wifi-densepose/examples/scipix/docs/14_SECURITY.md

# Security Architecture - RuVector Scipix OCR

## Executive Summary

This document outlines the comprehensive security architecture for the ruvector-scipix OCR system, designed with defense-in-depth principles, zero-trust assumptions, and Rust's memory-safety guarantees at its core.

**Security Posture**: Multi-layered protection spanning authentication, authorization, data privacy, input validation, secure processing, transport security, and supply chain integrity.

**Target Threat Model**: Protection against unauthorized access, data exfiltration, denial-of-service attacks, code injection, malicious file uploads, and supply chain attacks.

---

## 1. Authentication System

### 1.1 API Key Management

#### Key Generation Strategy
```rust
use argon2::{Argon2, PasswordHasher};
use rand::Rng;
use base64::{Engine as _, engine::general_purpose};

pub struct ApiKeyManager {
    pepper: [u8; 32],
}

impl ApiKeyManager {
    /// Generate cryptographically secure API key
    pub fn generate_api_key(&self) -> Result<ApiKey, SecurityError> {
        let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
        let mut key_bytes = [0u8; 32];
        rng.fill(&mut key_bytes);

        // Format: rvx_live_<base64url>_<checksum>
        let key_data = general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(&key_bytes);
        let checksum = self.compute_checksum(&key_bytes)?;

        let key_string = format!("rvx_live_{}_{}", key_data, checksum);

        Ok(ApiKey {
            key: key_string,
            hash: self.hash_key(&key_bytes)?,
            created_at: chrono::Utc::now(),
            expires_at: None,
        })
    }

    /// Hash API key for secure storage
    fn hash_key(&self, key_bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<String, SecurityError> {
        let mut combined = Vec::new();
        combined.extend_from_slice(key_bytes);
        combined.extend_from_slice(&self.pepper);

        let salt = argon2::password_hash::SaltString::generate(&mut rand::thread_rng());
        let argon2 = Argon2::default();

        let hash = argon2.hash_password(&combined, &salt)
            .map_err(|e| SecurityError::HashingFailed(e.to_string()))?;

        Ok(hash.to_string())
    }

    /// Verify API key without timing attacks
    pub fn verify_key(&self, provided_key: &str, stored_hash: &str) -> Result<bool, SecurityError> {
        use argon2::PasswordVerifier;
        use subtle::ConstantTimeEq;

        // Parse and extract key bytes
        let key_bytes = self.parse_key(provided_key)?;

        let mut combined = Vec::new();
        combined.extend_from_slice(&key_bytes);
        combined.extend_from_slice(&self.pepper);

        let parsed_hash = argon2::PasswordHash::new(stored_hash)
            .map_err(|e| SecurityError::InvalidHash(e.to_string()))?;

        // Constant-time verification
        match Argon2::default().verify_password(&combined, &parsed_hash) {
            Ok(_) => Ok(true),
            Err(_) => Ok(false),
        }
    }
}

pub struct ApiKey {
    pub key: String,          // Never logged or displayed
    pub hash: String,         // Stored in database
    pub created_at: chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc>,
    pub expires_at: Option<chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc>>,
}
```

#### Key Rotation Policy
- **Automatic rotation**: Every 90 days for high-privilege keys
- **Manual rotation**: Available at any time via API
- **Grace period**: 7 days overlap for seamless transition
- **Revocation**: Immediate invalidation with audit trail

### 1.2 Token Generation and Expiry

#### JWT Implementation
```rust
use jsonwebtoken::{encode, decode, Header, Algorithm, Validation, EncodingKey, DecodingKey};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};

#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct Claims {
    sub: String,           // Subject (API key ID)
    exp: usize,           // Expiry timestamp
    iat: usize,           // Issued at
    nbf: usize,           // Not before
    jti: String,          // JWT ID (for revocation)
    scopes: Vec<String>,  // Permission scopes

    // Custom claims
    rate_limit_tier: String,
    max_image_size: usize,
}

pub struct TokenManager {
    encoding_key: EncodingKey,
    decoding_key: DecodingKey,
    revoked_tokens: Arc<DashSet<String>>, // Distributed revocation list
}

impl TokenManager {
    /// Generate short-lived access token
    pub fn generate_access_token(&self, api_key_id: &str, scopes: Vec<String>) -> Result<String, SecurityError> {
        let now = chrono::Utc::now();
        let expiry = now + chrono::Duration::minutes(15); // 15-minute expiry

        let claims = Claims {
            sub: api_key_id.to_string(),
            exp: expiry.timestamp() as usize,
            iat: now.timestamp() as usize,
            nbf: now.timestamp() as usize,
            jti: uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
            scopes,
            rate_limit_tier: "standard".to_string(),
            max_image_size: 10 * 1024 * 1024, // 10MB
        };

        encode(&Header::new(Algorithm::EdDSA), &claims, &self.encoding_key)
            .map_err(|e| SecurityError::TokenGenerationFailed(e.to_string()))
    }

    /// Validate and decode token
    pub fn validate_token(&self, token: &str) -> Result<Claims, SecurityError> {
        // Check revocation list first (fast path)
        if self.is_revoked(token) {
            return Err(SecurityError::TokenRevoked);
        }

        let mut validation = Validation::new(Algorithm::EdDSA);
        validation.set_required_spec_claims(&["exp", "sub", "iat"]);

        let token_data = decode::<Claims>(token, &self.decoding_key, &validation)
            .map_err(|e| SecurityError::InvalidToken(e.to_string()))?;

        // Double-check JTI in revocation list (defense in depth)
        if self.revoked_tokens.contains(&token_data.claims.jti) {
            return Err(SecurityError::TokenRevoked);
        }

        Ok(token_data.claims)
    }

    /// Revoke token immediately
    pub fn revoke_token(&self, jti: &str) {
        self.revoked_tokens.insert(jti.to_string());
        // Also propagate to distributed cache (Redis/etc)
    }
}
```

### 1.3 Client-Side vs Server-Side Keys

#### Key Classification
```rust
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum KeyType {
    /// Server-side keys: Full API access, never exposed to browsers
    ServerSide,

    /// Client-side keys: Limited scope, rate-limited, domain-restricted
    ClientSide,

    /// Service keys: M2M communication, specific service scopes
    Service,
}

pub struct KeyConfig {
    key_type: KeyType,
    allowed_domains: Vec<String>,     // CORS whitelist
    allowed_ips: Vec<IpNet>,          // IP whitelist
    max_requests_per_minute: u32,
    allowed_scopes: Vec<Scope>,
}

#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum Scope {
    // Read-only scopes (safe for client-side)
    ReadEquations,
    ReadImages,

    // Write scopes (server-side only)
    WriteEquations,
    ProcessBatch,
    AccessAnalytics,

    // Admin scopes (highly restricted)
    ManageKeys,
    AccessAuditLogs,
}

impl KeyConfig {
    /// Validate scope is allowed for key type
    pub fn validate_scope(&self, scope: &Scope) -> bool {
        match self.key_type {
            KeyType::ClientSide => {
                // Client-side keys restricted to read-only operations
                matches!(scope, Scope::ReadEquations | Scope::ReadImages)
            },
            KeyType::ServerSide => {
                // Server-side keys can access all non-admin scopes
                !matches!(scope, Scope::ManageKeys | Scope::AccessAuditLogs)
            },
            KeyType::Service => {
                // Service keys have explicit scope list
                self.allowed_scopes.contains(scope)
            }
        }
    }
}
```

---

## 2. Authorization System

### 2.1 Permission Levels

#### Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
```rust
use std::collections::HashSet;

#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
pub enum Permission {
    // Basic permissions
    ProcessImage,
    ProcessEquation,

    // Batch operations
    ProcessBatch,

    // Analytics
    ViewUsageStats,
    ViewDetailedAnalytics,

    // Administration
    ManageApiKeys,
    ViewAuditLogs,
    ConfigureRateLimits,
}

#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub enum Role {
    Free,
    Standard,
    Premium,
    Enterprise,
    Admin,
}

impl Role {
    pub fn permissions(&self) -> HashSet<Permission> {
        use Permission::*;

        match self {
            Role::Free => {
                vec![ProcessImage, ProcessEquation].into_iter().collect()
            },
            Role::Standard => {
                vec![
                    ProcessImage,
                    ProcessEquation,
                    ProcessBatch,
                    ViewUsageStats,
                ].into_iter().collect()
            },
            Role::Premium => {
                vec![
                    ProcessImage,
                    ProcessEquation,
                    ProcessBatch,
                    ViewUsageStats,
                    ViewDetailedAnalytics,
                ].into_iter().collect()
            },
            Role::Enterprise => {
                vec![
                    ProcessImage,
                    ProcessEquation,
                    ProcessBatch,
                    ViewUsageStats,
                    ViewDetailedAnalytics,
                    ManageApiKeys,
                ].into_iter().collect()
            },
            Role::Admin => {
                vec![
                    ProcessImage,
                    ProcessEquation,
                    ProcessBatch,
                    ViewUsageStats,
                    ViewDetailedAnalytics,
                    ManageApiKeys,
                    ViewAuditLogs,
                    ConfigureRateLimits,
                ].into_iter().collect()
            }
        }
    }
}

pub struct AuthorizationService {
    role_cache: Arc<DashMap<String, Role>>,
}

impl AuthorizationService {
    pub fn check_permission(&self, user_id: &str, permission: Permission) -> Result<(), AuthError> {
        let role = self.role_cache
            .get(user_id)
            .ok_or(AuthError::UserNotFound)?;

        if role.permissions().contains(&permission) {
            Ok(())
        } else {
            Err(AuthError::InsufficientPermissions {
                required: permission,
                user_role: role.clone(),
            })
        }
    }
}
```

### 2.2 Rate Limiting Per Key

#### Token Bucket Algorithm with Distributed State
```rust
use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
use dashmap::DashMap;

pub struct RateLimiter {
    buckets: Arc<DashMap<String, TokenBucket>>,
    tiers: Arc<DashMap<String, RateLimitTier>>,
}

#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct RateLimitTier {
    requests_per_second: u32,
    burst_size: u32,
    daily_quota: Option<u64>,
}

struct TokenBucket {
    tokens: f64,
    capacity: f64,
    refill_rate: f64,
    last_refill: Instant,
    daily_count: u64,
    daily_reset: Instant,
}

impl RateLimiter {
    pub fn new() -> Self {
        let mut tiers = DashMap::new();

        tiers.insert("free".to_string(), RateLimitTier {
            requests_per_second: 1,
            burst_size: 5,
            daily_quota: Some(100),
        });

        tiers.insert("standard".to_string(), RateLimitTier {
            requests_per_second: 10,
            burst_size: 50,
            daily_quota: Some(10_000),
        });

        tiers.insert("premium".to_string(), RateLimitTier {
            requests_per_second: 100,
            burst_size: 500,
            daily_quota: Some(1_000_000),
        });

        tiers.insert("enterprise".to_string(), RateLimitTier {
            requests_per_second: 1000,
            burst_size: 5000,
            daily_quota: None, // Unlimited
        });

        Self {
            buckets: Arc::new(DashMap::new()),
            tiers: Arc::new(tiers),
        }
    }

    /// Check and consume tokens (returns remaining tokens or error)
    pub async fn check_limit(&self, key_id: &str, tier: &str, cost: u32) -> Result<u64, RateLimitError> {
        let tier_config = self.tiers
            .get(tier)
            .ok_or(RateLimitError::UnknownTier)?;

        // Initialize or get bucket
        let mut bucket_ref = self.buckets.entry(key_id.to_string()).or_insert_with(|| {
            TokenBucket {
                tokens: tier_config.burst_size as f64,
                capacity: tier_config.burst_size as f64,
                refill_rate: tier_config.requests_per_second as f64,
                last_refill: Instant::now(),
                daily_count: 0,
                daily_reset: Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(86400),
            }
        });

        let bucket = bucket_ref.value_mut();

        // Refill tokens based on elapsed time
        let now = Instant::now();
        let elapsed = now.duration_since(bucket.last_refill).as_secs_f64();
        bucket.tokens = (bucket.tokens + elapsed * bucket.refill_rate).min(bucket.capacity);
        bucket.last_refill = now;

        // Reset daily counter if needed
        if now >= bucket.daily_reset {
            bucket.daily_count = 0;
            bucket.daily_reset = now + Duration::from_secs(86400);
        }

        // Check daily quota
        if let Some(quota) = tier_config.daily_quota {
            if bucket.daily_count >= quota {
                return Err(RateLimitError::DailyQuotaExceeded {
                    quota,
                    reset_at: bucket.daily_reset,
                });
            }
        }

        // Check if enough tokens available
        if bucket.tokens >= cost as f64 {
            bucket.tokens -= cost as f64;
            bucket.daily_count += cost as u64;
            Ok(bucket.tokens as u64)
        } else {
            Err(RateLimitError::RateLimitExceeded {
                retry_after: Duration::from_secs_f64((cost as f64 - bucket.tokens) / bucket.refill_rate),
            })
        }
    }
}

#[derive(Debug)]
pub enum RateLimitError {
    RateLimitExceeded { retry_after: Duration },
    DailyQuotaExceeded { quota: u64, reset_at: Instant },
    UnknownTier,
}
```

### 2.3 Feature Access Control

#### Feature Flags with Permission Gating
```rust
pub struct FeatureGate {
    features: DashMap<String, FeatureConfig>,
}

#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct FeatureConfig {
    name: String,
    enabled: bool,
    required_role: Role,
    required_permissions: Vec<Permission>,
    beta_access: bool,
}

impl FeatureGate {
    pub fn can_access_feature(&self, user_id: &str, feature: &str) -> Result<(), FeatureError> {
        let config = self.features
            .get(feature)
            .ok_or(FeatureError::UnknownFeature)?;

        if !config.enabled {
            return Err(FeatureError::FeatureDisabled);
        }

        // Check role requirement
        let user_role = self.get_user_role(user_id)?;
        if !self.role_satisfies(&user_role, &config.required_role) {
            return Err(FeatureError::InsufficientRole);
        }

        // Check beta access
        if config.beta_access && !self.has_beta_access(user_id)? {
            return Err(FeatureError::BetaAccessRequired);
        }

        Ok(())
    }
}
```

---

## 3. Data Privacy

### 3.1 Image Data Handling

#### Zero-Persistence Default Policy
```rust
pub struct ImageProcessor {
    temp_storage: TempStorage,
    max_retention: Duration,
}

impl ImageProcessor {
    /// Process image with automatic cleanup
    pub async fn process_image(&self, image_data: Vec<u8>, request_id: &str) -> Result<OcrResult, ProcessingError> {
        // Create temporary storage with auto-cleanup
        let temp_file = self.temp_storage.create_temp_file(request_id, image_data)?;

        // Ensure cleanup on drop
        let _cleanup_guard = CleanupGuard::new(temp_file.path());

        // Process image
        let result = self.run_ocr(&temp_file).await?;

        // Explicit cleanup (guard ensures it happens even on panic)
        drop(_cleanup_guard);

        Ok(result)
    }
}

/// RAII guard for automatic cleanup
struct CleanupGuard {
    path: PathBuf,
}

impl CleanupGuard {
    fn new(path: PathBuf) -> Self {
        Self { path }
    }
}

impl Drop for CleanupGuard {
    fn drop(&mut self) {
        // Secure deletion: overwrite before removal
        if let Ok(mut file) = std::fs::OpenOptions::new()
            .write(true)
            .open(&self.path)
        {
            let metadata = file.metadata().ok();
            if let Some(meta) = metadata {
                let size = meta.len();
                let zeros = vec![0u8; size as usize];
                let _ = file.write_all(&zeros);
                let _ = file.sync_all();
            }
        }

        // Remove file
        let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&self.path);
    }
}

/// Optional persistent storage (opt-in only)
pub struct OptInStorage {
    enabled: bool,
    encryption_key: [u8; 32],
    retention_policy: RetentionPolicy,
}

impl OptInStorage {
    pub async fn store_if_enabled(&self, user_consent: bool, data: &[u8]) -> Result<(), StorageError> {
        if !self.enabled || !user_consent {
            return Ok(()); // Skip storage
        }

        // Encrypt before storage
        let encrypted = self.encrypt_data(data)?;

        // Store with retention metadata
        self.persist_encrypted(encrypted, self.retention_policy.duration).await?;

        Ok(())
    }
}
```

### 3.2 GDPR Compliance

#### Data Subject Rights Implementation
```rust
pub struct GdprCompliance {
    data_registry: Arc<DashMap<String, UserDataRecord>>,
    deletion_queue: Arc<Mutex<VecDeque<DeletionRequest>>>,
}

#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct UserDataRecord {
    user_id: String,
    data_locations: Vec<DataLocation>,
    processing_purposes: Vec<ProcessingPurpose>,
    consent_given: bool,
    consent_timestamp: chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc>,
}

impl GdprCompliance {
    /// Right to Access (Article 15)
    pub async fn export_user_data(&self, user_id: &str) -> Result<UserDataExport, GdprError> {
        let record = self.data_registry
            .get(user_id)
            .ok_or(GdprError::UserNotFound)?;

        let mut export = UserDataExport::new(user_id);

        for location in &record.data_locations {
            let data = self.retrieve_data(location).await?;
            export.add_data(location.category.clone(), data);
        }

        Ok(export)
    }

    /// Right to Erasure (Article 17)
    pub async fn delete_user_data(&self, user_id: &str, reason: DeletionReason) -> Result<(), GdprError> {
        let record = self.data_registry
            .remove(user_id)
            .ok_or(GdprError::UserNotFound)?;

        // Queue deletion across all storage locations
        for location in record.1.data_locations {
            self.deletion_queue.lock().await.push_back(DeletionRequest {
                user_id: user_id.to_string(),
                location,
                reason: reason.clone(),
                requested_at: chrono::Utc::now(),
            });
        }

        // Process deletions
        self.process_deletion_queue().await?;

        // Audit log
        self.log_deletion(user_id, reason).await?;

        Ok(())
    }

    /// Right to Rectification (Article 16)
    pub async fn update_user_data(&self, user_id: &str, updates: DataUpdates) -> Result<(), GdprError> {
        // Implementation for data correction
        todo!()
    }

    /// Right to Data Portability (Article 20)
    pub async fn export_portable_format(&self, user_id: &str) -> Result<PortableData, GdprError> {
        let export = self.export_user_data(user_id).await?;

        // Convert to machine-readable format (JSON)
        Ok(PortableData {
            format: "application/json".to_string(),
            data: serde_json::to_vec(&export)?,
        })
    }
}
```

### 3.3 Data Retention Policies

#### Automated Retention Management
```rust
pub struct RetentionPolicy {
    default_retention: Duration,
    category_policies: HashMap<DataCategory, Duration>,
}

#[derive(Debug, Clone, Hash, Eq, PartialEq)]
pub enum DataCategory {
    ProcessedImages,      // 0 seconds (immediate deletion)
    ApiLogs,             // 90 days
    AuditLogs,           // 7 years
    UserProfiles,        // Until account deletion
    BillingRecords,      // 7 years (legal requirement)
}

impl RetentionPolicy {
    pub fn retention_period(&self, category: DataCategory) -> Duration {
        self.category_policies
            .get(&category)
            .copied()
            .unwrap_or(self.default_retention)
    }

    pub async fn enforce_retention(&self, storage: &dyn Storage) -> Result<(), RetentionError> {
        for (category, period) in &self.category_policies {
            let cutoff = chrono::Utc::now() - chrono::Duration::from_std(*period)?;

            // Delete data older than retention period
            storage.delete_older_than(category, cutoff).await?;
        }

        Ok(())
    }
}
```

### 3.4 Audit Logging

#### Tamper-Proof Audit Trail
```rust
use sha2::{Sha256, Digest};

pub struct AuditLogger {
    log_chain: Arc<Mutex<Vec<AuditEntry>>>,
    storage: Arc<dyn AuditStorage>,
}

#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize)]
pub struct AuditEntry {
    timestamp: chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc>,
    event_type: AuditEventType,
    user_id: String,
    ip_address: IpAddr,
    user_agent: String,
    action: String,
    resource: String,
    result: ActionResult,
    previous_hash: String,
    current_hash: String,
}

#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize)]
pub enum AuditEventType {
    Authentication,
    Authorization,
    DataAccess,
    DataModification,
    DataDeletion,
    ConfigChange,
    SecurityEvent,
}

impl AuditLogger {
    /// Log event with chain verification
    pub async fn log(&self, event: AuditEvent) -> Result<(), AuditError> {
        let mut chain = self.log_chain.lock().await;

        let previous_hash = chain.last()
            .map(|e| e.current_hash.clone())
            .unwrap_or_else(|| "genesis".to_string());

        let entry = AuditEntry {
            timestamp: chrono::Utc::now(),
            event_type: event.event_type,
            user_id: event.user_id,
            ip_address: event.ip_address,
            user_agent: event.user_agent,
            action: event.action,
            resource: event.resource,
            result: event.result,
            previous_hash: previous_hash.clone(),
            current_hash: String::new(), // Computed below
        };

        // Compute hash of current entry
        let current_hash = self.compute_hash(&entry)?;
        let mut entry = entry;
        entry.current_hash = current_hash;

        // Append to chain
        chain.push(entry.clone());

        // Persist to storage
        self.storage.append(entry).await?;

        Ok(())
    }

    fn compute_hash(&self, entry: &AuditEntry) -> Result<String, AuditError> {
        let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
        hasher.update(entry.timestamp.to_rfc3339().as_bytes());
        hasher.update(entry.user_id.as_bytes());
        hasher.update(entry.action.as_bytes());
        hasher.update(entry.previous_hash.as_bytes());

        Ok(format!("{:x}", hasher.finalize()))
    }

    /// Verify audit log integrity
    pub async fn verify_integrity(&self) -> Result<bool, AuditError> {
        let chain = self.log_chain.lock().await;

        for i in 1..chain.len() {
            if chain[i].previous_hash != chain[i-1].current_hash {
                return Ok(false); // Chain broken
            }

            // Verify current hash
            let computed = self.compute_hash(&chain[i])?;
            if computed != chain[i].current_hash {
                return Ok(false); // Hash mismatch
            }
        }

        Ok(true)
    }
}
```

---

## 4. Input Validation

### 4.1 Image Size Limits

```rust
pub struct ImageValidator {
    max_file_size: usize,
    max_dimensions: (u32, u32),
    max_pixel_count: u64,
}

impl ImageValidator {
    pub fn new() -> Self {
        Self {
            max_file_size: 10 * 1024 * 1024,  // 10 MB
            max_dimensions: (8192, 8192),      // 8K resolution
            max_pixel_count: 50_000_000,       // 50 megapixels
        }
    }

    pub fn validate_size(&self, data: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ValidationError> {
        if data.len() > self.max_file_size {
            return Err(ValidationError::FileTooLarge {
                size: data.len(),
                max_size: self.max_file_size,
            });
        }
        Ok(())
    }

    pub fn validate_dimensions(&self, image: &DynamicImage) -> Result<(), ValidationError> {
        let (width, height) = (image.width(), image.height());

        if width > self.max_dimensions.0 || height > self.max_dimensions.1 {
            return Err(ValidationError::DimensionsTooLarge {
                dimensions: (width, height),
                max_dimensions: self.max_dimensions,
            });
        }

        let pixel_count = width as u64 * height as u64;
        if pixel_count > self.max_pixel_count {
            return Err(ValidationError::TooManyPixels {
                count: pixel_count,
                max_count: self.max_pixel_count,
            });
        }

        Ok(())
    }
}
```

### 4.2 File Type Validation

```rust
pub struct FileTypeValidator {
    allowed_types: HashSet<ImageFormat>,
}

impl FileTypeValidator {
    pub fn validate(&self, data: &[u8]) -> Result<ImageFormat, ValidationError> {
        // Check magic bytes
        let format = self.detect_format(data)?;

        if !self.allowed_types.contains(&format) {
            return Err(ValidationError::UnsupportedFormat {
                detected: format,
                allowed: self.allowed_types.clone(),
            });
        }

        // Additional format-specific validation
        match format {
            ImageFormat::Png => self.validate_png(data)?,
            ImageFormat::Jpeg => self.validate_jpeg(data)?,
            ImageFormat::WebP => self.validate_webp(data)?,
            _ => {}
        }

        Ok(format)
    }

    fn detect_format(&self, data: &[u8]) -> Result<ImageFormat, ValidationError> {
        if data.len() < 12 {
            return Err(ValidationError::FileTooSmall);
        }

        // Check magic bytes
        match &data[0..4] {
            [0x89, b'P', b'N', b'G'] => Ok(ImageFormat::Png),
            [0xFF, 0xD8, 0xFF, _] => Ok(ImageFormat::Jpeg),
            [b'R', b'I', b'F', b'F'] if &data[8..12] == b"WEBP" => Ok(ImageFormat::WebP),
            _ => Err(ValidationError::UnknownFormat),
        }
    }
}
```

### 4.3 Malicious File Detection

```rust
pub struct MalwareScanner {
    yara_rules: yara::Rules,
    suspicious_patterns: Vec<Pattern>,
}

impl MalwareScanner {
    pub async fn scan(&self, data: &[u8]) -> Result<ScanResult, ScanError> {
        let mut threats = Vec::new();

        // YARA scanning
        let matches = self.yara_rules.scan_mem(data, 30)?;
        for m in matches {
            threats.push(Threat {
                severity: Severity::High,
                description: format!("YARA rule matched: {}", m.identifier),
            });
        }

        // Check for polyglot files
        if self.is_polyglot(data) {
            threats.push(Threat {
                severity: Severity::Medium,
                description: "Polyglot file detected (valid as multiple formats)".to_string(),
            });
        }

        // Check for embedded executables
        if self.contains_executable(data) {
            threats.push(Threat {
                severity: Severity::Critical,
                description: "Embedded executable code detected".to_string(),
            });
        }

        // Check for steganography indicators
        if self.has_steganography_markers(data) {
            threats.push(Threat {
                severity: Severity::Low,
                description: "Possible steganographic content".to_string(),
            });
        }

        Ok(ScanResult { threats })
    }

    fn is_polyglot(&self, data: &[u8]) -> bool {
        // Check if file is valid as multiple formats
        let mut valid_formats = 0;

        if self.is_valid_png(data) { valid_formats += 1; }
        if self.is_valid_jpeg(data) { valid_formats += 1; }
        if self.is_valid_gif(data) { valid_formats += 1; }

        valid_formats > 1
    }

    fn contains_executable(&self, data: &[u8]) -> bool {
        // Check for PE header
        if data.windows(2).any(|w| w == b"MZ") {
            return true;
        }

        // Check for ELF header
        if data.starts_with(b"\x7fELF") {
            return true;
        }

        // Check for Mach-O header
        if data.starts_with(&[0xFE, 0xED, 0xFA, 0xCE]) ||
           data.starts_with(&[0xCE, 0xFA, 0xED, 0xFE]) {
            return true;
        }

        false
    }
}
```

### 4.4 Path Traversal Prevention

```rust
pub struct PathValidator {
    allowed_base_dir: PathBuf,
}

impl PathValidator {
    pub fn validate_path(&self, user_path: &Path) -> Result<PathBuf, ValidationError> {
        // Canonicalize to resolve '..' and symlinks
        let canonical = user_path.canonicalize()
            .map_err(|_| ValidationError::InvalidPath)?;

        // Ensure path is within allowed directory
        if !canonical.starts_with(&self.allowed_base_dir) {
            return Err(ValidationError::PathTraversal {
                attempted: canonical,
                allowed_base: self.allowed_base_dir.clone(),
            });
        }

        // Check for suspicious components
        for component in canonical.components() {
            match component {
                std::path::Component::ParentDir => {
                    return Err(ValidationError::SuspiciousPath("Contains '..'".to_string()));
                }
                std::path::Component::Normal(s) => {
                    if s.to_string_lossy().contains('\0') {
                        return Err(ValidationError::SuspiciousPath("Contains null byte".to_string()));
                    }
                }
                _ => {}
            }
        }

        Ok(canonical)
    }
}
```

---

## 5. Secure Processing

### 5.1 Sandboxed Inference

```rust
use nix::unistd::{fork, ForkResult};
use nix::sys::wait::waitpid;

pub struct SandboxedInference {
    resource_limits: ResourceLimits,
}

#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct ResourceLimits {
    max_memory: usize,
    max_cpu_time: Duration,
    max_file_descriptors: u64,
}

impl SandboxedInference {
    pub async fn run_in_sandbox<F, T>(&self, f: F) -> Result<T, SandboxError>
    where
        F: FnOnce() -> T + Send,
        T: Send,
    {
        match unsafe { fork() } {
            Ok(ForkResult::Parent { child }) => {
                // Parent process: wait for child with timeout
                let timeout = self.resource_limits.max_cpu_time;

                match tokio::time::timeout(timeout, async {
                    waitpid(child, None)
                }).await {
                    Ok(Ok(status)) => {
                        if status.success() {
                            // Read result from shared memory or pipe
                            Ok(todo!()) // Retrieve result
                        } else {
                            Err(SandboxError::ProcessFailed)
                        }
                    }
                    Ok(Err(e)) => Err(SandboxError::WaitFailed(e)),
                    Err(_) => {
                        // Timeout: kill child
                        let _ = nix::sys::signal::kill(child, nix::sys::signal::SIGKILL);
                        Err(SandboxError::Timeout)
                    }
                }
            }
            Ok(ForkResult::Child) => {
                // Child process: set resource limits and execute
                self.apply_resource_limits()?;

                let result = f();

                // Write result to shared memory or pipe
                std::process::exit(0);
            }
            Err(e) => Err(SandboxError::ForkFailed(e)),
        }
    }

    fn apply_resource_limits(&self) -> Result<(), SandboxError> {
        use nix::sys::resource::{setrlimit, Resource};

        // Memory limit
        setrlimit(
            Resource::RLIMIT_AS,
            self.resource_limits.max_memory as u64,
            self.resource_limits.max_memory as u64,
        )?;

        // CPU time limit
        let cpu_secs = self.resource_limits.max_cpu_time.as_secs();
        setrlimit(
            Resource::RLIMIT_CPU,
            cpu_secs,
            cpu_secs,
        )?;

        // File descriptor limit
        setrlimit(
            Resource::RLIMIT_NOFILE,
            self.resource_limits.max_file_descriptors,
            self.resource_limits.max_file_descriptors,
        )?;

        Ok(())
    }
}
```

### 5.2 Memory Isolation

```rust
pub struct IsolatedMemoryPool {
    pool: Arc<Mutex<Vec<Vec<u8>>>>,
    max_pool_size: usize,
}

impl IsolatedMemoryPool {
    /// Allocate isolated memory region
    pub fn allocate(&self, size: usize) -> Result<IsolatedBuffer, MemoryError> {
        if size > self.max_pool_size {
            return Err(MemoryError::AllocationTooLarge);
        }

        // Allocate page-aligned memory
        let layout = std::alloc::Layout::from_size_align(size, 4096)
            .map_err(|_| MemoryError::InvalidAlignment)?;

        let ptr = unsafe { std::alloc::alloc_zeroed(layout) };

        if ptr.is_null() {
            return Err(MemoryError::AllocationFailed);
        }

        // Lock pages to prevent swapping (sensitive data)
        #[cfg(unix)]
        unsafe {
            libc::mlock(ptr as *const libc::c_void, size);
        }

        Ok(IsolatedBuffer {
            ptr,
            size,
            layout,
        })
    }
}

pub struct IsolatedBuffer {
    ptr: *mut u8,
    size: usize,
    layout: std::alloc::Layout,
}

impl Drop for IsolatedBuffer {
    fn drop(&mut self) {
        unsafe {
            // Zero memory before deallocation
            std::ptr::write_bytes(self.ptr, 0, self.size);

            // Unlock pages
            #[cfg(unix)]
            libc::munlock(self.ptr as *const libc::c_void, self.size);

            // Deallocate
            std::alloc::dealloc(self.ptr, self.layout);
        }
    }
}

unsafe impl Send for IsolatedBuffer {}
unsafe impl Sync for IsolatedBuffer {}
```

### 5.3 Resource Limits

```rust
pub struct ResourceGovernor {
    cpu_limit: CpuLimit,
    memory_limit: MemoryLimit,
    time_limit: TimeLimit,
}

pub struct CpuLimit {
    max_threads: usize,
    max_cpu_percent: f32,
}

impl CpuLimit {
    pub fn enforce(&self) -> Result<(), ResourceError> {
        // Set CPU affinity
        #[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
        {
            let max_cores = (num_cpus::get() as f32 * self.max_cpu_percent / 100.0).ceil() as usize;
            let mut cpu_set = nix::sched::CpuSet::new();

            for i in 0..max_cores {
                cpu_set.set(i)?;
            }

            nix::sched::sched_setaffinity(nix::unistd::Pid::from_raw(0), &cpu_set)?;
        }

        Ok(())
    }
}

pub struct MemoryLimit {
    max_heap: usize,
    max_stack: usize,
}

impl MemoryLimit {
    pub fn enforce(&self) -> Result<(), ResourceError> {
        use nix::sys::resource::{setrlimit, Resource};

        // Heap limit
        setrlimit(Resource::RLIMIT_DATA, self.max_heap as u64, self.max_heap as u64)?;

        // Stack limit
        setrlimit(Resource::RLIMIT_STACK, self.max_stack as u64, self.max_stack as u64)?;

        Ok(())
    }
}

pub struct TimeLimit {
    max_duration: Duration,
}

impl TimeLimit {
    pub async fn enforce<F, T>(&self, future: F) -> Result<T, ResourceError>
    where
        F: Future<Output = T>,
    {
        tokio::time::timeout(self.max_duration, future)
            .await
            .map_err(|_| ResourceError::TimeoutExceeded)
    }
}
```

---

## 6. Transport Security

### 6.1 TLS 1.3 Enforcement

```rust
use rustls::{ServerConfig, ClientConfig};
use rustls::version::TLS13;

pub struct TlsConfigBuilder {
    cert_resolver: Arc<dyn ResolvesServerCert>,
}

impl TlsConfigBuilder {
    pub fn build_server_config(&self) -> Result<ServerConfig, TlsError> {
        let mut config = ServerConfig::builder()
            .with_safe_default_cipher_suites()
            .with_safe_default_kx_groups()
            .with_protocol_versions(&[&TLS13])?  // TLS 1.3 only
            .with_no_client_auth()
            .with_cert_resolver(self.cert_resolver.clone());

        // Disable session resumption (enforce fresh handshakes)
        config.session_storage = Arc::new(rustls::server::NoServerSessionStorage {});

        // Enable ALPN for HTTP/2
        config.alpn_protocols = vec![b"h2".to_vec(), b"http/1.1".to_vec()];

        Ok(config)
    }

    pub fn build_client_config(&self) -> Result<ClientConfig, TlsError> {
        let mut config = ClientConfig::builder()
            .with_safe_default_cipher_suites()
            .with_safe_default_kx_groups()
            .with_protocol_versions(&[&TLS13])?  // TLS 1.3 only
            .with_root_certificates(self.load_root_certs()?)
            .with_no_client_auth();

        // Enable certificate transparency verification
        config.enable_sct = true;

        Ok(config)
    }
}
```

### 6.2 Certificate Management

```rust
use x509_parser::prelude::*;

pub struct CertificateManager {
    cert_store: Arc<DashMap<String, Certificate>>,
    renewal_threshold: Duration,
}

impl CertificateManager {
    /// Check certificate expiry and auto-renew
    pub async fn check_and_renew(&self, domain: &str) -> Result<(), CertError> {
        let cert = self.cert_store.get(domain)
            .ok_or(CertError::CertificateNotFound)?;

        let expires_at = cert.validity_period.not_after;
        let now = chrono::Utc::now();

        let time_until_expiry = expires_at.signed_duration_since(now);

        if time_until_expiry < self.renewal_threshold {
            // Renew certificate via ACME
            let new_cert = self.renew_via_acme(domain).await?;
            self.cert_store.insert(domain.to_string(), new_cert);
        }

        Ok(())
    }

    async fn renew_via_acme(&self, domain: &str) -> Result<Certificate, CertError> {
        // ACME protocol implementation
        todo!()
    }

    /// Validate certificate chain
    pub fn validate_chain(&self, cert_chain: &[Certificate]) -> Result<(), CertError> {
        for i in 0..cert_chain.len() - 1 {
            let cert = &cert_chain[i];
            let issuer = &cert_chain[i + 1];

            // Verify signature
            if !self.verify_signature(cert, issuer)? {
                return Err(CertError::InvalidSignature);
            }

            // Check validity period
            if !cert.is_valid_at(chrono::Utc::now()) {
                return Err(CertError::CertificateExpired);
            }

            // Check revocation status (OCSP)
            if self.is_revoked(cert).await? {
                return Err(CertError::CertificateRevoked);
            }
        }

        Ok(())
    }
}
```

### 6.3 CORS Policies

```rust
use axum::http::Method;
use tower_http::cors::{CorsLayer, AllowOrigin};

pub struct CorsConfigBuilder {
    allowed_origins: Vec<String>,
}

impl CorsConfigBuilder {
    pub fn build(&self) -> CorsLayer {
        CorsLayer::new()
            // Specific origins (no wildcard for credentials)
            .allow_origin(AllowOrigin::list(
                self.allowed_origins.iter()
                    .map(|o| o.parse().unwrap())
            ))
            // Allowed methods
            .allow_methods([Method::GET, Method::POST, Method::OPTIONS])
            // Allowed headers
            .allow_headers([
                "Authorization",
                "Content-Type",
                "X-Request-ID",
            ])
            // Expose headers
            .expose_headers([
                "X-RateLimit-Remaining",
                "X-RateLimit-Reset",
            ])
            // Max age for preflight cache (1 hour)
            .max_age(Duration::from_secs(3600))
            // Allow credentials
            .allow_credentials(true)
    }
}
```

---

## 7. Dependency Security

### 7.1 Cargo Audit Integration

```toml
# .github/workflows/security-audit.yml
name: Security Audit
on:
  schedule:
    - cron: '0 0 * * *'  # Daily
  pull_request:
  push:
    branches: [main]

jobs:
  audit:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v3

      - name: Install cargo-audit
        run: cargo install cargo-audit

      - name: Run audit
        run: cargo audit --deny warnings

      - name: Check for yanked crates
        run: cargo audit --deny yanked

      - name: Generate SBOM
        run: cargo install cargo-sbom && cargo sbom > sbom.json

      - name: Upload SBOM
        uses: actions/upload-artifact@v3
        with:
          name: sbom
          path: sbom.json
```

### 7.2 Supply Chain Security

```rust
// build.rs - Verify dependency integrity at build time
use std::process::Command;

fn main() {
    // Verify cargo.lock exists and is committed
    if !std::path::Path::new("Cargo.lock").exists() {
        panic!("Cargo.lock must exist and be committed");
    }

    // Run cargo-deny checks
    let output = Command::new("cargo")
        .args(&["deny", "check"])
        .output()
        .expect("Failed to run cargo-deny");

    if !output.status.success() {
        panic!("cargo-deny checks failed");
    }

    // Verify no git dependencies (security risk)
    let cargo_toml = std::fs::read_to_string("Cargo.toml")
        .expect("Failed to read Cargo.toml");

    if cargo_toml.contains("git =") {
        panic!("Git dependencies are not allowed in production");
    }
}
```

```toml
# deny.toml - cargo-deny configuration
[advisories]
vulnerability = "deny"
unmaintained = "warn"
yanked = "deny"
notice = "warn"

[licenses]
unlicensed = "deny"
allow = [
    "MIT",
    "Apache-2.0",
    "BSD-3-Clause",
]
deny = [
    "GPL-3.0",
    "AGPL-3.0",
]

[bans]
multiple-versions = "warn"
wildcards = "deny"

[sources]
unknown-registry = "deny"
unknown-git = "deny"
allow-git = []
```

### 7.3 Minimal Dependencies

```toml
# Cargo.toml - Minimal dependency strategy
[dependencies]
# Use feature flags to minimize attack surface
tokio = { version = "1", default-features = false, features = ["rt", "net"] }
serde = { version = "1", default-features = false, features = ["derive"] }

# Prefer well-audited crates
rustls = "0.21"  # Instead of openssl
ring = "0.17"    # Cryptography

# Avoid unnecessary dependencies
# ❌ regex = "1"        # Heavy dependency
# ✅ Use stdlib when possible

[dev-dependencies]
# Development dependencies don't affect production binary
criterion = "0.5"
```

---

## 8. Error Handling

### 8.1 Safe Error Messages

```rust
use thiserror::Error;

#[derive(Error, Debug)]
pub enum ApiError {
    #[error("Authentication failed")]
    AuthenticationFailed,  // Don't leak why

    #[error("Resource not found")]
    NotFound,  // Don't leak what

    #[error("Invalid input")]
    InvalidInput,  // Don't leak specifics

    #[error("Internal error occurred")]
    InternalError,  // Don't leak implementation details

    #[error("Rate limit exceeded")]
    RateLimitExceeded { retry_after: Duration },  // Safe to expose
}

impl ApiError {
    /// Convert to user-facing error response
    pub fn to_response(&self) -> ErrorResponse {
        match self {
            ApiError::AuthenticationFailed => ErrorResponse {
                code: "AUTH_FAILED",
                message: "Authentication failed".to_string(),
                details: None,  // No details
            },
            ApiError::InternalError => ErrorResponse {
                code: "INTERNAL_ERROR",
                message: "An internal error occurred".to_string(),
                details: None,  // Never expose internals
            },
            ApiError::RateLimitExceeded { retry_after } => ErrorResponse {
                code: "RATE_LIMIT",
                message: "Rate limit exceeded".to_string(),
                details: Some(json!({
                    "retry_after_seconds": retry_after.as_secs()
                })),
            },
            _ => ErrorResponse {
                code: "ERROR",
                message: "An error occurred".to_string(),
                details: None,
            }
        }
    }

    /// Internal error with full details (for logging only)
    pub fn internal_details(&self) -> String {
        // Full details only in logs, never in responses
        format!("{:?}", self)
    }
}
```

### 8.2 Logging Without PII

```rust
use tracing::{info, warn, error};

pub struct SafeLogger;

impl SafeLogger {
    /// Log request without PII
    pub fn log_request(&self, request: &Request) {
        info!(
            request_id = %request.id,
            method = %request.method,
            path = %self.sanitize_path(&request.path),
            ip = %self.anonymize_ip(&request.ip),
            user_agent_hash = %self.hash_user_agent(&request.user_agent),
            "Request received"
        );
    }

    fn sanitize_path(&self, path: &str) -> String {
        // Remove potential PII from path parameters
        path.split('/')
            .map(|segment| {
                if self.looks_like_pii(segment) {
                    "[REDACTED]"
                } else {
                    segment
                }
            })
            .collect::<Vec<_>>()
            .join("/")
    }

    fn anonymize_ip(&self, ip: &IpAddr) -> String {
        match ip {
            IpAddr::V4(ipv4) => {
                let octets = ipv4.octets();
                format!("{}.{}.0.0", octets[0], octets[1])
            }
            IpAddr::V6(ipv6) => {
                let segments = ipv6.segments();
                format!("{:x}:{:x}::", segments[0], segments[1])
            }
        }
    }

    fn hash_user_agent(&self, ua: &str) -> String {
        use sha2::{Sha256, Digest};
        let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
        hasher.update(ua.as_bytes());
        format!("{:x}", hasher.finalize())[..8].to_string()
    }

    fn looks_like_pii(&self, segment: &str) -> bool {
        // Email pattern
        if segment.contains('@') {
            return true;
        }

        // UUID pattern
        if uuid::Uuid::parse_str(segment).is_ok() {
            return true;
        }

        // Long numeric strings (potential IDs)
        if segment.len() > 10 && segment.chars().all(|c| c.is_numeric()) {
            return true;
        }

        false
    }
}
```

---

## 9. Open Source Considerations

### 9.1 License Compliance

```toml
# Cargo.toml
[package]
name = "ruvector-scipix"
license = "Apache-2.0"
license-file = "LICENSE"

[dependencies]
# All dependencies must have compatible licenses
# Verified via cargo-deny
```

```rust
// src/lib.rs
//! # License
//!
//! Copyright 2024 RuVector Contributors
//!
//! Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
//! you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
//! You may obtain a copy of the License at
//!
//!     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//!
//! Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
//! distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
//! WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
//! See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
//! limitations under the License.
```

### 9.2 Security Disclosure Process

```markdown
# SECURITY.md

## Reporting Security Vulnerabilities

**Please do not report security vulnerabilities through public GitHub issues.**

Instead, please report them via email to security@ruvector.io

Include:
- Description of the vulnerability
- Steps to reproduce
- Potential impact
- Suggested fix (if any)

## Response Timeline

- **24 hours**: Initial response acknowledging receipt
- **7 days**: Assessment and severity classification
- **30 days**: Fix development and testing
- **90 days**: Public disclosure (coordinated)

## Security Updates

Security updates are released as patch versions and announced via:
- GitHub Security Advisories
- Release notes
- Security mailing list

## Supported Versions

| Version | Supported          |
| ------- | ------------------ |
| 0.x.x   | :white_check_mark: |

## Security Best Practices

### For Users
- Always use the latest version
- Enable automatic updates
- Use API keys, not hardcoded credentials
- Rotate keys regularly
- Monitor audit logs

### For Contributors
- Run `cargo audit` before submitting PRs
- Never commit secrets or credentials
- Follow secure coding guidelines
- Add security tests for new features
```

### 9.3 Responsible Defaults

```rust
pub struct SecurityDefaults;

impl SecurityDefaults {
    /// Secure-by-default configuration
    pub fn production_config() -> Config {
        Config {
            // TLS required
            tls_enabled: true,
            tls_min_version: TlsVersion::Tls13,

            // Strong authentication
            require_api_key: true,
            allow_anonymous: false,

            // Data protection
            auto_delete_temp_files: true,
            max_file_retention: Duration::from_secs(0),  // Immediate deletion
            encrypt_at_rest: true,

            // Rate limiting
            rate_limit_enabled: true,
            default_rate_limit: RateLimitTier::Free,

            // Audit logging
            audit_enabled: true,
            log_level: LogLevel::Info,

            // Resource limits
            max_request_size: 10 * 1024 * 1024,  // 10MB
            max_processing_time: Duration::from_secs(30),

            // Security headers
            cors_enabled: true,
            cors_allow_credentials: false,  // Safer default
            hsts_enabled: true,
            csp_enabled: true,
        }
    }

    /// Development configuration (less restrictive)
    pub fn development_config() -> Config {
        let mut config = Self::production_config();

        // Relax some constraints for development
        config.tls_enabled = false;  // Allow HTTP for localhost
        config.rate_limit_enabled = false;  // Easier testing

        config
    }
}
```

---

## Security Testing

### Automated Security Tests

```rust
#[cfg(test)]
mod security_tests {
    use super::*;

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn test_sql_injection_prevention() {
        let malicious_input = "'; DROP TABLE users; --";
        let result = process_user_input(malicious_input).await;
        assert!(result.is_err());
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn test_path_traversal_prevention() {
        let malicious_path = "../../etc/passwd";
        let result = validate_file_path(malicious_path);
        assert!(matches!(result, Err(ValidationError::PathTraversal { .. })));
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn test_rate_limiting() {
        let limiter = RateLimiter::new();

        // Exhaust rate limit
        for _ in 0..100 {
            let _ = limiter.check_limit("user123", "free", 1).await;
        }

        // Next request should be blocked
        let result = limiter.check_limit("user123", "free", 1).await;
        assert!(matches!(result, Err(RateLimitError::RateLimitExceeded { .. })));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_constant_time_comparison() {
        use subtle::ConstantTimeEq;

        let secret1 = b"correct_password";
        let secret2 = b"correct_password";
        let wrong = b"wrong_password!!";

        // Correct comparison
        assert_eq!(secret1.ct_eq(secret2).unwrap_u8(), 1);

        // Wrong comparison
        assert_eq!(secret1.ct_eq(wrong).unwrap_u8(), 0);
    }
}
```

---

## Security Checklist

### Pre-Release Security Audit

- [ ] All dependencies audited (`cargo audit`)
- [ ] No hardcoded secrets or credentials
- [ ] TLS 1.3 enforced
- [ ] Rate limiting tested
- [ ] Input validation comprehensive
- [ ] Error messages don't leak information
- [ ] Audit logging enabled
- [ ] GDPR compliance verified
- [ ] Security tests passing
- [ ] Penetration testing completed
- [ ] Security documentation updated
- [ ] Incident response plan in place

### Deployment Security

- [ ] Secrets managed via environment variables or vault
- [ ] Firewall rules configured
- [ ] Monitoring and alerting enabled
- [ ] Backup and recovery tested
- [ ] Access controls reviewed
- [ ] Security headers configured
- [ ] HTTPS enforced
- [ ] Regular security updates scheduled

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## Conclusion

This security architecture provides defense-in-depth protection for the ruvector-scipix OCR system through:

1. **Strong Authentication**: API keys with Argon2 hashing and JWT tokens
2. **Granular Authorization**: RBAC with feature gating and rate limiting
3. **Privacy by Design**: GDPR compliance and minimal data retention
4. **Secure Processing**: Sandboxing, resource limits, and memory isolation
5. **Transport Security**: TLS 1.3 with certificate management
6. **Supply Chain Security**: Dependency auditing and minimal dependencies
7. **Responsible Defaults**: Secure-by-default configuration

**Security is not a feature—it's a foundational requirement.** This architecture must be maintained and updated as new threats emerge and best practices evolve.