptr(base)) {
if (base == 0x0) //all is empty
break;
uint16_t fid = flash_read_uint16(base+sizeof(uintptr_t)+sizeof(uintptr_t));
printf("[%x] scan fid %x, len %d\r\n",base,fid,flash_read_uint16(base+sizeof(uintptr_t)+sizeof(uintptr_t)+sizeof(uint16_t)));
file_t *file = (file_t *)search_by_fid(fid, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
if (!file) {
file = file_new(fid);
if ((fid & 0xff00) == (KEY_PREFIX << 8)) {
//add_file_to_chain(file, &ef_kf);
}
else if ((fid & 0xff00) == (PRKD_PREFIX << 8)) {
//add_file_to_chain(file, &ef_prkdf);
}
else if ((fid & 0xff00) == (CD_PREFIX << 8)) {
//add_file_to_chain(file, &ef_cdf);
}
else if ((fid & 0xff00) == (EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX << 8)) {
//add_file_to_chain(file, &ef_pukdf);
}
else {
TU_LOG1("SCAN FOUND ORPHAN FILE: %x\r\n",fid);
continue;
}
}
file->data = (uint8_t *)(base+sizeof(uintptr_t)+sizeof(uintptr_t)+sizeof(uint16_t));
if (flash_read_uintptr(base) == 0x0) {
break;
}
}
file_pin1 = search_by_fid(0x1081, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
if (file_pin1) {
if (!file_pin1->data) {
TU_LOG1("PIN1 is empty. Initializing with default password\r\n");
const uint8_t empty[33] = { 0 };
flash_write_data_to_file(file_pin1, empty, sizeof(empty));
}
}
else {
TU_LOG1("FATAL ERROR: PIN1 not found in memory!\r\n");
}
file_sopin = search_by_fid(0x1088, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
if (file_sopin) {
if (!file_sopin->data) {
TU_LOG1("SOPIN is empty. Initializing with default password\r\n");
const uint8_t empty[33] = { 0 };
flash_write_data_to_file(file_sopin, empty, sizeof(empty));
}
}
else {
TU_LOG1("FATAL ERROR: SOPIN not found in memory!\r\n");
}
file_retries_pin1 = search_by_fid(0x1083, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
if (file_retries_pin1) {
if (!file_retries_pin1->data) {
TU_LOG1("Retries PIN1 is empty. Initializing with default retriesr\n");
const uint8_t retries = 3;
flash_write_data_to_file(file_retries_pin1, &retries, sizeof(uint8_t));
}
}
else {
TU_LOG1("FATAL ERROR: Retries PIN1 not found in memory!\r\n");
}
file_retries_sopin = search_by_fid(0x108A, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
if (file_retries_sopin) {
if (!file_retries_sopin->data) {
TU_LOG1("Retries SOPIN is empty. Initializing with default retries\r\n");
const uint8_t retries = 15;
flash_write_data_to_file(file_retries_sopin, &retries, sizeof(uint8_t));
}
}
else {
TU_LOG1("FATAL ERROR: Retries SOPIN not found in memory!\r\n");
}
file_t *tf = NULL;
tf = search_by_fid(0x1082, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
if (tf) {
if (!tf->data) {
TU_LOG1("Max retries PIN1 is empty. Initializing with default max retriesr\n");
const uint8_t retries = 3;
flash_write_data_to_file(tf, &retries, sizeof(uint8_t));
}
}
else {
TU_LOG1("FATAL ERROR: Max Retries PIN1 not found in memory!\r\n");
}
tf = search_by_fid(0x1089, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
if (tf) {
if (!tf->data) {
TU_LOG1("Max Retries SOPIN is empty. Initializing with default max retries\r\n");
const uint8_t retries = 15;
flash_write_data_to_file(tf, &retries, sizeof(uint8_t));
}
}
else {
TU_LOG1("FATAL ERROR: Retries SOPIN not found in memory!\r\n");
}
low_flash_available();
}
uint8_t *file_read(const uint8_t *addr) {
return flash_read((uintptr_t)addr);
}
uint16_t file_read_uint16(const uint8_t *addr) {
return flash_read_uint16((uintptr_t)addr);
}
uint8_t file_read_uint8(const uint8_t *addr) {
return flash_read_uint8((uintptr_t)addr);
}
file_t *search_dynamic_file(uint16_t fid) {
for (int i = 0; i < dynamic_files; i++) {
if (dynamic_file[i].fid == fid)
return &dynamic_file[i];
}
return NULL;
}
int delete_dynamic_file(file_t *f) {
for (int i = 0; i < dynamic_files; i++) {
if (dynamic_file[i].fid == f->fid) {
for (int j = i+1; j < dynamic_files; j++)
memcpy(&dynamic_file[j-1], &dynamic_file[j], sizeof(file_t));
dynamic_files--;
return HSM_OK;
}
}
return HSM_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
}
file_t *file_new(uint16_t fid) {
file_t *f;
if ((f = search_dynamic_file(fid)))
return f;
if (dynamic_files == MAX_DYNAMIC_FILES)
return NULL;
f = &dynamic_file[dynamic_files];
dynamic_files++;
file_t file = {
.fid = fid,
.parent = 5,
.name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT,
.data = NULL,
.acl = {0}
};
memcpy(f, &file, sizeof(file_t));
//memset((uint8_t *)f->acl, 0x90, sizeof(f->acl));
return f;
}
file_chain_t *add_file_to_chain(file_t *file, file_chain_t **chain) {
if (search_file_chain(file->fid, *chain))
return NULL;
file_chain_t *fc = (file_chain_t *)malloc(sizeof(file_chain_t));
fc->file = file;
fc->next = *chain;
*chain = fc;
return fc;
}
file_t *search_file_chain(uint16_t fid, file_chain_t *chain) {
for (file_chain_t *fc = chain; fc; fc = fc->next) {
if (fid == fc->file->fid) {
return fc->file;
}
}
return NULL;
}

View File

@@ -1,123 +0,0 @@
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#ifndef _FILE_H_
#define _FILE_H_
#include <stdlib.h>
#include "pico/stdlib.h"
#define FILE_TYPE_UNKNOWN 0x00
#define FILE_TYPE_DF 0x04
#define FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF 0x03
#define FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF 0x01
#define FILE_TYPE_BSO 0x10
#define FILE_PERSISTENT 0x20
#define FILE_DATA_FLASH 0x40
#define FILE_DATA_FUNC 0x80
/* EF structures */
#define FILE_EF_UNKNOWN 0x00
#define FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT 0x01
#define FILE_EF_LINEAR_FIXED 0x02
#define FILE_EF_LINEAR_FIXED_TLV 0x03
#define FILE_EF_LINEAR_VARIABLE 0x04
#define FILE_EF_LINEAR_VARIABLE_TLV 0x05
#define FILE_EF_CYCLIC 0x06
#define FILE_EF_CYCLIC_TLV 0x07
#define ACL_OP_DELETE_SELF 0x00
#define ACL_OP_CREATE_DF 0x01
#define ACL_OP_CREATE_EF 0x02
#define ACL_OP_DELETE_CHILD 0x03
#define ACL_OP_WRITE 0x04
#define ACL_OP_UPDATE_ERASE 0x05
#define ACL_OP_READ_SEARCH 0x06
#define SPECIFY_EF 0x1
#define SPECIFY_DF 0x2
#define SPECIFY_ANY 0x3
#define EF_DKEK 0x108F
#define EF_PRKDFS 0x6040
#define EF_PUKDFS 0x6041
#define EF_CDFS 0x6042
#define EF_AODFS 0x6043
#define EF_DODFS 0x6044
#define EF_SKDFS 0x6045
#define MAX_DEPTH 4
typedef struct file
{
const uint16_t fid;
const uint8_t parent; //entry number in the whole table!!
const uint8_t *name;
const uint8_t type;
const uint8_t ef_structure;
uint8_t *data; //should include 2 bytes len at begining
const uint8_t acl[7];
} __attribute__((packed)) file_t;
typedef struct file_chain
{
file_t *file;
struct file_chain *next;
} file_chain_t;
extern file_t *currentEF;
extern file_t *currentDF;
extern const file_t *selected_applet;
extern const file_t *MF;
extern const file_t *file_last;
extern const file_t *file_openpgp;
extern const file_t *file_sc_hsm;
extern bool card_terminated;
extern file_t *file_pin1;
extern file_t *file_retries_pin1;
extern file_t *file_sopin;
extern file_t *file_retries_sopin;
extern file_t *search_by_fid(const uint16_t fid, const file_t *parent, const uint8_t sp);
extern file_t *search_by_name(uint8_t *name, uint16_t namelen);
extern file_t *search_by_path(const uint8_t *pe_path, uint8_t pathlen, const file_t *parent);
extern bool authenticate_action(const file_t *ef, uint8_t op);
extern void process_fci(const file_t *pe);
extern void scan_flash();
extern void initialize_flash(bool);
extern file_t file_entries[];
extern uint8_t *file_read(const uint8_t *addr);
extern uint16_t file_read_uint16(const uint8_t *addr);
extern uint8_t file_read_uint8(const uint8_t *addr);
extern file_t *file_new(uint16_t);
file_t *get_parent(file_t *f);
extern uint16_t dynamic_files;
extern file_t dynamic_file[];
extern file_t *search_dynamic_file(uint16_t);
extern int delete_dynamic_file(file_t *f);
extern file_chain_t *add_file_to_chain(file_t *file, file_chain_t **chain);
extern file_t *search_file_chain(uint16_t fid, file_chain_t *chain);
extern bool isUserAuthenticated;
#endif

View File

@@ -1,133 +0,0 @@
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include <stdint.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "pico/stdlib.h"
#include "hardware/flash.h"
#include "hsm2040.h"
#include "tusb.h"
#include "file.h"
#include "sc_hsm.h"
/*
* ------------------------------------------------------
* | |
* | next_addr | prev_addr | fid | data (len + payload) |
* | |
* ------------------------------------------------------
*/
#define FLASH_TARGET_OFFSET (PICO_FLASH_SIZE_BYTES >> 1) // DATA starts at the mid of flash
#define FLASH_DATA_HEADER_SIZE (sizeof(uintptr_t)+sizeof(uint32_t))
//To avoid possible future allocations, data region starts at the end of flash and goes upwards to the center region
const uintptr_t start_data_pool = (XIP_BASE + FLASH_TARGET_OFFSET);
const uintptr_t end_data_pool = (XIP_BASE + PICO_FLASH_SIZE_BYTES)-FLASH_DATA_HEADER_SIZE; //This is a fixed value. DO NOT CHANGE
#define FLASH_ADDR_DATA_STORAGE_START start_data_pool
extern int flash_program_block(uintptr_t addr, const uint8_t *data, size_t len);
extern int flash_program_halfword (uintptr_t addr, uint16_t data);
extern int flash_program_uintptr(uintptr_t, uintptr_t);
extern uintptr_t flash_read_uintptr(uintptr_t addr);
extern uint16_t flash_read_uint16(uintptr_t addr);
extern void low_flash_available();
uintptr_t allocate_free_addr(uint16_t size) {
if (size > FLASH_SECTOR_SIZE)
return 0x0; //ERROR
size_t real_size = size+sizeof(uint16_t)+sizeof(uintptr_t)+sizeof(uint16_t)+sizeof(uintptr_t); //len+len size+next address+fid+prev_addr size
uintptr_t next_base = 0x0;
for (uintptr_t base = end_data_pool; base >= start_data_pool; base = next_base) {
uintptr_t addr_alg = base & -FLASH_SECTOR_SIZE; //start address of sector
uintptr_t potential_addr = base-real_size;
next_base = flash_read_uintptr(base);
//printf("nb %x %x %x %x\r\n",base,next_base,addr_alg,potential_addr);
//printf("fid %x\r\n",flash_read_uint16(next_base+sizeof(uintptr_t)));
if (next_base == 0x0) { //we are at the end
//now we check if we fit in the current sector
if (addr_alg <= potential_addr) //it fits in the current sector
{
flash_program_uintptr(potential_addr, 0x0);
flash_program_uintptr(potential_addr+sizeof(uintptr_t), base);
flash_program_uintptr(base, potential_addr);
return potential_addr;
}
else if (addr_alg-FLASH_SECTOR_SIZE >= start_data_pool) { //check whether it fits in the next sector, so we take addr_aligned as the base
potential_addr = addr_alg-real_size;
flash_program_uintptr(potential_addr, 0x0);
flash_program_uintptr(potential_addr+sizeof(uintptr_t), base);
flash_program_uintptr(base, potential_addr);
return potential_addr;
}
return 0x0;
}
//we check if |base-(next_addr+size_next_addr)| > |base-potential_addr| only if fid != 1xxx (not size blocked)
else if (addr_alg <= potential_addr && base-(next_base+flash_read_uint16(next_base+sizeof(uintptr_t)+sizeof(uintptr_t)+sizeof(uint16_t))+2*sizeof(uint16_t)+2*sizeof(uintptr_t)) > base-potential_addr && flash_read_uint16(next_base+sizeof(uintptr_t)) & 0x1000 != 0x1000) {
flash_program_uintptr(potential_addr, next_base);
flash_program_uintptr(potential_addr+sizeof(uintptr_t), base);
flash_program_uintptr(base, potential_addr);
return potential_addr;
}
}
return 0x0; //probably never reached
}
int flash_clear_file(file_t *file) {
uintptr_t base_addr = (uintptr_t)(file->data-sizeof(uintptr_t)-sizeof(uint16_t)-sizeof(uintptr_t));
uintptr_t prev_addr = flash_read_uintptr(base_addr+sizeof(uintptr_t));
uintptr_t next_addr = flash_read_uintptr(base_addr);
//printf("nc %x->%x %x->%x\r\n",prev_addr,flash_read_uintptr(prev_addr),base_addr,next_addr);
flash_program_uintptr(prev_addr, next_addr);
flash_program_halfword((uintptr_t)file->data, 0);
if (next_addr > 0)
flash_program_uintptr(next_addr+sizeof(uintptr_t), prev_addr);
//printf("na %x->%x\r\n",prev_addr,flash_read_uintptr(prev_addr));
return HSM_OK;
}
int flash_write_data_to_file(file_t *file, const uint8_t *data, uint16_t len) {
if (!file)
return HSM_ERR_NULL_PARAM;
if (len > FLASH_SECTOR_SIZE)
return HSM_ERR_NO_MEMORY;
if (file->data) { //already in flash
uint16_t size_file_flash = flash_read_uint16((uintptr_t)file->data);
if (len <= size_file_flash) { //it fits, no need to move it
flash_program_halfword((uintptr_t)file->data, len);
if (data)
flash_program_block((uintptr_t)file->data+sizeof(uint16_t), data, len);
return HSM_OK;
}
else { //we clear the old file
flash_clear_file(file);
}
}
uintptr_t new_addr = allocate_free_addr(len);
//printf("na %x\r\n",new_addr);
if (new_addr == 0x0)
return HSM_ERR_NO_MEMORY;
file->data = (uint8_t *)new_addr+sizeof(uintptr_t)+sizeof(uint16_t)+sizeof(uintptr_t); //next addr+fid+prev addr
flash_program_halfword(new_addr+sizeof(uintptr_t)+sizeof(uintptr_t), file->fid);
flash_program_halfword((uintptr_t)file->data, len);
if (data)
flash_program_block((uintptr_t)file->data+sizeof(uint16_t), data, len);
return HSM_OK;
}

View File

@@ -1,248 +0,0 @@
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include "pico/stdlib.h"
#include "hardware/flash.h"
#include "hardware/sync.h"
#include "pico/mutex.h"
#include "pico/sem.h"
#include "pico/multicore.h"
#include "hsm2040.h"
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include <string.h>
#define TOTAL_FLASH_PAGES 4
typedef struct page_flash {
uint8_t page[FLASH_SECTOR_SIZE];
uintptr_t address;
bool ready;
bool erase;
size_t page_size; //this param is for easy erase. It allows to erase with a single call. IT DOES NOT APPLY TO WRITE
} page_flash_t;
static page_flash_t flash_pages[TOTAL_FLASH_PAGES];
static mutex_t mtx_flash;
static semaphore_t sem_wait;
static uint8_t ready_pages = 0;
bool flash_available = false;
static bool locked_out = false;
//this function has to be called from the core 0
void do_flash()
{
if (mutex_try_enter(&mtx_flash, NULL) == true) {
if (locked_out == true && flash_available == true && ready_pages > 0) {
//printf(" DO_FLASH AVAILABLE\r\n");
for (int r = 0; r < TOTAL_FLASH_PAGES; r++) {
if (flash_pages[r].ready == true) {
//printf("WRITTING %X\r\n",flash_pages[r].address-XIP_BASE);
while (multicore_lockout_start_timeout_us(1000) == false);
//printf("WRITTING %X\r\n",flash_pages[r].address-XIP_BASE);
uint32_t ints = save_and_disable_interrupts();
flash_range_erase(flash_pages[r].address-XIP_BASE, FLASH_SECTOR_SIZE);
flash_range_program(flash_pages[r].address-XIP_BASE, flash_pages[r].page, FLASH_SECTOR_SIZE);
restore_interrupts (ints);
while (multicore_lockout_end_timeout_us(1000) == false);
//printf("WRITEN %X !\r\n",flash_pages[r].address);
flash_pages[r].ready = false;
ready_pages--;
}
else if (flash_pages[r].erase == true) {
while (multicore_lockout_start_timeout_us(1000) == false);
//printf("WRITTING\r\n");
flash_range_erase(flash_pages[r].address-XIP_BASE, flash_pages[r].page_size ? ((int)(flash_pages[r].page_size/FLASH_SECTOR_SIZE))*FLASH_SECTOR_SIZE : FLASH_SECTOR_SIZE);
while (multicore_lockout_end_timeout_us(1000) == false);
flash_pages[r].erase = false;
ready_pages--;
}
}
flash_available = false;
if (ready_pages != 0) {
DEBUG_INFO("ERROR: DO FLASH DOES NOT HAVE ZERO PAGES");
}
}
mutex_exit(&mtx_flash);
}
sem_release(&sem_wait);
}
//this function has to be called from the core 0
void low_flash_init() {
mutex_init(&mtx_flash);
sem_init(&sem_wait, 0, 1);
memset(flash_pages, 0, sizeof(page_flash_t)*TOTAL_FLASH_PAGES);
}
void low_flash_init_core1() {
mutex_enter_blocking(&mtx_flash);
multicore_lockout_victim_init();
locked_out = true;
mutex_exit(&mtx_flash);
}
void wait_flash_finish() {
sem_acquire_blocking(&sem_wait); //blocks until released
//wake up
sem_acquire_blocking(&sem_wait); //decrease permits
}
void low_flash_available() {
mutex_enter_blocking(&mtx_flash);
flash_available = true;
mutex_exit(&mtx_flash);
}
page_flash_t *find_free_page(uintptr_t addr) {
uintptr_t addr_alg = addr & -FLASH_SECTOR_SIZE;
page_flash_t *p = NULL;
for (int r = 0; r < TOTAL_FLASH_PAGES; r++)
{
if ((!flash_pages[r].ready && !flash_pages[r].erase) || flash_pages[r].address == addr_alg) //first available
{
p = &flash_pages[r];
if (!flash_pages[r].ready && !flash_pages[r].erase)
{
memcpy(p->page, (uint8_t *)addr_alg, FLASH_SECTOR_SIZE);
ready_pages++;
p->address = addr_alg;
p->ready = true;
}
return p;
}
}
return NULL;
}
int flash_program_block(uintptr_t addr, const uint8_t *data, size_t len) {
uintptr_t addr_alg = addr & -FLASH_SECTOR_SIZE;
page_flash_t *p = NULL;
if (!data || len == 0)
return HSM_ERR_NULL_PARAM;
mutex_enter_blocking(&mtx_flash);
if (ready_pages == TOTAL_FLASH_PAGES) {
mutex_exit(&mtx_flash);
DEBUG_INFO("ERROR: ALL FLASH PAGES CACHED\r\n");
return HSM_ERR_NO_MEMORY;
}
if (!(p = find_free_page(addr)))
{
DEBUG_INFO("ERROR: FLASH CANNOT FIND A PAGE (rare error)\r\n");
mutex_exit(&mtx_flash);
return HSM_ERR_MEMORY_FATAL;
}
memcpy(&p->page[addr&(FLASH_SECTOR_SIZE-1)], data, len);
//printf("Flash: modified page %X with data %x at [%x] (top page %X)\r\n",addr_alg,data,addr&(FLASH_SECTOR_SIZE-1),addr);
mutex_exit(&mtx_flash);
return HSM_OK;
}
int flash_program_halfword (uintptr_t addr, uint16_t data) {
return flash_program_block(addr, (const uint8_t *)&data, sizeof(uint16_t));
}
int flash_program_word (uintptr_t addr, uint32_t data) {
return flash_program_block(addr, (const uint8_t *)&data, sizeof(uint32_t));
}
int flash_program_uintptr (uintptr_t addr, uintptr_t data) {
return flash_program_block(addr, (const uint8_t *)&data, sizeof(uintptr_t));
}
uint8_t *flash_read(uintptr_t addr) {
uintptr_t addr_alg = addr & -FLASH_SECTOR_SIZE;
//mutex_enter_blocking(&mtx_flash);
if (ready_pages > 0) {
for (int r = 0; r < TOTAL_FLASH_PAGES; r++)
{
if (flash_pages[r].ready && flash_pages[r].address == addr_alg) {
uint8_t *v = &flash_pages[r].page[addr&(FLASH_SECTOR_SIZE-1)];
//mutex_exit(&mtx_flash);
return v;
}
}
}
uint8_t *v = (uint8_t *)addr;
//mutex_exit(&mtx_flash);
return v;
}
uintptr_t flash_read_uintptr(uintptr_t addr) {
uint8_t *p = flash_read(addr);
uintptr_t v = 0x0;
for (int i = 0; i < sizeof(uintptr_t); i++) {
v |= (uintptr_t)p[i]<<(8*i);
}
return v;
}
uint16_t flash_read_uint16(uintptr_t addr) {
uint8_t *p = flash_read(addr);
uint16_t v = 0x0;
for (int i = 0; i < sizeof(uint16_t); i++) {
v |= p[i]<<(8*i);
}
return v;
}
uint8_t flash_read_uint8(uintptr_t addr) {
return *flash_read(addr);
}
int flash_erase_page (uintptr_t addr, size_t page_size) {
uintptr_t addr_alg = addr & -FLASH_SECTOR_SIZE;
page_flash_t *p = NULL;
mutex_enter_blocking(&mtx_flash);
if (ready_pages == TOTAL_FLASH_PAGES) {
mutex_exit(&mtx_flash);
DEBUG_INFO("ERROR: ALL FLASH PAGES CACHED\r\n");
return HSM_ERR_NO_MEMORY;
}
if (!(p = find_free_page(addr))) {
DEBUG_INFO("ERROR: FLASH CANNOT FIND A PAGE (rare error)\r\n");
mutex_exit(&mtx_flash);
return HSM_ERR_MEMORY_FATAL;
}
p->erase = true;
p->ready = false;
p->page_size = page_size;
mutex_exit(&mtx_flash);
return HSM_OK;
}
bool flash_check_blank(const uint8_t *p_start, size_t size)
{
const uint8_t *p;
for (p = p_start; p < p_start + size; p++) {
if (*p != 0xff)
return false;
}
return true;
}

34
src/hsm/cmd_challenge.c Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "random.h"
#include "sc_hsm.h"
uint8_t challenge[256];
uint8_t challenge_len = 0;
int cmd_challenge() {
uint8_t *rb = (uint8_t *) random_bytes_get(apdu.ne);
if (!rb) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
memcpy(res_APDU, rb, apdu.ne);
challenge_len = MIN(apdu.ne, sizeof(challenge));
memcpy(challenge, rb, challenge_len);
res_APDU_size = apdu.ne;
return SW_OK();
}

72
src/hsm/cmd_change_pin.c Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "crypto_utils.h"
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "kek.h"
int cmd_change_pin() {
if (P1(apdu) == 0x0) {
if (P2(apdu) == 0x81 || P2(apdu) == 0x88) {
file_t *file_pin = NULL;
if (P2(apdu) == 0x81) {
file_pin = file_pin1;
}
else if (P2(apdu) == 0x88) {
file_pin = file_sopin;
}
if (!file_pin) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
if (!file_has_data(file_pin)) {
return SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND();
}
uint8_t pin_len = file_read_uint8(file_get_data(file_pin));
int r = check_pin(file_pin, apdu.data, pin_len);
if (r != 0x9000) {
return r;
}
uint8_t mkek[MKEK_SIZE];
r = load_mkek(mkek); //loads the MKEK with old pin
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
//encrypt MKEK with new pin
if (P2(apdu) == 0x81) {
hash_multi(apdu.data + pin_len, apdu.nc - pin_len, session_pin);
has_session_pin = true;
}
else if (P2(apdu) == 0x88) {
hash_multi(apdu.data + pin_len, apdu.nc - pin_len, session_sopin);
has_session_sopin = true;
}
r = store_mkek(mkek);
release_mkek(mkek);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
uint8_t dhash[33];
dhash[0] = apdu.nc - pin_len;
double_hash_pin(apdu.data + pin_len, apdu.nc - pin_len, dhash + 1);
flash_write_data_to_file(file_pin, dhash, sizeof(dhash));
low_flash_available();
return SW_OK();
}
}
return SW_WRONG_P1P2();
}

459
src/hsm/cmd_cipher_sym.c Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,459 @@
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "common.h"
#include "mbedtls/aes.h"
#include "mbedtls/cmac.h"
#include "mbedtls/hkdf.h"
#include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h"
#include "md_wrap.h"
#include "mbedtls/md.h"
#include "crypto_utils.h"
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "kek.h"
#include "asn1.h"
#include "oid.h"
#include "mbedtls/pkcs5.h"
#include "mbedtls/error.h"
#include "mbedtls/asn1.h"
#include "mbedtls/cipher.h"
#include "mbedtls/oid.h"
/* This is copied from pkcs5.c Mbedtls */
/** Unfortunately it is declared as static, so I cannot call it. **/
static int pkcs5_parse_pbkdf2_params(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params,
mbedtls_asn1_buf *salt, int *iterations,
int *keylen, mbedtls_md_type_t *md_type) {
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
mbedtls_asn1_buf prf_alg_oid;
unsigned char *p = params->p;
const unsigned char *end = params->p + params->len;
if (params->tag != (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) {
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT,
MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG);
}
/*
* PBKDF2-params ::= SEQUENCE {
* salt OCTET STRING,
* iterationCount INTEGER,
* keyLength INTEGER OPTIONAL
* prf AlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT algid-hmacWithSHA1
* }
*
*/
if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &salt->len,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) != 0) {
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
}
salt->p = p;
p += salt->len;
if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int(&p, end, iterations)) != 0) {
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
}
if (p == end) {
return 0;
}
if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int(&p, end, keylen)) != 0) {
if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) {
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
}
}
if (p == end) {
return 0;
}
if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg_null(&p, end, &prf_alg_oid)) != 0) {
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
}
if (mbedtls_oid_get_md_hmac(&prf_alg_oid, md_type) != 0) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
}
if (p != end) {
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT,
MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
}
return 0;
}
/* Taken from https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/2335 */
int mbedtls_ansi_x963_kdf(mbedtls_md_type_t md_type,
size_t input_len,
uint8_t *input,
size_t shared_info_len,
uint8_t *shared_info,
size_t output_len,
uint8_t *output) {
mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx;
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = NULL;
int hashlen = 0, exit_code = MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
uint8_t counter_buf[4], tmp_output[64]; //worst case
mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx);
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_type);
if (md_info == NULL) {
return exit_code;
}
if (mbedtls_md_setup(&md_ctx, md_info, 0)) {
return exit_code;
}
if (input_len + shared_info_len + 4 >= (1ULL << 61) - 1) {
return exit_code;
}
// keydatalen equals output_len
hashlen = md_info->size;
if (output_len >= hashlen * ((1ULL << 32) - 1)) {
return exit_code;
}
for (int i = 0, counter = 1; i < output_len; counter++) {
mbedtls_md_starts(&md_ctx);
mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, input, input_len);
//TODO: be careful with architecture little vs. big
counter_buf[0] = (uint8_t) ((counter >> 24) & 0xff);
counter_buf[1] = (uint8_t) ((counter >> 16) & 0xff);
counter_buf[2] = (uint8_t) ((counter >> 8) & 0xff);
counter_buf[3] = (uint8_t) ((counter >> 0) & 0xff);
mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, counter_buf, 4);
if (shared_info_len > 0 && shared_info != NULL) {
mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, shared_info, shared_info_len);
}
mbedtls_md_finish(&md_ctx, tmp_output);
memcpy(&output[i], tmp_output, (output_len - i < hashlen) ? output_len - i : hashlen);
i += hashlen;
}
mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx);
return 0;
}
int cmd_cipher_sym() {
int key_id = P1(apdu);
int algo = P2(apdu);
if (!isUserAuthenticated) {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
file_t *ef = search_dynamic_file((KEY_PREFIX << 8) | key_id);
if (!ef) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
if (key_has_purpose(ef, algo) == false) {
return SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
if (wait_button_pressed() == true) { // timeout
return SW_SECURE_MESSAGE_EXEC_ERROR();
}
int key_size = file_get_size(ef);
uint8_t kdata[32]; //maximum AES key size
memcpy(kdata, file_get_data(ef), key_size);
if (mkek_decrypt(kdata, key_size) != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
if (algo == ALGO_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT || algo == ALGO_AES_CBC_DECRYPT) {
if ((apdu.nc % 16) != 0) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
mbedtls_aes_context aes;
mbedtls_aes_init(&aes);
uint8_t tmp_iv[IV_SIZE];
memset(tmp_iv, 0, sizeof(tmp_iv));
if (algo == ALGO_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT) {
int r = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&aes, kdata, key_size * 8);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
mbedtls_aes_free(&aes);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
r = mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc(&aes,
MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT,
apdu.nc,
tmp_iv,
apdu.data,
res_APDU);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_aes_free(&aes);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
else if (algo == ALGO_AES_CBC_DECRYPT) {
int r = mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec(&aes, kdata, key_size * 8);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
mbedtls_aes_free(&aes);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
r = mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc(&aes,
MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT,
apdu.nc,
tmp_iv,
apdu.data,
res_APDU);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_aes_free(&aes);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
res_APDU_size = apdu.nc;
mbedtls_aes_free(&aes);
}
else if (algo == ALGO_AES_CMAC) {
const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info;
if (key_size == 16) {
cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB);
}
else if (key_size == 24) {
cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB);
}
else if (key_size == 32) {
cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB);
}
else {
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
int r = mbedtls_cipher_cmac(cipher_info, kdata, key_size * 8, apdu.data, apdu.nc, res_APDU);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU_size = 16;
}
else if (algo == ALGO_AES_DERIVE) {
int r = mbedtls_hkdf(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256),
NULL,
0,
file_get_data(ef),
key_size,
apdu.data,
apdu.nc,
res_APDU,
apdu.nc);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU_size = apdu.nc;
}
else if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_ENCRYPT || algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_DECRYPT) {
size_t oid_len = 0, aad_len = 0, iv_len = 0, enc_len = 0;
uint8_t *oid = NULL, *aad = NULL, *iv = NULL, *enc = NULL;
if (!asn1_find_tag(apdu.data, apdu.nc, 0x6, &oid_len,
&oid) || oid_len == 0 || oid == NULL) {
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
asn1_find_tag(apdu.data, apdu.nc, 0x81, &enc_len, &enc);
asn1_find_tag(apdu.data, apdu.nc, 0x82, &iv_len, &iv);
asn1_find_tag(apdu.data, apdu.nc, 0x83, &aad_len, &aad);
uint8_t tmp_iv[16];
memset(tmp_iv, 0, sizeof(tmp_iv));
if (memcmp(oid, OID_CHACHA20_POLY1305, oid_len) == 0) {
if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_DECRYPT && enc_len < 16) {
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
int r = 0;
mbedtls_chachapoly_context ctx;
mbedtls_chachapoly_init(&ctx);
if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_ENCRYPT) {
r = mbedtls_chachapoly_encrypt_and_tag(&ctx,
enc_len,
iv ? iv : tmp_iv,
aad,
aad_len,
enc,
res_APDU,
res_APDU + enc_len);
}
else if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_DECRYPT) {
r = mbedtls_chachapoly_auth_decrypt(&ctx,
enc_len - 16,
iv ? iv : tmp_iv,
aad,
aad_len,
enc + enc_len - 16,
enc,
res_APDU);
}
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
mbedtls_chachapoly_free(&ctx);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_ENCRYPT) {
res_APDU_size = enc_len + 16;
}
else if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_DECRYPT) {
res_APDU_size = enc_len - 16;
}
}
else if (memcmp(oid, OID_DIGEST, 7) == 0) {
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = NULL;
if (memcmp(oid, OID_HMAC_SHA1, oid_len) == 0) {
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1);
}
else if (memcmp(oid, OID_HMAC_SHA224, oid_len) == 0) {
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224);
}
else if (memcmp(oid, OID_HMAC_SHA256, oid_len) == 0) {
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256);
}
else if (memcmp(oid, OID_HMAC_SHA384, oid_len) == 0) {
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384);
}
else if (memcmp(oid, OID_HMAC_SHA512, oid_len) == 0) {
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512);
}
if (md_info == NULL) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
int r = mbedtls_md_hmac(md_info, kdata, key_size, enc, enc_len, res_APDU);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU_size = md_info->size;
}
else if (memcmp(oid, OID_HKDF_SHA256,
oid_len) == 0 ||
memcmp(oid, OID_HKDF_SHA384,
oid_len) == 0 || memcmp(oid, OID_HKDF_SHA512, oid_len) == 0) {
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = NULL;
if (memcmp(oid, OID_HKDF_SHA256, oid_len) == 0) {
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256);
}
else if (memcmp(oid, OID_HKDF_SHA384, oid_len) == 0) {
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384);
}
else if (memcmp(oid, OID_HKDF_SHA512, oid_len) == 0) {
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512);
}
int r = mbedtls_hkdf(md_info,
iv,
iv_len,
kdata,
key_size,
enc,
enc_len,
res_APDU,
apdu.ne > 0 &&
apdu.ne < 65536 ? apdu.ne : mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info));
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU_size = apdu.ne > 0 && apdu.ne < 65536 ? apdu.ne : mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info);
}
else if (memcmp(oid, OID_PKCS5_PBKDF2, oid_len) == 0) {
int iterations = 0, keylen = 0;
mbedtls_asn1_buf salt,
params =
{ .p = enc, .len = enc_len, .tag = (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) };
mbedtls_md_type_t md_type = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;
int r = pkcs5_parse_pbkdf2_params(&params, &salt, &iterations, &keylen, &md_type);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
r = mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac_ext(md_type,
kdata,
key_size,
salt.p,
salt.len,
iterations,
keylen ? keylen : (apdu.ne > 0 &&
apdu.ne < 65536 ? apdu.ne : 32),
res_APDU);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU_size = keylen ? keylen : (apdu.ne > 0 && apdu.ne < 65536 ? apdu.ne : 32);
}
else if (memcmp(oid, OID_PKCS5_PBES2, oid_len) == 0) {
mbedtls_asn1_buf params =
{ .p = aad, .len = aad_len, .tag = (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) };
int r = mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2(&params,
algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_ENCRYPT ? MBEDTLS_PKCS5_ENCRYPT : MBEDTLS_PKCS5_DECRYPT,
kdata,
key_size,
enc,
enc_len,
res_APDU);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
if (r != 0) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
res_APDU_size = enc_len;
}
else if (memcmp(oid, OID_KDF_X963, oid_len) == 0) {
mbedtls_md_type_t md_type = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;
if (memcmp(enc, OID_HMAC_SHA1, enc_len) == 0) {
md_type = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;
}
else if (memcmp(enc, OID_HMAC_SHA224, enc_len) == 0) {
md_type = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224;
}
else if (memcmp(enc, OID_HMAC_SHA256, enc_len) == 0) {
md_type = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256;
}
else if (memcmp(enc, OID_HMAC_SHA384, enc_len) == 0) {
md_type = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384;
}
else if (memcmp(enc, OID_HMAC_SHA512, enc_len) == 0) {
md_type = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512;
}
int r = mbedtls_ansi_x963_kdf(md_type,
key_size,
kdata,
aad_len,
aad,
apdu.ne > 0 && apdu.ne < 65536 ? apdu.ne : 32,
res_APDU);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
if (r != 0) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
res_APDU_size = apdu.ne > 0 && apdu.ne < 65536 ? apdu.ne : 32;
}
}
else {
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
return SW_WRONG_P1P2();
}
return SW_OK();
}

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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "common.h"
#include "mbedtls/ecdh.h"
#include "crypto_utils.h"
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "kek.h"
#include "files.h"
#include "asn1.h"
#include "cvc.h"
#include "random.h"
#include "oid.h"
int cmd_decrypt_asym() {
int key_id = P1(apdu);
uint8_t p2 = P2(apdu);
if (!isUserAuthenticated) {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
file_t *ef = search_dynamic_file((KEY_PREFIX << 8) | key_id);
if (!ef) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
if (get_key_counter(ef) == 0) {
return SW_FILE_FULL();
}
if (key_has_purpose(ef, p2) == false) {
return SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
if (p2 >= ALGO_RSA_DECRYPT && p2 <= ALGO_RSA_DECRYPT_OEP) {
mbedtls_rsa_context ctx;
mbedtls_rsa_init(&ctx);
if (p2 == ALGO_RSA_DECRYPT_OEP) {
mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(&ctx, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256);
}
int r = load_private_key_rsa(&ctx, ef);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(&ctx);
if (r == CCID_VERIFICATION_FAILED) {
return SW_SECURE_MESSAGE_EXEC_ERROR();
}
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
int key_size = file_get_size(ef);
if (apdu.nc < key_size) { //needs padding
memset(apdu.data + apdu.nc, 0, key_size - apdu.nc);
}
if (p2 == ALGO_RSA_DECRYPT_PKCS1 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_DECRYPT_OEP) {
size_t olen = apdu.nc;
r = mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt(&ctx, random_gen, NULL, &olen, apdu.data, res_APDU, 512);
if (r == 0) {
res_APDU_size = olen;
}
}
else {
r = mbedtls_rsa_private(&ctx, random_gen, NULL, apdu.data, res_APDU);
if (r == 0) {
res_APDU_size = key_size;
}
}
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(&ctx);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
mbedtls_rsa_free(&ctx);
}
else if (p2 == ALGO_EC_DH || p2 == ALGO_EC_DH_XKEK) {
mbedtls_ecdh_context ctx;
if (wait_button_pressed() == true) { //timeout
return SW_SECURE_MESSAGE_EXEC_ERROR();
}
int key_size = file_get_size(ef);
uint8_t *kdata = (uint8_t *) calloc(1, key_size);
memcpy(kdata, file_get_data(ef), key_size);
if (mkek_decrypt(kdata, key_size) != 0) {
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, key_size);
free(kdata);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
mbedtls_ecdh_init(&ctx);
mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid = kdata[0];
int r = 0;
r = mbedtls_ecdh_setup(&ctx, gid);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, key_size);
mbedtls_ecdh_free(&ctx);
free(kdata);
return SW_DATA_INVALID();
}
r = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx.ctx.mbed_ecdh.d, kdata + 1, key_size - 1);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, key_size);
free(kdata);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdh_free(&ctx);
return SW_DATA_INVALID();
}
r = -1;
if (p2 == ALGO_EC_DH) {
r = mbedtls_ecdh_read_public(&ctx, apdu.data - 1, apdu.nc + 1);
}
else if (p2 == ALGO_EC_DH_XKEK) {
size_t pub_len = 0;
const uint8_t *pub = cvc_get_pub(apdu.data, apdu.nc, &pub_len);
if (pub) {
size_t t86_len = 0;
const uint8_t *t86 = cvc_get_field(pub, pub_len, &t86_len, 0x86);
if (t86) {
r = mbedtls_ecdh_read_public(&ctx, t86 - 1, t86_len + 1);
}
}
}
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdh_free(&ctx);
return SW_DATA_INVALID();
}
size_t olen = 0;
r =
mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret(&ctx, &olen, res_APDU, MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES, random_gen,
NULL);
mbedtls_ecdh_free(&ctx);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
if (p2 == ALGO_EC_DH) {
res_APDU_size = olen;
}
else {
res_APDU_size = 0;
size_t ext_len = 0;
const uint8_t *ext = NULL;
if ((ext = cvc_get_ext(apdu.data, apdu.nc, &ext_len)) == NULL) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
uint8_t *p = NULL, *tag_data = NULL, *kdom_uid = NULL;
uint16_t tag = 0;
size_t tag_len = 0, kdom_uid_len = 0;
while (walk_tlv(ext, ext_len, &p, &tag, &tag_len, &tag_data)) {
if (tag == 0x73) {
size_t oid_len = 0;
uint8_t *oid_data = NULL;
if (asn1_find_tag(tag_data, tag_len, 0x6, &oid_len,
&oid_data) == true &&
oid_len == strlen(OID_ID_KEY_DOMAIN_UID) &&
memcmp(oid_data, OID_ID_KEY_DOMAIN_UID,
strlen(OID_ID_KEY_DOMAIN_UID)) == 0) {
if (asn1_find_tag(tag_data, tag_len, 0x80, &kdom_uid_len,
&kdom_uid) == false) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
break;
}
}
}
if (kdom_uid_len == 0 || kdom_uid == NULL) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
for (int n = 0; n < MAX_KEY_DOMAINS; n++) {
file_t *tf = search_dynamic_file(EF_XKEK + n);
if (tf) {
if (file_get_size(tf) == kdom_uid_len &&
memcmp(file_get_data(tf), kdom_uid, kdom_uid_len) == 0) {
file_new(EF_DKEK + n);
if (store_dkek_key(n, res_APDU) != CCID_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
return SW_OK();
}
}
}
return SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND();
}
}
else {
return SW_WRONG_P1P2();
}
decrement_key_counter(ef);
return SW_OK();
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "sc_hsm.h"
int cmd_delete_file() {
file_t *ef = NULL;
if (!isUserAuthenticated) {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
if (apdu.nc == 0) {
ef = currentEF;
if (!(ef = search_dynamic_file(ef->fid))) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
}
else {
uint16_t fid = (apdu.data[0] << 8) | apdu.data[1];
if (!(ef = search_dynamic_file(fid))) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
}
if (!authenticate_action(ef, ACL_OP_DELETE_SELF)) {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
if (delete_file(ef) != CCID_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
return SW_OK();
}

102
src/hsm/cmd_derive_asym.c Normal file
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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "common.h"
#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h"
#include "crypto_utils.h"
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "cvc.h"
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED -0x006E
#define MOD_ADD(N) \
while (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&(N), &grp->P) >= 0) \
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs(&(N), &(N), &grp->P))
static inline int mbedtls_mpi_add_mod(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
mbedtls_mpi *X,
const mbedtls_mpi *A,
const mbedtls_mpi *B) {
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(X, A, B));
MOD_ADD(*X);
cleanup:
return ret;
}
int cmd_derive_asym() {
uint8_t key_id = P1(apdu);
uint8_t dest_id = P2(apdu);
file_t *fkey;
if (!isUserAuthenticated) {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
if (!(fkey = search_dynamic_file((KEY_PREFIX << 8) | key_id)) || !file_has_data(fkey)) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
if (key_has_purpose(fkey, ALGO_EC_DERIVE) == false) {
return SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
if (apdu.nc == 0) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
if (apdu.data[0] == ALGO_EC_DERIVE) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_context ctx;
mbedtls_ecdsa_init(&ctx);
int r;
r = load_private_key_ecdsa(&ctx, fkey);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ctx);
if (r == CCID_VERIFICATION_FAILED) {
return SW_SECURE_MESSAGE_EXEC_ERROR();
}
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
mbedtls_mpi a, nd;
mbedtls_mpi_init(&a);
mbedtls_mpi_init(&nd);
r = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&a, apdu.data + 1, apdu.nc - 1);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ctx);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&a);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&nd);
return SW_DATA_INVALID();
}
r = mbedtls_mpi_add_mod(&ctx.grp, &nd, &ctx.d, &a);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&a);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ctx);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&nd);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
r = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx.d, &nd);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&nd);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ctx);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
r = store_keys(&ctx, HSM_KEY_EC, dest_id);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ctx);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ctx);
}
else {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
return SW_OK();
}

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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "crypto_utils.h"
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "cvc.h"
#include "files.h"
extern file_t *ef_puk_aut;
extern uint8_t challenge[256];
extern uint8_t challenge_len;
int cmd_external_authenticate() {
if (P1(apdu) != 0x0 || P2(apdu) != 0x0) {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
if (ef_puk_aut == NULL) {
return SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND();
}
if (apdu.nc == 0) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
file_t *ef_puk = search_by_fid(EF_PUKAUT, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
if (!file_has_data(ef_puk)) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
uint8_t *puk_data = file_get_data(ef_puk);
uint8_t *input = (uint8_t *) calloc(dev_name_len + challenge_len, sizeof(uint8_t)), hash[32];
memcpy(input, dev_name, dev_name_len);
memcpy(input + dev_name_len, challenge, challenge_len);
hash256(input, dev_name_len + challenge_len, hash);
int r =
puk_verify(apdu.data,
apdu.nc,
hash,
32,
file_get_data(ef_puk_aut),
file_get_size(ef_puk_aut));
free(input);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
puk_status[ef_puk_aut->fid & (MAX_PUK - 1)] = 1;
uint8_t auts = 0;
for (int i = 0; i < puk_data[0]; i++) {
auts += puk_status[i];
}
if (auts >= puk_data[2]) {
isUserAuthenticated = true;
}
return SW_OK();
}

202
src/hsm/cmd_extras.c Normal file
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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "common.h"
#include "mbedtls/ecdh.h"
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#ifndef ENABLE_EMULATION
#include "hardware/rtc.h"
#endif
#include "files.h"
#include "random.h"
#include "kek.h"
#include "mbedtls/hkdf.h"
#include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h"
int cmd_extras() {
if (P1(apdu) == 0xA) { //datetime operations
if (P2(apdu) != 0x0) {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
if (apdu.nc == 0) {
#ifndef ENABLE_EMULATION
datetime_t dt;
if (!rtc_get_datetime(&dt)) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = dt.year >> 8;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = dt.year & 0xff;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = dt.month;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = dt.day;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = dt.dotw;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = dt.hour;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = dt.min;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = dt.sec;
#endif
}
else {
if (apdu.nc != 8) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
#ifndef ENABLE_EMULATION
datetime_t dt;
dt.year = (apdu.data[0] << 8) | (apdu.data[1]);
dt.month = apdu.data[2];
dt.day = apdu.data[3];
dt.dotw = apdu.data[4];
dt.hour = apdu.data[5];
dt.min = apdu.data[6];
dt.sec = apdu.data[7];
if (!rtc_set_datetime(&dt)) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
#endif
}
}
else if (P1(apdu) == 0x6) { //dynamic options
if (P2(apdu) != 0x0) {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
if (apdu.nc > sizeof(uint8_t)) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
uint16_t opts = get_device_options();
if (apdu.nc == 0) {
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = opts >> 8;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = opts & 0xff;
}
else {
uint8_t newopts[] = { apdu.data[0], (opts & 0xff) };
file_t *tf = search_by_fid(EF_DEVOPS, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
flash_write_data_to_file(tf, newopts, sizeof(newopts));
low_flash_available();
}
}
else if (P1(apdu) == 0x3A) { // secure lock
if (apdu.nc == 0) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
if (P2(apdu) == 0x01) { // Key Agreement
mbedtls_ecdh_context hkey;
mbedtls_ecdh_init(&hkey);
mbedtls_ecdh_setup(&hkey, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1);
int ret = mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public(&hkey.ctx.mbed_ecdh.grp,
&hkey.ctx.mbed_ecdh.d,
&hkey.ctx.mbed_ecdh.Q,
random_gen,
NULL);
mbedtls_mpi_lset(&hkey.ctx.mbed_ecdh.Qp.Z, 1);
ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary(&hkey.ctx.mbed_ecdh.grp,
&hkey.ctx.mbed_ecdh.Qp,
apdu.data,
apdu.nc);
if (ret != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdh_free(&hkey);
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
memcpy(mse.Qpt, apdu.data, sizeof(mse.Qpt));
uint8_t buf[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES];
size_t olen = 0;
ret = mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret(&hkey,
&olen,
buf,
MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES,
random_gen,
NULL);
if (ret != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdh_free(&hkey);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf));
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
ret = mbedtls_hkdf(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256),
NULL,
0,
buf,
olen,
mse.Qpt,
sizeof(mse.Qpt),
mse.key_enc,
sizeof(mse.key_enc));
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf));
if (ret != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdh_free(&hkey);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&hkey.ctx.mbed_ecdh.grp,
&hkey.ctx.mbed_ecdh.Q,
MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED,
&olen,
res_APDU,
4096);
mbedtls_ecdh_free(&hkey);
if (ret != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
mse.init = true;
res_APDU_size = olen;
}
else if (P2(apdu) == 0x02 || P2(apdu) == 0x03 || P2(apdu) == 0x04) {
if (mse.init == false) {
return SW_COMMAND_NOT_ALLOWED();
}
int ret = mse_decrypt_ct(apdu.data, apdu.nc);
if (ret != 0) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
if (P2(apdu) == 0x02 || P2(apdu) == 0x04) { // Enable
uint16_t opts = get_device_options();
uint8_t newopts[] = { opts >> 8, (opts & 0xff) };
if ((P2(apdu) == 0x02 && !(opts & HSM_OPT_SECURE_LOCK)) ||
(P2(apdu) == 0x04 && (opts & HSM_OPT_SECURE_LOCK))) {
uint16_t tfids[] = { EF_MKEK, EF_MKEK_SO };
for (int t = 0; t < sizeof(tfids) / sizeof(uint16_t); t++) {
file_t *tf = search_by_fid(tfids[t], NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
if (tf) {
uint8_t *tmp = (uint8_t *) calloc(1, file_get_size(tf));
memcpy(tmp, file_get_data(tf), file_get_size(tf));
for (int i = 0; i < MKEK_KEY_SIZE; i++) {
MKEK_KEY(tmp)[i] ^= apdu.data[i];
}
flash_write_data_to_file(tf, tmp, file_get_size(tf));
free(tmp);
}
}
}
if (P2(apdu) == 0x02) {
newopts[0] |= HSM_OPT_SECURE_LOCK >> 8;
}
else if (P2(apdu) == 0x04) {
newopts[0] &= ~HSM_OPT_SECURE_LOCK >> 8;
}
file_t *tf = search_by_fid(EF_DEVOPS, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
flash_write_data_to_file(tf, newopts, sizeof(newopts));
low_flash_available();
}
else if (P2(apdu) == 0x03) {
memcpy(mkek_mask, apdu.data, apdu.nc);
has_mkek_mask = true;
}
}
}
else {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
return SW_OK();
}

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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "common.h"
#include "mbedtls/ecdh.h"
#include "asn1.h"
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "random.h"
#include "oid.h"
#include "eac.h"
#include "files.h"
int cmd_general_authenticate() {
if (P1(apdu) == 0x0 && P2(apdu) == 0x0) {
if (apdu.data[0] == 0x7C) {
int r = 0;
size_t pubkey_len = 0;
const uint8_t *pubkey = NULL;
uint16_t tag = 0x0;
uint8_t *tag_data = NULL, *p = NULL;
size_t tag_len = 0;
while (walk_tlv(apdu.data + 2, apdu.nc - 2, &p, &tag, &tag_len, &tag_data)) {
if (tag == 0x80) {
pubkey = tag_data - 1; //mbedtls ecdh starts reading one pos before
pubkey_len = tag_len + 1;
}
}
file_t *fkey = search_by_fid(EF_KEY_DEV, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
if (!fkey) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
mbedtls_ecdsa_context ectx;
mbedtls_ecdsa_init(&ectx);
r = load_private_key_ecdsa(&ectx, fkey);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ectx);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
mbedtls_ecdh_context ctx;
mbedtls_ecdh_init(&ctx);
mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1;
r = mbedtls_ecdh_setup(&ctx, gid);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ectx);
mbedtls_ecdh_free(&ctx);
return SW_DATA_INVALID();
}
r = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx.ctx.mbed_ecdh.d, &ectx.d);
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ectx);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdh_free(&ctx);
return SW_DATA_INVALID();
}
r = mbedtls_ecdh_read_public(&ctx, pubkey, pubkey_len);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdh_free(&ctx);
return SW_DATA_INVALID();
}
size_t olen = 0;
uint8_t derived[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES];
r = mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret(&ctx,
&olen,
derived,
MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES,
random_gen,
NULL);
mbedtls_ecdh_free(&ctx);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
sm_derive_all_keys(derived, olen);
uint8_t *t = (uint8_t *) calloc(1, pubkey_len + 16);
memcpy(t, "\x7F\x49\x4F\x06\x0A", 5);
if (sm_get_protocol() == MSE_AES) {
memcpy(t + 5, OID_ID_CA_ECDH_AES_CBC_CMAC_128, 10);
}
t[15] = 0x86;
memcpy(t + 16, pubkey, pubkey_len);
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = 0x7C;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = 20;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = 0x81;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = 8;
memcpy(res_APDU + res_APDU_size, sm_get_nonce(), 8);
res_APDU_size += 8;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = 0x82;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = 8;
r = sm_sign(t, pubkey_len + 16, res_APDU + res_APDU_size);
free(t);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU_size += 8;
}
}
return SW_OK();
}

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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "crypto_utils.h"
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "files.h"
#include "random.h"
#include "kek.h"
#include "version.h"
#include "asn1.h"
#include "cvc.h"
extern void scan_all();
extern char __StackLimit;
int heapLeft() {
#ifndef ENABLE_EMULATION
char *p = malloc(256); // try to avoid undue fragmentation
int left = &__StackLimit - p;
free(p);
#else
int left = 1024 * 1024;
#endif
return left;
}
int cmd_initialize() {
if (apdu.nc > 0) {
uint8_t mkek[MKEK_SIZE];
int ret_mkek = load_mkek(mkek); //Try loading MKEK with previous session
initialize_flash(true);
scan_all();
has_session_pin = has_session_sopin = false;
uint16_t tag = 0x0;
uint8_t *tag_data = NULL, *p = NULL, *kds = NULL, *dkeks = NULL;
size_t tag_len = 0;
while (walk_tlv(apdu.data, apdu.nc, &p, &tag, &tag_len, &tag_data)) {
if (tag == 0x80) { //options
file_t *tf = search_by_fid(EF_DEVOPS, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
flash_write_data_to_file(tf, tag_data, tag_len);
}
else if (tag == 0x81) { //user pin
if (file_pin1 && file_pin1->data) {
uint8_t dhash[33];
dhash[0] = tag_len;
double_hash_pin(tag_data, tag_len, dhash + 1);
flash_write_data_to_file(file_pin1, dhash, sizeof(dhash));
hash_multi(tag_data, tag_len, session_pin);
has_session_pin = true;
}
}
else if (tag == 0x82) { //sopin pin
if (file_sopin && file_sopin->data) {
uint8_t dhash[33];
dhash[0] = tag_len;
double_hash_pin(tag_data, tag_len, dhash + 1);
flash_write_data_to_file(file_sopin, dhash, sizeof(dhash));
hash_multi(tag_data, tag_len, session_sopin);
has_session_sopin = true;
}
}
else if (tag == 0x91) { //retries user pin
file_t *tf = search_by_fid(0x1082, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
if (tf && tf->data) {
flash_write_data_to_file(tf, tag_data, tag_len);
}
if (file_retries_pin1 && file_retries_pin1->data) {
flash_write_data_to_file(file_retries_pin1, tag_data, tag_len);
}
}
else if (tag == 0x92) {
dkeks = tag_data;
file_t *tf = file_new(EF_DKEK);
if (!tf) {
release_mkek(mkek);
return SW_MEMORY_FAILURE();
}
flash_write_data_to_file(tf, NULL, 0);
}
else if (tag == 0x93) {
file_t *ef_puk = search_by_fid(EF_PUKAUT, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
if (!ef_puk) {
release_mkek(mkek);
return SW_MEMORY_FAILURE();
}
uint8_t pk_status[4], puks = MIN(tag_data[0], MAX_PUK);
memset(pk_status, 0, sizeof(pk_status));
pk_status[0] = puks;
pk_status[1] = puks;
pk_status[2] = tag_data[1];
flash_write_data_to_file(ef_puk, pk_status, sizeof(pk_status));
for (int i = 0; i < puks; i++) {
file_t *tf = file_new(EF_PUK + i);
if (!tf) {
release_mkek(mkek);
return SW_MEMORY_FAILURE();
}
flash_write_data_to_file(tf, NULL, 0);
}
}
else if (tag == 0x97) {
kds = tag_data;
/*
for (int i = 0; i < MIN(*kds,MAX_KEY_DOMAINS); i++) {
file_t *tf = file_new(EF_DKEK+i);
if (!tf)
return SW_MEMORY_FAILURE();
flash_write_data_to_file(tf, NULL, 0);
}
*/
}
}
file_t *tf_kd = search_by_fid(EF_KEY_DOMAIN, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
if (!tf_kd) {
release_mkek(mkek);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
if (ret_mkek != CCID_OK) {
ret_mkek = load_mkek(mkek); //Try again with new PIN/SO-PIN just in case some is the same
}
if (store_mkek(ret_mkek == CCID_OK ? mkek : NULL) != CCID_OK) {
release_mkek(mkek);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
release_mkek(mkek);
if (dkeks) {
if (*dkeks > 0) {
uint16_t d = *dkeks;
if (flash_write_data_to_file(tf_kd, (const uint8_t *) &d, sizeof(d)) != CCID_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
else {
int r = save_dkek_key(0, random_bytes_get(32));
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
uint16_t d = 0x0101;
if (flash_write_data_to_file(tf_kd, (const uint8_t *) &d, sizeof(d)) != CCID_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
}
else {
uint16_t d = 0x0000;
if (flash_write_data_to_file(tf_kd, (const uint8_t *) &d, sizeof(d)) != CCID_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
if (kds) {
uint8_t t[MAX_KEY_DOMAINS * 2], k = MIN(*kds, MAX_KEY_DOMAINS);
memset(t, 0xff, 2 * k);
if (flash_write_data_to_file(tf_kd, t, 2 * k) != CCID_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
/* When initialized, it has all credentials */
isUserAuthenticated = true;
/* Create terminal private key */
file_t *fdkey = search_by_fid(EF_KEY_DEV, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
if (!fdkey) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
int ret = 0;
if (ret_mkek != CCID_OK || !file_has_data(fdkey)) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_context ecdsa;
mbedtls_ecdsa_init(&ecdsa);
mbedtls_ecp_group_id ec_id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1;
uint8_t index = 0, key_id = 0;
ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey(&ecdsa, ec_id, random_gen, &index);
if (ret != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
ret = store_keys(&ecdsa, HSM_KEY_EC, key_id);
if (ret != CCID_OK) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
size_t cvc_len = 0;
if ((cvc_len = asn1_cvc_aut(&ecdsa, HSM_KEY_EC, res_APDU, 4096, NULL, 0)) == 0) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa);
file_t *fpk = search_by_fid(EF_EE_DEV, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
ret = flash_write_data_to_file(fpk, res_APDU, cvc_len);
if (ret != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
const uint8_t *keyid =
(const uint8_t *) "\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0",
*label = (const uint8_t *) "ESTERMHSM";
size_t prkd_len = asn1_build_prkd_ecc(label,
strlen((const char *) label),
keyid,
20,
192,
res_APDU,
4096);
fpk = search_by_fid(EF_PRKD_DEV, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
ret = flash_write_data_to_file(fpk, res_APDU, prkd_len);
}
if (ret != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
low_flash_available();
}
else { //free memory bytes request
int heap_left = heapLeft();
res_APDU[0] = ((heap_left >> 24) & 0xff);
res_APDU[1] = ((heap_left >> 16) & 0xff);
res_APDU[2] = ((heap_left >> 8) & 0xff);
res_APDU[3] = ((heap_left >> 0) & 0xff);
res_APDU[4] = 0;
res_APDU[5] = HSM_VERSION_MAJOR;
res_APDU[6] = HSM_VERSION_MINOR;
res_APDU_size = 7;
}
return SW_OK();
}

196
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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "crypto_utils.h"
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "cvc.h"
#include "kek.h"
#include "files.h"
uint8_t get_key_domain(file_t *fkey) {
size_t tag_len = 0;
const uint8_t *meta_tag = get_meta_tag(fkey, 0x92, &tag_len);
if (meta_tag) {
return *meta_tag;
}
return 0xff;
}
int cmd_key_domain() {
//if (dkeks == 0)
// return SW_COMMAND_NOT_ALLOWED();
uint8_t p1 = P1(apdu), p2 = P2(apdu);
if ((has_session_pin == false || isUserAuthenticated == false) && apdu.nc > 0 &&
!(p1 == 0x0 && p2 == 0x0)) {
return SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
if (p2 >= MAX_KEY_DOMAINS) {
return SW_WRONG_P1P2();
}
file_t *tf_kd = search_by_fid(EF_KEY_DOMAIN, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
if (!tf_kd) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
uint16_t tf_kd_size = file_get_size(tf_kd);
if (tf_kd_size == 0) {
return SW_WRONG_P1P2();
}
uint8_t *kdata = file_get_data(tf_kd), dkeks = kdata ? kdata[2 * p2] : 0,
current_dkeks = kdata ? kdata[2 * p2 + 1] : 0;
if (p1 == 0x0) { //dkek import
if (apdu.nc > 0) {
file_t *tf = file_new(EF_DKEK + p2);
if (!tf) {
return SW_MEMORY_FAILURE();
}
if (apdu.nc < 32) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
if (current_dkeks == dkeks) {
return SW_COMMAND_NOT_ALLOWED();
}
import_dkek_share(p2, apdu.data);
if (++current_dkeks >= dkeks) {
if (save_dkek_key(p2, NULL) != CCID_OK) {
/* On fail, it will return to previous dkek state. */
import_dkek_share(p2, apdu.data);
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
}
uint8_t t[MAX_KEY_DOMAINS * 2];
memcpy(t, kdata, tf_kd_size);
t[2 * p2 + 1] = current_dkeks;
if (flash_write_data_to_file(tf_kd, t, tf_kd_size) != CCID_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
low_flash_available();
}
else {
file_t *tf = search_dynamic_file(EF_XKEK + p2);
if (2 * p2 >= tf_kd_size) {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
if (current_dkeks == 0xff && !tf) { //XKEK have always 0xff
return SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND();
}
}
}
else if (p1 == 0x1 || p1 == 0x3 || p1 == 0x4) { //key domain setup
if (p1 == 0x1 && apdu.nc != 1) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
if (p1 == 0x3) { //if key domain is not empty, command is denied
for (int i = 0; i < dynamic_files; i++) {
if (get_key_domain(&dynamic_file[i]) == p2) {
return SW_FILE_EXISTS();
}
}
}
uint8_t t[MAX_KEY_DOMAINS * 2];
memcpy(t, kdata, tf_kd_size);
if (p1 == 0x1) {
t[2 * p2] = dkeks = apdu.data[0];
t[2 * p2 + 1] = current_dkeks = 0;
}
else if (p1 == 0x3) {
t[2 * p2] = dkeks = 0xff;
t[2 * p2 + 1] = 0xff;
}
else if (p1 == 0x4) {
t[2 * p2 + 1] = current_dkeks = 0;
}
if (flash_write_data_to_file(tf_kd, t, tf_kd_size) != CCID_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
file_t *tf = NULL;
if ((tf = search_dynamic_file(EF_DKEK + p2))) {
if (delete_file(tf) != CCID_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
if (p1 == 0x3 && (tf = search_dynamic_file(EF_XKEK + p2))) {
if (delete_file(tf) != CCID_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
low_flash_available();
if (p1 == 0x3) {
return SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND();
}
}
else if (p1 == 0x2) { //XKEK Key Domain creation
if (apdu.nc > 0) {
size_t pub_len = 0;
file_t *fterm = search_by_fid(EF_TERMCA, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
if (!fterm) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
const uint8_t *pub = cvc_get_pub(file_get_data(fterm), file_get_size(fterm), &pub_len);
if (!pub) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
size_t t86_len = 0;
const uint8_t *t86 = cvc_get_field(pub, pub_len, &t86_len, 0x86);
if (!t86 || t86[0] != 0x4) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
size_t t54_len = 0;
const uint8_t *t54 = cvc_get_field(apdu.data, apdu.nc, &t54_len, 0x54);
if (!t54) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
uint8_t hash[32], *input = (uint8_t *) calloc(1, (t86_len - 1) / 2 + 1);
input[0] = 0x54;
memcpy(input + 1, t86 + 1, (t86_len - 1) / 2);
hash256(input, (t86_len - 1) / 2 + 1, hash);
free(input);
int r = puk_verify(t54, t54_len, hash, 32, apdu.data, apdu.nc);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
file_t *tf = file_new(EF_XKEK + p2);
if (!tf) {
return SW_MEMORY_FAILURE();
}
//All checks done. Get Key Domain UID
pub = cvc_get_pub(apdu.data, apdu.nc, &pub_len);
if (pub) {
size_t t86_len = 0;
const uint8_t *t86 = cvc_get_field(pub, pub_len, &t86_len, 0x86);
if (t86) {
flash_write_data_to_file(tf, t86 + 1, t86_len - 1);
low_flash_available();
}
}
}
}
else {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
memset(res_APDU, 0, 10);
res_APDU[0] = dkeks;
res_APDU[1] = dkeks > current_dkeks ? dkeks - current_dkeks : 0;
dkek_kcv(p2, res_APDU + 2);
res_APDU_size = 2 + 8;
file_t *tf = search_dynamic_file(EF_XKEK + p2);
if (tf) {
memcpy(res_APDU + 10, file_get_data(tf), file_get_size(tf));
res_APDU_size += file_get_size(tf);
}
return SW_OK();
}

61
src/hsm/cmd_key_gen.c Normal file
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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "crypto_utils.h"
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "random.h"
int cmd_key_gen() {
uint8_t key_id = P1(apdu);
uint8_t p2 = P2(apdu);
uint8_t key_size = 32;
int r;
if (!isUserAuthenticated) {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
if (p2 == 0xB2) {
key_size = 32;
}
else if (p2 == 0xB1) {
key_size = 24;
}
else if (p2 == 0xB0) {
key_size = 16;
}
//at this moment, we do not use the template, as only CBC is supported by the driver (encrypt, decrypt and CMAC)
uint8_t aes_key[32]; //maximum AES key size
memcpy(aes_key, random_bytes_get(key_size), key_size);
int aes_type = 0x0;
if (key_size == 16) {
aes_type = HSM_KEY_AES_128;
}
else if (key_size == 24) {
aes_type = HSM_KEY_AES_192;
}
else if (key_size == 32) {
aes_type = HSM_KEY_AES_256;
}
r = store_keys(aes_key, aes_type, key_id);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return SW_MEMORY_FAILURE();
}
if (find_and_store_meta_key(key_id) != CCID_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
low_flash_available();
return SW_OK();
}

138
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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "crypto_utils.h"
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "kek.h"
#include "cvc.h"
int cmd_key_unwrap() {
int key_id = P1(apdu), r = 0;
if (P2(apdu) != 0x93) {
return SW_WRONG_P1P2();
}
if (!isUserAuthenticated) {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
int key_type = dkek_type_key(apdu.data);
uint8_t kdom = -1, *allowed = NULL;
size_t allowed_len = 0;
if (key_type == 0x0) {
return SW_DATA_INVALID();
}
if (key_type == HSM_KEY_RSA) {
mbedtls_rsa_context ctx;
mbedtls_rsa_init(&ctx);
do {
r = dkek_decode_key(++kdom, &ctx, apdu.data, apdu.nc, NULL, &allowed, &allowed_len);
} while ((r == CCID_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND || r == CCID_WRONG_DKEK) && kdom < MAX_KEY_DOMAINS);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(&ctx);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
r = store_keys(&ctx, HSM_KEY_RSA, key_id);
if ((res_APDU_size = asn1_cvc_aut(&ctx, HSM_KEY_RSA, res_APDU, 4096, NULL, 0)) == 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(&ctx);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
mbedtls_rsa_free(&ctx);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
else if (key_type == HSM_KEY_EC) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_context ctx;
mbedtls_ecdsa_init(&ctx);
do {
r = dkek_decode_key(++kdom, &ctx, apdu.data, apdu.nc, NULL, &allowed, &allowed_len);
} while ((r == CCID_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND || r == CCID_WRONG_DKEK) && kdom < MAX_KEY_DOMAINS);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ctx);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
r = store_keys(&ctx, HSM_KEY_EC, key_id);
if ((res_APDU_size = asn1_cvc_aut(&ctx, HSM_KEY_EC, res_APDU, 4096, NULL, 0)) == 0) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ctx);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ctx);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
else if (key_type == HSM_KEY_AES) {
uint8_t aes_key[32];
int key_size = 0, aes_type = 0;
do {
r = dkek_decode_key(++kdom,
aes_key,
apdu.data,
apdu.nc,
&key_size,
&allowed,
&allowed_len);
} while ((r == CCID_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND || r == CCID_WRONG_DKEK) && kdom < MAX_KEY_DOMAINS);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
if (key_size == 32) {
aes_type = HSM_KEY_AES_256;
}
else if (key_size == 24) {
aes_type = HSM_KEY_AES_192;
}
else if (key_size == 16) {
aes_type = HSM_KEY_AES_128;
}
else {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
r = store_keys(aes_key, aes_type, key_id);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
if ((allowed != NULL && allowed_len > 0) || kdom >= 0) {
size_t meta_len = (allowed_len > 0 ? 2 + allowed_len : 0) + (kdom >= 0 ? 3 : 0);
uint8_t *meta = (uint8_t *) calloc(1, meta_len), *m = meta;
if (allowed_len > 0) {
*m++ = 0x91;
*m++ = allowed_len;
memcpy(m, allowed, allowed_len); m += allowed_len;
}
if (kdom >= 0) {
*m++ = 0x92;
*m++ = 1;
*m++ = kdom;
}
r = meta_add((KEY_PREFIX << 8) | key_id, meta, meta_len);
free(meta);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return r;
}
}
if (res_APDU_size > 0) {
file_t *fpk = file_new((EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX << 8) | key_id);
r = flash_write_data_to_file(fpk, res_APDU, res_APDU_size);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
low_flash_available();
res_APDU_size = 0;
}
return SW_OK();
}

105
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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "crypto_utils.h"
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "asn1.h"
#include "kek.h"
extern uint8_t get_key_domain(file_t *fkey);
int cmd_key_wrap() {
int key_id = P1(apdu), r = 0;
if (P2(apdu) != 0x92) {
return SW_WRONG_P1P2();
}
if (!isUserAuthenticated) {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
file_t *ef = search_dynamic_file((KEY_PREFIX << 8) | key_id);
uint8_t kdom = get_key_domain(ef);
if (!ef) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
if (key_has_purpose(ef, ALGO_WRAP) == false) {
return SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
file_t *prkd = search_dynamic_file((PRKD_PREFIX << 8) | key_id);
if (!prkd) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
const uint8_t *dprkd = file_get_data(prkd);
size_t wrap_len = MAX_DKEK_ENCODE_KEY_BUFFER;
size_t tag_len = 0;
const uint8_t *meta_tag = get_meta_tag(ef, 0x91, &tag_len);
if (*dprkd == P15_KEYTYPE_RSA) {
mbedtls_rsa_context ctx;
mbedtls_rsa_init(&ctx);
r = load_private_key_rsa(&ctx, ef);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(&ctx);
if (r == CCID_VERIFICATION_FAILED) {
return SW_SECURE_MESSAGE_EXEC_ERROR();
}
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
r = dkek_encode_key(kdom, &ctx, HSM_KEY_RSA, res_APDU, &wrap_len, meta_tag, tag_len);
mbedtls_rsa_free(&ctx);
}
else if (*dprkd == P15_KEYTYPE_ECC) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_context ctx;
mbedtls_ecdsa_init(&ctx);
r = load_private_key_ecdsa(&ctx, ef);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ctx);
if (r == CCID_VERIFICATION_FAILED) {
return SW_SECURE_MESSAGE_EXEC_ERROR();
}
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
r = dkek_encode_key(kdom, &ctx, HSM_KEY_EC, res_APDU, &wrap_len, meta_tag, tag_len);
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ctx);
}
else if (*dprkd == P15_KEYTYPE_AES) {
uint8_t kdata[32]; //maximum AES key size
if (wait_button_pressed() == true) { //timeout
return SW_SECURE_MESSAGE_EXEC_ERROR();
}
int key_size = file_get_size(ef), aes_type = HSM_KEY_AES;
memcpy(kdata, file_get_data(ef), key_size);
if (mkek_decrypt(kdata, key_size) != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
if (key_size == 32) {
aes_type = HSM_KEY_AES_256;
}
else if (key_size == 24) {
aes_type = HSM_KEY_AES_192;
}
else if (key_size == 16) {
aes_type = HSM_KEY_AES_128;
}
r = dkek_encode_key(kdom, kdata, aes_type, res_APDU, &wrap_len, meta_tag, tag_len);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
}
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU_size = wrap_len;
return SW_OK();
}

171
src/hsm/cmd_keypair_gen.c Normal file
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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "crypto_utils.h"
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "files.h"
#include "asn1.h"
#include "cvc.h"
#include "oid.h"
#include "random.h"
#include "kek.h"
int cmd_keypair_gen() {
uint8_t key_id = P1(apdu);
if (!isUserAuthenticated) {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
int ret = 0;
size_t tout = 0;
//sc_asn1_print_tags(apdu.data, apdu.nc);
uint8_t *p = NULL;
//DEBUG_DATA(apdu.data,apdu.nc);
if (asn1_find_tag(apdu.data, apdu.nc, 0x7f49, &tout, &p) && tout > 0 && p != NULL) {
size_t oid_len = 0;
uint8_t *oid = NULL;
if (asn1_find_tag(p, tout, 0x6, &oid_len, &oid) && oid_len > 0 && oid != NULL) {
if (memcmp(oid, OID_ID_TA_RSA_V1_5_SHA_256, oid_len) == 0) { //RSA
size_t ex_len = 3, ks_len = 2;
uint8_t *ex = NULL, *ks = NULL;
uint32_t exponent = 65537, key_size = 2048;
if (asn1_find_tag(p, tout, 0x82, &ex_len, &ex) && ex_len > 0 && ex != NULL) {
uint8_t *dt = ex;
exponent = 0;
for (int i = 0; i < ex_len; i++) {
exponent = (exponent << 8) | *dt++;
}
}
if (asn1_find_tag(p, tout, 0x2, &ks_len, &ks) && ks_len > 0 && ks != NULL) {
uint8_t *dt = ks;
key_size = 0;
for (int i = 0; i < ks_len; i++) {
key_size = (key_size << 8) | *dt++;
}
}
printf("KEYPAIR RSA %lu (%lx)\r\n",
(unsigned long) key_size,
(unsigned long) exponent);
mbedtls_rsa_context rsa;
mbedtls_rsa_init(&rsa);
uint8_t index = 0;
ret = mbedtls_rsa_gen_key(&rsa, random_gen, &index, key_size, exponent);
if (ret != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(&rsa);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
if ((res_APDU_size =
asn1_cvc_aut(&rsa, HSM_KEY_RSA, res_APDU, 4096, NULL, 0)) == 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
ret = store_keys(&rsa, HSM_KEY_RSA, key_id);
if (ret != CCID_OK) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(&rsa);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
mbedtls_rsa_free(&rsa);
}
else if (memcmp(oid, OID_ID_TA_ECDSA_SHA_256, MIN(oid_len, 10)) == 0) { //ECC
size_t prime_len;
uint8_t *prime = NULL;
if (asn1_find_tag(p, tout, 0x81, &prime_len, &prime) != true) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
mbedtls_ecp_group_id ec_id = ec_get_curve_from_prime(prime, prime_len);
printf("KEYPAIR ECC %d\r\n", ec_id);
if (ec_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) {
return SW_FUNC_NOT_SUPPORTED();
}
mbedtls_ecdsa_context ecdsa;
mbedtls_ecdsa_init(&ecdsa);
uint8_t index = 0;
ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey(&ecdsa, ec_id, random_gen, &index);
if (ret != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
size_t l91 = 0, ext_len = 0;
uint8_t *p91 = NULL, *ext = NULL;
if (asn1_find_tag(apdu.data, apdu.nc, 0x91, &l91, &p91) && p91 != NULL && l91 > 0) {
for (int n = 0; n < l91; n++) {
if (p91[n] == ALGO_EC_DH_XKEK) {
size_t l92 = 0;
uint8_t *p92 = NULL;
if (!asn1_find_tag(apdu.data, apdu.nc, 0x92, &l92,
&p92) || p92 == NULL || l92 == 0) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
if (p92[0] > MAX_KEY_DOMAINS) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
file_t *tf_xkek = search_dynamic_file(EF_XKEK + p92[0]);
if (!tf_xkek) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
ext_len = 2 + 2 + strlen(OID_ID_KEY_DOMAIN_UID) + 2 + file_get_size(
tf_xkek);
ext = (uint8_t *) calloc(1, ext_len);
uint8_t *pe = ext;
*pe++ = 0x73;
*pe++ = ext_len - 2;
*pe++ = 0x6;
*pe++ = strlen(OID_ID_KEY_DOMAIN_UID);
memcpy(pe, OID_ID_KEY_DOMAIN_UID, strlen(OID_ID_KEY_DOMAIN_UID));
pe += strlen(OID_ID_KEY_DOMAIN_UID);
*pe++ = 0x80;
*pe++ = file_get_size(tf_xkek);
memcpy(pe, file_get_data(tf_xkek), file_get_size(tf_xkek));
}
}
}
if ((res_APDU_size =
asn1_cvc_aut(&ecdsa, HSM_KEY_EC, res_APDU, 4096, ext, ext_len)) == 0) {
if (ext) {
free(ext);
}
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
if (ext) {
free(ext);
}
ret = store_keys(&ecdsa, HSM_KEY_EC, key_id);
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa);
if (ret != CCID_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
}
}
else {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
if (find_and_store_meta_key(key_id) != CCID_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
file_t *fpk = file_new((EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX << 8) | key_id);
ret = flash_write_data_to_file(fpk, res_APDU, res_APDU_size);
if (ret != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
if (apdu.ne == 0) {
apdu.ne = res_APDU_size;
}
low_flash_available();
return SW_OK();
}

64
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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "files.h"
int cmd_list_keys() {
/* First we send DEV private key */
/* Both below conditions should be always TRUE */
if (search_by_fid(EF_PRKD_DEV, NULL, SPECIFY_EF)) {
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = EF_PRKD_DEV >> 8;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = EF_PRKD_DEV & 0xff;
}
if (search_by_fid(EF_KEY_DEV, NULL, SPECIFY_EF)) {
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = EF_KEY_DEV >> 8;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = EF_KEY_DEV & 0xff;
}
//first CC
for (int i = 0; i < dynamic_files; i++) {
file_t *f = &dynamic_file[i];
if ((f->fid & 0xff00) == (KEY_PREFIX << 8)) {
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = KEY_PREFIX;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = f->fid & 0xff;
}
}
for (int i = 0; i < dynamic_files; i++) {
file_t *f = &dynamic_file[i];
if ((f->fid & 0xff00) == (PRKD_PREFIX << 8)) {
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = PRKD_PREFIX;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = f->fid & 0xff;
}
}
//second CD
for (int i = 0; i < dynamic_files; i++) {
file_t *f = &dynamic_file[i];
if ((f->fid & 0xff00) == (CD_PREFIX << 8)) {
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = CD_PREFIX;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = f->fid & 0xff;
}
}
for (int i = 0; i < dynamic_files; i++) {
file_t *f = &dynamic_file[i];
if ((f->fid & 0xff00) == (DCOD_PREFIX << 8)) {
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = DCOD_PREFIX;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = f->fid & 0xff;
}
}
return SW_OK();
}

84
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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "asn1.h"
#include "oid.h"
#include "eac.h"
#include "files.h"
#include "cvc.h"
file_t *ef_puk_aut = NULL;
int cmd_mse() {
int p1 = P1(apdu);
int p2 = P2(apdu);
if (p2 != 0xA4 && p2 != 0xA6 && p2 != 0xAA && p2 != 0xB4 && p2 != 0xB6 && p2 != 0xB8) {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
if (p1 & 0x1) { //SET
uint16_t tag = 0x0;
uint8_t *tag_data = NULL, *p = NULL;
size_t tag_len = 0;
while (walk_tlv(apdu.data, apdu.nc, &p, &tag, &tag_len, &tag_data)) {
if (tag == 0x80) {
if (p2 == 0xA4) {
if (tag_len == 10 &&
memcmp(tag_data, OID_ID_CA_ECDH_AES_CBC_CMAC_128, tag_len) == 0) {
sm_set_protocol(MSE_AES);
}
}
}
else if (tag == 0x83) {
if (tag_len == 1) {
}
else {
if (p2 == 0xB6) {
if (puk_store_select_chr(tag_data) == CCID_OK) {
return SW_OK();
}
}
else if (p2 == 0xA4) { /* Aut */
for (int i = 0; i < MAX_PUK; i++) {
file_t *ef = search_dynamic_file(EF_PUK + i);
if (!ef) {
break;
}
if (!file_has_data(ef)) {
break;
}
size_t chr_len = 0;
const uint8_t *chr = cvc_get_chr(file_get_data(ef),
file_get_size(ef),
&chr_len);
if (memcmp(chr, tag_data, chr_len) == 0) {
ef_puk_aut = ef;
return SW_OK();
}
}
}
return SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND();
}
}
}
}
else {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
return SW_OK();
}

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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "oid.h"
#include "asn1.h"
#include "cvc.h"
extern int add_cert_puk_store(const uint8_t *data, size_t data_len, bool copy);
extern PUK *current_puk;
int cmd_pso() {
uint8_t p1 = P1(apdu), p2 = P2(apdu);
if (p1 == 0x0 && (p2 == 0x92 || p2 == 0xAE || p2 == 0xBE)) { /* Verify certificate */
if (apdu.nc == 0) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
if (current_puk == NULL) {
return SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND();
}
if (apdu.data[0] != 0x7F || apdu.data[1] != 0x21) {
uint8_t tlv_len = 2 + format_tlv_len(apdu.nc, NULL);
memmove(apdu.data + tlv_len, apdu.data, apdu.nc);
memcpy(apdu.data, "\x7F\x21", 2);
format_tlv_len(apdu.nc, apdu.data + 2);
apdu.nc += tlv_len;
}
int r = cvc_verify(apdu.data, apdu.nc, current_puk->cvcert, current_puk->cvcert_len);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
if (r == CCID_WRONG_DATA) {
return SW_DATA_INVALID();
}
else if (r == CCID_WRONG_SIGNATURE) {
return SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
for (int i = 0; i < 0xfe; i++) {
uint16_t fid = (CA_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX << 8) | i;
file_t *ca_ef = search_dynamic_file(fid);
if (!ca_ef) {
ca_ef = file_new(fid);
flash_write_data_to_file(ca_ef, apdu.data, apdu.nc);
if (add_cert_puk_store(file_get_data(ca_ef), file_get_size(ca_ef),
false) != CCID_OK) {
return SW_FILE_FULL();
}
size_t chr_len = 0;
const uint8_t *chr = cvc_get_chr(apdu.data, apdu.nc, &chr_len);
if (chr == NULL) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
size_t puk_len = 0, puk_bin_len = 0;
const uint8_t *puk = cvc_get_pub(apdu.data, apdu.nc, &puk_len), *puk_bin = NULL;
if (puk == NULL) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
size_t oid_len = 0;
const uint8_t *oid = cvc_get_field(puk, puk_len, &oid_len, 0x6);
if (oid == NULL) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
if (memcmp(oid, OID_ID_TA_RSA, 9) == 0) { //RSA
puk_bin = cvc_get_field(puk, puk_len, &puk_bin_len, 0x81);
if (!puk_bin) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
}
else if (memcmp(oid, OID_ID_TA_ECDSA, 9) == 0) { //ECC
mbedtls_ecp_group_id ec_id = cvc_inherite_ec_group(apdu.data, apdu.nc);
mbedtls_ecp_group grp;
mbedtls_ecp_group_init(&grp);
if (mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&grp, ec_id) != 0) {
mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&grp);
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
size_t plen = mbedtls_mpi_size(&grp.P);
size_t t86_len = 0;
const uint8_t *t86 = cvc_get_field(puk, puk_len, &t86_len, 0x86);
if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(&grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY) {
if (plen != t86_len) {
mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&grp);
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
puk_bin = t86;
puk_bin_len = t86_len;
}
else if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(&grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS) {
if (t86[0] == 0x2 || t86[0] == 0x3) {
if (t86_len != plen + 1) {
mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&grp);
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
}
else if (t86[0] == 0x4) {
if (t86_len != 2 * plen + 1) {
mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&grp);
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
}
else {
mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&grp);
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
puk_bin = t86 + 1;
puk_bin_len = plen;
}
mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&grp);
if (!puk_bin) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
}
file_t *cd_ef = file_new((CD_PREFIX << 8) | i);
size_t cd_len = asn1_build_cert_description(chr,
chr_len,
puk_bin,
puk_bin_len,
fid,
NULL,
0);
if (cd_len == 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
uint8_t *buf = (uint8_t *) calloc(cd_len, sizeof(uint8_t));
int r = asn1_build_cert_description(chr,
chr_len,
puk_bin,
puk_bin_len,
fid,
buf,
cd_len);
flash_write_data_to_file(cd_ef, buf, cd_len);
free(buf);
if (r == 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
low_flash_available();
break;
}
}
return SW_OK();
}
else {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
return SW_OK();
}

96
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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "files.h"
#include "cvc.h"
int cmd_puk_auth() {
uint8_t p1 = P1(apdu), p2 = P2(apdu);
file_t *ef_puk = search_by_fid(EF_PUKAUT, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
if (!file_has_data(ef_puk)) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
uint8_t *puk_data = file_get_data(ef_puk);
if (apdu.nc > 0) {
if (p1 == 0x0 || p1 == 0x1) {
file_t *ef = NULL;
if (p1 == 0x0) { /* Add */
if (p2 != 0x0) {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
for (int i = 0; i < puk_data[0]; i++) {
ef = search_dynamic_file(EF_PUK + i);
if (!ef) { /* Never should not happen */
return SW_MEMORY_FAILURE();
}
if (!file_has_data(ef)) { /* found first empty slot */
break;
}
}
uint8_t *tmp = (uint8_t *) calloc(file_get_size(ef_puk), sizeof(uint8_t));
memcpy(tmp, puk_data, file_get_size(ef_puk));
tmp[1] = puk_data[1] - 1;
flash_write_data_to_file(ef_puk, tmp, file_get_size(ef_puk));
puk_data = file_get_data(ef_puk);
free(tmp);
}
else if (p1 == 0x1) { /* Replace */
if (p2 >= puk_data[0]) {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
ef = search_dynamic_file(EF_PUK + p2);
if (!ef) { /* Never should not happen */
return SW_MEMORY_FAILURE();
}
}
flash_write_data_to_file(ef, apdu.data, apdu.nc);
low_flash_available();
}
else {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
}
if (p1 == 0x2) {
if (p2 >= puk_data[0]) {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
file_t *ef = search_dynamic_file(EF_PUK + p2);
if (!ef) {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
if (!file_has_data(ef)) {
return SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND();
}
size_t chr_len = 0;
const uint8_t *chr = cvc_get_chr(file_get_data(ef), file_get_size(ef), &chr_len);
if (chr) {
memcpy(res_APDU, chr, chr_len);
res_APDU_size = chr_len;
}
return set_res_sw(0x90, puk_status[p2]);
}
else {
memcpy(res_APDU, puk_data, 3);
res_APDU[3] = 0;
for (int i = 0; i < puk_data[0]; i++) {
res_APDU[3] += puk_status[i];
}
res_APDU_size = 4;
}
return SW_OK();
}

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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "sc_hsm.h"
int cmd_read_binary() {
uint16_t fid = 0x0;
uint32_t offset = 0;
uint8_t ins = INS(apdu), p1 = P1(apdu), p2 = P2(apdu);
const file_t *ef = NULL;
if ((ins & 0x1) == 0) {
if ((p1 & 0x80) != 0) {
if (!(ef = search_by_fid(p1 & 0x1f, NULL, SPECIFY_EF))) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
offset = p2;
}
else {
offset = make_uint16_t(p1, p2) & 0x7fff;
ef = currentEF;
}
}
else {
if (p1 == 0 && (p2 & 0xE0) == 0 && (p2 & 0x1f) != 0 && (p2 & 0x1f) != 0x1f) {
if (!(ef = search_by_fid(p2 & 0x1f, NULL, SPECIFY_EF))) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
}
else {
uint16_t file_id = make_uint16_t(p1, p2); // & 0x7fff;
if (file_id == 0x0) {
ef = currentEF;
}
else if (!(ef =
search_by_fid(file_id, NULL,
SPECIFY_EF)) && !(ef = search_dynamic_file(file_id))) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
if (apdu.data[0] != 0x54) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
offset = 0;
for (int d = 0; d < apdu.data[1]; d++) {
offset |= apdu.data[2 + d] << (apdu.data[1] - 1 - d) * 8;
}
}
}
if ((fid >> 8) == KEY_PREFIX || !authenticate_action(ef, ACL_OP_READ_SEARCH)) {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
if (ef->data) {
if ((ef->type & FILE_DATA_FUNC) == FILE_DATA_FUNC) {
uint16_t data_len = ((int (*)(const file_t *, int))(ef->data))((const file_t *) ef, 1); //already copies content to res_APDU
if (offset > data_len) {
return SW_WRONG_P1P2();
}
uint16_t maxle = data_len - offset;
if (apdu.ne > maxle) {
apdu.ne = maxle;
}
if (offset) {
memmove(res_APDU, res_APDU + offset, res_APDU_size - offset);
//res_APDU += offset;
res_APDU_size -= offset;
}
}
else {
uint16_t data_len = file_get_size(ef);
if (offset > data_len) {
return SW_WRONG_P1P2();
}
uint16_t maxle = data_len - offset;
if (apdu.ne > maxle) {
apdu.ne = maxle;
}
memcpy(res_APDU, file_get_data(ef) + offset, data_len - offset);
res_APDU_size = data_len - offset;
}
}
return SW_OK();
}

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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "crypto_utils.h"
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "kek.h"
int cmd_reset_retry() {
if (P2(apdu) != 0x81) {
return SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND();
}
if (!file_sopin || !file_pin1) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
if (!file_has_data(file_sopin)) {
return SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND();
}
uint16_t opts = get_device_options();
if (!(opts & HSM_OPT_RRC)) {
return SW_COMMAND_NOT_ALLOWED();
}
if (P1(apdu) == 0x0 || P1(apdu) == 0x2) {
int newpin_len = 0;
if (P1(apdu) == 0x0) {
if (apdu.nc <= 8) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
uint16_t r = check_pin(file_sopin, apdu.data, 8);
if (r != 0x9000) {
return r;
}
newpin_len = apdu.nc - 8;
has_session_sopin = true;
hash_multi(apdu.data, 8, session_sopin);
}
else if (P1(apdu) == 0x2) {
if (!has_session_sopin) {
return SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
if (apdu.nc > 16) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
newpin_len = apdu.nc;
}
uint8_t dhash[33];
dhash[0] = newpin_len;
double_hash_pin(apdu.data + (apdu.nc - newpin_len), newpin_len, dhash + 1);
flash_write_data_to_file(file_pin1, dhash, sizeof(dhash));
if (pin_reset_retries(file_pin1, true) != CCID_OK) {
return SW_MEMORY_FAILURE();
}
uint8_t mkek[MKEK_SIZE];
int r = load_mkek(mkek); //loads the MKEK with SO pin
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
hash_multi(apdu.data + (apdu.nc - newpin_len), newpin_len, session_pin);
has_session_pin = true;
r = store_mkek(mkek);
release_mkek(mkek);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
low_flash_available();
return SW_OK();
}
else if (P1(apdu) == 0x1 || P1(apdu) == 0x3) {
if (!(opts & HSM_OPT_RRC_RESET_ONLY)) {
return SW_COMMAND_NOT_ALLOWED();
}
if (P1(apdu) == 0x1) {
if (apdu.nc != 8) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
uint16_t r = check_pin(file_sopin, apdu.data, 8);
if (r != 0x9000) {
return r;
}
has_session_sopin = true;
hash_multi(apdu.data, 8, session_sopin);
}
else if (P1(apdu) == 0x3) {
if (!has_session_sopin) {
return SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
if (apdu.nc != 0) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
}
if (pin_reset_retries(file_pin1, true) != CCID_OK) {
return SW_MEMORY_FAILURE();
}
return SW_OK();
}
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}

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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "version.h"
void select_file(file_t *pe) {
if (!pe) {
currentDF = (file_t *) MF;
currentEF = NULL;
}
else if (pe->type & FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF) {
currentEF = pe;
currentDF = &file_entries[pe->parent];
}
else {
currentDF = pe;
}
if (currentEF == file_openpgp || currentEF == file_sc_hsm) {
selected_applet = currentEF;
//sc_hsm_unload(); //reset auth status
}
}
int cmd_select() {
uint8_t p1 = P1(apdu);
uint8_t p2 = P2(apdu);
file_t *pe = NULL;
uint16_t fid = 0x0;
// Only "first or only occurence" supported
//if ((p2 & 0xF3) != 0x00) {
// return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
//}
if (apdu.nc >= 2) {
fid = get_uint16_t(apdu.data, 0);
}
//if ((fid & 0xff00) == (KEY_PREFIX << 8))
// fid = (PRKD_PREFIX << 8) | (fid & 0xff);
uint8_t pfx = fid >> 8;
if (pfx == PRKD_PREFIX ||
pfx == CD_PREFIX ||
pfx == CA_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX ||
pfx == KEY_PREFIX ||
pfx == EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX ||
pfx == DCOD_PREFIX ||
pfx == DATA_PREFIX ||
pfx == PROT_DATA_PREFIX) {
if (!(pe = search_dynamic_file(fid)) && !(pe = search_by_fid(fid, NULL, SPECIFY_EF))) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
}
if (!pe) {
if (p1 == 0x0) { //Select MF, DF or EF - File identifier or absent
if (apdu.nc == 0) {
pe = (file_t *) MF;
//ac_fini();
}
else if (apdu.nc == 2) {
if (!(pe = search_by_fid(fid, NULL, SPECIFY_ANY))) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
}
}
else if (p1 == 0x01) { //Select child DF - DF identifier
if (!(pe = search_by_fid(fid, currentDF, SPECIFY_DF))) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
}
else if (p1 == 0x02) { //Select EF under the current DF - EF identifier
if (!(pe = search_by_fid(fid, currentDF, SPECIFY_EF))) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
}
else if (p1 == 0x03) { //Select parent DF of the current DF - Absent
if (apdu.nc != 0) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
}
else if (p1 == 0x04) { //Select by DF name - e.g., [truncated] application identifier
if (!(pe = search_by_name(apdu.data, apdu.nc))) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
if (card_terminated) {
return set_res_sw(0x62, 0x85);
}
}
else if (p1 == 0x08) { //Select from the MF - Path without the MF identifier
if (!(pe = search_by_path(apdu.data, apdu.nc, MF))) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
}
else if (p1 == 0x09) { //Select from the current DF - Path without the current DF identifier
if (!(pe = search_by_path(apdu.data, apdu.nc, currentDF))) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
}
}
if ((p2 & 0xfc) == 0x00 || (p2 & 0xfc) == 0x04) {
process_fci(pe, 0);
if (pe == file_sc_hsm) {
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = 0x85;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = 5;
uint16_t opts = get_device_options();
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = opts >> 8;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = opts & 0xff;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = 0xFF;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = HSM_VERSION_MAJOR;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = HSM_VERSION_MINOR;
res_APDU[1] = res_APDU_size - 2;
}
}
else {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
select_file(pe);
return SW_OK();
}

35
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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "random.h"
#include "eac.h"
int cmd_session_pin() {
if (P1(apdu) == 0x01 && P2(apdu) == 0x81) {
memcpy(sm_session_pin, random_bytes_get(8), 8);
sm_session_pin_len = 8;
memcpy(res_APDU, sm_session_pin, sm_session_pin_len);
res_APDU_size = sm_session_pin_len;
apdu.ne = sm_session_pin_len;
}
else {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
return SW_OK();
}

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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "crypto_utils.h"
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "asn1.h"
#include "mbedtls/oid.h"
#include "random.h"
//-----
/* From OpenSC */
static const uint8_t hdr_md5[] = {
0x30, 0x20, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7,
0x0d, 0x02, 0x05, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x10
};
static const uint8_t hdr_sha1[] = {
0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05, 0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a,
0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14
};
static const uint8_t hdr_sha256[] = {
0x30, 0x31, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65,
0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x20
};
static const uint8_t hdr_sha384[] = {
0x30, 0x41, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65,
0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x30
};
static const uint8_t hdr_sha512[] = {
0x30, 0x51, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65,
0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x40
};
static const uint8_t hdr_sha224[] = {
0x30, 0x2d, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65,
0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x04, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x1c
};
static const uint8_t hdr_ripemd160[] = {
0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05, 0x2b, 0x24, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01,
0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14
};
static const struct digest_info_prefix {
mbedtls_md_type_t algorithm;
const uint8_t *hdr;
size_t hdr_len;
size_t hash_len;
} digest_info_prefix[] = {
{ MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, hdr_md5, sizeof(hdr_md5), 16 },
{ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, hdr_sha1, sizeof(hdr_sha1), 20 },
{ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, hdr_sha256, sizeof(hdr_sha256), 32 },
{ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, hdr_sha384, sizeof(hdr_sha384), 48 },
{ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, hdr_sha512, sizeof(hdr_sha512), 64 },
{ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, hdr_sha224, sizeof(hdr_sha224), 28 },
{ MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160, hdr_ripemd160, sizeof(hdr_ripemd160), 20 },
{ 0, NULL, 0, 0 }
};
int pkcs1_strip_digest_info_prefix(mbedtls_md_type_t *algorithm,
const uint8_t *in_dat,
size_t in_len,
uint8_t *out_dat,
size_t *out_len) {
for (int i = 0; digest_info_prefix[i].algorithm != 0; i++) {
size_t hdr_len = digest_info_prefix[i].hdr_len, hash_len = digest_info_prefix[i].hash_len;
const uint8_t *hdr = digest_info_prefix[i].hdr;
if (in_len == (hdr_len + hash_len) && !memcmp(in_dat, hdr, hdr_len)) {
if (algorithm) {
*algorithm = digest_info_prefix[i].algorithm;
}
if (out_dat == NULL) {
return CCID_OK;
}
if (*out_len < hash_len) {
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
}
memmove(out_dat, in_dat + hdr_len, hash_len);
*out_len = hash_len;
return CCID_OK;
}
}
return CCID_EXEC_ERROR;
}
//-----
int cmd_signature() {
uint8_t key_id = P1(apdu);
uint8_t p2 = P2(apdu);
mbedtls_md_type_t md = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;
file_t *fkey;
if (!isUserAuthenticated) {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
if (!(fkey = search_dynamic_file((KEY_PREFIX << 8) | key_id)) || !file_has_data(fkey)) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
if (get_key_counter(fkey) == 0) {
return SW_FILE_FULL();
}
if (key_has_purpose(fkey, p2) == false) {
return SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
int key_size = file_get_size(fkey);
if (p2 == ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA1 || p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA1) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;
}
else if (p2 == ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA256 || p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA256) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256;
}
else if (p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA224 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA224 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA224) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224;
}
else if (p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA384 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA384) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384;
}
else if (p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA512 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA512) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512;
}
if (p2 == ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA1 || p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA1 ||
p2 == ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA256 || p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA256 ||
p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA224 || p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA384 || p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA512 ||
p2 == ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA224 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512 ||
p2 == ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA224 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA384 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA512) {
generic_hash(md, apdu.data, apdu.nc, apdu.data);
apdu.nc = mbedtls_md_get_size(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md));
}
if (p2 >= ALGO_RSA_RAW && p2 <= ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA512) {
mbedtls_rsa_context ctx;
mbedtls_rsa_init(&ctx);
int r = load_private_key_rsa(&ctx, fkey);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(&ctx);
if (r == CCID_VERIFICATION_FAILED) {
return SW_SECURE_MESSAGE_EXEC_ERROR();
}
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
uint8_t *hash = apdu.data;
size_t hash_len = apdu.nc;
if (p2 == ALGO_RSA_PKCS1) { //DigestInfo attached
size_t nc = apdu.nc;
if (pkcs1_strip_digest_info_prefix(&md, apdu.data, apdu.nc, apdu.data,
&nc) != CCID_OK) { //gets the MD algo id and strips it off
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
apdu.nc = nc;
}
else {
//sc_asn1_print_tags(apdu.data, apdu.nc);
size_t tout = 0, oid_len = 0;
uint8_t *p = NULL, *oid = NULL;
if (asn1_find_tag(apdu.data, apdu.nc, 0x30, &tout, &p) && tout > 0 && p != NULL) {
size_t tout30 = 0;
uint8_t *c30 = NULL;
if (asn1_find_tag(p, tout, 0x30, &tout30, &c30) && tout30 > 0 && c30 != NULL) {
asn1_find_tag(c30, tout30, 0x6, &oid_len, &oid);
}
asn1_find_tag(p, tout, 0x4, &hash_len, &hash);
}
if (oid && oid_len > 0) {
if (memcmp(oid, MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA1, oid_len) == 0) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;
}
else if (memcmp(oid, MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA224, oid_len) == 0) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224;
}
else if (memcmp(oid, MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA256, oid_len) == 0) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256;
}
else if (memcmp(oid, MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA384, oid_len) == 0) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384;
}
else if (memcmp(oid, MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA512, oid_len) == 0) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512;
}
}
if (p2 >= ALGO_RSA_PSS && p2 <= ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA512) {
if (p2 == ALGO_RSA_PSS && !oid) {
if (apdu.nc == 20) { //default is sha1
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;
}
else if (apdu.nc == 28) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224;
}
else if (apdu.nc == 32) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256;
}
else if (apdu.nc == 48) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384;
}
else if (apdu.nc == 64) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512;
}
}
mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(&ctx, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21, md);
}
}
if (md == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) {
if (apdu.nc < key_size) { //needs padding
memset(apdu.data + apdu.nc, 0, key_size - apdu.nc);
}
r = mbedtls_rsa_private(&ctx, random_gen, NULL, apdu.data, res_APDU);
}
else {
uint8_t *signature = (uint8_t *) calloc(key_size, sizeof(uint8_t));
r = mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign(&ctx, random_gen, NULL, md, hash_len, hash, signature);
memcpy(res_APDU, signature, key_size);
free(signature);
}
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(&ctx);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU_size = key_size;
apdu.ne = key_size;
mbedtls_rsa_free(&ctx);
}
else if (p2 >= ALGO_EC_RAW && p2 <= ALGO_EC_SHA512) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_context ctx;
mbedtls_ecdsa_init(&ctx);
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256;
if (p2 == ALGO_EC_RAW) {
if (apdu.nc == 32) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256;
}
else if (apdu.nc == 20) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;
}
else if (apdu.nc == 28) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224;
}
else if (apdu.nc == 48) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384;
}
else if (apdu.nc == 64) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512;
}
}
if (p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA1) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;
}
else if (p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA224) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224;
}
else if (p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA256) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256;
}
else if (p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA384) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384;
}
else if (p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA512) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512;
}
int r = load_private_key_ecdsa(&ctx, fkey);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ctx);
if (r == CCID_VERIFICATION_FAILED) {
return SW_SECURE_MESSAGE_EXEC_ERROR();
}
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
size_t olen = 0;
uint8_t buf[MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN];
if (mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature(&ctx, md, apdu.data, apdu.nc, buf, MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN,
&olen, random_gen, NULL) != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ctx);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
memcpy(res_APDU, buf, olen);
res_APDU_size = olen;
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ctx);
}
else {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
decrement_key_counter(fkey);
return SW_OK();
}

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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "asn1.h"
extern void select_file(file_t *pe);
int cmd_update_ef() {
uint8_t p1 = P1(apdu), p2 = P2(apdu);
uint16_t fid = (p1 << 8) | p2;
uint8_t *data = NULL;
uint16_t offset = 0;
uint16_t data_len = 0;
file_t *ef = NULL;
if (!isUserAuthenticated) {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
if (fid == 0x0) {
ef = currentEF;
}
else if (p1 != EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX && p1 != PRKD_PREFIX && p1 != CA_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX &&
p1 != CD_PREFIX && p1 != DATA_PREFIX && p1 != DCOD_PREFIX &&
p1 != PROT_DATA_PREFIX) {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
if (ef && !authenticate_action(ef, ACL_OP_UPDATE_ERASE)) {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
uint16_t tag = 0x0;
uint8_t *tag_data = NULL, *p = NULL;
size_t tag_len = 0;
while (walk_tlv(apdu.data, apdu.nc, &p, &tag, &tag_len, &tag_data)) {
if (tag == 0x54) { //ofset tag
for (int i = 1; i <= tag_len; i++) {
offset |= (*tag_data++ << (8 * (tag_len - i)));
}
}
else if (tag == 0x53) { //data
data_len = tag_len;
data = tag_data;
}
}
if (data_len == 0 && offset == 0) { //new file
ef = file_new(fid);
//if ((fid & 0xff00) == (EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX << 8))
// add_file_to_chain(ef, &ef_pukdf);
select_file(ef);
}
else {
if (fid == 0x0 && !ef) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
else if (fid != 0x0 &&
!(ef =
search_by_fid(fid, NULL,
SPECIFY_EF)) && !(ef = search_dynamic_file(fid))) { //if does not exist, create it
//return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
ef = file_new(fid);
}
if (offset == 0) {
int r = flash_write_data_to_file(ef, data, data_len);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return SW_MEMORY_FAILURE();
}
}
else {
if (!file_has_data(ef)) {
return SW_DATA_INVALID();
}
uint8_t *data_merge = (uint8_t *) calloc(1, offset + data_len);
memcpy(data_merge, file_get_data(ef), offset);
memcpy(data_merge + offset, data, data_len);
int r = flash_write_data_to_file(ef, data_merge, offset + data_len);
free(data_merge);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return SW_MEMORY_FAILURE();
}
}
low_flash_available();
}
return SW_OK();
}

66
src/hsm/cmd_verify.c Normal file
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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "sc_hsm.h"
int cmd_verify() {
uint8_t p1 = P1(apdu);
uint8_t p2 = P2(apdu);
if (p1 != 0x0 || (p2 & 0x60) != 0x0) {
return SW_WRONG_P1P2();
}
if (p2 == 0x81) { //UserPin
uint16_t opts = get_device_options();
if (opts & HSM_OPT_TRANSPORT_PIN) {
return SW_DATA_INVALID();
}
if (has_session_pin && apdu.nc == 0) {
return SW_OK();
}
if (*file_get_data(file_pin1) == 0 && pka_enabled() == false) { //not initialized
return SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND();
}
if (apdu.nc > 0) {
return check_pin(file_pin1, apdu.data, apdu.nc);
}
if (file_read_uint8(file_get_data(file_retries_pin1)) == 0) {
return SW_PIN_BLOCKED();
}
return set_res_sw(0x63, 0xc0 | file_read_uint8(file_get_data(file_retries_pin1)));
}
else if (p2 == 0x88) { //SOPin
if (file_read_uint8(file_get_data(file_sopin)) == 0) { //not initialized
return SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND();
}
if (apdu.nc > 0) {
return check_pin(file_sopin, apdu.data, apdu.nc);
}
if (file_read_uint8(file_get_data(file_retries_sopin)) == 0) {
return SW_PIN_BLOCKED();
}
if (has_session_sopin) {
return SW_OK();
}
return set_res_sw(0x63, 0xc0 | file_read_uint8(file_get_data(file_retries_sopin)));
}
else if (p2 == 0x85) {
return SW_OK();
}
return SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND();
}

842
src/hsm/cvc.c Normal file
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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "common.h"
#include "cvc.h"
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "mbedtls/rsa.h"
#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h"
#include <string.h>
#include "asn1.h"
#include "crypto_utils.h"
#include "random.h"
#include "oid.h"
#include "mbedtls/md.h"
#include "files.h"
extern const uint8_t *dev_name;
extern size_t dev_name_len;
size_t asn1_cvc_public_key_rsa(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, uint8_t *buf, size_t buf_len) {
const uint8_t oid_rsa[] = { 0x04, 0x00, 0x7F, 0x00, 0x07, 0x02, 0x02, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02 };
size_t n_size = mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->N), e_size = mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->E);
size_t ntot_size = asn1_len_tag(0x81, n_size), etot_size = asn1_len_tag(0x82, e_size);
size_t oid_len = asn1_len_tag(0x6, sizeof(oid_rsa));
size_t tot_len = asn1_len_tag(0x7f49, oid_len + ntot_size + etot_size);
if (buf == NULL || buf_len == 0) {
return tot_len;
}
if (buf_len < tot_len) {
return 0;
}
uint8_t *p = buf;
memcpy(p, "\x7F\x49", 2); p += 2;
p += format_tlv_len(oid_len + ntot_size + etot_size, p);
//oid
*p++ = 0x6; p += format_tlv_len(sizeof(oid_rsa), p); memcpy(p, oid_rsa, sizeof(oid_rsa));
p += sizeof(oid_rsa);
//n
*p++ = 0x81; p += format_tlv_len(n_size, p); mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&rsa->N, p, n_size);
p += n_size;
//n
*p++ = 0x82; p += format_tlv_len(e_size, p); mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&rsa->E, p, e_size);
p += e_size;
return tot_len;
}
const uint8_t *pointA[] = {
NULL,
(uint8_t *)
"\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFE\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFC",
(uint8_t *)
"\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFE\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFE",
(uint8_t *)
"\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFC",
(uint8_t *)
"\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFE\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFC",
(uint8_t *)
"\x01\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFC",
};
size_t asn1_cvc_public_key_ecdsa(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ecdsa, uint8_t *buf, size_t buf_len) {
uint8_t Y_buf[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_PT_LEN];
const uint8_t oid_ecdsa[] = { 0x04, 0x00, 0x7F, 0x00, 0x07, 0x02, 0x02, 0x02, 0x02, 0x03 };
size_t p_size = mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.P), a_size = mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.A);
size_t b_size = mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.B),
g_size = 1 + mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.G.X) + mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.G.X);
size_t o_size = mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.N), y_size = 0;
mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp,
&ecdsa->Q,
MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED,
&y_size,
Y_buf,
sizeof(Y_buf));
size_t c_size = 1;
size_t ptot_size = asn1_len_tag(0x81, p_size), atot_size = asn1_len_tag(0x82,
a_size ? a_size : (
pointA[ecdsa->grp.id
] &&
ecdsa->grp.id <
6 ? p_size : 1));
size_t btot_size = asn1_len_tag(0x83, b_size), gtot_size = asn1_len_tag(0x84, g_size);
size_t otot_size = asn1_len_tag(0x85, o_size), ytot_size = asn1_len_tag(0x86, y_size);
size_t ctot_size = asn1_len_tag(0x87, c_size);
size_t oid_len = asn1_len_tag(0x6, sizeof(oid_ecdsa));
size_t tot_len = asn1_len_tag(0x7f49,
oid_len + ptot_size + atot_size + btot_size + gtot_size + otot_size + ytot_size +
ctot_size);
if (buf == NULL || buf_len == 0) {
return tot_len;
}
if (buf_len < tot_len) {
return 0;
}
uint8_t *p = buf;
memcpy(p, "\x7F\x49", 2); p += 2;
p += format_tlv_len(
oid_len + ptot_size + atot_size + btot_size + gtot_size + otot_size + ytot_size + ctot_size,
p);
//oid
*p++ = 0x6; p += format_tlv_len(sizeof(oid_ecdsa), p); memcpy(p, oid_ecdsa, sizeof(oid_ecdsa));
p += sizeof(oid_ecdsa);
//p
*p++ = 0x81; p += format_tlv_len(p_size, p); mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp.P, p, p_size);
p += p_size;
//A
if (a_size) {
*p++ = 0x82; p += format_tlv_len(a_size, p); mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp.A,
p,
a_size); p += a_size;
}
else { //mbedtls does not set point A for some curves
if (pointA[ecdsa->grp.id] && ecdsa->grp.id < 6) {
*p++ = 0x82; p += format_tlv_len(p_size, p); memcpy(p, pointA[ecdsa->grp.id], p_size);
p += p_size;
}
else {
*p++ = 0x82; p += format_tlv_len(1, p);
*p++ = 0x0;
}
}
//B
*p++ = 0x83; p += format_tlv_len(b_size, p); mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp.B, p, b_size);
p += b_size;
//G
size_t g_new_size = 0;
*p++ = 0x84; p += format_tlv_len(g_size, p); mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp,
&ecdsa->grp.G,
MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED,
&g_new_size,
p,
g_size);
p += g_size;
//order
*p++ = 0x85; p += format_tlv_len(o_size, p); mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp.N, p, o_size);
p += o_size;
//Y
*p++ = 0x86; p += format_tlv_len(y_size, p); memcpy(p, Y_buf, y_size); p += y_size;
//cofactor
*p++ = 0x87; p += format_tlv_len(c_size, p);
if (ecdsa->grp.id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448) {
*p++ = 4;
}
else if (ecdsa->grp.id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519) {
*p++ = 8;
}
else {
*p++ = 1;
}
return tot_len;
}
size_t asn1_cvc_cert_body(void *rsa_ecdsa,
uint8_t key_type,
uint8_t *buf,
size_t buf_len,
const uint8_t *ext,
size_t ext_len) {
size_t pubkey_size = 0;
if (key_type == HSM_KEY_RSA) {
pubkey_size = asn1_cvc_public_key_rsa(rsa_ecdsa, NULL, 0);
}
else if (key_type == HSM_KEY_EC) {
pubkey_size = asn1_cvc_public_key_ecdsa(rsa_ecdsa, NULL, 0);
}
size_t cpi_size = 4;
size_t ext_size = 0;
if (ext && ext_len > 0) {
ext_size = asn1_len_tag(0x65, ext_len);
}
uint8_t *car = NULL, *chr = NULL;
size_t lencar = 0, lenchr = 0;
if (asn1_find_tag(apdu.data, apdu.nc, 0x42, &lencar,
&car) == false || lencar == 0 || car == NULL) {
car = (uint8_t *) dev_name;
lencar = dev_name_len;
}
if (asn1_find_tag(apdu.data, apdu.nc, 0x5f20, &lenchr,
&chr) == false || lenchr == 0 || chr == NULL) {
chr = (uint8_t *) dev_name;
lenchr = dev_name_len;
}
size_t car_size = asn1_len_tag(0x42, lencar), chr_size = asn1_len_tag(0x5f20, lenchr);
size_t tot_len = asn1_len_tag(0x7f4e, cpi_size + car_size + pubkey_size + chr_size + ext_size);
if (buf_len == 0 || buf == NULL) {
return tot_len;
}
if (buf_len < tot_len) {
return 0;
}
uint8_t *p = buf;
memcpy(p, "\x7F\x4E", 2); p += 2;
p += format_tlv_len(cpi_size + car_size + pubkey_size + chr_size + ext_size, p);
//cpi
*p++ = 0x5f; *p++ = 0x29; *p++ = 1; *p++ = 0;
//car
*p++ = 0x42; p += format_tlv_len(lencar, p); memcpy(p, car, lencar); p += lencar;
//pubkey
if (key_type == HSM_KEY_RSA) {
p += asn1_cvc_public_key_rsa(rsa_ecdsa, p, pubkey_size);
}
else if (key_type == HSM_KEY_EC) {
p += asn1_cvc_public_key_ecdsa(rsa_ecdsa, p, pubkey_size);
}
//chr
*p++ = 0x5f; *p++ = 0x20; p += format_tlv_len(lenchr, p); memcpy(p, chr, lenchr); p += lenchr;
if (ext && ext_len > 0) {
*p++ = 0x65;
p += format_tlv_len(ext_len, p);
memcpy(p, ext, ext_len);
p += ext_len;
}
return tot_len;
}
size_t asn1_cvc_cert(void *rsa_ecdsa,
uint8_t key_type,
uint8_t *buf,
size_t buf_len,
const uint8_t *ext,
size_t ext_len) {
size_t key_size = 0;
if (key_type == HSM_KEY_RSA) {
key_size = mbedtls_mpi_size(&((mbedtls_rsa_context *) rsa_ecdsa)->N);
}
else if (key_type == HSM_KEY_EC) {
key_size = 2 *
(int) ((mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id(((mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) rsa_ecdsa)
->grp.id)->
bit_size + 7) / 8);
}
size_t body_size = asn1_cvc_cert_body(rsa_ecdsa, key_type, NULL, 0, ext, ext_len),
sig_size = asn1_len_tag(0x5f37, key_size);
size_t tot_len = asn1_len_tag(0x7f21, body_size + sig_size);
if (buf_len == 0 || buf == NULL) {
return tot_len;
}
if (buf_len < tot_len) {
return 0;
}
uint8_t *p = buf, *body = NULL;
memcpy(p, "\x7F\x21", 2); p += 2;
p += format_tlv_len(body_size + sig_size, p);
body = p;
p += asn1_cvc_cert_body(rsa_ecdsa, key_type, p, body_size, ext, ext_len);
uint8_t hsh[32];
hash256(body, body_size, hsh);
memcpy(p, "\x5F\x37", 2); p += 2;
p += format_tlv_len(key_size, p);
if (key_type == HSM_KEY_RSA) {
if (mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign(rsa_ecdsa, random_gen, NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, 32,
hsh, p) != 0) {
memset(p, 0, key_size);
}
p += key_size;
}
else if (key_type == HSM_KEY_EC) {
mbedtls_mpi r, s;
int ret = 0;
mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ecdsa = (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) rsa_ecdsa;
mbedtls_mpi_init(&r);
mbedtls_mpi_init(&s);
ret =
mbedtls_ecdsa_sign(&ecdsa->grp, &r, &s, &ecdsa->d, hsh, sizeof(hsh), random_gen, NULL);
if (ret == 0) {
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&r, p, key_size / 2); p += key_size / 2;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&s, p, key_size / 2); p += key_size / 2;
}
else {
memset(p, 0, key_size);
p += key_size;
}
mbedtls_mpi_free(&r);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&s);
}
return p - buf;
}
size_t asn1_cvc_aut(void *rsa_ecdsa,
uint8_t key_type,
uint8_t *buf,
size_t buf_len,
const uint8_t *ext,
size_t ext_len) {
size_t cvcert_size = asn1_cvc_cert(rsa_ecdsa, key_type, NULL, 0, ext, ext_len);
size_t outcar_len = dev_name_len;
const uint8_t *outcar = dev_name;
size_t outcar_size = asn1_len_tag(0x42, outcar_len);
file_t *fkey = search_by_fid(EF_KEY_DEV, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
if (!fkey) {
return 0;
}
mbedtls_ecdsa_context ectx;
mbedtls_ecdsa_init(&ectx);
if (load_private_key_ecdsa(&ectx, fkey) != CCID_OK) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ectx);
return 0;
}
int ret = 0, key_size = 2 * mbedtls_mpi_size(&ectx.d);
size_t outsig_size = asn1_len_tag(0x5f37, key_size), tot_len = asn1_len_tag(0x67,
cvcert_size + outcar_size +
outsig_size);
if (buf_len == 0 || buf == NULL) {
return tot_len;
}
if (buf_len < tot_len) {
return 0;
}
uint8_t *p = buf;
*p++ = 0x67;
p += format_tlv_len(cvcert_size + outcar_size + outsig_size, p);
uint8_t *body = p;
//cvcert
p += asn1_cvc_cert(rsa_ecdsa, key_type, p, cvcert_size, ext, ext_len);
//outcar
*p++ = 0x42; p += format_tlv_len(outcar_len, p); memcpy(p, outcar, outcar_len); p += outcar_len;
uint8_t hsh[32];
memcpy(p, "\x5f\x37", 2); p += 2;
p += format_tlv_len(key_size, p);
hash256(body, cvcert_size + outcar_size, hsh);
mbedtls_mpi r, s;
mbedtls_mpi_init(&r);
mbedtls_mpi_init(&s);
ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_sign(&ectx.grp, &r, &s, &ectx.d, hsh, sizeof(hsh), random_gen, NULL);
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ectx);
if (ret != 0) {
mbedtls_mpi_free(&r);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&s);
return 0;
}
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&r, p, mbedtls_mpi_size(&r)); p += mbedtls_mpi_size(&r);
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&s, p, mbedtls_mpi_size(&s)); p += mbedtls_mpi_size(&s);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&r);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&s);
return p - buf;
}
size_t asn1_build_cert_description(const uint8_t *label,
size_t label_len,
const uint8_t *puk,
size_t puk_len,
uint16_t fid,
uint8_t *buf,
size_t buf_len) {
size_t opt_len = 2;
size_t seq1_size =
asn1_len_tag(0x30, asn1_len_tag(0xC, label_len) + asn1_len_tag(0x3, opt_len));
size_t seq2_size = asn1_len_tag(0x30, asn1_len_tag(0x4, 20)); /* SHA1 is 20 bytes length */
size_t seq3_size =
asn1_len_tag(0xA1,
asn1_len_tag(0x30, asn1_len_tag(0x30, asn1_len_tag(0x4, sizeof(uint16_t)))));
size_t tot_len = asn1_len_tag(0x30, seq1_size + seq2_size + seq3_size);
if (buf_len == 0 || buf == NULL) {
return tot_len;
}
if (buf_len < tot_len) {
return 0;
}
uint8_t *p = buf;
*p++ = 0x30;
p += format_tlv_len(seq1_size + seq2_size + seq3_size, p);
//Seq 1
*p++ = 0x30;
p += format_tlv_len(asn1_len_tag(0xC, label_len) + asn1_len_tag(0x3, opt_len), p);
*p++ = 0xC;
p += format_tlv_len(label_len, p);
memcpy(p, label, label_len); p += label_len;
*p++ = 0x3;
p += format_tlv_len(opt_len, p);
memcpy(p, "\x06\x40", 2); p += 2;
//Seq 2
*p++ = 0x30;
p += format_tlv_len(asn1_len_tag(0x4, 20), p);
*p++ = 0x4;
p += format_tlv_len(20, p);
mbedtls_md(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1), puk, puk_len, p); p += 20;
//Seq 3
*p++ = 0xA1;
p += format_tlv_len(asn1_len_tag(0x30, asn1_len_tag(0x30, asn1_len_tag(0x4, sizeof(uint16_t)))),
p);
*p++ = 0x30;
p += format_tlv_len(asn1_len_tag(0x30, asn1_len_tag(0x4, sizeof(uint16_t))), p);
*p++ = 0x30;
p += format_tlv_len(asn1_len_tag(0x4, sizeof(uint16_t)), p);
*p++ = 0x4;
p += format_tlv_len(sizeof(uint16_t), p);
*p++ = fid >> 8;
*p++ = fid & 0xff;
return p - buf;
}
size_t asn1_build_prkd_generic(const uint8_t *label,
size_t label_len,
const uint8_t *keyid,
size_t keyid_len,
size_t keysize,
const uint8_t *seq,
size_t seq_len,
uint8_t *buf,
size_t buf_len) {
size_t seq1_size = asn1_len_tag(0x30, asn1_len_tag(0xC, label_len));
size_t seq2_size =
asn1_len_tag(0x30, asn1_len_tag(0x4, keyid_len) + asn1_len_tag(0x3, seq_len));
size_t seq3_size =
asn1_len_tag(0xA1,
asn1_len_tag(0x30,
asn1_len_tag(0x30, asn1_len_tag(0x4, 0)) + asn1_len_tag(0x2, 2)));
size_t tot_len = asn1_len_tag(0xA0, seq1_size + seq2_size + seq3_size);
if (buf_len == 0 || buf == NULL) {
return tot_len;
}
if (buf_len < tot_len) {
return 0;
}
uint8_t *p = buf;
*p++ = 0xA0;
p += format_tlv_len(seq1_size + seq2_size + seq3_size, p);
//Seq 1
*p++ = 0x30;
p += format_tlv_len(asn1_len_tag(0xC, label_len), p);
*p++ = 0xC;
p += format_tlv_len(label_len, p);
memcpy(p, label, label_len); p += label_len;
//Seq 2
*p++ = 0x30;
p += format_tlv_len(asn1_len_tag(0x4, keyid_len) + asn1_len_tag(0x3, seq_len), p);
*p++ = 0x4;
p += format_tlv_len(keyid_len, p);
memcpy(p, keyid, keyid_len); p += keyid_len;
*p++ = 0x3;
p += format_tlv_len(seq_len, p);
memcpy(p, seq, seq_len); p += seq_len;
//Seq 3
*p++ = 0xA1;
p +=
format_tlv_len(asn1_len_tag(0x30,
asn1_len_tag(0x30, asn1_len_tag(0x4, 0)) + asn1_len_tag(0x2,
2)),
p);
*p++ = 0x30;
p += format_tlv_len(asn1_len_tag(0x30, asn1_len_tag(0x4, 0)) + asn1_len_tag(0x2, 2), p);
*p++ = 0x30;
p += format_tlv_len(asn1_len_tag(0x4, 0), p);
*p++ = 0x4;
p += format_tlv_len(0, p);
*p++ = 0x2;
p += format_tlv_len(2, p);
*p++ = (keysize >> 8) & 0xff;
*p++ = keysize & 0xff;
return p - buf;
}
size_t asn1_build_prkd_ecc(const uint8_t *label,
size_t label_len,
const uint8_t *keyid,
size_t keyid_len,
size_t keysize,
uint8_t *buf,
size_t buf_len) {
return asn1_build_prkd_generic(label,
label_len,
keyid,
keyid_len,
keysize,
(const uint8_t *) "\x07\x20\x80",
3,
buf,
buf_len);
}
size_t asn1_build_prkd_rsa(const uint8_t *label,
size_t label_len,
const uint8_t *keyid,
size_t keyid_len,
size_t keysize,
uint8_t *buf,
size_t buf_len) {
return asn1_build_prkd_generic(label,
label_len,
keyid,
keyid_len,
keysize,
(const uint8_t *) "\x02\x74",
2,
buf,
buf_len);
}
const uint8_t *cvc_get_field(const uint8_t *data, size_t len, size_t *olen, uint16_t tag) {
uint8_t *rdata = NULL;
if (data == NULL || len == 0) {
return NULL;
}
if (asn1_find_tag(data, len, tag, olen, &rdata) == false) {
return NULL;
}
return rdata;
}
const uint8_t *cvc_get_body(const uint8_t *data, size_t len, size_t *olen) {
const uint8_t *bkdata = data;
if ((data = cvc_get_field(data, len, olen, 0x67)) == NULL) { /* Check for CSR */
data = bkdata;
}
if ((data = cvc_get_field(data, len, olen, 0x7F21)) != NULL) {
return cvc_get_field(data, len, olen, 0x7F4E);
}
return NULL;
}
const uint8_t *cvc_get_sig(const uint8_t *data, size_t len, size_t *olen) {
const uint8_t *bkdata = data;
if ((data = cvc_get_field(data, len, olen, 0x67)) == NULL) { /* Check for CSR */
data = bkdata;
}
if ((data = cvc_get_field(data, len, olen, 0x7F21)) != NULL) {
return cvc_get_field(data, len, olen, 0x5F37);
}
return NULL;
}
const uint8_t *cvc_get_car(const uint8_t *data, size_t len, size_t *olen) {
if ((data = cvc_get_body(data, len, olen)) != NULL) {
return cvc_get_field(data, len, olen, 0x42);
}
return NULL;
}
const uint8_t *cvc_get_chr(const uint8_t *data, size_t len, size_t *olen) {
if ((data = cvc_get_body(data, len, olen)) != NULL) {
return cvc_get_field(data, len, olen, 0x5F20);
}
return NULL;
}
const uint8_t *cvc_get_pub(const uint8_t *data, size_t len, size_t *olen) {
if ((data = cvc_get_body(data, len, olen)) != NULL) {
return cvc_get_field(data, len, olen, 0x7F49);
}
return NULL;
}
const uint8_t *cvc_get_ext(const uint8_t *data, size_t len, size_t *olen) {
if ((data = cvc_get_body(data, len, olen)) != NULL) {
return cvc_get_field(data, len, olen, 0x65);
}
return NULL;
}
extern PUK puk_store[MAX_PUK_STORE_ENTRIES];
extern int puk_store_entries;
int puk_store_index(const uint8_t *chr, size_t chr_len) {
for (int i = 0; i < puk_store_entries; i++) {
if (memcmp(puk_store[i].chr, chr, chr_len) == 0) {
return i;
}
}
return -1;
}
mbedtls_ecp_group_id cvc_inherite_ec_group(const uint8_t *ca, size_t ca_len) {
size_t chr_len = 0, car_len = 0;
const uint8_t *chr = NULL, *car = NULL;
int eq = -1;
do {
chr = cvc_get_chr(ca, ca_len, &chr_len);
car = cvc_get_car(ca, ca_len, &car_len);
eq = memcmp(car, chr, MAX(car_len, chr_len));
if (car && eq != 0) {
int idx = puk_store_index(car, car_len);
if (idx != -1) {
ca = puk_store[idx].cvcert;
ca_len = puk_store[idx].cvcert_len;
}
else {
ca = NULL;
}
}
} while (car && chr && eq != 0);
size_t ca_puk_len = 0;
const uint8_t *ca_puk = cvc_get_pub(ca, ca_len, &ca_puk_len);
if (!ca_puk) {
return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE;
}
size_t t81_len = 0;
const uint8_t *t81 = cvc_get_field(ca_puk, ca_puk_len, &t81_len, 0x81);
if (!t81) {
return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE;
}
return ec_get_curve_from_prime(t81, t81_len);
}
int puk_verify(const uint8_t *sig,
size_t sig_len,
const uint8_t *hash,
size_t hash_len,
const uint8_t *ca,
size_t ca_len) {
size_t puk_len = 0;
const uint8_t *puk = cvc_get_pub(ca, ca_len, &puk_len);
if (!puk) {
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
}
size_t oid_len = 0;
const uint8_t *oid = cvc_get_field(puk, puk_len, &oid_len, 0x6);
if (!oid) {
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
}
if (memcmp(oid, OID_ID_TA_RSA, 9) == 0) { //RSA
size_t t81_len = 0, t82_len = 0;
const uint8_t *t81 = cvc_get_field(puk, puk_len, &t81_len, 0x81), *t82 = cvc_get_field(puk,
puk_len,
&t81_len,
0x82);
if (!t81 || !t82) {
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
}
mbedtls_rsa_context rsa;
mbedtls_rsa_init(&rsa);
mbedtls_md_type_t md = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;
if (memcmp(oid, OID_ID_TA_RSA_V1_5_SHA_1, oid_len) == 0) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;
}
else if (memcmp(oid, OID_ID_TA_RSA_V1_5_SHA_256, oid_len) == 0) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256;
}
else if (memcmp(oid, OID_ID_TA_RSA_V1_5_SHA_512, oid_len) == 0) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512;
}
else if (memcmp(oid, OID_ID_TA_RSA_PSS_SHA_1, oid_len) == 0) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;
mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(&rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21, md);
}
else if (memcmp(oid, OID_ID_TA_RSA_PSS_SHA_256, oid_len) == 0) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256;
mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(&rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21, md);
}
else if (memcmp(oid, OID_ID_TA_RSA_PSS_SHA_512, oid_len) == 0) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512;
mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(&rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21, md);
}
if (md == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(&rsa);
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
}
int r = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&rsa.N, t81, t81_len);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(&rsa);
return CCID_EXEC_ERROR;
}
r = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&rsa.E, t82, t82_len);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(&rsa);
return CCID_EXEC_ERROR;
}
r = mbedtls_rsa_complete(&rsa);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(&rsa);
return CCID_EXEC_ERROR;
}
r = mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(&rsa);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(&rsa);
return CCID_EXEC_ERROR;
}
r = mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify(&rsa, md, hash_len, hash, sig);
mbedtls_rsa_free(&rsa);
if (r != 0) {
return CCID_WRONG_SIGNATURE;
}
}
else if (memcmp(oid, OID_ID_TA_ECDSA, 9) == 0) { //ECC
mbedtls_md_type_t md = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;
if (memcmp(oid, OID_ID_TA_ECDSA_SHA_1, oid_len) == 0) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;
}
else if (memcmp(oid, OID_ID_TA_ECDSA_SHA_224, oid_len) == 0) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224;
}
else if (memcmp(oid, OID_ID_TA_ECDSA_SHA_256, oid_len) == 0) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256;
}
else if (memcmp(oid, OID_ID_TA_ECDSA_SHA_384, oid_len) == 0) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384;
}
else if (memcmp(oid, OID_ID_TA_ECDSA_SHA_512, oid_len) == 0) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512;
}
if (md == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) {
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
}
size_t t86_len = 0;
const uint8_t *t86 = cvc_get_field(puk, puk_len, &t86_len, 0x86);
if (!t86) {
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
}
mbedtls_ecp_group_id ec_id = cvc_inherite_ec_group(ca, ca_len);
if (ec_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) {
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
}
mbedtls_ecdsa_context ecdsa;
mbedtls_ecdsa_init(&ecdsa);
int ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&ecdsa.grp, ec_id);
if (ret != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa);
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
}
ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary(&ecdsa.grp, &ecdsa.Q, t86, t86_len);
if (ret != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa);
return CCID_EXEC_ERROR;
}
ret = mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey(&ecdsa.grp, &ecdsa.Q);
if (ret != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa);
return CCID_EXEC_ERROR;
}
mbedtls_mpi r, s;
mbedtls_mpi_init(&r);
mbedtls_mpi_init(&s);
ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&r, sig, sig_len / 2);
if (ret != 0) {
mbedtls_mpi_free(&r);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&s);
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa);
return CCID_EXEC_ERROR;
}
ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&s, sig + sig_len / 2, sig_len / 2);
if (ret != 0) {
mbedtls_mpi_free(&r);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&s);
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa);
return CCID_EXEC_ERROR;
}
ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_verify(&ecdsa.grp, hash, hash_len, &ecdsa.Q, &r, &s);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&r);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&s);
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa);
if (ret != 0) {
return CCID_WRONG_SIGNATURE;
}
}
return CCID_OK;
}
int cvc_verify(const uint8_t *cert, size_t cert_len, const uint8_t *ca, size_t ca_len) {
size_t puk_len = 0;
const uint8_t *puk = cvc_get_pub(ca, ca_len, &puk_len);
if (!puk) {
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
}
size_t oid_len = 0, cv_body_len = 0, sig_len = 0;
const uint8_t *oid = cvc_get_field(puk, puk_len, &oid_len, 0x6);
const uint8_t *cv_body = cvc_get_body(cert, cert_len, &cv_body_len);
const uint8_t *sig = cvc_get_sig(cert, cert_len, &sig_len);
if (!sig) {
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
}
if (!cv_body) {
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
}
if (!oid) {
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
}
mbedtls_md_type_t md = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;
if (memcmp(oid, OID_ID_TA_RSA, 9) == 0) { //RSA
if (memcmp(oid, OID_ID_TA_RSA_V1_5_SHA_1, oid_len) == 0) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;
}
else if (memcmp(oid, OID_ID_TA_RSA_V1_5_SHA_256, oid_len) == 0) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256;
}
else if (memcmp(oid, OID_ID_TA_RSA_V1_5_SHA_512, oid_len) == 0) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512;
}
else if (memcmp(oid, OID_ID_TA_RSA_PSS_SHA_1, oid_len) == 0) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;
}
else if (memcmp(oid, OID_ID_TA_RSA_PSS_SHA_256, oid_len) == 0) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256;
}
else if (memcmp(oid, OID_ID_TA_RSA_PSS_SHA_512, oid_len) == 0) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512;
}
}
else if (memcmp(oid, OID_ID_TA_ECDSA, 9) == 0) { //ECC
if (memcmp(oid, OID_ID_TA_ECDSA_SHA_1, oid_len) == 0) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;
}
else if (memcmp(oid, OID_ID_TA_ECDSA_SHA_224, oid_len) == 0) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224;
}
else if (memcmp(oid, OID_ID_TA_ECDSA_SHA_256, oid_len) == 0) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256;
}
else if (memcmp(oid, OID_ID_TA_ECDSA_SHA_384, oid_len) == 0) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384;
}
else if (memcmp(oid, OID_ID_TA_ECDSA_SHA_512, oid_len) == 0) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512;
}
}
if (md == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) {
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
}
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md);
uint8_t hash[64], hash_len = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info);
uint8_t tlv_body = 2 + format_tlv_len(cv_body_len, NULL);
int r = mbedtls_md(md_info, cv_body - tlv_body, cv_body_len + tlv_body, hash);
if (r != 0) {
return CCID_EXEC_ERROR;
}
r = puk_verify(sig, sig_len, hash, hash_len, ca, ca_len);
if (r != 0) {
return CCID_WRONG_SIGNATURE;
}
return CCID_OK;
}

89
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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#ifndef _CVC_H_
#define _CVC_H_
#include <stdlib.h>
#ifndef ENABLE_EMULATION
#include "pico/stdlib.h"
#else
#include <stdbool.h>
#endif
#include "mbedtls/ecp.h"
typedef struct PUK {
const uint8_t *puk;
size_t puk_len;
const uint8_t *car;
size_t car_len;
const uint8_t *chr;
size_t chr_len;
const uint8_t *cvcert;
size_t cvcert_len;
bool copied;
} PUK;
#define MAX_PUK_STORE_ENTRIES 4
extern size_t asn1_cvc_cert(void *rsa_ecdsa,
uint8_t key_type,
uint8_t *buf,
size_t buf_len,
const uint8_t *ext,
size_t ext_len);
extern size_t asn1_cvc_aut(void *rsa_ecdsa,
uint8_t key_type,
uint8_t *buf,
size_t buf_len,
const uint8_t *ext,
size_t ext_len);
extern size_t asn1_build_cert_description(const uint8_t *label,
size_t label_len,
const uint8_t *puk,
size_t puk_len,
uint16_t fid,
uint8_t *buf,
size_t buf_len);
extern const uint8_t *cvc_get_field(const uint8_t *data, size_t len, size_t *olen, uint16_t tag);
extern const uint8_t *cvc_get_car(const uint8_t *data, size_t len, size_t *olen);
extern const uint8_t *cvc_get_chr(const uint8_t *data, size_t len, size_t *olen);
extern const uint8_t *cvc_get_pub(const uint8_t *data, size_t len, size_t *olen);
extern const uint8_t *cvc_get_ext(const uint8_t *data, size_t len, size_t *olen);
extern int cvc_verify(const uint8_t *cert, size_t cert_len, const uint8_t *ca, size_t ca_len);
extern mbedtls_ecp_group_id cvc_inherite_ec_group(const uint8_t *ca, size_t ca_len);
extern int puk_verify(const uint8_t *sig,
size_t sig_len,
const uint8_t *hash,
size_t hash_len,
const uint8_t *ca,
size_t ca_len);
extern size_t asn1_build_prkd_ecc(const uint8_t *label,
size_t label_len,
const uint8_t *keyid,
size_t keyid_len,
size_t keysize,
uint8_t *buf,
size_t buf_len);
extern size_t asn1_build_prkd_rsa(const uint8_t *label,
size_t label_len,
const uint8_t *keyid,
size_t keyid_len,
size_t keysize,
uint8_t *buf,
size_t buf_len);
#endif

115
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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "files.h"
extern const uint8_t sc_hsm_aid[];
extern int parse_token_info(const file_t *f, int mode);
file_t file_entries[] = {
/* 0 */ { .fid = 0x3f00, .parent = 0xff, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_DF, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = 0, .acl = { 0 } }, // MF
/* 1 */ { .fid = 0x2f00, .parent = 0, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0 } }, //EF.DIR
/* 2 */ { .fid = 0x2f01, .parent = 0, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0 } }, //EF.ATR
/* 3 */ { .fid = EF_TERMCA, .parent = 0, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH | FILE_PERSISTENT, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0 } }, //EF.GDO
/* 4 */ { .fid = 0x2f03, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF | FILE_DATA_FUNC, .data = (uint8_t *) parse_token_info,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0 } }, //EF.TokenInfo
/* 5 */ { .fid = 0x5015, .parent = 0, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_DF, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = 0, .acl = { 0 } }, //DF.PKCS15
/* 6 */ { .fid = 0x5031, .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0 } }, //EF.ODF
/* 7 */ { .fid = 0x5032, .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0 } }, //EF.TokenInfo
/* 8 */ { .fid = 0x5033, .parent = 0, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0 } }, //EF.UnusedSpace
/* 9 */ { .fid = 0x1081, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0xff } }, //PIN (PIN1)
/* 10 */ { .fid = 0x1082, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0xff } }, //max retries PIN (PIN1)
/* 11 */ { .fid = 0x1083, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0xff } }, //retries PIN (PIN1)
/* 12 */ { .fid = 0x1088, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0xff } }, //PIN (SOPIN)
/* 13 */ { .fid = 0x1089, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0xff } }, //max retries PIN (SOPIN)
/* 14 */ { .fid = 0x108A, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0xff } }, //retries PIN (SOPIN)
/* 15 */ { .fid = EF_DEVOPS, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0xff } }, //Device options
/* 16 */ { .fid = EF_PRKDFS, .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF,
.data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0 } }, //EF.PrKDFs
/* 17 */ { .fid = EF_PUKDFS, .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF,
.data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0 } }, //EF.PuKDFs
/* 18 */ { .fid = EF_CDFS, .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF,
.data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0 } }, //EF.CDFs
/* 19 */ { .fid = EF_AODFS, .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF,
.data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0 } }, //EF.AODFs
/* 20 */ { .fid = EF_DODFS, .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF,
.data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0 } }, //EF.DODFs
/* 21 */ { .fid = EF_SKDFS, .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF,
.data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0 } }, //EF.SKDFs
/* 22 */ { .fid = EF_KEY_DOMAIN, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0xff } }, //Key domain options
/* 23 */ { .fid = EF_META, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0xff } }, //EF.CDFs
/* 24 */ { .fid = EF_PUKAUT, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0xff } }, //Public Key Authentication
/* 25 */ { .fid = EF_KEY_DEV, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH | FILE_PERSISTENT, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0xff } }, //Device Key
/* 26 */ { .fid = EF_PRKD_DEV, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH | FILE_PERSISTENT, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0xff } }, //PrKD Device
/* 27 */ { .fid = EF_EE_DEV, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH | FILE_PERSISTENT, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0xff } }, //End Entity Certificate Device
/* 28 */ { .fid = EF_MKEK, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH | FILE_PERSISTENT, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0xff } }, //MKEK
/* 29 */ { .fid = EF_MKEK_SO, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH | FILE_PERSISTENT, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0xff } }, //MKEK with SO-PIN
///* 30 */ { .fid = 0x0000, .parent = 0, .name = openpgpcard_aid, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} },
/* 31 */ { .fid = 0x0000, .parent = 5, .name = sc_hsm_aid, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF,
.data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0 } },
/* 32 */ { .fid = 0x0000, .parent = 0xff, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_UNKNOWN, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = 0, .acl = { 0 } } //end
};
const file_t *MF = &file_entries[0];
const file_t *file_last = &file_entries[sizeof(file_entries) / sizeof(file_t) - 1];
const file_t *file_openpgp = &file_entries[sizeof(file_entries) / sizeof(file_t) - 3];
const file_t *file_sc_hsm = &file_entries[sizeof(file_entries) / sizeof(file_t) - 2];
file_t *file_pin1 = NULL;
file_t *file_retries_pin1 = NULL;
file_t *file_sopin = NULL;
file_t *file_retries_sopin = NULL;

50
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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#ifndef _FILES_H_
#define _FILES_H_
#include "file.h"
#define EF_DEVOPS 0x100E
#define EF_MKEK 0x100A
#define EF_MKEK_SO 0x100B
#define EF_XKEK 0x1080
#define EF_DKEK 0x1090
#define EF_KEY_DOMAIN 0x10A0
#define EF_PUKAUT 0x10C0
#define EF_PUK 0X10D0
#define EF_PRKDFS 0x6040
#define EF_PUKDFS 0x6041
#define EF_CDFS 0x6042
#define EF_AODFS 0x6043
#define EF_DODFS 0x6044
#define EF_SKDFS 0x6045
#define EF_KEY_DEV 0xCC00
#define EF_PRKD_DEV 0xC400
#define EF_EE_DEV 0xCE00
#define EF_TERMCA 0x2f02
extern file_t *file_pin1;
extern file_t *file_retries_pin1;
extern file_t *file_sopin;
extern file_t *file_retries_sopin;
#endif

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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#ifndef _HSM2040_H_
#define _HSM2040_H_
#include "ccid.h"
#include "tusb.h"
#include "file.h"
#include "pico/unique_id.h"
#define USB_REQ_CCID 0xA1
typedef struct app {
const uint8_t *aid;
int (*process_apdu)();
struct app* (*select_aid)();
int (*unload)();
} app_t;
extern int register_app(app_t * (*)());
extern const uint8_t historical_bytes[];
#define DEBUG_PAYLOAD(p,s) { \
printf("Payload %s (%d bytes):\r\n", #p,s);\
for (int i = 0; i < s; i += 16) {\
printf("%07Xh : ",i+p);\
for (int j = 0; j < 16; j++) {\
if (j < s-i) printf("%02X ",(p)[i+j]);\
else printf(" ");\
if (j == 7) printf(" ");\
} printf(": "); \
for (int j = 0; j < MIN(16,s-i); j++) {\
printf("%c",(p)[i+j] == 0x0a || (p)[i+j] == 0x0d ? '\\' : (p)[i+j]);\
if (j == 7) printf(" ");\
}\
printf("\r\n");\
} printf("\r\n"); \
}
struct apdu {
uint8_t seq;
/* command APDU */
uint8_t *cmd_apdu_head; /* CLS INS P1 P2 [ internal Lc ] */
uint8_t *cmd_apdu_data;
size_t cmd_apdu_data_len; /* Nc, calculated by Lc field */
size_t expected_res_size; /* Ne, calculated by Le field */
/* response APDU */
uint16_t sw;
uint16_t res_apdu_data_len;
uint8_t *res_apdu_data;
};
#define MAX_CMD_APDU_DATA_SIZE (24+4+512*4)
#define MAX_RES_APDU_DATA_SIZE (5+9+512*4)
#define CCID_MSG_HEADER_SIZE 10
#define USB_LL_BUF_SIZE 64
/* CCID thread */
#define EV_CARD_CHANGE 1
#define EV_TX_FINISHED 2 /* CCID Tx finished */
#define EV_EXEC_ACK_REQUIRED 4 /* OpenPGPcard Execution ACK required */
#define EV_EXEC_FINISHED 8 /* OpenPGPcard Execution finished */
#define EV_RX_DATA_READY 16 /* USB Rx data available */
/* OpenPGPcard thread */
#define EV_MODIFY_CMD_AVAILABLE 1
#define EV_VERIFY_CMD_AVAILABLE 2
#define EV_CMD_AVAILABLE 4
#define EV_EXIT 8
#define EV_PINPAD_INPUT_DONE 16
enum ccid_state {
CCID_STATE_NOCARD, /* No card available */
CCID_STATE_START, /* Initial */
CCID_STATE_WAIT, /* Waiting APDU */
CCID_STATE_EXECUTE, /* Executing command */
CCID_STATE_ACK_REQUIRED_0, /* Ack required (executing)*/
CCID_STATE_ACK_REQUIRED_1, /* Waiting user's ACK (execution finished) */
CCID_STATE_EXITED, /* CCID Thread Terminated */
CCID_STATE_EXEC_REQUESTED, /* Exec requested */
};
#define CLS(a) a.cmd_apdu_head[0]
#define INS(a) a.cmd_apdu_head[1]
#define P1(a) a.cmd_apdu_head[2]
#define P2(a) a.cmd_apdu_head[3]
#define res_APDU apdu.res_apdu_data
#define res_APDU_size apdu.res_apdu_data_len
extern struct apdu apdu;
uint16_t set_res_sw (uint8_t sw1, uint8_t sw2);
static inline const uint16_t make_uint16_t(uint8_t b1, uint8_t b2) {
return (b1 << 8) | b2;
}
static inline const uint16_t get_uint16_t(const uint8_t *b, uint16_t offset) {
return make_uint16_t(b[offset], b[offset+1]);
}
static inline const void put_uint16_t(uint16_t n, uint8_t *b) {
*b++ = (n >> 8) & 0xff;
*b = n & 0xff;
}
#ifdef DEBUG
void stdout_init (void);
#define DEBUG_MORE 1
/*
* Debug functions in debug.c
*/
void put_byte (uint8_t b);
void put_byte_with_no_nl (uint8_t b);
void put_short (uint16_t x);
void put_word (uint32_t x);
void put_int (uint32_t x);
void put_string (const char *s);
void put_binary (const char *s, int len);
#define DEBUG_INFO(msg) put_string (msg)
#define DEBUG_WORD(w) put_word (w)
#define DEBUG_SHORT(h) put_short (h)
#define DEBUG_BYTE(b) put_byte (b)
#define DEBUG_BINARY(s,len) put_binary ((const char *)s,len)
#else
#define DEBUG_INFO(msg)
#define DEBUG_WORD(w)
#define DEBUG_SHORT(h)
#define DEBUG_BYTE(b)
#define DEBUG_BINARY(s,len)
#endif
extern int flash_write_data_to_file(file_t *file, const uint8_t *data, uint16_t len);
extern void low_flash_available();
extern int flash_clear_file(file_t *file);
extern pico_unique_board_id_t unique_id;
#endif

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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include <string.h>
#include "common.h"
#include "stdlib.h"
#ifndef ENABLE_EMULATION
#include "pico/stdlib.h"
#endif
#include "kek.h"
#include "crypto_utils.h"
#include "random.h"
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "mbedtls/md.h"
#include "mbedtls/cmac.h"
#include "mbedtls/rsa.h"
#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h"
#include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h"
#include "files.h"
extern bool has_session_pin, has_session_sopin;
extern uint8_t session_pin[32], session_sopin[32];
uint8_t mkek_mask[MKEK_KEY_SIZE];
bool has_mkek_mask = false;
#define POLY 0xedb88320
uint32_t crc32c(const uint8_t *buf, size_t len) {
uint32_t crc = ~0;
while (len--) {
crc ^= *buf++;
for (int k = 0; k < 8; k++) {
crc = (crc >> 1) ^ (POLY & (0 - (crc & 1)));
}
}
return ~crc;
}
int load_mkek(uint8_t *mkek) {
if (has_session_pin == false && has_session_sopin == false) {
return CCID_NO_LOGIN;
}
const uint8_t *pin = NULL;
if (pin == NULL && has_session_pin == true) {
file_t *tf = search_by_fid(EF_MKEK, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
if (file_has_data(tf)) {
memcpy(mkek, file_get_data(tf), MKEK_SIZE);
pin = session_pin;
}
}
if (pin == NULL && has_session_sopin == true) {
file_t *tf = search_by_fid(EF_MKEK_SO, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
if (file_has_data(tf)) {
memcpy(mkek, file_get_data(tf), MKEK_SIZE);
pin = session_sopin;
}
}
if (pin == NULL) { //Should never happen
return CCID_EXEC_ERROR;
}
if (has_mkek_mask) {
for (int i = 0; i < MKEK_KEY_SIZE; i++) {
MKEK_KEY(mkek)[i] ^= mkek_mask[i];
}
}
int ret =
aes_decrypt_cfb_256(pin, MKEK_IV(mkek), MKEK_KEY(mkek), MKEK_KEY_SIZE + MKEK_KEY_CS_SIZE);
if (ret != 0) {
return CCID_EXEC_ERROR;
}
if (crc32c(MKEK_KEY(mkek), MKEK_KEY_SIZE) != *(uint32_t *) MKEK_CHECKSUM(mkek)) {
return CCID_WRONG_DKEK;
}
return CCID_OK;
}
mse_t mse = { .init = false };
int mse_decrypt_ct(uint8_t *data, size_t len) {
mbedtls_chachapoly_context chatx;
mbedtls_chachapoly_init(&chatx);
mbedtls_chachapoly_setkey(&chatx, mse.key_enc + 12);
int ret = mbedtls_chachapoly_auth_decrypt(&chatx,
len - 16,
mse.key_enc,
mse.Qpt,
65,
data + len - 16,
data,
data);
mbedtls_chachapoly_free(&chatx);
return ret;
}
int load_dkek(uint8_t id, uint8_t *dkek) {
file_t *tf = search_dynamic_file(EF_DKEK + id);
if (!tf) {
return CCID_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
}
memcpy(dkek, file_get_data(tf), DKEK_KEY_SIZE);
return mkek_decrypt(dkek, DKEK_KEY_SIZE);
}
void release_mkek(uint8_t *mkek) {
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(mkek, MKEK_SIZE);
}
int store_mkek(const uint8_t *mkek) {
if (has_session_pin == false && has_session_sopin == false) {
return CCID_NO_LOGIN;
}
uint8_t tmp_mkek[MKEK_SIZE];
if (mkek == NULL) {
const uint8_t *rd = random_bytes_get(MKEK_IV_SIZE + MKEK_KEY_SIZE);
memcpy(tmp_mkek, rd, MKEK_IV_SIZE + MKEK_KEY_SIZE);
}
else {
memcpy(tmp_mkek, mkek, MKEK_SIZE);
}
*(uint32_t *) MKEK_CHECKSUM(tmp_mkek) = crc32c(MKEK_KEY(tmp_mkek), MKEK_KEY_SIZE);
if (has_session_pin) {
uint8_t tmp_mkek_pin[MKEK_SIZE];
memcpy(tmp_mkek_pin, tmp_mkek, MKEK_SIZE);
file_t *tf = search_by_fid(EF_MKEK, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
if (!tf) {
release_mkek(tmp_mkek);
release_mkek(tmp_mkek_pin);
return CCID_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
}
aes_encrypt_cfb_256(session_pin,
MKEK_IV(tmp_mkek_pin),
MKEK_KEY(tmp_mkek_pin),
MKEK_KEY_SIZE + MKEK_KEY_CS_SIZE);
flash_write_data_to_file(tf, tmp_mkek_pin, MKEK_SIZE);
release_mkek(tmp_mkek_pin);
}
if (has_session_sopin) {
uint8_t tmp_mkek_sopin[MKEK_SIZE];
memcpy(tmp_mkek_sopin, tmp_mkek, MKEK_SIZE);
file_t *tf = search_by_fid(EF_MKEK_SO, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
if (!tf) {
release_mkek(tmp_mkek);
release_mkek(tmp_mkek_sopin);
return CCID_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
}
aes_encrypt_cfb_256(session_sopin,
MKEK_IV(tmp_mkek_sopin),
MKEK_KEY(tmp_mkek_sopin),
MKEK_KEY_SIZE + MKEK_KEY_CS_SIZE);
flash_write_data_to_file(tf, tmp_mkek_sopin, MKEK_SIZE);
release_mkek(tmp_mkek_sopin);
}
low_flash_available();
release_mkek(tmp_mkek);
return CCID_OK;
}
int store_dkek_key(uint8_t id, uint8_t *dkek) {
file_t *tf = search_dynamic_file(EF_DKEK + id);
if (!tf) {
return CCID_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
}
int r = mkek_encrypt(dkek, DKEK_KEY_SIZE);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return r;
}
flash_write_data_to_file(tf, dkek, DKEK_KEY_SIZE);
low_flash_available();
return CCID_OK;
}
int save_dkek_key(uint8_t id, const uint8_t *key) {
uint8_t dkek[DKEK_KEY_SIZE];
if (!key) {
file_t *tf = search_dynamic_file(EF_DKEK + id);
if (!tf) {
return CCID_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
}
memcpy(dkek, file_get_data(tf), DKEK_KEY_SIZE);
}
else {
memcpy(dkek, key, DKEK_KEY_SIZE);
}
return store_dkek_key(id, dkek);
}
int import_dkek_share(uint8_t id, const uint8_t *share) {
uint8_t tmp_dkek[DKEK_KEY_SIZE];
file_t *tf = search_dynamic_file(EF_DKEK + id);
if (!tf) {
return CCID_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
}
memset(tmp_dkek, 0, sizeof(tmp_dkek));
if (file_get_size(tf) == DKEK_KEY_SIZE) {
memcpy(tmp_dkek, file_get_data(tf), DKEK_KEY_SIZE);
}
for (int i = 0; i < DKEK_KEY_SIZE; i++) {
tmp_dkek[i] ^= share[i];
}
flash_write_data_to_file(tf, tmp_dkek, DKEK_KEY_SIZE);
low_flash_available();
return CCID_OK;
}
int dkek_kcv(uint8_t id, uint8_t *kcv) { //kcv 8 bytes
uint8_t hsh[32], dkek[DKEK_KEY_SIZE];
memset(kcv, 0, 8);
memset(hsh, 0, sizeof(hsh));
int r = load_dkek(id, dkek);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return r;
}
hash256(dkek, DKEK_KEY_SIZE, hsh);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(dkek, sizeof(dkek));
memcpy(kcv, hsh, 8);
return CCID_OK;
}
int dkek_kenc(uint8_t id, uint8_t *kenc) { //kenc 32 bytes
uint8_t dkek[DKEK_KEY_SIZE + 4];
memset(kenc, 0, 32);
int r = load_dkek(id, dkek);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return r;
}
memcpy(dkek + DKEK_KEY_SIZE, "\x0\x0\x0\x1", 4);
hash256(dkek, sizeof(dkek), kenc);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(dkek, sizeof(dkek));
return CCID_OK;
}
int dkek_kmac(uint8_t id, uint8_t *kmac) { //kmac 32 bytes
uint8_t dkek[DKEK_KEY_SIZE + 4];
memset(kmac, 0, 32);
int r = load_dkek(id, dkek);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return r;
}
memcpy(dkek + DKEK_KEY_SIZE, "\x0\x0\x0\x2", 4);
hash256(dkek, DKEK_KEY_SIZE + 4, kmac);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(dkek, sizeof(dkek));
return CCID_OK;
}
int mkek_encrypt(uint8_t *data, size_t len) {
int r;
uint8_t mkek[MKEK_SIZE + 4];
if ((r = load_mkek(mkek)) != CCID_OK) {
return r;
}
r = aes_encrypt_cfb_256(MKEK_KEY(mkek), MKEK_IV(mkek), data, len);
release_mkek(mkek);
return r;
}
int mkek_decrypt(uint8_t *data, size_t len) {
int r;
uint8_t mkek[MKEK_SIZE + 4];
if ((r = load_mkek(mkek)) != CCID_OK) {
return r;
}
r = aes_decrypt_cfb_256(MKEK_KEY(mkek), MKEK_IV(mkek), data, len);
release_mkek(mkek);
return r;
}
int dkek_encode_key(uint8_t id,
void *key_ctx,
int key_type,
uint8_t *out,
size_t *out_len,
const uint8_t *allowed,
size_t allowed_len) {
if (!(key_type & HSM_KEY_RSA) && !(key_type & HSM_KEY_EC) && !(key_type & HSM_KEY_AES)) {
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
}
uint8_t kb[8 + 2 * 4 + 2 * 4096 / 8 + 3 + 13]; //worst case: RSA-4096 (plus, 13 bytes padding)
memset(kb, 0, sizeof(kb));
int kb_len = 0, r = 0;
uint8_t *algo = NULL;
uint8_t algo_len = 0;
uint8_t kenc[32];
memset(kenc, 0, sizeof(kenc));
r = dkek_kenc(id, kenc);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return r;
}
uint8_t kcv[8];
memset(kcv, 0, sizeof(kcv));
r = dkek_kcv(id, kcv);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return r;
}
uint8_t kmac[32];
memset(kmac, 0, sizeof(kmac));
r = dkek_kmac(id, kmac);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return r;
}
if (key_type & HSM_KEY_AES) {
if (key_type & HSM_KEY_AES_128) {
kb_len = 16;
}
else if (key_type & HSM_KEY_AES_192) {
kb_len = 24;
}
else if (key_type & HSM_KEY_AES_256) {
kb_len = 32;
}
if (kb_len != 16 && kb_len != 24 && kb_len != 32) {
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
}
if (*out_len < 8 + 1 + 10 + 6 + 4 + (2 + 32 + 14) + 16) {
return CCID_WRONG_LENGTH;
}
put_uint16_t(kb_len, kb + 8);
memcpy(kb + 10, key_ctx, kb_len);
kb_len += 2;
algo = (uint8_t *) "\x00\x08\x60\x86\x48\x01\x65\x03\x04\x01"; //2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1 (2+8)
algo_len = 10;
}
else if (key_type & HSM_KEY_RSA) {
if (*out_len < 8 + 1 + 12 + 6 + (8 + 2 * 4 + 2 * 4096 / 8 + 3 + 13) + 16) { //13 bytes pading
return CCID_WRONG_LENGTH;
}
mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) key_ctx;
kb_len = 0;
put_uint16_t(mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa) * 8, kb + 8 + kb_len); kb_len += 2;
put_uint16_t(mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->D), kb + 8 + kb_len); kb_len += 2;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&rsa->D, kb + 8 + kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->D));
kb_len += mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->D);
put_uint16_t(mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->N), kb + 8 + kb_len); kb_len += 2;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&rsa->N, kb + 8 + kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->N));
kb_len += mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->N);
put_uint16_t(mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->E), kb + 8 + kb_len); kb_len += 2;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&rsa->E, kb + 8 + kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->E));
kb_len += mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->E);
algo = (uint8_t *) "\x00\x0A\x04\x00\x7F\x00\x07\x02\x02\x02\x01\x02";
algo_len = 12;
}
else if (key_type & HSM_KEY_EC) {
if (*out_len < 8 + 1 + 12 + 6 + (8 + 2 * 8 + 9 * 66 + 2 + 4) + 16) { //4 bytes pading
return CCID_WRONG_LENGTH;
}
mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ecdsa = (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) key_ctx;
kb_len = 0;
put_uint16_t(mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.P) * 8, kb + 8 + kb_len); kb_len += 2;
put_uint16_t(mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.A), kb + 8 + kb_len); kb_len += 2;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp.A, kb + 8 + kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.A));
kb_len += mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.A);
put_uint16_t(mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.B), kb + 8 + kb_len); kb_len += 2;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp.B, kb + 8 + kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.B));
kb_len += mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.B);
put_uint16_t(mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.P), kb + 8 + kb_len); kb_len += 2;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp.P, kb + 8 + kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.P));
kb_len += mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.P);
put_uint16_t(mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.N), kb + 8 + kb_len); kb_len += 2;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp.N, kb + 8 + kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.N));
kb_len += mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.N);
put_uint16_t(1 + mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.G.X) + mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.G.Y),
kb + 8 + kb_len); kb_len += 2;
kb[8 + kb_len++] = 0x4;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp.G.X, kb + 8 + kb_len,
mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.G.X));
kb_len += mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.G.X);
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp.G.Y, kb + 8 + kb_len,
mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.G.Y));
kb_len += mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.G.Y);
put_uint16_t(mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->d), kb + 8 + kb_len); kb_len += 2;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->d, kb + 8 + kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->d));
kb_len += mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->d);
put_uint16_t(1 + mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->Q.X) + mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->Q.Y),
kb + 8 + kb_len);
kb_len += 2;
kb[8 + kb_len++] = 0x4;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->Q.X, kb + 8 + kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->Q.X));
kb_len += mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->Q.X);
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->Q.Y, kb + 8 + kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->Q.Y));
kb_len += mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->Q.Y);
algo = (uint8_t *) "\x00\x0A\x04\x00\x7F\x00\x07\x02\x02\x02\x02\x03";
algo_len = 12;
}
memset(out, 0, *out_len);
*out_len = 0;
memcpy(out + *out_len, kcv, 8);
*out_len += 8;
if (key_type & HSM_KEY_AES) {
out[*out_len] = 15;
}
else if (key_type & HSM_KEY_RSA) {
out[*out_len] = 5;
}
else if (key_type & HSM_KEY_EC) {
out[*out_len] = 12;
}
*out_len += 1;
if (algo) {
memcpy(out + *out_len, algo, algo_len);
*out_len += algo_len;
}
else {
*out_len += 2;
}
if (allowed && allowed_len > 0) {
put_uint16_t(allowed_len, out + *out_len); *out_len += 2;
memcpy(out + *out_len, allowed, allowed_len);
*out_len += allowed_len;
}
else {
*out_len += 2;
}
//add 4 zeros
*out_len += 4;
memcpy(kb, random_bytes_get(8), 8);
kb_len += 8; //8 random bytes
int kb_len_pad = ((int) (kb_len / 16)) * 16;
if (kb_len % 16 > 0) {
kb_len_pad = ((int) (kb_len / 16) + 1) * 16;
}
//key already copied at kb+10
if (kb_len < kb_len_pad) {
kb[kb_len] = 0x80;
}
r = aes_encrypt(kenc, NULL, 256, HSM_AES_MODE_CBC, kb, kb_len_pad);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return r;
}
memcpy(out + *out_len, kb, kb_len_pad);
*out_len += kb_len_pad;
r = mbedtls_cipher_cmac(mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB),
kmac,
256,
out,
*out_len,
out + *out_len);
*out_len += 16;
if (r != 0) {
return r;
}
return CCID_OK;
}
int dkek_type_key(const uint8_t *in) {
if (in[8] == 5 || in[8] == 6) {
return HSM_KEY_RSA;
}
else if (in[8] == 12) {
return HSM_KEY_EC;
}
else if (in[8] == 15) {
return HSM_KEY_AES;
}
return 0x0;
}
int dkek_decode_key(uint8_t id,
void *key_ctx,
const uint8_t *in,
size_t in_len,
int *key_size_out,
uint8_t **allowed,
size_t *allowed_len) {
uint8_t kcv[8];
int r = 0;
memset(kcv, 0, sizeof(kcv));
r = dkek_kcv(id, kcv);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return r;
}
uint8_t kmac[32];
memset(kmac, 0, sizeof(kmac));
r = dkek_kmac(id, kmac);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return r;
}
uint8_t kenc[32];
memset(kenc, 0, sizeof(kenc));
r = dkek_kenc(id, kenc);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return r;
}
if (memcmp(kcv, in, 8) != 0) {
return CCID_WRONG_DKEK;
}
uint8_t signature[16];
r = mbedtls_cipher_cmac(mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB),
kmac,
256,
in,
in_len - 16,
signature);
if (r != 0) {
return CCID_WRONG_SIGNATURE;
}
if (memcmp(signature, in + in_len - 16, 16) != 0) {
return CCID_WRONG_SIGNATURE;
}
int key_type = in[8];
if (key_type != 5 && key_type != 6 && key_type != 12 && key_type != 15) {
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
}
if ((key_type == 5 || key_type == 6) &&
memcmp(in + 9, "\x00\x0A\x04\x00\x7F\x00\x07\x02\x02\x02\x01\x02", 12) != 0) {
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
}
if (key_type == 12 &&
memcmp(in + 9, "\x00\x0A\x04\x00\x7F\x00\x07\x02\x02\x02\x02\x03", 12) != 0) {
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
}
if (key_type == 15 && memcmp(in + 9, "\x00\x08\x60\x86\x48\x01\x65\x03\x04\x01", 10) != 0) {
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
}
size_t ofs = 9;
//OID
size_t len = get_uint16_t(in, ofs);
ofs += len + 2;
//Allowed algorithms
len = get_uint16_t(in, ofs);
*allowed = (uint8_t *) (in + ofs + 2);
*allowed_len = len;
ofs += len + 2;
//Access conditions
len = get_uint16_t(in, ofs);
ofs += len + 2;
//Key OID
len = get_uint16_t(in, ofs);
ofs += len + 2;
if ((in_len - 16 - ofs) % 16 != 0) {
return CCID_WRONG_PADDING;
}
uint8_t kb[8 + 2 * 4 + 2 * 4096 / 8 + 3 + 13]; //worst case: RSA-4096 (plus, 13 bytes padding)
memset(kb, 0, sizeof(kb));
memcpy(kb, in + ofs, in_len - 16 - ofs);
r = aes_decrypt(kenc, NULL, 256, HSM_AES_MODE_CBC, kb, in_len - 16 - ofs);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return r;
}
int key_size = get_uint16_t(kb, 8);
if (key_size_out) {
*key_size_out = key_size;
}
ofs = 10;
if (key_type == 5 || key_type == 6) {
mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) key_ctx;
mbedtls_rsa_init(rsa);
if (key_type == 5) {
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += 2;
r = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&rsa->D, kb + ofs, len); ofs += len;
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa);
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
}
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += 2;
r = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&rsa->N, kb + ofs, len); ofs += len;
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa);
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
}
}
else if (key_type == 6) {
//DP-1
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += len + 2;
//DQ-1
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += len + 2;
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += 2;
r = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&rsa->P, kb + ofs, len); ofs += len;
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa);
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
}
//PQ
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += len + 2;
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += 2;
r = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&rsa->Q, kb + ofs, len); ofs += len;
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa);
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
}
//N
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += len + 2;
}
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += 2;
r = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&rsa->E, kb + ofs, len); ofs += len;
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa);
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
}
if (key_type == 5) {
r = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, &rsa->N, NULL, NULL, &rsa->D, &rsa->E);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa);
return CCID_EXEC_ERROR;
}
}
else if (key_type == 6) {
r = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, NULL, &rsa->P, &rsa->Q, NULL, &rsa->E);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa);
return CCID_EXEC_ERROR;
}
}
r = mbedtls_rsa_complete(rsa);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa);
return CCID_EXEC_ERROR;
}
r = mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey(rsa);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa);
return CCID_EXEC_ERROR;
}
}
else if (key_type == 12) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ecdsa = (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) key_ctx;
mbedtls_ecdsa_init(ecdsa);
//A
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += len + 2;
//B
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += len + 2;
//P
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += 2;
mbedtls_ecp_group_id ec_id = ec_get_curve_from_prime(kb + ofs, len);
if (ec_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(ecdsa);
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
}
ofs += len;
//N
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += len + 2;
//G
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += len + 2;
//d
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += 2;
r = mbedtls_ecp_read_key(ec_id, ecdsa, kb + ofs, len);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(ecdsa);
return CCID_EXEC_ERROR;
}
ofs += len;
//Q
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += 2;
r = mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary(&ecdsa->grp, &ecdsa->Q, kb + ofs, len);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(ecdsa);
return CCID_EXEC_ERROR;
}
r = mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv(ecdsa, ecdsa, random_gen, NULL);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(ecdsa);
return CCID_EXEC_ERROR;
}
}
else if (key_type == 15) {
memcpy(key_ctx, kb + ofs, key_size);
}
return CCID_OK;
}

77
src/hsm/kek.h Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#ifndef _DKEK_H_
#define _DKEK_H_
#include "crypto_utils.h"
#ifdef ENABLE_EMULATION
#include <stdbool.h>
#endif
extern int load_mkek(uint8_t *);
extern int store_mkek(const uint8_t *);
extern int save_dkek_key(uint8_t, const uint8_t *key);
extern int store_dkek_key(uint8_t, uint8_t *);
extern void init_mkek();
extern void release_mkek(uint8_t *);
extern int import_dkek_share(uint8_t, const uint8_t *share);
extern int dkek_kcv(uint8_t, uint8_t *kcv);
extern int mkek_encrypt(uint8_t *data, size_t len);
extern int mkek_decrypt(uint8_t *data, size_t len);
extern int dkek_encode_key(uint8_t,
void *key_ctx,
int key_type,
uint8_t *out,
size_t *out_len,
const uint8_t *,
size_t);
extern int dkek_type_key(const uint8_t *in);
extern int dkek_decode_key(uint8_t,
void *key_ctx,
const uint8_t *in,
size_t in_len,
int *key_size_out,
uint8_t **,
size_t *);
#define MAX_DKEK_ENCODE_KEY_BUFFER (8 + 1 + 12 + 6 + (8 + 2 * 4 + 2 * 4096 / 8 + 3 + 13) + 16)
#define MAX_KEY_DOMAINS 16
#define MKEK_IV_SIZE (IV_SIZE)
#define MKEK_KEY_SIZE (32)
#define MKEK_KEY_CS_SIZE (4)
#define MKEK_SIZE (MKEK_IV_SIZE + MKEK_KEY_SIZE + MKEK_KEY_CS_SIZE)
#define MKEK_IV(p) (p)
#define MKEK_KEY(p) (MKEK_IV(p) + MKEK_IV_SIZE)
#define MKEK_CHECKSUM(p) (MKEK_KEY(p) + MKEK_KEY_SIZE)
#define DKEK_KEY_SIZE (32)
extern uint8_t mkek_mask[MKEK_KEY_SIZE];
extern bool has_mkek_mask;
typedef struct mse {
uint8_t Qpt[65];
uint8_t key_enc[12 + 32];
bool init;
} mse_t;
extern mse_t mse;
extern int mse_decrypt_ct(uint8_t *, size_t);
#endif

View File

@@ -1,29 +1,18 @@
/*
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#ifndef _NEUG_H_
#define _NEUG_H_
#define NEUG_PRE_LOOP 32
void neug_init(uint32_t *buf, uint8_t size);
uint32_t neug_get();
void neug_flush(void);
void neug_wait_full(void);
void neug_fini(void);
#endif
#include "oid.h"

147
src/hsm/oid.h Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#ifndef _OID_H_
#define _OID_H_
#define OID_BSI_DE "\x04\x00\x7F\x00\x07"
#define OID_ECKA OID_BSI_DE "\x01\x01\x05"
#define OID_ECKA_EG OID_ECKA "\x01"
#define OID_ECKA_EG_X963KDF OID_ECKA_EG "\x01"
#define OID_ECKA_EG_X963KDF_SHA1 OID_ECKA_EG_X963KDF "\x01"
#define OID_ECKA_EG_X963KDF_SHA224 OID_ECKA_EG_X963KDF "\x02"
#define OID_ECKA_EG_X963KDF_SHA256 OID_ECKA_EG_X963KDF "\x03"
#define OID_ECKA_EG_X963KDF_SHA384 OID_ECKA_EG_X963KDF "\x04"
#define OID_ECKA_EG_X963KDF_SHA512 OID_ECKA_EG_X963KDF "\x05"
#define OID_ECKA_DH OID_ECKA "\x02"
#define OID_ECKA_DH_X963KDF OID_ECKA_DH "\x01"
#define OID_ECKA_DH_X963KDF_SHA1 OID_ECKA_DH_X963KDF "\x01"
#define OID_ECKA_DH_X963KDF_SHA224 OID_ECKA_DH_X963KDF "\x02"
#define OID_ECKA_DH_X963KDF_SHA256 OID_ECKA_DH_X963KDF "\x03"
#define OID_ECKA_DH_X963KDF_SHA384 OID_ECKA_DH_X963KDF "\x04"
#define OID_ECKA_DH_X963KDF_SHA512 OID_ECKA_DH_X963KDF "\x05"
#define OID_ID_PK OID_BSI_DE "\x02\x02\x01"
#define OID_ID_PK_DH OID_ID_PK "\x01"
#define OID_ID_PK_ECDH OID_ID_PK "\x02"
#define OID_ID_TA OID_BSI_DE "\x02\x02\x02"
#define OID_ID_TA_RSA OID_ID_TA "\x01"
#define OID_ID_TA_RSA_V1_5_SHA_1 OID_ID_TA_RSA "\x01"
#define OID_ID_TA_RSA_V1_5_SHA_256 OID_ID_TA_RSA "\x02"
#define OID_ID_TA_RSA_PSS_SHA_1 OID_ID_TA_RSA "\x03"
#define OID_ID_TA_RSA_PSS_SHA_256 OID_ID_TA_RSA "\x04"
#define OID_ID_TA_RSA_V1_5_SHA_512 OID_ID_TA_RSA "\x05"
#define OID_ID_TA_RSA_PSS_SHA_512 OID_ID_TA_RSA "\x06"
#define OID_ID_TA_ECDSA OID_ID_TA "\x02"
#define OID_ID_TA_ECDSA_SHA_1 OID_ID_TA_ECDSA "\x01"
#define OID_ID_TA_ECDSA_SHA_224 OID_ID_TA_ECDSA "\x02"
#define OID_ID_TA_ECDSA_SHA_256 OID_ID_TA_ECDSA "\x03"
#define OID_ID_TA_ECDSA_SHA_384 OID_ID_TA_ECDSA "\x04"
#define OID_ID_TA_ECDSA_SHA_512 OID_ID_TA_ECDSA "\x05"
#define OID_ID_CA OID_BSI_DE "\x02\x02\x03"
#define OID_ID_CA_DH OID_ID_CA "\x01"
#define OID_ID_CA_DH_3DES_CBC_CBC OID_ID_CA_DH "\x01"
#define OID_ID_CA_DH_AES_CBC_CMAC_128 OID_ID_CA_DH "\x02"
#define OID_ID_CA_DH_AES_CBC_CMAC_192 OID_ID_CA_DH "\x03"
#define OID_ID_CA_DH_AES_CBC_CMAC_256 OID_ID_CA_DH "\x04"
#define OID_ID_CA_ECDH OID_ID_CA "\x02"
#define OID_ID_CA_ECDH_3DES_CBC_CBC OID_ID_CA_ECDH "\x01"
#define OID_ID_CA_ECDH_AES_CBC_CMAC_128 OID_ID_CA_ECDH "\x02"
#define OID_ID_CA_ECDH_AES_CBC_CMAC_192 OID_ID_CA_ECDH "\x03"
#define OID_ID_CA_ECDH_AES_CBC_CMAC_256 OID_ID_CA_ECDH "\x04"
#define OID_ID_RI OID_BSI_DE "\x02\x02\x05"
#define OID_ID_RI_DH OID_ID_RI "\x01"
#define OID_ID_RI_DH_SHA_1 OID_ID_RI_DH "\x01"
#define OID_ID_RI_DH_SHA_224 OID_ID_RI_DH "\x02"
#define OID_ID_RI_DH_SHA_256 OID_ID_RI_DH "\x03"
#define OID_ID_RI_ECDH OID_ID_RI "\x02"
#define OID_ID_RI_ECDH_SHA_1 OID_ID_RI_ECDH "\x01"
#define OID_ID_RI_ECDH_SHA_224 OID_ID_RI_ECDH "\x02"
#define OID_ID_RI_ECDH_SHA_256 OID_ID_RI_ECDH "\x03"
#define OID_ID_CI OID_BSI_DE "\x02\x02\x06"
#define OID_CARDCONTACT "\x2B\x06\x01\x04\x01\x81\xC3\x1F"
#define OID_OPENSCDP OID_CARDCONTACT "\x01"
#define OID_CC_ISO7816 OID_CARDCONTACT "\x02"
#define OID_CC_PKI OID_CARDCONTACT "\x03"
#define OID_CC_FORMAT OID_CARDCONTACT "\x04"
#define OID_CC_GP_PROFILES OID_CARDCONTACT "\x10"
#define OID_SCSH3 OID_OPENSCDP "\x01"
#define OID_SCSH3GUI OID_OPENSCDP "\x02"
#define OID_SMARCARD_HSM OID_CC_ISO7816 "\x01"
#define OID_CC_APDUTEST OID_CC_ISO7816 "\x02"
#define OID_CC_PACKAGES OID_CC_ISO7816 "\x7F"
#define OID_CC_ROLES OID_CC_PKI "\x01"
#define OID_CC_ROLE_SC_HSM OID_CC_ROLES "\x01"
#define OID_CC_EXTENSIONS OID_CC_PKI "\x02"
#define OID_ID_IMPU OID_CC_EXTENSIONS "\x01"
#define OID_ID_KEY_DOMAIN_UID OID_CC_EXTENSIONS "\x02"
#define OID_CC_FF_DEVICEID OID_CC_FORMAT "\x01"
#define OID_CC_FF_KDM OID_CC_FORMAT "\x02"
#define OID_CC_FF_PKA OID_CC_FORMAT "\x03"
#define OID_CC_FF_KDA OID_CC_FORMAT "\x04"
#define OID_RSADSI "\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x0D"
#define OID_PKCS OID_RSADSI "\x01"
#define OID_PKCS_5 OID_PKCS "\x05"
#define OID_PKCS5_PBKDF2 OID_PKCS_5 "\x0C"
#define OID_PKCS5_PBES2 OID_PKCS_5 "\x0D"
#define OID_PKCS_9 OID_PKCS "\x09"
#define OID_PKCS9_SMIME_ALG OID_PKCS_9 "\x10\x03"
#define OID_CHACHA20_POLY1305 OID_PKCS9_SMIME_ALG "\x12"
#define OID_HKDF_SHA256 OID_PKCS9_SMIME_ALG "\x1D"
#define OID_HKDF_SHA384 OID_PKCS9_SMIME_ALG "\x1E"
#define OID_HKDF_SHA512 OID_PKCS9_SMIME_ALG "\x1F"
#define OID_DIGEST OID_RSADSI "\x02"
#define OID_HMAC_SHA1 OID_DIGEST "\x07"
#define OID_HMAC_SHA224 OID_DIGEST "\x08"
#define OID_HMAC_SHA256 OID_DIGEST "\x09"
#define OID_HMAC_SHA384 OID_DIGEST "\x0A"
#define OID_HMAC_SHA512 OID_DIGEST "\x0B"
#define OID_KDF_X963 "\x2B\x81\x05\x10\x86\x48\x3F"
#endif

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -1,17 +1,17 @@
/*
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
@@ -19,70 +19,84 @@
#define _SC_HSM_H_
#include <stdlib.h>
#include "common.h"
#include "mbedtls/rsa.h"
#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h"
#ifndef ENABLE_EMULATION
#include "pico/stdlib.h"
#include "hsm2040.h"
#endif
#include "file.h"
#include "apdu.h"
#include "hsm.h"
extern const uint8_t sc_hsm_aid[];
#define SW_BYTES_REMAINING_00() set_res_sw (0x61, 0x00)
#define SW_WARNING_STATE_UNCHANGED() set_res_sw (0x62, 0x00)
#define SW_PIN_BLOCKED() set_res_sw (0x63, 0x00)
#define SW_EXEC_ERROR() set_res_sw (0x64, 0x00)
#define SW_MEMORY_FAILURE() set_res_sw (0x65, 0x81)
#define SW_WRONG_LENGTH() set_res_sw (0x67, 0x00)
#define SW_WRONG_DATA() set_res_sw (0x67, 0x00)
#define SW_LOGICAL_CHANNEL_NOT_SUPPORTED() set_res_sw (0x68, 0x81)
#define SW_SECURE_MESSAGING_NOT_SUPPORTED() set_res_sw (0x68, 0x82)
#define SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED() set_res_sw (0x69, 0x82)
#define SW_FILE_INVALID() set_res_sw (0x69, 0x83)
#define SW_DATA_INVALID() set_res_sw (0x69, 0x84)
#define SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED() set_res_sw (0x69, 0x85)
#define SW_COMMAND_NOT_ALLOWED() set_res_sw (0x69, 0x86)
#define SW_APPLET_SELECT_FAILED() set_res_sw (0x69, 0x99)
#define SW_FUNC_NOT_SUPPORTED() set_res_sw (0x6A, 0x81)
#define SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND() set_res_sw (0x6A, 0x82)
#define SW_RECORD_NOT_FOUND() set_res_sw (0x6A, 0x83)
#define SW_FILE_FULL() set_res_sw (0x6A, 0x84)
#define SW_INCORRECT_P1P2() set_res_sw (0x6A, 0x86)
#define SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND() set_res_sw (0x6A, 0x88)
#define SW_WRONG_P1P2() set_res_sw (0x6B, 0x00)
#define SW_CORRECT_LENGTH_00() set_res_sw (0x6C, 0x00)
#define SW_INS_NOT_SUPPORTED() set_res_sw (0x6D, 0x00)
#define SW_CLA_NOT_SUPPORTED() set_res_sw (0x6E, 0x00)
#define SW_UNKNOWN() set_res_sw (0x6F, 0x00)
#define SW_OK() set_res_sw (0x90, 0x00)
#define ALGO_RSA_RAW 0x20 /* RSA signature with external padding */
#define ALGO_RSA_DECRYPT 0x21 /* RSA raw decrypt */
#define ALGO_RSA_DECRYPT_PKCS1 0x22
#define ALGO_RSA_DECRYPT_OEP 0x23
#define ALGO_RSA_PKCS1 0x30 /* RSA signature with DigestInfo input and PKCS#1 V1.5 padding */
#define ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1 0x31 /* RSA signature with SHA-1 hash and PKCS#1 V1.5 padding */
#define ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA224 0x32
#define ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256 0x33 /* RSA signature with SHA-256 hash and PKCS#1 V1.5 padding */
#define ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384 0x34
#define ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512 0x35
#define HSM_OK 0
#define HSM_ERR_NO_MEMORY -1000
#define HSM_ERR_MEMORY_FATAL -1001
#define HSM_ERR_NULL_PARAM -1002
#define HSM_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND -1003
#define HSM_ERR_BLOCKED -1004
#define HSM_NO_LOGIN -1005
#define HSM_EXEC_ERROR -1006
#define ALGO_RSA_PSS 0x40 /* RSA signature with external hash and PKCS#1 PSS padding*/
#define ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA1 0x41 /* RSA signature with SHA-1 hash and PKCS#1 PSS padding */
#define ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA224 0x42
#define ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA256 0x43 /* RSA signature with SHA-256 hash and PKCS#1 PSS padding */
#define ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA384 0x44
#define ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA512 0x45
#define ALGO_RSA_RAW 0x20 /* RSA signature with external padding */
#define ALGO_RSA_DECRYPT 0x21 /* RSA decrypt */
#define ALGO_RSA_PKCS1 0x30 /* RSA signature with DigestInfo input and PKCS#1 V1.5 padding */
#define ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1 0x31 /* RSA signature with SHA-1 hash and PKCS#1 V1.5 padding */
#define ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256 0x33 /* RSA signature with SHA-256 hash and PKCS#1 V1.5 padding */
#define ALGO_EC_RAW 0x70 /* ECDSA signature with hash input */
#define ALGO_EC_SHA1 0x71 /* ECDSA signature with SHA-1 hash */
#define ALGO_EC_SHA224 0x72 /* ECDSA signature with SHA-224 hash */
#define ALGO_EC_SHA256 0x73 /* ECDSA signature with SHA-256 hash */
#define ALGO_EC_SHA384 0x74
#define ALGO_EC_SHA512 0x75
#define ALGO_EC_DH 0x80 /* ECDH key derivation */
#define ALGO_EC_DH_AUTPUK 0x83
#define ALGO_EC_DH_XKEK 0x84
#define ALGO_RSA_PSS 0x40 /* RSA signature with external hash and PKCS#1 PSS padding*/
#define ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA1 0x41 /* RSA signature with SHA-1 hash and PKCS#1 PSS padding */
#define ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA256 0x43 /* RSA signature with SHA-256 hash and PKCS#1 PSS padding */
#define ALGO_WRAP 0x92
#define ALGO_UNWRAP 0x93
#define ALGO_REPLACE 0x94
#define ALGO_EC_RAW 0x70 /* ECDSA signature with hash input */
#define ALGO_EC_SHA1 0x71 /* ECDSA signature with SHA-1 hash */
#define ALGO_EC_SHA224 0x72 /* ECDSA signature with SHA-224 hash */
#define ALGO_EC_SHA256 0x73 /* ECDSA signature with SHA-256 hash */
#define ALGO_EC_DH 0x80 /* ECDH key derivation */
#define ALGO_EC_DERIVE 0x98 /* Derive EC key from EC key */
#define ALGO_EC_DERIVE 0x98 /* Derive EC key from EC key */
#define ALGO_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT 0x10
#define ALGO_AES_CBC_DECRYPT 0x11
#define ALGO_AES_CMAC 0x18
#define ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_ENCRYPT 0x51 /* Extended ciphering Encrypt */
#define ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_DECRYPT 0x52 /* Extended ciphering Decrypt */
#define ALGO_AES_DERIVE 0x99
#define ALGO_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT 0x10
#define ALGO_AES_CBC_DECRYPT 0x11
#define ALGO_AES_CMAC 0x18
#define ALGO_AES_DERIVE 0x99
#define HSM_OPT_RRC 0x0001
#define HSM_OPT_TRANSPORT_PIN 0x0002
#define HSM_OPT_SESSION_PIN 0x0004
#define HSM_OPT_SESSION_PIN_EXPL 0x000C
#define HSM_OPT_REPLACE_PKA 0x0008
#define HSM_OPT_COMBINED_AUTH 0x0010
#define HSM_OPT_RRC_RESET_ONLY 0x0020
#define HSM_OPT_BOOTSEL_BUTTON 0x0100
#define HSM_OPT_KEY_COUNTER_ALL 0x0200
#define HSM_OPT_SECURE_LOCK 0x0400
#define PRKD_PREFIX 0xC4 /* Hi byte in file identifier for PKCS#15 PRKD objects */
#define CD_PREFIX 0xC8 /* Hi byte in file identifier for PKCS#15 CD objects */
#define DCOD_PREFIX 0xC9 /* Hi byte in file identifier for PKCS#15 DCOD objects */
#define CA_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX 0xCA /* Hi byte in file identifier for CA certificates */
#define KEY_PREFIX 0xCC /* Hi byte in file identifier for key objects */
#define PROT_DATA_PREFIX 0xCD /* Hi byte in file identifier for PIN protected data objects */
#define EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX 0xCE /* Hi byte in file identifier for EE certificates */
#define DATA_PREFIX 0xCF /* Hi byte in file identifier for readable data objects */
#define P15_KEYTYPE_RSA 0x30
#define P15_KEYTYPE_ECC 0xA0
#define P15_KEYTYPE_AES 0xA8
#define MAX_PUK 8
extern int pin_reset_retries(const file_t *pin, bool);
extern int pin_wrong_retry(const file_t *pin);
@@ -90,9 +104,24 @@ extern int pin_wrong_retry(const file_t *pin);
extern void hash(const uint8_t *input, size_t len, uint8_t output[32]);
extern void hash_multi(const uint8_t *input, size_t len, uint8_t output[32]);
extern void double_hash_pin(const uint8_t *pin, size_t len, uint8_t output[32]);
extern uint16_t get_device_options();
extern bool has_session_pin, has_session_sopin;
extern uint8_t session_pin[32], session_sopin[32];
extern int check_pin(const file_t *pin, const uint8_t *data, size_t len);
extern bool pka_enabled();
extern const uint8_t *dev_name;
extern size_t dev_name_len;
extern uint8_t puk_status[MAX_PUK];
extern int puk_store_select_chr(const uint8_t *chr);
extern int delete_file(file_t *ef);
extern const uint8_t *get_meta_tag(file_t *ef, uint16_t meta_tag, size_t *tag_len);
extern bool key_has_purpose(file_t *ef, uint8_t purpose);
extern int load_private_key_rsa(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, file_t *fkey);
extern int load_private_key_ecdsa(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, file_t *fkey);
extern bool wait_button_pressed();
extern int store_keys(void *key_ctx, int type, uint8_t key_id);
extern int find_and_store_meta_key(uint8_t key_id);
extern uint32_t get_key_counter(file_t *fkey);
extern uint32_t decrement_key_counter(file_t *fkey);
#define IV_SIZE 16
#endif
#endif

View File

@@ -1,27 +1,26 @@
/*
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#ifndef __VERSION_H_
#define __VERSION_H_
#define HSM_VERSION 0x0104
#define HSM_VERSION 0x0304
#define HSM_VERSION_MAJOR ((HSM_VERSION >> 8) & 0xff)
#define HSM_VERSION_MINOR (HSM_VERSION & 0xff)
#endif

View File

@@ -1,302 +0,0 @@
/*
* ac.c -- Check access condition
*
* Copyright (C) 2010, 2012, 2013, 2017 Free Software Initiative of Japan
* Author: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
*
* This file is a part of Gnuk, a GnuPG USB Token implementation.
*
* Gnuk is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify it
* under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* Gnuk is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT
* ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
* or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public
* License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*
*/
#include <stdint.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "config.h"
#include "gnuk.h"
#include "mbedtls/sha256.h"
#include "random.h"
#include "hsm2040.h"
uint8_t volatile auth_status; /* Initialized to AC_NONE_AUTHORIZED */
int
ac_check_status (uint8_t ac_flag)
{
if (ac_flag == AC_ALWAYS)
return 1;
else if (ac_flag == AC_NEVER)
return 0;
else
return (ac_flag & auth_status)? 1 : 0;
}
void
ac_reset_pso_cds (void)
{
gpg_do_clear_prvkey (GPG_KEY_FOR_SIGNING);
auth_status &= ~AC_PSO_CDS_AUTHORIZED;
}
void
ac_reset_other (void)
{
gpg_do_clear_prvkey (GPG_KEY_FOR_DECRYPTION);
gpg_do_clear_prvkey (GPG_KEY_FOR_AUTHENTICATION);
auth_status &= ~AC_OTHER_AUTHORIZED;
}
int
verify_user_0 (uint8_t access, const uint8_t *pw, int buf_len, int pw_len_known,
const uint8_t *ks_pw1, int save_ks)
{
int pw_len;
int r;
uint8_t keystring[KEYSTRING_MD_SIZE];
const uint8_t *salt;
int salt_len;
if (gpg_pw_locked (PW_ERR_PW1))
return 0;
if (ks_pw1 == NULL)
{
const uint8_t *initial_pw;
salt = NULL;
salt_len = 0;
gpg_do_get_initial_pw_setting (0, &pw_len, &initial_pw);
if ((pw_len_known >= 0 && pw_len_known != pw_len)
|| buf_len < pw_len
|| memcmp (pw, initial_pw, pw_len))
goto failure;
}
else
{
pw_len = ks_pw1[0] & PW_LEN_MASK;
salt = KS_GET_SALT (ks_pw1);
salt_len = SALT_SIZE;
if ((pw_len_known >= 0 && pw_len_known != pw_len)
|| buf_len < pw_len)
goto failure;
}
s2k (salt, salt_len, pw, pw_len, keystring);
if (save_ks)
memcpy (keystring_md_pw3, keystring, KEYSTRING_MD_SIZE);
if (access == AC_PSO_CDS_AUTHORIZED)
r = gpg_do_load_prvkey (GPG_KEY_FOR_SIGNING, BY_USER, keystring);
else
{
int r1, r2;
r1 = gpg_do_load_prvkey (GPG_KEY_FOR_DECRYPTION, BY_USER, keystring);
r2 = gpg_do_load_prvkey (GPG_KEY_FOR_AUTHENTICATION, BY_USER, keystring);
if (r1 < 0 || r2 < 0)
r = -1;
else if (r1 == 0)
{
if (r2 == 0)
/* No encryption/authentication keys, then, check signing key. */
r = gpg_do_load_prvkey (GPG_KEY_FOR_SIGNING, BY_USER, keystring);
else
r = r2;
}
else if (r2 == 0)
r = r1;
else
r = 1;
}
if (r < 0)
{
failure:
gpg_pw_increment_err_counter (PW_ERR_PW1);
return -1;
}
gpg_pw_reset_err_counter (PW_ERR_PW1);
return pw_len;
}
/*
* Verify for "Perform Security Operation : Compute Digital Signature"
*/
int
verify_pso_cds (const uint8_t *pw, int pw_len)
{
const uint8_t *ks_pw1 = gpg_do_read_simple (NR_DO_KEYSTRING_PW1);
int r;
DEBUG_INFO ("verify_pso_cds\r\n");
DEBUG_BYTE (pw_len);
r = verify_user_0 (AC_PSO_CDS_AUTHORIZED, pw, pw_len, pw_len, ks_pw1, 0);
if (r > 0)
auth_status |= AC_PSO_CDS_AUTHORIZED;
return r;
}
int
verify_other (const uint8_t *pw, int pw_len)
{
const uint8_t *ks_pw1 = gpg_do_read_simple (NR_DO_KEYSTRING_PW1);
int r;
DEBUG_INFO ("verify_other\r\n");
DEBUG_BYTE (pw_len);
r = verify_user_0 (AC_OTHER_AUTHORIZED, pw, pw_len, pw_len, ks_pw1, 0);
if (r > 0)
auth_status |= AC_OTHER_AUTHORIZED;
return r;
}
static int
verify_admin_00 (const uint8_t *pw, int buf_len, int pw_len_known,
const uint8_t *ks, int save_ks)
{
int pw_len;
int r;
uint8_t keystring[KEYSTRING_MD_SIZE];
const uint8_t *salt;
int salt_len;
pw_len = ks[0] & PW_LEN_MASK;
salt = KS_GET_SALT (ks);
salt_len = SALT_SIZE;
if ((pw_len_known >= 0 && pw_len_known != pw_len) || buf_len < pw_len)
return -1;
s2k (salt, salt_len, pw, pw_len, keystring);
if (save_ks)
memcpy (keystring_md_pw3, keystring, KEYSTRING_MD_SIZE);
r = gpg_do_load_prvkey (GPG_KEY_FOR_SIGNING, BY_ADMIN, keystring);
if (r < 0)
return -1;
else if (r == 0)
if ((ks[0] & PW_LEN_KEYSTRING_BIT) == 0
|| memcmp (KS_GET_KEYSTRING (ks), keystring, KEYSTRING_MD_SIZE) != 0)
return -1;
return pw_len;
}
uint8_t keystring_md_pw3[KEYSTRING_MD_SIZE];
uint8_t admin_authorized;
int
verify_admin_0 (const uint8_t *pw, int buf_len, int pw_len_known,
const uint8_t *pw3_keystring, int save_ks)
{
int pw_len;
if (pw3_keystring != NULL)
{
if (gpg_pw_locked (PW_ERR_PW3))
return 0;
pw_len = verify_admin_00 (pw, buf_len, pw_len_known, pw3_keystring,
save_ks);
if (pw_len < 0)
{
failure:
gpg_pw_increment_err_counter (PW_ERR_PW3);
return -1;
}
admin_authorized = BY_ADMIN;
success: /* OK, the admin is now authenticated. */
gpg_pw_reset_err_counter (PW_ERR_PW3);
return pw_len;
}
else
{
const uint8_t *initial_pw;
const uint8_t *ks_pw1 = gpg_do_read_simple (NR_DO_KEYSTRING_PW1);
if (ks_pw1 != NULL)
{ /* empty PW3, but PW1 exists */
int r = verify_user_0 (AC_PSO_CDS_AUTHORIZED,
pw, buf_len, pw_len_known, ks_pw1, save_ks);
if (r > 0)
admin_authorized = BY_USER;
return r;
}
if (gpg_pw_locked (PW_ERR_PW3))
return 0;
/*
* For the case of empty PW3 (with empty PW1), passphrase is
* OPENPGP_CARD_INITIAL_PW3, or defined by KDF DO.
*/
gpg_do_get_initial_pw_setting (1, &pw_len, &initial_pw);
if ((pw_len_known >=0 && pw_len_known != pw_len)
|| buf_len < pw_len
|| memcmp (pw, initial_pw, pw_len))
goto failure;
admin_authorized = BY_ADMIN;
if (save_ks)
s2k (NULL, 0, pw, pw_len, keystring_md_pw3);
goto success;
}
}
int
verify_admin (const uint8_t *pw, int pw_len)
{
int r;
const uint8_t *pw3_keystring;
pw3_keystring = gpg_do_read_simple (NR_DO_KEYSTRING_PW3);
r = verify_admin_0 (pw, pw_len, pw_len, pw3_keystring, 1);
if (r <= 0)
return r;
auth_status |= AC_ADMIN_AUTHORIZED;
return 1;
}
void
ac_reset_admin (void)
{
memset (keystring_md_pw3, 0, KEYSTRING_MD_SIZE);
auth_status &= ~AC_ADMIN_AUTHORIZED;
admin_authorized = 0;
}
void
ac_fini (void)
{
memset (keystring_md_pw3, 0, KEYSTRING_MD_SIZE);
gpg_do_clear_prvkey (GPG_KEY_FOR_SIGNING);
gpg_do_clear_prvkey (GPG_KEY_FOR_DECRYPTION);
gpg_do_clear_prvkey (GPG_KEY_FOR_AUTHENTICATION);
auth_status = AC_NONE_AUTHORIZED;
admin_authorized = 0;
}

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@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
/**
* @brief Affine coordinates
*/
typedef struct
{
bn256 x[1];
bn256 y[1];
} ac;

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@@ -1,427 +0,0 @@
/*
* bn.c -- 256-bit (and 512-bit) bignum calculation
*
* Copyright (C) 2011, 2013, 2014, 2019
* Free Software Initiative of Japan
* Author: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
*
* This file is a part of Gnuk, a GnuPG USB Token implementation.
*
* Gnuk is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify it
* under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* Gnuk is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT
* ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
* or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public
* License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*
*/
#include <stdint.h>
#include <string.h>
#ifndef BN256_NO_RANDOM
#include "random.h"
#endif
#include "bn.h"
uint32_t
bn256_add (bn256 *X, const bn256 *A, const bn256 *B)
{
int i;
uint32_t v;
uint32_t carry = 0;
uint32_t *px;
const uint32_t *pa, *pb;
px = X->word;
pa = A->word;
pb = B->word;
for (i = 0; i < BN256_WORDS; i++)
{
v = *pb;
*px = *pa + carry;
carry = (*px < carry);
*px += v;
carry += (*px < v);
px++;
pa++;
pb++;
}
return carry;
}
uint32_t
bn256_sub (bn256 *X, const bn256 *A, const bn256 *B)
{
int i;
uint32_t v;
uint32_t borrow = 0;
uint32_t *px;
const uint32_t *pa, *pb;
px = X->word;
pa = A->word;
pb = B->word;
for (i = 0; i < BN256_WORDS; i++)
{
uint32_t borrow0 = (*pa < borrow);
v = *pb;
*px = *pa - borrow;
borrow = (*px < v) + borrow0;
*px -= v;
px++;
pa++;
pb++;
}
return borrow;
}
uint32_t
bn256_add_uint (bn256 *X, const bn256 *A, uint32_t w)
{
int i;
uint32_t carry = w;
uint32_t *px;
const uint32_t *pa;
px = X->word;
pa = A->word;
for (i = 0; i < BN256_WORDS; i++)
{
*px = *pa + carry;
carry = (*px < carry);
px++;
pa++;
}
return carry;
}
uint32_t
bn256_sub_uint (bn256 *X, const bn256 *A, uint32_t w)
{
int i;
uint32_t borrow = w;
uint32_t *px;
const uint32_t *pa;
px = X->word;
pa = A->word;
for (i = 0; i < BN256_WORDS; i++)
{
uint32_t borrow0 = (*pa < borrow);
*px = *pa - borrow;
borrow = borrow0;
px++;
pa++;
}
return borrow;
}
#ifndef BN256_C_IMPLEMENTATION
#define ASM_IMPLEMENTATION 0
#endif
void
bn256_mul (bn512 *X, const bn256 *A, const bn256 *B)
{
#if ASM_IMPLEMENTATION
#include "muladd_256.h"
const uint32_t *s;
uint32_t *d;
uint32_t w;
uint32_t c;
memset (X->word, 0, sizeof (uint32_t)*BN256_WORDS*2);
s = A->word; d = &X->word[0]; w = B->word[0]; MULADD_256 (s, d, w, c);
s = A->word; d = &X->word[1]; w = B->word[1]; MULADD_256 (s, d, w, c);
s = A->word; d = &X->word[2]; w = B->word[2]; MULADD_256 (s, d, w, c);
s = A->word; d = &X->word[3]; w = B->word[3]; MULADD_256 (s, d, w, c);
s = A->word; d = &X->word[4]; w = B->word[4]; MULADD_256 (s, d, w, c);
s = A->word; d = &X->word[5]; w = B->word[5]; MULADD_256 (s, d, w, c);
s = A->word; d = &X->word[6]; w = B->word[6]; MULADD_256 (s, d, w, c);
s = A->word; d = &X->word[7]; w = B->word[7]; MULADD_256 (s, d, w, c);
#else
int i, j, k;
int i_beg, i_end;
uint32_t r0, r1, r2;
r0 = r1 = r2 = 0;
for (k = 0; k <= (BN256_WORDS - 1)*2; k++)
{
if (k < BN256_WORDS)
{
i_beg = 0;
i_end = k;
}
else
{
i_beg = k - BN256_WORDS + 1;
i_end = BN256_WORDS - 1;
}
for (i = i_beg; i <= i_end; i++)
{
uint64_t uv;
uint32_t u, v;
uint32_t carry;
j = k - i;
uv = ((uint64_t )A->word[i])*((uint64_t )B->word[j]);
v = uv;
u = (uv >> 32);
r0 += v;
carry = (r0 < v);
r1 += carry;
carry = (r1 < carry);
r1 += u;
carry += (r1 < u);
r2 += carry;
}
X->word[k] = r0;
r0 = r1;
r1 = r2;
r2 = 0;
}
X->word[k] = r0;
#endif
}
void
bn256_sqr (bn512 *X, const bn256 *A)
{
#if ASM_IMPLEMENTATION
int i;
memset (X->word, 0, sizeof (bn512));
for (i = 0; i < BN256_WORDS; i++)
{
uint32_t *wij = &X->word[i*2];
const uint32_t *xj = &A->word[i];
uint32_t x_i = *xj++;
uint32_t c;
asm (/* (C,R4,R5) := w_i_i + x_i*x_i; w_i_i := R5; */
"mov %[c], #0\n\t"
"ldr r5, [%[wij]]\n\t" /* R5 := w_i_i; */
"mov r4, %[c]\n\t"
"umlal r5, r4, %[x_i], %[x_i]\n\t"
"str r5, [%[wij]], #4\n\t"
"cmp %[xj], %[x_max1]\n\t"
"bhi 0f\n\t"
"mov r9, %[c]\n\t" /* R9 := 0, the constant ZERO from here. */
"beq 1f\n"
"2:\n\t"
"ldmia %[xj]!, { r7, r8 }\n\t"
"ldmia %[wij], { r5, r6 }\n\t"
/* (C,R4,R5) := (C,R4) + w_i_j + 2*x_i*x_j; */
"umull r7, r12, %[x_i], r7\n\t"
"adds r5, r5, r4\n\t"
"adc r4, %[c], r9\n\t"
"adds r5, r5, r7\n\t"
"adcs r4, r4, r12\n\t"
"adc %[c], r9, r9\n\t"
"adds r5, r5, r7\n\t"
"adcs r4, r4, r12\n\t"
"adc %[c], %[c], r9\n\t"
/* (C,R4,R6) := (C,R4) + w_i_j + 2*x_i*x_j; */
"adds r6, r6, r4\n\t"
"adc r4, %[c], r9\n\t"
"umull r7, r12, %[x_i], r8\n\t"
"adds r6, r6, r7\n\t"
"adcs r4, r4, r12\n\t"
"adc %[c], r9, r9\n\t"
"adds r6, r6, r7\n\t"
"adcs r4, r4, r12\n\t"
"adc %[c], %[c], r9\n\t"
/**/
"stmia %[wij]!, { r5, r6 }\n\t"
"cmp %[xj], %[x_max1]\n\t"
"bcc 2b\n\t"
"bne 0f\n"
"1:\n\t"
/* (C,R4,R5) := (C,R4) + w_i_j + 2*x_i*x_j; */
"ldr r5, [%[wij]]\n\t"
"ldr r6, [%[xj]], #4\n\t"
"adds r5, r5, r4\n\t"
"adc r4, %[c], r9\n\t"
"umull r7, r12, %[x_i], r6\n\t"
"adds r5, r5, r7\n\t"
"adcs r4, r4, r12\n\t"
"adc %[c], r9, r9\n\t"
"adds r5, r5, r7\n\t"
"adcs r4, r4, r12\n\t"
"adc %[c], %[c], r9\n\t"
"str r5, [%[wij]], #4\n"
"0:\n\t"
"ldr r5, [%[wij]]\n\t"
"adds r4, r4, r5\n\t"
"adc %[c], %[c], #0\n\t"
"str r4, [%[wij]], #4"
: [c] "=&r" (c), [wij] "=r" (wij), [xj] "=r" (xj)
: [x_i] "r" (x_i), [x_max1] "r" (&A->word[BN256_WORDS-1]),
"[wij]" (wij), "[xj]" (xj)
: "r4", "r5", "r6", "r7", "r8", "r9", "r12", "memory", "cc");
if (i < BN256_WORDS - 1)
*wij = c;
}
#else
int i, j, k;
int i_beg, i_end;
uint32_t r0, r1, r2;
r0 = r1 = r2 = 0;
for (k = 0; k <= (BN256_WORDS - 1)*2; k++)
{
if (k < BN256_WORDS)
{
i_beg = 0;
i_end = k/2;
}
else
{
i_beg = k - BN256_WORDS + 1;
i_end = k/2;
}
for (i = i_beg; i <= i_end; i++)
{
uint64_t uv;
uint32_t u, v;
uint32_t carry;
j = k - i;
uv = ((uint64_t )A->word[i])*((uint64_t )A->word[j]);
if (i < j)
{
r2 += ((uv >> 63) != 0);
uv <<= 1;
}
v = uv;
u = (uv >> 32);
r0 += v;
carry = (r0 < v);
r1 += carry;
carry = (r1 < carry);
r1 += u;
carry += (r1 < u);
r2 += carry;
}
X->word[k] = r0;
r0 = r1;
r1 = r2;
r2 = 0;
}
X->word[k] = r0;
#endif
}
uint32_t
bn256_shift (bn256 *X, const bn256 *A, int shift)
{
int i;
uint32_t carry = 0, next_carry;
if (shift > 0)
{
for (i = 0; i < BN256_WORDS; i++)
{
next_carry = A->word[i] >> (32 - shift);
X->word[i] = (A->word[i] << shift) | carry;
carry = next_carry;
}
}
else
{
shift = -shift;
for (i = BN256_WORDS - 1; i >= 0; i--)
{
next_carry = A->word[i] & ((1 << shift) - 1);
X->word[i] = (A->word[i] >> shift) | (carry << (32 - shift));
carry = next_carry;
}
}
return carry;
}
int
bn256_is_zero (const bn256 *X)
{
int i;
int r = 1;
for (i = 0; i < BN256_WORDS; i++)
r &= (X->word[i] == 0);
return r;
}
int
bn256_is_even (const bn256 *X)
{
return !(X->word[0] & 1);
}
int
bn256_is_ge (const bn256 *A, const bn256 *B)
{
uint32_t borrow;
bn256 tmp[1];
borrow = bn256_sub (tmp, A, B);
return borrow == 0;
}
int
bn256_cmp (const bn256 *A, const bn256 *B)
{
uint32_t borrow;
int is_zero;
bn256 tmp[1];
borrow = bn256_sub (tmp, A, B);
is_zero = bn256_is_zero (tmp);
return is_zero ? 0 : (borrow ? -1 : 1);
}
#ifndef BN256_NO_RANDOM
void
bn256_random (bn256 *X)
{
int i, j;
const uint8_t *rand;
for (i = 0; i < 256/256; i++)
{
rand = random_bytes_get (32);
for (j = 0; j < BN256_WORDS; j++)
X->word[i*BN256_WORDS+j] = ((uint32_t *)rand)[j];
random_bytes_free (rand);
}
}
#endif

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@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
#define BN256_WORDS 8
typedef struct bn256 {
uint32_t word[ BN256_WORDS ]; /* Little endian */
} bn256;
#define BN512_WORDS 16
typedef struct bn512 {
uint32_t word[ BN512_WORDS ]; /* Little endian */
} bn512;
uint32_t bn256_add (bn256 *X, const bn256 *A, const bn256 *B);
uint32_t bn256_sub (bn256 *X, const bn256 *A, const bn256 *B);
uint32_t bn256_add_uint (bn256 *X, const bn256 *A, uint32_t w);
uint32_t bn256_sub_uint (bn256 *X, const bn256 *A, uint32_t w);
void bn256_mul (bn512 *X, const bn256 *A, const bn256 *B);
void bn256_sqr (bn512 *X, const bn256 *A);
uint32_t bn256_shift (bn256 *X, const bn256 *A, int shift);
int bn256_is_zero (const bn256 *X);
int bn256_is_even (const bn256 *X);
int bn256_is_ge (const bn256 *A, const bn256 *B);
int bn256_cmp (const bn256 *A, const bn256 *B);
void bn256_random (bn256 *X);

View File

@@ -1,136 +0,0 @@
/*
* call-ec.c - interface between Gnuk and Elliptic curve over GF(prime)
*
* Copyright (C) 2013, 2014, 2017 Free Software Initiative of Japan
* Author: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
*
* This file is a part of Gnuk, a GnuPG USB Token implementation.
*
* Gnuk is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify it
* under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* Gnuk is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT
* ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
* or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public
* License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*
*/
#include "field-group-select.h"
/* We are little-endian in the computation, but the protocol is big-endian. */
#define ECDSA_BYTE_SIZE 32
#define ECDH_BYTE_SIZE 32
int
FUNC(ecdsa_sign) (const uint8_t *hash, uint8_t *output,
const uint8_t *key_data)
{
int i;
bn256 r[1], s[1], z[1], d[1];
uint8_t *p;
p = (uint8_t *)d;
for (i = 0; i < ECDSA_BYTE_SIZE; i++)
p[ECDSA_BYTE_SIZE - i - 1] = key_data[i];
p = (uint8_t *)z;
for (i = 0; i < ECDSA_BYTE_SIZE; i++)
p[ECDSA_BYTE_SIZE - i - 1] = hash[i];
FUNC(ecdsa) (r, s, z, d);
p = (uint8_t *)r;
for (i = 0; i < ECDSA_BYTE_SIZE; i++)
*output++ = p[ECDSA_BYTE_SIZE - i - 1];
p = (uint8_t *)s;
for (i = 0; i < ECDSA_BYTE_SIZE; i++)
*output++ = p[ECDSA_BYTE_SIZE - i - 1];
return 0;
}
int
FUNC(ecc_compute_public) (const uint8_t *key_data, uint8_t *pubkey)
{
uint8_t *p, *p1;
ac q[1];
bn256 k[1];
int i;
p = (uint8_t *)k;
for (i = 0; i < ECDSA_BYTE_SIZE; i++)
p[ECDSA_BYTE_SIZE - i - 1] = key_data[i];
if (FUNC(compute_kG) (q, k) < 0)
return -1;
p = pubkey;
p1 = (uint8_t *)q->x;
for (i = 0; i < ECDSA_BYTE_SIZE; i++)
*p++ = p1[ECDSA_BYTE_SIZE - i - 1];
p1 = (uint8_t *)q->y;
for (i = 0; i < ECDSA_BYTE_SIZE; i++)
*p++ = p1[ECDSA_BYTE_SIZE - i - 1];
return 0;
}
int
FUNC(ecdh_decrypt) (const uint8_t *input, uint8_t *output,
const uint8_t *key_data)
{
bn256 k[1];
ac X[1], P[1];
int i;
uint8_t *p0;
const uint8_t *p1;
int r;
p0 = (uint8_t *)k;
for (i = 0; i < ECDH_BYTE_SIZE; i++)
p0[ECDH_BYTE_SIZE - i - 1] = key_data[i];
p1 = input+1; /* skip '04' */
p0 = (uint8_t *)P->x;
for (i = 0; i < ECDH_BYTE_SIZE; i++)
p0[ECDH_BYTE_SIZE - i - 1] = *p1++;
p0 = (uint8_t *)P->y;
for (i = 0; i < ECDH_BYTE_SIZE; i++)
p0[ECDH_BYTE_SIZE - i - 1] = *p1++;
r = FUNC(compute_kP) (X, k, P);
if (r == 0)
{
p0 = output;
p1 = (const uint8_t *)X->x;
*p0++ = 4;
for (i = 0; i < ECDH_BYTE_SIZE; i++)
*p0++ = p1[ECDH_BYTE_SIZE - i - 1];
p1 = (const uint8_t *)X->y;
for (i = 0; i < ECDH_BYTE_SIZE; i++)
*p0++ = p1[ECDH_BYTE_SIZE - i - 1];
}
return r;
}
/**
* @brief Check if a secret d0 is valid or not
*
* @param D0 scalar D0: secret
* @param D1 scalar D1: secret candidate N-D0
*
* Return 0 on error.
* Return -1 when D1 should be used as the secret
* Return 1 when D0 should be used as the secret
*/
int
FUNC(ecc_check_secret) (const uint8_t *d0, uint8_t *d1)
{
return FUNC(check_secret) ((const bn256 *)d0, (bn256 *)d1);
}

View File

@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
/*
* call-ec_p256k1.c - interface between Gnuk and Elliptic curve over
* GF(p256k1)
*
* Copyright (C) 2014, 2017 Free Software Initiative of Japan
* Author: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
*
* This file is a part of Gnuk, a GnuPG USB Token implementation.
*
* Gnuk is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify it
* under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* Gnuk is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT
* ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
* or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public
* License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*
*/
#include <stdint.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "bn.h"
#include "affine.h"
#include "jpc-ac_p256k1.h"
#include "ec_p256k1.h"
#define FIELD p256k1
#include "call-ec.c"

View File

@@ -1,291 +0,0 @@
/*
* call-rsa.c -- Glue code between RSA computation and OpenPGP card protocol
*
* Copyright (C) 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2017
* Free Software Initiative of Japan
* Author: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
*
* This file is a part of Gnuk, a GnuPG USB Token implementation.
*
* Gnuk is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify it
* under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* Gnuk is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT
* ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
* or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public
* License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*
*/
#include <stdint.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "common.h"
//#include <chopstx.h>
#include "config.h"
#include "gnuk.h"
#include "status-code.h"
#include "random.h"
//#include "polarssl/config.h"
#include "mbedtls/rsa.h"
#include "hsm2040.h"
static mbedtls_rsa_context rsa_ctx;
//static struct chx_cleanup clp;
static void
rsa_cleanup (void *arg)
{
(void)arg;
mbedtls_rsa_free (&rsa_ctx);
}
int
rsa_sign (const uint8_t *raw_message, uint8_t *output, int msg_len,
struct key_data *kd, int pubkey_len)
{
mbedtls_mpi P1, Q1, H;
int ret = 0;
unsigned char temp[pubkey_len];
mbedtls_rsa_init (&rsa_ctx);
mbedtls_mpi_init (&P1); mbedtls_mpi_init (&Q1); mbedtls_mpi_init (&H);
rsa_ctx.len = pubkey_len;
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset (&rsa_ctx.E, 0x10001) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary (&rsa_ctx.P, &kd->data[0], pubkey_len / 2) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary (&rsa_ctx.Q, &kd->data[pubkey_len / 2],
pubkey_len / 2) );
#if 0
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi (&rsa_ctx.N, &rsa_ctx.P, &rsa_ctx.Q) );
#endif
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int (&P1, &rsa_ctx.P, 1) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int (&Q1, &rsa_ctx.Q, 1) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi (&H, &P1, &Q1) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod (&rsa_ctx.D , &rsa_ctx.E, &H) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi (&rsa_ctx.DP, &rsa_ctx.D, &P1) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi (&rsa_ctx.DQ, &rsa_ctx.D, &Q1) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod (&rsa_ctx.QP, &rsa_ctx.Q, &rsa_ctx.P) );
cleanup:
mbedtls_mpi_free (&P1); mbedtls_mpi_free (&Q1); mbedtls_mpi_free (&H);
if (ret == 0)
{
int cs;
DEBUG_INFO ("RSA sign...");
//clp.next = NULL;
//clp.routine = rsa_cleanup;
//clp.arg = NULL;
//chopstx_cleanup_push (&clp);
//cs = chopstx_setcancelstate (0); /* Allow cancellation. */
ret = mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign (&rsa_ctx, NULL, NULL,
MBEDTLS_MD_NONE,
msg_len, raw_message, temp);
memcpy (output, temp, pubkey_len);
rsa_cleanup(NULL);
//chopstx_setcancelstate (cs);
//chopstx_cleanup_pop (0);
}
mbedtls_rsa_free (&rsa_ctx);
if (ret != 0)
{
DEBUG_INFO ("fail:");
DEBUG_SHORT (ret);
return -1;
}
else
{
DEBUG_INFO ("done.\r\n");
GPG_SUCCESS ();
return 0;
}
}
/*
* LEN: length in byte
*/
int
modulus_calc (const uint8_t *p, int len, uint8_t *pubkey)
{
mbedtls_mpi P, Q, N;
int ret;
mbedtls_mpi_init (&P); mbedtls_mpi_init (&Q); mbedtls_mpi_init (&N);
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary (&P, p, len / 2) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary (&Q, p + len / 2, len / 2) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi (&N, &P, &Q) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary (&N, pubkey, len) );
cleanup:
mbedtls_mpi_free (&P); mbedtls_mpi_free (&Q); mbedtls_mpi_free (&N);
if (ret != 0)
return -1;
return 0;
}
int
rsa_decrypt (const uint8_t *input, uint8_t *output, int msg_len,
struct key_data *kd, unsigned int *output_len_p)
{
mbedtls_mpi P1, Q1, H;
int ret;
DEBUG_INFO ("RSA decrypt:");
DEBUG_WORD ((uint32_t)&ret);
mbedtls_rsa_init (&rsa_ctx);
mbedtls_mpi_init (&P1); mbedtls_mpi_init (&Q1); mbedtls_mpi_init (&H);
rsa_ctx.len = msg_len;
DEBUG_WORD (msg_len);
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset (&rsa_ctx.E, 0x10001) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary (&rsa_ctx.P, &kd->data[0], msg_len / 2) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary (&rsa_ctx.Q, &kd->data[msg_len / 2], msg_len / 2) );
#if 0
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi (&rsa_ctx.N, &rsa_ctx.P, &rsa_ctx.Q) );
#endif
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int (&P1, &rsa_ctx.P, 1) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int (&Q1, &rsa_ctx.Q, 1) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi (&H, &P1, &Q1) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod (&rsa_ctx.D , &rsa_ctx.E, &H) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi (&rsa_ctx.DP, &rsa_ctx.D, &P1) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi (&rsa_ctx.DQ, &rsa_ctx.D, &Q1) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod (&rsa_ctx.QP, &rsa_ctx.Q, &rsa_ctx.P) );
cleanup:
mbedtls_mpi_free (&P1); mbedtls_mpi_free (&Q1); mbedtls_mpi_free (&H);
if (ret == 0)
{
int cs;
DEBUG_INFO ("RSA decrypt ...");
//clp.next = NULL;
//clp.routine = rsa_cleanup;
//clp.arg = NULL;
//chopstx_cleanup_push (&clp);
//cs = chopstx_setcancelstate (0); /* Allow cancellation. */
ret = mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt (&rsa_ctx, NULL, NULL,
output_len_p, input,
output, MAX_RES_APDU_DATA_SIZE);
rsa_cleanup(NULL);
//chopstx_setcancelstate (cs);
//chopstx_cleanup_pop (0);
}
mbedtls_rsa_free (&rsa_ctx);
if (ret != 0)
{
DEBUG_INFO ("fail:");
DEBUG_SHORT (ret);
return -1;
}
else
{
DEBUG_INFO ("done.\r\n");
GPG_SUCCESS ();
return 0;
}
}
int
rsa_verify (const uint8_t *pubkey, int pubkey_len,
const uint8_t *hash, const uint8_t *sig)
{
int ret;
mbedtls_rsa_init (&rsa_ctx);
rsa_ctx.len = pubkey_len;
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset (&rsa_ctx.E, 0x10001) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary (&rsa_ctx.N, pubkey, pubkey_len) );
DEBUG_INFO ("RSA verify...");
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify (&rsa_ctx,
MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, 32,
hash, sig) );
cleanup:
mbedtls_rsa_free (&rsa_ctx);
if (ret != 0)
{
DEBUG_INFO ("fail:");
DEBUG_SHORT (ret);
return -1;
}
else
{
DEBUG_INFO ("verified.\r\n");
return 0;
}
}
#define RSA_EXPONENT 0x10001
struct jkiss_state { uint32_t x, y, z, c; };
static struct jkiss_state jkiss_state_v;
int prng_seed (int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng)
{
int ret;
struct jkiss_state *s = &jkiss_state_v;
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK ( f_rng (p_rng, (unsigned char *)s, sizeof (struct jkiss_state)) );
while (s->y == 0)
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK ( f_rng (p_rng, (unsigned char *)&s->y, sizeof (uint32_t)) );
s->z |= 1; /* avoiding z=c=0 */
cleanup:
return ret;
}
int
rsa_genkey (int pubkey_len, uint8_t *pubkey, uint8_t *p_q)
{
int ret;
uint8_t index = 0;
uint8_t *p = p_q;
uint8_t *q = p_q + pubkey_len / 2;
int cs;
extern void neug_flush (void);
neug_flush ();
prng_seed (random_gen, &index);
mbedtls_rsa_init (&rsa_ctx);
//clp.next = NULL;
//clp.routine = rsa_cleanup;
//clp.arg = NULL;
//chopstx_cleanup_push (&clp);
//cs = chopstx_setcancelstate (0); /* Allow cancellation. */
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_gen_key (&rsa_ctx, random_gen, &index, pubkey_len * 8,
RSA_EXPONENT) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary (&rsa_ctx.P, p, pubkey_len / 2) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary (&rsa_ctx.Q, q, pubkey_len / 2) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary (&rsa_ctx.N, pubkey, pubkey_len) );
cleanup:
//chopstx_setcancelstate (cs);
//chopstx_cleanup_pop (1);
rsa_cleanup(NULL);
if (ret != 0)
return -1;
else
return 0;
}

View File

@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
#define DEBUG
#ifdef DEBUG
#define ENABLE_VIRTUAL_COM_PORT 1
#endif
#undef DFU_SUPPORT
#define ORIGIN 0x08000000
#define ORIGIN_REAL 0x08000000
#undef PINPAD_SUPPORT
#define CERTDO_SUPPORT 1
#undef HID_CARD_CHANGE_SUPPORT
#define LIFE_CYCLE_MANAGEMENT_SUPPORT 1
#undef ACKBTN_SUPPORT
#define SERIALNO_STR_LEN 12
#undef KDF_DO_REQUIRED
#define MHZ 133

View File

@@ -1,136 +0,0 @@
/*
* debug.c -- Debuging with virtual COM port
*
* Copyright (C) 2010 Free Software Initiative of Japan
* Author: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
*
* This file is a part of Gnuk, a GnuPG USB Token implementation.
*
* Gnuk is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify it
* under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* Gnuk is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT
* ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
* or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public
* License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*
*/
#include <stdint.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "tusb.h"
#include "config.h"
void my_write (const char *s, int len)
{
if (len == 0)
return;
TU_LOG1(s);
}
static void
put_hex (uint8_t nibble)
{
uint8_t c;
if (nibble < 0x0a)
c = '0' + nibble;
else
c = 'a' + nibble - 0x0a;
//my_write ((const char *)&c, 1);
printf("%X",nibble);
}
void
put_byte (uint8_t b)
{
put_hex (b >> 4);
put_hex (b &0x0f);
my_write ("\r\n", 2);
}
void
put_byte_with_no_nl (uint8_t b)
{
my_write (" ", 1);
put_hex (b >> 4);
put_hex (b &0x0f);
}
void
put_short (uint16_t x)
{
put_hex (x >> 12);
put_hex ((x >> 8)&0x0f);
put_hex ((x >> 4)&0x0f);
put_hex (x & 0x0f);
my_write ("\r\n", 2);
}
void
put_word (uint32_t x)
{
put_hex (x >> 28);
put_hex ((x >> 24)&0x0f);
put_hex ((x >> 20)&0x0f);
put_hex ((x >> 16)&0x0f);
put_hex ((x >> 12)&0x0f);
put_hex ((x >> 8)&0x0f);
put_hex ((x >> 4)&0x0f);
put_hex (x & 0x0f);
my_write ("\r\n", 2);
}
void
put_int (uint32_t x)
{
char s[10];
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 10; i++)
{
s[i] = '0' + (x % 10);
x /= 10;
if (x == 0)
break;
}
while (i)
{
my_write (s+i, 1);
i--;
}
my_write (s, 1);
my_write ("\r\n", 2);
}
void
put_binary (const char *s, int len)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
{
put_byte_with_no_nl (s[i]);
if ((i & 0x0f) == 0x0f)
my_write ("\r\n", 2);
}
my_write ("\r\n", 2);
}
void
put_string (const char *s)
{
my_write (s, strlen (s));
}

View File

@@ -1,233 +0,0 @@
/* -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
* ec_p256k1.c - Elliptic curve over GF(p256k1)
*
* Copyright (C) 2014 Free Software Initiative of Japan
* Author: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
*
* This file is a part of Gnuk, a GnuPG USB Token implementation.
*
* Gnuk is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify it
* under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* Gnuk is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT
* ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
* or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public
* License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*
*/
/*
* Note: we don't take advantage of the specific feature of this curve,
* but use same method of computation as NIST P-256 curve. That's due
* to some software patent(s).
*/
#include <stdint.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "bn.h"
#include "modp256k1.h"
#include "affine.h"
#include "jpc-ac_p256k1.h"
#include "mod.h"
#include "ec_p256k1.h"
#define FIELD p256k1
#define COEFFICIENT_A_IS_ZERO 1
/*
* a = 0, b = 7
*/
#if 0
static const bn256 coefficient_a[1] = {
{{ 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0 }}
};
#endif
static const bn256 coefficient_b[1] = {
{{ 0x7, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0 }}
};
static const ac precomputed_KG[15] = {
{
{{{ 0x16f81798, 0x59f2815b, 0x2dce28d9, 0x029bfcdb,
0xce870b07, 0x55a06295, 0xf9dcbbac, 0x79be667e }}},
{{{ 0xfb10d4b8, 0x9c47d08f, 0xa6855419, 0xfd17b448,
0x0e1108a8, 0x5da4fbfc, 0x26a3c465, 0x483ada77 }}}
}, {
{{{ 0x42d0e6bd, 0x13b7e0e7, 0xdb0f5e53, 0xf774d163,
0x104d6ecb, 0x82a2147c, 0x243c4e25, 0x3322d401 }}},
{{{ 0x6c28b2a0, 0x24f3a2e9, 0xa2873af6, 0x2805f63e,
0x4ddaf9b7, 0xbfb019bc, 0xe9664ef5, 0x56e70797 }}}
}, {
{{{ 0x829d122a, 0xdca81127, 0x67e99549, 0x8f17f314,
0x6a8a9e73, 0x9b889085, 0x846dd99d, 0x583fdfd9 }}},
{{{ 0x63c4eac4, 0xf3c7719e, 0xb734b37a, 0xb44685a3,
0x572a47a6, 0x9f92d2d6, 0x2ff57d81, 0xabc6232f }}}
}, {
{{{ 0x9ec4c0da, 0x1b7b444c, 0x723ea335, 0xe88c5678,
0x981f162e, 0x9239c1ad, 0xf63b5f33, 0x8f68b9d2 }}},
{{{ 0x501fff82, 0xf23cbf79, 0x95510bfd, 0xbbea2cfe,
0xb6be215d, 0xde1d90c2, 0xba063986, 0x662a9f2d }}}
}, {
{{{ 0x114cbf09, 0x63c5e885, 0x7be77e3e, 0x2f27ce93,
0xf54a3e33, 0xdaa6d12d, 0x3eff872c, 0x8b300e51 }}},
{{{ 0xb3b10a39, 0x26c6ff28, 0x9aaf7169, 0x08f6a7aa,
0x6b8238ea, 0x446f0d46, 0x7f43c0cc, 0x1cec3067 }}}
}, {
{{{ 0x075e9070, 0xba16ce6a, 0x9b5cfe37, 0xbc26893d,
0x9c510774, 0xe1ddadfe, 0xfe3ae2f4, 0x90922d88 }}},
{{{ 0x5c08824a, 0x653943cc, 0xfce8f4bc, 0x06d74475,
0x533c615d, 0x8d101fa7, 0x742108a9, 0x7b1903f6 }}}
}, {
{{{ 0x6ebdc96c, 0x1bcfa45c, 0x1c7584ba, 0xe400bc04,
0x74cf531f, 0x6395e20e, 0xc5131b30, 0x1edd0bb1 }}},
{{{ 0xe358cf9e, 0xa117161b, 0x2724d11c, 0xe490d6f0,
0xee6dd8c9, 0xf75062f6, 0xfba373e4, 0x31e03b2b }}}
}, {
{{{ 0x2120e2b3, 0x7f3b58fa, 0x7f47f9aa, 0x7a58fdce,
0x4ce6e521, 0xe7be4ae3, 0x1f51bdba, 0xeaa649f2 }}},
{{{ 0xba5ad93d, 0xd47a5305, 0xf13f7e59, 0x01a6b965,
0x9879aa5a, 0xc69a80f8, 0x5bbbb03a, 0xbe3279ed }}}
}, {
{{{ 0x27bb4d71, 0xcf291a33, 0x33524832, 0x6caf7d6b,
0x766584ee, 0x6e0ee131, 0xd064c589, 0x160cb0f6 }}},
{{{ 0x17136e8d, 0x9d5de554, 0x1aab720e, 0xe3f2d468,
0xccf75cc2, 0xd1378b49, 0xc4ff16e1, 0x6920c375 }}}
}, {
{{{ 0x1a9ee611, 0x3eef9e96, 0x9cc37faf, 0xfe4d7bf3,
0xb321d965, 0x462aa9b3, 0x208736c5, 0x1702da3e }}},
{{{ 0x3a545ceb, 0xfba57bbf, 0x7ea858f5, 0x6dbcd766,
0x680d92f1, 0x088e897c, 0xbc626c80, 0x468c1fd8 }}}
}, {
{{{ 0xb188660a, 0xb40f85c7, 0x99bc3c36, 0xc5873c19,
0x7f33b54c, 0x3c7b4541, 0x1f8c9bf8, 0x4cd3a93c }}},
{{{ 0x33099cb0, 0xf8dce380, 0x2edd2f33, 0x7a167dd6,
0x0ffe35b7, 0x576d8987, 0xc68ace5c, 0xd2de0386 }}}
}, {
{{{ 0x6658bb08, 0x9a9e0a72, 0xc589607b, 0xe23c5f2a,
0xf2bfb4c8, 0xa048ca14, 0xc62c2291, 0x4d9a0f89 }}},
{{{ 0x0f827294, 0x427b5f31, 0x9f2c35cd, 0x1ea7a8b5,
0x85a3c00f, 0x95442e56, 0x9b57975a, 0x8cb83121 }}}
}, {
{{{ 0x51f5cf67, 0x4333f0da, 0xf4f0d3cb, 0x6d3ea47c,
0xa05a831f, 0x442fda14, 0x016d3e81, 0x6a496013 }}},
{{{ 0xe52e0f48, 0xf647318c, 0x4a0d5ff1, 0x5ff3a66e,
0x61199ba8, 0x046ed81a, 0x3e79c23a, 0x578edf08 }}}
}, {
{{{ 0x3ea01ea7, 0xb8f996f8, 0x7497bb15, 0xc0045d33,
0x6205647c, 0xc4749dc9, 0x0efd22c9, 0xd8946054 }}},
{{{ 0x12774ad5, 0x062dcb09, 0x8be06e3a, 0xcb13f310,
0x235de1a9, 0xca281d35, 0x69c3645c, 0xaf8a7412 }}}
}, {
{{{ 0xbeb8b1e2, 0x8808ca5f, 0xea0dda76, 0x0262b204,
0xddeb356b, 0xb6fffffc, 0xfbb83870, 0x52de253a }}},
{{{ 0x8f8d21ea, 0x961f40c0, 0x002f03ed, 0x89686278,
0x38e421ea, 0x0ff834d7, 0xd36fb8db, 0x3a270d6f }}}
}
};
static const ac precomputed_2E_KG[15] = {
{
{{{ 0x39a48db0, 0xefd7835b, 0x9b3c03bf, 0x9f1215a2,
0x9b7bde45, 0x2791d0a0, 0x696e7167, 0x100f44da }}},
{{{ 0x2bc65a09, 0x0fbd5cd6, 0xff5195ac, 0xb7ff4a18,
0x0c090666, 0x2ec8f330, 0x92a00b77, 0xcdd9e131 }}}
}, {
{{{ 0x40fb27b6, 0x32427e28, 0xbe430576, 0xc76e3db2,
0x61686aa5, 0x10f238ad, 0xbe778b1b, 0xfea74e3d }}},
{{{ 0xf23cb96f, 0x701d3db7, 0x973f7b77, 0x126b596b,
0xccb6af93, 0x7cf674de, 0x9b0b1329, 0x6e0568db }}}
}, {
{{{ 0x2c8118bc, 0x6cac5154, 0x399ddd98, 0x19bd4b34,
0x2e9c8949, 0x47248a8d, 0x2cefa3b1, 0x734cb6a8 }}},
{{{ 0x1e410fd5, 0xf1b340ad, 0xc4873539, 0xa2982bee,
0xd4de4530, 0x7b5a3ea4, 0x42202574, 0xae46e10e }}}
}, {
{{{ 0xac1f98cd, 0xcbfc99c8, 0x4d7f0308, 0x52348905,
0x1cc66021, 0xfaed8a9c, 0x4a474870, 0x9c3919a8 }}},
{{{ 0xd4fc599d, 0xbe7e5e03, 0x6c64c8e6, 0x905326f7,
0xf260e641, 0x584f044b, 0x4a4ddd57, 0xddb84f0f }}}
}, {
{{{ 0xed7cebed, 0xc4aacaa8, 0x4fae424e, 0xb75d2dce,
0xba20735e, 0xa01585a2, 0xba122399, 0x3d75f24b }}},
{{{ 0xd5570dce, 0xcbe4606f, 0x2da192c2, 0x9d00bfd7,
0xa57b7265, 0x9c3ce86b, 0xec4edf5e, 0x987a22f1 }}}
}, {
{{{ 0x73ea0665, 0x211b9715, 0xf3a1abbb, 0x86f485d4,
0xcd076f0e, 0xabd242d8, 0x0ba5dc88, 0x862332ab }}},
{{{ 0x7b784911, 0x09af505c, 0xcaf4fae7, 0xc89544e8,
0xae9a32eb, 0x256625f6, 0x606d1a3f, 0xe2532b72 }}}
}, {
{{{ 0x0deaf885, 0x79e9f313, 0x46df21c9, 0x938ff76e,
0xa953bb2c, 0x1968f5fb, 0x29155f27, 0xdff538bf }}},
{{{ 0x31d5d020, 0xf7bae0b1, 0x1a676a8d, 0x5afdc787,
0xfa9d53ff, 0x11b4f032, 0xc5959167, 0x86ba433e }}}
}, {
{{{ 0x9475b7ba, 0x884fdff0, 0xe4918b3d, 0xe039e730,
0xf5018cdb, 0x3d3e57ed, 0x1943785c, 0x95939698 }}},
{{{ 0x7524f2fd, 0xe9b8abf8, 0xc8709385, 0x9c653f64,
0x4b9cd684, 0x8ba0386a, 0x88c331dd, 0x2e7e5528 }}}
}, {
{{{ 0xeefe79e5, 0x940bef53, 0xbe9b87f3, 0xc518d286,
0x7833042c, 0x9e0c7c76, 0x11fbe152, 0x104e2cb5 }}},
{{{ 0x50bbec83, 0xc0d35e0f, 0x4acd0fcc, 0xee4879be,
0x006085ee, 0xc8d80f5d, 0x72fe1ac1, 0x3c51bc1c }}}
}, {
{{{ 0xb2de976e, 0x06187f61, 0xf5e4b4b6, 0x52869e18,
0x38d332ca, 0x74d4facd, 0xb3a2f8d9, 0x5c1c90b4 }}},
{{{ 0xdaa37893, 0x98644d09, 0xabe39818, 0x682435a8,
0x469c53a0, 0x17e46617, 0x77dc2e64, 0x642f9632 }}}
}, {
{{{ 0x222f6c54, 0xad2101c5, 0xfa74785e, 0xb05c7a58,
0x489bcdaf, 0xce55fa79, 0xffe88d54, 0xc1f920fd }}},
{{{ 0x9065e490, 0x32553ab0, 0x35329f74, 0x7611b9af,
0xab7b24c0, 0x57df19ef, 0x6181c447, 0xb9a78749 }}}
}, {
{{{ 0xa80b7ea8, 0x392f156f, 0x8ae4a8bf, 0x57ab7ca0,
0x50c4b178, 0xac320747, 0x0e781feb, 0x146041b9 }}},
{{{ 0x845279b2, 0xd343f075, 0x7387afa5, 0x2d4fe757,
0xa72f3c39, 0x151e0948, 0x550da168, 0x41a6d54e }}}
}, {
{{{ 0x075a0010, 0xb3134ed3, 0x7ae93e23, 0x9fa76f4b,
0x7bb4daaa, 0xc0db256f, 0x464dd8a3, 0x7668dc27 }}},
{{{ 0x9f5da977, 0x150063f5, 0x05efce00, 0x3acac5c8,
0x884493fe, 0xc8e12ffc, 0x88f06bd2, 0x4ab936d8 }}}
}, {
{{{ 0x5d09ea98, 0x996fde77, 0x4145da58, 0x16ddf512,
0xdc2fb225, 0xa97a6ca8, 0xfbdcdf5a, 0xc7331f30 }}},
{{{ 0x86a86e52, 0x838f99e0, 0x77795edd, 0x68d39b29,
0x9f412aaa, 0xe4e4f97e, 0x30d25352, 0xe5cc2c0a }}}
}, {
{{{ 0x9c21ff71, 0xb3d68650, 0xddbe3884, 0x11e7589d,
0x423bac67, 0x7efd4055, 0x46957425, 0x587a7293 }}},
{{{ 0x8f5a8fc6, 0x360adc2e, 0xbd69f12e, 0x6f8bbafb,
0x0a3f3b4d, 0xf671f423, 0x59942dc3, 0xb49acb47 }}}
}
};
/*
* N: order of G
* 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEBAAEDCE6AF48A03BBFD25E8CD0364141
*/
static const bn256 N[1] = {
{{ 0xd0364141, 0xbfd25e8c, 0xaf48a03b, 0xbaaedce6,
0xfffffffe, 0xffffffff, 0xffffffff, 0xffffffff }}
};
/*
* MU = 2^512 / N
* MU = ( (1 << 256) | MU_lower )
*/
static const bn256 MU_lower[1] = {
{{ 0x2fc9bec0, 0x402da173, 0x50b75fc4, 0x45512319,
0x1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0 }}
};
#include "ecc.c"

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@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
int compute_kP_p256k1 (ac *X, const bn256 *K, const ac *P);
int compute_kG_p256k1 (ac *X, const bn256 *K);
void ecdsa_p256k1 (bn256 *r, bn256 *s, const bn256 *z, const bn256 *d);
int check_secret_p256k1 (const bn256 *q, bn256 *d1);

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@@ -1,955 +0,0 @@
/* -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
* ecc-ed25519.c - Elliptic curve computation for
* the twisted Edwards curve: -x^2 + y^2 = 1 + d*x^2*y^2
* d = -121665/121666
*
* Copyright (C) 2014, 2017 Free Software Initiative of Japan
* Author: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
*
* This file is a part of Gnuk, a GnuPG USB Token implementation.
*
* Gnuk is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify it
* under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* Gnuk is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT
* ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
* or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public
* License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*
*/
#include <stdint.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "bn.h"
#include "mod.h"
#include "mod25638.h"
#include "mbedtls/sha512.h"
/*
* References:
*
* [1] Daniel J. Bernstein, Niels Duif, Tanja Lange, Peter Schwabe, Bo-Yin Yang.
* High-speed high-security signatures.
* Journal of Cryptographic Engineering 2 (2012), 77--89.
* http://cr.yp.to/papers.html#ed25519
*
* [2] Daniel J. Bernstein, Peter Birkner, Marc Joye, Tanja Lange,
* Christiane Peters.
* Twisted Edwards curves.
* Pages 389--405 in Progress in cryptology---AFRICACRYPT 2008.
* http://cr.yp.to/papers.html#twisted
*/
/*
* IMPLEMENTATION NOTE
*
* (0) We assume that the processor has no cache, nor branch target
* prediction. Thus, we don't avoid indexing by secret value.
* We don't avoid conditional jump if both cases have same timing,
* either.
*
* (1) We use Radix-32 field arithmetic. It's a representation like
* 2^256-38, but it's more redundant. For example, "1" can be
* represented in three ways in 256-bit: 1, 2^255-18, and
* 2^256-37.
*
* (2) We use fixed base comb multiplication. Scalar is 252-bit.
* There are various possible choices for 252 = 2 * 2 * 3 * 3 * 7.
* Current choice of total size is 3KB. We use three tables, and
* a table has 16 points (3 * 1KB).
*
* Window size W = 4-bit, E = 21.
* <--21-bit-
* <---42-bit----------
* [ ][########][////////][ ][########][////////]
* <-------63-bit----------------
* <-----------84-bit----------------------
* <--------------105-bit----------------------------
*
* [ ][########][////////][ ][########][////////]
* <-126-bit-
* <-147-bit-
* <----168-bit--------
*
* <-------189-bit---------------
* <----------210-bit----------------------
* <-------------231-bit-----------------------------
*/
/*
* Identity element: (0,1)
* Negation: -(x,y) = (-x,y)
*
* d: -0x2DFC9311D490018C7338BF8688861767FF8FF5B2BEBE27548A14B235ECA6874A
* order:
* 0x1000000000000000000000000000000014DEF9DEA2F79CD65812631A5CF5D3ED
* Gx: 0x216936D3CD6E53FEC0A4E231FDD6DC5C692CC7609525A7B2C9562D608F25D51A
* Gy: 0x6666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666658
*/
/* d + 2^255 - 19 */
static const bn256 coefficient_d[1] = {
{{ 0x135978a3, 0x75eb4dca, 0x4141d8ab, 0x00700a4d,
0x7779e898, 0x8cc74079, 0x2b6ffe73, 0x52036cee }} };
/**
* @brief Projective Twisted Coordinates
*/
typedef struct
{
bn256 x[1];
bn256 y[1];
bn256 z[1];
} ptc;
#include "affine.h"
static int
mod25519_is_neg (const bn256 *a)
{
return (a->word[0] & 1);
}
/**
* @brief X = 2 * A
*
* Compute (X3 : Y3 : Z3) = 2 * (X1 : Y1 : Z1)
*/
static void
point_double (ptc *X, const ptc *A)
{
bn256 b[1], d[1], e[1];
/* Compute: B = (X1 + Y1)^2 */
mod25638_add (b, A->x, A->y);
mod25638_sqr (b, b);
/* Compute: C = X1^2 : E */
mod25638_sqr (e, A->x);
/* Compute: D = Y1^2 */
mod25638_sqr (d, A->y);
/* E = aC; where a = -1 */
/* Compute: D - E = D + C : Y3_tmp */
mod25638_add (X->y, e, d);
/* Compute: -F = -(E + D) = C - D; where a = -1 : E */
mod25638_sub (e, e, d);
/* Compute: H = Z1^2 : D */
mod25638_sqr (d, A->z);
/* Compute: -J = 2*H - F : D */
mod25638_add (d, d, d);
mod25638_add (d, d, e);
/* Compute: X3 = (B-C-D)*J = -J*(C+D-B) = -J*(Y3_tmp-B) */
mod25638_sub (X->x, X->y, b);
mod25638_mul (X->x, X->x, d);
/* Compute: Y3 = -F*(D-E) = -F*Y3_tmp */
mod25638_mul (X->y, X->y, e);
/* Z3 = -F*-J */
mod25638_mul (X->z, e, d);
}
/**
* @brief X = A + B
*
* @param X Destination PTC
* @param A PTC
* @param B AC
*
* Compute: (X3 : Y3 : Z3) = (X1 : Y1 : Z1) + (X2 : Y2 : 1)
*/
static void
point_add (ptc *X, const ptc *A, const ac *B)
{
bn256 c[1], d[1], e[1], tmp[1];
/* Compute: C = X1 * X2 */
mod25638_mul (c, A->x, B->x);
/* Compute: D = Y1 * Y2 */
mod25638_mul (d, A->y, B->y);
/* Compute: E = d * C * D */
mod25638_mul (e, c, d);
mod25638_mul (e, coefficient_d, e);
/* Compute: C_1 = C + D */
mod25638_add (c, c, d);
/* Compute: D_1 = Z1^2 : B */
mod25638_sqr (d, A->z);
/* tmp = D_1 - E : F */
mod25638_sub (tmp, d, e);
/* D_2 = D_1 + E : G */
mod25638_add (d, d, e);
/* X3_final = Z1 * tmp * ((X1 + Y1) * (X2 + Y2) - C_1) */
mod25638_add (X->x, A->x, A->y);
mod25638_add (e, B->x, B->y);
mod25638_mul (e, X->x, e);
mod25638_sub (e, e, c);
mod25638_mul (e, tmp, e);
mod25638_mul (X->x, A->z, e);
/* Y3_final = Z1 * D_2 * C_1 */
mod25638_mul (c, d, c);
mod25638_mul (X->y, A->z, c);
/* Z3_final = tmp * D_2 */
mod25638_mul (X->z, tmp, d);
/* A = Z1 */
/* B = A^2 */
/* C = X1 * X2 */
/* D = Y1 * Y2 */
/* E = d * C * D */
/* F = B - E */
/* G = B + E */
/* X3 = A * F * ((X1 + Y1) * (X2 + Y2) - C - D) */
/* Y3 = A * G * (D - aC); where a = -1 */
/* Z3 = F * G */
}
/**
* @brief X = convert A
*
* @param X Destination AC
* @param A PTC
*
* (X1:Y1:Z1) represents the affine point (x=X1/Z1, y=Y1/Z1)
*/
static void
point_ptc_to_ac (ac *X, const ptc *A)
{
bn256 z_inv[1];
/*
* A->z may be bigger than p25519, or two times bigger than p25519.
* But this is no problem for computation of mod_inv.
*/
mod_inv (z_inv, A->z, p25519);
mod25638_mul (X->x, A->x, z_inv);
mod25519_reduce (X->x);
mod25638_mul (X->y, A->y, z_inv);
mod25519_reduce (X->y);
}
static const ac precomputed_KG[16] = {
{ {{{ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }}},
{{{ 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }}} },
{ {{{ 0x8f25d51a, 0xc9562d60, 0x9525a7b2, 0x692cc760,
0xfdd6dc5c, 0xc0a4e231, 0xcd6e53fe, 0x216936d3 }}},
{{{ 0x66666658, 0x66666666, 0x66666666, 0x66666666,
0x66666666, 0x66666666, 0x66666666, 0x66666666 }}} },
{ {{{ 0x3713af22, 0xac7137bd, 0xac634604, 0x25ed77a4,
0xa815e038, 0xce0d0064, 0xbca90151, 0x041c030f }}},
{{{ 0x0780f989, 0xe9b33fcf, 0x3d4445e7, 0xe4e97c2a,
0x655e5c16, 0xc67dc71c, 0xee43fb7a, 0x72467625 }}} },
{ {{{ 0x3ee99893, 0x76a19171, 0x7ba9b065, 0xe647edd9,
0x6aeae260, 0x31f39299, 0x5f4a9bb2, 0x6d9e4545 }}},
{{{ 0x94cae280, 0xc41433da, 0x79061211, 0x8e842de8,
0xa259dc8a, 0xaab95e0b, 0x99013cd0, 0x28bd5fc3 }}} },
{ {{{ 0x7d23ea24, 0x59e22c56, 0x0460850e, 0x1e745a88,
0xda13ef4b, 0x4583ff4c, 0x95083f85, 0x1f13202c }}},
{{{ 0x90275f48, 0xad42025c, 0xb55c4778, 0x0085087e,
0xfdfd7ffa, 0xf21109e7, 0x6c381b7e, 0x66336d35 }}} },
{ {{{ 0xd00851f2, 0xaa9476ab, 0x4a61600b, 0xe7838534,
0x1a52df87, 0x0de65625, 0xbd675870, 0x5f0dd494 }}},
{{{ 0xe23493ba, 0xf20aec1b, 0x3414b0a8, 0x8f7f2741,
0xa80e1eb6, 0x497e74bd, 0xe9365b15, 0x1648eaac }}} },
{ {{{ 0x04ac2b69, 0x5b78dcec, 0x32001a73, 0xecdb66ce,
0xb34cf697, 0xb75832f4, 0x3a2bce94, 0x7aaf57c5 }}},
{{{ 0x60fdfc6f, 0xb32ed2ce, 0x757924c6, 0x77bf20be,
0x48742dd1, 0xaebd15dd, 0x55d38439, 0x6311bb16 }}} },
{ {{{ 0x42ff5c97, 0x139cdd73, 0xdbd82964, 0xee4c359e,
0x70611a3f, 0x91c1cd94, 0x8075dbcb, 0x1d0c34f6 }}},
{{{ 0x5f931219, 0x43eaa549, 0xa23d35a6, 0x3737aba7,
0x46f167bb, 0x54b1992f, 0xb74a9944, 0x01a11f3c }}} },
{ {{{ 0xba46b161, 0x67a5310e, 0xd9d67f6c, 0x790f8527,
0x2f6cc814, 0x359c5b5f, 0x7786383d, 0x7b6a5565 }}},
{{{ 0x663ab0d3, 0xf1431b60, 0x09995826, 0x14a32d8f,
0xeddb8571, 0x61d526f6, 0x0eac739a, 0x0cb7acea }}} },
{ {{{ 0x4a2d009f, 0x5eb1a697, 0xd8df987a, 0xdacb43b4,
0x8397f958, 0x4870f214, 0x8a175fbb, 0x5aa0c67c }}},
{{{ 0x78887db3, 0x27dbbd4c, 0x64e322ab, 0xe327b707,
0x7cbe4e3b, 0x87e293fa, 0xbda72395, 0x17040799 }}} },
{ {{{ 0x99d1e696, 0xc833a5a2, 0x2d9d5877, 0x969bff8e,
0x2216fa67, 0x383a533a, 0x684d3925, 0x338bbe0a }}},
{{{ 0xd6cfb491, 0x35b5aae8, 0xaa12f3f8, 0x4a588279,
0x2e30380e, 0xa7c2e708, 0x9e4b3d62, 0x69f13e09 }}} },
{ {{{ 0x27f1cd56, 0xec0dc2ef, 0xdb11cc97, 0x1af11548,
0x9ebc7613, 0xb642f86a, 0xcb77c3b9, 0x5ce45e73 }}},
{{{ 0x3eddd6de, 0x5d128786, 0x4859eab7, 0x16f9a6b4,
0xd8782345, 0x55c53916, 0xdb7b202a, 0x6b1dfa87 }}} },
{ {{{ 0x19e30528, 0x2461a8ed, 0x665cfb1c, 0xaf756bf9,
0x3a6e8673, 0x0fcafd1d, 0x45d10f48, 0x0d264435 }}},
{{{ 0x5431db67, 0x543fd4c6, 0x60932432, 0xc153a5b3,
0xd2119aa4, 0x41d5b8eb, 0x8b09b6a5, 0x36bd9ab4 }}} },
{ {{{ 0x21e06738, 0x6d39f935, 0x3765dd86, 0x4e6a7c59,
0xa4730880, 0xefc0dd80, 0x4079fe2f, 0x40617e56 }}},
{{{ 0x921439b9, 0xbc83cdff, 0x98833c09, 0xd5cccc06,
0xda13cdcb, 0xe315c425, 0x67ff5370, 0x37bc6e84 }}} },
{ {{{ 0xf643b5f5, 0x65e7f028, 0x0ffbf5a8, 0x5b0d4831,
0xf4085f62, 0x0f540498, 0x0db7bd1b, 0x6f0bb035 }}},
{{{ 0x9733742c, 0x51f65571, 0xf513409f, 0x2fc047a0,
0x355facf6, 0x07f45010, 0x3a989a9c, 0x5cd416a9 }}} },
{ {{{ 0x748f2a67, 0x0bdd7208, 0x415b7f7f, 0x0cf0b80b,
0x57aa0119, 0x44afdd5f, 0x430dc946, 0x05d68802 }}},
{{{ 0x1a60eeb2, 0x420c46e5, 0x665024f5, 0xc60a9b33,
0x48c51347, 0x37520265, 0x00a21bfb, 0x6f4be0af }}} }
};
static const ac precomputed_2E_KG[16] = {
{ {{{ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }}},
{{{ 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }}} },
{ {{{ 0x199c4f7d, 0xec314ac0, 0xb2ebaaf9, 0x66a39c16,
0xedd4d15f, 0xab1c92b8, 0x57d9eada, 0x482a4cdf }}},
{{{ 0x6e4eb04b, 0xbd513b11, 0x25e4fd6a, 0x3f115fa5,
0x14519298, 0x0b3c5fc6, 0x81c2f7a8, 0x7391de43 }}} },
{ {{{ 0x1254fe02, 0xa57dca18, 0x6da34368, 0xa56a2a14,
0x63e7328e, 0x44c6e34f, 0xca63ab3e, 0x3f748617 }}},
{{{ 0x7dc1641e, 0x5a13dc52, 0xee4e9ca1, 0x4cbb2899,
0x1ba9acee, 0x3938a289, 0x420fc47b, 0x0fed89e6 }}} },
{ {{{ 0x49cbad08, 0x3c193f32, 0x15e80ef5, 0xdda71ef1,
0x9d128c33, 0xda44186c, 0xbf98c24f, 0x54183ede }}},
{{{ 0x93d165c1, 0x2cb483f7, 0x177f44aa, 0x51762ace,
0xb4ab035d, 0xb3fe651b, 0xa0b0d4e5, 0x426c99c3 }}} },
{ {{{ 0xef3f3fb1, 0xb3fcf4d8, 0x065060a0, 0x7052292b,
0x24240b15, 0x18795ff8, 0x9989ffcc, 0x13aea184 }}},
{{{ 0xc2b81f44, 0x1930c101, 0x10600555, 0x672d6ca4,
0x1b25e570, 0xfbddbff2, 0x8ca12b70, 0x0884949c }}} },
{ {{{ 0x00564bbf, 0x9983a033, 0xde61b72d, 0x95587d25,
0xeb17ad71, 0xb6719dfb, 0xc0bc3517, 0x46871ad0 }}},
{{{ 0xe95a6693, 0xb034fb61, 0x76eabad9, 0x5b0d8d18,
0x884785dc, 0xad295dd0, 0x74a1276a, 0x359debad }}} },
{ {{{ 0xe89fb5ca, 0x2e5a2686, 0x5656c6c5, 0xd3d200ba,
0x9c969001, 0xef4c051e, 0x02cb45f4, 0x0d4ea946 }}},
{{{ 0x76d6e506, 0xa6f8a422, 0x63209e23, 0x454c768f,
0x2b372386, 0x5c12fd04, 0xdbfee11f, 0x1aedbd3e }}} },
{ {{{ 0x00dbf569, 0x700ab50f, 0xd335b313, 0x9553643c,
0xa17dc97e, 0xeea9bddf, 0x3350a2bd, 0x0d12fe3d }}},
{{{ 0xa16a3dee, 0xe5ac35fe, 0xf81950c3, 0x4ae4664a,
0x3dbbf921, 0x75c63df4, 0x2958a5a6, 0x545b109c }}} },
{ {{{ 0x0a61b29c, 0xd7a52a98, 0x65aca9ee, 0xe21e0acb,
0x5985dcbe, 0x57a69c0f, 0xeb87a534, 0x3c0c1e7b }}},
{{{ 0x6384bd2f, 0xf0a0b50d, 0xc6939e4b, 0xff349a34,
0x6e2f1973, 0x922c4554, 0xf1347631, 0x74e826b2 }}} },
{ {{{ 0xa655803c, 0xd7eaa066, 0x38292c5c, 0x09504e76,
0x2c874953, 0xe298a02e, 0x8932b73f, 0x225093ed }}},
{{{ 0xe69c3efd, 0xf93e2b4d, 0x8a87c799, 0xa2cbd5fc,
0x85dba986, 0xdf41da94, 0xccee8edc, 0x36fe85e7 }}} },
{ {{{ 0x7d742813, 0x78df7dc5, 0x4a193e64, 0x333bcc6d,
0x6a966d2d, 0x8242aa25, 0x4cd36d32, 0x03500a94 }}},
{{{ 0x580505d7, 0xd5d110fc, 0xfa11e1e9, 0xb2f47e16,
0x06eab6b4, 0xd0030f92, 0x62c91d46, 0x2dc80d5f }}} },
{ {{{ 0x2a75e492, 0x5788b01a, 0xbae31352, 0x992acf54,
0x8159db27, 0x4591b980, 0xd3d84740, 0x36c6533c }}},
{{{ 0x103883b5, 0xc44c7c00, 0x515d0820, 0x10329423,
0x71b9dc16, 0xbd306903, 0xf88f8d32, 0x7edd5a95 }}} },
{ {{{ 0x005523d7, 0xfd63b1ac, 0xad70dd21, 0x74482e0d,
0x02b56105, 0x67c9d9d0, 0x5971b456, 0x4d318012 }}},
{{{ 0x841106df, 0xdc9a6f6d, 0xa326987f, 0x7c52ed9d,
0x00607ea0, 0x4dbeaa6f, 0x6959e688, 0x115c221d }}} },
{ {{{ 0xc80f7c16, 0xf8718464, 0xe9930634, 0x05dc8f40,
0xc2e9d5f4, 0xefa699bb, 0x021da209, 0x2469e813 }}},
{{{ 0xc602a3c4, 0x75c02845, 0x0a200f9d, 0x49d1b2ce,
0x2fb3ec8f, 0xd21b75e4, 0xd72a7545, 0x10dd726a }}} },
{ {{{ 0x63ef1a6c, 0xeda58527, 0x051705e0, 0xb3fc0e72,
0x44f1161f, 0xbda6f3ee, 0xf339efe5, 0x7680aebf }}},
{{{ 0xb1b070a7, 0xe8d3fd01, 0xdbfbaaa0, 0xc3ff7dbf,
0xa320c916, 0xd81ef6f2, 0x62a3b54d, 0x3e22a1fb }}} },
{ {{{ 0xb1fa18c8, 0xcdbb9187, 0xcb483a17, 0x8ddb5f6b,
0xea49af98, 0xc0a880b9, 0xf2dfddd0, 0x53bf600b }}},
{{{ 0x9e25b164, 0x4217404c, 0xafb74aa7, 0xfabf06ee,
0x2b9f233c, 0xb17712ae, 0xd0eb909e, 0x71f0b344 }}} }
};
static const ac precomputed_4E_KG[16] = {
{ {{{ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }}},
{{{ 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }}} },
{ {{{ 0xe388a820, 0xbb6ec091, 0x5182278a, 0xa928b283,
0xa9a6eb83, 0x2259174d, 0x45500054, 0x184b48cb }}},
{{{ 0x26e77c33, 0xfe324dba, 0x83faf453, 0x6679a5e3,
0x2380ef73, 0xdd60c268, 0x03dc33a9, 0x3ee0e07a }}} },
{ {{{ 0xce974493, 0x403aff28, 0x9bf6f5c4, 0x84076bf4,
0xecd898fb, 0xec57038c, 0xb663ed49, 0x2898ffaa }}},
{{{ 0xf335163d, 0xf4b3bc46, 0xfa4fb6c6, 0xe613a0f4,
0xb9934557, 0xe759d6bc, 0xab6c9477, 0x094f3b96 }}} },
{ {{{ 0x6afffe9e, 0x168bb5a0, 0xee748c29, 0x950f7ad7,
0xda17203d, 0xa4850a2b, 0x77289e0f, 0x0062f7a7 }}},
{{{ 0x4b3829fa, 0x6265d4e9, 0xbdfcd386, 0x4f155ada,
0x475795f6, 0x9f38bda4, 0xdece4a4c, 0x560ed4b3 }}} },
{ {{{ 0x141e648a, 0xdad4570a, 0x019b965c, 0x8bbf674c,
0xdb08fe30, 0xd7a8d50d, 0xa2851109, 0x7efb45d3 }}},
{{{ 0xd0c28cda, 0x52e818ac, 0xa321d436, 0x792257dd,
0x9d71f8b7, 0x867091c6, 0x11a1bf56, 0x0fe1198b }}} },
{ {{{ 0x06137ab1, 0x4e848339, 0x3e6674cc, 0x5673e864,
0x0140502b, 0xad882043, 0x6ea1e46a, 0x34b5c0cb }}},
{{{ 0x1d70aa7c, 0x29786814, 0x8cdbb8aa, 0x840ae3f9,
0xbd4801fb, 0x78b4d622, 0xcf18ae9a, 0x6cf4e146 }}} },
{ {{{ 0x36297168, 0x95c270ad, 0x942e7812, 0x2303ce80,
0x0205cf0e, 0x71908cc2, 0x32bcd754, 0x0cc15edd }}},
{{{ 0x2c7ded86, 0x1db94364, 0xf141b22c, 0xc694e39b,
0x5e5a9312, 0xf22f64ef, 0x3c5e6155, 0x649b8859 }}} },
{ {{{ 0xb6417945, 0x0d5611c6, 0xac306c97, 0x9643fdbf,
0x0df500ff, 0xe81faaa4, 0x6f50e615, 0x0792c79b }}},
{{{ 0xd2af8c8d, 0xb45bbc49, 0x84f51bfe, 0x16c615ab,
0xc1d02d32, 0xdc57c526, 0x3c8aaa55, 0x5fb9a9a6 }}} },
{ {{{ 0xdee40b98, 0x82faa8db, 0x6d520674, 0xff8a5208,
0x446ac562, 0x1f8c510f, 0x2cc6b66e, 0x4676d381 }}},
{{{ 0x2e7429f4, 0x8f1aa780, 0x8ed6bdf6, 0x2a95c1bf,
0x457fa0eb, 0x051450a0, 0x744c57b1, 0x7d89e2b7 }}} },
{ {{{ 0x3f95ea15, 0xb6bdacd2, 0x2f1a5d69, 0xc9a9d1b1,
0xf4d22d72, 0xd4c2f1a9, 0x4dc516b5, 0x73ecfdf1 }}},
{{{ 0x05391e08, 0xa1ce93cd, 0x7b8aac17, 0x98f1e99e,
0xa098cbb3, 0x9ba84f2e, 0xf9bdd37a, 0x1425aa8b }}} },
{ {{{ 0x966abfc0, 0x8a385bf4, 0xf081a640, 0x55e5e8bc,
0xee26f5ff, 0x835dff85, 0xe509e1ea, 0x4927e622 }}},
{{{ 0x352334b0, 0x164c8dbc, 0xa3fea31f, 0xcac1ad63,
0x682fd457, 0x9b87a676, 0x1a53145f, 0x75f382ff }}} },
{ {{{ 0xc3efcb46, 0x16b944f5, 0x68cb184c, 0x1fb55714,
0x9ccf2dc8, 0xf1c2b116, 0x808283d8, 0x7417e00f }}},
{{{ 0x930199ba, 0x1ea67a22, 0x718990d8, 0x9fbaf765,
0x8f3d5d57, 0x231fc664, 0xe5853194, 0x38141a19 }}} },
{ {{{ 0x2f81290d, 0xb9f00390, 0x04a9ca6c, 0x44877827,
0xe1dbdd65, 0x65d7f9b9, 0xf7c6698a, 0x7133424c }}},
{{{ 0xa7cd250f, 0x604cfb3c, 0x5acc18f3, 0x460c3c4b,
0xb518e3eb, 0xa53e50e0, 0x98a40196, 0x2b4b9267 }}} },
{ {{{ 0xc5dbd06c, 0x591b0672, 0xaa1eeb65, 0x10d43dca,
0xcd2517af, 0x420cdef8, 0x0b695a8a, 0x513a307e }}},
{{{ 0x66503215, 0xee9d6a7b, 0x088fd9a4, 0xdea58720,
0x973afe12, 0x8f3cbbea, 0x872f2538, 0x005c2350 }}} },
{ {{{ 0x35af3291, 0xe5024b70, 0x4f5e669a, 0x1d3eec2d,
0x6e79d539, 0xc1f6d766, 0x795b5248, 0x34ec043f }}},
{{{ 0x400960b6, 0xb2763511, 0x29e57df0, 0xff7a3d84,
0x1666c1f1, 0xaeac7792, 0x66084bc0, 0x72426e97 }}} },
{ {{{ 0x44f826ca, 0x5b1c3199, 0x790aa408, 0x68b00b73,
0x69e9b92b, 0xaf0984b4, 0x3ffe9093, 0x5fe6736f }}},
{{{ 0xffd49312, 0xd67f2889, 0x5cb9ed21, 0x3520d747,
0x3c65a606, 0x94f893b1, 0x2d65496f, 0x2fee5e8c }}} }
};
/**
* @brief X = k * G
*
* @param K scalar k
*
* Return -1 on error.
* Return 0 on success.
*/
static void
compute_kG_25519 (ac *X, const bn256 *K)
{
ptc Q[1];
int i;
/* identity element */
memset (Q, 0, sizeof (ptc));
Q->y->word[0] = 1;
Q->z->word[0] = 1;
for (i = 20; i >= 0; i--)
{
int k0, k1, k2;
k0 = ((K->word[0] >> i) & 1)
| (i < 1 ? ((K->word[1] >> 30) & 2)
: (((K->word[2] >> (i-1)) & 1) << 1))
| (i < 2 ? ((K->word[3] >> (i+28)) & 4)
: (((K->word[4] >> (i-2)) & 1) << 2))
| (i < 3 ? ((K->word[5] >> (i+26)) & 8)
: (((K->word[6] >> (i-3)) & 1) << 3));
k1 = (i < 11 ? ((K->word[0] >> (i+21)) & 1)
: ((K->word[1] >> (i-11)) & 1))
| (i < 12 ? ((K->word[2] >> (i+19)) & 2)
: (((K->word[3] >> (i-12)) & 1) << 1))
| (i < 13 ? ((K->word[4] >> (i+17)) & 4)
: (((K->word[5] >> (i-13)) & 1) << 2))
| (i < 14 ? ((K->word[6] >> (i+15)) & 8)
: (((K->word[7] >> (i-14)) & 1) << 3));
k2 = ((K->word[1] >> (i+10)) & 1)
| ((K->word[3] >> (i+8)) & 2)
| ((K->word[5] >> (i+6)) & 4)
| ((K->word[7] >> (i+4)) & 8);
point_double (Q, Q);
point_add (Q, Q, &precomputed_KG[k0]);
point_add (Q, Q, &precomputed_2E_KG[k1]);
point_add (Q, Q, &precomputed_4E_KG[k2]);
}
point_ptc_to_ac (X, Q);
}
#define BN416_WORDS 13
#define BN128_WORDS 4
/* M: The order of the generator G. */
static const bn256 M[1] = {
{{ 0x5CF5D3ED, 0x5812631A, 0xA2F79CD6, 0x14DEF9DE,
0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x10000000 }}
};
#define C ((const uint32_t *)M)
static void
bnX_mul_C (uint32_t *r, const uint32_t *q, int q_size)
{
int i, j, k;
int i_beg, i_end;
uint32_t r0, r1, r2;
r0 = r1 = r2 = 0;
for (k = 0; k <= q_size + BN128_WORDS - 2; k++)
{
if (q_size < BN128_WORDS)
if (k < q_size)
{
i_beg = 0;
i_end = k;
}
else
{
i_beg = k - q_size + 1;
i_end = k;
if (i_end > BN128_WORDS - 1)
i_end = BN128_WORDS - 1;
}
else
if (k < BN128_WORDS)
{
i_beg = 0;
i_end = k;
}
else
{
i_beg = k - BN128_WORDS + 1;
i_end = k;
if (i_end > q_size - 1)
i_end = q_size - 1;
}
for (i = i_beg; i <= i_end; i++)
{
uint64_t uv;
uint32_t u, v;
uint32_t carry;
j = k - i;
if (q_size < BN128_WORDS)
uv = ((uint64_t )q[j])*((uint64_t )C[i]);
else
uv = ((uint64_t )q[i])*((uint64_t )C[j]);
v = uv;
u = (uv >> 32);
r0 += v;
carry = (r0 < v);
r1 += carry;
carry = (r1 < carry);
r1 += u;
carry += (r1 < u);
r2 += carry;
}
r[k] = r0;
r0 = r1;
r1 = r2;
r2 = 0;
}
r[k] = r0;
}
/**
* @brief R = A mod M (using M=2^252+C) (Barret reduction)
*
* See HAC 14.47 and 14.52.
*/
static void
mod_reduce_M (bn256 *R, const bn512 *A)
{
uint32_t q[BN256_WORDS+1];
uint32_t tmp[BN416_WORDS];
bn256 r[1];
uint32_t carry, next_carry;
int i;
#define borrow carry
q[8] = A->word[15]>>28;
carry = A->word[15] & 0x0fffffff;
for (i = BN256_WORDS - 1; i >= 0; i--)
{
next_carry = A->word[i+7] & 0x0fffffff;
q[i] = (A->word[i+7] >> 28) | (carry << 4);
carry = next_carry;
}
memcpy (R, A, sizeof (bn256));
R->word[7] &= 0x0fffffff;
/* Q_size: 9 */
bnX_mul_C (tmp, q, 9); /* TMP = Q*C */
/* Q = tmp / 2^252 */
carry = tmp[12] & 0x0fffffff;
for (i = 4; i >= 0; i--)
{
next_carry = tmp[i+7] & 0x0fffffff;
q[i] = (tmp[i+7] >> 28) | (carry << 4);
carry = next_carry;
}
/* R' = tmp % 2^252 */
memcpy (r, tmp, sizeof (bn256));
r->word[7] &= 0x0fffffff;
/* R -= R' */
borrow = bn256_sub (R, R, r);
if (borrow)
bn256_add (R, R, M);
else
bn256_add ((bn256 *)tmp, R, M);
/* Q_size: 5 */
bnX_mul_C (tmp, q, 5); /* TMP = Q*C */
carry = tmp[8] & 0x0fffffff;
q[0] = (tmp[7] >> 28) | (carry << 4);
/* R' = tmp % 2^252 */
memcpy (r, tmp, sizeof (bn256));
r->word[7] &= 0x0fffffff;
/* R += R' */
bn256_add (R, R, r);
borrow = bn256_sub (R, R, M);
if (borrow)
bn256_add (R, R, M);
else
bn256_add ((bn256 *)tmp, R, M);
/* Q_size: 1 */
bnX_mul_C (tmp, q, 1); /* TMP = Q*C */
/* R' = tmp % 2^252 */
memset (((uint8_t *)r)+(sizeof (uint32_t)*5), 0, sizeof (uint32_t)*3);
memcpy (r, tmp, sizeof (uint32_t)*5);
/* R -= R' */
borrow = bn256_sub (R, R, r);
if (borrow)
bn256_add (R, R, M);
else
bn256_add ((bn256 *)tmp, R, M);
#undef borrow
}
int
eddsa_sign_25519 (const uint8_t *input, size_t ilen, uint32_t *out,
const bn256 *a, const uint8_t *seed, const bn256 *pk)
{
bn256 *r, *s;
mbedtls_sha512_context ctx;
mbedtls_sha512_init(&ctx);
uint8_t hash[64];
bn256 tmp[1];
ac R[1];
uint32_t carry, borrow;
r = (bn256 *)out;
s = (bn256 *)(out+(32/4));
mbedtls_sha512_starts (&ctx, 0);
mbedtls_sha512_update (&ctx, seed, sizeof (bn256)); /* It's upper half of the hash */
mbedtls_sha512_update (&ctx, input, ilen);
mbedtls_sha512_finish (&ctx, hash);
mod_reduce_M (r, (bn512 *)hash);
compute_kG_25519 (R, r);
/* EdDSA encoding. */
memcpy (tmp, R->y, sizeof (bn256));
tmp->word[7] ^= mod25519_is_neg (R->x) * 0x80000000;
mbedtls_sha512_starts (&ctx, 0);
mbedtls_sha512_update (&ctx, (uint8_t *)tmp, sizeof (bn256));
mbedtls_sha512_update (&ctx, (uint8_t *)pk, sizeof (bn256));
mbedtls_sha512_update (&ctx, input, ilen);
mbedtls_sha512_finish (&ctx, (uint8_t *)hash);
mod_reduce_M (s, (bn512 *)hash);
bn256_mul ((bn512 *)hash, s, a);
mod_reduce_M (s, (bn512 *)hash);
carry = bn256_add (s, s, r);
borrow = bn256_sub (s, s, M);
memcpy (r, tmp, sizeof (bn256));
if ((borrow && !carry))
bn256_add (s, s, M);
else
bn256_add (tmp, s, M);
mbedtls_sha512_free (&ctx);
return 0;
}
static void
eddsa_public_key_25519 (bn256 *pk, const bn256 *a)
{
ac R[1];
ptc X[1];
bn256 a0[1];
bn256_shift (a0, a, -3);
compute_kG_25519 (R, a0);
memcpy (X, R, sizeof (ac));
memset (X->z, 0, sizeof (bn256));
X->z->word[0] = 1;
point_double (X, X);
point_double (X, X);
point_double (X, X);
point_ptc_to_ac (R, X);
/* EdDSA encoding. */
memcpy (pk, R->y, sizeof (bn256));
pk->word[7] ^= mod25519_is_neg (R->x) * 0x80000000;
}
void
eddsa_compute_public_25519 (const uint8_t *kd, uint8_t *pubkey)
{
eddsa_public_key_25519 ((bn256 *)pubkey, (const bn256 *)kd);
}
#if 0
/**
* check if P is on the curve.
*
* Return -1 on error.
* Return 0 on success.
*/
static int
point_is_on_the_curve (const ac *P)
{
bn256 s[1], t[1];
/* Twisted Edwards curve: a*x^2 + y^2 = 1 + d*x^2*y^2 */
}
int
compute_kP_25519 (ac *X, const bn256 *K, const ac *P);
#endif
#ifdef PRINT_OUT_TABLE
static const ptc G[1] = {{
{{{ 0x8f25d51a, 0xc9562d60, 0x9525a7b2, 0x692cc760,
0xfdd6dc5c, 0xc0a4e231, 0xcd6e53fe, 0x216936d3 }}},
{{{ 0x66666658, 0x66666666, 0x66666666, 0x66666666,
0x66666666, 0x66666666, 0x66666666, 0x66666666 }}},
{{{ 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }}},
}};
#include <stdio.h>
#ifdef TESTING_EDDSA
static void
print_bn256 (const bn256 *X)
{
int i;
for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--)
printf ("%08x", X->word[i]);
puts ("");
}
#endif
#if 0
static void
print_point (const ac *X)
{
int i;
#ifdef PRINT_OUT_TABLE_AS_C
fputs (" { {{{ ", stdout);
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
printf ("0x%08x, ", X->x->word[i]);
fputs ("\n ", stdout);
for (; i < 7; i++)
printf ("0x%08x, ", X->x->word[i]);
printf ("0x%08x }}},\n", X->x->word[i]);
fputs (" {{{ ", stdout);
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
printf ("0x%08x, ", X->y->word[i]);
fputs ("\n ", stdout);
for (; i < 7; i++)
printf ("0x%08x, ", X->y->word[i]);
printf ("0x%08x }}} },\n", X->y->word[i]);
#else
puts ("--");
for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--)
printf ("%08x", X->x->word[i]);
puts ("");
for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--)
printf ("%08x", X->y->word[i]);
puts ("");
puts ("--");
#endif
}
static void
print_point_ptc (const ptc *X)
{
int i;
puts ("---");
for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--)
printf ("%08x", X->x->word[i]);
puts ("");
for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--)
printf ("%08x", X->y->word[i]);
puts ("");
for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--)
printf ("%08x", X->z->word[i]);
puts ("");
puts ("---");
}
#endif
#ifndef TESTING_EDDSA
static void power_2 (ac *A, ptc *a, int N)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < N; i++)
ed_double_25638 (a, a);
ptc_to_ac_25519 (A, a);
}
static void print_table (ac *a0001, ac *a0010, ac *a0100, ac *a1000)
{
int i;
ptc a[1];
ac x[1];
for (i = 1; i < 16; i++)
{
/* A := Identity Element */
memset (a, 0, sizeof (ptc));
a->y->word[0] = 1;
a->z->word[0] = 1;
if ((i & 1))
ed_add_25638 (a, a, a0001);
if ((i & 2))
ed_add_25638 (a, a, a0010);
if ((i & 4))
ed_add_25638 (a, a, a0100);
if ((i & 8))
ed_add_25638 (a, a, a1000);
ptc_to_ac_25519 (x, a);
print_point (x);
}
fputs ("\n", stdout);
}
static void compute_and_print_table (ac *a0001, ac *a0010, ac *a0100, ac *a1000)
{
ptc a[1];
memcpy (a, a0001, sizeof (ac));
memset (a->z, 0, sizeof (bn256));
a->z->word[0] = 1;
power_2 (a0010, a, 63);
power_2 (a0100, a, 63);
power_2 (a1000, a, 63);
print_table (a0001, a0010, a0100, a1000);
}
#endif
int
main (int argc, char *argv[])
{
#ifdef TESTING_EDDSA
uint8_t hash[64];
bn256 a[1];
uint8_t r_s[64];
bn256 pk[1];
bn256 *r, *s;
const bn256 sk[1] = {
{{ 0x9db1619d, 0x605afdef, 0xf44a84ba, 0xc42cec92,
0x69c54944, 0x1969327b, 0x03ac3b70, 0x607fae1c }} };
const bn256 r_expected[1] = {
{{ 0x004356e5, 0x72ac60c3, 0xcce28690, 0x8a826e80,
0x1e7f8784, 0x74d9e5b8, 0x65e073d8, 0x55014922 }} };
const bn256 s_expected[1] = {
{{ 0x1582b85f, 0xac3ba390, 0x70391ec6, 0x6bb4f91c,
0xf0f55bd2, 0x24be5b59, 0x43415165, 0x0b107a8e }} };
r = (bn256 *)r_s;
s = (bn256 *)(r_s+32);
sha512 ((uint8_t *)sk, sizeof (bn256), hash);
hash[0] &= 248;
hash[31] &= 127;
hash[31] |= 64;
memcpy (a, hash, sizeof (bn256));
eddsa_public_key_25519 (pk, a);
eddsa_sign_25519 ((const uint8_t *)"", 0, r_s, a, hash+32, pk);
if (memcmp (r, r_expected, sizeof (bn256)) != 0
|| memcmp (s, s_expected, sizeof (bn256)) != 0)
{
print_bn256 (r);
print_bn256 (s);
return 1;
}
#else
ac a0001[1], a0010[1], a0100[1], a1000[1];
ptc a[1];
memcpy (a, G, sizeof (ptc));
ptc_to_ac_25519 (a0001, a);
compute_and_print_table (a0001, a0010, a0100, a1000);
memcpy (a, a0001, sizeof (ac));
memset (a->z, 0, sizeof (bn256));
a->z->word[0] = 1;
power_2 (a0001, a, 21);
compute_and_print_table (a0001, a0010, a0100, a1000);
memcpy (a, a0001, sizeof (ac));
memset (a->z, 0, sizeof (bn256));
a->z->word[0] = 1;
power_2 (a0001, a, 21);
compute_and_print_table (a0001, a0010, a0100, a1000);
#endif
return 0;
}
#endif

View File

@@ -1,824 +0,0 @@
/* -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
* ecc-ed448.c - Elliptic curve computation for
* the twisted Edwards curve: -x^2 + y^2 = 1 + d*x^2*y^2
* d = -39081
*
* Copyright (C) 2021 Free Software Initiative of Japan
* Author: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
*
* This file is a part of Gnuk, a GnuPG USB Token implementation.
*
* Gnuk is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify it
* under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* Gnuk is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT
* ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
* or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public
* License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*
*/
/*
* IMPLEMENTATION NOTE
*
* (0) We assume that the processor has no cache, nor branch target
* prediction. Thus, we don't avoid indexing by secret value.
* We don't avoid conditional jump if both cases have same timing,
* either.
*
* (1) We use fixed base comb multiplication. Scalar is 448-bit.
* We use two tables, and a table has 16 points.
* Window size W = 4-bit, E = 56.
*
*/
#include <stdint.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "p448.h"
#include "shake256.h"
#define C_WORDS 7
#define BN448_WORDS 14
#define BN690_WORDS 22
#define BN896_WORDS 28
#define BN912_WORDS 29 /* 28.5 */
typedef struct bn448 {
uint32_t word[ BN448_WORDS ]; /* Little endian */
} bn448;
typedef struct bn896 {
uint32_t word[ BN896_WORDS ]; /* Little endian */
} bn896;
typedef struct bn912 {
uint32_t word[ BN912_WORDS ]; /* Little endian */
} bn912;
static const bn448 M[1] = {{{
0xab5844f3, 0x2378c292, 0x8dc58f55, 0x216cc272,
0xaed63690, 0xc44edb49, 0x7cca23e9, 0xffffffff,
0xffffffff, 0xffffffff, 0xffffffff, 0xffffffff,
0xffffffff, 0x3fffffff
}}};
static const uint32_t C[C_WORDS] = {
0x54a7bb0d, 0xdc873d6d, 0x723a70aa, 0xde933d8d,
0x5129c96f, 0x3bb124b6, 0x8335dc16
};
static uint32_t
bn448_add (bn448 *X, const bn448 *A, const bn448 *B)
{
int i;
uint32_t v;
uint32_t carry = 0;
uint32_t *px;
const uint32_t *pa, *pb;
px = X->word;
pa = A->word;
pb = B->word;
for (i = 0; i < BN448_WORDS; i++)
{
v = *pb;
*px = *pa + carry;
carry = (*px < carry);
*px += v;
carry += (*px < v);
px++;
pa++;
pb++;
}
return carry;
}
static uint32_t
bn448_sub (bn448 *X, const bn448 *A, const bn448 *B)
{
int i;
uint32_t v;
uint32_t borrow = 0;
uint32_t *px;
const uint32_t *pa, *pb;
px = X->word;
pa = A->word;
pb = B->word;
for (i = 0; i < BN448_WORDS; i++)
{
uint32_t borrow0 = (*pa < borrow);
v = *pb;
*px = *pa - borrow;
borrow = (*px < v) + borrow0;
*px -= v;
px++;
pa++;
pb++;
}
return borrow;
}
static void
bnX_mul_C (uint32_t *r, const uint32_t *q, int q_size)
{
int i, j, k;
int i_beg, i_end;
uint32_t r0, r1, r2;
r0 = r1 = r2 = 0;
for (k = 0; k <= q_size + C_WORDS - 2; k++)
{
if (q_size < C_WORDS)
if (k < q_size)
{
i_beg = 0;
i_end = k;
}
else
{
i_beg = k - q_size + 1;
i_end = k;
if (i_end > C_WORDS - 1)
i_end = C_WORDS - 1;
}
else
if (k < C_WORDS)
{
i_beg = 0;
i_end = k;
}
else
{
i_beg = k - C_WORDS + 1;
i_end = k;
if (i_end > q_size - 1)
i_end = q_size - 1;
}
for (i = i_beg; i <= i_end; i++)
{
uint64_t uv;
uint32_t u, v;
uint32_t carry;
j = k - i;
if (q_size < C_WORDS)
uv = ((uint64_t)q[j])*((uint64_t)C[i]);
else
uv = ((uint64_t)q[i])*((uint64_t)C[j]);
v = uv;
u = (uv >> 32);
r0 += v;
carry = (r0 < v);
r1 += carry;
carry = (r1 < carry);
r1 += u;
carry += (r1 < u);
r2 += carry;
}
r[k] = r0;
r0 = r1;
r1 = r2;
r2 = 0;
}
r[k] = r0;
}
/* X <= X + A when COND!=0 */
/* X <= X when COND==0 */
static void
bn448_add_cond (bn448 *X, const bn448 *A, int cond)
{
int i;
uint32_t v;
uint32_t carry = 0;
uint32_t *px;
const uint32_t *pa;
uint32_t mask = -(!!cond);
px = X->word;
pa = A->word;
for (i = 0; i < BN448_WORDS; i++)
{
v = *px;
*px = (*pa & mask) + carry;
carry = (*px < carry);
*px += v;
carry += (*px < v);
px++;
pa++;
}
}
/* X <= X + A mod M */
static void
bn448_addm (bn448 *X, const bn448 *A)
{
uint32_t borrow;
bn448_add (X, X, A);
borrow = bn448_sub (X, X, M);
bn448_add_cond (X, M, borrow);
}
/**
* @brief R = A mod M (using M=2^446-C) (Barret reduction)
*
* See HAC 14.47.
*/
void
mod_reduce_M (bn448 *R, const bn912 *A)
{
uint32_t q[BN448_WORDS+1];
uint32_t tmp[BN690_WORDS];
bn448 r[1];
uint32_t carry, next_carry;
int i;
/* Q = A / 2^446 *//* 466-bit */
/* Upper half of A->word[28] must be zero. */
q[14] = (A->word[28] << 2) | (A->word[27] >> 30);
carry = A->word[27] & 0x3fffffff;
for (i = BN448_WORDS - 1; i >= 0; i--)
{
next_carry = A->word[i+13] & 0x3fffffff;
q[i] = (A->word[i+13] >> 30) | (carry << 2);
carry = next_carry;
}
memcpy (R, A, sizeof (bn448));
R->word[13] &= 0x3fffffff;
/* Q_size: 15 *//* 466-bit */
bnX_mul_C (tmp, q, 15); /* TMP = Q*C *//* 690-bit */
/* Q = tmp / 2^446 *//* 244-bit */
carry = tmp[21];
for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--)
{
next_carry = tmp[i+13] & 0x3fffffff;
q[i] = (tmp[i+13] >> 30) | (carry << 2);
carry = next_carry;
}
/* R' = tmp % 2^446 */
memcpy (r, tmp, sizeof (bn448));
r->word[13] &= 0x3fffffff;
/* R += R' */
bn448_addm (R, r);
/* Q_size: 8 *//* 244-bit */
bnX_mul_C (tmp, q, 8); /* TMP = Q*C *//* 468-bit */
/* Q = tmp / 2^446 *//* 22-bit */
carry = tmp[14];
q[0] = (tmp[13] >> 30) | (carry << 2);
/* R' = tmp % 2^446 */
memcpy (r, tmp, sizeof (bn448));
r->word[13] &= 0x3fffffff;
/* R += R' */
bn448_addm (R, r);
/* Q_size: 1 */
bnX_mul_C (tmp, q, 1); /* TMP = Q*C *//* 246-bit */
/* R' = tmp % 2^446 */
memset (((uint8_t *)r)+(sizeof (uint32_t)*8), 0, sizeof (uint32_t)*6);
memcpy (r, tmp, sizeof (uint32_t)*8);
/* R += R' */
bn448_addm (R, r);
}
static void
bn448_mul (bn896 *X, const bn448 *A, const bn448 *B)
{
int i, j, k;
int i_beg, i_end;
uint32_t r0, r1, r2;
r0 = r1 = r2 = 0;
for (k = 0; k <= (BN448_WORDS - 1)*2; k++)
{
if (k < BN448_WORDS)
{
i_beg = 0;
i_end = k;
}
else
{
i_beg = k - BN448_WORDS + 1;
i_end = BN448_WORDS - 1;
}
for (i = i_beg; i <= i_end; i++)
{
uint64_t uv;
uint32_t u, v;
uint32_t carry;
j = k - i;
uv = ((uint64_t )A->word[i])*((uint64_t )B->word[j]);
v = uv;
u = (uv >> 32);
r0 += v;
carry = (r0 < v);
r1 += carry;
carry = (r1 < carry);
r1 += u;
carry += (r1 < u);
r2 += carry;
}
X->word[k] = r0;
r0 = r1;
r1 = r2;
r2 = 0;
}
X->word[k] = r0;
}
static const p448_t nGx0[16] = {
{ { 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000,
0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000,
0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000,
0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000 } },
{ { 0x070cc05e, 0x026a82bc, 0x00938e26, 0x080e18b0,
0x0511433b, 0x0f72ab66, 0x0412ae1a, 0x0a3d3a46,
0x0a6de324, 0x00f1767e, 0x04657047, 0x036da9e1,
0x05a622bf, 0x0ed221d1, 0x066bed0d, 0x04f1970c } },
{ { 0x0464238e, 0x00079817, 0x00d381ca, 0x02110302,
0x0d9f01b5, 0x01cc4c6e, 0x05a131b1, 0x05e35dc5,
0x006944eb, 0x0b61848d, 0x029631a3, 0x083792a0,
0x0afca0dd, 0x0be1017f, 0x0782fcbb, 0x070aaa01 } },
{ { 0x0e7661f9, 0x0b2f9f62, 0x009fae89, 0x03b99803,
0x066014d2, 0x067900ef, 0x06556c10, 0x0c8eacf3,
0x0ad4a82e, 0x020a44d0, 0x00572f1c, 0x0e7819e7,
0x0fd08cdf, 0x0c0ed140, 0x09aee1da, 0x0a16934a } },
{ { 0x091780c7, 0x0a7ea989, 0x0d2476b6, 0x004e4ecc,
0x0c494b68, 0x00af9f58, 0x0dee64fd, 0x0e0f269f,
0x0021bd26, 0x085a61f6, 0x0b5d284b, 0x0c265c35,
0x03775afd, 0x058755ea, 0x02ecf2c6, 0x0617f174 } },
{ { 0x067f4947, 0x0dbf4eb6, 0x0b8716d9, 0x02206a2a,
0x0e7cad5a, 0x04a148b0, 0x0e483133, 0x0fbf12cd,
0x0c6458f7, 0x0e022d5a, 0x01b7e39d, 0x0a60afe6,
0x05a5208c, 0x0c62f458, 0x03311553, 0x0a08a4c3 } },
{ { 0x0054a90d, 0x0ad5dc54, 0x00ac9fd6, 0x097f2af4,
0x0f4ddbc7, 0x01b0f7b3, 0x0324ce0b, 0x01d5d092,
0x0cd2798f, 0x08cb96e2, 0x0957bc39, 0x0bd045b5,
0x0f76fbfb, 0x046308a9, 0x0ef679ce, 0x0c86d628 } },
{ { 0x0d5d9262, 0x0f251539, 0x0711a956, 0x0240708f,
0x04a0b0bc, 0x07f7e4dd, 0x055b70a8, 0x065dd24f,
0x07ef8979, 0x0e83cec7, 0x09589db8, 0x0f1db2d1,
0x09d93037, 0x0fcc7e8a, 0x04e0b8f4, 0x0cb99f0b } },
{ { 0x04acea57, 0x06f24100, 0x0da68597, 0x0dace1c6,
0x050ce77f, 0x0ea7dd41, 0x01585884, 0x01aecb84,
0x0ea4a85c, 0x092ff208, 0x088eebd2, 0x0de9433c,
0x03f4d289, 0x053cd318, 0x026539af, 0x03970858 } },
{ { 0x0d229665, 0x06e9fd2b, 0x0878dd51, 0x049345aa,
0x0f45bacf, 0x0ccde72a, 0x0be16b6f, 0x0bc249d1,
0x0448a61d, 0x0a25bae9, 0x0d773878, 0x0c93b6ea,
0x02cda508, 0x055f708a, 0x08cf49e6, 0x0fa56852 } },
{ { 0x093bfef9, 0x07bec8db, 0x0fafda3d, 0x0ce4dcdc,
0x06f62ed7, 0x0a75c872, 0x07b3dadd, 0x0c39ac92,
0x0f926d90, 0x0ae1b8d1, 0x048da0a9, 0x0d7dbeca,
0x02a52b3b, 0x0ec13f74, 0x0d4c5ce2, 0x02071cee } },
{ { 0x05a644a6, 0x0e56b0a9, 0x0be6360b, 0x01ecf90e,
0x023b73a8, 0x0c3bbcf7, 0x0292054b, 0x05417d25,
0x07b91b46, 0x0ca1ea05, 0x07ea6c44, 0x01560b21,
0x04f12989, 0x0463cd2a, 0x03d7e086, 0x0092781c } },
{ { 0x0d59796d, 0x0ce08d7e, 0x055bc822, 0x0e464443,
0x0d243cc4, 0x0542002f, 0x098259b3, 0x044fc576,
0x012781de, 0x08650550, 0x0055e6b4, 0x0137f762,
0x0fbf007e, 0x0a391ccc, 0x039fe6f6, 0x0a9c9ad3 } },
{ { 0x01ca2765, 0x0ccddbb0, 0x0563b46c, 0x05d18f4c,
0x0462647e, 0x02ff700d, 0x0822dc83, 0x0670b143,
0x00013963, 0x01627d78, 0x055dbfb9, 0x0435f413,
0x063d41e8, 0x066c95cd, 0x0c797bba, 0x08e27dfb } },
{ { 0x03da4531, 0x01ff4dd6, 0x0cd39a3c, 0x02d0de4c,
0x0bc9da8d, 0x0003561e, 0x033e1e9a, 0x001eea00,
0x078bf710, 0x05458c53, 0x0f56338e, 0x069043ab,
0x061ffba0, 0x0637cf41, 0x039fb551, 0x0fc09757 } },
{ { 0x0256141f, 0x0f1e0e38, 0x00ab2673, 0x0efd5f47,
0x0af4a4af, 0x0b749116, 0x0ac6540b, 0x04242f82,
0x0abaf195, 0x0b26730c, 0x0d06842d, 0x076fbe60,
0x0580cad8, 0x02613d91, 0x0b568ae0, 0x0c2e5b1d } }
};
static const p448_t nGy0[16] = {
{ { 0x00000001, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000,
0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000,
0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000,
0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000 } },
{ { 0x0230fa14, 0x008795bf, 0x07c8ad98, 0x0132c4ed,
0x09c4fdbd, 0x01ce67c3, 0x073ad3ff, 0x005a0c2d,
0x07789c1e, 0x0a398408, 0x0a73736c, 0x0c7624be,
0x003756c9, 0x02488762, 0x016eb6bc, 0x0693f467 } },
{ { 0x099945e7, 0x0c63b7a0, 0x0c4486c1, 0x0e9164ec,
0x0885f2c1, 0x0b133e35, 0x0c99ae02, 0x0186f0d3,
0x02bf53e6, 0x02fca492, 0x048a02bc, 0x0f922aa2,
0x00dd3dca, 0x04fe6490, 0x0f6a8207, 0x0e8c313f } },
{ { 0x0579a4e2, 0x0a1ffe8b, 0x0ce472b4, 0x01d006b3,
0x089def96, 0x07c8f689, 0x0a32ae93, 0x079d7bd1,
0x03a02760, 0x0ebb4776, 0x05b4c55e, 0x019b3c6c,
0x07da436f, 0x066ff782, 0x0659536d, 0x0ee40076 } },
{ { 0x05ec556a, 0x050109e2, 0x0fd57e39, 0x0235366b,
0x044b6b2e, 0x07b3c976, 0x0b2b7b9c, 0x0f7f9e82,
0x00ec6409, 0x0b6196ab, 0x00a20d9e, 0x088f1d16,
0x0586f761, 0x0e3be3b4, 0x0e26395d, 0x09983c26 } },
{ { 0x0fab8e56, 0x0ded288e, 0x057277e6, 0x0a4e6f4e,
0x0e949681, 0x0a2a4c4f, 0x0721fdb3, 0x0508a46c,
0x0fb44de2, 0x0f98049e, 0x02fb0f31, 0x071f3724,
0x09067763, 0x0d3fbbb3, 0x0a83faaa, 0x0696ec4a } },
{ { 0x07a04bb0, 0x0f52ae70, 0x0ae14cdb, 0x0784d14b,
0x034acc37, 0x09aa3869, 0x09703f7b, 0x08f79c87,
0x0264026c, 0x0859cde5, 0x0486b035, 0x0b2a45f7,
0x03d5144b, 0x0809740f, 0x0416dc87, 0x0dcf324d } },
{ { 0x0a0c8bc7, 0x04125cec, 0x0eac3f20, 0x0d30ff7e,
0x029ad678, 0x06901f05, 0x04805ff1, 0x033c307d,
0x049d6a79, 0x080f0710, 0x02dece6c, 0x0d1ba22b,
0x0778cccb, 0x01692a0b, 0x02df78fb, 0x0f8c02d3 } },
{ { 0x0b827d87, 0x04b57599, 0x03d77638, 0x0dc82ac0,
0x052f6e61, 0x06943366, 0x0ad5e8a6, 0x0b8fc4b0,
0x0f388642, 0x01b6f7dc, 0x0a74dd57, 0x06f24533,
0x041750cf, 0x0c669378, 0x028a37af, 0x006757eb } },
{ { 0x080128d5, 0x0ef186a8, 0x04a54843, 0x01ceb43b,
0x045be148, 0x0c112a42, 0x01ac9412, 0x0621b93a,
0x05e16552, 0x0a2ca24f, 0x086301c0, 0x0cf3fecf,
0x05c2e2e0, 0x05108805, 0x09e9d8ab, 0x0d2ba341 } },
{ { 0x02138911, 0x0f0d3e4c, 0x0c1a371b, 0x062382ce,
0x05b3a392, 0x09d954e7, 0x0517d2a1, 0x0047d71a,
0x07f70073, 0x09cd1733, 0x0efc3aea, 0x0549d0d1,
0x0df78457, 0x0666e074, 0x0a48e084, 0x0f67e924 } },
{ { 0x0b3114fe, 0x073bec50, 0x0e8b6172, 0x01c5e7b6,
0x0e896bcc, 0x0a1c3ae1, 0x0bcd8cab, 0x0bb3f870,
0x07e9fa9d, 0x0eea8546, 0x0042e2cf, 0x056431f0,
0x0469e8d2, 0x08eb9b9c, 0x0a9adf2c, 0x06856458 } },
{ { 0x07b2cfdd, 0x01855530, 0x073bd43a, 0x01816246,
0x08897062, 0x02f82d12, 0x03563816, 0x06517857,
0x0394a8c7, 0x0529bf2e, 0x075a3141, 0x0660c4f2,
0x018e5a16, 0x0787c8ad, 0x045b679e, 0x0abaec01 } },
{ { 0x06d87d9e, 0x07c9fabb, 0x03b2a99d, 0x0673b28a,
0x068816ee, 0x0efb205e, 0x0dd5e3d5, 0x03d21920,
0x07544f4d, 0x085f40c2, 0x06fb538d, 0x057d045b,
0x05470e4e, 0x028a93c3, 0x063adfd4, 0x0d1cf7a5 } },
{ { 0x06699694, 0x0c83c837, 0x0386dade, 0x0621103f,
0x0f247dc3, 0x06058f43, 0x0aec07c3, 0x0b1ac29a,
0x0bde5d50, 0x06e35e33, 0x078fd31c, 0x0516263c,
0x00a9d127, 0x04a13379, 0x078bec6e, 0x0f39316a } },
{ { 0x0e26ea19, 0x05ecf40e, 0x03bdf1b5, 0x07c284a0,
0x06f461fa, 0x08393462, 0x064a69aa, 0x07d4f6a5,
0x06e88ea4, 0x023059e9, 0x0f92bd0b, 0x0c4a8035,
0x0c5c44a2, 0x0fccec22, 0x07f57ea1, 0x0598207c } }
};
static const p448_t nGx1[16] = {
{ { 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000,
0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000,
0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000,
0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000 } },
{ { 0x0528af6f, 0x078c6f13, 0x094b74d9, 0x00001fe2,
0x001aab44, 0x0ae77425, 0x0ef0039c, 0x07cbe937,
0x00fa2a67, 0x0af3e4f0, 0x0da1378e, 0x0e28175f,
0x08ccd90e, 0x072adeed, 0x000af22f, 0x016a8ce1 } },
{ { 0x0fa0459e, 0x0f31f53f, 0x0315cd6b, 0x0f8742a1,
0x0ae64e97, 0x0abe2f50, 0x09b9da48, 0x0bd78741,
0x051e526e, 0x04521a33, 0x0e10ba45, 0x0fa05935,
0x0e8f903c, 0x05c947e1, 0x05a754ee, 0x00aa47d1 } },
{ { 0x00d9a33b, 0x0284f76f, 0x0e4d41e7, 0x09461141,
0x0cc79344, 0x015371b9, 0x03dd8bdd, 0x0173f667,
0x053f866b, 0x0c0d0f83, 0x030b45ea, 0x08b7d59b,
0x0044dc82, 0x02b4cdec, 0x094fa772, 0x0e245b21 } },
{ { 0x04ddc8a8, 0x02fe182d, 0x0ac056bf, 0x088d6e79,
0x00e41e4e, 0x0c3ff2d1, 0x02c3679f, 0x032ec7f9,
0x04e61051, 0x03561f09, 0x06c6250a, 0x04553f5a,
0x0dd25c5b, 0x02b765ef, 0x06a1cd7f, 0x0e3a40a2 } },
{ { 0x05e1f4b2, 0x0e9485c4, 0x070a1e6b, 0x01d85e53,
0x077730a7, 0x0db61fa9, 0x050d418e, 0x0201a6bd,
0x02774433, 0x0e78a475, 0x0622ea3a, 0x016424e5,
0x0d5b9631, 0x01c7734d, 0x0f5064f2, 0x0c7586d3 } },
{ { 0x0af6151d, 0x0c3ed603, 0x0aa19b93, 0x05a5e4a6,
0x0536ff03, 0x07e465ce, 0x0b0be710, 0x0bbb36bf,
0x09249bff, 0x0d15454d, 0x03736654, 0x0ba934d9,
0x0370dc86, 0x0675c04e, 0x0d86eb3b, 0x06cd21cb } },
{ { 0x030c7ce7, 0x04217221, 0x0e9dba4d, 0x0ec314cd,
0x05439062, 0x0d7196cd, 0x0dd96166, 0x0b8295cd,
0x0c15796f, 0x0c767da7, 0x00ab2036, 0x059120e7,
0x0b7d07ec, 0x0e1562a9, 0x0231cdd9, 0x07d5c89f } },
{ { 0x01a82a12, 0x091a5884, 0x080f3a62, 0x0a754175,
0x0f73417a, 0x0399009f, 0x00a8c5cd, 0x02db1fb9,
0x0c046d51, 0x082c8912, 0x08f18274, 0x00a3f577,
0x026ccae2, 0x02ad0ede, 0x08a4e9c2, 0x07d6bd8b } },
{ { 0x0afd28b4, 0x02b7b7be, 0x0298d67e, 0x0e834401,
0x04b11493, 0x0e070d60, 0x063ce6fb, 0x04b67725,
0x0a0cfb04, 0x0d3a0f67, 0x0f08f1b2, 0x0debe82e,
0x0b402b9e, 0x07114482, 0x0b307043, 0x0af532e6 } },
{ { 0x049ab457, 0x0f6483c2, 0x0818ac81, 0x05aced0a,
0x0a900e3a, 0x080916bc, 0x02948675, 0x0145adb9,
0x0d8b7821, 0x04fe2b0e, 0x0b1a62cc, 0x0a9e1bce,
0x096c2408, 0x048f1f80, 0x0ac552fe, 0x0d17e7a0 } },
{ { 0x08ce3344, 0x0ea48915, 0x0434ae70, 0x0c6cf019,
0x0c48f5d2, 0x089d3c0f, 0x0ca7aa7e, 0x0c550a00,
0x017fb3ab, 0x09f8b49f, 0x024844a0, 0x0366a6d5,
0x0ceb4a83, 0x0f1f5bf4, 0x03b782f0, 0x099fd2f7 } },
{ { 0x052daf76, 0x038fbbd7, 0x0bced01d, 0x0ffb0a8b,
0x07c6bd6c, 0x0dc3b0ff, 0x041d595c, 0x03814ee7,
0x01941d44, 0x0e1f8343, 0x0f89b18d, 0x0c083601,
0x0e52ec62, 0x0fc338ff, 0x0e971788, 0x04601008 } },
{ { 0x0add862e, 0x0e8c3a8e, 0x033cea23, 0x06d00cf1,
0x0cdc039a, 0x0d7bda40, 0x0e0a2ac3, 0x04750dcb,
0x0bec4388, 0x0a1bb0bc, 0x0d20c0f9, 0x077a4a7b,
0x0b9e1f0b, 0x02ff072d, 0x07bd3e06, 0x0bd796d7 } },
{ { 0x08e321b4, 0x08757de1, 0x0151699c, 0x06ba6bd4,
0x0a156df0, 0x02ec93a1, 0x0dad4f9e, 0x04e547c5,
0x0ee9310d, 0x01dcc8bf, 0x0f7b5016, 0x0355f710,
0x0ce8f36d, 0x0389d7a9, 0x02b8056d, 0x0ff83804 } },
{ { 0x060f6dcf, 0x0dcaa234, 0x0285b23d, 0x0ec8d56f,
0x083dac2b, 0x01042255, 0x08e1bed7, 0x0c3fe788,
0x0832c0af, 0x07258b0e, 0x02b2affc, 0x0a901bdb,
0x0038f36e, 0x01a28d5f, 0x0dbb618d, 0x080838af } }
};
static const p448_t nGy1[16] = {
{ { 0x00000001, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000,
0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000,
0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000,
0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000 } },
{ { 0x0cbf63dd, 0x069fae17, 0x09e39e26, 0x06786172,
0x0f827a18, 0x0e92b3d5, 0x08403682, 0x04d75e41,
0x09056a79, 0x001a4fd9, 0x020008f5, 0x089efb2d,
0x0b78ff15, 0x0a2f6918, 0x0a3437f5, 0x0f41c870 } },
{ { 0x0d814825, 0x0b2849ef, 0x05c9968d, 0x09c2a5d2,
0x004e634c, 0x024dbb26, 0x0db38194, 0x033f3a4c,
0x0c8a2b6b, 0x0e04f609, 0x0abbbfdb, 0x0caefd8e,
0x0404498b, 0x0683119a, 0x08b21cbd, 0x024ab7a9 } },
{ { 0x0ede77b3, 0x0043b728, 0x0a043f1d, 0x003cf736,
0x0ab4e700, 0x0d95a612, 0x0c8fe17c, 0x05ccaac2,
0x0177bd28, 0x0dc3bd14, 0x05360c86, 0x0b3d5c96,
0x04ec7e48, 0x01880c26, 0x04bb47c6, 0x0fd5dba8 } },
{ { 0x05d821dd, 0x0b27309b, 0x0c2c17ca, 0x0950fb8d,
0x08fb0d4c, 0x0feed015, 0x0f550179, 0x0762c479,
0x0e095840, 0x0306cf44, 0x0d379e66, 0x084b413a,
0x0bb2e4f1, 0x0d6e5d5a, 0x094b085d, 0x08bc12b7 } },
{ { 0x0b8a16f6, 0x0b4dacd9, 0x003afc96, 0x0000b9b9,
0x03f19cbf, 0x0ab930b8, 0x0b077171, 0x0541f92e,
0x019baa42, 0x08758d9c, 0x0fea31a2, 0x0299b935,
0x081d9e24, 0x03bc7232, 0x09d91676, 0x0fc081c2 } },
{ { 0x02f05282, 0x04ca6fb6, 0x02e9801e, 0x051928b6,
0x0b609dcb, 0x0c6f37b6, 0x06e32803, 0x06617fd7,
0x0166f0bb, 0x07d1bffb, 0x0ac137d4, 0x0bfdebdd,
0x0df8f3cb, 0x0d558ac9, 0x08fabbb4, 0x00217c7c } },
{ { 0x0f5d72ad, 0x04c71050, 0x008880dd, 0x093209a0,
0x07c3fef0, 0x0e1857c5, 0x022b21d2, 0x07584709,
0x0e52fe8a, 0x039aeffa, 0x0a384e66, 0x0bd7c58b,
0x0bfbbfe2, 0x022fc035, 0x0506e447, 0x0bc96411 } },
{ { 0x04b3de44, 0x0aa0d797, 0x096ac9bb, 0x0f8658b9,
0x05f6c334, 0x031e7be2, 0x04df12c9, 0x023836ce,
0x059eb5c9, 0x0029027b, 0x05b8649d, 0x02f22531,
0x0d907162, 0x0a0fdf03, 0x09e80226, 0x0101d9df } },
{ { 0x05237b19, 0x00d0c997, 0x04a2bcdb, 0x0692bae3,
0x0805b9e0, 0x0a0d3a98, 0x08c7dd07, 0x0a253f11,
0x0e19738e, 0x0c0794d0, 0x019812a1, 0x041a8569,
0x025d360c, 0x078e4ebd, 0x07ee8567, 0x0f02e9d6 } },
{ { 0x00548584, 0x0bb1ee61, 0x0549030f, 0x0026e17a,
0x0b4c52fb, 0x0a4e4e61, 0x0a1ca8f9, 0x0339754c,
0x0ee8806f, 0x03d2a45e, 0x0e2028fa, 0x03c44782,
0x0072e42b, 0x03328ae4, 0x0d21c91f, 0x07e98738 } },
{ { 0x0b9618ad, 0x07f781fa, 0x09cf7662, 0x0855bfab,
0x0c316a14, 0x0d98f9ff, 0x07b3046a, 0x0109f273,
0x042cecfe, 0x0cc21cdc, 0x05be5a36, 0x05236b10,
0x058a0700, 0x0ff2cf95, 0x005ad57d, 0x09cbf152 } },
{ { 0x0ebe90d2, 0x049f0de4, 0x02243779, 0x0221424d,
0x09051808, 0x0b52f44b, 0x0bb9c3fb, 0x0a5d64e3,
0x07690354, 0x0d8bf65d, 0x0bc06e3f, 0x05d039f6,
0x033a3443, 0x04e11c79, 0x04147a83, 0x06a7e42c } },
{ { 0x082e4773, 0x00d276be, 0x0e1b9057, 0x0e9dd324,
0x0369bc97, 0x0b3181ef, 0x002f04fa, 0x01d08726,
0x07c2c5d3, 0x0bf49cbf, 0x09ecb59b, 0x098eae7e,
0x02e09293, 0x052e08b6, 0x0c40f3e6, 0x04096c37 } },
{ { 0x06074e1f, 0x07bc94ed, 0x0790175a, 0x040b2a81,
0x0e307782, 0x0b7958e8, 0x089ff273, 0x07ed27c6,
0x026db869, 0x0b6a32f8, 0x03d2e15c, 0x00446ef9,
0x0777e1ac, 0x0492d2de, 0x01b69b63, 0x06b8dbab } },
{ { 0x07e98bea, 0x0e7c9e7a, 0x02e17335, 0x09302c64,
0x0acc1e93, 0x05dcdcd8, 0x04d90baa, 0x05982bae,
0x0c686ed6, 0x07c08c6c, 0x0fce2c72, 0x04dd3cce,
0x01dc8f12, 0x029ca465, 0x0161cbd7, 0x09324c0a } }
};
static void
compute_kG_448 (uint8_t *out, const uint32_t k[16])
{
int i;
p448_t x0[1], y0[1], z0[1]; /* P0 */
p448_t tmp0[1], tmp1[1];
/* P0 <= O */
memset (x0, 0, sizeof (p448_t));
memset (y0, 0, sizeof (p448_t));
memset (z0, 0, sizeof (p448_t));
y0->limb[0] = 1;
z0->limb[0] = 1;
for (i = 0; i < 56; i++)
{
p448_t b[1], c[1], d[1];
p448_t e[1], f[1], g[1], h[1];
int index0, index1;
if (i < 28)
{
int i0 = 28 - i - 1;
index0 = ((k[1] >> i0) & 1) | (((k[5] >> i0) & 1)<<1)
| (((k[ 9] >> i0) & 1)<<2) | (((k[13] >> i0) & 1)<<3);
index1 = ((k[3] >> i0) & 1) | (((k[7] >> i0) & 1)<<1)
| (((k[11] >> i0) & 1)<<2) | (((k[15] >> i0) & 1)<<3);
}
else
{
int i0 = 56 - i - 1;
index0 = ((k[0] >> i0) & 1) | (((k[4] >> i0) & 1)<<1)
| (((k[ 8] >> i0) & 1)<<2) | (((k[12] >> i0) & 1)<<3);
index1 = ((k[2] >> i0) & 1) | (((k[6] >> i0) & 1)<<1)
| (((k[10] >> i0) & 1)<<2) | (((k[14] >> i0) & 1)<<3);
}
/* Point double P0' <= P0 + P0 */
p448_add (tmp0, x0, y0);
p448_sqr (b, tmp0);
p448_sqr (c, x0);
p448_sqr (d, y0);
p448_add (e, c, d);
p448_sqr (h, z0);
p448_add (tmp0, h, h);
p448_sub (tmp1, e, tmp0);
p448_sub (tmp0, b, e);
p448_mul (x0, tmp0, tmp1);
p448_sub (tmp0, c, d);
p448_mul (y0, e, tmp0);
p448_mul (z0, e, tmp1);
/*
B = (X1+Y1)^2
C = X1^2
D = Y1^2
E = C+D
H = Z1^2
J = E-2*H
X3 = (B-E)*J
Y3 = E*(C-D)
Z3 = E*J
*/
/* Point addition P0' <= P0 + [v0(index0)]G */
p448_sqr (b, z0);
p448_mul (c, x0, &nGx0[index0]);
p448_mul (d, y0, &nGy0[index0]);
p448_mul (tmp0, c, d);
p448_mul_39081 (e, tmp0);
p448_add (f, b, e);
p448_sub (g, b, e);
p448_add (tmp0, x0, y0);
p448_add (tmp1, &nGx0[index0], &nGy0[index0]);
p448_mul (h, tmp0, tmp1);
p448_sub (tmp0, h, c);
p448_sub (tmp1, tmp0, d);
p448_mul (tmp0, f, tmp1);
p448_mul (x0, z0, tmp0);
p448_sub (tmp0, d, c);
p448_mul (tmp1, g, tmp0);
p448_mul (y0, z0, tmp1);
p448_mul (z0, f, g);
/*
A = Z1*Z2
B = A^2
C = X1*X2
D = Y1*Y2
E = d*C*D
F = B-E
G = B+E
H = (X1+Y1)*(X2+Y2)
X3 = A*F*(H-C-D)
Y3 = A*G*(D-C)
Z3 = F*G
*/
/* Point addition P0' <= P0 + [v1(index1)]G */
p448_sqr (b, z0);
p448_mul (c, x0, &nGx1[index1]);
p448_mul (d, y0, &nGy1[index1]);
p448_mul (tmp0, c, d);
p448_mul_39081 (e, tmp0);
p448_add (f, b, e);
p448_sub (g, b, e);
p448_add (tmp0, x0, y0);
p448_add (tmp1, &nGx1[index1], &nGy1[index1]);
p448_mul (h, tmp0, tmp1);
p448_sub (tmp0, h, c);
p448_sub (tmp1, tmp0, d);
p448_mul (tmp0, f, tmp1);
p448_mul (x0, z0, tmp0);
p448_sub (tmp0, d, c);
p448_mul (tmp1, g, tmp0);
p448_mul (y0, z0, tmp1);
p448_mul (z0, f, g);
}
/* Convert to affine coordinate. */
p448_inv (tmp0, z0);
p448_mul (tmp1, x0, tmp0);
p448_serialize (out, tmp1);
/* EdDSA encoding. */
out[56] = (out[0] & 1) << 7;
p448_mul (tmp1, y0, tmp0);
p448_serialize (out, tmp1);
}
#define SEED_SIZE 57
#define DOM448 (const uint8_t *)"SigEd448"
#define DOM448_LEN 8
int
ed448_sign (uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *input, unsigned int ilen,
const uint8_t *a_in, const uint8_t *seed, const uint8_t *pk)
{
bn448 a[1], k[1], s[1];
shake_context ctx;
const unsigned char x_olen[2] = { 0, 0 };
uint32_t hash[BN912_WORDS];
uint8_t r[57];
uint32_t carry, borrow;
p448_t k_redundant[1];
memset (hash, 0, sizeof (hash));
memcpy (a, a_in, sizeof (bn448));
a->word[13] |= 0x80000000;
a->word[0] &= ~3;
shake256_start (&ctx);
shake256_update (&ctx, DOM448, DOM448_LEN);
shake256_update (&ctx, x_olen, 2);
shake256_update (&ctx, seed, 57);
shake256_update (&ctx, input, ilen);
shake256_finish (&ctx, (uint8_t *)hash, 2*57);
mod_reduce_M (k, (const bn912 *)hash);
p448_deserialize (k_redundant, (uint8_t *)k);
compute_kG_448 (r, (uint32_t *)k_redundant);
shake256_start (&ctx);
shake256_update (&ctx, DOM448, DOM448_LEN);
shake256_update (&ctx, x_olen, 2);
shake256_update (&ctx, r, 57);
shake256_update (&ctx, pk, 57);
shake256_update (&ctx, input, ilen);
shake256_finish (&ctx, (uint8_t *)hash, 2*57);
mod_reduce_M (s, (const bn912 *)hash);
memset (hash, 0, sizeof (hash));
bn448_mul ((bn896 *)hash, s, a);
mod_reduce_M (s, (const bn912 *)hash);
carry = bn448_add (s, s, k);
borrow = bn448_sub (s, s, M);
bn448_add_cond (s, M, (borrow && !carry));
memcpy (out, r, 57);
memcpy (out+57, s, 56);
out[114-1] = 0;
return 0;
}
void
ed448_compute_public (uint8_t *pk, const uint8_t *a_in)
{
p448_t a[1];
p448_deserialize (a, a_in);
a->limb[15] |= 0x08000000;
a->limb[0] &= ~3;
compute_kG_448 (pk, (uint32_t *)a);
}

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@@ -1,226 +0,0 @@
/* -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
* ecc-mont.c - Elliptic curve computation for
* the Montgomery curve: y^2 = x^3 + 486662*x^2 + x.
*
* Copyright (C) 2014, 2015, 2017 Free Software Initiative of Japan
* Author: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
*
* This file is a part of Gnuk, a GnuPG USB Token implementation.
*
* Gnuk is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify it
* under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* Gnuk is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT
* ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
* or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public
* License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*
*/
#include <stdint.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "bn.h"
#include "mod25638.h"
#include "mod.h"
/*
* References:
*
* [1] D. J. Bernstein. Curve25519: new Diffie-Hellman speed records.
* Proceedings of PKC 2006, to appear.
* http://cr.yp.to/papers.html#curve25519. Date: 2006.02.09.
*
* [2] D. J. Bernstein. Can we avoid tests for zero in fast
* elliptic-curve arithmetic?
* http://cr.yp.to/papers.html#curvezero. Date: 2006.07.26.
*
*/
/*
* IMPLEMENTATION NOTE
*
* (0) We assume that the processor has no cache, nor branch target
* prediction. Thus, we don't avoid indexing by secret value.
* We don't avoid conditional jump if both cases have same timing,
* either.
*
* (1) We use Radix-32 field arithmetic. It's a representation like
* 2^256-38, but it's more redundant. For example, "1" can be
* represented in three ways in 256-bit: 1, 2^255-18, and
* 2^256-37.
*
* (2) We use Montgomery double-and-add.
*
*/
#ifndef BN256_C_IMPLEMENTATION
#define ASM_IMPLEMENTATION 0
#endif
/*
*
* 121665 = 0x1db41
* 1 1101 1011 0100 0001
*/
static void
mod25638_mul_121665 (bn256 *x, const bn256 *a)
{
#if ASM_IMPLEMENTATION
#include "muladd_256.h"
const uint32_t *s;
uint32_t *d;
uint32_t w;
uint32_t c;
s = a->word;
d = x->word;
memset (d, 0, sizeof (bn256));
w = 121665;
MULADD_256_ASM (s, d, w, c);
#else
uint32_t c, c1;
bn256 m[1];
c = c1 = bn256_shift (m, a, 6); c += bn256_add (x, a, m);
c1 <<= 2; c1 |= bn256_shift (m, m, 2); c = c + c1 + bn256_add (x, x, m);
c1 <<= 1; c1 |= bn256_shift (m, m, 1); c = c + c1 + bn256_add (x, x, m);
c1 <<= 2; c1 |= bn256_shift (m, m, 2); c = c + c1 + bn256_add (x, x, m);
c1 <<= 1; c1 |= bn256_shift (m, m, 1); c = c + c1 + bn256_add (x, x, m);
c1 <<= 2; c1 |= bn256_shift (m, m, 2); c = c + c1 + bn256_add (x, x, m);
c1 <<= 1; c1 |= bn256_shift (m, m, 1); c = c + c1 + bn256_add (x, x, m);
c1 <<= 1; c1 |= bn256_shift (m, m, 1); c = c + c1 + bn256_add (x, x, m);
#endif
c = bn256_add_uint (x, x, c*38);
x->word[0] += c * 38;
}
typedef struct
{
bn256 x[1];
bn256 z[1];
} pt;
/**
* @brief Process Montgomery double-and-add
*
* With Q0, Q1, DIF (= Q0 - Q1), compute PRD = 2Q0, SUM = Q0 + Q1
* Q0 and Q1 are clobbered.
*
*/
static void
mont_d_and_a (pt *prd, pt *sum, pt *q0, pt *q1, const bn256 *dif_x)
{
mod25638_add (sum->x, q1->x, q1->z);
mod25638_sub (q1->z, q1->x, q1->z);
mod25638_add (prd->x, q0->x, q0->z);
mod25638_sub (q0->z, q0->x, q0->z);
mod25638_mul (q1->x, q0->z, sum->x);
mod25638_mul (q1->z, prd->x, q1->z);
mod25638_sqr (q0->x, prd->x);
mod25638_sqr (q0->z, q0->z);
mod25638_add (sum->x, q1->x, q1->z);
mod25638_sub (q1->z, q1->x, q1->z);
mod25638_mul (prd->x, q0->x, q0->z);
mod25638_sub (q0->z, q0->x, q0->z);
mod25638_sqr (sum->x, sum->x);
mod25638_sqr (sum->z, q1->z);
mod25638_mul_121665 (prd->z, q0->z);
mod25638_mul (sum->z, sum->z, dif_x);
mod25638_add (prd->z, q0->x, prd->z);
mod25638_mul (prd->z, prd->z, q0->z);
}
/**
* @brief RES = x-coordinate of [n]Q
*
* @param N Scalar N (three least significant bits are 000)
* @param Q_X x-coordinate of Q
*
*/
static void
compute_nQ (bn256 *res, const bn256 *n, const bn256 *q_x)
{
int i, j;
pt p0[1], p1[1], p0_[1], p1_[1];
/* P0 = O = (1:0) */
memset (p0->x, 0, sizeof (bn256));
p0->x->word[0] = 1;
memset (p0->z, 0, sizeof (bn256));
/* P1 = (X:1) */
memcpy (p1->x, q_x, sizeof (bn256));
memset (p1->z, 0, sizeof (bn256));
p1->z->word[0] = 1;
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
{
uint32_t u = n->word[7-i];
for (j = 0; j < 16; j++)
{
pt *q0, *q1;
pt *sum_n, *prd_n;
if ((u & 0x80000000))
q0 = p1, q1 = p0, sum_n = p0_, prd_n = p1_;
else
q0 = p0, q1 = p1, sum_n = p1_, prd_n = p0_;
mont_d_and_a (prd_n, sum_n, q0, q1, q_x);
if ((u & 0x40000000))
q0 = p1_, q1 = p0_, sum_n = p0, prd_n = p1;
else
q0 = p0_, q1 = p1_, sum_n = p1, prd_n = p0;
mont_d_and_a (prd_n, sum_n, q0, q1, q_x);
u <<= 2;
}
}
/* We know the LSB of N is always 0. Thus, result is always in P0. */
/*
* p0->z may be zero here, but our mod_inv doesn't raise error for 0,
* but returns 0 (like the implementation of z^(p-2)), thus, RES will
* be 0 in that case, which is correct value.
*/
mod_inv (res, p0->z, p25519);
mod25638_mul (res, res, p0->x);
mod25519_reduce (res);
}
void
ecdh_compute_public_25519 (const uint8_t *key_data, uint8_t *pubkey)
{
bn256 gx[1];
bn256 k[1];
memset (gx, 0, sizeof (bn256));
gx[0].word[0] = 9; /* Gx = 9 */
memcpy (k, key_data, sizeof (bn256));
compute_nQ ((bn256 *)pubkey, k, gx);
}
int
ecdh_decrypt_curve25519 (const uint8_t *input, uint8_t *output,
const uint8_t *key_data)
{
bn256 q_x[1];
bn256 k[1];
bn256 shared[1];
memcpy (q_x, input, sizeof (bn256));
memcpy (k, key_data, sizeof (bn256));
compute_nQ (shared, k, q_x);
memcpy (output, shared, sizeof (bn256));
return 0;
}

View File

@@ -1,177 +0,0 @@
/* -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
* ecc-x448.c - Elliptic curve computation for
* the Montgomery curve: y^2 = x^3 + 156326*x^2 + x
*
* Copyright (C) 2021 Free Software Initiative of Japan
* Author: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
*
* This file is a part of Gnuk, a GnuPG USB Token implementation.
*
* Gnuk is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify it
* under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* Gnuk is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT
* ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
* or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public
* License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*
*/
/*
* IMPLEMENTATION NOTE
*
* (0) We assume that the processor has no cache, nor branch target
* prediction.
* We don't avoid conditional jump if both cases have same timing,
* either.
*
*/
#include <stdint.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "p448.h"
#define N_LIMBS 14
/**
* @brief Process Montgomery double-and-add
*
* With Q0, Q1, DIF (= Q0 - Q1), compute PRD = 2Q0 into Q0,
* and computute SUM = Q0 + Q1 into Q1
*
*/
static void
mont_d_and_a (p448_t q0_x[1], p448_t q0_z[1], p448_t q1_x[1], p448_t q1_z[1],
const p448_t dif_x[1])
{
p448_t reg0[1], reg1[1];
#define c reg0
#define d reg1
#define a q1_x
#define b q1_z
#define cb q0_x
#define da reg0
#define aa reg1
#define bb q0_z
#define da_plus_cb q1_z
#define da_minus_cb q1_x
#define e reg0
#define dacb_2 q0_z
#define a24_e q1_x
#define aa_ aa /* override is allowed by p448_add */
p448_add (c, q1_x, q1_z);
p448_sub (d, q1_x, q1_z);
p448_add (a, q0_x, q0_z);
p448_sub (b, q0_x, q0_z);
p448_mul (cb, c, b);
p448_mul (da, d, a);
p448_sqr (aa, a);
p448_sqr (bb, b);
p448_add (da_plus_cb, da, cb);
p448_sub (da_minus_cb, da, cb);
p448_mul (q0_x, aa, bb);
p448_sub (e, aa, bb);
p448_sqr (dacb_2, da_minus_cb);
p448_mul_39081 (a24_e, e);
p448_add (aa_, aa, a24_e);
p448_sqr (q1_x, da_plus_cb);
p448_mul (q1_z, dacb_2, dif_x);
p448_mul (q0_z, e, aa_);
}
typedef struct
{
p448_t x[1];
p448_t z[1];
} pt;
/**
* @brief RES = x-coordinate of [n]Q
*
* @param N Scalar N (three least significant bits are 00)
* @param Q_X x-coordinate of Q
*
*/
static void
compute_nQ (uint8_t *res, const uint32_t n[N_LIMBS], const p448_t q_x[1])
{
int i, j;
pt p0[1], p1[1];
#define tmp0 p0->z
#define tmp1 p1->z
/* P0 = O = (1:0) */
memset (p0->x, 0, sizeof (p0->x));
p0->x->limb[0] = 1;
memset (p0->z, 0, sizeof (p0->z));
/* P1 = (X:1) */
memcpy (p1->x, q_x, N_REDUNDANT_LIMBS*4);
memset (p1->z, 0, sizeof (p1->z));
p1->z->limb[0] = 1;
for (i = 0; i < N_LIMBS; i++)
{
uint32_t u = n[N_LIMBS-i-1];
for (j = 0; j < 32; j++)
{
p448_t *q0_x, *q0_z, *q1_x, *q1_z;
if ((u & 0x80000000))
q0_x = p1->x, q0_z = p1->z, q1_x = p0->x, q1_z = p0->z;
else
q0_x = p0->x, q0_z = p0->z, q1_x = p1->x, q1_z = p1->z;
mont_d_and_a (q0_x, q0_z, q1_x, q1_z, q_x);
u <<= 1;
}
}
/* We know the LSB of N is always 0. Thus, result is always in P0. */
/*
* p0->z may be zero here, but our inverse function doesn't raise
* error for 0, but returns 0, thus, RES will be 0 in that case,
* which is correct value.
*/
p448_inv (tmp1, p0->z);
p448_mul (tmp0, tmp1, p0->x);
p448_serialize (res, tmp0);
}
void
ecdh_compute_public_x448 (uint8_t *pubkey, const uint8_t *key_data)
{
const p448_t gx[1] = { { { 5, 0, }, } };
uint32_t k[N_LIMBS];
memcpy (k, key_data, N_LIMBS*4);
k[0] &= ~3;
k[N_LIMBS-1] |= 0x80000000;
compute_nQ (pubkey, k, gx);
}
int
ecdh_decrypt_x448 (uint8_t *output, const uint8_t *input,
const uint8_t *key_data)
{
p448_t q_x[1];
uint32_t k[N_LIMBS];
p448_deserialize (q_x, input);
memcpy (k, key_data, N_LIMBS*4);
k[0] &= ~3;
k[N_LIMBS-1] |= 0x80000000;
compute_nQ (output, k, q_x);
return 0;
}

View File

@@ -1,398 +0,0 @@
/* -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
* ecc.c - Elliptic curve over GF(prime)
*
* Copyright (C) 2011, 2013, 2014, 2015
* Free Software Initiative of Japan
* Author: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
*
* This file is a part of Gnuk, a GnuPG USB Token implementation.
*
* Gnuk is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify it
* under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* Gnuk is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT
* ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
* or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public
* License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*
*/
/*
* References:
*
* [1] Suite B Implementer's Guide to FIPS 186-3 (ECDSA), February 3, 2010.
*
* [2] Michael Brown, Darrel Hankerson, Julio López, and Alfred Menezes,
* Software Implementation of the NIST Elliptic Curves Over Prime Fields,
* Proceedings of the 2001 Conference on Topics in Cryptology: The
* Cryptographer's Track at RSA
* Pages 250-265, Springer-Verlag London, UK, 2001
* ISBN:3-540-41898-9
*
* [3] Mustapha Hedabou, Pierre Pinel, Lucien Bénéteau,
* A comb method to render ECC resistant against Side Channel Attacks,
* 2004
*/
#include "field-group-select.h"
/*
* Coefficients
*/
/*
* static const bn256 *coefficient_a;
* static const bn256 *coefficient_b;
*/
/*
* N: order of G
*/
/*
* static const bn256 N[1];
*/
/*
* MU = 2^512 / N
* MU = ( (1 << 256) | MU_lower )
*/
/*
* static const bn256 MU_lower[1];
*/
/*
* w = 4
* m = 256
* d = 64
* e = 32
*/
/*
* static const ac precomputed_KG[15];
* static const ac precomputed_2E_KG[15];
*/
#if TEST
/*
* Generator of Elliptic curve over GF(p256)
*/
const ac *G = &precomputed_KG[0];
#endif
static int
get_vk (const bn256 *K, int i)
{
uint32_t w0, w1, w2, w3;
if (i < 32)
{
w3 = K->word[6]; w2 = K->word[4]; w1 = K->word[2]; w0 = K->word[0];
}
else
{
w3 = K->word[7]; w2 = K->word[5]; w1 = K->word[3]; w0 = K->word[1];
i -= 32;
}
w3 >>= i; w2 >>= i; w1 >>= i; w0 >>= i;
return ((w3 & 1) << 3) | ((w2 & 1) << 2) | ((w1 & 1) << 1) | (w0 & 1);
}
/**
* @brief X = k * G
*
* @param K scalar k
*
* Return -1 on error.
* Return 0 on success.
*/
int
FUNC(compute_kG) (ac *X, const bn256 *K)
{
uint8_t index[64]; /* Lower 4-bit for index absolute value, msb is
for sign (encoded as: 0 means 1, 1 means -1). */
bn256 K_dash[1];
jpc Q[1], tmp[1], *dst;
int i;
int vk;
uint32_t k_is_even = bn256_is_even (K);
bn256_sub_uint (K_dash, K, k_is_even);
/* It keeps the condition: 1 <= K' <= N - 2, and K' is odd. */
/* Fill index. */
vk = get_vk (K_dash, 0);
for (i = 1; i < 64; i++)
{
int vk_next, is_zero;
vk_next = get_vk (K_dash, i);
is_zero = (vk_next == 0);
index[i-1] = (vk - 1) | (is_zero << 7);
vk = (is_zero ? vk : vk_next);
}
index[63] = vk - 1;
memset (Q->z, 0, sizeof (bn256)); /* infinity */
for (i = 31; i >= 0; i--)
{
FUNC(jpc_double) (Q, Q);
FUNC(jpc_add_ac_signed) (Q, Q, &precomputed_2E_KG[index[i+32]&0x0f],
index[i+32] >> 7);
FUNC(jpc_add_ac_signed) (Q, Q, &precomputed_KG[index[i]&0x0f],
index[i] >> 7);
}
dst = k_is_even ? Q : tmp;
FUNC(jpc_add_ac) (dst, Q, &precomputed_KG[0]);
return FUNC(jpc_to_ac) (X, Q);
}
/**
* check if P is on the curve.
*
* Return -1 on error.
* Return 0 on success.
*/
static int
point_is_on_the_curve (const ac *P)
{
bn256 s[1], t[1];
/* Elliptic curve: y^2 = x^3 + a*x + b */
MFNC(sqr) (s, P->x);
MFNC(mul) (s, s, P->x);
#ifndef COEFFICIENT_A_IS_ZERO
MFNC(mul) (t, coefficient_a, P->x);
MFNC(add) (s, s, t);
#endif
MFNC(add) (s, s, coefficient_b);
MFNC(sqr) (t, P->y);
if (bn256_cmp (s, t) == 0)
return 0;
else
return -1;
}
static int
get_vk_kP (const bn256 *K, int i)
{
uint32_t w;
uint8_t blk = i/32;
uint8_t pos = i%32;
uint8_t col = 3*(pos % 11) + (pos >= 11) + (pos >= 22);
uint8_t word_index = (blk * 3) + (pos / 11);
w = ((K->word[word_index] >> col) & 7);
if (word_index < 7 && (pos == 10 || pos == 21))
{
uint8_t mask;
uint8_t shift;
word_index++;
if (pos == 10)
{
shift = 2;
mask = 4;
}
else
{
shift = 1;
mask = 6;
}
w |= ((K->word[word_index] << shift) & mask);
}
return w;
}
/**
* @brief X = k * P
*
* @param K scalar k
* @param P P in affine coordiate
*
* Return -1 on error.
* Return 0 on success.
*
* For the curve (cofactor is 1 and n is prime), possible error cases are:
*
* P is not on the curve.
* P = G, k = n
* Something wrong in the code.
*
* Mathmatically, k=1 and P=O is another possible case, but O cannot be
* represented by affine coordinate.
*/
int
FUNC(compute_kP) (ac *X, const bn256 *K, const ac *P)
{
uint8_t index[86]; /* Lower 2-bit for index absolute value, msb is
for sign (encoded as: 0 means 1, 1 means -1). */
bn256 K_dash[1];
uint32_t k_is_even = bn256_is_even (K);
jpc Q[1], tmp[1], *dst;
int i;
int vk;
ac P3[1], P5[1], P7[1];
const ac *p_Pi[4];
if (point_is_on_the_curve (P) < 0)
return -1;
if (bn256_sub (K_dash, K, N) == 0) /* >= N, it's too big. */
return -1;
bn256_sub_uint (K_dash, K, k_is_even);
/* It keeps the condition: 1 <= K' <= N - 2, and K' is odd. */
p_Pi[0] = P;
p_Pi[1] = P3;
p_Pi[2] = P5;
p_Pi[3] = P7;
{
jpc Q1[1];
memcpy (Q->x, P->x, sizeof (bn256));
memcpy (Q->y, P->y, sizeof (bn256));
memset (Q->z, 0, sizeof (bn256));
Q->z->word[0] = 1;
FUNC(jpc_double) (Q, Q);
FUNC(jpc_add_ac) (Q1, Q, P);
if (FUNC(jpc_to_ac) (P3, Q1) < 0) /* Never occurs, except coding errors. */
return -1;
FUNC(jpc_double) (Q, Q);
FUNC(jpc_add_ac) (Q1, Q, P);
if (FUNC(jpc_to_ac) (P5, Q1) < 0) /* Never occurs, except coding errors. */
return -1;
memcpy (Q->x, P3->x, sizeof (bn256));
memcpy (Q->y, P3->y, sizeof (bn256));
memset (Q->z, 0, sizeof (bn256));
Q->z->word[0] = 1;
FUNC(jpc_double) (Q, Q);
FUNC(jpc_add_ac) (Q1, Q, P);
if (FUNC(jpc_to_ac) (P7, Q1) < 0) /* Never occurs, except coding errors. */
return -1;
}
/* Fill index. */
vk = get_vk_kP (K_dash, 0);
for (i = 1; i < 86; i++)
{
int vk_next, is_even;
vk_next = get_vk_kP (K_dash, i);
is_even = ((vk_next & 1) == 0);
index[i-1] = (is_even << 7) | ((is_even?7-vk:vk-1) >> 1);
vk = vk_next + is_even;
}
index[85] = ((vk - 1) >> 1);
memset (Q->z, 0, sizeof (bn256)); /* infinity */
for (i = 85; i >= 0; i--)
{
FUNC(jpc_double) (Q, Q);
FUNC(jpc_double) (Q, Q);
FUNC(jpc_double) (Q, Q);
FUNC(jpc_add_ac_signed) (Q, Q, p_Pi[index[i]&0x03], index[i] >> 7);
}
dst = k_is_even ? Q : tmp;
FUNC(jpc_add_ac) (dst, Q, P);
return FUNC(jpc_to_ac) (X, Q);
}
/**
* @brief Compute signature (r,s) of hash string z with secret key d
*/
void
FUNC(ecdsa) (bn256 *r, bn256 *s, const bn256 *z, const bn256 *d)
{
bn256 k[1];
ac KG[1];
bn512 tmp[1];
bn256 k_inv[1];
uint32_t carry;
#define borrow carry
#define tmp_k k_inv
do
{
do
{
bn256_random (k);
if (bn256_add_uint (k, k, 1))
continue;
if (bn256_sub (tmp_k, k, N) == 0) /* >= N, it's too big. */
continue;
/* 1 <= k <= N - 1 */
FUNC(compute_kG) (KG, k);
borrow = bn256_sub (r, KG->x, N);
if (borrow)
memcpy (r, KG->x, sizeof (bn256));
else
memcpy (KG->x, r, sizeof (bn256));
}
while (bn256_is_zero (r));
mod_inv (k_inv, k, N);
bn256_mul (tmp, r, d);
mod_reduce (s, tmp, N, MU_lower);
carry = bn256_add (s, s, z);
if (carry)
bn256_sub (s, s, N);
else
bn256_sub ((bn256 *)tmp, s, N);
bn256_mul (tmp, s, k_inv);
mod_reduce (s, tmp, N, MU_lower);
}
while (bn256_is_zero (s));
#undef tmp_k
#undef borrow
}
/**
* @brief Check if a secret d0 is valid or not
*
* @param D0 scalar D0: secret
* @param D1 scalar D1: secret candidate N-D0
*
* Return 0 on error.
* Return -1 when D1 should be used as the secret
* Return 1 when D0 should be used as the secret
*/
int
FUNC(check_secret) (const bn256 *d0, bn256 *d1)
{
ac Q0[1], Q1[1];
if (bn256_is_zero (d0) || bn256_sub (d1, N, d0) != 0)
/* == 0 or >= N, it's not valid. */
return 0;
FUNC(compute_kG) (Q0, d0);
FUNC(compute_kG) (Q1, d1);
/*
* Jivsov compliant key check
*/
return bn256_cmp (Q1[0].y, Q0[0].y);
}

View File

@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
#define CONCAT0(a,b) a##b
#define CONCAT1(a,b) CONCAT0(a,b)
#define CONCAT2(a,b,c) CONCAT1(a,b##c)
#define CONCAT3(a,b,c) CONCAT2(a,b,c)
#define FUNC(func) CONCAT1(func##_,FIELD)
#define MFNC(func) CONCAT3(mod,FIELD,_##func)

View File

@@ -1,763 +0,0 @@
/*
* flash.c -- Data Objects (DO) and GPG Key handling on Flash ROM
*
* Copyright (C) 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018
* Free Software Initiative of Japan
* Author: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
*
* This file is a part of Gnuk, a GnuPG USB Token implementation.
*
* Gnuk is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify it
* under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* Gnuk is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT
* ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
* or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public
* License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*
*/
/*
* We assume single DO size is less than 256.
*
* NOTE: "Card holder certificate" (which size is larger than 256) is
* not put into data pool, but is implemented by its own flash
* page(s).
*/
#include <stdint.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "config.h"
#include "sys.h"
#include "gnuk.h"
#include "pico/stdlib.h"
#include "hardware/flash.h"
#include "hsm2040.h"
#include "tusb.h"
extern void low_flash_available();
/*
* Flash memory map
*
* _text
* .text
* .ctors
* .dtors
* _etext
* .data
* _bss_start
* .bss
* _end
* <alignment to page>
* ch_certificate_startp
* <2048 bytes>
* _keystore_pool
* Three flash pages for keystore
* a page contains a key data of:
* For RSA-2048: 512-byte (p, q and N)
* For RSA-4096: 1024-byte (p, q and N)
* For ECDSA/ECDH and EdDSA, there are padding after public key
* _data_pool
* <two pages>
*/
#define FLASH_DATA_POOL_HEADER_SIZE 2
#define FLASH_DATA_POOL_SIZE (2048*1024)
static uint16_t flash_page_size;
static const uint8_t *data_pool;
static uint8_t *last_p;
/* The first halfword is generation for the data page (little endian) */
const uint8_t flash_data[4] __attribute__ ((section (".gnuk_data"))) = {
0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0xff
};
#define FLASH_TARGET_OFFSET (PICO_FLASH_SIZE_BYTES >> 1) // DATA starts at the mid of flash
const uint8_t *flash_addr_key_storage_start = (const uint8_t *) (XIP_BASE + FLASH_TARGET_OFFSET);
const uint8_t *flash_addr_data_storage_start = (const uint8_t *) (XIP_BASE + FLASH_TARGET_OFFSET + 2048 * 1024); // 2 MB
const uint8_t *ch_certificate_start = (const uint8_t *) (XIP_BASE + FLASH_TARGET_OFFSET - FLASH_SECTOR_SIZE);
#define FLASH_ADDR_KEY_STORAGE_START flash_addr_key_storage_start
#define FLASH_ADDR_DATA_STORAGE_START flash_addr_data_storage_start
extern int flash_erase_page (uintptr_t addr);
extern int flash_program_halfword (uintptr_t addr, uint16_t data);
extern int flash_check_blank (const uint8_t *p_start, size_t size);
extern int flash_write (uintptr_t dst_addr, const uint8_t *src, size_t len);
static int key_available_at (const uint8_t *k, int key_size)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < key_size; i++)
if (k[i])
break;
if (i == key_size) /* It's ZERO. Released key. */
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < key_size; i++)
if (k[i] != 0xff)
break;
if (i == key_size) /* It's FULL. Unused key. */
return 0;
return 1;
}
void
flash_do_storage_init (const uint8_t **p_do_start, const uint8_t **p_do_end)
{
uint16_t gen0, gen1;
uint16_t *gen0_p = (uint16_t *)FLASH_ADDR_DATA_STORAGE_START;
uint16_t *gen1_p;
flash_page_size = FLASH_SECTOR_SIZE * 8; // 32 KB
gen1_p = (uint16_t *)(FLASH_ADDR_DATA_STORAGE_START + flash_page_size);
data_pool = FLASH_ADDR_DATA_STORAGE_START;
/* Check data pool generation and choose the page */
gen0 = *gen0_p;
gen1 = *gen1_p;
if (gen0 == 0xffff && gen1 == 0xffff)
{
gen0 = 0x0000;
*gen0_p = gen0;
}
if (gen0 == 0xffff)
/* Use another page if a page is erased. */
data_pool = FLASH_ADDR_DATA_STORAGE_START + flash_page_size;
else if (gen1 == 0xffff)
/* Or use different page if another page is erased. */
data_pool = FLASH_ADDR_DATA_STORAGE_START;
else if ((gen0 == 0xfffe && gen1 == 0) || gen1 > gen0)
/* When both pages have valid header, use newer page. */
data_pool = FLASH_ADDR_DATA_STORAGE_START + flash_page_size;
*p_do_start = data_pool + FLASH_DATA_POOL_HEADER_SIZE;
*p_do_end = data_pool + flash_page_size;
}
static uint8_t *flash_key_getpage (enum kind_of_key kk);
void
flash_terminate (void)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
flash_erase_page ((uintptr_t)flash_key_getpage (i));
flash_erase_page ((uintptr_t)FLASH_ADDR_DATA_STORAGE_START);
flash_erase_page ((uintptr_t)(FLASH_ADDR_DATA_STORAGE_START + flash_page_size));
data_pool = FLASH_ADDR_DATA_STORAGE_START;
last_p = (uint8_t *)FLASH_ADDR_DATA_STORAGE_START + FLASH_DATA_POOL_HEADER_SIZE;
#if defined(CERTDO_SUPPORT)
flash_erase_page ((uintptr_t)ch_certificate_start);
if (FLASH_CH_CERTIFICATE_SIZE > flash_page_size)
flash_erase_page ((uintptr_t)(ch_certificate_start + flash_page_size));
#endif
}
void
flash_activate (void)
{
flash_program_halfword ((uintptr_t)FLASH_ADDR_DATA_STORAGE_START, 0);
low_flash_available();
}
void
flash_key_storage_init (void)
{
const uint8_t *p;
int i;
/* For each key, find its address. */
p = FLASH_ADDR_KEY_STORAGE_START;
for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
{
const uint8_t *k;
int key_size = gpg_get_algo_attr_key_size (i, GPG_KEY_STORAGE);
kd[i].pubkey = NULL;
for (k = p; k < p + flash_page_size; k += key_size)
if (key_available_at (k, key_size))
{
int prv_len = gpg_get_algo_attr_key_size (i, GPG_KEY_PRIVATE);
kd[i].pubkey = k + prv_len;
break;
}
p += flash_page_size;
}
}
/*
* Flash data pool managenent
*
* Flash data pool consists of two parts:
* 2-byte header
* contents
*
* Flash data pool objects:
* Data Object (DO) (of smart card)
* Internal objects:
* NONE (0x0000)
* 123-counter
* 14-bit counter
* bool object
* small enum
*
* Format of a Data Object:
* NR: 8-bit tag_number
* LEN: 8-bit length
* DATA: data * LEN
* PAD: optional byte for 16-bit alignment
*/
void
flash_set_data_pool_last (const uint8_t *p)
{
last_p = (uint8_t *)p;
}
/*
* We use two pages
*/
static int
flash_copying_gc (void)
{
uint8_t *src, *dst;
uint16_t generation;
if (data_pool == FLASH_ADDR_DATA_STORAGE_START)
{
src = (uint8_t *)FLASH_ADDR_DATA_STORAGE_START;
dst = (uint8_t *)FLASH_ADDR_DATA_STORAGE_START + flash_page_size;
}
else
{
src = (uint8_t *)FLASH_ADDR_DATA_STORAGE_START + flash_page_size;
dst = (uint8_t *)FLASH_ADDR_DATA_STORAGE_START;
}
generation = *(uint16_t *)src;
data_pool = dst;
gpg_data_copy (data_pool + FLASH_DATA_POOL_HEADER_SIZE);
if (generation == 0xfffe)
generation = 0;
else
generation++;
flash_program_halfword ((uintptr_t)dst, generation);
flash_erase_page ((uintptr_t)src);
low_flash_available();
return 0;
}
static int
is_data_pool_full (size_t size)
{
return last_p + size > data_pool + flash_page_size;
}
static uint8_t *
flash_data_pool_allocate (size_t size)
{
uint8_t *p;
size = (size + 1) & ~1; /* allocation unit is 1-halfword (2-byte) */
if (is_data_pool_full (size))
if (flash_copying_gc () < 0 || /*still*/ is_data_pool_full (size))
TU_LOG1 ("!!!! FATAL: %d\r\n",FATAL_FLASH);
p = last_p;
last_p += size;
return p;
}
void
flash_do_write_internal (const uint8_t *p, int nr, const uint8_t *data, int len)
{
uint16_t hw;
uintptr_t addr;
int i;
addr = (uintptr_t)p;
hw = nr | (len << 8);
if (flash_program_halfword (addr, hw) != 0)
flash_warning ("DO WRITE ERROR");
addr += 2;
for (i = 0; i < len/2; i++)
{
hw = data[i*2] | (data[i*2+1]<<8);
if (flash_program_halfword (addr, hw) != 0)
flash_warning ("DO WRITE ERROR");
addr += 2;
}
if ((len & 1))
{
hw = data[i*2] | 0xff00;
if (flash_program_halfword (addr, hw) != 0)
flash_warning ("DO WRITE ERROR");
}
low_flash_available();
}
const uint8_t *
flash_do_write (uint8_t nr, const uint8_t *data, int len)
{
const uint8_t *p;
DEBUG_INFO ("flash DO\r\n");
p = flash_data_pool_allocate (2 + len);
if (p == NULL)
{
DEBUG_INFO ("flash data pool allocation failure.\r\n");
return NULL;
}
flash_do_write_internal (p, nr, data, len);
DEBUG_INFO ("flash DO...done\r\n");
return p + 1;
}
void
flash_warning (const char *msg)
{
(void)msg;
DEBUG_INFO ("FLASH: ");
DEBUG_INFO (msg);
DEBUG_INFO ("\r\n");
}
void
flash_do_release (const uint8_t *do_data)
{
uintptr_t addr = (uintptr_t)do_data - 1;
uintptr_t addr_tag = addr;
int i;
int len = do_data[0];
/* Don't filling zero for data in code (such as ds_count_initial_value) */
if (do_data < FLASH_ADDR_DATA_STORAGE_START
|| do_data > FLASH_ADDR_DATA_STORAGE_START + FLASH_DATA_POOL_SIZE)
return;
addr += 2;
/* Fill zero for content and pad */
for (i = 0; i < len/2; i ++)
{
if (flash_program_halfword (addr, 0) != 0)
flash_warning ("fill-zero failure");
addr += 2;
}
if ((len & 1))
{
if (flash_program_halfword (addr, 0) != 0)
flash_warning ("fill-zero pad failure");
}
/* Fill 0x0000 for "tag_number and length" word */
if (flash_program_halfword (addr_tag, 0) != 0)
flash_warning ("fill-zero tag_nr failure");
//CAUTION: flash_do_release is followed by a flash_write. Thus, we can avoid a single write
//low_flash_available();
}
static uint8_t *
flash_key_getpage (enum kind_of_key kk)
{
/* There is a page for each KK. */
return (uint8_t *)FLASH_ADDR_KEY_STORAGE_START + (flash_page_size * kk);
}
uint8_t *
flash_key_alloc (enum kind_of_key kk)
{
uint8_t *k, *k0 = flash_key_getpage (kk);
int i;
int key_size = gpg_get_algo_attr_key_size (kk, GPG_KEY_STORAGE);
/* Seek free space in the page. */
for (k = k0; k < k0 + flash_page_size; k += key_size)
{
const uint32_t *p = (const uint32_t *)k;
for (i = 0; i < key_size/4; i++)
if (p[i] != 0xffffffff)
break;
if (i == key_size/4) /* Yes, it's empty. */
return k;
}
/* Should not happen as we have enough free space all time, but just
in case. */
return NULL;
}
int
flash_key_write (uint8_t *key_addr,
const uint8_t *key_data, int key_data_len,
const uint8_t *pubkey, int pubkey_len)
{
uint16_t hw;
uintptr_t addr;
int i;
addr = (uintptr_t)key_addr;
for (i = 0; i < key_data_len/2; i ++)
{
hw = key_data[i*2] | (key_data[i*2+1]<<8);
if (flash_program_halfword (addr, hw) != 0)
return -1;
addr += 2;
}
for (i = 0; i < pubkey_len/2; i ++)
{
hw = pubkey[i*2] | (pubkey[i*2+1]<<8);
if (flash_program_halfword (addr, hw) != 0)
return -1;
addr += 2;
}
low_flash_available();
return 0;
}
static int
flash_check_all_other_keys_released (const uint8_t *key_addr, int key_size)
{
uintptr_t start = (uintptr_t)key_addr & ~(flash_page_size - 1);
const uint32_t *p = (const uint32_t *)start;
while (p < (const uint32_t *)(start + flash_page_size))
if (p == (const uint32_t *)key_addr)
p += key_size/4;
else
if (*p)
return 0;
else
p++;
return 1;
}
static void
flash_key_fill_zero_as_released (uint8_t *key_addr, int key_size)
{
int i;
uintptr_t addr = (uintptr_t)key_addr;
for (i = 0; i < key_size/2; i++)
flash_program_halfword (addr + i*2, 0);
low_flash_available();
}
void
flash_key_release (uint8_t *key_addr, int key_size)
{
if (flash_check_all_other_keys_released (key_addr, key_size))
flash_erase_page (((uintptr_t)key_addr & ~(flash_page_size - 1)));
else
flash_key_fill_zero_as_released (key_addr, key_size);
}
void
flash_key_release_page (enum kind_of_key kk)
{
flash_erase_page ((uintptr_t)flash_key_getpage (kk));
}
void
flash_clear_halfword (uintptr_t addr)
{
flash_program_halfword (addr, 0);
low_flash_available();
}
void
flash_put_data_internal (const uint8_t *p, uint16_t hw)
{
flash_program_halfword ((uintptr_t)p, hw);
low_flash_available();
}
void
flash_put_data (uint16_t hw)
{
uint8_t *p;
p = flash_data_pool_allocate (2);
if (p == NULL)
{
DEBUG_INFO ("data allocation failure.\r\n");
}
flash_program_halfword ((uintptr_t)p, hw);
low_flash_available();
}
void
flash_bool_clear (const uint8_t **addr_p)
{
const uint8_t *p;
if ((p = *addr_p) == NULL)
return;
flash_program_halfword ((uintptr_t)p, 0);
*addr_p = NULL;
low_flash_available();
}
void
flash_bool_write_internal (const uint8_t *p, int nr)
{
flash_program_halfword ((uintptr_t)p, nr);
low_flash_available();
}
const uint8_t *
flash_bool_write (uint8_t nr)
{
uint8_t *p;
uint16_t hw = nr;
p = flash_data_pool_allocate (2);
if (p == NULL)
{
DEBUG_INFO ("bool allocation failure.\r\n");
return NULL;
}
flash_program_halfword ((uintptr_t)p, hw);
low_flash_available();
return p;
}
void
flash_enum_clear (const uint8_t **addr_p)
{
flash_bool_clear (addr_p);
}
void
flash_enum_write_internal (const uint8_t *p, int nr, uint8_t v)
{
uint16_t hw = nr | (v << 8);
flash_program_halfword ((uintptr_t)p, hw);
low_flash_available();
}
const uint8_t *
flash_enum_write (uint8_t nr, uint8_t v)
{
uint8_t *p;
uint16_t hw = nr | (v << 8);
p = flash_data_pool_allocate (2);
if (p == NULL)
{
DEBUG_INFO ("enum allocation failure.\r\n");
return NULL;
}
flash_program_halfword ((uintptr_t)p, hw);
low_flash_available();
return p;
}
int
flash_cnt123_get_value (const uint8_t *p)
{
if (p == NULL)
return 0;
else
{
uint8_t v = *p;
/*
* After erase, a halfword in flash memory becomes 0xffff.
* The halfword can be programmed to any value.
* Then, the halfword can be programmed to zero.
*
* Thus, we can represent value 1, 2, and 3.
*/
if (v == 0xff)
return 1;
else if (v == 0x00)
return 3;
else
return 2;
}
}
void
flash_cnt123_write_internal (const uint8_t *p, int which, int v)
{
uint16_t hw;
hw = NR_COUNTER_123 | (which << 8);
flash_program_halfword ((uintptr_t)p, hw);
if (v == 1)
return;
else if (v == 2)
flash_program_halfword ((uintptr_t)p+2, 0xc3c3);
else /* v == 3 */
flash_program_halfword ((uintptr_t)p+2, 0);
low_flash_available();
}
void
flash_cnt123_increment (uint8_t which, const uint8_t **addr_p)
{
const uint8_t *p;
uint16_t hw;
if ((p = *addr_p) == NULL)
{
p = flash_data_pool_allocate (4);
if (p == NULL)
{
DEBUG_INFO ("cnt123 allocation failure.\r\n");
return;
}
hw = NR_COUNTER_123 | (which << 8);
flash_program_halfword ((uintptr_t)p, hw);
*addr_p = p + 2;
}
else
{
uint8_t v = *p;
if (v == 0)
return;
if (v == 0xff)
hw = 0xc3c3;
else
hw = 0;
flash_program_halfword ((uintptr_t)p, hw);
}
low_flash_available();
}
void
flash_cnt123_clear (const uint8_t **addr_p)
{
const uint8_t *p;
if ((p = *addr_p) == NULL)
return;
flash_program_halfword ((uintptr_t)p, 0);
p -= 2;
flash_program_halfword ((uintptr_t)p, 0);
*addr_p = NULL;
low_flash_available();
}
#if defined(CERTDO_SUPPORT)
int
flash_erase_binary (uint8_t file_id)
{
if (file_id == FILEID_CH_CERTIFICATE)
{
const uint8_t *p = ch_certificate_start;
if (flash_check_blank (p, FLASH_CH_CERTIFICATE_SIZE) == 0)
{
flash_erase_page ((uintptr_t)p);
if (FLASH_CH_CERTIFICATE_SIZE > flash_page_size)
flash_erase_page ((uintptr_t)p + flash_page_size);
}
low_flash_available();
return 0;
}
return -1;
}
#endif
int
flash_write_binary (uint8_t file_id, const uint8_t *data,
uint16_t len, uint16_t offset)
{
uint16_t maxsize;
const uint8_t *p;
if (file_id == FILEID_SERIAL_NO)
{
maxsize = 6;
p = &openpgpcard_aid[8];
}
#if defined(CERTDO_SUPPORT)
else if (file_id == FILEID_CH_CERTIFICATE)
{
maxsize = FLASH_CH_CERTIFICATE_SIZE;
p = ch_certificate_start;
}
#endif
else
return -1;
if (offset + len > maxsize || (offset&1) || (len&1))
return -1;
else
{
uint16_t hw;
uintptr_t addr;
int i;
if (flash_check_blank (p + offset, len) == 0)
return -1;
addr = (uintptr_t)p + offset;
for (i = 0; i < len/2; i++)
{
hw = data[i*2] | (data[i*2+1]<<8);
if (flash_program_halfword (addr, hw) != 0)
flash_warning ("DO WRITE ERROR");
addr += 2;
}
low_flash_available();
return 0;
}
}

View File

@@ -1,465 +0,0 @@
#ifndef _GNUK_H_
#define _GNUK_H_
#include "config.h"
/*
* Application layer <-> CCID layer data structure
*/
#define CARD_CHANGE_INSERT 0
#define CARD_CHANGE_REMOVE 1
#define CARD_CHANGE_TOGGLE 2
void ccid_card_change_signal (int how);
/* CCID thread */
#define EV_CARD_CHANGE 1
#define EV_TX_FINISHED 2 /* CCID Tx finished */
#define EV_EXEC_ACK_REQUIRED 4 /* OpenPGPcard Execution ACK required */
#define EV_EXEC_FINISHED 8 /* OpenPGPcard Execution finished */
#define EV_RX_DATA_READY 16 /* USB Rx data available */
/* OpenPGPcard thread */
#define EV_MODIFY_CMD_AVAILABLE 1
#define EV_VERIFY_CMD_AVAILABLE 2
#define EV_CMD_AVAILABLE 4
#define EV_EXIT 8
#define EV_PINPAD_INPUT_DONE 16
/* Maximum cmd apdu data is key import 24+4+256+256 (proc_key_import) */
#define MAX_CMD_APDU_DATA_SIZE (24+4+256+256) /* without header */
/* Maximum res apdu data is public key 5+9+512 (gpg_do_public_key) */
#define MAX_RES_APDU_DATA_SIZE (5+9+512) /* without trailer */
#define CCID_MSG_HEADER_SIZE 10
/* USB buffer size of LL (Low-level): size of single Bulk transaction */
#define USB_LL_BUF_SIZE 64
enum ccid_state {
CCID_STATE_NOCARD, /* No card available */
CCID_STATE_START, /* Initial */
CCID_STATE_WAIT, /* Waiting APDU */
CCID_STATE_EXECUTE, /* Executing command */
CCID_STATE_ACK_REQUIRED_0, /* Ack required (executing)*/
CCID_STATE_ACK_REQUIRED_1, /* Waiting user's ACK (execution finished) */
CCID_STATE_EXITED, /* CCID Thread Terminated */
CCID_STATE_EXEC_REQUESTED, /* Exec requested */
};
enum ccid_state ccid_get_ccid_state (void);
extern volatile uint8_t auth_status;
#define AC_NONE_AUTHORIZED 0x00
#define AC_PSO_CDS_AUTHORIZED 0x01 /* PW1 with 0x81 verified */
#define AC_OTHER_AUTHORIZED 0x02 /* PW1 with 0x82 verified */
#define AC_ADMIN_AUTHORIZED 0x04 /* PW3 verified */
#define AC_NEVER 0x80
#define AC_ALWAYS 0xFF
#define PW_ERR_PW1 0
#define PW_ERR_RC 1
#define PW_ERR_PW3 2
int gpg_pw_get_retry_counter (int who);
int gpg_pw_locked (uint8_t which);
void gpg_pw_reset_err_counter (uint8_t which);
void gpg_pw_increment_err_counter (uint8_t which);
int ac_check_status (uint8_t ac_flag);
int verify_pso_cds (const uint8_t *pw, int pw_len);
int verify_other (const uint8_t *pw, int pw_len);
int verify_user_0 (uint8_t access, const uint8_t *pw, int buf_len,
int pw_len_known, const uint8_t *ks_pw1, int saveks);
int verify_admin (const uint8_t *pw, int pw_len);
int verify_admin_0 (const uint8_t *pw, int buf_len, int pw_len_known,
const uint8_t *ks_pw3, int saveks);
void ac_reset_pso_cds (void);
void ac_reset_other (void);
void ac_reset_admin (void);
void ac_fini (void);
extern uint8_t file_selection;
extern const uint8_t historical_bytes[];
extern uint16_t data_objects_number_of_bytes;
#define CHALLENGE_LEN 32
void gpg_data_scan (const uint8_t *start, const uint8_t *end);
void gpg_data_copy (const uint8_t *p);
void gpg_do_terminate (void);
void gpg_do_get_data (uint16_t tag, int with_tag);
void gpg_do_put_data (uint16_t tag, const uint8_t *data, int len);
void gpg_do_public_key (uint8_t kk_byte);
void gpg_do_keygen (uint8_t *buf);
const uint8_t *gpg_get_firmware_update_key (uint8_t keyno);
/* Constants: algo+size */
#define ALGO_RSA4K 0
/* #define ALGO_NISTP256R1 1 */
#define ALGO_SECP256K1 2
#define ALGO_ED25519 3
#define ALGO_CURVE25519 4
#define ALGO_X448 5
#define ALGO_ED448 6
#define ALGO_RSA2K 255
enum kind_of_key {
GPG_KEY_FOR_SIGNING = 0,
GPG_KEY_FOR_DECRYPTION = 1,
GPG_KEY_FOR_AUTHENTICATION = 2,
};
enum size_of_key {
GPG_KEY_STORAGE = 0, /* PUBKEY + PRVKEY rounded to 2^N */
GPG_KEY_PUBLIC,
GPG_KEY_PRIVATE,
};
int gpg_get_algo_attr (enum kind_of_key kk);
int gpg_get_algo_attr_key_size (enum kind_of_key kk, enum size_of_key s);
void flash_do_storage_init (const uint8_t **, const uint8_t **);
void flash_terminate (void);
void flash_activate (void);
void flash_key_storage_init (void);
void flash_do_release (const uint8_t *);
const uint8_t *flash_do_write (uint8_t nr, const uint8_t *data, int len);
uint8_t *flash_key_alloc (enum kind_of_key);
void flash_key_release (uint8_t *, int);
void flash_key_release_page (enum kind_of_key);
int flash_key_write (uint8_t *key_addr,
const uint8_t *key_data, int key_data_len,
const uint8_t *pubkey, int pubkey_len);
void flash_set_data_pool_last (const uint8_t *p);
void flash_clear_halfword (uintptr_t addr);
void flash_increment_counter (uint8_t counter_tag_nr);
void flash_reset_counter (uint8_t counter_tag_nr);
#define FILEID_SERIAL_NO 0
#define FILEID_UPDATE_KEY_0 1
#define FILEID_UPDATE_KEY_1 2
#define FILEID_UPDATE_KEY_2 3
#define FILEID_UPDATE_KEY_3 4
#define FILEID_CH_CERTIFICATE 5
int flash_erase_binary (uint8_t file_id);
int flash_write_binary (uint8_t file_id, const uint8_t *data,
uint16_t len, uint16_t offset);
#define FLASH_CH_CERTIFICATE_SIZE 2048
extern const uint8_t *ch_certificate_start;
#define FIRMWARE_UPDATE_KEY_CONTENT_LEN 256 /* RSA-2048 (p and q) */
#define INITIAL_VECTOR_SIZE 16
#define DATA_ENCRYPTION_KEY_SIZE 16
#define MAX_PRVKEY_LEN 512 /* Maximum is the case for RSA 4096-bit. */
struct key_data {
const uint8_t *pubkey; /* Pointer to public key */
uint8_t data[MAX_PRVKEY_LEN]; /* decrypted private key data content */
};
struct prvkey_data {
/*
* IV: Initial Vector
*/
uint8_t iv[INITIAL_VECTOR_SIZE];
/*
* Checksum
*/
uint8_t checksum_encrypted[DATA_ENCRYPTION_KEY_SIZE];
/*
* DEK (Data Encryption Key) encrypted
*/
uint8_t dek_encrypted_1[DATA_ENCRYPTION_KEY_SIZE]; /* For user */
uint8_t dek_encrypted_2[DATA_ENCRYPTION_KEY_SIZE]; /* For resetcode */
uint8_t dek_encrypted_3[DATA_ENCRYPTION_KEY_SIZE]; /* For admin */
};
#define BY_USER 1
#define BY_RESETCODE 2
#define BY_ADMIN 3
/*
* Maximum length of pass phrase is 127.
* We use the top bit (0x80) to encode if keystring is available within DO.
*/
#define PW_LEN_MAX 127
#define PW_LEN_MASK 0x7f
#define PW_LEN_KEYSTRING_BIT 0x80
#define SALT_SIZE 8
void s2k (const unsigned char *salt, size_t slen,
const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char output[32]);
#define KEYSTRING_PASSLEN_SIZE 1
#define KEYSTRING_SALT_SIZE SALT_SIZE
#define KEYSTRING_MD_SIZE 32
#define KEYSTRING_SIZE (KEYSTRING_PASSLEN_SIZE + KEYSTRING_SALT_SIZE \
+ KEYSTRING_MD_SIZE)
#define KS_META_SIZE (KEYSTRING_PASSLEN_SIZE + KEYSTRING_SALT_SIZE)
#define KS_GET_SALT(ks) (ks + KEYSTRING_PASSLEN_SIZE)
#define KS_GET_KEYSTRING(ks) (ks + KS_META_SIZE)
void gpg_do_clear_prvkey (enum kind_of_key kk);
int gpg_do_load_prvkey (enum kind_of_key kk, int who, const uint8_t *keystring);
int gpg_do_chks_prvkey (enum kind_of_key kk,
int who_old, const uint8_t *old_ks,
int who_new, const uint8_t *new_ks);
int gpg_change_keystring (int who_old, const uint8_t *old_ks,
int who_new, const uint8_t *new_ks);
extern struct key_data kd[3];
int rsa_sign (const uint8_t *, uint8_t *, int, struct key_data *, int);
int modulus_calc (const uint8_t *, int, uint8_t *);
int rsa_decrypt (const uint8_t *, uint8_t *, int, struct key_data *,
unsigned int *);
int rsa_verify (const uint8_t *, int, const uint8_t *, const uint8_t *);
int rsa_genkey (int, uint8_t *, uint8_t *);
int ecdsa_sign_p256k1 (const uint8_t *hash, uint8_t *output,
const uint8_t *key_data);
int ecc_compute_public_p256k1 (const uint8_t *key_data, uint8_t *);
int ecc_check_secret_p256k1 (const uint8_t *d0, uint8_t *d1);
int ecdh_decrypt_p256k1 (const uint8_t *input, uint8_t *output,
const uint8_t *key_data);
int eddsa_sign_25519 (const uint8_t *input, size_t ilen, uint32_t *output,
const uint8_t *sk_a, const uint8_t *seed,
const uint8_t *pk);
void eddsa_compute_public_25519 (const uint8_t *a, uint8_t *);
void ecdh_compute_public_25519 (const uint8_t *a, uint8_t *);
int ecdh_decrypt_curve25519 (const uint8_t *input, uint8_t *output,
const uint8_t *key_data);
void ecdh_compute_public_x448 (uint8_t *pubkey, const uint8_t *key_data);
int ecdh_decrypt_x448 (uint8_t *output, const uint8_t *input,
const uint8_t *key_data);
int ed448_sign (uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *input, unsigned int ilen,
const uint8_t *a_in, const uint8_t *seed, const uint8_t *pk);
void ed448_compute_public (uint8_t *pk, const uint8_t *a_in);
const uint8_t *gpg_do_read_simple (uint8_t);
void gpg_do_write_simple (uint8_t, const uint8_t *, int);
void gpg_increment_digital_signature_counter (void);
void gpg_do_get_initial_pw_setting (int is_pw3, int *r_len,
const uint8_t **r_p);
int gpg_do_kdf_check (int len, int how_many);
int gpg_do_get_uif (enum kind_of_key kk);
void fatal (uint8_t code) __attribute__ ((noreturn));
#define FATAL_FLASH 1
#define FATAL_RANDOM 2
#define FATAL_HEAP 3
extern uint8_t keystring_md_pw3[KEYSTRING_MD_SIZE];
extern uint8_t admin_authorized;
/*** Flash memory tag values ***/
/* Data objects */
/*
* Representation of data object:
*
* <-1 halfword-> <--len/2 halfwords->
* <-tag-><-len-> <---data content--->
*/
#define NR_DO_SEX 0x00
#define NR_DO_FP_SIG 0x01
#define NR_DO_FP_DEC 0x02
#define NR_DO_FP_AUT 0x03
#define NR_DO_CAFP_1 0x04
#define NR_DO_CAFP_2 0x05
#define NR_DO_CAFP_3 0x06
#define NR_DO_KGTIME_SIG 0x07
#define NR_DO_KGTIME_DEC 0x08
#define NR_DO_KGTIME_AUT 0x09
#define NR_DO_LOGIN_DATA 0x0a
#define NR_DO_URL 0x0b
#define NR_DO_NAME 0x0c
#define NR_DO_LANGUAGE 0x0d
#define NR_DO_PRVKEY_SIG 0x0e
#define NR_DO_PRVKEY_DEC 0x0f
#define NR_DO_PRVKEY_AUT 0x10
#define NR_DO_KEYSTRING_PW1 0x11
#define NR_DO_KEYSTRING_RC 0x12
#define NR_DO_KEYSTRING_PW3 0x13
#define NR_DO_KDF 0x14
#define NR_DO__LAST__ 21 /* == 0x15 */
/* 14-bit counter for DS: Recorded in flash memory by 1-halfword (2-byte). */
/*
* Representation of 14-bit counter:
* 0: 0x8000
* 1: 0x8001
* ...
* 16383: 0xbfff
*/
#define NR_COUNTER_DS 0x80 /* ..0xbf */
/* 10-bit counter for DS: Recorded in flash memory by 1-halfword (2-byte). */
/*
* Representation of 10-bit counter:
* 0: 0xc000
* 1: 0xc001
* ...
* 1023: 0xc3ff
*/
#define NR_COUNTER_DS_LSB 0xc0 /* ..0xc3 */
/*
* Boolean object, small enum, or 8-bit integer:
* Recorded in flash memory by 1-halfword (2-byte)
*/
/*
* Representation of Boolean object:
* 0: No record in flash memory
* 1: 0xf000
*/
#define NR_BOOL_PW1_LIFETIME 0xf0
/*
* Representation of algorithm attribute object:
* RSA-2048: No record in flash memory
* RSA-4096: 0xf?00
* ECC p256r1: 0xf?01
* ECC p256k1: 0xf?02
* ECC Ed25519: 0xf?03
* ECC Curve25519: 0xf?04
* where <?> == 1 (signature), 2 (decryption) or 3 (authentication)
*/
#define NR_KEY_ALGO_ATTR_SIG 0xf1
#define NR_KEY_ALGO_ATTR_DEC 0xf2
#define NR_KEY_ALGO_ATTR_AUT 0xf3
/*
* Representation of User Interaction Flag:
* 0 (UIF disabled): 0xf?00 or No record in flash memory
* 1 (UIF enabled): 0xf?01
* 2 (UIF permanently enabled): 0xf?02
*
*/
#define NR_DO_UIF_SIG 0xf6
#define NR_DO_UIF_DEC 0xf7
#define NR_DO_UIF_AUT 0xf8
/*
* NR_UINT_SOMETHING could be here... Use 0xf[459abcd]
*/
/* 123-counters: Recorded in flash memory by 2-halfword (4-byte). */
/*
* Representation of 123-counters:
* 0: No record in flash memory
* 1: 0xfe?? 0xffff
* 2: 0xfe?? 0xc3c3
* 3: 0xfe?? 0x0000
* where <counter_id> is placed at second byte <??>
*/
#define NR_COUNTER_123 0xfe
#define NR_EMPTY 0xff
#define SIZE_PW_STATUS_BYTES 7
#define NUM_ALL_PRV_KEYS 3 /* SIG, DEC and AUT */
#if !defined(OPENPGP_CARD_INITIAL_PW1)
#define OPENPGP_CARD_INITIAL_PW1 "123456"
#endif
#if !defined(OPENPGP_CARD_INITIAL_PW3)
#define OPENPGP_CARD_INITIAL_PW3 "12345678"
#endif
extern const uint8_t openpgpcard_aid[];
void flash_bool_clear (const uint8_t **addr_p);
const uint8_t *flash_bool_write (uint8_t nr);
void flash_enum_clear (const uint8_t **addr_p);
const uint8_t *flash_enum_write (uint8_t nr, uint8_t v);
int flash_cnt123_get_value (const uint8_t *p);
void flash_cnt123_increment (uint8_t which, const uint8_t **addr_p);
void flash_cnt123_clear (const uint8_t **addr_p);
void flash_put_data (uint16_t hw);
void flash_warning (const char *msg);
void flash_put_data_internal (const uint8_t *p, uint16_t hw);
void flash_bool_write_internal (const uint8_t *p, int nr);
void flash_enum_write_internal (const uint8_t *p, int nr, uint8_t v);
void flash_cnt123_write_internal (const uint8_t *p, int which, int v);
void flash_do_write_internal (const uint8_t *p, int nr,
const uint8_t *data, int len);
extern const uint8_t gnuk_string_serial[];
#define LED_ONESHOT 1
#define LED_TWOSHOTS 2
#define LED_SHOW_STATUS 4
#define LED_FATAL 8
#define LED_SYNC 16
#define LED_GNUK_EXEC 32
#define LED_START_COMMAND 64
#define LED_FINISH_COMMAND 128
#define LED_WAIT_FOR_BUTTON 256
#define LED_OFF LED_FINISH_COMMAND
void led_blink (int spec);
#if defined(PINPAD_SUPPORT)
# if defined(PINPAD_CIR_SUPPORT)
void cir_init (void);
# elif defined(PINPAD_DIAL_SUPPORT)
void dial_sw_disable (void);
void dial_sw_enable (void);
# elif defined(PINPAD_DND_SUPPORT)
void msc_init (void);
void msc_media_insert_change (int available);
int msc_scsi_write (uint32_t lba, const uint8_t *buf, size_t size);
int msc_scsi_read (uint32_t lba, const uint8_t **sector_p);
void msc_scsi_stop (uint8_t code);
# endif
#define PIN_INPUT_CURRENT 1
#define PIN_INPUT_NEW 2
#define PIN_INPUT_CONFIRM 3
#define MAX_PIN_CHARS 32
extern uint8_t pin_input_buffer[MAX_PIN_CHARS];
extern uint8_t pin_input_len;
int pinpad_getline (int msg_code, uint32_t timeout_usec);
#endif
extern uint8_t _regnual_start, __heap_end__[];
uint8_t * sram_address (uint32_t offset);
static inline const uint8_t *
unique_device_id (void)
{
/*
* STM32F103 has 96-bit unique device identifier.
* This routine mimics that.
*/
static const uint8_t id[] = { /* My RSA fingerprint */
0x12, 0x41, 0x24, 0xBD, 0x3B, 0x48, 0x62, 0xAF,
0x7A, 0x0A, 0x42, 0xF1, 0x00, 0xB4, 0x5E, 0xBD,
0x4C, 0xA7, 0xBA, 0xBE
};
return id;
}
#endif

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@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
/**
* @brief Jacobian projective coordinates
*/
typedef struct
{
bn256 x[1];
bn256 y[1];
bn256 z[1];
} jpc;
void jpc_double_p256k1 (jpc *X, const jpc *A);
void jpc_add_ac_p256k1 (jpc *X, const jpc *A, const ac *B);
void jpc_add_ac_signed_p256k1 (jpc *X, const jpc *A, const ac *B, int minus);
int jpc_to_ac_p256k1 (ac *X, const jpc *A);

View File

@@ -1,199 +0,0 @@
/*
* jpc.c -- arithmetic on Jacobian projective coordinates.
*
* Copyright (C) 2011, 2013 Free Software Initiative of Japan
* Author: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
*
* This file is a part of Gnuk, a GnuPG USB Token implementation.
*
* Gnuk is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify it
* under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* Gnuk is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT
* ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
* or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public
* License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*
*/
#include "field-group-select.h"
/**
* @brief X = 2 * A
*
* @param X Destination JPC
* @param A JPC
*/
void
FUNC(jpc_double) (jpc *X, const jpc *A)
{
bn256 a[1], b[1], c[1], tmp0[1];
bn256 *d;
if (bn256_is_zero (A->z)) /* A is infinite */
return;
d = X->x;
MFNC(sqr) (a, A->y);
memcpy (b, a, sizeof (bn256));
MFNC(mul) (a, a, A->x);
MFNC(shift) (a, a, 2);
MFNC(sqr) (b, b);
MFNC(shift) (b, b, 3);
#if defined(COEFFICIENT_A_IS_MINUS_3)
MFNC(sqr) (tmp0, A->z);
MFNC(sub) (c, A->x, tmp0);
MFNC(add) (tmp0, tmp0, A->x);
MFNC(mul) (tmp0, tmp0, c);
MFNC(shift) (c, tmp0, 1);
MFNC(add) (c, c, tmp0);
#elif defined (COEFFICIENT_A_IS_ZERO)
MFNC(sqr) (tmp0, A->x);
MFNC(shift) (c, tmp0, 1);
MFNC(add) (c, c, tmp0);
#else
#error "not supported."
#endif
MFNC(sqr) (d, c);
MFNC(shift) (tmp0, a, 1);
MFNC(sub) (d, d, tmp0);
MFNC(mul) (X->z, A->y, A->z);
MFNC(shift) (X->z, X->z, 1);
MFNC(sub) (tmp0, a, d);
MFNC(mul) (tmp0, c, tmp0);
MFNC(sub) (X->y, tmp0, b);
}
/**
* @brief X = A + B
*
* @param X Destination JPC
* @param A JPC
* @param B AC
* @param MINUS if 1 subtraction, addition otherwise.
*/
void
FUNC(jpc_add_ac_signed) (jpc *X, const jpc *A, const ac *B, int minus)
{
bn256 a[1], b[1], c[1], d[1], tmp[1];
#define minus_B_y c
#define c_sqr a
#define c_cube b
#define x1_c_sqr c
#define x1_c_sqr_2 c
#define c_cube_plus_x1_c_sqr_2 c
#define x1_c_sqr_copy a
#define y3_tmp c
#define y1_c_cube a
if (bn256_is_zero (A->z)) /* A is infinite */
{
memcpy (X->x, B->x, sizeof (bn256));
if (minus)
{
memcpy (tmp, B->y, sizeof (bn256));
bn256_sub (X->y, CONST_P256, B->y);
}
else
{
memcpy (X->y, B->y, sizeof (bn256));
bn256_sub (tmp, CONST_P256, B->y);
}
memset (X->z, 0, sizeof (bn256));
X->z->word[0] = 1;
return;
}
MFNC(sqr) (a, A->z);
memcpy (b, a, sizeof (bn256));
MFNC(mul) (a, a, B->x);
MFNC(mul) (b, b, A->z);
if (minus)
{
bn256_sub (minus_B_y, CONST_P256, B->y);
MFNC(mul) (b, b, minus_B_y);
}
else
{
bn256_sub (tmp, CONST_P256, B->y);
MFNC(mul) (b, b, B->y);
}
if (bn256_cmp (A->x, a) == 0 && bn256_cmp (A->y, b) == 0)
{
FUNC(jpc_double) (X, A);
return;
}
MFNC(sub) (c, a, A->x);
MFNC(sub) (d, b, A->y);
MFNC(mul) (X->z, A->z, c);
MFNC(sqr) (c_sqr, c);
MFNC(mul) (c_cube, c_sqr, c);
MFNC(mul) (x1_c_sqr, A->x, c_sqr);
MFNC(sqr) (X->x, d);
memcpy (x1_c_sqr_copy, x1_c_sqr, sizeof (bn256));
MFNC(shift) (x1_c_sqr_2, x1_c_sqr, 1);
MFNC(add) (c_cube_plus_x1_c_sqr_2, x1_c_sqr_2, c_cube);
MFNC(sub) (X->x, X->x, c_cube_plus_x1_c_sqr_2);
MFNC(sub) (y3_tmp, x1_c_sqr_copy, X->x);
MFNC(mul) (y3_tmp, y3_tmp, d);
MFNC(mul) (y1_c_cube, A->y, c_cube);
MFNC(sub) (X->y, y3_tmp, y1_c_cube);
}
/**
* @brief X = A + B
*
* @param X Destination JPC
* @param A JPC
* @param B AC
*/
void
FUNC(jpc_add_ac) (jpc *X, const jpc *A, const ac *B)
{
FUNC(jpc_add_ac_signed) (X, A, B, 0);
}
/**
* @brief X = convert A
*
* @param X Destination AC
* @param A JPC
*
* Return -1 on error (infinite).
* Return 0 on success.
*/
int
FUNC(jpc_to_ac) (ac *X, const jpc *A)
{
bn256 z_inv[1], z_inv_sqr[1];
if (bn256_is_zero (A->z))
return -1;
mod_inv (z_inv, A->z, CONST_P256);
MFNC(sqr) (z_inv_sqr, z_inv);
MFNC(mul) (z_inv, z_inv, z_inv_sqr);
MFNC(mul) (X->x, A->x, z_inv_sqr);
MFNC(mul) (X->y, A->y, z_inv);
return 0;
}

View File

@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
/*
* jpc_p256k1.c -- arithmetic on Jacobian projective coordinates for p256k1.
*
* Copyright (C) 2014 Free Software Initiative of Japan
* Author: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
*
* This file is a part of Gnuk, a GnuPG USB Token implementation.
*
* Gnuk is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify it
* under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* Gnuk is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT
* ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
* or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public
* License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*
*/
#include <stdint.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "bn.h"
#include "mod.h"
#include "modp256k1.h"
#include "affine.h"
#include "jpc-ac_p256k1.h"
#define FIELD p256k1
#define CONST_P256 P256K1
#define COEFFICIENT_A_IS_ZERO 1
#include "jpc.c"

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@@ -1,352 +0,0 @@
/*
* mod.c -- modulo arithmetic
*
* Copyright (C) 2011, 2014 Free Software Initiative of Japan
* Author: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
*
* This file is a part of Gnuk, a GnuPG USB Token implementation.
*
* Gnuk is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify it
* under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* Gnuk is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT
* ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
* or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public
* License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*
*/
#include <stdint.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "bn.h"
/**
* @brief X = A mod B (using MU=(1<<(256)+MU_lower)) (Barret reduction)
*
*/
void
mod_reduce (bn256 *X, const bn512 *A, const bn256 *B, const bn256 *MU_lower)
{
bn256 q[1];
bn512 q_big[1], tmp[1];
uint32_t carry;
#define borrow carry
memset (q, 0, sizeof (bn256));
q->word[0] = A->word[15];
bn256_mul (tmp, q, MU_lower);
tmp->word[8] += A->word[15];
carry = (tmp->word[8] < A->word[15]);
tmp->word[9] += carry;
q->word[7] = A->word[14];
q->word[6] = A->word[13];
q->word[5] = A->word[12];
q->word[4] = A->word[11];
q->word[3] = A->word[10];
q->word[2] = A->word[9];
q->word[1] = A->word[8];
q->word[0] = A->word[7];
bn256_mul (q_big, q, MU_lower);
bn256_add ((bn256 *)&q_big->word[8], (bn256 *)&q_big->word[8], q);
q->word[0] = q_big->word[9] + tmp->word[1];
carry = (q->word[0] < tmp->word[1]);
q->word[1] = q_big->word[10] + carry;
carry = (q->word[1] < carry);
q->word[1] += tmp->word[2];
carry += (q->word[1] < tmp->word[2]);
q->word[2] = q_big->word[11] + carry;
carry = (q->word[2] < carry);
q->word[2] += tmp->word[3];
carry += (q->word[2] < tmp->word[3]);
q->word[3] = q_big->word[12] + carry;
carry = (q->word[3] < carry);
q->word[3] += tmp->word[4];
carry += (q->word[3] < tmp->word[4]);
q->word[4] = q_big->word[13] + carry;
carry = (q->word[4] < carry);
q->word[4] += tmp->word[5];
carry += (q->word[4] < tmp->word[5]);
q->word[5] = q_big->word[14] + carry;
carry = (q->word[5] < carry);
q->word[5] += tmp->word[6];
carry += (q->word[5] < tmp->word[6]);
q->word[6] = q_big->word[15] + carry;
carry = (q->word[6] < carry);
q->word[6] += tmp->word[7];
carry += (q->word[6] < tmp->word[7]);
q->word[7] = carry;
q->word[7] += tmp->word[8];
carry = (q->word[7] < tmp->word[8]);
memset (q_big, 0, sizeof (bn512));
q_big->word[8] = A->word[8];
q_big->word[7] = A->word[7];
q_big->word[6] = A->word[6];
q_big->word[5] = A->word[5];
q_big->word[4] = A->word[4];
q_big->word[3] = A->word[3];
q_big->word[2] = A->word[2];
q_big->word[1] = A->word[1];
q_big->word[0] = A->word[0];
bn256_mul (tmp, q, B);
tmp->word[8] += carry * B->word[0];
tmp->word[15] = tmp->word[14] = tmp->word[13] = tmp->word[12]
= tmp->word[11] = tmp->word[10] = tmp->word[9] = 0;
borrow = bn256_sub (X, (bn256 *)&q_big->word[0], (bn256 *)&tmp->word[0]);
q_big->word[8] -= borrow;
q_big->word[8] -= tmp->word[8];
carry = q_big->word[8];
if (carry)
carry -= bn256_sub (X, X, B);
else
bn256_sub (q, X, B);
if (carry)
bn256_sub (X, X, B);
else
bn256_sub (q, X, B);
borrow = bn256_sub (q, X, B);
if (borrow)
memcpy (q, X, sizeof (bn256));
else
memcpy (X, q, sizeof (bn256));
#undef borrow
}
/*
* Reference:
* Donald E. Knuth, The Art of Computer Programming, Vol. 2:
* Seminumerical Algorithms, 3rd ed. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1998
*
* Max loop: X=0x8000...0000 and N=0xffff...ffff
*/
#define MAX_GCD_STEPS_BN256 (3*256-2)
/**
* @brief C = X^(-1) mod N
*
* Assume X and N are co-prime (or N is prime).
* NOTE: If X==0, it return 0.
*
*/
void
mod_inv (bn256 *C, const bn256 *X, const bn256 *N)
{
bn256 u[1], v[1], tmp[1];
bn256 A[1] = { { { 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 } } };
uint32_t carry;
#define borrow carry
int n = MAX_GCD_STEPS_BN256;
memset (tmp, 0, sizeof (bn256));
memset (C, 0, sizeof (bn256));
memcpy (u, X, sizeof (bn256));
memcpy (v, N, sizeof (bn256));
while (n--)
{
int c = (bn256_is_even (u) << 1) + bn256_is_even (v);
switch (c)
{
case 3:
bn256_shift (u, u, -1);
if (bn256_is_even (A))
{
bn256_add (tmp, A, N);
carry = 0;
}
else
carry = bn256_add (A, A, N);
bn256_shift (A, A, -1);
A->word[7] |= carry * 0x80000000;
bn256_shift (v, v, -1);
if (bn256_is_even (C))
{
bn256_add (tmp, C, N);
carry = 0;
}
else
carry = bn256_add (C, C, N);
bn256_shift (C, C, -1);
C->word[7] |= carry * 0x80000000;
if (bn256_is_ge (tmp, tmp))
{
bn256_sub (tmp, tmp, tmp);
borrow = bn256_sub (tmp, tmp, tmp);
if (borrow)
bn256_add (tmp, tmp, tmp);
else
bn256_add (tmp, A, N);
}
else
{
bn256_sub (tmp, tmp, tmp);
borrow = bn256_sub (tmp, tmp, tmp);
if (borrow)
bn256_add (tmp, tmp, tmp);
else
bn256_add (tmp, tmp, N);
}
break;
case 1:
bn256_shift (tmp, tmp, -1);
if (bn256_is_even (tmp))
{
bn256_add (tmp, tmp, N);
carry = 0;
}
else
carry = bn256_add (tmp, tmp, N);
bn256_shift (tmp, tmp, -1);
tmp->word[7] |= carry * 0x80000000;
bn256_shift (v, v, -1);
if (bn256_is_even (C))
{
bn256_add (tmp, C, N);
carry = 0;
}
else
carry = bn256_add (C, C, N);
bn256_shift (C, C, -1);
C->word[7] |= carry * 0x80000000;
if (bn256_is_ge (tmp, tmp))
{
bn256_sub (tmp, tmp, tmp);
borrow = bn256_sub (tmp, tmp, tmp);
if (borrow)
bn256_add (tmp, tmp, tmp);
else
bn256_add (tmp, A, N);
}
else
{
bn256_sub (tmp, tmp, tmp);
borrow = bn256_sub (tmp, tmp, tmp);
if (borrow)
bn256_add (tmp, tmp, tmp);
else
bn256_add (tmp, tmp, N);
}
break;
case 2:
bn256_shift (u, u, -1);
if (bn256_is_even (A))
{
bn256_add (tmp, A, N);
carry = 0;
}
else
carry = bn256_add (A, A, N);
bn256_shift (A, A, -1);
A->word[7] |= carry * 0x80000000;
bn256_shift (tmp, tmp, -1);
if (bn256_is_even (tmp))
{
bn256_add (tmp, tmp, N);
carry = 0;
}
else
carry = bn256_add (tmp, tmp, N);
bn256_shift (tmp, tmp, -1);
tmp->word[7] |= carry * 0x80000000;
if (bn256_is_ge (tmp, tmp))
{
bn256_sub (tmp, tmp, tmp);
borrow = bn256_sub (tmp, tmp, tmp);
if (borrow)
bn256_add (tmp, tmp, tmp);
else
bn256_add (tmp, A, N);
}
else
{
bn256_sub (tmp, tmp, tmp);
borrow = bn256_sub (tmp, tmp, tmp);
if (borrow)
bn256_add (tmp, tmp, tmp);
else
bn256_add (tmp, tmp, N);
}
break;
case 0:
bn256_shift (tmp, tmp, -1);
if (bn256_is_even (tmp))
{
bn256_add (tmp, tmp, N);
carry = 0;
}
else
carry = bn256_add (tmp, tmp, N);
bn256_shift (tmp, tmp, -1);
tmp->word[7] |= carry * 0x80000000;
bn256_shift (tmp, tmp, -1);
if (bn256_is_even (tmp))
{
bn256_add (tmp, tmp, N);
carry = 0;
}
else
carry = bn256_add (tmp, tmp, N);
bn256_shift (tmp, tmp, -1);
tmp->word[7] |= carry * 0x80000000;
if (bn256_is_ge (u, v))
{
bn256_sub (u, u, v);
borrow = bn256_sub (A, A, C);
if (borrow)
bn256_add (A, A, N);
else
bn256_add (tmp, A, N);
}
else
{
bn256_sub (v, v, u);
borrow = bn256_sub (C, C, A);
if (borrow)
bn256_add (C, C, N);
else
bn256_add (tmp, C, N);
}
break;
}
}
#undef borrow
}

View File

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
void mod_reduce (bn256 *X, const bn512 *A, const bn256 *B,
const bn256 *MU_lower);
void mod_inv (bn256 *X, const bn256 *A, const bn256 *N);

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@@ -1,287 +0,0 @@
/*
* mod25638.c -- modulo arithmetic of 2^256-38 for 2^255-19 field
*
* Copyright (C) 2014 Free Software Initiative of Japan
* Author: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
*
* This file is a part of Gnuk, a GnuPG USB Token implementation.
*
* Gnuk is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify it
* under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* Gnuk is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT
* ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
* or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public
* License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*
*/
/*
* The field is \Z/(2^255-19)
*
* We use radix-32. During computation, it's not reduced to 2^255-19,
* but it is represented in 256-bit (it is redundant representation),
* that is, something like 2^256-38.
*
* The idea is, keeping within 256-bit until it will be converted to
* affine coordinates.
*/
#include <stdint.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "bn.h"
#include "mod25638.h"
#ifndef BN256_C_IMPLEMENTATION
#define ASM_IMPLEMENTATION 0
#endif
#if ASM_IMPLEMENTATION
#include "muladd_256.h"
#define ADDWORD_256(d_,s_,w_,c_) \
asm ( "ldmia %[s]!, { r4, r5, r6, r7 } \n\t" \
"adds r4, r4, %[w] \n\t" \
"adcs r5, r5, #0 \n\t" \
"adcs r6, r6, #0 \n\t" \
"adcs r7, r7, #0 \n\t" \
"stmia %[d]!, { r4, r5, r6, r7 }\n\t" \
"ldmia %[s]!, { r4, r5, r6, r7 } \n\t" \
"adcs r4, r4, #0 \n\t" \
"adcs r5, r5, #0 \n\t" \
"adcs r6, r6, #0 \n\t" \
"adcs r7, r7, #0 \n\t" \
"stmia %[d]!, { r4, r5, r6, r7 }\n\t" \
"mov %[c], #0 \n\t" \
"adc %[c], %[c], #0" \
: [s] "=&r" (s_), [d] "=&r" (d_), [c] "=&r" (c_) \
: "[s]" (s_), "[d]" (d_), [w] "r" (w_) \
: "r4", "r5", "r6", "r7", "memory", "cc" )
#endif
/*
256 224 192 160 128 96 64 32 0
2^256
1 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
2^256 - 16
0 ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff fffffff0
2^256 - 16 - 2
0 ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffee
2^256 - 16 - 2 - 1
0 ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffed
*/
const bn256 p25519[1] = {
{{ 0xffffffed, 0xffffffff, 0xffffffff, 0xffffffff,
0xffffffff, 0xffffffff, 0xffffffff, 0x7fffffff }} };
/*
* Implementation Note.
*
* It's not always modulo n25638. The representation is redundant
* during computation. For example, when we add the number - 1 and 1,
* it won't overflow to 2^256, and the result is represented within
* 256-bit.
*/
/**
* @brief X = (A + B) mod 2^256-38
*/
void
mod25638_add (bn256 *X, const bn256 *A, const bn256 *B)
{
uint32_t carry;
carry = bn256_add (X, A, B);
carry = bn256_add_uint (X, X, carry*38);
X->word[0] += carry * 38;
}
/**
* @brief X = (A - B) mod 2^256-38
*/
void
mod25638_sub (bn256 *X, const bn256 *A, const bn256 *B)
{
uint32_t borrow;
borrow = bn256_sub (X, A, B);
borrow = bn256_sub_uint (X, X, borrow*38);
X->word[0] -= borrow * 38;
}
/**
* @brief X = A mod 2^256-38
*
* Note that the second argument is not "const bn512 *".
* A is modified during the computation of modulo.
*
* It's not precisely modulo 2^256-38 for all cases,
* but result may be redundant.
*/
static void
mod25638_reduce (bn256 *X, bn512 *A)
{
const uint32_t *s;
uint32_t *d;
uint32_t w;
#if ASM_IMPLEMENTATION
uint32_t c, c0;
s = &A->word[8]; d = &A->word[0]; w = 38; MULADD_256 (s, d, w, c);
c0 = A->word[8] * 38;
d = &X->word[0];
s = &A->word[0];
ADDWORD_256 (d, s, c0, c);
X->word[0] += c * 38;
#else
s = &A->word[8]; d = &A->word[0]; w = 38;
{
int i;
uint64_t r;
uint32_t carry;
r = 0;
for (i = 0; i < BN256_WORDS; i++)
{
uint64_t uv;
r += d[i];
carry = (r < d[i]);
uv = ((uint64_t)s[i])*w;
r += uv;
carry += (r < uv);
d[i] = (uint32_t)r;
r = ((r >> 32) | ((uint64_t)carry << 32));
}
carry = bn256_add_uint (X, (bn256 *)A, r * 38);
X->word[0] += carry * 38;
}
#endif
}
/**
* @brief X = (A * B) mod 2^256-38
*/
void
mod25638_mul (bn256 *X, const bn256 *A, const bn256 *B)
{
bn512 tmp[1];
bn256_mul (tmp, A, B);
mod25638_reduce (X, tmp);
}
/**
* @brief X = A * A mod 2^256-38
*/
void
mod25638_sqr (bn256 *X, const bn256 *A)
{
bn512 tmp[1];
bn256_sqr (tmp, A);
mod25638_reduce (X, tmp);
}
/**
* @brief X = (A << shift) mod 2^256-38
* @note shift < 32
*/
void
mod25638_shift (bn256 *X, const bn256 *A, int shift)
{
uint32_t carry;
bn256 tmp[1];
carry = bn256_shift (X, A, shift);
if (shift < 0)
return;
memset (tmp, 0, sizeof (bn256));
tmp->word[0] = (carry << 1);
/* tmp->word[1] = (carry >> 31); always zero. */
tmp->word[0] = tmp->word[0] + (carry << 2);
tmp->word[1] = (tmp->word[0] < (carry << 2)) + (carry >> 30);
tmp->word[0] = tmp->word[0] + (carry << 5);
tmp->word[1] = tmp->word[1] + (tmp->word[0] < (carry << 5)) + (carry >> 27);
mod25638_add (X, X, tmp);
}
/*
* @brief X = A mod 2^255-19
*
* It's precisely modulo 2^255-19 (unlike mod25638_reduce).
*/
void
mod25519_reduce (bn256 *X)
{
uint32_t q;
bn256 r0[1], r1[1];
int flag;
memcpy (r0, X, sizeof (bn256));
q = (r0->word[7] >> 31);
r0->word[7] &= 0x7fffffff;
if (q)
{
bn256_add_uint (r0, r0, 19);
q = (r0->word[7] >> 31);
r0->word[7] &= 0x7fffffff;
if (q)
{
bn256_add_uint (r1, r0, 19);
q = (r1->word[7] >> 31);
r1->word[7] &= 0x7fffffff;
flag = 0;
}
else
flag = 1;
}
else
{
bn256_add_uint (r1, r0, 19);
q = (r1->word[7] >> 31); /* dummy */
r1->word[7] &= 0x7fffffff; /* dummy */
if (q)
flag = 2;
else
flag = 3;
}
if (flag)
{
bn256_add_uint (r1, r0, 19);
q = (r1->word[7] >> 31);
r1->word[7] &= 0x7fffffff;
if (q)
memcpy (X, r1, sizeof (bn256));
else
memcpy (X, r0, sizeof (bn256));
}
else
{
if (q)
{
asm volatile ("" : : "r" (q) : "memory");
memcpy (X, r1, sizeof (bn256));
asm volatile ("" : : "r" (q) : "memory");
}
else
memcpy (X, r1, sizeof (bn256));
}
}

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@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
extern const bn256 p25519[1];
void mod25638_add (bn256 *X, const bn256 *A, const bn256 *B);
void mod25638_sub (bn256 *X, const bn256 *A, const bn256 *B);
void mod25638_mul (bn256 *X, const bn256 *A, const bn256 *B);
void mod25638_sqr (bn256 *X, const bn256 *A);
void mod25519_reduce (bn256 *X);

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@@ -1,315 +0,0 @@
/*
* modp256k1.c -- modulo arithmetic for p256k1
*
* Copyright (C) 2014, 2016, 2020 Free Software Initiative of Japan
* Author: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
*
* This file is a part of Gnuk, a GnuPG USB Token implementation.
*
* Gnuk is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify it
* under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* Gnuk is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT
* ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
* or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public
* License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*
*/
/*
* p256k1 = 2^256 - 2^32 - 2^9 - 2^8 - 2^7 - 2^6 - 2^4 - 1
*/
#include <stdint.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "bn.h"
#include "modp256k1.h"
/*
256 224 192 160 128 96 64 32 0
2^256
1 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
2^256 - 2^32
0 ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff 00000000
2^256 - 2^32 - 2^9
0 ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff fffffffe fffffe00
2^256 - 2^32 - 2^9 - 2^8
0 ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff fffffffe fffffd00
2^256 - 2^32 - 2^9 - 2^8 - 2^7
0 ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff fffffffe fffffc80
2^256 - 2^32 - 2^9 - 2^8 - 2^7 - 2^6
0 ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff fffffffe fffffc40
2^256 - 2^32 - 2^9 - 2^8 - 2^7 - 2^6 - 2^4
0 ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff fffffffe fffffc30
2^256 - 2^32 - 2^9 - 2^8 - 2^7 - 2^6 - 2^4 - 1
0 ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff fffffffe fffffc2f
*/
const bn256 p256k1 = { {0xfffffc2f, 0xfffffffe, 0xffffffff, 0xffffffff,
0xffffffff, 0xffffffff, 0xffffffff, 0xffffffff } };
/*
* Implementation Note.
*
* It's always modulo p256k1.
*
* Once, I tried redundant representation which caused wrong
* calculation. Implementation could be correct with redundant
* representation, but it found that it's more expensive.
*
*/
/**
* @brief X = (A + B) mod p256k1
*/
void
modp256k1_add (bn256 *X, const bn256 *A, const bn256 *B)
{
uint32_t cond;
bn256 tmp[1];
bn256 dummy[1];
cond = (bn256_add (X, A, B) == 0);
cond &= bn256_sub (tmp, X, P256K1);
memcpy (cond?dummy:X, tmp, sizeof (bn256));
asm ("" : "=m" (dummy) : "m" (dummy) : "memory");
}
/**
* @brief X = (A - B) mod p256
*/
void
modp256k1_sub (bn256 *X, const bn256 *A, const bn256 *B)
{
uint32_t borrow;
bn256 tmp[1];
bn256 dummy[1];
borrow = bn256_sub (X, A, B);
bn256_add (tmp, X, P256K1);
memcpy (borrow?X:dummy, tmp, sizeof (bn256));
asm ("" : "=m" (dummy) : "m" (dummy) : "memory");
}
/**
* @brief X = A mod p256k1
*/
void
modp256k1_reduce (bn256 *X, const bn512 *A)
{
bn256 tmp[1];
uint32_t carry;
#define borrow carry
uint32_t s0, s1;
#define s00 tmp->word[0]
#define s01 tmp->word[1]
#define s02 tmp->word[2]
#define W0 X
#define W1 tmp
#define W2 tmp
#define W3 tmp
#define W4 tmp
#define W5 tmp
#define W6 tmp
#define W7 tmp
#define S tmp
/*
* Suppose: P256K1 = 2^256 - CONST
* Then, compute: W = A_low + A_high * CONST
* 256-bit W0 = W mod 2^256
* 64-bit (S1, S0) = W / 2^256
* where: CONST = 2^32 + 2^9 + 2^8 + 2^7 + 2^6 + 2^4 + 1
*/
/* W0 = A_low */
/* W7 = A_high */
/* W0 += W7 */
carry = bn256_add (W0, (const bn256 *)&A->word[8], (const bn256 *)A);
/* W6 = W7 << 4 */
/* W0 += W6 */
bn256_shift (W6, (const bn256 *)&A->word[8], 4);
carry += bn256_add (W0, W0, W6);
/* W5 = W6 << 2 */
/* W0 += W5 */
bn256_shift (W5, W6, 2);
carry += bn256_add (W0, W0, W5);
/* W4 = W5 << 1 */
/* W0 += W4 */
bn256_shift (W4, W5, 1);
carry += bn256_add (W0, W0, W4);
/* W3 = W4 << 1 */
/* W0 += W3 */
bn256_shift (W3, W4, 1);
carry += bn256_add (W0, W0, W3);
/* W2 = W3 << 1 */
/* W0 += W2 */
bn256_shift (W2, W3, 1);
carry += bn256_add (W0, W0, W2);
/* W1 = A_high << 32 */
/* W0 += W1 */
W1->word[7] = A->word[14];
W1->word[6] = A->word[13];
W1->word[5] = A->word[12];
W1->word[4] = A->word[11];
W1->word[3] = A->word[10];
W1->word[2] = A->word[9];
W1->word[1] = A->word[8];
W1->word[0] = 0;
carry += bn256_add (W0, W0, W1);
/* (S1, S0) = W / 2^256 */
s0 = A->word[15];
carry += (s0 >> 28) + (s0 >> 26) + (s0 >> 25) + (s0 >> 24) + (s0 >> 23);
carry += s0;
s1 = (carry < s0) ? 1 : 0;
s0 = carry;
/*
* Compute: S:=(S02, S01, S00), S = (S1,S0)*CONST
*/
S->word[7] = S->word[6] = S->word[5] = S->word[4] = S->word[3] = 0;
/* (S02, S01, S00) = (S1, S0) + (S1, S0)*2^32 */
s00 = s0;
s01 = s0 + s1;
s02 = s1 + ((s01 < s0)? 1 : 0);
/* (S02, S01, S00) += (S1, S0)*2^9 */
carry = (s0 >> 23) + s01;
s02 += (s1 >> 23) + ((carry < s01)? 1 : 0);
s01 = (s1 << 9) + carry;
s02 += ((s01 < carry)? 1 : 0);
s00 += (s0 << 9);
carry = ((s00 < (s0 << 9))? 1 : 0);
s01 += carry;
s02 += ((s01 < carry)? 1 : 0);
/* (S02, S01, S00) += (S1, S0)*2^8 */
carry = (s0 >> 24) + s01;
s02 += (s1 >> 24) + ((carry < s01)? 1 : 0);
s01 = (s1 << 8) + carry;
s02 += ((s01 < carry)? 1 : 0);
s00 += (s0 << 8);
carry = ((s00 < (s0 << 8))? 1 : 0);
s01 += carry;
s02 += ((s01 < carry)? 1 : 0);
/* (S02, S01, S00) += (S1, S0)*2^7 */
carry = (s0 >> 25) + s01;
s02 += (s1 >> 25) + ((carry < s01)? 1 : 0);
s01 = (s1 << 7) + carry;
s02 += ((s01 < carry)? 1 : 0);
s00 += (s0 << 7);
carry = ((s00 < (s0 << 7))? 1 : 0);
s01 += carry;
s02 += ((s01 < carry)? 1 : 0);
/* (S02, S01, S00) += (S1, S0)*2^6 */
carry = (s0 >> 26) + s01;
s02 += (s1 >> 26) + ((carry < s01)? 1 : 0);
s01 = (s1 << 6) + carry;
s02 += ((s01 < carry)? 1 : 0);
s00 += (s0 << 6);
carry = ((s00 < (s0 << 6))? 1 : 0);
s01 += carry;
s02 += ((s01 < carry)? 1 : 0);
/* (S02, S01, S00) += (S1, S0)*2^4 */
carry = (s0 >> 28) + s01;
s02 += (s1 >> 28) + ((carry < s01)? 1 : 0);
s01 = (s1 << 4) + carry;
s02 += ((s01 < carry)? 1 : 0);
s00 += (s0 << 4);
carry = ((s00 < (s0 << 4))? 1 : 0);
s01 += carry;
s02 += ((s01 < carry)? 1 : 0);
/* W0 += S */
modp256k1_add (W0, W0, S);
borrow = bn256_sub (tmp, W0, P256K1);
if (borrow)
memcpy (tmp, W0, sizeof (bn256));
else
memcpy (W0, tmp, sizeof (bn256));
#undef W0
#undef W1
#undef W2
#undef W3
#undef W4
#undef W5
#undef W6
#undef W7
#undef S
#undef s00
#undef s01
#undef s02
#undef borrow
}
/**
* @brief X = (A * B) mod p256k1
*/
void
modp256k1_mul (bn256 *X, const bn256 *A, const bn256 *B)
{
bn512 AB[1];
bn256_mul (AB, A, B);
modp256k1_reduce (X, AB);
}
/**
* @brief X = A * A mod p256k1
*/
void
modp256k1_sqr (bn256 *X, const bn256 *A)
{
bn512 AA[1];
bn256_sqr (AA, A);
modp256k1_reduce (X, AA);
}
/**
* @brief X = (A << shift) mod p256k1
* @note shift < 32
*/
void
modp256k1_shift (bn256 *X, const bn256 *A, int shift)
{
uint32_t carry;
bn256 tmp[1];
carry = bn256_shift (X, A, shift);
if (shift < 0)
return;
memset (tmp, 0, sizeof (bn256));
tmp->word[0] = carry + (carry << 9);
tmp->word[1] = carry + (tmp->word[0] < (carry << 9)) + (carry >> 23);
tmp->word[0] = tmp->word[0] + (carry << 8);
tmp->word[1] = tmp->word[1] + (tmp->word[0] < (carry << 8)) + (carry >> 24);
tmp->word[0] = tmp->word[0] + (carry << 7);
tmp->word[1] = tmp->word[1] + (tmp->word[0] < (carry << 7)) + (carry >> 25);
tmp->word[0] = tmp->word[0] + (carry << 6);
tmp->word[1] = tmp->word[1] + (tmp->word[0] < (carry << 6)) + (carry >> 26);
tmp->word[0] = tmp->word[0] + (carry << 4);
tmp->word[1] = tmp->word[1] + (tmp->word[0] < (carry << 4)) + (carry >> 28);
modp256k1_add (X, X, tmp);
}

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@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
extern const bn256 p256k1;
#define P256K1 (&p256k1)
void modp256k1_add (bn256 *X, const bn256 *A, const bn256 *B);
void modp256k1_sub (bn256 *X, const bn256 *A, const bn256 *B);
void modp256k1_reduce (bn256 *X, const bn512 *A);
void modp256k1_mul (bn256 *X, const bn256 *A, const bn256 *B);
void modp256k1_sqr (bn256 *X, const bn256 *A);
void modp256k1_shift (bn256 *X, const bn256 *A, int shift);

View File

@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
#define MULADD_256_ASM(s_,d_,w_,c_) \
asm ( "ldmia %[s]!, { r8, r9, r10 } \n\t" \
"ldmia %[d], { r5, r6, r7 } \n\t" \
"umull r4, r8, %[w], r8 \n\t" \
"adds r5, r5, r4 \n\t" \
"adcs r6, r6, r8 \n\t" \
"umull r4, r8, %[w], r9 \n\t" \
"adc %[c], r8, #0 \n\t" \
"adds r6, r6, r4 \n\t" \
"adcs r7, r7, %[c] \n\t" \
"umull r4, r8, %[w], r10 \n\t" \
"adc %[c], r8, #0 \n\t" \
"adds r7, r7, r4 \n\t" \
"stmia %[d]!, { r5, r6, r7 } \n\t" \
"ldmia %[s]!, { r8, r9, r10 } \n\t" \
"ldmia %[d], { r5, r6, r7 } \n\t" \
"adcs r5, r5, %[c] \n\t" \
"umull r4, r8, %[w], r8 \n\t" \
"adc %[c], r8, #0 \n\t" \
"adds r5, r5, r4 \n\t" \
"adcs r6, r6, %[c] \n\t" \
"umull r4, r8, %[w], r9 \n\t" \
"adc %[c], r8, #0 \n\t" \
"adds r6, r6, r4 \n\t" \
"adcs r7, r7, %[c] \n\t" \
"umull r4, r8, %[w], r10 \n\t" \
"adc %[c], r8, #0 \n\t" \
"adds r7, r7, r4 \n\t" \
"stmia %[d]!, { r5, r6, r7 } \n\t" \
"ldmia %[s]!, { r8, r9 } \n\t" \
"ldmia %[d], { r5, r6 } \n\t" \
"adcs r5, r5, %[c] \n\t" \
"umull r4, r8, %[w], r8 \n\t" \
"adc %[c], r8, #0 \n\t" \
"adds r5, r5, r4 \n\t" \
"adcs r6, r6, %[c] \n\t" \
"umull r4, r8, %[w], r9 \n\t" \
"adc %[c], r8, #0 \n\t" \
"adds r6, r6, r4 \n\t" \
"adc %[c], %[c], #0 \n\t" \
"stmia %[d]!, { r5, r6 }" \
: [s] "=&r" (s_), [d] "=&r" (d_), [c] "=&r" (c_) \
: "[s]" (s_), "[d]" (d_), [w] "r" (w_) \
: "r4", "r5", "r6", "r7", "r8", "r9", "r10", \
"memory", "cc" )
#define MULADD_256(s__,d__,w__,c__) do { \
MULADD_256_ASM(s__,d__,w__,c__); \
*d__ = c__; \
} while (0)

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -1,666 +0,0 @@
/* -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
* p448.c - Modular calculation with p448: 2^448 - 2^224 - 1
*
* Copyright (C) 2021 Free Software Initiative of Japan
* Author: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
*
* This file is a part of Gnuk, a GnuPG USB Token implementation.
*
* Gnuk is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify it
* under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* Gnuk is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT
* ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
* or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public
* License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*
*/
#include <stdint.h>
#include "p448.h"
#define MASK_28BITS 0x0fffffff
static void
p448_add_raw (p448_t *x, const p448_t *a, const p448_t *b)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < N_REDUNDANT_LIMBS; i++)
x->limb[i] = a->limb[i] + b->limb[i];
}
static void
p448_sub_raw (p448_t *x, const p448_t *a, const p448_t *b)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < N_REDUNDANT_LIMBS; i++)
x->limb[i] = a->limb[i] - b->limb[i];
}
static uint64_t
mul64_32x32 (const uint32_t a, const uint32_t b)
{
return ((uint64_t)a) * b;
}
/**
* Compute X = A * B mod p448
*/
/*
* When we set phi = 2^224, p448 can be expressed as:
*
* p448 = phi^2 - phy - 1
*
* Here, using the right hand side and make a fomula
*
* phi^2 - phy - 1 = 0
*
* it is the fomula where it's solution is golden ratio.
*
* By analogy, so, p448 is called "golden-ratio prime".
*
* When we set phi = 2^224, Karatsuba multiplication goes like:
*
* (p + q * phi) * (r + s * phi)
* = pr + (ps + qr)*phy + qs*phi^2
* == (pr + qs) + (ps + qr + qs) * phy (mod p448)
* = (pr + qs) + ((p + q)*(r + s) - pr) * phy
*
* That is, it can be done by three times of 224-bit multiplications
* (instead of four).
*
* Let us see more detail.
*
* The formula above is calculated to:
* = lower224(pr + qs) + upper224(pr + qs)*phy
* + lower224((p + q)*(r + s) - pr)*phy
* + upper224((p + q)*(r + s) - pr)*phy^2 (mod p448)
* == lower224(pr + qs)
* + upper224((p + q)*(r + s) - pr)
* + (upper224(pr + qs)
* + lower224((p + q)*(r + s) - pr)
* + upper224((p + q)*(r + s) - pr))*phy (mod p448)
* = lower224(pr + qs)
* + upper224((p + q)*(r + s) - pr)
* + (lower224((p + q)*(r + s) - pr)
* + upper224((p + q)*(r + s) + qs)) * phy
*
*/
/*
Here is a figure of: multiplication by 8-limb * 8-limb
a b c d e f g h
* i j k l m n o p
---------------------------------------------
ap bp cp dp ep fp gp hp
ao bo co do eo fo go ho
an bn cn dn en fn gn hn
am bm cm dm em fm gm hm
al bl cl dl el fl gl hl
ak bk ck dk ek fk gk hk
aj bj cj dj ej fj gj hj
ai bi ci di ei fi gi hi
Considering lower224, it's:
ap bp cp dp ep fp gp hp
bo co do eo fo go ho
cn dn en fn gn hn
dm em fm gm hm
el fl gl hl
fk gk hk
gj hj
hi
Considering upper224, it's:
ao
an bn
am bm cm
al bl cl dl
ak bk ck dk ek
aj bj cj dj ej fj
ai bi ci di ei fi gi
*/
void
p448_mul (p448_t *__restrict__ x, const p448_t *a, const p448_t *b)
{
int i, j;
uint64_t v64_0, v64_1, v64_2;
uint32_t p_q[8], r_s[8];
uint32_t *px;
const uint32_t *pa, *pb;
px = x->limb;
pa = a->limb;
pb = b->limb;
/* Firstly, we do Karatsuba preparation. */
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
{
p_q[i] = pa[i] + pa[i+8];
r_s[i] = pb[i] + pb[i+8];
}
v64_0 = v64_1 = 0;
for (j = 0; j < 8; j++)
{
v64_2 = 0;
/* Compute lower half of limbs (lower224) */
/* __ <-- j
* | / |
* |/ v i
*
*/
for (i = 0; i <= j; i++)
{
v64_0 += mul64_32x32 (pa[8+j-i], pb[8+i]);/* accumulating q*s */
v64_1 += mul64_32x32 (p_q[j-i], r_s[i]); /* accumulating p_q*r_s */
v64_2 += mul64_32x32 (pa[j-i], pb[i]); /* accumulating p*r */
}
v64_0 += v64_2; /* Compute pr+qs. */
v64_1 -= v64_2; /* Compute p_q*r_s - pr. */
v64_2 = 0;
/* Compute upper half of limbs (upper224) */
/* <-- j
* /| |
* /_| v i
*
*/
for (; i < 8; i++)
{
v64_0 -= mul64_32x32 (pa[8+j-i], pb[i]); /* accumulating -p*r */
v64_1 += mul64_32x32 (pa[16+j-i], pb[8+i]);/* accumulating q*s */
v64_2 += mul64_32x32 (p_q[8+j-i], r_s[i]); /* accumulating p_q*r_s */
}
v64_0 += v64_2; /* Compute p_q*r_s - pr. */
v64_1 += v64_2; /* Compute p_q*r_s + qs. */
px[j] = v64_0 & MASK_28BITS;
px[j+8] = v64_1 & MASK_28BITS;
v64_0 >>= 28;
v64_1 >>= 28;
}
/* "Carry" remains as: 2^448 * v64_1 + 2^224 * v64_0 */
/*
* Subtract p448 times v64_1 to clear msbs, meaning, clear those
* bits and adding v64_1 to px[0] and px[8] (in mod p448
* calculation).
*/
v64_0 += v64_1;
v64_0 += px[8];
v64_1 += px[0];
px[8] = v64_0 & MASK_28BITS;
px[0] = v64_1 & MASK_28BITS;
/* Still, it carries to... */
v64_0 >>= 28;
v64_1 >>= 28;
px[9] += v64_0;
px[1] += v64_1;
/* DONE. */
}
/**
* Compute X = A * 39081
*/
void
p448_mul_39081 (p448_t *x, const p448_t *a)
{
int i;
const uint32_t w = 39081;
uint32_t *px;
const uint32_t *pa;
uint64_t v64;
uint32_t carry;
px = x->limb;
pa = a->limb;
v64 = 0;
for (i = 0; i < N_REDUNDANT_LIMBS; i++)
{
v64 += mul64_32x32 (w, pa[i]);
px[i] = v64 & MASK_28BITS;
v64 >>= 28;
}
carry = v64;
carry += px[0];
px[0] = carry & MASK_28BITS;
px[1] += carry >> 28;
carry = v64;
carry += px[8];
px[8] = carry & MASK_28BITS;
px[9] += carry >> 28;
}
/*
ah bh ch dh eh fh gh HH
bg cg dg eg fg GG
cf df ef FF
de EE
DD
CC dc ec
BB cb db eb fb
AA ba ca da ea fa ga
*/
/**
* Compute X = A^2 mod p448
*/
void
p448_sqr (p448_t *__restrict__ x, const p448_t *a)
{
int i, j;
uint64_t v64_0, v64_1, v64_2, v64_3;
uint32_t p_q[8];
uint32_t *px;
const uint32_t *pa;
px = x->limb;
pa = a->limb;
/* Firstly, we do Karatsuba preparation. */
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
p_q[i] = pa[i] + pa[i+8];
v64_0 = v64_1 = 0;
for (j = 0; j < 8; j++)
{
v64_2 = 0;
/* Compute lower half of limbs (lower224) */
/* __ <-- j
* | / |
* |/ v i
*
*/
for (i = 0; i <= j/2; i++)
{
int cond = ((j & 1) || i != j/2);
v64_3 = mul64_32x32 (pa[8+j-i], pa[8+i]);/* accumulating q*q */
v64_0 += (v64_3 << cond);
v64_3 = mul64_32x32 (p_q[j-i], p_q[i]); /* accumulating p_q^2 */
v64_1 += (v64_3 << cond);
v64_3 = mul64_32x32 (pa[j-i], pa[i]); /* accumulating p*p */
v64_2 += (v64_3 << cond);
}
v64_0 += v64_2; /* Compute pp+qq. */
v64_1 -= v64_2; /* Compute p_q^2 - pp. */
v64_2 = 0;
/* Compute upper half of limbs (upper224) */
/* <-- j
* /| |
* /_| v i
*
*/
if (!(j & 1))
{
v64_0 -= mul64_32x32 (pa[4+i-1], pa[4+i-1]); /* accumulating -p*p */
v64_1 += mul64_32x32 (pa[12+i-1], pa[12+i-1]);/* accumulating q*q */
v64_2 += mul64_32x32 (p_q[4+i-1], p_q[4+i-1]);/* accumulating p_q^2 */
}
for (; i < 4; i++)
{
v64_3 = mul64_32x32 (pa[4+j-i], pa[4+i]);
v64_0 -= (v64_3 << 1); /* accumulating -p*p */
v64_3 = mul64_32x32 (pa[12+j-i], pa[12+i]);
v64_1 += (v64_3 << 1); /* accumulating q*q */
v64_3 = mul64_32x32 (p_q[4+j-i], p_q[4+i]);
v64_2 += (v64_3 << 1); /* accumulating p_q^2 */
}
v64_0 += v64_2; /* Compute p_q^2 - p^2. */
v64_1 += v64_2; /* Compute p_q^2 + q^2. */
px[j] = v64_0 & MASK_28BITS;
px[j+8] = v64_1 & MASK_28BITS;
v64_0 >>= 28;
v64_1 >>= 28;
}
/* "Carry" remains as: 2^448 * v64_1 + 2^224 * v64_0 */
/*
* Subtract p448 times v64_1 to clear msbs, meaning, clear those
* bits and adding v64_1 to px[0] and px[8] (in mod p448
* calculation).
*/
v64_0 += v64_1;
v64_0 += px[8];
v64_1 += px[0];
px[8] = v64_0 & MASK_28BITS;
px[0] = v64_1 & MASK_28BITS;
/* Still, it carries to... */
v64_0 >>= 28;
v64_1 >>= 28;
px[9] += v64_0;
px[1] += v64_1;
/* DONE. */
}
/**
* Weak reduce - Make each limb of redundunt representation smaller.
* Do our best weakly to zeroing most significant 4-bit.
*
* Note that: p448 = 2^448 - 2^224 - 1
*
* Subtracting p448 means that subtracting 2^448 then adding 2^224 + 1.
*/
void
p448_weak_reduce (p448_t *a)
{
int i;
uint32_t tmp = a->limb[15] >> 28;
a->limb[8] += tmp; /* Adding TMP * 2^224 (28 * 8 = 224) */
/* Compute top to bottom. */
for (i = 0; i < N_REDUNDANT_LIMBS - 1; i++)
a->limb[N_REDUNDANT_LIMBS - i - 1] =
(a->limb[N_REDUNDANT_LIMBS - i - 1] & MASK_28BITS)
+ (a->limb[N_REDUNDANT_LIMBS - i - 2] >> 28);
a->limb[0] = (a->limb[0] & MASK_28BITS) + tmp;
}
static const p448_t p448[1] = {
{
{
0x0fffffff, 0x0fffffff, 0x0fffffff, 0x0fffffff,
0x0fffffff, 0x0fffffff, 0x0fffffff, 0x0fffffff,
0x0ffffffe, 0x0fffffff, 0x0fffffff, 0x0fffffff,
0x0fffffff, 0x0fffffff, 0x0fffffff, 0x0fffffff
}
}
};
static uint32_t
p448_add_carry_cond (p448_t *x, const p448_t *a, const p448_t *b,
uint32_t cond)
{
int i;
uint32_t v;
uint32_t carry = 0;
uint32_t *px;
const uint32_t *pa, *pb;
cond = cond * MASK_28BITS;
px = x->limb;
pa = a->limb;
pb = b->limb;
for (i = 0; i < N_REDUNDANT_LIMBS; i++)
{
v = *pb & cond;
*px = *pa + carry;
carry = (*px < carry);
*px = (*px + v) & MASK_28BITS;
carry += (*px < v);
px++;
pa++;
pb++;
}
return carry;
}
static uint32_t
p448_sub_borrow (p448_t *x, const p448_t *a, const p448_t *b)
{
int i;
uint32_t v;
uint32_t borrow = 0;
uint32_t *px;
const uint32_t *pa, *pb;
px = x->limb;
pa = a->limb;
pb = b->limb;
for (i = 0; i < N_REDUNDANT_LIMBS; i++)
{
uint32_t borrow0 = (*pa < borrow);
v = *pb;
*px = *pa - borrow;
borrow = (*px < v) + borrow0;
*px = (*px - v) & MASK_28BITS;
px++;
pa++;
pb++;
}
return borrow;
}
/**
* Strong reduce - Make sure that each limb of redundunt
* representation has zeros of significant 4-bit.
*/
void
p448_strong_reduce (p448_t *a)
{
uint32_t tmp;
uint32_t is_negative;
/*
* Clear the 4-bit of the last (top) limb. As stated in the comment
* of weak_reduce, subtracting p448 means that subtracting 2^448
* then adding 2^224 + 1.
*/
tmp = a->limb[15] >> 28;
a->limb[8] += tmp;
a->limb[0] += tmp;
a->limb[15] &= MASK_28BITS;
/*
* Here, it's: 0 <= v < 2*p448
*
* When v > p448, subtract p448 from v, then it becomes strongly reduced.
* Otherwise, it's already strongly reduced.
*/
/* Subtract p448 */
is_negative = p448_sub_borrow (a, a, p448);
/* Add p448 conditionally, when it becomes negative. */
p448_add_carry_cond (a, a, p448, is_negative);
}
/**
* Convert to wire-format from internal redundant representation.
*/
void
p448_serialize (uint8_t serial[56], const struct p448_t *x)
{
int i;
p448_t tmp[1];
uint8_t *p = serial;
*tmp = *x;
p448_strong_reduce (tmp);
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
{
uint32_t limb0 = tmp->limb[2*i];
uint32_t limb1 = tmp->limb[2*i+1];
*p++ = limb0;
*p++ = (limb0 >> 8);
*p++ = (limb0 >> 16);
*p++ = ((limb0 >> 24) & 0x0f) | ((limb1 & 0x0f )<< 4);
*p++ = (limb1 >> 4);
*p++ = (limb1 >> 12);
*p++ = (limb1 >> 20);
}
}
/**
* Convert from wire-format to internal redundant representation.
*/
void
p448_deserialize (p448_t *x, const uint8_t serial[56])
{
int i;
const uint8_t *p = serial + 56;
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
{
uint32_t v;
v = *--p;
v <<= 8;
v |= *--p;
v <<= 8;
v |= *--p;
v <<= 8;
v |= *--p;
x->limb[N_REDUNDANT_LIMBS-2*i-1] = (v >> 4);
v = (v & 0x0f);
v <<= 8;
v |= *--p;
v <<= 8;
v |= *--p;
v <<= 8;
v |= *--p;
x->limb[N_REDUNDANT_LIMBS-2*i-2] = v & MASK_28BITS;
}
}
/* X = A^(2*N) */
static void
p448_sqrn (p448_t *__restrict__ x, const p448_t *a, int n)
{
p448_t tmp[1];
if ((n&1))
{
p448_sqr (x, a);
n--;
}
else
{
p448_sqr (tmp, a);
p448_sqr (x, tmp);
n -= 2;
}
for (; n; n -= 2)
{
p448_sqr (tmp, x);
p448_sqr (x, tmp);
}
}
/**
* Compute X = A^(-1) mod p448 (if A=0, return X = 0)
*
* Internally, do A^(p448 - 2) to get A^(-1).
*/
void
p448_inv (p448_t *__restrict__ x, const p448_t *a)
{
p448_t t[1], u[1];
/*
* Bit pattern of p448-2: 1{223} 0 1{222}01
*
* 222-bit can be composed by 3-bit three times to get 9-bit, 9-bit
* two times to get 18-bit, 18-bit two times plus 1-bit to get 37-bit.
* 37-bit three times to get 111-bit, and lastly 111-bit two times.
* 222 = 111*2 = 37*3*2 = (18*2+1)*3*2 = (9*2*2+1)*3*2 = (3*3*2*2+1)*3*2
*/
p448_sqr ( x, a ); /* 10 */
p448_mul ( t, a, x ); /* 11 */
p448_sqr ( x, t ); /* 110 */
p448_mul ( t, a, x ); /* 111 */
p448_sqrn ( x, t, 3 ); /* 111000 */
p448_mul ( u, t, x ); /* 111111 */
p448_sqrn ( x, u, 3 ); /* 111111000 */
p448_mul ( u, t, x ); /* 111111111 */
p448_sqrn ( t, u, 9 ); /* 1{9} 0{9} */
p448_mul ( x, u, t ); /* 1{18} */
p448_sqr ( t, x ); /* 1{18} 0 */
p448_mul ( u, a, t ); /* 1{19} */
p448_sqrn ( t, u, 18 ); /* 1{19} 0{18} */
p448_mul ( u, x, t ); /* 1{37} */
p448_sqrn ( t, u, 37 ); /* 1{37} 0{37} */
p448_mul ( x, u, t ); /* 1{74} */
p448_sqrn ( t, x, 37 ); /* 1{74} 0{37} */
p448_mul ( x, u, t ); /* 1{111} */
p448_sqrn ( t, x, 111 ); /* 1{111} 0{111} */
p448_mul ( u, x, t ); /* 1{222} */
p448_sqr ( t, u ); /* 1{222} 0 */
p448_mul ( x, a, t ); /* 1{223} */
p448_sqrn ( u, x, 224 ); /* 1{223} 0{224} */
p448_mul ( x, u, t ); /* 1{223} 0 1{222}0 */
p448_sqr ( t, x ); /* 1{223} 0 1{222}00 */
p448_mul ( x, a, t ); /* 1{223} 0 1{222}01 */
}
static const p448_t p448_times_2[1] = {
{
{
0x1ffffffe, 0x1ffffffe, 0x1ffffffe, 0x1ffffffe,
0x1ffffffe, 0x1ffffffe, 0x1ffffffe, 0x1ffffffe,
0x1ffffffc, 0x1ffffffe, 0x1ffffffe, 0x1ffffffe,
0x1ffffffe, 0x1ffffffe, 0x1ffffffe, 0x1ffffffe
}
}
};
/**
* Compute X = A + B mod p448, result is weakly reduced.
*
*/
void
p448_add (p448_t *x, const p448_t *a, const p448_t *b)
{
p448_add_raw (x, a, b);
p448_weak_reduce (x);
}
/**
* Compute X = A - B mod p448, result is weakly reduced.
*
*/
void
p448_sub (p448_t *x, const p448_t *a, const p448_t *b)
{
p448_t tmp[1];
p448_sub_raw (tmp, a, b);
p448_add_raw (x, p448_times_2, tmp);
p448_weak_reduce (x);
}

View File

@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
#define N_REDUNDANT_LIMBS 16
typedef struct p448_t
{
uint32_t limb[N_REDUNDANT_LIMBS];
} p448_t;
void p448_add (p448_t *x, const p448_t *a, const p448_t *b);
void p448_sub (p448_t *x, const p448_t *a, const p448_t *b);
void p448_mul (p448_t *__restrict__ x, const p448_t *a, const p448_t *b);
void p448_mul_39081 (p448_t *x, const p448_t *a);
void p448_sqr (p448_t *__restrict__ c, const p448_t *a);
void p448_inv (p448_t *__restrict__ x, const p448_t *a);
void p448_serialize (uint8_t serial[56], const p448_t *x);
void p448_deserialize (p448_t *x, const uint8_t serial[56]);
void p448_strong_reduce (p448_t *a);

View File

@@ -1,202 +0,0 @@
/*
* shake256.c -- Compute SHAKE hash.
*
* Copyright (C) 2021 Free Software Initiative of Japan
* Author: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
*
* This file is a part of Gnuk, a GnuPG USB Token implementation.
*
* Gnuk is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify it
* under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* Gnuk is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT
* ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
* or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public
* License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*
*/
/*
* Reference:
*
* [1] FIPS PUB 202: SHA-3 Standard:
* Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions,
* August 2015.
*/
#define SHAKE_BITS 256
#define SHAKE_INDEX_MAX (200 - (SHAKE_BITS >> 2))
/*
* b=1600
* nr = 24 iterations
* l = 6
*
* state: 25x64-bit == 5 x 5 x 64
* row column bit
*/
#include <stdint.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "shake256.h"
/* Round constants in iota step. */
static const uint64_t rc[24] = {
UINT64_C (0x0000000000000001), UINT64_C (0x0000000000008082),
UINT64_C (0x800000000000808a), UINT64_C (0x8000000080008000),
UINT64_C (0x000000000000808b), UINT64_C (0x0000000080000001),
UINT64_C (0x8000000080008081), UINT64_C (0x8000000000008009),
UINT64_C (0x000000000000008a), UINT64_C (0x0000000000000088),
UINT64_C (0x0000000080008009), UINT64_C (0x000000008000000a),
UINT64_C (0x000000008000808b), UINT64_C (0x800000000000008b),
UINT64_C (0x8000000000008089), UINT64_C (0x8000000000008003),
UINT64_C (0x8000000000008002), UINT64_C (0x8000000000000080),
UINT64_C (0x000000000000800a), UINT64_C (0x800000008000000a),
UINT64_C (0x8000000080008081), UINT64_C (0x8000000000008080),
UINT64_C (0x0000000080000001), UINT64_C (0x8000000080008008),
};
static const uint8_t rho[25-1] = {
1, 62, 28, 27,
36, 44, 6, 55, 20,
3, 10, 43, 25, 39,
41, 45, 15, 21, 8,
18, 2, 61, 56, 14
};
static const uint8_t pi[24] = {
10, 7, 11, 17, 18, 3, 5, 16, 8, 21, 24, 4,
15, 23, 19, 13, 12, 2, 20, 14, 22, 9, 6, 1,
};
static uint64_t
rotl64 (uint64_t x, uint64_t y)
{
return (x << y) | (x >> (64U - y));
}
static void
absorb (uint64_t *dst, uint8_t index, uint8_t v)
{
dst[index >> 3] ^= ((uint64_t)v) << ((index & 7) << 3);
}
static uint8_t
squeeze (const uint64_t *src, uint8_t index)
{
return src[index >> 3] >> ((index & 7) << 3);
}
/* The permutation function. */
static void
keccak_f1600 (uint64_t s[25])
{
uint64_t lane[5];
int i, j, round;
for (round = 0; round < 24; round++)
{
uint64_t t;
/* STEP: theta */
for (i = 0; i < 5; i++)
lane[i] = s[i] ^ s[i + 5] ^ s[i + 10] ^ s[i + 15] ^ s[i + 20];
for (i = 0; i < 5; i++)
{
t = lane[(i + 4) % 5] ^ rotl64 (lane[(i + 1) % 5], 1);
for (j = 0; j < 25; j += 5)
s[j + i] ^= t;
}
/* STEP: rho */
for (i = 1; i < 25; i++)
s[i] = rotl64(s[i], rho[i-1]);
/* STEP: pi */
t = s[1];
for (i = 0; i < 25-1; i++)
{
uint64_t tmp;
j = pi[i];
tmp = s[j];
s[j] = t;
t = tmp;
}
/* STEP: chi */
for (i = 0; i < 25; i += 5)
{
for (j = 0; j < 5; j++)
lane[j] = s[i + j];
for (j = 0; j < 5; j++)
s[i + j] ^= (~lane[(j + 1) % 5]) & lane[(j + 2) % 5];
}
/* STEP: iota */
s[0] ^= rc[round];
}
}
void
shake256_start (struct shake_context *shake)
{
memset (shake, 0, sizeof (shake_context));
}
void
shake256_update (struct shake_context *shake,
const unsigned char *src, unsigned int size)
{
if (size == 0)
return;
while (1)
{
absorb (shake->state, shake->index, *src++);
if (++shake->index == SHAKE_INDEX_MAX)
{
keccak_f1600 (shake->state);
shake->index = 0;
}
if (--size == 0)
break;
}
}
void
shake256_finish (struct shake_context *shake,
unsigned char *dst, unsigned int size)
{
if (size == 0)
return;
/*
* SHAKE is defined appending 11 at the end to RawSHAKE,
* RawSHAKE is defined adding 11 at the end to KECCAK,
* and KECCACK uses pad10*1 at the end.
* This means adding 111110*1 at the end.
*/
absorb (shake->state, shake->index, 0x1F);
absorb (shake->state, SHAKE_INDEX_MAX - 1, 0x80);
keccak_f1600 (shake->state);
shake->index = 0;
while (1)
{
*dst++ = squeeze (shake->state, shake->index);
if (--size == 0)
break;
if (++shake->index == SHAKE_INDEX_MAX)
{
keccak_f1600 (shake->state);
shake->index = 0;
}
}
}

View File

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
#include <stdint.h>
struct shake_context {
uint64_t state[25];
uint32_t index;
};
typedef struct shake_context shake_context;
void shake256_start (struct shake_context *shake);
void shake256_update (struct shake_context *shake,
const unsigned char *src, unsigned int size);
void shake256_finish (struct shake_context *shake,
unsigned char *dst, unsigned int size);

View File

@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
#define GPG_APPLICATION_TERMINATED() set_res_sw (0x62, 0x85)
#define GPG_MEMORY_FAILURE() set_res_sw (0x65, 0x81)
#define GPG_WRONG_LENGTH() set_res_sw (0x67, 0x00)
#define GPG_SECURITY_FAILURE() set_res_sw (0x69, 0x82)
#define GPG_SECURITY_AUTH_BLOCKED() set_res_sw (0x69, 0x83)
#define GPG_CONDITION_NOT_SATISFIED() set_res_sw (0x69, 0x85)
#define GPG_COMMAND_NOT_ALLOWED() set_res_sw (0x69, 0x86)
#define GPG_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED() set_res_sw (0x6a, 0x81)
#define GPG_NO_FILE() set_res_sw (0x6a, 0x82)
#define GPG_NO_RECORD() set_res_sw (0x6a, 0x88)
#define GPG_BAD_P1_P2() set_res_sw (0x6b, 0x00)
#define GPG_NO_INS() set_res_sw (0x6d, 0x00)
#define GPG_ERROR() set_res_sw (0x6f, 0x00)
#define GPG_SUCCESS() set_res_sw (0x90, 0x00)

View File

@@ -1,182 +0,0 @@
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
//Part of the code is taken from GnuK (GPLv3)
#include <stdint.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include "pico/stdlib.h"
#include "neug.h"
#include "hardware/structs/rosc.h"
#include "hardware/gpio.h"
#include "hardware/adc.h"
#include "bsp/board.h"
#include "pico/unique_id.h"
void adc_start() {
adc_init();
adc_gpio_init(27);
adc_select_input(1);
}
void adc_stop() {
}
static uint64_t random_word = 0xcbf29ce484222325;
static uint8_t ep_round = 0;
static void ep_init() {
random_word = 0xcbf29ce484222325;
ep_round = 0;
}
/* Here, we assume a little endian architecture. */
static int ep_process () {
if (ep_round == 0) {
ep_init();
}
uint64_t word = 0x0;
for (int n = 0; n < 64; n++) {
uint8_t bit1, bit2;
do
{
bit1 = rosc_hw->randombit&0xff;
//sleep_ms(1);
bit2 = rosc_hw->randombit&0xff;
} while(bit1 == bit2);
word = (word << 1) | bit1;
}
random_word ^= word^board_millis()^adc_read();
random_word *= 0x00000100000001B3;
if (++ep_round == 8) {
ep_round = 0;
return 2; //2 words
}
return 0;
}
static const uint32_t *ep_output() {
return (uint32_t *)&random_word;
}
struct rng_rb {
uint32_t *buf;
uint8_t head, tail;
uint8_t size;
unsigned int full :1;
unsigned int empty :1;
};
static void rb_init(struct rng_rb *rb, uint32_t *p, uint8_t size) {
rb->buf = p;
rb->size = size;
rb->head = rb->tail = 0;
rb->full = 0;
rb->empty = 1;
}
static void rb_add(struct rng_rb *rb, uint32_t v) {
rb->buf[rb->tail++] = v;
if (rb->tail == rb->size)
rb->tail = 0;
if (rb->tail == rb->head)
rb->full = 1;
rb->empty = 0;
}
static uint32_t rb_del(struct rng_rb *rb) {
uint32_t v = rb->buf[rb->head++];
if (rb->head == rb->size)
rb->head = 0;
if (rb->head == rb->tail)
rb->empty = 1;
rb->full = 0;
return v;
}
static struct rng_rb the_ring_buffer;
void *neug_task() {
struct rng_rb *rb = &the_ring_buffer;
int n;
if ((n = ep_process())) {
int i;
const uint32_t *vp;
vp = ep_output();
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
rb_add (rb, *vp++);
if (rb->full)
break;
}
}
return NULL;
}
void neug_init(uint32_t *buf, uint8_t size) {
pico_unique_board_id_t unique_id;
pico_get_unique_board_id(&unique_id);
const uint32_t *u = (const uint32_t *)unique_id.id;
struct rng_rb *rb = &the_ring_buffer;
int i;
rb_init(rb, buf, size);
adc_start();
ep_init();
}
void neug_flush(void) {
struct rng_rb *rb = &the_ring_buffer;
while (!rb->empty)
rb_del (rb);
}
uint32_t neug_get(int kick) {
struct rng_rb *rb = &the_ring_buffer;
uint32_t v;
while (rb->empty)
neug_task();
v = rb_del(rb);
return v;
}
void neug_wait_full(void) { //should be called only on core1
struct rng_rb *rb = &the_ring_buffer;
while (!rb->full) {
sleep_ms(1);
}
}
void neug_fini(void) {
neug_get(1);
}

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