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wifi-densepose/npm/packages/ruvbot/docs/adr/ADR-008-security-architecture.md
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# ADR-008: Security Architecture
## Status
Accepted
## Date
2026-01-27
## Context
RuvBot handles sensitive data including:
- User conversations and personal information
- API credentials for LLM providers
- Integration tokens (Slack, Discord)
- Vector embeddings that may encode sensitive content
- Multi-tenant data requiring strict isolation
## Decision
### Security Layers
```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Security Architecture │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Layer 1: Transport Security │
│ - TLS 1.3 for all connections │
│ - Certificate pinning for external APIs │
│ - HSTS enabled by default │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Layer 2: Authentication │
│ - JWT tokens with RS256 signing │
│ - OAuth 2.0 for Slack/Discord │
│ - API key authentication with rate limiting │
│ - Session tokens with secure rotation │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Layer 3: Authorization │
│ - RBAC with claims-based permissions │
│ - Tenant isolation at all layers │
│ - Skill-level permission grants │
│ - Resource-based access control │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Layer 4: Data Protection │
│ - AES-256-GCM for data at rest │
│ - Field-level encryption for sensitive data │
│ - Key rotation with envelope encryption │
│ - Secure secret management │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Layer 5: Input Validation │
│ - Zod schema validation for all inputs │
│ - SQL injection prevention (parameterized queries) │
│ - XSS prevention (content sanitization) │
│ - Path traversal prevention │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Layer 6: WASM Sandbox │
│ - Memory isolation per operation │
│ - Resource limits (CPU, memory) │
│ - No filesystem access from WASM │
│ - Controlled imports/exports │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```
### Multi-Tenancy Security
```sql
-- PostgreSQL Row-Level Security
CREATE POLICY tenant_isolation ON memories
USING (tenant_id = current_setting('app.current_tenant')::uuid);
CREATE POLICY tenant_isolation ON sessions
USING (tenant_id = current_setting('app.current_tenant')::uuid);
CREATE POLICY tenant_isolation ON agents
USING (tenant_id = current_setting('app.current_tenant')::uuid);
```
### Secret Management
```typescript
// Secrets are never logged or exposed
interface SecretStore {
get(key: string): Promise<string>;
set(key: string, value: string, options?: SecretOptions): Promise<void>;
rotate(key: string): Promise<void>;
delete(key: string): Promise<void>;
}
// Environment variable validation
const requiredSecrets = z.object({
ANTHROPIC_API_KEY: z.string().startsWith('sk-ant-'),
SLACK_BOT_TOKEN: z.string().startsWith('xoxb-').optional(),
DATABASE_URL: z.string().url().optional(),
});
```
### API Security
1. **Rate Limiting**: Per-tenant, per-endpoint limits
2. **Request Signing**: HMAC-SHA256 for webhooks
3. **IP Allowlisting**: Optional for enterprise
4. **Audit Logging**: All security events logged
### Vulnerability Prevention
| CVE Category | Prevention |
|--------------|------------|
| Injection (SQL, NoSQL, Command) | Parameterized queries, input validation |
| XSS | Content-Security-Policy, output encoding |
| CSRF | SameSite cookies, origin validation |
| SSRF | URL allowlisting, no user-controlled URLs |
| Path Traversal | Path sanitization, chroot for file ops |
| Sensitive Data Exposure | Encryption, minimal logging |
| Broken Authentication | Secure session management |
| Security Misconfiguration | Secure defaults, hardening guide |
### Compliance Readiness
- **GDPR**: Data export, deletion, consent tracking
- **SOC 2**: Audit logging, access controls
- **HIPAA**: Encryption, access logging (with configuration)
## Consequences
### Positive
- Defense in depth provides multiple security layers
- Multi-tenancy isolation prevents data leakage
- Comprehensive input validation blocks injection attacks
- WASM sandbox limits damage from malicious code
### Negative
- Performance overhead from encryption/validation
- Complexity in secret management
- Additional testing required for security features
### Risks
- Key management complexity
- Potential for misconfiguration
- Balance between security and usability
## Security Checklist
- [ ] TLS configured for all endpoints
- [ ] API keys stored in secure vault
- [ ] Rate limiting enabled
- [ ] Audit logging configured
- [ ] Input validation on all endpoints
- [ ] SQL injection tests passing
- [ ] XSS tests passing
- [ ] CSRF protection enabled
- [ ] Security headers configured
- [ ] Dependency vulnerabilities scanned