621 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Pol Henarejos
bb45c9b3a8 Merge branch 'master' into development-eddsa 2024-11-12 20:10:07 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
1ea0a91ba8 Fix initialization when initializing a RP2350 board for first time.
Fixes #60.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-11-12 19:25:22 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
6f572954d5 If the board is RP2350 or ESP32, the requested certificate must be for secp256k1 key.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-11-12 19:24:10 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
99a9803328 Update README.md
Fix headings
2024-11-10 19:00:29 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
5535f3ec10 No esp32 in eddsa workflows.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-11-09 18:47:41 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
f992a04142 Fix eddsa signature.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-11-09 18:45:05 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
d858a1e1d5 Upgrade to v5.0
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-11-09 18:10:56 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
b7c6ca58d0 Upgrade to v5.0
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-11-09 15:47:40 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
2f3d70fcac Upgrade mbedtls v3.6.2
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-11-09 15:16:32 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
91c641033a Merge branch 'development' 2024-11-09 15:00:26 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
f3bf3cd8f4 Do not use pico patcher script anymore.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-11-09 14:58:42 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
e4736cc448 Upgrade Pico Keys SDK to v7.0
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-11-09 14:58:06 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
bfa8891c8d Update README.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-11-09 14:54:51 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
618fdb4c1a Do not request dev cert when performing tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-11-09 00:50:51 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
9457433844 Add compile flags for optimization build in ESP32.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-11-09 00:20:31 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
c239b4dd7c Fix secure otp build for non rp2350.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-11-08 19:46:00 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
96359ebe03 Add secure boot and secure lock commands via rescue.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-11-08 19:36:54 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
f301b2a1b1 Add --no-dev-cert to do not request a certificate and use a self-signed one. Do not use if attestation is needed.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-11-08 19:13:14 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
4ec1d4d891 Fix initialization and terminal certificate generation.
Fixes #59.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-11-08 17:52:13 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
f1410bbf04 Only request and upload the device certificate if needed.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-11-08 17:45:48 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
9b9ea7cae5 Add product and mcu to info in rescue mode.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-11-07 20:00:41 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
f5b89aed69 Use DEV key from OTP if available when initializing.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-11-07 00:16:22 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
f74a374c64 Fix version header.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-11-05 19:33:07 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
3c6684cdab Rename CCID_ codes to PICOKEY_
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-11-05 19:29:00 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
20ef94c301 Upgrade Pico HSM Tool to v2.0
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-10-28 00:28:49 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
68360978d6 Use BOOTKEY instead of reading json.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-10-28 00:25:22 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
1933498a33 Add optional bootkey index param for secure_boot.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-10-28 00:24:17 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
0ce89ae968 Add support for lock chip on secure_boot.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-10-28 00:19:55 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
9fa3758dad Add support for OTP raw read/write.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-10-28 00:15:48 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
d1ee43baab Add secure_boot enable.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-10-27 02:37:16 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
2856ec6917 Align data in case it's not.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-10-27 02:14:51 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
ccec83dfb1 Fix otp write length check.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-10-27 01:41:12 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
9de1b4ca5d Fix OTP data check size.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-10-27 01:24:49 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
cbd9a5d296 Add sanitize check.
Only pages 0 and 1 are allowed for reading.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-10-27 01:24:36 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
eaf3d051e3 Fix sc-hsm test.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-10-15 23:16:02 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
8e3801e9a2 Revert "Update flash memory for tests."
This reverts commit 5388c11182.
2024-10-15 23:00:35 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
5388c11182 Update flash memory for tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-10-15 22:54:18 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
2b77519a3b Add OTP command to Pico HSM Tool.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-10-15 22:12:34 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
812a737ff5 Fix length.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-10-13 20:52:29 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
6163b870ed Fix haders.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-10-13 20:51:18 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
08d4dc58aa Add OTP extra command to read/write OTP without bootmode.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-10-13 20:25:59 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
0193e55f7b Use macros in extras.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-10-13 20:06:58 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
9dc3ea3232 Fix emulation alignment.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-10-01 14:38:56 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
48d92f53a0 Update Dockerfile with latest versions.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-10-01 14:38:44 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
3b083f9bd7 Fix nightly build for master branch
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-30 09:27:22 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
9cd7bc7b3e Fix nightly build for master branch
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-30 09:26:59 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
4bea47faca Add nightly builds workflow
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-30 09:25:06 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
954eb1d890 Add nightly builds workflow
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-30 09:22:23 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
f7451f56ed Add support for led dimming and max. brightness.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-30 09:21:39 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
1a8c8440cf Add support for LED management
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-30 09:08:15 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
9f1e5d0abd Update pico_sdk_import
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-24 00:44:38 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
4b314470b4 Fix header in Linux.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-20 07:19:47 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d0461f81f4 Upgrade codeaction to v3
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-20 07:19:15 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
4454c633e4 Autobuild esp32
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-20 07:16:55 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
15664da61d Added ESP32 OTP support.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-16 00:54:47 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
1a2bff33a8 Added ESP32 OTP support.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-16 00:51:21 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
cf44794bb6 Fix build.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-13 08:47:41 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
33a6a70457 Use sha256 hardware if available.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-13 00:27:16 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c3ddfe9689 Use OTP
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-11 23:16:51 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
72eb5a2a69 Enable OTP to store a permanent secret key.
It can be used by HSM or Fido to protect the keys and use it as MKEK.
2024-09-11 23:16:23 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
95f3a464b1 Use internal TRNG of Pico.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-06 15:16:34 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
bb37a3ddb8 Fix artifacts version
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-05 15:21:51 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
6da49336c9 Use v4 for artifacts
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-05 09:16:20 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
fc69f5e1b1 Upgrade upload-artifact
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-05 07:46:25 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
3602577b6e Merge branch 'master' into development 2024-09-05 07:45:51 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c6a72e4ffb Fix indent
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-05 07:44:17 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c889cef488 Merge pull request #52 from polhenarejos/dependabot/github_actions/dot-github/workflows/actions/download-artifact-4.1.7
Bump actions/download-artifact from 3 to 4.1.7 in /.github/workflows
2024-09-04 01:34:34 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d78e925d49 Parse and set binary version
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-04 01:30:38 +02:00
dependabot[bot]
bb8fcbcd3f Bump actions/download-artifact from 3 to 4.1.7 in /.github/workflows
Bumps [actions/download-artifact](https://github.com/actions/download-artifact) from 3 to 4.1.7.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/actions/download-artifact/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/actions/download-artifact/compare/v3...v4.1.7)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: actions/download-artifact
  dependency-type: direct:production
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
2024-09-03 23:24:23 +00:00
Pol Henarejos
c433e131eb Use new led color module.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-03 18:08:03 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
11d52495d7 Upgrade to MbedTLS 3.6.1
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-03 12:12:40 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
f450279370 Add support for Edwards curves generation.
Fixes #51

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-03 11:50:46 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b571b0b945 Upgrade to version 4.2
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-02 20:00:46 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
5ae63959d5 Fix LED blink.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-02 18:21:22 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
8e8bd32b44 Upgrade to version 4.2
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-02 12:04:36 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
68d2909653 Add RP2350 boards.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-02 12:04:18 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
e64eb2157c Fix emulation build.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-02 10:15:50 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
af23b401cb Fix BOOT button in RP2350.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-02 09:55:44 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
1da29f22c1 Fix emulation build.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-02 09:55:32 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
f458750c91 Removed unused extern declaration.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-02 09:53:20 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c5143df212 Fix emulation with mutexes
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-01 18:30:16 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
60f471cdd7 Update Pico Keys SDK.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-09-01 18:17:53 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
5c3c45a189 Add pthread lib to emulation build.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-08-30 13:13:57 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
3b92ce0597 Use mutex/semaphores for emulation, like in Pico and ESP.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-08-30 13:01:47 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
56ab770a26 Fix partition 0 boot.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-08-29 16:29:26 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
09f7ed6640 Add support for RP2350.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-08-28 18:47:51 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
aaf1bc2bbd Add partitions to RP2350.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-08-28 18:46:24 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
f7e8359835 Add pico_aon_timer lib.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-08-28 18:45:48 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
1c45295d28 Move ESP32 partitions file.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-08-28 18:44:20 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
af099cd416 Add support to RP2350.
RP2350 does not support RTC, so we use AON timer instead.
2024-08-28 16:42:46 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
36d1011471 Fix USB/CCID writes.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-08-26 22:42:02 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c5714a91ab Fix AES key generation for 192 and 256.
Fixes #48.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-08-26 02:39:21 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b8002a1a08 Update ESP32 sdkdefaults
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-08-26 02:33:04 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
604fc1aa45 Fix long writes.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-08-26 02:19:07 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
39a5af8649 Free hd_context if error.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-08-25 20:00:16 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
28c63a500c Revert "Fix non-free'd context."
This reverts commit 9335b088cf.
2024-08-25 19:55:02 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
ef03ce4020 ADd latests changes in CCID interface memory management.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-08-25 19:40:26 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
9335b088cf Fix non-free'd context.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-08-25 19:39:47 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
9cc934282c Fix memory boundaries check.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-08-25 19:39:30 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
2ad67e5e17 Fix new Pico Keys SDK selection callback.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-08-25 18:30:29 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
7493f9eb3e Upgrade to version 4.0.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-08-15 00:03:56 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d44b780970 Fix PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-08-14 16:57:33 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
e7080d6f82 Upgrade to MbedTLS 3.6 with EdDSA.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-08-14 15:32:22 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
9258c9ff70 Fix merge.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-08-14 15:32:09 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
ad18577e98 Merge branch 'master' into development-eddsa
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-08-14 13:34:40 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
3cae928de8 Fix for Pico Patcher.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-07-15 14:41:28 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b429616895 Fix potential infinite loop when bad ASN1 is processed.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-07-08 10:53:25 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
0c2e728c35 Add EF.DIR list aid.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-28 22:59:52 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
5630043a4d Fix binary read permission.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-28 22:59:16 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c1a47ed023 Fix EF.DIR selection.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-28 22:05:10 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
bf2f961b85 Fix windows compatibility. Fixes #44.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-27 21:02:04 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
0811b8022e Update README.md 2024-06-24 20:37:03 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
fd12758551 Upgrade to version 4.0
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-24 19:44:58 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c65f921188 Update README.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-24 19:44:46 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
55cf9292d2 Update ESP32 CMake
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-23 02:09:38 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
db5c7adef4 Update tests for OpenSC 0.25.1
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-23 01:59:32 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d3751e3918 Upgrade opensc version in workflows.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-23 01:18:19 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d708158fea Fix key unwrap with latest OpenSC. Fixes #41.
SC-HSM driver in OpenSC has changed the procedure for unwraping. It stores the wrap into a temporary file (0x2F10) and then it calls unwrap cmd.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-23 01:17:01 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
dc979194fa Fix crash in mbedtls 3.6
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-23 01:00:14 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
237e687c3b Upgrade to Pico Keys SDK v6.0
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-22 20:57:28 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
ed89175edc Fix rare overflow (never happens).
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-22 19:03:58 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
9a7be98e6e Settings proper phy options
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-21 22:08:36 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c4a08aff0f Upgrade to Mbedtls 3.6
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-21 21:29:32 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
223fc117dd Enable patch only for RPI
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-21 21:15:29 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d1fb4d0c65 Merge branch 'master' into development
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-21 21:14:43 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
47acef71c8 Only when not emulation.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-21 21:11:18 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
bb641ee134 Merge pull request #43 from al-heisner/master
Fix for multiples of 64 bytes on cmd_list_keys
2024-06-21 21:05:27 +02:00
al heisner
99c777c780 Fix for multiples of 64 bytes on cmd_list_keys 2024-06-21 11:35:05 -05:00
Pol Henarejos
79f76a176d Fix time.h header.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-19 23:36:41 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
dd68554782 Added support for enable/disable Web CCID on the fly.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-19 23:29:05 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
f20fdc9bda Add missing header.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-19 22:42:19 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
e7d4a5dd3d Fix tusb initialization.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-19 22:35:04 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b4671c2ecb Merge branch 'esp32' into development 2024-06-19 22:03:47 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
50a29519bd First release to support ESP32.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-19 22:03:39 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
54cdbfc22c Add PHY OPTS.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-19 22:01:15 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
4a40cebe1f Merge pull request #40 from fastchain/extras-button-check
Security fix for issue 39
2024-06-17 11:30:31 +02:00
fastchain
87ffd21543 Update cmd_extras.c
This security fix ensures that the extra settings, cannot be silently disabled, if button control enabled. So the button control setting cannot be silently (without button push) disabled, even if the user's PC is fully compromised.
2024-06-13 16:09:54 +09:00
Pol Henarejos
7cb0bbf982 Merge branch 'development' into esp32
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-03 13:06:39 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
07079b6ba1 Add descriptive message.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-05-30 19:19:02 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
294ca81d7d Upgrade patch_vidpid with newer Pico Keys SDK.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-05-30 19:18:37 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
218660e694 Only allow change PHY without PIN. PIN is required for other extra options.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-22 23:47:08 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
de89d61359 Use new file methods.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-22 23:44:00 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
8e8192362c Use macros for referring system fids.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-17 19:43:10 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
25c93c279f Fix potential crash on loading dkek.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-17 19:42:47 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
001d076fdf Better check for XKEK content.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-17 19:42:23 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
35d5d5e94e Use search_file() method.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-17 19:19:45 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b034303193 Use new methods search_file() and file_put_data().
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-17 16:36:34 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
623cf10dba Add phy command to pico-hsm-tool to change VIDPID dynamically.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-17 11:51:25 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
fdc41e5856 Add support for PHY command to store and change VIDPID and LED no. dynamically on reboot.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-17 11:50:44 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
5d0dc210da Use external unique ID.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-17 11:48:23 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
a674410826 Remove carriage return \r for better debug.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-17 11:46:34 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
920d22212a Add phy command to pico-hsm-tool to change VIDPID dynamically.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-16 23:23:20 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
aeeb540a2f Add support for PHY command to store and change VIDPID and LED no. dynamically on reboot.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-16 23:22:49 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
be071b0bc1 Add support for dynamic VID / PID.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-16 00:05:01 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
8bbbdb4dd8 Build WCID interface.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-16 00:04:48 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
45b633cc9d More defaults.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-16 00:04:33 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
842919a26b Use external unique ID.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-15 23:45:30 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
3dbcefea85 Upate build parameters.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-11 15:15:18 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
60038f9345 Fix flash issues.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-10 20:29:02 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d8c7fb0856 Remove carriage return \r for better debug.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-10 18:16:38 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d6456b4dde First attempt to add support to ESP32.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-08 19:41:39 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
ac781c1db6 Fix asn1 struct initialization.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-03-13 21:21:37 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
c3b66773e8 Use new asn1 structs.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-03-13 18:11:28 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
3ca23b932c Fix Windows emulation build.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-01-09 11:43:59 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
9fad920c3b Fix Windows emulation build.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-01-09 11:43:46 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
38bef5b43f Fix error message
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-01-09 11:26:26 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
2034e436d1 Fix CVC outer signature length.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-01-08 10:59:34 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
215221b30e Let's add pico and local CodeQL modes.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-01-02 20:51:08 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
de4d95beb8 Fix Pico build.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-01-02 20:43:24 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
963b6f4f87 Fix CodeQL build.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-01-02 20:36:54 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
fa9b244c42 Fix LE computation in a wrapped APDU.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-01-02 19:57:52 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
2b92d89ab7 Fix size_t casting.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-01-02 19:56:38 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
a1d7733b95 Fix key exchange.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-01-02 02:44:59 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
39f1041dbb Fix byte overwrite for long chained RAPDU.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-01-02 02:36:21 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
2e4fc568db Fix new return format for import_kek.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-01-02 02:36:09 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
4f4e6e09a2 Fix size var load.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-01-02 02:31:38 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
08c0aaee6f Fix SM wrap for large RAPDU.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-01-02 01:03:57 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
de98e79c99 Try to fix CodeQL build.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-01-01 21:09:42 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
481cd5fd69 Some fixes for emulation.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-01-01 20:58:40 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
d9a8826a32 Stupid bug integer overflow.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-01-01 02:01:22 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
d82affa880 Added support for building emulation in Windows.
It has not been tested but it should not break any linux build.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-01-01 01:55:49 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
ab31a6615c Fix ATR overwrite.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-12-29 19:07:28 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
677cceb130 Update to latest PicoHSM.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-12-29 19:07:20 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
29967c067a Add -DVIDPID=<VALUE> to build a project with a known VID/PID. Supported values: NitroHSM, NitroFIDO2, NitroStart, NitroPro, Nitro3, Yubikey5, YubikeyNeo, YubiHSM, Gnuk, GnuPG
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-12-11 18:14:04 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
2974aa234a Added required for subparsers.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-13 16:59:15 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
d90b296237 Added keygen command to generate AES, X25519 and X448 keys.
It replaces x25519/x448 commands and cipher keygen subcommand.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-13 16:57:11 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
e98b26fee5 Flush stderr.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-13 15:34:33 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
2086a68c53 Key id not needed on keygen.
It also returns the fresh new generated key id.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-13 15:34:21 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
74afa07512 Do not make a PRKD on key unwrap since it is already done when storing.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-13 15:33:52 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
e96e1d0097 When a key is generated and stored, it creates its PRKD.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-13 15:33:27 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
4d47f0224e Fix emulation in apple.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-13 14:26:46 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
58692b2711 Fix PRKD cert on key unwrap.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-13 14:14:10 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
a5ab1cabc5 Add support for AES-ECB, AES-CBC with custom IV, AES-OFB, AES-CFB, AES-GCM, AES-CCM, AES-CTR and AES-XTS.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-11 21:19:31 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
1c7cdc8564 Added support for CMAC.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-11 20:28:13 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
d74b3418bc Fix typo
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-11 20:13:38 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
fb5be153ed Fix merge.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-06 23:51:15 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
0ac71f2fff Removed old SDK
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-06 23:47:21 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
6ec5235cc3 Upgrade Pico Keys SDK and mbedtls 3.5
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-06 23:38:33 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
ff74d6306e mbedtls 3.5
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-06 23:27:02 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
ba562da00e Merge branch 'development' into development-eddsa
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-06 23:11:08 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
98e9b72b42 Upgrade version to 3.6.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-06 17:26:43 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
1b0d23cf24 Add two new boards.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-06 17:26:24 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
3ccff7881f Upgrade to Pico Keys SDK 5.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-06 17:25:04 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
a3bf2e9e14 If no key is found, generate a new one.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-06 17:10:19 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
88ff27f354 Fix mbedTLS 3.5 build.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-06 17:01:27 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
ed2925cfb6 Use new Pico Keys SDK.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-06 14:25:42 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
cc19f8f061 Use new pico-keys-sdk submodule.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-06 14:20:39 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
b6831a4650 Rename pico-hsm-sdk submodule to new name.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-06 14:20:19 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
652a0f0d21 Fix managing spaces.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-12 21:04:02 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
9dbf4b3172 Removing pkcs11-tool test for EC.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-12 19:03:37 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
76522829ef User must log in after DKEK import.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-12 17:42:49 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
6b1eeb4004 Fix DKEK import when no logged.
DKEK shall accept import even if it is not logged in. However, to store the DKEK, the PIN is used for MKEK, which is not available if it is nog logged in. I added a queueing system to store a pending DKEK after login.

Therefore, to import a DKEK, the user must import it AND call VERIFY command if it is not already logged in.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-12 17:42:31 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
2693ab4926 Fix applet selection.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-12 17:40:56 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
5d21e39aa6 Fix deleting key domain.
It only checks if contains keys and no other files.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-12 17:40:20 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
1bf0d6337b Added backup and restore tests (pkcs11 wrap/unwrap).
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-11 21:12:06 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
1950b03d35 Add more pkcs11-tool tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-11 21:11:41 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
4be258f4c7 Fix applet loading.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-11 21:04:53 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
eddb1baf7b Use new applet selection format.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-11 21:03:17 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
11bb00e186 Default key domain is 0.
It allows to wrap keys not associated to any key domain.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-11 21:03:09 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
aaed6bd7b6 New format for applet selection.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-11 21:02:18 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
2853b38b08 Add PKCS11 tool test
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-11 13:00:24 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
654cb1e4e0 Added AES pkcs11 tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-11 12:13:21 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
185d19504f Add plaintext debug.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-11 12:12:53 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
dbe0ef19de Fix store binary test script.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 22:17:22 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c3b57b229f Add sc-hsm-pkcs11-test to test matrix.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 21:56:41 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
43c46e9112 Add sc-hsm-embedd pkcs11 driver and test.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 21:56:18 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d5af9160c1 Build in docker with for CI flag.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 21:55:55 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
e27c8d4ff6 Added flag for compile for CI or production.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 21:55:31 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
2ecfff0ebb Add store binary data tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 21:15:51 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
3057aba041 Fix redundant line.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 21:15:23 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
011a594fe4 Also use artifacts@v3 on upload.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 19:18:04 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
448d61dd2d Use artifact@v3
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 19:00:36 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
fa821c43c8 Prune images autom.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 19:00:23 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
9db3e78d32 Not necessary rmi
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 18:41:01 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b74c4070d1 When build, it copies generated binaries to image, which will be used later by other jobs.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 18:26:16 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
a7770a7e57 Check Pico HSM PCSC connectivity.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 18:25:10 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
78cbe59e64 Fix startup
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 17:58:32 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
42a9434c50 Not used
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 17:46:01 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
11a3472941 Refactor test workflow
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 17:45:49 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
2f177eb8df Build image only during build
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 16:46:51 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c97680772d Use artifacts
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 16:36:37 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
345ae2be69 Not used
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 16:36:00 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
ba036f4c0f Add EC derive tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 16:35:51 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
4493afa84d Fix workflow
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 14:46:37 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d118b787a2 Try using reusable workflows
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 14:44:52 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
205356b848 Let's try different jobs
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 14:21:55 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c435764978 Add PKCS11 asymmetric ciphering tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 13:10:10 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
2e633abb2c Use dynamic dd size.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 13:09:16 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
3514c7ad82 Fix pkcs11 runner test.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 09:30:15 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
4bba3c6f64 Merge branch 'master' into development 2023-10-09 08:30:53 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
8321996a14 Fix +x flag.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 08:30:24 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c3af303468 Split pytest and pkcs11 test suites.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 00:58:49 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c44d7db4e1 Refactor tests
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 00:34:50 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
cb1bba4f13 Enable pytest tests
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-02 01:12:09 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
48301a5d71 Fix chunking
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-02 00:50:34 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
1105a1263c Add signature and verification tests for RSA and ECDSA.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-02 00:48:54 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
37421d9aad Added pkcs11 keygen test script.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-09-26 20:09:43 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d906df2809 Add initialization test script with pkcs11
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-09-24 10:30:59 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
08e7d74a81 Fix sending binary when ne=0
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-09-24 10:30:09 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
433e509c94 Add initialize with pkcs11-tool test script.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-09-05 19:56:11 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
9f08d612ae Add base58 to dockerfile.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-09-05 19:56:11 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
173ca7678d Accept arbitrary SO-PIN length on reset retry.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-09-05 19:56:11 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
3d7f714936 Fix initialization with so-pin.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-09-05 19:56:11 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
f4a537f156 Added NO_DELAY in emulation env.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-09-05 19:56:11 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
f09654ccf4 Added --silent flag to initialization to avoid prompt display.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-09-05 19:56:11 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
7506ccd263 Update usage.md 2023-09-05 19:45:51 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
ee442ac084 Get vpcd from repo instead of building it.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-24 16:39:57 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b94810d31d Added triggers to development-eddsa branch.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-24 16:17:06 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
2c4be41ecf Remove print.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-24 16:12:40 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
447d223de4 Fix mbedtls ed448 bugs.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-24 16:12:34 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
4f9f7f14fe Add support for Edwards cvc.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-24 16:08:39 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
6699913eff Add edwards signature test.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-24 16:06:02 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b0057bc3fe Add edwards key import test.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-24 16:05:52 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
e3a773d145 Add edwards key generation test.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-24 16:05:43 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
10a47f9177 Uniform ec key loading.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-24 16:05:34 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
9f49a144ac Add support for Edwards key import.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-24 16:05:11 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
e67a7091ff Add support for Edwards key generation.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-24 16:04:45 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
1d3232df36 Fix loading and saving Montgomery keys.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-24 16:01:39 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
7376817724 Fix G export.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-24 16:00:59 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
5e801fbae7 Merge branch 'development' into development-eddsa 2023-08-24 10:35:51 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
e18c413268 Added X25519 and X448 exchange test.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-23 16:42:34 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
0e1c82196a Added test for Curve25519 and Curve448 key import.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-23 16:39:32 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c6a5272340 Added test for Curve25519 and Curve448 keypair generation.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-23 16:39:21 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
a6072b4ce8 Curve25519 and Curve448 are encoded using ECDH template.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-23 16:38:51 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
5bdba8e1e8 Move to ecp_keypair instead of ecdsa.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-22 17:20:56 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
5df4e62f81 Revert previous fix.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-22 17:20:11 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
685c7f25fc Revert previous fix.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-22 17:19:23 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
faef2dc278 Added support for EdDSA signature.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-22 17:10:03 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
22d8793683 Add fix in EdDSA.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-22 15:29:26 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
32c8bc4a24 Enable EdDSA for curves Ed25519 and Ed448 in config file.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-16 15:05:46 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b5174d64af Using SDK with EdDSA support.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-14 02:45:16 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
235bf342b3 Update README.md
Added description for hierarchical deterministic key generation.
2023-08-02 14:34:12 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
57188ff877 Added some tests for HD ciphering.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-07-24 11:45:11 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
f631e4a5f3 Code style.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-07-17 12:56:16 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
f880ee6c93 Added support for HD symmetric ciphering.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-07-17 12:55:14 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
6af4cc7fec Fix getting RTC with pico-hsm-tool.
Closes #25.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-06-20 13:32:30 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
e3f1f45a9f Added more tests for HD Signature.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-27 19:00:13 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
fe315e7326 Fix AES derivation (HKDF).
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-27 19:00:04 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
02903bbc65 Added tests for HD signatures.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-26 18:07:26 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
ee3ee21e40 Added support for signatures based on HD BIP/SLIP.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-26 18:07:06 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c6c00e7e43 Added tests for SLIP-0021 node derivation.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-26 17:15:30 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
29544a3f17 Added support for SLIP-0021 node derivation.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-26 17:15:14 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
5135404083 Fix node derivation.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-25 15:17:39 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
55520ce184 Added support for master key generation for symmetric derivation.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-25 14:07:48 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
525b05b7ef Small refactoring to avoid unnecessary casts from uint32 to byte strings.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-25 12:18:28 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b61a34d415 Added more tests for secp256r1 curves.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-24 12:47:49 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
0eea0fb096 Fix deriving nodes with retries (invalid first key).
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-24 12:47:27 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
82c03ee6c4 Fix memory free on error.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-24 12:40:51 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
20dfbcaaed Fix xpub for masters.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-24 11:25:36 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
a9fb170c58 Added tests for BIP and SLIP.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-23 20:40:31 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
46d85c029e Added first commit with BIP and SLIP support for cryptowallets.
Needs more work.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-23 20:40:16 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
1c6f4cfd7f Update FUNDING.yml 2023-05-17 09:44:59 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
526869bc06 Create FUNDING.yml 2023-05-17 09:42:57 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
279df32acc Update README.md
Added link to Pico Patcher tool.
2023-05-11 20:05:28 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c402b884cc Upgrade to mbedtls 3.4
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-10 00:17:32 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
8316196b42 Using forked vsmartcard just in case
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-04 11:10:58 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
7a6dafd7b6 Moving HSM SDK pointer
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-04 09:13:15 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
6d3809a792 Allow signatures with device key.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-04-06 14:09:18 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
f22f58f983 Fix returning EOF when reading an element outside the size.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-04-06 14:08:43 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
405bf92e18 Added support for TokenInfo and StaticTokenInfo files.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-04-04 09:53:26 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b5b6dcd2e6 Fix conditional build for WS2812.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-26 20:16:09 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d637dbec01 Added CMAC and AES generation to README.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-26 18:42:12 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
ebcac9dfdc Upgrade to pico-hsm-tool to use the newer PicoHSM python package.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-23 20:19:53 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
510b148adf Update README with latest AES algorithms.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-23 20:19:15 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
371ae93fcd Added support for AES CCM.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-23 19:20:33 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
f5e875a6b7 Added support for AES CTR.
Note: the OID used by CTR does not exist.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-23 18:47:32 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
ad3304a384 Added AES XTS tests, with and without IV.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-22 23:29:31 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
4d647ba3c8 Add sanity check if wrong oid is provided.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-22 23:28:55 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
008db87fa7 Fix AES XTS call.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-22 23:28:22 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
1d80b45439 Add tests for AES extended.
It tests ECB, CBC, OFB, CFB and GCM.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-22 23:25:25 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
17560034ec Fix AES extended encoding call.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-22 23:23:12 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
8b0d85fbd4 Fix PRKD generation for AES.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-22 22:57:15 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
3dcb2e9d70 A PRKD is generated on every key import, regardless it might be replaced later.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-22 22:56:55 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
0f12ff1c48 Added support for PRKD for AES.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-22 22:07:34 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
2a5fe1cc6d Added initialization with self-signed certificate.
It will allow the initialization with OpenSC tool (sc-hsm-tool --initialize). However, it will not allow the use of card with SCS3, as it needs a PKI with trust chain. In this case, pico-hsm-tool.py shall be used for initialization.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-22 01:04:24 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
5e0f62265d Fix key size of terminal cert.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-20 21:41:38 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
0990805fb6 More code style.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-20 20:08:29 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
18bcf532e7 PicoHSM always returns bytes().
No need for casting.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-20 20:07:33 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
9f0316aedd Add chachapoly tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-20 18:08:00 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
088002863c Before cloning, it should be removed.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-20 18:03:49 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
7876f4b32a pypicohsm is built everytime that test is run, since it could implement more features used by tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-20 18:02:33 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
a5e3d4e0e5 Added dockerfile for debian.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-20 18:01:48 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
0c842773d2 Move to debian docker.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-20 17:58:43 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
0aaf339353 Fix error message.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-20 17:58:17 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
efba39adc5 Add SW_WRONG_DATA return on bad tag for Chachapoly.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-20 17:58:01 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
13755cb4d5 Fix buffer overflow when importing AES 512 key.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-20 17:06:06 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
11a30863e8 Using new package pypicohsm.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-20 17:05:46 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
a69d06b2d9 Fixed chachapoly crypt algorithm.
It missed setkey function. So, no key was used at any moment.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-19 20:24:32 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
1c7bc18161 Added support for AES 512 bit key size.
AES XTS uses two keys. Therefore, XTS with 2 AES 256 implies 64 bytes key length.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-19 20:22:40 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
86ce01cac2 Added AES XTS via AES_EXT command.
Note that it requires 32 bytes or 64 bytes key length.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-19 19:42:37 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
9cb60ba420 Added AES ECB (insecure), CBC (with custom IV), OFB, CFB and GCM (with 16-byte tag) via AES_EXT command.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-19 19:34:34 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
99f1620e7d Fixes #22.
SC-HSM returns the result with a 0x04 prepended. This comes from OpenSC but it is not clear the exact reason. 0x04 is usually for encoding uncompressed EC points but in that case it does not seem to make sense.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-18 18:40:27 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
755570e01a Fix deletion key in test 50.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-18 18:38:05 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
4b264597d6 Fix race condition.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-14 09:58:06 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
67e3d908b3 Fix test key deletion.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-14 09:57:25 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
7ae76354ef Added more tests for key_export.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-13 18:03:21 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
9291c2b4e3 delete_file() supports p1/p2
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-13 18:02:47 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
657ee18730 Added assert on deletion
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-13 18:02:31 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
132054c9b9 Public point is calculated everytime a private key is loaded.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-13 18:01:56 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
2a3b9b7474 Fix wrapping points.
Now it uses mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary() for better control.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-13 18:01:20 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
4e73723747 Fix checking key domain set.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-10 15:59:52 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
09724d95db Fix XKEK key generation.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-10 07:34:15 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
c1bfb597bc Added first tests of key wrapping.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-09 20:10:25 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
fd53b88397 Added more tests to key domain tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-09 20:09:58 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
11e5338736 Check if key domain is not already initialized when initializing.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-09 20:09:32 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
3660120b11 Before wrapping, check if DKEK is properly configured.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-09 20:09:03 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
75ca1b57d9 Added support of counter, algorithms and key domain to AES too.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-09 18:39:06 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
7af67713e7 Add support for counter, algorithms and key domain in key generation.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-09 18:38:29 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
63c465138b Added delete XKEK tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-09 18:28:31 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
4d569df108 Added dkek import in key domain tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-09 18:28:08 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
bee6a7bb92 Return error if a non-initialized key domain is deleted.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-09 18:27:47 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
e4583eb9c0 Fix potential crash on delete file.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-09 18:16:38 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
1c8582365d Add manual trigger
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-09 08:48:09 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
daf71678c5 Added first XKEK tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-08 22:15:44 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
26f0775772 Move some certs to common place.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-08 22:15:11 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
ed674b379c Zeroize ecdh key.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-08 11:15:02 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
6aa8d37d07 If a key does not belong to any key domain, it cannot be wrapped.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-07 23:45:37 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
963456051e If public point is not found, it is computed automatically.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-07 23:45:10 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
1e90699a3f Added more PKA tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-07 23:16:12 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
f8110a9d75 Update README.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-07 23:16:01 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
d81b21695f If no key domain is found, 0 is used by default.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-07 23:15:50 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
51e9e6722e Reset puk status on failed authentication.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-07 23:14:55 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
dba4630895 Add Public Key Authorization tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-07 17:28:56 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
ee73c6e781 Code style
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-07 17:28:23 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
2f63966c60 Fix checking status of PUK.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-07 15:55:59 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
e624f9ff72 Fix checking if PKU is enabled.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-07 11:15:07 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
fb4ff9424e Call reset puk store on init.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-07 11:14:42 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
63b245b858 Fix initialize with PUK store memory.
Now it is cleared.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-07 11:14:13 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
cd525d91a3 Updated base flash memory for emulation to include CA CVC.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-06 01:09:00 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
8fd3b4d858 CA cert is also uploaded to perform PKA.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-06 01:01:20 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
3c160f69c0 Add DV cert to PUK store.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-06 00:40:31 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
2c9fa8b19f Add two new boards for build.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-06 00:39:00 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
ccfe7ca8a8 Upgrade to version 3.4
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-04 14:38:28 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
d2d038f14d Upgrade to version 3.4
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-04 14:35:33 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
1a05d7b51f Fix conditional interface compilation.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-04 14:16:59 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
fa60ed5049 Update code style.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-04 14:05:51 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
35aec06391 Adding support for CCID GET, SET and RESET PARAMS.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-20 13:17:32 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
61359c7ebd Add key derivation tests (HKDF, PBKDF2 and X963).
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-17 23:54:40 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
20c01eb08d Fix name of x963 function.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-17 23:54:06 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
0b71bf693d Added CMAC tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-17 22:46:16 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
a1f478239d Added HMAC tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-17 22:43:28 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
420e55901c Fix HMAC computation.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-17 22:43:09 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
414cab78e3 Enabling entropy and ctr_drbg for emulation mode.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-16 23:43:11 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
36e5282d19 Update codeql.yml
Enable CodeQL to development branch.
2023-02-16 23:36:08 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
367651fe75 Upgrade to mbedtls v3.3.0
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-16 23:34:13 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
7b62ca5327 Upgrade to mbedtls v3.3.0 2023-02-16 23:33:13 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
9be176e523 Fixes for Pico SDK 1.5
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-16 22:55:36 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
b24e109a3c Fix error message when no card is detected.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-16 22:50:53 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
f61d0dd677 Update codeql.yml
Added development branch to CodeQL workflow.
2023-02-15 19:55:13 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
215fdca9f8 Added AES cipher tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-15 19:47:16 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
9279773073 Removed printf
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-15 19:46:42 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
d5b718ca58 Move pointer again...
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-15 00:14:37 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
cd6e280f4f Switching to new style.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-15 00:10:35 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
e7495d11f2 Moving pointer.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-14 23:25:13 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
daaa5bf402 Harmonize coding style.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-14 23:13:46 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
cab72f200a Moving pointer
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-14 23:12:48 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
380d47faa1 Renaming for avoiding confusions
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-14 23:05:37 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
962d1c6916 When runing a test, load a initial flash image that contains KEYDEV.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-14 22:53:30 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
d81d51d6fc Fix get public key.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-14 21:51:46 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
319000df1a Add challenge tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-14 21:38:06 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
5508e531a0 Added key domain tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-14 18:52:12 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
1e846600dd Add test info
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-14 18:51:50 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
43a49d2a14 Return reference not found when deleting a key domain.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-14 18:51:30 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
3b9c2d159b Fix returning existing key domain.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-14 18:47:43 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
14c7852143 Fix returning shared secret.
I do not know why a 0x04 was prepended.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-14 11:28:27 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
407110def4 Added ECDH tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-14 11:25:02 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
79d86a335c Adding more tests and renaming old ones.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-13 23:54:41 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
0685be5f1e EE_CERTIFICATE is added when importing key.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-13 23:53:41 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
8f6ae52c70 Added routines for import key.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-13 23:52:58 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
af16be64a2 Adding checks on ec import.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-13 23:30:27 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
68071825c2 Fix EC public key computation when importing.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-13 23:24:04 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
fbabb81acd Fix asymmetric decrypt for OAEP. It only supports SHA256.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-12 21:53:47 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
8bc4b133ca Adding routine for asymmetric decryption.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-12 21:53:19 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
2ce458dad5 Adding BP curves and RSA 4k to signature test.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-12 21:53:01 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
478b186094 Finally it seems to work.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 16:09:57 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
ab71b3163b Adding sleep just in case.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 16:07:41 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
c4de88e6c6 Moving pointer
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 15:39:31 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
3b0e34f465 More tries...
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 13:23:39 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
9077e78315 More flags to debug
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 13:15:04 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
2f5fcd1f14 Start pcscd with debug flag to get more debug info.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 13:09:17 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
24d430a3ac Updating pointer to include aesni
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 13:04:34 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
307eb63ee5 Init submodules in actions.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 12:59:03 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
07f85dc4b8 Add warning removal
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 12:18:18 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
a4026e0ca0 Submodules must be pulled.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 12:09:46 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
ebd8dc7bb8 Add apt-utils package.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 12:08:16 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
bac15d5472 Removing TTY from docker.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 12:05:03 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
8540fdcf19 Updating pointer.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 12:01:20 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
fc8d39882f Add missing build file.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 12:00:57 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
ca093eb81e Add emulation and test workflow.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 11:59:26 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
35c42bccb4 List PRKD if exist.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 01:25:25 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
52114b2d85 Added initialization on each keypairgen.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 01:25:05 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
8f593f6357 Added support for build emulation in Apple and Linux.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 01:24:35 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
6f8769ee8d Added scripts for testing in a docker container.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 01:24:10 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
1af461c206 Add first battery of tests.
It contains keypair generation for ECC and RSA, PIN blocking and signature generation and verification.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-17 13:41:10 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
8976dc1f79 Added support for RSA-PKCSv15-SHA224, SHA384 and SHA512. Also added support for RSA-PSS-SHA224, SHA384 and SHA512.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-17 00:41:46 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
9d47e62041 Fix signature for secp521r1.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-17 00:05:46 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
0daddfd477 Fix ECDSA-SHA384 and ECDSA-SHA512.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-17 00:05:31 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
89d617110f Add asn1_build_prkd_rsa()
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-16 18:54:28 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
17941397e9 Fix exporting large ECC key.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-16 18:54:20 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
f2aa4aae79 Moving pointer to latest bug fixes.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-14 00:41:23 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
e29b3143ed Moving pointer
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-13 18:49:08 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
5419ff74ee Using file_has_data() to check contents.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-13 18:07:50 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
723011078c Using file_has_data() instead of data directly.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-12 20:06:31 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
fe7c0333ab Some emulation fixes.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-12 20:06:11 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
c01940b62b Fix accessing way to data.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-12 20:05:59 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
7195a8f3ec Fix headers in emulation mode.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-12 20:05:46 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
7764de4e10 Unused headers.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-12 20:05:16 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
e05c526b4d Fix printf format.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-12 20:04:55 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
bc20f98b44 In emulation, return always 1mb of memory.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-12 20:04:44 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
742c3f3e3c RTC command is not available in emulation.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-12 20:04:23 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
9793977ffc Fixed double counter increment.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-12 20:04:05 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
6c85772fff Added emulated build capability.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-12 20:03:42 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
9ff3254a4c Update to latest HSM SDK.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-12-22 22:50:54 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
7d906851dd Updating to newer version of Pico HSM SDK.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-12-20 23:51:49 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
691aa3308c Fix when importing a dkek and it fails.
Now the dkek state is returned to the previous one.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-12-06 20:11:26 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
6a57e67629 Fix importing dkek twice.
It is not allowed anymore.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-12-06 20:04:18 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
202c8a4b22 Credentials are not necessary when importing DKEK.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-12-06 20:00:32 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
f2874ae3ef Fix when ping is provided during the initialization.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-12-06 20:00:19 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
9e9cf9b768 Upgrading version to v3.2.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-12-06 19:00:44 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
c95dee84f2 Changing backend service url.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-12-06 19:00:35 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
65cde9960f Upgrading version to v3.2.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-12-04 17:42:03 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
7ca96178fb Moving HSM SDK pointer to latest release.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-28 18:54:22 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
020feaf325 Update README.md
Fix header
2022-11-15 22:42:43 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
e70461e551 Merge branch 'master' into development 2022-11-15 17:40:29 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
0e918434a2 Update README.md 2022-11-15 17:38:33 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
63c85000d0 Added support for kdf.
It supports HKDF, PBKDF2 and X963, with multiple MD (SHA family), salt/nonces and configurable output size.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-15 00:15:59 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
4113f6a65d Fix parsing PBKDF2 params.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-15 00:14:39 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
f98d744076 Add apdu.ne check for large buffers.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-14 18:04:44 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
bb4c293736 Adding subparsers for subcommands.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-14 16:27:51 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
aa8b1e6efe Added support for X963 KDF.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-14 15:38:16 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
0cb2e8ec2e Added PBES2 key derivation with encryption and decryption support.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-14 13:07:49 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
0e96753ccb Added support for PBKDF2.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-14 12:01:27 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
2b2df22d75 Added support for configurable HKDF.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-14 10:14:54 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
f65167e3c7 Adding support for keypair generation for Curve25519 and Curve448.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-11 17:10:34 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
8fe2677a56 Fix cofactor return with cvc.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-11 17:08:36 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
d09a7cf9c8 If self-signature fails, puts all-0.
When generating a keypair and returns a self-signed CVREQ, the signature might fail for Curve25519 and Curve448. Instead of returning null, it puts zeros in order to return what is expected to return.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-11 17:04:17 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
6bf72e5a59 Added support for HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA224, HMAC-SHA256, HMAC-SHA384 and HMAC-SHA512.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-08 17:26:32 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
7c877ebea2 Using file_out parameter.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-07 22:31:19 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
e1983f7bcc Now is possible pipe encrypt & decrypt commands.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-07 22:16:10 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
a5e025a4e5 If no applet is selected, then select it.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-07 21:37:42 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
a7682d2639 Adding Extended Cipher feature.
With this new subcommand, Pico HSM will support newer cipher algorithms.
ChaCha20-Poly1305 is the first. It will be based on a custom P2 subcommand to support an arbitrary structure with multiple parameters (AAD, IV, etc.)

pico-hsm-tool.py shall be used.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-07 21:37:11 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
30301c68f1 Linux uses the generic interface. Needs deep testing.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-07 13:14:37 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
abf980d84e Fixes in windows backend.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-03 18:41:02 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
8718f55df2 Adding secure_key for windows.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-03 18:26:35 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
d1a3a24527 Import secure_key only when needed.
Now, it does not block anymore the entire execution of pico tool.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-03 16:09:42 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
f363b77a07 Adding secure_key for macOS.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-03 16:06:06 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
d5899a90c1 Merge pull request #10 from rrottmann/small-fixes
Small fixes
2022-11-03 16:05:56 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
f1058ea611 Merge branch 'master' into small-fixes 2022-11-03 15:48:33 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
00279da8d5 Adding Secure Lock to lock the device with a random 256 bit key.
This is an extra layer of security to avoid brute force attacks if PIN is too weak.
At every hard reset (on device plug), the device must be unlocked prior any other command. Once unlocked, the device can be used as usual.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-31 15:09:54 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
eda8b53949 Memory cleanup on ECDH.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-31 12:54:44 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
cfc0cc8f6e Some optimizations.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-31 00:38:30 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
ab61b2a2d5 Fix returning public key of koblitz curve secp_k1.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-31 00:38:21 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
f79a6ed30a Do not override Ne.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-30 23:42:12 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
4313722b06 Fix memory free on keygen ecc.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-30 23:15:22 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
eec4612a6f Fix when secure message cannot be correctly processed.
It is discarded.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-30 21:11:06 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
b2ac893efc Fix general authentication with AES.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-30 21:09:41 +01:00
Reiner Rottmann
14e8d9cd04 Fixing typo in command. 2022-10-30 08:52:28 +01:00
Reiner Rottmann
1a6cfd17cb Small fix in ModuleNotFoundError handling. 2022-10-30 08:51:57 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
3835507e00 Fix displaying error message if pycvc is missing.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-29 11:35:54 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
4536589e2c Added error message if package is missing.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-10 11:02:07 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
1e39558fbc Typo
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-10 00:39:32 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
a089cc279b Adding support for changing SO-PIN.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-10 00:37:56 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
84f646dbad Fix storing SO-PIN session when checking PIN with SO-PIN.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-10 00:37:33 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b9ec473aaa Fix critical bug saving SO-PIN securely.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-10 00:27:46 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b7eb0dff02 Upgrade to Version 3.0.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-09 22:27:11 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
06f550cc04 Update usage.md 2022-10-09 22:26:45 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
1752b1aec7 Update usage.md 2022-10-09 22:25:35 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
67ea640a14 Fix endianness of patcher (again)
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-09 22:20:41 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
f593060007 Moving delete_file() outside.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-09 22:07:21 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
8504eed35c Adding fixes and moving to Mbedtls 3.2.1
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-09 22:07:10 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
8b29b137a8 Small fixes.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-09 22:04:30 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
08d3ca6d27 Update README.md 2022-10-09 19:57:52 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
e6767f4c0a Moving pointer.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-09-25 23:25:16 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
9e5d65706e Merge pull request #2 from rrottmann/master
Building pico-hsm using Linux containers
2022-09-25 18:42:37 +02:00
Reiner Rottmann
61d7b6da38 Added Dockerfile for building pico-hsm and updated README.md with instructions. 2022-09-23 20:36:05 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
6affe64ec5 Adding missing file to pico-hsm-sdk. 2022-08-31 14:19:32 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
ab75718927 Using pico_hsm_sdk library instead. 2022-08-31 14:10:04 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
9e1747e539 Upgrading pico-hsm-sdk version to v3.0 2022-08-31 14:09:02 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
a7396dc698 Fix the endianness of vid/pid patcher. 2022-08-31 14:08:29 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
67699bd24c Before initializing, we select the applet. 2022-08-30 17:55:56 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
62c72c48a5 Moving to new pico-hsm-sdk. 2022-08-30 17:55:42 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
3944c8437a Moving to pico-hsm-sdk 2022-08-30 17:54:38 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b7d603342e Upgrading pico-ccid 2022-08-29 11:32:39 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
6e5db3c292 Upgrading pico-ccid to version 2.2 2022-08-29 11:31:47 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
4fb26559f4 Adding --so-pin flag for initialize command.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-25 13:47:42 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c366c1d1a3 Added datetime and options menu to manipulate the RTC and options (press-to-confirm button and optional counter for each key).
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-25 13:38:09 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
e8cc6a169e Try to recover MKEK twice: with previous PIN/SO-PIN or after setting the new PIN/SO-PIN just in case some is the same as previous.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-25 01:51:16 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
7d7b6b88ba Trying to recover MKEK to preserver device private key. If not, all are generated again.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-25 01:51:16 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
138af5c113 Adding --pin parameter for initialization.
If provided, it unlocks MKEK before initialization.
If not, it will generate a new MKEK and device certificate.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-25 01:51:16 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b3bcad9ce6 Making MKEK persistent.
It must be persistent as it encrypts device private key and therefore it must survive across reinitializations.
However, if no PIN is provided to unlock it, it will be lost, as with device private key.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-25 01:51:16 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
cd6f898f8e Fix storing certs in DER format.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-25 01:51:16 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
9ef088971b Integrate all commands to a single script
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-25 01:51:16 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
e399b1c0b1 Renaming the tools and moving to tools/ folder.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-25 01:51:16 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
59bacaf5b4 Update scs3.md
Updated patch.
2022-08-24 14:11:14 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d872a156c1 Update scs3.md
Updated CA certs.
2022-08-24 14:04:14 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c5e4583762 Add a tool for attestation of a private key.
It looks for a particular private key and generates a report with some useful information and validates the source of the private key, whether it is generated in this device or outside.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-23 14:54:38 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
38b9c06138 Reformat oids.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-23 14:52:44 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
df18a1e917 Added header.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-23 00:50:07 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
2bc40771ca Fix generating CVC REQ.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-23 00:50:06 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
5696c7a5da Update public_key_authentication.md 2022-08-22 14:24:53 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c5f980fc98 Fix curve for ECDH key.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-22 01:13:08 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
aebb68724a Removing trailing spaces.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-19 01:44:27 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
1f2ccd8c1c Not used.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-19 01:40:13 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
874058d86a Pull last changes in pico-ccid.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-19 00:03:09 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
8fccb80295 New burn-certs is called after compilation, not before. Not needed anymore.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 23:58:38 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c9c60575c7 Removed 3DES as it is unsecure.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 23:55:21 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
7e6ed20b26 Not downloading nested submodules for tinyusb
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 23:53:49 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
52c7be4e16 Also clone nested submodules
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 23:38:50 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
36d250fc2b Github does not clone submodules. So, let's do it
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 23:33:52 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
84ba0e03de Fix missing TinyUSB submodule
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 23:31:17 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
7d27c4b546 Fix autobuild
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 23:28:29 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
80b2bab0f8 Granting root to apt
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 23:23:58 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
79372ced2f Just install the SDK in the workflow
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 23:21:42 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
6fc91962bd Update codeql.yml 2022-08-18 23:13:02 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
fb76c23694 Let's try our autobuild
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 23:00:09 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
fc6c852e09 When used this tool, the device is always reset to default state.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 20:09:23 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
82f61ff1d4 When initialized, the device key (EF_KEY_DEV) is only generated if not found.
To generate a new device key, it must be wiped.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 20:08:54 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
64052f4f70 Marked EF_DEV files as persistent to remain permanent.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 20:08:11 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
36c8150f25 Enhanced the procedure for burning the device certificate.
When initialized, the device generates a private key in place and stores it encrypted. The publick key is recovered and sent to our PKI, which generates a CV certificate. This CV certificate is stored inside the device, jointly with the DV CVC.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 18:17:48 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
cb492728ec Device key now uses SECP256R1 curve.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 18:17:48 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
fec02ca733 Removing cvcerts.h dependency.
A python script gets the public key of the device (EF_EE_DEV) and requests to our PKI for a CVC. Once got, it is updated to EF_TERMCA (0x2f02).
termca_pk is now on EF_KEY_DEV and termca is on EF_TERMCA (concat with DICA).

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 18:17:48 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
4e01a78286 Fix OID names.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 18:17:48 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
538b39386b List keys returns the DEV key if exists.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 18:17:48 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
977aced343 Fix OID names.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 18:17:48 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
83b5753bb5 Fix saving DEV key.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 18:17:48 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
a57c3b691f Fix passing DEBUG_APDU flag.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-18 18:17:48 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
648a374ebb Create codeql.yml 2022-08-17 18:27:55 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c3568e1211 Create the terminal private key with id = 0.
This is the terminal private key, which will be signed by our PKI.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-14 01:20:54 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
6a16d4d55c Fix returning store_keys();
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-14 01:17:06 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
ab2e71cc40 By default, all CVC are self-generated (chr=car).
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-14 01:16:53 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
f79fe9f7d0 Fix when no DKEK is present.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-14 01:16:33 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
6956587106 Add newline at the end of file.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-13 23:31:09 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
349df56b09 Missing header.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-13 15:00:05 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
e6f082d512 Splitting cmd_xxx() functions in separate files.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-13 14:59:27 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
87feed1222 Renaming KEK files.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-13 13:47:43 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
55c8a66613 Fix wrap/unwrap keys with specific allowed algorithms.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-13 02:58:36 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
2e88422c86 Fix deleting KEK when a key is present in the key domain.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-13 00:50:22 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
da841b82d4 Fix deleting KEK.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-13 00:48:05 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
9256a72c3e Added XKEK derivation to save the KEK from XKEK key domain.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-13 00:43:55 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
69120cc961 Added cvc_get_ext() to find CVC extensions.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-13 00:43:35 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
06aaf58f0b Added extension optional parameter to be included in the CVC body.
This field should be a concatenation of tag 73, which should include an OID and a context.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-13 00:07:24 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
12e5a586d2 Adding support for XKEK CVC extension.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-12 22:18:21 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
0e76ed7077 Adding OID for CVC extensions.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-12 21:12:56 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
be911a7aa7 Clearing hash, just in case.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-12 19:55:07 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
0556a528f3 Fix DKEK key domain creation.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-12 19:51:59 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
de789cef66 Fix Key Domain deletion.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-12 19:46:08 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
7208d01547 Adding XKEK Key Domain creation.
It validates the membership and creates a XKEK Key Domain. XKEK Key Domains can only be created based on memberships for THAT device. A device can only create XKEK Key Domains with memberships issued for itself.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-12 19:36:10 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
46cb0a455d Fix DKEK are only created when requested and not by default.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-12 14:01:19 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
300e19b612 Moving to mbedtls_platform_zeroize() for better zeroization.
Also added more zeroization when a private/secret key is loaded in memory.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-12 01:52:37 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
2666573050 Fix dkek status report when device is initialized without dkek.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-12 01:00:27 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
5506b46c9d Fix finding MKEK file.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-12 00:57:08 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
7b27cb7a1c MKEK is also stored with SO encryption.
A copy of MKEK is also stored but encrypted with SO-PIN. Thus, we always ensure that we have an operative copy of MKEK, either with PIN and/or SO-PIN. If user resets PIN, the MKEK is loaded with SO-PIN and stored with the derived key from new PIN.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-12 00:41:04 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
84a70a1de0 Adding MKEK_SO file descriptor.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-12 00:39:25 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
1756ec49ad When user resets retry counter and sends the SO-PIN (P1=0x0) it becomes authenticated in this session.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-12 00:29:34 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
7b286b04b1 Introducing MKEK (Master Key Encryption Key).
MKEK is used to encrypt all keys in the device, regardless of Key Domains or DKEK. From now on, all keys are encrypted using an AES 256-bit secret key. MKEK is also encrypted and stored based on a derived key from PIN. When user introduces the PIN, the MKEK can be unlocked to load the stored private/secret keys.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-12 00:20:02 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
a731e88c78 Adding MKEK ef id.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-11 22:59:54 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
ffd31f2ea7 Memset kcv to 0 always when called.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-10 23:58:01 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
356eeea505 Added support for ECDH_XKEK.
Note that it is unfinished. ECDH_XKEK is utilized for deriving and setting the KEK, based on the calc DH secret. It should not return anything, just SW_OK (this is not what is happening right now).

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-10 23:51:41 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
34d9469157 When creating XKEK domain, it returns key domain UID.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-10 23:29:08 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
36b1bf9875 Added ECDH algorithms for XKEK and AUT.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-10 23:28:44 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
7badd19a07 Upgrading PICO SDK to v1.4 and adding new boards.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-08-09 01:28:39 +02:00
114 changed files with 11407 additions and 3627 deletions

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.github/FUNDING.yml vendored Normal file
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# These are supported funding model platforms
github: polhenarejos
custom: ["https://www.paypal.me/polhenarejos"]

74
.github/workflows/codeql.yml vendored Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
# For most projects, this workflow file will not need changing; you simply need
# to commit it to your repository.
#
# You may wish to alter this file to override the set of languages analyzed,
# or to provide custom queries or build logic.
#
# ******** NOTE ********
# We have attempted to detect the languages in your repository. Please check
# the `language` matrix defined below to confirm you have the correct set of
# supported CodeQL languages.
#
name: "CodeQL"
on:
push:
branches: [ "master", "development", "development-eddsa" ]
pull_request:
# The branches below must be a subset of the branches above
branches: [ "master", "development", "development-eddsa" ]
schedule:
- cron: '23 5 * * 4'
workflow_dispatch:
jobs:
analyze:
name: Analyze
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
actions: read
contents: read
security-events: write
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
language: [ 'cpp', 'python' ]
# CodeQL supports [ 'cpp', 'csharp', 'go', 'java', 'javascript', 'python', 'ruby' ]
# Learn more about CodeQL language support at https://aka.ms/codeql-docs/language-support
mode: [ 'pico', 'local' ]
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@v3
# Initializes the CodeQL tools for scanning.
- name: Initialize CodeQL
uses: github/codeql-action/init@v3
with:
languages: ${{ matrix.language }}
# If you wish to specify custom queries, you can do so here or in a config file.
# By default, queries listed here will override any specified in a config file.
# Prefix the list here with "+" to use these queries and those in the config file.
# Details on CodeQL's query packs refer to : https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/code-scanning/automatically-scanning-your-code-for-vulnerabilities-and-errors/configuring-code-scanning#using-queries-in-ql-packs
# queries: security-extended,security-and-quality
# Autobuild attempts to build any compiled languages (C/C++, C#, or Java).
# If this step fails, then you should remove it and run the build manually (see below)
# - name: Autobuild
# uses: github/codeql-action/autobuild@v2
# Command-line programs to run using the OS shell.
# 📚 See https://docs.github.com/en/actions/using-workflows/workflow-syntax-for-github-actions#jobsjob_idstepsrun
# If the Autobuild fails above, remove it and uncomment the following three lines.
# modify them (or add more) to build your code if your project, please refer to the EXAMPLE below for guidance.
- run: |
echo "Run, Build Application using script"
./workflows/autobuild.sh ${{ matrix.mode }}
- name: Perform CodeQL Analysis
uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@v3

34
.github/workflows/nightly.yml vendored Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
name: "Nightly deploy"
on:
schedule:
- cron: '0 2 * * *'
workflow_dispatch:
jobs:
nightly:
name: Deploy nightly
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
refs: [master, development]
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
ref: ${{ matrix.refs }}
submodules: 'recursive'
- name : Build
env:
PICO_SDK_PATH: ../pico-sdk
run: |
./workflows/autobuild.sh pico
./build_pico_hsm.sh
- name: Update nightly release
uses: pyTooling/Actions/releaser@main
with:
tag: nightly-${{ matrix.refs }}
rm: true
token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
files: release/*.*

66
.github/workflows/test.yml vendored Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
# For most projects, this workflow file will not need changing; you simply need
# to commit it to your repository.
#
# You may wish to alter this file to override the set of languages analyzed,
# or to provide custom queries or build logic.
#
# ******** NOTE ********
# We have attempted to detect the languages in your repository. Please check
# the `language` matrix defined below to confirm you have the correct set of
# supported CodeQL languages.
#
name: "Emulation and test"
on:
push:
branches: [ "master", "development", "development-eddsa" ]
pull_request:
# The branches below must be a subset of the branches above
branches: [ "master", "development", "development-eddsa" ]
schedule:
- cron: '23 5 * * 4'
workflow_dispatch:
jobs:
build:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Checkout repository and submodules
uses: actions/checkout@v3
with:
submodules: recursive
- name: Build in container
run: ./tests/build-in-docker.sh
- name: Export image
run: |
mkdir -p artifacts
docker save pico-hsm-test:bullseye -o artifacts/docker-image.tar
- name: Temporarily save image
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
with:
name: docker-artifact
path: artifacts
retention-days: 1
test:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: build
strategy:
matrix:
suite: ["pkcs11", "pytest", "sc-hsm-pkcs11"]
steps:
- name: Checkout repository and submodules
uses: actions/checkout@v3
with:
submodules: recursive
- name: Retrieve saved image
uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
with:
name: docker-artifact
path: artifacts
- name: Load image
run: |
cd artifacts
docker load -q -i docker-image.tar
- name: Test ${{ matrix.suite }}
run: ./tests/run-test-in-docker.sh ${{ matrix.suite }}

6
.gitmodules vendored
View File

@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
[submodule "pico-ccid"]
path = pico-ccid
url = https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-ccid
[submodule "pico-keys-sdk"]
path = pico-keys-sdk
url = https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-keys-sdk

317
.uncrustify.cfg Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,317 @@
#
# Uncrustify Configuration File
# File Created With UncrustifyX 0.4.3 (252)
#
# Code-Modifying
# --------------
## Braces
# Braces on single-line do statement
mod_full_brace_do = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Braces on single-line else statement
mod_full_brace_if = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Braces on single-line for statement
mod_full_brace_for = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Braces on single-line while statement
mod_full_brace_while = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
## Parentheses
# Remove unnecessary parentheses on return statement
mod_paren_on_return = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Comments
# --------
## Other
# Remove leading spaces from multi-line comments
cmt_multi_check_last = false # boolean (false/true)
# General
# -------
## Other
# Input tab size
input_tab_size = 4 # number
# Indentation
# -----------
## Indentation Size
# Indentation column size
indent_columns = 4 # number
# Indentation size between case and switch
indent_switch_case = 4 # number
## Other
# Align strings broken by backslash
indent_align_string = true # boolean (false/true)
# Indent with tabs
indent_with_tabs = 0 # number
# Line-Splitting
# --------------
## Splitting
# Code width
code_width = 100 # number
# Split long for statements at semicolons
ls_for_split_full = true # boolean (false/true)
# Split long function prototypes/calls at commas
ls_func_split_full = true # boolean (false/true)
# Newlines
# --------
## Newline Between
# Newline between assignment and open brace
nl_assign_brace = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Newline between close brace and else
nl_brace_else = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Newline between close brace and while
nl_brace_while = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Newline between do and open brace
nl_do_brace = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Newline between else and open brace
nl_else_brace = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Newline between enum and open brace
nl_enum_brace = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Newline between for and open brace
nl_for_brace = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Newline between function call and open brace
nl_fcall_brace = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Newline between function signature and open brace
nl_fdef_brace = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Newline between if and open brace
nl_if_brace = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Newline between struct and open brace
nl_struct_brace = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Newline between switch and open brace
nl_switch_brace = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Newline between union and open brace
nl_union_brace = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Newline between while and open brace
nl_while_brace = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
## Other
# Newline count at end of file
nl_end_of_file_min = 1 # number
# Newlines at end of file
nl_end_of_file = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Newlines at start of file
nl_start_of_file = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Spacing
# -------
## Space After
# Space after address-of operator
sp_addr = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space after cast
sp_after_cast = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space after comma
sp_after_comma = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space after dereference operator
sp_deref = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space after final semicolon in empty for statement
sp_after_semi_for_empty = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space after invert operator
sp_inv = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space after not operator
sp_not = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space after pointer star
sp_after_ptr_star = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space after pointer star followed by function
sp_after_ptr_star_func = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space after semicolon
sp_after_semi = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space after semicolon in non-empty for statements
sp_after_semi_for = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space after sign in assignment
sp_sign = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space after type
sp_after_type = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
## Space Around
# Space around arithmetic operators
sp_arith = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space around assignment operator
sp_assign = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space around boolean operators
sp_bool = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space around compare operators
sp_compare = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space around increment/decrement operators
sp_incdec = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space around member operators
sp_member = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space around preprocessor concatenation operator
sp_pp_concat = ignore # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space around ternary condition colon
sp_cond_colon = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space around ternary condition question mark
sp_cond_question = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
## Space Before
# Space before backslash-newline at end of line
sp_before_nl_cont = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space before case colon
sp_before_case_colon = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space before comma
sp_before_comma = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space before if/for/switch/while open parenthesis
sp_before_sparen = force # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space before pointer star
sp_before_ptr_star = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space before semicolon
sp_before_semi = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space before semicolon in empty for statement
sp_before_semi_for_empty = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space before semicolon in for statements
sp_before_semi_for = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
## Space Between
# Space between __attribute__ and open parenthesis
sp_attribute_paren = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between close brace and else
sp_brace_else = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between close brace and typedef name
sp_brace_typedef = force # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between closing parenthesis and open brace
sp_fparen_brace = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between defined and open parenthesis
sp_defined_paren = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between else and open brace
sp_else_brace = force # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between function name and open parenthesis
sp_func_call_paren = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between function name and open parenthesis in declaration
sp_func_proto_paren = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between function name and open parenthesis in function definition
sp_func_def_paren = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between if/for/switch/while close parenthesis and open brace
sp_sparen_brace = force # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between macro and value
sp_macro = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between macro function close parenthesis and value
sp_macro_func = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between nested parentheses
sp_paren_paren = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between pointer stars
sp_between_ptr_star = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between preprocessor else and comment
sp_endif_cmt = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between return type and function name
sp_type_func = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between sizeof and open parenthesis
sp_sizeof_paren = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
## Space Inside
# Space inside braces
sp_inside_braces = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space inside cast parentheses
sp_inside_paren_cast = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space inside empty function parentheses
sp_inside_fparens = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space inside enum braces
sp_inside_braces_enum = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space inside function parentheses
sp_inside_fparen = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space inside if-condition parentheses
sp_inside_sparen = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space inside non-empty square brackets
sp_inside_square = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space inside parentheses
sp_inside_paren = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space inside parentheses in function type
sp_inside_tparen = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space inside struct/union braces
sp_inside_braces_struct = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)

View File

@@ -1,129 +1,129 @@
#
# This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
# Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
#
# This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
# the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
#
# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
# WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
# General Public License for more details.
#
# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
# along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
#
#
# This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
# Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
#
# This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
# the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
#
# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
# WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
# General Public License for more details.
#
# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
# along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
#
cmake_minimum_required(VERSION 3.13)
include(pico_sdk_import.cmake)
if(ESP_PLATFORM)
set(EXTRA_COMPONENT_DIRS src pico-keys-sdk/src)
include($ENV{IDF_PATH}/tools/cmake/project.cmake)
else()
if(NOT ENABLE_EMULATION)
include(pico_sdk_import.cmake)
endif()
project(pico_hsm C CXX ASM)
project(pico_hsm C CXX ASM)
set(CMAKE_C_STANDARD 11)
set(CMAKE_CXX_STANDARD 17)
set(CMAKE_C_STANDARD 11)
set(CMAKE_CXX_STANDARD 17)
pico_sdk_init()
if(NOT ENABLE_EMULATION)
pico_sdk_init()
endif()
add_executable(pico_hsm)
if(NOT DEFINED __FOR_CI)
set(__FOR_CI 0)
endif()
if(__FOR_CI)
add_definitions(-D__FOR_CI)
endif()
if (NOT DEFINED USB_VID)
set(USB_VID 0xFEFF)
add_executable(pico_hsm)
endif()
add_definitions(-DUSB_VID=${USB_VID})
if (NOT DEFINED USB_PID)
set(USB_PID 0xFCFD)
endif()
add_definitions(-DUSB_PID=${USB_PID})
find_package( PythonInterp 3.7 REQUIRED )
if (NOT EXISTS ${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cvcerts.h)
execute_process(COMMAND ${PYTHON_EXECUTABLE} ${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/burn-cvcerts.py ${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR})
message("Burning CVCert")
endif()
configure_file(${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/config/mbedtls_config.h ${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/mbedtls/include/mbedtls COPYONLY)
target_sources(pico_hsm PUBLIC
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/src/usb/usb.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/src/usb/usb_descriptors.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/src/ccid/ccid2040.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/src/ccid/asn1.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/src/fs/file.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/src/fs/flash.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/src/fs/low_flash.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/src/rng/random.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/src/rng/neug.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/src/ccid/crypto_utils.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/src/ccid/eac.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/sc_hsm.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cvc.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/files.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/dkek.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/oid.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/mbedtls/library/aes.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/mbedtls/library/asn1write.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/mbedtls/library/bignum.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/mbedtls/library/cmac.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/mbedtls/library/cipher.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/mbedtls/library/cipher_wrap.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/mbedtls/library/constant_time.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/mbedtls/library/ecdsa.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/mbedtls/library/ecdh.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/mbedtls/library/ecp.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/mbedtls/library/ecp_curves.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/mbedtls/library/hkdf.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/mbedtls/library/md.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/mbedtls/library/md5.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/mbedtls/library/oid.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/mbedtls/library/platform_util.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/mbedtls/library/ripemd160.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/mbedtls/library/rsa.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/mbedtls/library/rsa_alt_helpers.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/mbedtls/library/sha1.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/mbedtls/library/sha256.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/mbedtls/library/sha512.c
)
target_include_directories(pico_hsm PUBLIC
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/src/fs
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/src/ccid
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/src/rng
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/src/usb
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/mbedtls/include
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/pico-ccid/mbedtls/library
)
target_compile_options(pico_hsm PUBLIC
-Wall
-Werror
set(SOURCES ${SOURCES}
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/sc_hsm.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_select.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_list_keys.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_read_binary.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_verify.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_reset_retry.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_challenge.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_external_authenticate.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_mse.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_initialize.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_key_domain.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_key_wrap.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_keypair_gen.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_update_ef.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_delete_file.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_change_pin.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_key_gen.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_signature.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_key_unwrap.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_decrypt_asym.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_cipher_sym.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_derive_asym.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_extras.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_general_authenticate.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_session_pin.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_puk_auth.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_pso.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_bip_slip.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cvc.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/files.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/kek.c
)
set(USB_ITF_CCID 1)
set(USB_ITF_WCID 1)
include(pico-keys-sdk/pico_keys_sdk_import.cmake)
pico_add_extra_outputs(pico_hsm)
SET_VERSION(ver_major ver_minor "${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/version.h")
target_link_libraries(pico_hsm PRIVATE pico_stdlib pico_multicore hardware_flash hardware_sync hardware_adc pico_unique_id hardware_rtc tinyusb_device tinyusb_board)
if(ESP_PLATFORM)
project(pico_hsm)
endif()
#
#project(flash_nuke C CXX ASM)
#add_executable(flash_nuke nuke.c)
#target_link_libraries(flash_nuke
# pico_stdlib
# hardware_flash
# )
#pico_set_binary_type(flash_nuke no_flash)
#
#pico_add_extra_outputs(flash_nuke)
set(INCLUDES ${INCLUDES}
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm
)
if(NOT ESP_PLATFORM)
target_sources(pico_hsm PUBLIC ${SOURCES})
target_include_directories(pico_hsm PUBLIC ${INCLUDES})
#project(memory C CXX ASM)
#add_executable(memory memory.c)
#target_link_libraries(memory
# pico_stdlib
# hardware_flash
# )
#pico_set_binary_type(memory no_flash)
#
#pico_add_extra_outputs(memory)
target_compile_options(pico_hsm PUBLIC
-Wall
)
if(NOT MSVC)
target_compile_options(pico_hsm PUBLIC
-Werror
)
endif()
if(ENABLE_EMULATION)
if(NOT MSVC)
target_compile_options(pico_hsm PUBLIC
-fdata-sections
-ffunction-sections
)
endif()
if(APPLE)
target_link_options(pico_hsm PUBLIC
-Wl,-dead_strip
)
elseif(MSVC)
target_compile_options(pico_hsm PUBLIC
-WX
)
target_link_libraries(pico_hsm PUBLIC wsock32 ws2_32 Bcrypt)
else()
target_link_options(pico_hsm PUBLIC
-Wl,--gc-sections
)
endif(APPLE)
target_link_libraries(pico_hsm PRIVATE pthread m)
endif()
endif()

54
Dockerfile Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
FROM debian:bullseye
ENV DEBIAN_FRONTEND noninteractive
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y \
build-essential \
git \
cmake \
gcc-arm-none-eabi \
libnewlib-arm-none-eabi \
libstdc++-arm-none-eabi-newlib \
python3 \
python3-pip
RUN useradd -m builduser
USER builduser
WORKDIR /home/builduser
VOLUME /home/builduser/release
ARG VERSION_PICO_SDK 2.0.0
RUN mkdir -p /home/builduser/Devel/pico
RUN cd /home/builduser/Devel/pico \
&& git clone https://github.com/raspberrypi/pico-sdk.git \
&& cd pico-sdk \
&& git checkout $VERSION_PICO_SDK \
&& git submodule update --init --recursive
RUN pip install cryptography
ARG VERSION_MAJOR 4
ARG VERSION_MINOR 2
RUN cd /home/builduser \
&& git clone https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm.git \
&& cd pico-hsm \
&& git checkout v${VERSION_MAJOR}.${VERSION_MINOR} \
&& git submodule update --init --recursive \
&& mkdir build_release
ENV PICO_SDK_PATH /home/builduser/Devel/pico/pico-sdk
ARG USB_VID 0xfeff
ARG USB_PID 0xfcfd
ARG PICO_BOARD waveshare_rp2040_zero
RUN cd /home/builduser/pico-hsm \
&& cd build_release \
&& cmake .. -DPICO_BOARD=$PICO_BOARD -DUSB_VID=${USB_VID} -DUSB_PID=${USB_PID} \
&& make -kj20

337
README.md
View File

@@ -1,140 +1,211 @@
# Raspberry Pico HSM
This is a project to create a Hardware Security Module (HSM) with a Raspberry Pico. It converts your Pico board into a HSM which is able to generate and store private keys, encrypt or decrypt with AES or signing data without to disclose the private key. In detail, the private key never leaves the board and it cannot be retrieved as it is encrypted in the flash memory.
This project aims to transform a Raspberry Pi Pico or ESP32 microcontroller into a Hardware Security Module (HSM). The modified Pico or ESP32 board will be capable of generating and storing private keys, performing AES encryption or decryption, and signing data without exposing the private key. Specifically, the private key remains securely on the board and cannot be retrieved since it is encrypted within the flash memory.
## Capabilities
### Key generation and encrypted storage
Private and secret keys are stored with a master AES 256 key (DKEK). The DKEK is, at the same time, encrypted with a hashed and salted version of the PIN.
### > Key generation and encrypted storage
Private and secret keys are secured using a master AES 256 key (MKEK). The MKEK is encrypted with a hashed and salted version of the PIN.
**No private/secret keys, DKEK or PIN are stored in plain text ever. Never.**
### RSA key generation from 1024 to 4096 bits
RSA key generation in place for 1024, 2048, 3072 and 4096 bits. Private keys never leave the device.
### > RSA Key Generation (1024 to 4096 Bits)
RSA key generation is supported for 1024, 2048, 3072, and 4096 bits. Private keys never leave the device.
### ECDSA key generation from 192 to 521 bits
ECDSA key generation in place for different curves, from 192 to 521 bits.
### > ECDSA Key Generation (192 to 521 Bits)
ECDSA key generation supports various curves from 192 to 521 bits.
### ECC curves
It supports secp192r1, secp256r1, secp384r1, secp521r1, brainpoolP256r1, brainpoolP384r1, brainpoolP512r1, secp192k1 (insecure), secp256k1 curves.
### > ECC Curves
Supported ECC curves include secp192r1, secp256r1, secp384r1, secp521r1, brainpoolP256r1, brainpoolP384r1, brainpoolP512r1, secp192k1 (insecure), secp256k1, Curve25519, and Curve448.
### SHA1, SHA224, SHA256, SHA384, SHA512 digests
ECDSA and RSA signature can be combined with SHA digest in place.
### > SHA Digests
ECDSA and RSA signatures can be combined with SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 digests.
### Multiple RSA signature algorithms
It supports RSA-PSS, RSA-PKCS and raw RSA signatures.
### > Multiple RSA Signature Algorithms
Supported RSA signature algorithms include RSA-PSS, RSA-PKCS, and raw RSA signatures.
### ECDSA raw and hash signature
ECDSA signatures can be in raw or pre-hashed formats.
### > ECDSA Signatures
ECDSA signatures can be raw or pre-hashed.
### ECDH key derivation
It supports the calculation of shared secrets with ECDH algorithm.
### > ECDH Key Derivation
Supports the ECDH algorithm for calculating shared secrets.
### EC private key derivation
It allows ECDSA key derivation.[^1]
### > EC Private Key Derivation
Allows ECDSA key derivation.
### RSA-OEP and RSA-X-509 decryption
It allows private decryption in place with RSA-OEP and RSA-X-509 algorithms.
### > RSA Decryption
Supports RSA-OEP and RSA-X.509 decryption.
### AES key generation
It supports AES key generation in place with keys of 128, 192 and 256 bits.
### > AES Key Generation
Supports AES key generation with keys of 128, 192, and 256 bits.
### AES-CBC encryption/decryption
AES encryption and decryption is performed in place.
### > AES-CBC Encryption/Decryption
Performs AES-CBC encryption and decryption.
### CMAC
It supports AES-CMAC authentication.[^1]
### > Advanced AES Modes
Supports AES encryption and decryption in ECB, CBC, CFB, OFB, XTS, CTR, GCM, and CCM modes, with customizable IV/nonce and additional authenticated data (AAD).[^4]
### AES derivation
It supports AES secret key derivation.[^1]
### > AES Key Generation (128, 192, 256, 512 Bits)
Supports AES key generation up to 512 bits, useful for AES XTS where two 256-bit keys are concatenated.
### PIN authorization
Private and secret keys cannot be used without prior PIN authentication. It supports alphanumeric PIN.
### > CMAC
Supports AES-CMAC authentication.[^1]
### PKCS11 compliant interface
The module can be interfaced with PKCS11 standard.
### > AES Secret Key Derivation
Supports AES secret key derivation.[^1]
### HRNG (hardware random number generator)
It contains a harware random number generator properly modeled to guarantee maximum entropy.
### > PIN Authorization
Private and secret keys require prior PIN authentication. Supports alphanumeric PINs.
### Device Key Encryption Key (DKEK) shares
It supports DKEK share imports. DKEK are used to wrap, unwrap and encrypt private and secret keys in the device.
### > PKCS11 Compliant Interface
Interfacing with the PKCS11 standard is supported.
### DKEK n-of-m threshold scheme
It supports a n-of-m threshold scheme to minimize outage when a DKEK custodian is not available during the import process.
### > Hardware Random Number Generator (HRNG)
Contains an HRNG designed for maximum entropy.
### USB/CCID support with OpenSC, openssl, etc.
Pico HSM has a full USB CCID stack to communicate with the host via OpenSC and PCSC. It allows the use of frontend applications such as OpenSSL via PKCS11 module.
### > Device Key Encryption Key (DKEK) Shares
Supports importing DKEK shares to wrap, unwrap, and encrypt keys.
### Extended APDU support
It supports extended APDU packets, which allows up to 65535 bytes.
### > DKEK n-of-m Threshold Scheme
Supports an n-of-m threshold scheme to prevent outages when a DKEK custodian is unavailable.
### CVC certificates
Pico HSM manipulates CVC certificates and requests to minimize the storage of internal certificates.
### > USB/CCID Support
Full USB CCID stack for communication with the host via OpenSC and PCSC, allowing the use of frontend applications like OpenSSL via the PKCS11 module.
### Attestation
Every generated key is attached to a certificate, signed by an external PKI to ensure that a particular key is effectively generated by this specific device.
### > Extended APDU Support
Supports extended APDU packets, allowing up to 65535 bytes.
### Import external private keys and certificates
It allows private key and certificates import via WKY or PKCS#12 files.[^2][^3]
### > CV Certificates
Handles CVC certificates and requests to minimize internal certificate storage.
### Tranport PIN
It allows transport PIN for provisioning and forcing to set a new PIN.[^2] It is a tampered mechanism that ensures the device has not been unsealed during the transportation from the issuer to the legitimate user.
### > Attestation
Each generated key is attached to a certificate signed by an external PKI, ensuring the key was generated by the specific device.
### Press-to-confirm button
It allows the use of BOOTSEL button to confirm operations with private/secret keys, such as signatures and decryption. When a private/secret key is loaded, the user has 15 seconds to press the button to confirm the operation.
This feature protects the user from unwanted uses from background applications that may sign data without user notice.
### > Import External Keys and Certificates
Allows importing private keys and certificates via WKY or PKCS#12 files.[^2][^3]
### Store and retrieve binary data
It allows the storage of arbitrary files with binary data.
### > Transport PIN
Allows a transport PIN for provisioning, ensuring the device has not been tampered with during transportation.[^2]
### Real time clock (RTC)
Pico HSM has a RTC with external datetime setting and getting.
### > Press-to-Confirm Button
Uses the BOOTSEL button to confirm operations with private/secret keys, providing a 15-second window to confirm the operation to protect against unauthorized use.
### Secure Messaging (secure channel)
Pico HSM supports secure channel, where the data packets between the host and device are encrypted to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks.
### > Store and Retrieve Binary Data
Allows the storage of arbitrary binary data files.
### Session PIN
A specific session PIN can be set during the session opening to avoid the systemmatic use of PIN.
### > Real-Time Clock (RTC)
Includes an RTC with external date and time setting and retrieval.
### PKI CVCert remote issuing for Secure Message
### > Secure Messaging
Supports secure channels to encrypt data packets between the host and device, preventing man-in-the-middle attacks.
### > Session PIN
A specific session PIN can be set during session opening to avoid systematic PIN usage.
### > PKI CVCert Remote Issuing for Secure Messaging
Secure channel messages are secured with a certificate issued by an external PKI.
### Multiple key domains
Key domains are domains to store separate private/secret keys. Each domain is protected by a DKEK, independent from the other domains. Private/secret keys can be generated in different key domains to be used with separated DKEK.
Therefore, a single device may contain different domains with independent keys.
### > Multiple Key Domains
Supports separate key domains protected by independent DKEKs, allowing different keys in different domains.
### Key usage counter
A key usage counter is a counter that is reduced by 1 everytime that the private/secret key is used for signing, decrypting, derivation, etc. When it reaches 0, the key is disabled and cannot be used anymore.
### > Key Usage Counter
Tracks and limits the usage of private/secret keys, disabling keys once their usage counter reaches zero.
Key usage can also be used to perform and auditory and track the usage of a particular key.
### > Public Key Authentication (PKA)
Supports PKA for enhanced security, requiring a secondary device for authentication using a challenge-response mechanism.
### Public Key Authentication
Public Key Authentication (PKA) allows to authenticate by using a secondary device with a private key and a registered public key in the primary device. A challenge is generated by the primary Pico HSM and given to the secondary for signature. The secondary device signs the challenge and returns the signature. Then, the primary device verifies the signature with the registered public key and if it is valid, it grants full access, as normal PIN authentication.
### > Secure Lock
Adds an extra layer of security by locking the Pico HSM to a specific computer using a private key.
In PKA, the PIN is used for protecting the DKEK, as classic method with only PIN, and PKA is used for adding an extra security layer. Therefore, this mechanism provides a higher degree of security, since it needs a secondary Pico HSM to authenticate the primary one.
### > ChaCha20-Poly1305
Supports the ChaCha20-Poly1305 encryption algorithm for secure data encryption.[^4]
### > X25519 and X448
Supports DH X25519 and X448 for key agreement, though these cannot be used for signing.
### > Key Derivation Functions
Supports HKDF, PBKDF2, and X963-KDF for symmetric key derivation.
### > HMAC
Supports HMAC generation with SHA digest algorithms.
### > CMAC
Supports CMAC with AES for keys of 128, 192, and 256 bits.
### > XKEK
Supports an advanced key sharing scheme (XKEK) for securely wrapping and unwrapping keys within authorized domains.
### > Master Key Encryption Key (MKEK)
Uses an MKEK to securely store all keys, encrypted with an ephemeral key derived from the hashed PIN.
### > Hierarchical Deterministic Key Generation
Supports BIP32 for asymmetric key derivation and SLIP10 for symmetric key derivation, enabling crypto wallet deployment with infinite key generation. Supports NIST 256 and Koblitz 256 curves for master key generation.[^4]
### > One Time Programming (OTP) Storage
The OTP securely stores the MKEK (Master Key Encryption Key) and Device Key permanently, making it inaccessible from external interfaces. This ensures that the key is protected against unauthorized access and tampering.
### > Secure Boot
Secure Boot ensures only authenticated firmware can run on the device, verifying each firmwares digital signature to block unauthorized code.
### > Secure Lock
Secure Lock restricts the device to the manufacturers firmware only, locking out debug access and preventing any further boot key installations.
### > Rescue Interface
A built-in rescue interface allows recovery of the device if it becomes unresponsive or undetectable. This feature provides a way to restore the device to operational status without compromising security.
### > LED Customization
The LED can be customized to reflect device status and user preferences, offering flexible color and brightness options for an enhanced user experience.
[^1]: PKCS11 modules (`pkcs11-tool` and `sc-tool`) do not support CMAC and key derivation. It must be processed through raw APDU command (`opensc-tool -s`).
[^2]: Available via SCS3 tool. See [SCS3](/doc/scs3.md "SCS3") for more information.
[^3]: Imports are available only if the Pico HSM is previously initialized with a DKEK and the DKEK shares are available during the import process.
[^3]: Imports are available only if the Pico HSM is previously initialized with a DKEK and DKEK shares are available during the import process.
[^4]: Available by using PicoHSM python tool.
### > ESP32-S3 support
Pico HSM also supports ESP32-S3 boards, which add secure storage, flash encryption and secure boot.
### > Dynamic VID/PID
Supports setting VID & PID on-the-fly. Use `pico-hsm-tool.py` or [Pico Commissioner](https://www.picokeys.com/pico-commissioner/ "Pico Commissioner") for specify VID/PID values and reboot the device.
### > Rescue Pico HSM Tool and Commissioner
Pico HSM Tool implements a new CCID stack to rescue the Pico HSM in case it has wrong VID/PID values and it is not recognized by the OS. It can be accessed through `pico-hsm-tool.py` or [Pico Commissioner](https://www.picokeys.com/pico-commissioner/ "Pico Commissioner").
## Security considerations
All secret keys (asymmetric and symmetric) are stored encrypted in the flash memory of the Raspberry Pico. DKEK is used as a 256 bit AES key to protect private and secret keys. Keys are never stored in RAM except for signature and decryption operations and only during the process. All keys (including DKEK) are loaded and cleared every time to avoid potential security flaws.
All secret keys (both asymmetric and symmetric) are encrypted and stored in the flash memory. The MKEK, a 256-bit AES key, is used to protect these private and secret keys. Keys are held in RAM only during signature and decryption operations, and are loaded and cleared each time to avoid potential security vulnerabilities.
At the same time, DKEK is encrypted with doubled salted and hashed PIN. Also, the PIN is hashed in memory during the session. Hence, PIN is never stored in plain text neither in flash nor in memory. Note that PIN is conveyed from the host to the HSM in plain text if no secure channel is provided.
The MKEK itself is encrypted using a doubly salted and hashed PIN, and the PIN is hashed in memory during sessions. This ensures that the PIN is never stored in plaintext, neither in flash memory nor in RAM. However, if no secure channel is used, the PIN may be transmitted in plaintext from the host to the HSM.
If the Pico is stolen the contents of private and secret keys cannot be read without the PIN, even if the flash memory is dumped.
DKEKs are used during the export and import of private/secret keys and are part of a Key Domain. A Key Domain is a set of secret/private keys that share the same DKEK. These are also shared by the custodians and are not specific to Pico HSM. Therefore, if a key does not belong to a Key Domain (and thus lacks a DKEK), it cannot be exported.
In the event that the Pico is stolen, the private and secret key contents cannot be accessed without the PIN, even if the flash memory is dumped.
### RP2350 and ESP32-S3
RP2350 and ESP32-S3 microcontrollers are equipped with advanced security features, including Secure Boot and Secure Lock, ensuring that firmware integrity and authenticity are tightly controlled. Both devices support the storage of the Master Key Encryption Key (MKEK) in an OTP (One-Time Programmable) memory region, making it permanently inaccessible for external access or tampering. This secure, non-volatile region guarantees that critical security keys are embedded into the hardware, preventing unauthorized access and supporting robust defenses against code injection or firmware modification. Together, Secure Boot and Secure Lock enforce firmware authentication, while the MKEK in OTP memory solidifies the foundation for secure operations.
### Secure Boot
Secure Boot is a security feature that ensures that only trusted firmware, verified through digital signatures, can be loaded onto the device during the boot process. Once enabled, Secure Boot checks every piece of firmware against a cryptographic signature before execution, rejecting any unauthorized or modified code. This prevents malicious firmware from compromising the devices operation and integrity. With Secure Boot activated, only firmware versions signed by a trusted authority, such as the device manufacturer, will be accepted, ensuring the device remains protected from unauthorized software modifications. **This is irreversible. Once enabled, it CANNOT be disabled.**
**IMPORTANT:** For users wishing to develop and compile custom firmware, a private-public key pair is essential. Activating Secure Boot requires users to generate and manage their own unique private-public key pair. The public key from this pair must be embedded into the device to validate all firmware. Firmware will not boot without a proper digital signature from this key pair. This means that users must sign all future firmware versions with their private key and embed the public key in the device to ensure compatibility.
### Secure Lock
Secure Lock builds on Secure Boot by imposing an even stricter security model. Once activated, Secure Lock prevents any further installation of new boot keys, effectively locking the device to only run firmware that is authorized by the device's primary vendor—in this case, Pico Keys. In addition to preventing additional keys, Secure Lock disables debugging interfaces and puts additional safeguards in place to resist tampering and intrusion attempts. This ensures that the device operates exclusively with the original vendors firmware and resists unauthorized access, making it highly secure against external threats. **This is irreversible. Once enabled, it CANNOT be disabled.**
**IMPORTANT:** Activating Secure Lock not only enables Secure Boot but also invalidates all keys except the official Pico Key. This means that only firmware signed by Pico Key will be recognized, and custom code will no longer be allowed. Once enabled, the Pico Key device will run solely on the official firmware available on the website, with no option for generating or compiling new code for the device.
## Download
Please, go to the Release page and download the UF2 file for your board.
**If you own an ESP32-S3 board, go to [ESP32 Flasher](https://www.picokeys.com/esp32-flasher/) for flashing your Pico HSM.**
Note that UF2 files are shiped with a dummy VID/PID to avoid license issues (FEFF:FCFD). If you are planning to use it with OpenSC or similar, you should modify Info.plist of CCID driver to add these VID/PID or use the VID/PID patcher as follows:
`./patch_vidpid.sh VID:PID input_hsm_file.uf2 output_hsm_file.uf2`
If you own a Raspberry Pico (RP2040 or RP2350), go to [Download page](https://www.picokeys.com/getting-started/), select your vendor and model and download the proper firmware; or go to [Release page](https://www.github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm/releases/) and download the UF2 file for your board.
Note that UF2 files are shiped with a dummy VID/PID to avoid license issues (FEFF:FCFD). If you plan to use it with OpenSC or similar tools, you should modify Info.plist of CCID driver to add these VID/PID or use the [Pico Commissioner](https://www.picokeys.com/pico-commissioner/ "Pico Commissioner").
You can use whatever VID/PID (i.e., 234b:0000 from FISJ), but remember that you are not authorized to distribute the binary with a VID/PID that you do not own.
## Build
Note that the pure-browser option [Pico Commissioner](https://www.picokeys.com/pico-commissioner/ "Pico Commissioner") is the most recommended.
## Build for Raspberry Pico
Before building, ensure you have installed the toolchain for the Pico and the Pico SDK is properly located in your drive.
```
git clone https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm
git submodule update --init --recursive
cd pico-hsm
mkdir build
cd build
@@ -143,43 +214,79 @@ make
```
Note that `PICO_BOARD`, `USB_VID` and `USB_PID` are optional. If not provided, `pico` board and VID/PID `FEFF:FCFD` will be used.
After `make` ends, the binary file `pico_hsm.uf2` will be generated. Put your pico board into loading mode, by pushing `BOOTSEL` button while pluging on, and copy the UF2 to the new fresh usb mass storage Pico device. Once copied, the pico mass storage will be disconnected automatically and the pico board will reset with the new firmware. A blinking led will indicate the device is ready to work.
Additionally, you can pass the `VIDPID=value` parameter to build the firmware with a known VID/PID. The supported values are:
- `NitroHSM`
- `NitroFIDO2`
- `NitroStart`
- `NitroPro`
- `Nitro3`
- `Yubikey5`
- `YubikeyNeo`
- `YubiHSM`
- `Gnuk`
- `GnuPG`
After running `make`, the binary file `pico_hsm.uf2` will be generated. To load this onto your Pico board:
1. Put the Pico board into loading mode by holding the `BOOTSEL` button while plugging it in.
2. Copy the `pico_hsm.uf2` file to the new USB mass storage device that appears.
3. Once the file is copied, the Pico mass storage device will automatically disconnect, and the Pico board will reset with the new firmware.
4. A blinking LED will indicate that the device is ready to work.
### Docker
Independent from your Linux distribution or when using another OS that supports Docker, you could build a specific pico-hsm version in a Linux container.
```
sudo docker build \
--build-arg VERSION_PICO_SDK=2.0.0 \
--build-arg VERSION_MAJOR=5 \
--build-arg VERSION_MINOR=0 \
--build-arg PICO_BOARD=waveshare_rp2040_zero \
--build-arg USB_VID=0xfeff \
--build-arg USB_PID=0xfcfd \
-t pico-hsm-builder .
sudo docker run \
--name mybuild \
-it pico-hsm-builder \
ls -l /home/builduser/pico-hsm/build_release/pico_hsm.uf2
sudo docker cp mybuild:/home/builduser/pico-hsm/build_release/pico_hsm.uf2 .
sudo docker rm mybuild
```
## Usage
The firmware uploaded to the Pico contains a reader and a virtual smart card. It is like having a physical reader with an inserted SIM card.
We recommend the use of [OpenSC](http://github.com/opensc/opensc/ "OpenSC") to communicate with the reader. If it is not installed, you can download and build it or install the binaries for your system. The first command is to ensure that the Pico is detected as a HSM:
```
The firmware uploaded to the Pico contains a reader and a virtual smart card, similar to having a physical reader with an inserted SIM card. We recommend using [OpenSC](http://github.com/opensc/opensc/ "OpenSC") to communicate with the reader. If OpenSC is not installed, you can download and build it or install the binaries for your system.
To ensure that the Pico is detected as an HSM, use the following command:
```sh
opensc-tool -an
```
It should return a text like the following:
```
It should return a text similar to:
```sh
Using reader with a card: Free Software Initiative of Japan Gnuk
3b:fe:18:00:00:81:31:fe:45:80:31:81:54:48:53:4d:31:73:80:21:40:81:07:fa
SmartCard-HSM
```
The name of the reader may vary if you modified the VID/PID.
For initialization and asymmetric operations, check [doc/usage.md](/doc/usage.md).
For further details and operations, refer to the following documentation:
For signing and verification operations, check [doc/sign-verify.md](/doc/sign-verify.md).
For asymmetric encryption and decryption, check [doc/asymmetric-ciphering.md](/doc/asymmetric-ciphering.md).
For backup, restore and DKEK share management, check [doc/backup-and-restore.md](/doc/backup-and-restore.md).
For AES key generation, encryption and decryption, check [doc/aes.md](/doc/aes.md).
For 4096 bits RSA support, check [doc/scs3.md](/doc/scs3.md).
For storing and retrieving arbitrary data, check [doc/store_data.md](/doc/store_data.md).
For extra options, such as set/get real datetime or enable/disable press-to-confirm button, check [doc/extra_command.md](/doc/extra_command.md).
For Public Key Authentication, check [doc/public_key_authentication.md](/doc/public_key_authentication.md).
- Initialization and Asymmetric Operations [doc/usage.md](/doc/usage.md)
- Signing and Verification Operations [doc/sign-verify.md](/doc/sign-verify.md)
- Asymmetric Encryption and Decryption [doc/asymmetric-ciphering.md](/doc/asymmetric-ciphering.md)
- Backup, Restore, and DKEK Share Management [doc/backup-and-restore.md](/doc/backup-and-restore.md)
- AES Key Generation, Encryption, and Decryption [doc/aes.md](/doc/aes.md)
- 4096 Bits RSA Support [doc/scs3.md](/doc/scs3.md)
- Storing and Retrieving Arbitrary Data [doc/store_data.md](/doc/store_data.md)
- Extra Options (e.g., set/get real datetime, enable/disable press-to-confirm button [doc/extra_command.md](/doc/extra_command.md)
- Public Key Authentication [doc/public_key_authentication.md](/doc/public_key_authentication.md)
## Operation time
### Keypair generation
Generating EC keys is almost instant. RSA keypair generation takes some time, specially for `3072` and `4096` bits.
Generating EC keys is almost instant. RSA keypair generation takes some time, specially for `3072` and `4096` bits.
| RSA key length (bits) | Average time (seconds) |
| :---: | :---: |
@@ -197,14 +304,17 @@ Generating EC keys is almost instant. RSA keypair generation takes some time, sp
| 4096 | 15 |
## Press-to-confirm button
Raspberry Pico comes with the BOOTSEL button to load the firmware. When this firmware is running, the button can be used for other purposes. Pico HSM uses this button to confirm private/secret operations. This feature is optional and it shall be enabled. For more information, see [doc/extra_command.md](/doc/extra_command.md).
The Raspberry Pico includes a BOOTSEL button used for loading firmware initially. Once the Pico HSM firmware is running, this button can be repurposed for additional functionalities. Specifically, the Pico HSM utilizes this button to confirm private and secret operations, a feature that is optional but highly recommended for enhanced security.
With this feature enabled, everytime that a private/secret key is loaded, the Pico HSM awaits for the user confirmation by pressing the BOOTSEL button. The Led of the Pico HSM will remain almost illuminated, turning off quickly once a second, indicating that the user must press the button to confirm the operation. Otherwise, the Pico HSM waits indefinitely. See [Led blink](#press-to-confirm) for a picture of the blinking sequence. When in this mode, the Pico HSM sends periodic timeout commands to the host to do not trigger the timeout operation.
When enabled, each time a private or secret key operation is initiated, the Pico HSM enters a waiting state where it awaits user confirmation by pressing the BOOTSEL button. During this waiting period, the Pico HSM's LED remains mostly illuminated but blinks off briefly every second, signaling to the user to press the button for confirmation. If no action is taken, the Pico HSM will continue to wait indefinitely. This operation mode includes periodic timeout commands sent to the host to prevent the session from timing out prematurely.
This feature is an extra layer of security, as it requires the user intervention to sign or decrypt and it ensures that any application will use the Pico HSM without user awareness. However, it is not recommended for servers or other environments where operations are authomatized, since it requires a physical access to the Pico HSM to push the button.
This feature adds an additional layer of security by requiring physical user intervention for sensitive operations such as signing or decrypting data. It mitigates risks associated with unauthorized applications or scripts using the Pico HSM without user awareness. However, it is not recommended for server environments or other automated settings where physical access to press the button may not be practical.
For more details on configuring and using this feature, refer to the [doc/extra_command.md](/doc/extra_command.md) document.
## Led blink
Pico HSM uses the led to indicate the current status. Four states are available:
### Press to confirm
The Led is almost on all the time. It goes off for 100 miliseconds every second.
@@ -227,18 +337,19 @@ While processing, the Pico HSM is busy and cannot receive additional commands un
## Driver
Pico HSM uses the `sc-hsm` driver provided by [OpenSC](https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/ "OpenSC") or the `sc-hsm-embedded` driver provided by [CardContact](https://github.com/CardContact/sc-hsm-embedded "CardContact"). This driver utilizes the standardized PKCS#11 interface to communicate with the user and it can be used with many engines that accept PKCS#11 interface, such as OpenSSL, P11 library or pkcs11-tool.
The Pico HSM uses either the `sc-hsm` driver from [OpenSC](https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/) or the `sc-hsm-embedded` driver from [CardContact](https://github.com/CardContact/sc-hsm-embedded/) to interface with external applications. These drivers employ the standardized PKCS#11 interface, making it compatible with various cryptographic engines that support PKCS#11, such as OpenSSL, P11 library, or pkcs11-tool.
Pico HSM relies on PKCS#15 structure to store and manipulate the internal files (PINs, private keys, certificates, etc.) and directories. Therefore, it accepts the commands from `pkcs15-tool`. For instance, `pkcs15-tool -D` will list all elements stored in the Pico HSM.
Internally, the Pico HSM organizes and manages its data using the PKCS#15 structure, which includes elements like PINs, private keys, and certificates. Commands can be issued to interact with these stored elements using tools such as `pkcs15-tool`. For example, `pkcs15-tool -D` lists all elements stored within the Pico HSM.
The way to communicate is exactly the same as with other cards, such as OpenPGP or similar.
Communication with the Pico HSM follows the same protocols and methods used with other smart cards, such as OpenPGP cards or similar devices.
For an advanced usage, see the docs and examples.
Pico HSM also supports SCS3 tool for advanced use and multiple key domain. See [SCS3](/doc/scs3.md) for more information.
For advanced usage scenarios, refer to the documentation and examples provided. Additionally, the Pico HSM supports the SCS3 tool for more sophisticated operations and includes features like multiple key domains. For detailed information on SCS3 usage, refer to [SCS3 documentation](/doc/scs3.md).
### Important
OpenSC relies on PCSC driver, which reads a list (`Info.plist`) that contains a pair of VID/PID of supported readers. In order to be detectable, you must patch the UF2 binary (if you just downloaded from the [Release section](https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm/releases "Release section")) or configure the project with the proper VID/PID with `USB_VID` and `USB_PID` parameters in `CMake` (see [Build section](#build "Build section")). Note that you cannot distribute the patched/compiled binary if you do not own the VID/PID or have an explicit authorization.
OpenSC relies on PCSC driver, which reads a list (`Info.plist`) that contains a pair of VID/PID of supported readers. In order to be detectable, you have several options:
- Use `pico-hsm-tool.py` to modify VID/PID on-the-fly.
- Use the pure-browser online [Pico Commissioner](https://www.picokeys.com/pico-commissioner/ "Pico Commissioner") that commissions the Pico Key on-the-fly without external tools.
- Build and configure the project with the proper VID/PID with `USB_VID` and `USB_PID` parameters in `CMake` (see [Build section](#build "Build section")). Note that you cannot distribute the patched/compiled binary if you do not own the VID/PID or have an explicit authorization.
## Credits
Pico HSM uses the following libraries or portion of code:

View File

@@ -1,21 +1,108 @@
#!/bin/bash
VERSION_MAJOR="2"
VERSION_MINOR="6"
VERSION_MAJOR="5"
VERSION_MINOR="0-eddsa1"
SUFFIX="${VERSION_MAJOR}.${VERSION_MINOR}"
#if ! [[ -z "${GITHUB_SHA}" ]]; then
# SUFFIX="${SUFFIX}.${GITHUB_SHA}"
#fi
rm -rf release/*
mkdir -p build_release
mkdir -p release
cd build_release
for board in adafruit_feather_rp2040 adafruit_itsybitsy_rp2040 adafruit_qtpy_rp2040 adafruit_trinkey_qt2040 arduino_nano_rp2040_connect melopero_shake_rp2040 pimoroni_interstate75 pimoroni_keybow2040 pimoroni_pga2040 pimoroni_picolipo_4mb pimoroni_picolipo_16mb pimoroni_picosystem pimoroni_plasma2040 pimoroni_tiny2040 pybstick26_rp2040 sparkfun_micromod sparkfun_promicro sparkfun_thingplus vgaboard waveshare_rp2040_lcd_0.96 waveshare_rp2040_plus_4mb waveshare_rp2040_plus_16mb waveshare_rp2040_zero
for board in 0xcb_helios \
adafruit_feather_rp2040_usb_host \
adafruit_feather_rp2040 \
adafruit_itsybitsy_rp2040 \
adafruit_kb2040 \
adafruit_macropad_rp2040 \
adafruit_qtpy_rp2040 \
adafruit_trinkey_qt2040 \
amethyst_fpga \
archi \
arduino_nano_rp2040_connect \
cytron_maker_pi_rp2040 \
datanoisetv_rp2040_dsp \
eetree_gamekit_rp2040 \
garatronic_pybstick26_rp2040 \
gen4_rp2350_24 \
gen4_rp2350_24ct \
gen4_rp2350_24t \
gen4_rp2350_28 \
gen4_rp2350_28ct \
gen4_rp2350_28t \
gen4_rp2350_32 \
gen4_rp2350_32ct \
gen4_rp2350_32t \
gen4_rp2350_35 \
gen4_rp2350_35ct \
gen4_rp2350_35t \
hellbender_2350A_devboard \
ilabs_challenger_rp2350_bconnect \
ilabs_challenger_rp2350_wifi_ble \
ilabs_opendec02 \
melopero_perpetuo_rp2350_lora \
melopero_shake_rp2040 \
metrotech_xerxes_rp2040 \
net8086_usb_interposer \
nullbits_bit_c_pro \
phyx_rick_tny_rp2350 \
pi-plates_micropi \
pico \
pico_w \
pico2 \
pimoroni_badger2040 \
pimoroni_interstate75 \
pimoroni_keybow2040 \
pimoroni_motor2040 \
pimoroni_pga2040 \
pimoroni_pga2350 \
pimoroni_pico_plus2_rp2350 \
pimoroni_picolipo_4mb \
pimoroni_picolipo_16mb \
pimoroni_picosystem \
pimoroni_plasma2040 \
pimoroni_plasma2350 \
pimoroni_servo2040 \
pimoroni_tiny2040 \
pimoroni_tiny2040_2mb \
pimoroni_tiny2350 \
pololu_3pi_2040_robot \
pololu_zumo_2040_robot \
seeed_xiao_rp2040 \
seeed_xiao_rp2350 \
solderparty_rp2040_stamp \
solderparty_rp2040_stamp_carrier \
solderparty_rp2040_stamp_round_carrier \
solderparty_rp2350_stamp_xl \
solderparty_rp2350_stamp \
sparkfun_micromod \
sparkfun_promicro \
sparkfun_promicro_rp2350 \
sparkfun_thingplus \
switchscience_picossci2_conta_base \
switchscience_picossci2_dev_board \
switchscience_picossci2_micro \
switchscience_picossci2_rp2350_breakout \
switchscience_picossci2_tiny \
tinycircuits_thumby_color_rp2350 \
vgaboard \
waveshare_rp2040_lcd_0.96 \
waveshare_rp2040_lcd_1.28 \
waveshare_rp2040_one \
waveshare_rp2040_plus_4mb \
waveshare_rp2040_plus_16mb \
waveshare_rp2040_zero \
weact_studio_rp2040_2mb \
weact_studio_rp2040_4mb \
weact_studio_rp2040_8mb \
weact_studio_rp2040_16mb \
wiznet_w5100s_evb_pico
do
rm -rf *
PICO_SDK_PATH=~/Devel/pico/pico-sdk cmake .. -DPICO_BOARD=$board
make -kj20
mv pico_hsm.uf2 ../release/pico_hsm_$board-$VERSION_MAJOR.$VERSION_MINOR.uf2
PICO_SDK_PATH="${PICO_SDK_PATH:-../../pico-sdk}" cmake .. -DPICO_BOARD=$board
make -j`nproc`
mv pico_hsm.uf2 ../release/pico_hsm_$board-$SUFFIX.uf2
done
rm -rf *
PICO_SDK_PATH=~/Devel/pico/pico-sdk cmake ..
make -kj20
mv pico_hsm.uf2 ../release/pico_hsm_pico_generic-$VERSION_MAJOR.$VERSION_MINOR.uf2

View File

@@ -1,116 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
Created on Wed Apr 13 20:15:01 2022
@author: Pol Henarejos
"""
from cryptography.hazmat.backends import default_backend
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec
import base64
import urllib.request
import json
import sys
import ssl
ssl._create_default_https_context = ssl._create_unverified_context
def print_var(v, name):
s = '\n'
s += "static const unsigned char "+name+"[] = {\n"
s += "\t0x{:02x},0x{:02x},\n".format((len(v) & 0xff),((len(v)>> 8) & 0xff))
for i in range(len(v)):
if (i%16 == 0):
s += '\t'
s += "0x{:02x}".format((v[i]))
if (i < len(v)-1):
s += ','
if (i%16 == 15):
s += '\n'
s += '\n'
s += '};\n'
return s
def main():
args = sys.argv[1:]
private_key = ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP192R1(), default_backend())
public_key = private_key.public_key()
pub_num = public_key.public_numbers()
pbk = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(b'\x04'+pub_num.x.to_bytes(24,'big')+pub_num.y.to_bytes(24,'big'))
user_agent = 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.9.0.7) Gecko/2009021910 Firefox/3.0.7'
data = urllib.parse.urlencode({'pubkey':pbk}).encode()
req = urllib.request.Request("https://www.henarejos.me/pico-hsm.php", method='POST', data=data, headers={'User-Agent':user_agent,} ) #The assembled request
response = urllib.request.urlopen(req)
resp = response.read().decode('utf-8')
j = json.loads(resp)
cvcert = base64.b64decode(j['cvcert'])
dica = [
0x7f,0x21,0x81,0xc5,0x7f,0x4e,0x81,0x8e,0x5f,0x29,0x01,0x00,0x42,0x0e,0x45,0x53,
0x43,0x56,0x43,0x41,0x48,0x53,0x4d,0x30,0x30,0x30,0x30,0x31,0x7f,0x49,0x3f,0x06,
0x0a,0x04,0x00,0x7f,0x00,0x07,0x02,0x02,0x02,0x02,0x03,0x86,0x31,0x04,0x93,0x7e,
0xdf,0xf1,0xa6,0xd2,0x40,0x7e,0xb4,0x71,0xb2,0x97,0x50,0xdb,0x7e,0xe1,0x70,0xfb,
0x6c,0xcd,0x06,0x47,0x2a,0x3e,0x9c,0x8d,0x59,0x56,0x57,0xbe,0x11,0x11,0x0a,0x08,
0x81,0x54,0xed,0x22,0xc0,0x83,0xac,0xa1,0x2e,0x39,0x7b,0xd4,0x65,0x1f,0x5f,0x20,
0x0e,0x45,0x53,0x44,0x56,0x43,0x41,0x48,0x53,0x4d,0x30,0x30,0x30,0x30,0x31,0x7f,
0x4c,0x12,0x06,0x09,0x04,0x00,0x7f,0x00,0x07,0x03,0x01,0x02,0x02,0x53,0x05,0x80,
0x00,0x00,0x00,0x04,0x5f,0x25,0x06,0x02,0x02,0x00,0x03,0x02,0x07,0x5f,0x24,0x06,
0x02,0x05,0x01,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x5f,0x37,0x30,0x8b,0xb2,0x01,0xb6,0x24,0xfe,0xe5,
0x4e,0x65,0x3a,0x02,0xa2,0xb2,0x27,0x2d,0x3d,0xb4,0xb0,0xc9,0xdd,0xbf,0x10,0x6d,
0x99,0x49,0x46,0xd6,0xd0,0x72,0xc1,0xf3,0x4c,0xab,0x4f,0x32,0x14,0x7c,0xb0,0x99,
0xb7,0x33,0x70,0xd6,0x00,0xff,0x73,0x0c,0x5d
]
cvca = [
0x7f, 0x21, 0x82, 0x01, 0x65, 0x7f, 0x4e, 0x82, 0x01, 0x2d, 0x5f, 0x29,
0x01, 0x00, 0x42, 0x0e, 0x45, 0x53, 0x43, 0x56, 0x43, 0x41, 0x48, 0x53,
0x4d, 0x30, 0x30, 0x30, 0x30, 0x31, 0x7f, 0x49, 0x81, 0xdd, 0x06, 0x0a,
0x04, 0x00, 0x7f, 0x00, 0x07, 0x02, 0x02, 0x02, 0x02, 0x03, 0x81, 0x18,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfe, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0x82, 0x18, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfe, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xfc, 0x83, 0x18, 0x64, 0x21, 0x05, 0x19, 0xe5, 0x9c, 0x80, 0xe7,
0x0f, 0xa7, 0xe9, 0xab, 0x72, 0x24, 0x30, 0x49, 0xfe, 0xb8, 0xde, 0xec,
0xc1, 0x46, 0xb9, 0xb1, 0x84, 0x31, 0x04, 0x18, 0x8d, 0xa8, 0x0e, 0xb0,
0x30, 0x90, 0xf6, 0x7c, 0xbf, 0x20, 0xeb, 0x43, 0xa1, 0x88, 0x00, 0xf4,
0xff, 0x0a, 0xfd, 0x82, 0xff, 0x10, 0x12, 0x07, 0x19, 0x2b, 0x95, 0xff,
0xc8, 0xda, 0x78, 0x63, 0x10, 0x11, 0xed, 0x6b, 0x24, 0xcd, 0xd5, 0x73,
0xf9, 0x77, 0xa1, 0x1e, 0x79, 0x48, 0x11, 0x85, 0x18, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x99, 0xde, 0xf8,
0x36, 0x14, 0x6b, 0xc9, 0xb1, 0xb4, 0xd2, 0x28, 0x31, 0x86, 0x31, 0x04,
0x08, 0x8f, 0xcd, 0xfc, 0xce, 0x87, 0xed, 0xd2, 0x85, 0x92, 0x06, 0x15,
0xe6, 0x51, 0xd7, 0x64, 0x52, 0xd8, 0x57, 0xec, 0xbb, 0x40, 0x8c, 0x32,
0x7a, 0xdb, 0x48, 0xa2, 0xa5, 0x14, 0xc1, 0xc9, 0xbd, 0x77, 0xcc, 0x97,
0x83, 0x60, 0x7a, 0x74, 0x14, 0x93, 0xa7, 0x42, 0x74, 0x4a, 0xd1, 0x73,
0x87, 0x01, 0x01, 0x5f, 0x20, 0x0e, 0x45, 0x53, 0x43, 0x56, 0x43, 0x41,
0x48, 0x53, 0x4d, 0x30, 0x30, 0x30, 0x30, 0x31, 0x7f, 0x4c, 0x12, 0x06,
0x09, 0x04, 0x00, 0x7f, 0x00, 0x07, 0x03, 0x01, 0x02, 0x02, 0x53, 0x05,
0xc0, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x5f, 0x25, 0x06, 0x02, 0x02, 0x00, 0x03,
0x02, 0x06, 0x5f, 0x24, 0x06, 0x03, 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x01, 0x5f,
0x37, 0x30, 0x72, 0x97, 0x77, 0x76, 0x64, 0xb6, 0x0c, 0x57, 0xa2, 0xc4,
0x5e, 0x7b, 0xfd, 0x12, 0xe5, 0x20, 0x14, 0x3e, 0xde, 0x90, 0x38, 0xbf,
0xb3, 0x02, 0x73, 0x91, 0x06, 0xf2, 0x73, 0x0d, 0x76, 0x06, 0x65, 0xd7,
0x46, 0x49, 0x91, 0x0c, 0x51, 0x90, 0x89, 0x84, 0x8d, 0x4f, 0xb6, 0xe5,
0x13, 0x40
]
s = '#ifndef _CVCERTS_H_\n#define _CVCERTS_H_\n'
s += print_var(cvca,'cvca')
s += print_var(dica,'dica')
s += print_var(cvcert,'termca')
pvk = private_key.private_numbers().private_value.to_bytes(24,'big')
s += print_var(pvk,'termca_pk')
s += '\n#endif\n'
f = open(args[0] + '/src/hsm/cvcerts.h','w')
f.write(s)
f.close()
if __name__ == '__main__':
main()

View File

@@ -54,4 +54,4 @@ Using decrypt algorithm AES-CBC
This is a text.
```
AES-CBC it is a block operation and it requires an input size multiple of 16 bytes. Thus, for a trivial data, a padding operation has to be performed beforehand.
AES-CBC it is a block operation and it requires an input size multiple of 16 bytes. Thus, for a trivial data, a padding operation has to be performed beforehand.

View File

@@ -24,12 +24,12 @@ This algorithm uses the PKCSv1.5 padding. It is considered deprecated and insecu
First, we encrypt the data with the public key:
```
$ openssl rsautl -encrypt -inkey 1.pub -in data -pubin -out data.crypt
$ openssl rsautl -encrypt -inkey 1.pub -in data -pubin -out data.crypt
```
Then, we decrypt with the private key inside the Pico HSM:
```
```
$ pkcs11-tool --id 1 --pin 648219 --decrypt --mechanism RSA-PKCS -i data.crypt
Using slot 0 with a present token (0x0)
Using decrypt algorithm RSA-PKCS
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ $ openssl rsautl -encrypt -inkey 1.pub -in data_pad -pubin -out data.crypt -raw
Then, we decrypt with the private key inside the Pico HSM:
```
$ cat data.crypt|pkcs11-tool --id 4 --pin 648219 --decrypt --mechanism RSA-X-509
$ cat data.crypt|pkcs11-tool --id 4 --pin 648219 --decrypt --mechanism RSA-X-509
Using slot 0 with a present token (0x0)
Using decrypt algorithm RSA-X-509
This is a test string. Be safe, be secure.
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ This is a test string. Be safe, be secure.
```
## ECDH-DERIVE
ECC keys do not allow ciphering operations. Instead, the ECDH scheme provides a mechanism to exchange a shared symmetric key without transmitting it to the remote part. The shared key is composed by multiplying the local private key and the remote public key.
ECC keys do not allow ciphering operations. Instead, the ECDH scheme provides a mechanism to exchange a shared symmetric key without transmitting it to the remote part. The shared key is composed by multiplying the local private key and the remote public key.
First, we create the remote part, Bob, by generating an ECC keypair and getting the public key:
```
@@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ No output is displayed if both are equal.
You can also view the contents of both keys:
```
$ xxd -p bob-mine.der
$ xxd -p bob-mine.der
9874558aefa9d92cc051e5da6d1753987e5314925d6d78bf
$ xxd -p mine-bob.der
$ xxd -p mine-bob.der
9874558aefa9d92cc051e5da6d1753987e5314925d6d78bf
```

View File

@@ -29,15 +29,15 @@ symbols.
Please keep the generated DKEK share file in a safe location. We also recommend to keep a
paper printout, in case the electronic version becomes unavailable. A printable version
of the file can be generated using "openssl base64 -in <filename>".
Enter password to encrypt DKEK share :
Enter password to encrypt DKEK share :
Please retype password to confirm :
Please retype password to confirm :
Enciphering DKEK share, please wait...
DKEK share created and saved to dkek.pbe
```
The generated file `dkek.pbe` contains the DKEK. Technically, it contains a share. But if a device is initialized with one share, it is equivalent to contain the full DKEK.
The generated file `dkek.pbe` contains the DKEK. Technically, it contains a share. But if a device is initialized with one share, it is equivalent to contain the full DKEK.
Keep these file in a safe place. If this file is lost, you can export the private keys but you will not be able to import into another device or in the same device if it is initialized again.
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ At this moment, the Pico HSM expects the DKEK. It is loaded with the following c
```
$ sc-hsm-tool --import-dkek-share dkek.pbe
Using reader with a card: Free Software Initiative of Japan Gnuk
Enter password to decrypt DKEK share :
Enter password to decrypt DKEK share :
Deciphering DKEK share, please wait...
DKEK share imported
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ And finally, all are imported one after the other, without special order:
```
$ sc-hsm-tool --import-dkek-share dkek-share-1.pbe
Using reader with a card: Free Software Initiative of Japan Gnuk
Enter password to decrypt DKEK share :
Enter password to decrypt DKEK share :
Deciphering DKEK share, please wait...
DKEK share imported
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ DKEK import pending, 2 share(s) still missing
$ sc-hsm-tool --import-dkek-share dkek-share-2.pbe
Using reader with a card: Free Software Initiative of Japan Gnuk
Enter password to decrypt DKEK share :
Enter password to decrypt DKEK share :
Deciphering DKEK share, please wait...
DKEK share imported
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ DKEK import pending, 1 share(s) still missing
$ sc-hsm-tool --import-dkek-share dkek-share-1.pbe
Using reader with a card: Free Software Initiative of Japan Gnuk
Enter password to decrypt DKEK share :
Enter password to decrypt DKEK share :
Deciphering DKEK share, please wait...
DKEK share imported
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ DKEK key check value : 4B7DA256ACD4EF62
### DKEK n-of-m threshold scheme
This scheme provides an extra level of flexiblity, as not all custodians are necessary to import the DKEK share. For instance, with the previous schemes, if a custodian gets unavailable, the initialization will block until the missing custodian can got to finalize the initialization.
With n-of-m threshold scheme, it flexibilizes the number of required custodians to reduce failure points. If a share is lost, the DKEK can still be recovered without major implications.
With n-of-m threshold scheme, it flexibilizes the number of required custodians to reduce failure points. If a share is lost, the DKEK can still be recovered without major implications.
This scheme is not a replacement of DKEK shares. Instead, it splits the DKEK share encryption password amongst the n-of-m threshold scheme. For instance, if you define 2 shares and a scheme of 3-of-5 threshold for each share, it will imply 10 different custodians, where 6 are necessary to load both shares. You can also mix one share with traditional passphrase and the other with the n-of-m threshold scheme.
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ Using reader with a card:Free Software Initiative of Japan Gnuk
The DKEK will be enciphered using a randomly generated 64 bit password.
This password is split using a (3-of-5) threshold scheme.
Please keep the generated and encrypted DKEK file in a safe location. We also recommend
Please keep the generated and encrypted DKEK file in a safe location. We also recommend
to keep a paper printout, in case the electronic version becomes unavailable. A printable version
of the file can be generated using "openssl base64 -in <filename>".
@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ Private RSA Key [Certificate]
...
```
Note that `Key ref` and `ID` may be different. Whilst different keys may share the same `ID` (highly discouraged), the `Key ref` is a value internally computed and unique.
Note that `Key ref` and `ID` may be different. Whilst different keys may share the same `ID` (highly discouraged), the `Key ref` is a value internally computed and unique.
To export and wrap the private key:
@@ -199,10 +199,10 @@ To export and wrap the private key:
$ sc-hsm-tool --wrap-key wrap-key.bin --key-reference 1 --pin 648219
```
A file named `wrap-key.bin` is created with the private key encrypted securely with the DKEK.
A file named `wrap-key.bin` is created with the private key encrypted securely with the DKEK.
## Restore
To restore the wraped key, a device initialized with the same DKEK is mandatory.
To restore the wraped key, a device initialized with the same DKEK is mandatory.
To unwrap the key:

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# Extra command
Pico HSM supports a customized extra command to use with different options. Since the drivers in the market do not support the following features, a raw APDU command shall be sent.
Pico HSM supports a customized extra command to use with different options. Since the drivers in the market do not support the following features, a raw APDU command shall be sent.
To send a raw APDU command, `opensc-tool -s <APDU>` can be used. The `APDU` parameter is a string of hexadecimal numbers and it takes the following form:
```
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ For example, to obtain the current datetime:
```
$ opensc-tool -s 80640A0008
Using reader with a card: Free Software Initiative of Japan Gnuk
Sending: 80 64 0A 00 08
Sending: 80 64 0A 00 08
Received (SW1=0x90, SW2=0x00):
07 E6 04 06 03 13 29 1E ......).
```
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ To set the reference datetime, a datetime string must be provided. For example:
```
$ opensc-tool -s 80640A000807E6040603132917
Using reader with a card: Free Software Initiative of Japan Gnuk
Sending: 80 64 0A 00 08 07 E6 04 06 03 13 29 17
Sending: 80 64 0A 00 08 07 E6 04 06 03 13 29 17
Received (SW1=0x90, SW2=0x00)
```
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ This feature is disabled by default but can be enabled rapidly by setting the LS
```
$ opensc-tool -s 806406000101
Using reader with a card: Free Software Initiative of Japan Gnuk
Sending: 80 64 06 00 01 01
Sending: 80 64 06 00 01 01
Received (SW1=0x90, SW2=0x00)
```
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ This feature is disabled by default but can be enabled rapidly by setting the 2n
```
$ opensc-tool -s 806406000102
Using reader with a card: Free Software Initiative of Japan Gnuk
Sending: 80 64 06 00 01 01
Sending: 80 64 06 00 01 01
Received (SW1=0x90, SW2=0x00)
```

View File

@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ On a secondary device, generate a private key, on the ECC 256 bits (`brainpoolP2
<img width="1037" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/55573252/173353764-4620ece4-0d82-4a23-a153-99bf912621a7.png">
Once finished, export the public key.
Once finished, export the public key.
<img width="350" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/55573252/173353732-63f40572-a42f-4e5c-a9ab-6e52a083956b.png">
@@ -64,17 +64,17 @@ From now on, you have full access and can operate normally with the primary devi
Pico HSM uses the PIN to protect the DKEK, which is lately used to protect private/secret keys and wrap/unwrap. However, when PKA is enabled, the authentication is not performed by introducing any PIN.
Authenticated privileges are granted when PKA succeeds, regardless of PIN, which is optional.
Nevertheless, **it is extremely recommended to combine PKA with PIN**. Note that when combined, only PKA grants authenticated privileges. Therefore, if both schemes are setup, it is necessary to unlock the DKEK with PIN verification.
Nevertheless, **it is extremely recommended to combine PKA with PIN**. Note that when combined, only PKA grants authenticated privileges. Therefore, if both schemes are setup, it is necessary to unlock the DKEK with PIN verification.
Otherwise, it will not be possible to operate with private/secret keys despite the user will be logged in.
With this scheme, multiple custodians may authenticate the device individually and remotely and, when fully authenticated, the master user can unlock the DKEK with the PIN.
Moreover, with this approach the device is kept safe and neither the DKEK nor the private/secret keys are stored in plain text in the device.
Moreover, with this approach the device is kept safe and neither the DKEK nor the private/secret keys are stored in plain text in the device.
Even though the flash memory is dumped by an attacker, it will not be possible to decipher any sensitive data or key.
Initialization of the device with PKA **and** PIN can be achieved with SCS3 or OpenSC:
**Note:** do not import any DKEK share or DKEK operation before PKA and PIN setup.
**Note:** do not import any DKEK share or DKEK operation before PKA and PIN setup.
### With OpenSC
@@ -84,9 +84,9 @@ Use the following command (or similar), which accepts the use of PIN parameter *
sc-hsm-tool -X --so-pin 1234567890123456 --pin 648219 -K 1 -n 1 -s 1
```
and PKA and PIN are enabled, jointly with DKEK protection.
and PKA and PIN are enabled, jointly with DKEK protection.
### With SCS3
### With SCS3
Unfortunately, SCS3 does not allow to initialize the device with PKA and PIN at the same time, though it can be achieved in separated steps:
@@ -94,4 +94,4 @@ Unfortunately, SCS3 does not allow to initialize the device with PKA and PIN at
2. There is NO default PIN. So, DO NOT attempt to log in yet. A reset PIN shall be requested.
3. Click on ``Reset User-PIN``, introduce the SO-PIN configured during the initialization and introduce the desired User-PIN.
When done, the device will be configured with PIN **and** PKA.
When done, the device will be configured with PIN **and** PKA.

View File

@@ -4,16 +4,16 @@ SCS3 tool is a specific tool developed by CardContact to manage HSM. Thanks to i
- Import PKCS12 private keys and certificates.
- Import private keys and certificates from other Pico HSM devices in WKY format.
-
-
Unfortunately, there is no pkcs11 tool or equivalent capable to perform the import. Since it uses the SC-HSM driver, it also supports the communication with the [SCS3 tool](https://www.openscdp.org/scsh3/ "SCS3 tool"). It can be downloaded from [here](https://www.openscdp.org/scsh3/download.html "here").
However, SCS3 only works with those HSM manufactured by CardContact. The check is performed by means of trust store against the manufacturing certificates. For obvious reasons, these certificates can only be signed with the private keys of the Certificate Authorities listed in the trust store.
However, SCS3 only works with those HSM manufactured by CardContact. The check is performed by means of trust store against the manufacturing certificates. For obvious reasons, these certificates can only be signed with the private keys of the Certificate Authorities listed in the trust store.
Pico HSM is shipped with its own CA certificates. To load this certificate onto the trust store of SCS3, the following line has to be appended to `SmartCardHSM.rootCerts` variable, near line `235` in the file `scs3/scsh/sc-hsm/SmartCardHSM.js`.
```
ESCVCAHSM00001: new CVC(new ByteString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
ESPICOHSMCA00001: new CVC(new ByteString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
```
Therefore, the whole variable becomes:
@@ -22,26 +22,27 @@ Therefore, the whole variable becomes:
SmartCardHSM.rootCerts = {
DESRCACC100001: new CVC(new ByteString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
UTSRCACC100001: new CVC(new ByteString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
ESCVCAHSM00001: new CVC(new ByteString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
ESPICOHSMCA00001: new CVC(new ByteString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
}
```
Similarly, replace the line `1531` in file `scs3/keymanager/keymanager.js` with:
```
assert(devcert.verifyWith(this.crypto, dicacert.getPublicKey(SmartCardHSM.rootCerts.ESCVCAHSM00001.getPublicKey()), dicacert.getPublicKeyOID()));
assert(devcert.verifyWith(this.crypto, dicacert.getPublicKey(SmartCardHSM.rootCerts.ESPICOHSMCA00001.getPublicKey()), dicacert.getPublicKeyOID()));
```
Alternatively, this patch [scs3.patch.txt](https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm/files/8890050/scs3.patch.txt) can be applied.
Alternatively, this patch [scs3.patch.txt](https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm/files/9415877/scs3.patch.txt) can be applied.
After this ammendment, the program can be started and the KeyManager can be invoked (CTRL+M) and it will output something similar to:
```
>load("keymanager/keymanager.js");
SmartCard-HSM Version 1.6 on JCOP Free memory 217104 byte
Issuer Certificate : CVC id-AT DV (official domestic) CAR=ESCVCAHSM00001 CHR=ESDVCAHSM00001 CED=27 / de març / 2022 CXD=31 / de desembre / 2025
Device Certificate : CVC id-AT Terminal CAR=ESDVCAHSM00001 CHR=ESTERMHSM00001 CED=27 / de març / 2022 CXD=31 / de desembre / 2023
Default Key Domain : 0F89B400975EDD2D425ABF85F2FBD318779B3D85475E65D4
SmartCard-HSM Version 2.6 on JCOP Free memory 215512 byte
Issuer Certificate : CVC id-AT DV (official domestic) CAR=ESPICOHSMCA00001 CHR=ESPICOHSMDV00001 CED=18 / dagost / 2022 CXD=14 / de juny / 2023
Device Certificate : CVC id-AT Terminal CAR=ESPICOHSMDV00001 CHR=ESPICOHSMTRYZRGW CED=22 / dagost / 2022 CXD=22 / dagost / 2023
Default Key Domain : 223CD8D8F794889AC163305881BF8C04960BBB8658120491F1C0601F6BF97183
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Please right-click on nodes in the outline to see possible actions.
For most operations you will need to authenticate first using a
@@ -60,7 +61,7 @@ It can be executed in a Terminal via
```
## DKEK requirement
In order to perform the import, private keys must be wrapped with the same DKEK present in the Pico HSM. Thus, the Pico HSM must be previously initialized with at minimum of 1 DKEK share. This share will be used to wrap the private key before import.
In order to perform the import, private keys must be wrapped with the same DKEK present in the Pico HSM. Thus, the Pico HSM must be previously initialized with at minimum of 1 DKEK share. This share will be used to wrap the private key before import.
Note that the DKEK share shall be available before the import. In this way, all custodians must be present during the import process, since they will have to introduce their respective DKEK.

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# Sign and verify
Pico HSM supports in place signature of arbitrary data. It supports the following algorithms:
* RSA-PKCS
* RSA-PKCS
* RSA-X-509
* SHA1-RSA-PKCS
* SHA256-RSA-PKCS
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ $ openssl rsa -inform DER -outform PEM -in 1.der -pubin > 1.pub
At this moment, you are able to verify with the public key in `1.pub`. The signature is computed inside the Pico HSM with the private key. It never leaves the device.
## RSA-PKCS
This algorithm is used to sign raw data.
This algorithm is used to sign raw data.
To sign the data:
```
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ This algorithm uses the RSA-PKCS with PSS salt to randomize the signature. Pico
To sign the data:
```
$ pkcs11-tool --id 1 --sign --pin 648219 --mechanism RSA-PKCS-PSS -i data.sha1 -o data.sig
```
```
To verify the signature:
```
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ This algorithm takes the file as the input and sends its hash for signing with t
To sign the data:
```
$ pkcs11-tool --id 1 --sign --pin 648219 --mechanism SHA1-RSA-PKCS-PSS -i data -o data.sig
```
```
To verify the signature:
```
@@ -118,14 +118,14 @@ This is a raw ECDSA signature, which is usually used to sign a hashed message. `
To sign the data:
```
$ pkcs11-tool --id 11 --sign --pin 648219 --mechanism ECDSA -i data.sha1 -o data.sig --signature-format openssl
$ pkcs11-tool --id 11 --sign --pin 648219 --mechanism ECDSA -i data.sha1 -o data.sig --signature-format openssl
Using slot 0 with a present token (0x0)
Using signature algorithm ECDSA
```
To verify the signature:
```
$ openssl pkeyutl -verify -pubin -inkey 11.pub -in data.sha1 -sigfile data.sig
$ openssl pkeyutl -verify -pubin -inkey 11.pub -in data.sha1 -sigfile data.sig
Signature Verified Successfully
```
@@ -143,6 +143,6 @@ Using signature algorithm ECDSA-SHA256
The signature is verified with the hash:
```
$ openssl pkeyutl -verify -pubin -inkey 11.pub -in data.sha1 -sigfile data.sig
$ openssl pkeyutl -verify -pubin -inkey 11.pub -in data.sha1 -sigfile data.sig
Signature Verified Successfully
```

View File

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Before writting a file into the Pico HSM, we generate the data file with the fol
```
$ echo 'Pico HSM is awesome!' > test
```
```
Then, we can store the data file with the following command:
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ Always provide a unique `--label`, as it will be used to index and reference the
To view the stored file, we can use the following command with the same label we employed:
```
$ pkcs11-tool --read-object --type data --label 'test1'
$ pkcs11-tool --read-object --type data --label 'test1'
Using slot 0 with a present token (0x0)
Pico HSM is awesome!
```
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ Data object 'test1'
applicationName: test1
Path: e82b0601040181c31f0201::cf00
Data (21 bytes): 5069636F2048534D20697320617765736F6D65210A
Data object 'test2'
applicationName: test2
Path: e82b0601040181c31f0201::cd01

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# Usage
## Tools
We use multiple tools and PKCS#11 drivers and modules, depending on the purpose.
We use multiple tools and PKCS#11 drivers and modules, depending on the purpose.
* **pkcs11-tool**: from OpenSC. It interfaces with the HSM via PKCS#11 interface. It supports different drivers and modules.
* **sc-tool**: an alias of pkcs11-tool with the sc-hsm-embedded module. It is mainly used for AES management and it is defined as:
```
@@ -22,20 +22,20 @@ init=0
PIN=648219
```
`opensc-pkcs11.so` can be replaced by `libsc-hsm-pkcs11.so` if desired.
* **sc-hsm-tool**: from OpenSC. Used to initialize the device.
* **pico-hsm-tool**: Used to initialize the device.
* **opensc-tool**: from OpenSC. Used to list and detect the reader with the HSM.
[^1]: `openssl version -a` will return the `OPENSSLDIR`, which contains `openssl.cnf` file and `ENGINESDIR`, which contains the p11 engine.
## Initialization
The first step is to initialize the HSM:
The first step is to initialize the HSM. To do so, use the `pico-hsm-tool.py` in `tools` folder:
```
$ sc-hsm-tool --initialize --so-pin 3537363231383830 --pin 648219
$ python3 tools/pico-hsm-tool.py --pin 648219 initialize --so-pin 57621880
```
The PIN number is used to manage all private keys in the device. It supports three attemps. After the third PIN failure, it gets blocked.
The PIN number is used to manage all private keys in the device. It supports three attemps. After the third PIN failure, it gets blocked.
The PIN accepts from 6 to 16 characters.
The SO-PIN is used to unblock the PIN. It accepts 15 attemps. After 15 failed attempts, the device will be completely blocked and will be necessary to initialize again, erasing all private keys and losing the access. Therefore, keep the SO-PIN in a safe place.
The SO-PIN is used to unblock the PIN. It accepts 15 attemps. After 15 failed attempts, the device will be completely blocked and will be necessary to initialize again, erasing all private keys and losing the access. Therefore, keep the SO-PIN in a safe place.
The SO-PIN is always 16 hexadecimal characters.
## PIN and SO-PIN management
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ $ pkcs11-tool --login --pin 648219 --change-pin --new-pin 123456
To unblock the PIN:
```
$ pkcs11-tool --login --login-type so --so-pin=3537363231383830 --init-pin --new-pin=648219
$ pkcs11-tool --login --login-type so --so-pin 3537363231383830 --init-pin --new-pin 648219
```
## Keypair generation
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ To generate a RSA 2048 bits, use the following command:
$ pkcs11-tool -l --pin 648219 --keypairgen --key-type rsa:2048 --id 1 --label "RSA2K"
Using slot 0 with a present token (0x0)
Key pair generated:
Private Key Object; RSA
Private Key Object; RSA
label: RSA2K
ID: 1
Usage: decrypt, sign
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ The ID parameter is an internal hexadecimal number for easy identification. The
Pico HSM accepts RSA of 1024 (`rsa:1024`), 2048 (`rsa:2048`) and 4096 bits (`rsa:4096`).
**Caution**: RSA 2048 bits may take more than 20 seconds. RSA 4096 bits may take more than 20 minutes. The Pico HSM will work as normally and neither the HSM nor the host will block. But, in the meantime, the Pico HSM will not accept any command.
**Caution**: RSA 2048 bits may take more than 20 seconds. RSA 4096 bits may take more than 20 minutes. The Pico HSM will work as normally and neither the HSM nor the host will block. But, in the meantime, the Pico HSM will not accept any command.
An alternative is to generate the private key locally and import it to the HSM. This approach, however, is less secure as it does not use a True RNG or HRNG like Pico HSM. Use this approach if you have plugged a TRNG or you are not worried about obtaining the highest entropy.
Pico HSM also accepts ECDSA keypairs:
@@ -157,9 +157,9 @@ Certificate:
a0:30:b2:ec:d3:d6:0d:58:f3
Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
98:07:DA:13:B0:8E:A0:5C:97:83:68:FE:4A:25:8D:50:C4:DC:16:FA
X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
keyid:98:07:DA:13:B0:8E:A0:5C:97:83:68:FE:4A:25:8D:50:C4:DC:16:FA
X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ Certificate:
99:2b:b2:82:66:c1:06:a7:2c:62:af:e2:e4:93:42:36:66:8d:
c5:3f:e1:ec:5f:9a:f8:5f:b3:6a:8f:0e:12:5d:c9:46:38:ea:
0b:08
```
```
The resulting file `cert.pem` contains the signed certificate in PEM format. Convert it into DER format and load it into the Pico HSM:

View File

@@ -1,94 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/bash
#
# This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
# Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
#
# This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
# the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
#
# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
# WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
# General Public License for more details.
#
# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
# along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
#
VERSION_MAJOR="2" #Version of Pico CCID Core
VERSION_MINOR="0"
echo "----------------------------"
echo "VID/PID patcher for Pico HSM"
echo "----------------------------"
echo ""
if [ "$#" -le 0 ]; then
echo "Usage: $0 VID:PID [input_uf2_file] [output_uf2_file]"
exit 1
fi
IFS=':' read -r -a ARR <<< "$1"
if [ ${#ARR[@]} -ne 2 ]; then
echo "ERROR: Specify vendor and product ids as VID:PID (e.g., $0 CAFE:1234)"
exit 1
fi
VID=${ARR[0]}
PID=${ARR[1]}
if [ ${#VID} -ne 4 ]; then
echo "ERROR: VID length must be 4 hexadecimal characters"
exit 1
fi
if [ ${#PID} -ne 4 ]; then
echo "ERROR: PID length must be 4 hexadecimal characters"
exit 1
fi
if ! [[ $VID =~ ^[0-9A-Fa-f]{1,}$ ]] ; then
echo "ERROR: VID must contain hexadecimal characters"
exit 1
fi
if ! [[ $PID =~ ^[0-9A-Fa-f]{1,}$ ]] ; then
echo "ERROR: PID must contain hexadecimal characters"
exit 1
fi
UF2_FILE_IF="hsm2040.uf2"
UF2_FILE_OF="$UF2_FILE_IF"
if [ "$#" -ge 2 ]; then
UF2_FILE_IF="$2"
UF2_FILE_OF="$UF2_FILE_IF"
fi
if [ "$#" -ge 3 ]; then
UF2_FILE_OF="$3"
fi
echo -n "Patching ${UF2_FILE_IF}... "
if [[ ! -f "$UF2_FILE_IF" ]]; then
echo "ERROR: UF2 file ${UF2_FILE_IF} does not exist"
exit 1
fi
if [ "$UF2_FILE_IF" != "$UF2_FILE_OF" ]; then
cp -R $UF2_FILE_IF $UF2_FILE_OF
fi
LITTLE_VID="\x${VID:2:2}\x${VID:0:2}"
LITTLE_PID="\x${PID:2:2}\x${PID:0:2}"
perl -pi -e "s/\xff\xfe\xfd\xfc\x$VERSION_MINOR\x$VERSION_MAJOR\x01\x02\x03\x01/$LITTLE_VID$LITTLE_PID\x$VERSION_MINOR\x$VERSION_MAJOR\x01\x02\x03\x01/" $UF2_FILE_OF
echo "Done!"
echo ""
echo "Patched file was saved in ${UF2_FILE_OF}"

Submodule pico-ccid deleted from be86197b0b

1
pico-keys-sdk Submodule

Submodule pico-keys-sdk added at 1d86efa33b

View File

@@ -18,9 +18,20 @@ if (DEFINED ENV{PICO_SDK_FETCH_FROM_GIT_PATH} AND (NOT PICO_SDK_FETCH_FROM_GIT_P
message("Using PICO_SDK_FETCH_FROM_GIT_PATH from environment ('${PICO_SDK_FETCH_FROM_GIT_PATH}')")
endif ()
if (DEFINED ENV{PICO_SDK_FETCH_FROM_GIT_TAG} AND (NOT PICO_SDK_FETCH_FROM_GIT_TAG))
set(PICO_SDK_FETCH_FROM_GIT_TAG $ENV{PICO_SDK_FETCH_FROM_GIT_TAG})
message("Using PICO_SDK_FETCH_FROM_GIT_TAG from environment ('${PICO_SDK_FETCH_FROM_GIT_TAG}')")
endif ()
if (PICO_SDK_FETCH_FROM_GIT AND NOT PICO_SDK_FETCH_FROM_GIT_TAG)
set(PICO_SDK_FETCH_FROM_GIT_TAG "master")
message("Using master as default value for PICO_SDK_FETCH_FROM_GIT_TAG")
endif()
set(PICO_SDK_PATH "${PICO_SDK_PATH}" CACHE PATH "Path to the Raspberry Pi Pico SDK")
set(PICO_SDK_FETCH_FROM_GIT "${PICO_SDK_FETCH_FROM_GIT}" CACHE BOOL "Set to ON to fetch copy of SDK from git if not otherwise locatable")
set(PICO_SDK_FETCH_FROM_GIT_PATH "${PICO_SDK_FETCH_FROM_GIT_PATH}" CACHE FILEPATH "location to download SDK")
set(PICO_SDK_FETCH_FROM_GIT_TAG "${PICO_SDK_FETCH_FROM_GIT_TAG}" CACHE FILEPATH "release tag for SDK")
if (NOT PICO_SDK_PATH)
if (PICO_SDK_FETCH_FROM_GIT)
@@ -29,11 +40,22 @@ if (NOT PICO_SDK_PATH)
if (PICO_SDK_FETCH_FROM_GIT_PATH)
get_filename_component(FETCHCONTENT_BASE_DIR "${PICO_SDK_FETCH_FROM_GIT_PATH}" REALPATH BASE_DIR "${CMAKE_SOURCE_DIR}")
endif ()
FetchContent_Declare(
pico_sdk
GIT_REPOSITORY https://github.com/raspberrypi/pico-sdk
GIT_TAG master
)
# GIT_SUBMODULES_RECURSE was added in 3.17
if (${CMAKE_VERSION} VERSION_GREATER_EQUAL "3.17.0")
FetchContent_Declare(
pico_sdk
GIT_REPOSITORY https://github.com/raspberrypi/pico-sdk
GIT_TAG ${PICO_SDK_FETCH_FROM_GIT_TAG}
GIT_SUBMODULES_RECURSE FALSE
)
else ()
FetchContent_Declare(
pico_sdk
GIT_REPOSITORY https://github.com/raspberrypi/pico-sdk
GIT_TAG ${PICO_SDK_FETCH_FROM_GIT_TAG}
)
endif ()
if (NOT pico_sdk)
message("Downloading Raspberry Pi Pico SDK")
FetchContent_Populate(pico_sdk)

52
sdkconfig.defaults Executable file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
# This file was generated using idf.py save-defconfig. It can be edited manually.
# Espressif IoT Development Framework (ESP-IDF) Project Minimal Configuration
#
IGNORE_UNKNOWN_FILES_FOR_MANAGED_COMPONENTS=y
CONFIG_PARTITION_TABLE_CUSTOM=y
CONFIG_PARTITION_TABLE_CUSTOM_FILENAME="pico-keys-sdk/config/esp32/partitions.csv"
CONFIG_PARTITION_TABLE_FILENAME="pico-keys-sdk/config/esp32/partitions.csv"
CONFIG_ESPTOOLPY_FLASHSIZE_4MB=y
CONFIG_WL_SECTOR_SIZE_512=y
CONFIG_WL_SECTOR_MODE_PERF=y
COMPILER_OPTIMIZATION="Performance"
CONFIG_MBEDTLS_CMAC_C=y
CONFIG_MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C=y
CONFIG_MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C=y
CONFIG_MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C=y
CONFIG_MBEDTLS_HKDF_C=y
CONFIG_MBEDTLS_HARDWARE_ECC=y
CONFIG_MBEDTLS_HARDWARE_GCM=y
# CONFIG_MBEDTLS_HARDWARE_MPI is not set
CONFIG_MBEDTLS_HARDWARE_SHA=y
CONFIG_MBEDTLS_HARDWARE_AES=y
# CONFIG_MBEDTLS_ROM_MD5 is not set
CONFIG_MBEDTLS_SHA512_C=y
CONFIG_MBEDTLS_TLS_DISABLED=y
# CONFIG_MBEDTLS_TLS_ENABLED is not set
# CONFIG_ESP_TLS_USE_DS_PERIPHERAL is not set
# CONFIG_ESP_WIFI_ENABLED is not set
# CONFIG_ESP_WIFI_MBEDTLS_CRYPTO is not set
# CONFIG_ESP_WIFI_MBEDTLS_TLS_CLIENT is not set
# CONFIG_ESP_WIFI_MBEDTLS_CRYPTO is not set
# CONFIG_MBEDTLS_PSK_MODES is not set
# CONFIG_MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA is not set
# CONFIG_MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ELLIPTIC_CURVE is not set
# CONFIG_MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA is not set
# CONFIG_MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA is not set
# CONFIG_MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA is not set
# CONFIG_MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA is not set
# CONFIG_MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION is not set
# CONFIG_MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 is not set
# CONFIG_MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_GMTSSL1_1 is not set
# CONFIG_MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS is not set
# CONFIG_MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN is not set
# CONFIG_MBEDTLS_CLIENT_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS is not set
# CONFIG_MBEDTLS_SERVER_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS is not set
# CONFIG_ESP_WIFI_ENABLE_WPA3_SAE is not set
# CONFIG_ESP_WIFI_ENABLE_WPA3_OWE_STA is not set
# CONFIG_ESP_WIFI_ENABLE_WPA3_SAE is not set
# CONFIG_ESP_WIFI_ENABLE_WPA3_OWE_STA is not set
CONFIG_ESP_COREDUMP_ENABLE_TO_UART=y

6
src/hsm/CMakeLists.txt Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
idf_component_register(
SRCS ${SOURCES}
INCLUDE_DIRS . ../../pico-keys-sdk/src ../../pico-keys-sdk/src/fs ../../pico-keys-sdk/src/rng ../../pico-keys-sdk/src/usb
REQUIRES bootloader_support esp_partition esp_tinyusb zorxx__neopixel mbedtls efuse
)
idf_component_set_property(${COMPONENT_NAME} WHOLE_ARCHIVE ON)

326
src/hsm/cmd_bip_slip.c Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,326 @@
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "files.h"
#include "random.h"
#include "kek.h"
#include "asn1.h"
const uint8_t *k1_seed = (const uint8_t *) "Bitcoin seed";
const uint8_t *p1_seed = (const uint8_t *) "Nist256p1 seed";
const uint8_t *sym_seed = (const uint8_t *) "Symmetric key seed";
mbedtls_ecp_keypair hd_context = { 0 };
uint8_t hd_keytype = 0;
int node_derive_bip_child(const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *parent,
const uint8_t cpar[32],
const uint8_t *i,
mbedtls_ecp_keypair *child,
uint8_t cchild[32]) {
uint8_t data[1 + 32 + 4], I[64], *iL = I, *iR = I + 32;
mbedtls_mpi il, kchild;
mbedtls_mpi_init(&il);
mbedtls_mpi_init(&kchild);
if (i[0] >= 0x80) {
if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&parent->d, 0) == 0) {
return PICOKEY_ERR_NULL_PARAM;
}
data[0] = 0x00;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&parent->d, data + 1, 32);
}
else {
size_t olen = 0;
mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&parent->grp,
&parent->Q,
MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED,
&olen,
data,
33);
}
do {
memcpy(data + 33, i, 4);
mbedtls_md_hmac(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512),
cpar,
32,
data,
sizeof(data),
I);
mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&il, iL, 32);
mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&kchild, &il, &parent->d);
mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&kchild, &kchild, &parent->grp.N);
data[0] = 0x01;
memcpy(data + 1, iR, 32);
} while (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&il,
&parent->grp.N) != -1 || mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&kchild, 0) == 0);
mbedtls_mpi_copy(&child->d, &kchild);
mbedtls_ecp_mul(&child->grp, &child->Q, &child->d, &child->grp.G, random_gen, NULL);
memcpy(cchild, iR, 32);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&il);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&kchild);
return PICOKEY_OK;
}
int sha256_ripemd160(const uint8_t *buffer, size_t buffer_len, uint8_t *output) {
mbedtls_md(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256), buffer, buffer_len, output);
mbedtls_md(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160), output, 32, output);
return PICOKEY_OK;
}
int sha256_sha256(const uint8_t *buffer, size_t buffer_len, uint8_t *output) {
mbedtls_md(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256), buffer, buffer_len, output);
mbedtls_md(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256), output, 32, output);
return PICOKEY_OK;
}
int node_fingerprint_bip(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ctx, uint8_t fingerprint[4]) {
size_t olen = 0;
uint8_t buffer[33];
mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&ctx->grp,
&ctx->Q,
MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED,
&olen,
buffer,
sizeof(buffer));
sha256_ripemd160(buffer, sizeof(buffer), buffer);
memcpy(fingerprint, buffer, 4);
return PICOKEY_OK;
}
int node_fingerprint_slip(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ctx, uint8_t fingerprint[4]) {
uint8_t buffer[32];
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ctx->d, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
sha256_ripemd160(buffer, sizeof(buffer), buffer);
memcpy(fingerprint, buffer, 4);
return PICOKEY_OK;
}
int load_master_bip(uint16_t mid, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ctx, uint8_t chain[32],
uint8_t key_type[1]) {
uint8_t mkey[65];
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(ctx);
file_t *ef = search_file(EF_MASTER_SEED | mid);
if (!file_has_data(ef)) {
return PICOKEY_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
}
memcpy(mkey, file_get_data(ef), sizeof(mkey));
int r = mkek_decrypt(mkey + 1,
sizeof(mkey) - 1);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
return PICOKEY_EXEC_ERROR;
}
if (mkey[0] == 0x1 || mkey[0] == 0x2) {
if (mkey[0] == 0x1) {
mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&ctx->grp, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1);
}
else if (mkey[0] == 0x2) {
mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&ctx->grp, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1);
}
else {
return PICOKEY_WRONG_DATA;
}
mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx->d, mkey + 1, 32);
memcpy(chain, mkey + 33, 32);
mbedtls_ecp_mul(&ctx->grp, &ctx->Q, &ctx->d, &ctx->grp.G, random_gen, NULL);
}
else if (mkey[0] == 0x3) {
mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx->d, mkey + 33, 32);
memcpy(chain, mkey + 1, 32);
}
key_type[0] = mkey[0];
return PICOKEY_OK;
}
int node_derive_path(const uint8_t *path,
uint16_t path_len,
mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ctx,
uint8_t chain[32],
uint8_t fingerprint[4],
uint8_t *nodes,
uint8_t last_node[4],
uint8_t key_type[1]) {
uint8_t *tag_data = NULL, *p = NULL;
uint16_t tag_len = 0, tag = 0x0;
uint8_t node = 0, N[64] = { 0 };
int r = 0;
memset(last_node, 0, 4);
memset(fingerprint, 0, 4);
asn1_ctx_t ctxi;
asn1_ctx_init((uint8_t *)path, path_len, &ctxi);
for (; walk_tlv(&ctxi, &p, &tag, &tag_len, &tag_data); node++) {
if (tag == 0x02) {
if ((node == 0 && tag_len != 1) || (node != 0 && tag_len != 4)) {
return PICOKEY_WRONG_DATA;
}
if (node == 0) {
if ((r = load_master_bip(tag_data[0], ctx, chain, key_type)) != PICOKEY_OK) {
return r;
}
}
else if (node > 0) {
node_fingerprint_bip(ctx, fingerprint);
if ((r = node_derive_bip_child(ctx, chain, tag_data, ctx, chain)) != PICOKEY_OK) {
return r;
}
memcpy(last_node, tag_data, 4);
}
}
else if (tag == 0x04) {
if (node == 0) {
return PICOKEY_WRONG_DATA;
}
else if (node > 0) {
node_fingerprint_slip(ctx, fingerprint);
*(tag_data - 1) = 0;
mbedtls_md_hmac(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512),
chain,
32,
tag_data - 1,
tag_len + 1,
N);
memcpy(chain, N, 32);
mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx->d, N + 32, 32);
}
}
}
if (nodes) {
*nodes = node;
}
return PICOKEY_OK;
}
int cmd_bip_slip() {
uint8_t p1 = P1(apdu), p2 = P2(apdu);
if (p1 == 0x1 || p1 == 0x2 || p1 == 0x3) { // Master generation (K1 and P1)
if (p2 >= 10) {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
uint8_t mkey[65], *seed = mkey + 1, seed_len = 64;
const uint8_t *key_seed = NULL;
mbedtls_mpi il;
mbedtls_mpi_init(&il);
mbedtls_ecp_group grp;
mbedtls_ecp_group_init(&grp);
if (p1 == 0x1) {
mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&grp, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1);
key_seed = k1_seed;
}
else if (p1 == 0x2) {
mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&grp, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1);
key_seed = p1_seed;
}
else if (p1 == 0x3) {
key_seed = sym_seed;
}
if (apdu.nc == 0) {
seed_len = 64;
random_gen(NULL, seed, seed_len);
}
else {
seed_len = MIN((uint8_t)apdu.nc, 64);
memcpy(seed, apdu.data, seed_len);
}
if (p1 == 0x1 || p1 == 0x2) {
do {
mbedtls_md_hmac(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512), key_seed,
strlen((char *) key_seed), seed, seed_len, seed);
mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&il, seed, 32);
seed_len = 64;
} while (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&il, 0) == 0 || mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&il, &grp.N) != -1);
mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&grp);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&il);
}
else if (p1 == 0x3) {
mbedtls_md_hmac(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512), key_seed,
strlen((char *) key_seed), seed, seed_len, seed);
}
mkey[0] = p1;
file_t *ef = file_new(EF_MASTER_SEED | p2);
int r = mkek_encrypt(mkey + 1, sizeof(mkey) - 1);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
r = file_put_data(ef, mkey, sizeof(mkey));
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
low_flash_available();
}
else if (p1 == 0xA) {
if (apdu.nc == 0) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
mbedtls_ecp_keypair ctx;
uint8_t chain[32] = { 0 }, fgpt[4] = { 0 }, last_node[4] = { 0 }, key_type = 0, nodes = 0;
size_t olen = 0;
int r =
node_derive_path(apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc, &ctx, chain, fgpt, &nodes, last_node, &key_type);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
uint8_t pubkey[33];
res_APDU_size = 0;
memcpy(res_APDU, "\x04\x88\xB2\x1E", 4);
res_APDU_size += 4;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = nodes - 1;
memcpy(res_APDU + res_APDU_size, fgpt, 4);
res_APDU_size += 4;
memcpy(res_APDU + res_APDU_size, last_node, 4);
res_APDU_size += 4;
if (key_type == 0x1 || key_type == 0x2) {
memcpy(res_APDU + res_APDU_size, chain, 32);
res_APDU_size += 32;
mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&ctx.grp,
&ctx.Q,
MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED,
&olen,
pubkey,
sizeof(pubkey));
memcpy(res_APDU + res_APDU_size, pubkey, olen);
res_APDU_size += (uint16_t)olen;
}
else if (key_type == 0x3) {
sha256_sha256(chain, 32, chain);
memcpy(res_APDU + res_APDU_size, chain, 32);
res_APDU_size += 32;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ctx.d, pubkey, 32);
sha256_sha256(pubkey, 32, pubkey);
memcpy(res_APDU + res_APDU_size, pubkey, 32);
res_APDU_size += 32;
}
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
}
else if (p1 == 0x10) {
uint8_t chain[32] = { 0 }, fgpt[4] = { 0 }, last_node[4] = { 0 }, nodes = 0;
int r = node_derive_path(apdu.data,
(uint16_t)apdu.nc,
&hd_context,
chain,
fgpt,
&nodes,
last_node,
&hd_keytype);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&hd_context);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
return SW_OK();
}

34
src/hsm/cmd_challenge.c Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "random.h"
#include "sc_hsm.h"
uint8_t challenge[256];
uint8_t challenge_len = 0;
int cmd_challenge() {
uint8_t *rb = (uint8_t *) random_bytes_get(apdu.ne);
if (!rb) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
memcpy(res_APDU, rb, apdu.ne);
challenge_len = (uint8_t)MIN(apdu.ne, sizeof(challenge));
memcpy(challenge, rb, challenge_len);
res_APDU_size = (uint16_t)apdu.ne;
return SW_OK();
}

72
src/hsm/cmd_change_pin.c Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "crypto_utils.h"
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "kek.h"
int cmd_change_pin() {
if (P1(apdu) == 0x0) {
if (P2(apdu) == 0x81 || P2(apdu) == 0x88) {
file_t *file_pin = NULL;
if (P2(apdu) == 0x81) {
file_pin = file_pin1;
}
else if (P2(apdu) == 0x88) {
file_pin = file_sopin;
}
if (!file_pin) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
if (!file_has_data(file_pin)) {
return SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND();
}
uint8_t pin_len = file_read_uint8(file_pin);
int r = check_pin(file_pin, apdu.data, pin_len);
if (r != 0x9000) {
return r;
}
uint8_t mkek[MKEK_SIZE];
r = load_mkek(mkek); //loads the MKEK with old pin
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
//encrypt MKEK with new pin
if (P2(apdu) == 0x81) {
hash_multi(apdu.data + pin_len, (uint16_t)(apdu.nc - pin_len), session_pin);
has_session_pin = true;
}
else if (P2(apdu) == 0x88) {
hash_multi(apdu.data + pin_len, (uint16_t)(apdu.nc - pin_len), session_sopin);
has_session_sopin = true;
}
r = store_mkek(mkek);
release_mkek(mkek);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
uint8_t dhash[33];
dhash[0] = (uint8_t)apdu.nc - pin_len;
double_hash_pin(apdu.data + pin_len, (uint16_t)(apdu.nc - pin_len), dhash + 1);
file_put_data(file_pin, dhash, sizeof(dhash));
low_flash_available();
return SW_OK();
}
}
return SW_WRONG_P1P2();
}

713
src/hsm/cmd_cipher_sym.c Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,713 @@
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "mbedtls/aes.h"
#include "mbedtls/cmac.h"
#include "mbedtls/hkdf.h"
#include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h"
#include "mbedtls/gcm.h"
//#include "mbedtls/md_wrap.h"
#include "mbedtls/md.h"
#include "crypto_utils.h"
#include "kek.h"
#include "asn1.h"
#include "oid.h"
#include "mbedtls/pkcs5.h"
#include "mbedtls/error.h"
#include "mbedtls/asn1.h"
#include "mbedtls/cipher.h"
#include "mbedtls/oid.h"
#include "mbedtls/ccm.h"
extern mbedtls_ecp_keypair hd_context;
extern uint8_t hd_keytype;
/* This is copied from pkcs5.c Mbedtls */
/** Unfortunately it is declared as static, so I cannot call it. **/
static int pkcs5_parse_pbkdf2_params(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params,
mbedtls_asn1_buf *salt, int *iterations,
uint16_t *keylen, mbedtls_md_type_t *md_type) {
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
mbedtls_asn1_buf prf_alg_oid;
unsigned char *p = params->p;
const unsigned char *end = params->p + params->len;
if (params->tag != (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) {
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT,
MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG);
}
/*
* PBKDF2-params ::= SEQUENCE {
* salt OCTET STRING,
* iterationCount INTEGER,
* keyLength INTEGER OPTIONAL
* prf AlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT algid-hmacWithSHA1
* }
*
*/
if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &salt->len,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) != 0) {
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
}
salt->p = p;
p += salt->len;
if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int(&p, end, iterations)) != 0) {
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
}
if (p == end) {
return 0;
}
if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int(&p, end, (int *)keylen)) != 0) {
if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) {
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
}
}
if (p == end) {
return 0;
}
if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg_null(&p, end, &prf_alg_oid)) != 0) {
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
}
if (mbedtls_oid_get_md_hmac(&prf_alg_oid, md_type) != 0) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
}
if (p != end) {
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT,
MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
}
return 0;
}
/* Taken from https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/2335 */
int mbedtls_ansi_x963_kdf(mbedtls_md_type_t md_type,
uint16_t input_len,
uint8_t *input,
uint16_t shared_info_len,
uint8_t *shared_info,
uint16_t output_len,
uint8_t *output) {
mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx;
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = NULL;
int hashlen = 0, exit_code = MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
uint8_t counter_buf[4], tmp_output[64]; //worst case
mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx);
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_type);
if (md_info == NULL) {
return exit_code;
}
if (mbedtls_md_setup(&md_ctx, md_info, 0)) {
return exit_code;
}
if (input_len + shared_info_len + 4 >= (1ULL << 61) - 1) {
return exit_code;
}
// keydatalen equals output_len
hashlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info);
if (output_len >= hashlen * ((1ULL << 32) - 1)) {
return exit_code;
}
for (int i = 0, counter = 1; i < output_len; counter++) {
mbedtls_md_starts(&md_ctx);
mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, input, input_len);
//TODO: be careful with architecture little vs. big
counter_buf[0] = (uint8_t) ((counter >> 24) & 0xff);
counter_buf[1] = (uint8_t) ((counter >> 16) & 0xff);
counter_buf[2] = (uint8_t) ((counter >> 8) & 0xff);
counter_buf[3] = (uint8_t) ((counter >> 0) & 0xff);
mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, counter_buf, 4);
if (shared_info_len > 0 && shared_info != NULL) {
mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, shared_info, shared_info_len);
}
mbedtls_md_finish(&md_ctx, tmp_output);
memcpy(&output[i], tmp_output, (output_len - i < hashlen) ? output_len - i : hashlen);
i += hashlen;
}
mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx);
return 0;
}
int cmd_cipher_sym() {
uint8_t key_id = P1(apdu), algo = P2(apdu);
if (!isUserAuthenticated) {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
if (wait_button_pressed() == true) { // timeout
return SW_SECURE_MESSAGE_EXEC_ERROR();
}
file_t *ef = search_file((KEY_PREFIX << 8) | key_id);
if (hd_keytype == 0) {
if (!ef) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
if (key_has_purpose(ef, algo) == false) {
return SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
}
uint16_t key_size = file_get_size(ef);
uint8_t kdata[64]; //maximum AES key size
memcpy(kdata, file_get_data(ef), key_size);
if (hd_keytype == 0 && mkek_decrypt(kdata, key_size) != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
if (algo == ALGO_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT || algo == ALGO_AES_CBC_DECRYPT) {
if ((apdu.nc % 16) != 0) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
mbedtls_aes_context aes;
mbedtls_aes_init(&aes);
uint8_t tmp_iv[IV_SIZE];
memset(tmp_iv, 0, sizeof(tmp_iv));
if (algo == ALGO_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT) {
int r = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&aes, kdata, key_size * 8);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_aes_free(&aes);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
r = mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc(&aes,
MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT,
apdu.nc,
tmp_iv,
apdu.data,
res_APDU);
mbedtls_aes_free(&aes);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
else if (algo == ALGO_AES_CBC_DECRYPT) {
int r = mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec(&aes, kdata, key_size * 8);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_aes_free(&aes);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
r = mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc(&aes,
MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT,
apdu.nc,
tmp_iv,
apdu.data,
res_APDU);
mbedtls_aes_free(&aes);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
res_APDU_size = (uint16_t)apdu.nc;
}
else if (algo == ALGO_AES_CMAC) {
const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info;
if (key_size == 16) {
cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB);
}
else if (key_size == 24) {
cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB);
}
else if (key_size == 32) {
cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB);
}
else {
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
int r = mbedtls_cipher_cmac(cipher_info, kdata, key_size * 8, apdu.data, apdu.nc, res_APDU);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU_size = 16;
}
else if (algo == ALGO_AES_DERIVE) {
int r = mbedtls_hkdf(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256),
NULL,
0,
kdata,
key_size,
apdu.data,
apdu.nc,
res_APDU,
apdu.nc);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU_size = (uint16_t)apdu.nc;
}
else if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_ENCRYPT || algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_DECRYPT) {
asn1_ctx_t ctxi, oid = {0}, enc = {0}, iv = {0}, aad = {0};
asn1_ctx_init(apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc, &ctxi);
if (!asn1_find_tag(&ctxi, 0x6, &oid) || asn1_len(&oid) == 0) {
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
asn1_find_tag(&ctxi, 0x81, &enc);
asn1_find_tag(&ctxi, 0x82, &iv);
asn1_find_tag(&ctxi, 0x83, &aad);
uint8_t tmp_iv[16];
memset(tmp_iv, 0, sizeof(tmp_iv));
if (memcmp(oid.data, OID_CHACHA20_POLY1305, oid.len) == 0) {
if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_DECRYPT && enc.len < 16) {
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
int r = 0;
mbedtls_chachapoly_context ctx;
mbedtls_chachapoly_init(&ctx);
mbedtls_chachapoly_setkey(&ctx, kdata);
if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_ENCRYPT) {
r = mbedtls_chachapoly_encrypt_and_tag(&ctx,
enc.len,
asn1_len(&iv) > 0 ? iv.data : tmp_iv,
aad.data,
aad.len,
enc.data,
res_APDU,
res_APDU + enc.len);
}
else if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_DECRYPT) {
r = mbedtls_chachapoly_auth_decrypt(&ctx,
enc.len - 16,
asn1_len(&iv) > 0 ? iv.data : tmp_iv,
aad.data,
aad.len,
enc.data + enc.len - 16,
enc.data,
res_APDU);
}
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
mbedtls_chachapoly_free(&ctx);
if (r != 0) {
if (r == MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_AUTH_FAILED) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_ENCRYPT) {
res_APDU_size = enc.len + 16;
}
else if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_DECRYPT) {
res_APDU_size = enc.len - 16;
}
}
else if (memcmp(oid.data, OID_DIGEST, 7) == 0) {
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = NULL;
if (memcmp(oid.data, OID_HMAC_SHA1, oid.len) == 0) {
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1);
}
else if (memcmp(oid.data, OID_HMAC_SHA224, oid.len) == 0) {
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224);
}
else if (memcmp(oid.data, OID_HMAC_SHA256, oid.len) == 0) {
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256);
}
else if (memcmp(oid.data, OID_HMAC_SHA384, oid.len) == 0) {
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384);
}
else if (memcmp(oid.data, OID_HMAC_SHA512, oid.len) == 0) {
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512);
}
if (md_info == NULL) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
int r = mbedtls_md_hmac(md_info, kdata, key_size, enc.data, enc.len, res_APDU);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU_size = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info);
}
else if (memcmp(oid.data, OID_HKDF_SHA256,
oid.len) == 0 ||
memcmp(oid.data, OID_HKDF_SHA384,
oid.len) == 0 || memcmp(oid.data, OID_HKDF_SHA512, oid.len) == 0) {
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = NULL;
if (memcmp(oid.data, OID_HKDF_SHA256, oid.len) == 0) {
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256);
}
else if (memcmp(oid.data, OID_HKDF_SHA384, oid.len) == 0) {
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384);
}
else if (memcmp(oid.data, OID_HKDF_SHA512, oid.len) == 0) {
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512);
}
int r = mbedtls_hkdf(md_info,
iv.data,
iv.len,
kdata,
key_size,
enc.data,
enc.len,
res_APDU,
apdu.ne > 0 &&
apdu.ne < 65536 ? apdu.ne : mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info));
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU_size = apdu.ne > 0 && apdu.ne < 65536 ? (uint16_t)apdu.ne : (uint16_t)mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info);
}
else if (memcmp(oid.data, OID_PKCS5_PBKDF2, oid.len) == 0) {
int iterations = 0;
uint16_t keylen = 0;
mbedtls_asn1_buf salt,
params =
{ .p = enc.data, .len = enc.len, .tag = (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) };
mbedtls_md_type_t md_type = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;
int r = pkcs5_parse_pbkdf2_params(&params, &salt, &iterations, &keylen, &md_type);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
r = mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac_ext(md_type,
kdata,
key_size,
salt.p,
salt.len,
iterations,
keylen ? keylen : (apdu.ne > 0 &&
apdu.ne < 65536 ? apdu.ne : 32),
res_APDU);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU_size = keylen ? keylen : (apdu.ne > 0 && apdu.ne < 65536 ? (uint16_t)apdu.ne : 32);
}
else if (memcmp(oid.data, OID_PKCS5_PBES2, oid.len) == 0) {
size_t olen = 0;
mbedtls_asn1_buf params =
{.p = aad.data, .len = aad.len, .tag = (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)};
int r = mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2_ext(&params,
algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_ENCRYPT ? MBEDTLS_PKCS5_ENCRYPT : MBEDTLS_PKCS5_DECRYPT,
kdata,
key_size,
enc.data,
enc.len,
res_APDU, 4096, &olen);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
if (r != 0) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
res_APDU_size = (uint16_t)olen;
}
else if (memcmp(oid.data, OID_KDF_X963, oid.len) == 0) {
mbedtls_md_type_t md_type = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;
if (memcmp(enc.data, OID_HMAC_SHA1, enc.len) == 0) {
md_type = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;
}
else if (memcmp(enc.data, OID_HMAC_SHA224, enc.len) == 0) {
md_type = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224;
}
else if (memcmp(enc.data, OID_HMAC_SHA256, enc.len) == 0) {
md_type = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256;
}
else if (memcmp(enc.data, OID_HMAC_SHA384, enc.len) == 0) {
md_type = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384;
}
else if (memcmp(enc.data, OID_HMAC_SHA512, enc.len) == 0) {
md_type = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512;
}
int r = mbedtls_ansi_x963_kdf(md_type,
key_size,
kdata,
aad.len,
aad.data,
apdu.ne > 0 && apdu.ne < 65536 ? (uint16_t)apdu.ne : 32,
res_APDU);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
if (r != 0) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
res_APDU_size = apdu.ne > 0 && apdu.ne < 65536 ? (uint16_t)apdu.ne : 32;
}
else if (memcmp(oid.data, OID_NIST_AES, 8) == 0) {
if (oid.len != 9) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
uint8_t aes_algo = oid.data[8],
mode =
(algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_ENCRYPT ? MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT : MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT);
if ((aes_algo >= 0x01 && aes_algo <= 0x09 && key_size != 16) ||
(aes_algo >= 0x15 && aes_algo <= 0x1D && key_size != 24) ||
(aes_algo >= 0x29 && aes_algo <= 0x31 && key_size != 32)) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
mbedtls_aes_context ctx;
int r = 0;
mbedtls_aes_init(&ctx);
if (asn1_len(&iv) == 0) {
iv.data = tmp_iv;
iv.len = sizeof(tmp_iv);
}
if (aes_algo == 0x01 || aes_algo == 0x15 || aes_algo == 0x29) { /* ECB */
if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_ENCRYPT) {
r = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx, kdata, key_size * 8);
}
else if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_DECRYPT) {
r = mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec(&ctx, kdata, key_size * 8);
}
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
r = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(&ctx, mode, enc.data, res_APDU);
mbedtls_aes_free(&ctx);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU_size = MIN(enc.len, 16); // ECB operates with 16-byte blocks
}
else if (aes_algo == 0x02 || aes_algo == 0x16 || aes_algo == 0x2A) { /* CBC */
if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_ENCRYPT) {
r = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx, kdata, key_size * 8);
}
else if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_DECRYPT) {
r = mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec(&ctx, kdata, key_size * 8);
}
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
r = mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc(&ctx, mode, enc.len, iv.data, enc.data, res_APDU);
mbedtls_aes_free(&ctx);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU_size = enc.len;
}
else if (aes_algo == 0x03 || aes_algo == 0x17 || aes_algo == 0x2B) { /* OFB */
size_t iv_off = 0;
r = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx, kdata, key_size * 8);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
r = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ofb(&ctx, enc.len, &iv_off, iv.data, enc.data, res_APDU);
mbedtls_aes_free(&ctx);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU_size = enc.len;
}
else if (aes_algo == 0x04 || aes_algo == 0x18 || aes_algo == 0x2C) { /* CFB */
size_t iv_off = 0;
r = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx, kdata, key_size * 8);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
r = mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb128(&ctx, mode, enc.len, &iv_off, iv.data, enc.data, res_APDU);
mbedtls_aes_free(&ctx);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU_size = enc.len;
}
else if (aes_algo == 0x06 || aes_algo == 0x1A || aes_algo == 0x2E) { /* GCM */
mbedtls_aes_free(&ctx); // No AES ctx used
mbedtls_gcm_context gctx;
mbedtls_gcm_init(&gctx);
r = mbedtls_gcm_setkey(&gctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, kdata, key_size * 8);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_ENCRYPT) {
r = mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag(&gctx,
MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT,
enc.len,
iv.data,
iv.len,
aad.data,
aad.len,
enc.data,
res_APDU,
16,
res_APDU + enc.len);
res_APDU_size = enc.len + 16;
}
else if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_DECRYPT) {
r = mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt(&gctx,
enc.len - 16,
iv.data,
iv.len,
aad.data,
aad.len,
enc.data + enc.len - 16,
16,
enc.data,
res_APDU);
res_APDU_size = enc.len - 16;
}
mbedtls_gcm_free(&gctx);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
else if (aes_algo == 0x09 || aes_algo == 0x1D || aes_algo == 0x31) { /* CTR */
size_t iv_off = 0;
uint8_t stream_block[16];
r = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx, kdata, key_size * 8);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
r = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ctr(&ctx, enc.len, &iv_off, iv.data, stream_block, enc.data, res_APDU);
mbedtls_aes_free(&ctx);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU_size = enc.len;
}
else if (aes_algo == 0x07 || aes_algo == 0x1B || aes_algo == 0x2F) { /* CCM */
mbedtls_aes_free(&ctx); // No AES ctx used
mbedtls_ccm_context gctx;
mbedtls_ccm_init(&gctx);
r = mbedtls_ccm_setkey(&gctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, kdata, key_size * 8);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
if (iv.len == 16) {
iv.len = 12;
}
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_ENCRYPT) {
r = mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag(&gctx,
enc.len,
iv.data,
iv.len,
aad.data,
aad.len,
enc.data,
res_APDU,
res_APDU + enc.len,
16);
res_APDU_size = enc.len + 16;
}
else if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_DECRYPT) {
r = mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt(&gctx,
enc.len - 16,
iv.data,
iv.len,
aad.data,
aad.len,
enc.data,
res_APDU,
enc.data + enc.len - 16,
16);
res_APDU_size = enc.len - 16;
}
mbedtls_ccm_free(&gctx);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
}
else if (memcmp(oid.data, OID_IEEE_ALG, 8) == 0) {
if (oid.len != 9) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
uint8_t aes_algo = oid.data[8],
mode =
(algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_ENCRYPT ? MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT : MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT);
int r = 0;
memset(tmp_iv, 0, sizeof(tmp_iv));
if (asn1_len(&iv) == 0) {
iv.data = tmp_iv;
iv.len = sizeof(tmp_iv);
}
if ((aes_algo == 0x01 && key_size != 32) || (aes_algo == 0x02 && key_size != 64)) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
mbedtls_aes_xts_context ctx;
mbedtls_aes_xts_init(&ctx);
if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_ENCRYPT) {
r = mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_enc(&ctx, kdata, key_size * 8);
}
else if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_DECRYPT) {
r = mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_dec(&ctx, kdata, key_size * 8);
}
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
r = mbedtls_aes_crypt_xts(&ctx, mode, enc.len, iv.data, enc.data, res_APDU);
mbedtls_aes_xts_free(&ctx);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU_size = enc.len;
}
else if (memcmp(oid.data, OID_HD, 11) == 0) {
mbedtls_aes_context ctx;
int r = 0;
uint8_t mode =
(algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_ENCRYPT ? MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT : MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT),
secret[64] = { 0 };
mbedtls_aes_init(&ctx);
if (hd_keytype != 0x3) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&hd_context);
return SW_INCORRECT_PARAMS();
}
key_size = 32;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&hd_context.d, kdata, key_size);
r = mbedtls_md_hmac(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512),
kdata,
key_size,
aad.data,
aad.len,
secret);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
if (iv.data == tmp_iv || iv.len == 0) {
iv.data = secret + 32;
iv.len = 16;
}
if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_ENCRYPT) {
r = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx, secret, key_size * 8);
}
else if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_DECRYPT) {
r = mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec(&ctx, secret, key_size * 8);
}
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
r = mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc(&ctx, mode, enc.len, iv.data, enc.data, res_APDU);
mbedtls_aes_free(&ctx);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU_size = enc.len;
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&hd_context);
hd_keytype = 0;
}
else {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
}
else {
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
return SW_WRONG_P1P2();
}
return SW_OK();
}

197
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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "mbedtls/ecdh.h"
#include "crypto_utils.h"
#include "kek.h"
#include "files.h"
#include "asn1.h"
#include "cvc.h"
#include "random.h"
#include "oid.h"
int cmd_decrypt_asym() {
uint8_t key_id = P1(apdu);
uint8_t p2 = P2(apdu);
if (!isUserAuthenticated) {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
file_t *ef = search_file((KEY_PREFIX << 8) | key_id);
if (!ef) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
if (get_key_counter(ef) == 0) {
return SW_FILE_FULL();
}
if (key_has_purpose(ef, p2) == false) {
return SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
if (p2 >= ALGO_RSA_DECRYPT && p2 <= ALGO_RSA_DECRYPT_OEP) {
mbedtls_rsa_context ctx;
mbedtls_rsa_init(&ctx);
if (p2 == ALGO_RSA_DECRYPT_OEP) {
mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(&ctx, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256);
}
int r = load_private_key_rsa(&ctx, ef);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(&ctx);
if (r == PICOKEY_VERIFICATION_FAILED) {
return SW_SECURE_MESSAGE_EXEC_ERROR();
}
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
uint16_t key_size = file_get_size(ef);
if (apdu.nc < key_size) { //needs padding
memset(apdu.data + apdu.nc, 0, key_size - apdu.nc);
}
if (p2 == ALGO_RSA_DECRYPT_PKCS1 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_DECRYPT_OEP) {
size_t olen = apdu.nc;
r = mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt(&ctx, random_gen, NULL, &olen, apdu.data, res_APDU, 512);
if (r == 0) {
res_APDU_size = (uint16_t)olen;
}
}
else {
r = mbedtls_rsa_private(&ctx, random_gen, NULL, apdu.data, res_APDU);
if (r == 0) {
res_APDU_size = key_size;
}
}
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(&ctx);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
mbedtls_rsa_free(&ctx);
}
else if (p2 == ALGO_EC_DH || p2 == ALGO_EC_DH_XKEK) {
mbedtls_ecdh_context ctx;
if (wait_button_pressed() == true) { //timeout
return SW_SECURE_MESSAGE_EXEC_ERROR();
}
uint16_t key_size = file_get_size(ef);
uint8_t *kdata = (uint8_t *) calloc(1, key_size);
memcpy(kdata, file_get_data(ef), key_size);
if (mkek_decrypt(kdata, key_size) != 0) {
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, key_size);
free(kdata);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
mbedtls_ecdh_init(&ctx);
mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid = kdata[0];
int r = 0;
r = mbedtls_ecdh_setup(&ctx, gid);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, key_size);
mbedtls_ecdh_free(&ctx);
free(kdata);
return SW_DATA_INVALID();
}
r = mbedtls_ecp_read_key(gid, (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *)&ctx.ctx.mbed_ecdh, kdata + 1, key_size - 1);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, key_size);
free(kdata);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdh_free(&ctx);
return SW_DATA_INVALID();
}
r = -1;
if (p2 == ALGO_EC_DH) {
*(apdu.data - 1) = (uint8_t)apdu.nc;
r = mbedtls_ecdh_read_public(&ctx, apdu.data - 1, apdu.nc + 1);
}
else if (p2 == ALGO_EC_DH_XKEK) {
uint16_t pub_len = 0;
const uint8_t *pub = cvc_get_pub(apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc, &pub_len);
if (pub) {
uint16_t t86_len = 0;
const uint8_t *t86 = cvc_get_field(pub, pub_len, &t86_len, 0x86);
uint8_t *t86w = (uint8_t *)t86;
if (t86) {
*(t86w - 1) = (uint8_t)t86_len;
r = mbedtls_ecdh_read_public(&ctx, t86 - 1, t86_len + 1);
}
}
}
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdh_free(&ctx);
return SW_DATA_INVALID();
}
size_t olen = 0;
// The SmartCard-HSM returns the point result of the DH operation
// with a leading '04'
res_APDU[0] = 0x04;
r =
mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret(&ctx, &olen, res_APDU + 1, MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES, random_gen,
NULL);
mbedtls_ecdh_free(&ctx);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
if (p2 == ALGO_EC_DH) {
res_APDU_size = (uint16_t)(olen + 1);
}
else {
res_APDU_size = 0;
uint16_t ext_len = 0;
const uint8_t *ext = NULL;
if ((ext = cvc_get_ext(apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc, &ext_len)) == NULL) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
uint8_t *p = NULL;
uint16_t tag = 0;
asn1_ctx_t ctxi, ctxo = { 0 }, kdom_uid = { 0 };
asn1_ctx_init((uint8_t *)ext, ext_len, &ctxi);
while (walk_tlv(&ctxi, &p, &tag, &ctxo.len, &ctxo.data)) {
if (tag == 0x73) {
asn1_ctx_t oid = {0};
if (asn1_find_tag(&ctxo, 0x6, &oid) == true &&
oid.len == strlen(OID_ID_KEY_DOMAIN_UID) &&
memcmp(oid.data, OID_ID_KEY_DOMAIN_UID,
strlen(OID_ID_KEY_DOMAIN_UID)) == 0) {
if (asn1_find_tag(&ctxo, 0x80, &kdom_uid) == false) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
break;
}
}
}
if (asn1_len(&kdom_uid) == 0) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
for (uint8_t n = 0; n < MAX_KEY_DOMAINS; n++) {
file_t *tf = search_file(EF_XKEK + n);
if (tf) {
if (file_get_size(tf) == kdom_uid.len &&
memcmp(file_get_data(tf), kdom_uid.data, kdom_uid.len) == 0) {
file_new(EF_DKEK + n);
if (store_dkek_key(n, res_APDU + 1) != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(res_APDU, 32);
return SW_OK();
}
}
}
return SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND();
}
}
else {
return SW_WRONG_P1P2();
}
decrement_key_counter(ef);
return SW_OK();
}

45
src/hsm/cmd_delete_file.c Normal file
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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "sc_hsm.h"
int cmd_delete_file() {
file_t *ef = NULL;
if (!isUserAuthenticated) {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
if (apdu.nc == 0) {
ef = currentEF;
if (!(ef = search_file(ef->fid))) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
}
else {
uint16_t fid = (apdu.data[0] << 8) | apdu.data[1];
if (!(ef = search_file(fid))) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
}
if (!authenticate_action(ef, ACL_OP_DELETE_SELF)) {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
if (delete_file(ef) != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
return SW_OK();
}

101
src/hsm/cmd_derive_asym.c Normal file
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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h"
#include "crypto_utils.h"
#include "cvc.h"
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED -0x006E
#define MOD_ADD(N) \
while (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&(N), &grp->P) >= 0) \
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs(&(N), &(N), &grp->P))
static inline int mbedtls_mpi_add_mod(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
mbedtls_mpi *X,
const mbedtls_mpi *A,
const mbedtls_mpi *B) {
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(X, A, B));
MOD_ADD(*X);
cleanup:
return ret;
}
int cmd_derive_asym() {
uint8_t key_id = P1(apdu);
uint8_t dest_id = P2(apdu);
file_t *fkey;
if (!isUserAuthenticated) {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
if (!(fkey = search_file((KEY_PREFIX << 8) | key_id)) || !file_has_data(fkey)) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
if (key_has_purpose(fkey, ALGO_EC_DERIVE) == false) {
return SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
if (apdu.nc == 0) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
if (apdu.data[0] == ALGO_EC_DERIVE) {
mbedtls_ecp_keypair ctx;
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(&ctx);
int r;
r = load_private_key_ec(&ctx, fkey);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
if (r == PICOKEY_VERIFICATION_FAILED) {
return SW_SECURE_MESSAGE_EXEC_ERROR();
}
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
mbedtls_mpi a, nd;
mbedtls_mpi_init(&a);
mbedtls_mpi_init(&nd);
r = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&a, apdu.data + 1, apdu.nc - 1);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&a);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&nd);
return SW_DATA_INVALID();
}
r = mbedtls_mpi_add_mod(&ctx.grp, &nd, &ctx.d, &a);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&a);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&nd);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
r = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx.d, &nd);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&nd);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
r = store_keys(&ctx, PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC, dest_id);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
}
else {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
return SW_OK();
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "crypto_utils.h"
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "cvc.h"
#include "files.h"
extern file_t *ef_puk_aut;
extern uint8_t challenge[256];
extern uint8_t challenge_len;
int cmd_external_authenticate() {
if (P1(apdu) != 0x0 || P2(apdu) != 0x0) {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
if (ef_puk_aut == NULL) {
return SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND();
}
if (apdu.nc == 0) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
file_t *ef_puk = search_file(EF_PUKAUT);
if (!file_has_data(ef_puk)) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
puk_status[ef_puk_aut->fid & (MAX_PUK - 1)] = 0;
uint8_t *puk_data = file_get_data(ef_puk);
uint8_t *input = (uint8_t *) calloc(dev_name_len + challenge_len, sizeof(uint8_t)), hash[32];
memcpy(input, dev_name, dev_name_len);
memcpy(input + dev_name_len, challenge, challenge_len);
hash256(input, dev_name_len + challenge_len, hash);
int r =
puk_verify(apdu.data,
(uint16_t)apdu.nc,
hash,
32,
file_get_data(ef_puk_aut),
file_get_size(ef_puk_aut));
free(input);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
puk_status[ef_puk_aut->fid & (MAX_PUK - 1)] = 1;
uint8_t auts = 0;
for (int i = 0; i < puk_data[0]; i++) {
auts += puk_status[i];
}
if (auts >= puk_data[2]) {
isUserAuthenticated = true;
}
return SW_OK();
}

295
src/hsm/cmd_extras.c Normal file
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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "mbedtls/ecdh.h"
#ifdef PICO_PLATFORM
#include "pico/aon_timer.h"
#else
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <time.h>
#endif
#include "files.h"
#include "random.h"
#include "kek.h"
#include "mbedtls/hkdf.h"
#include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h"
#ifdef PICO_RP2350
#include "otp.h"
#endif
#define CMD_DATETIME 0xA
#define CMD_DYNOPS 0x6
#define CMD_SECURE_LOCK 0x3A
#define SECURE_LOCK_KEY_AGREEMENT 0x1
#define SECURE_LOCK_ENABLE 0x2
#define SECURE_LOCK_MASK 0x3
#define SECURE_LOCK_DISABLE 0x4
#define CMD_PHY 0x1B
#define CMD_OTP 0x4C
int cmd_extras() {
#ifndef ENABLE_EMULATION
// Only allow change PHY without PIN
if (!isUserAuthenticated && P1(apdu) != 0x1B) {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
#endif
//check button (if enabled)
if (wait_button_pressed() == true) {
return SW_SECURE_MESSAGE_EXEC_ERROR();
}
if (P1(apdu) == CMD_DATETIME) { //datetime operations
if (P2(apdu) != 0x0) {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
if (apdu.nc == 0) {
#ifdef PICO_PLATFORM
struct timespec tv;
aon_timer_get_time(&tv);
#else
struct timeval tv;
gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
#endif
struct tm *tm = localtime(&tv.tv_sec);
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = (tm->tm_year + 1900) >> 8;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = (tm->tm_year + 1900) & 0xff;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = tm->tm_mon;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = tm->tm_mday;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = tm->tm_wday;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = tm->tm_hour;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = tm->tm_min;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = tm->tm_sec;
}
else {
if (apdu.nc != 8) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
struct tm tm;
tm.tm_year = ((apdu.data[0] << 8) | (apdu.data[1])) - 1900;
tm.tm_mon = apdu.data[2];
tm.tm_mday = apdu.data[3];
tm.tm_wday = apdu.data[4];
tm.tm_hour = apdu.data[5];
tm.tm_min = apdu.data[6];
tm.tm_sec = apdu.data[7];
time_t tv_sec = mktime(&tm);
#ifdef PICO_PLATFORM
struct timespec tv = {.tv_sec = tv_sec, .tv_nsec = 0};
aon_timer_set_time(&tv);
#else
struct timeval tv = {.tv_sec = tv_sec, .tv_usec = 0};
settimeofday(&tv, NULL);
#endif
}
}
else if (P1(apdu) == CMD_DYNOPS) { //dynamic options
if (P2(apdu) != 0x0) {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
if (apdu.nc > sizeof(uint8_t)) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
uint16_t opts = get_device_options();
if (apdu.nc == 0) {
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = opts >> 8;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = opts & 0xff;
}
else {
uint8_t newopts[] = { apdu.data[0], (opts & 0xff) };
file_t *tf = search_file(EF_DEVOPS);
file_put_data(tf, newopts, sizeof(newopts));
low_flash_available();
}
}
else if (P1(apdu) == CMD_SECURE_LOCK) { // secure lock
if (apdu.nc == 0) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
if (P2(apdu) == SECURE_LOCK_KEY_AGREEMENT) { // Key Agreement
mbedtls_ecdh_context hkey;
mbedtls_ecdh_init(&hkey);
mbedtls_ecdh_setup(&hkey, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1);
int ret = mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public(&hkey.ctx.mbed_ecdh.grp, &hkey.ctx.mbed_ecdh.d, &hkey.ctx.mbed_ecdh.Q, random_gen, NULL);
mbedtls_mpi_lset(&hkey.ctx.mbed_ecdh.Qp.Z, 1);
ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary(&hkey.ctx.mbed_ecdh.grp, &hkey.ctx.mbed_ecdh.Qp, apdu.data, apdu.nc);
if (ret != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdh_free(&hkey);
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
memcpy(mse.Qpt, apdu.data, sizeof(mse.Qpt));
uint8_t buf[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES];
size_t olen = 0;
ret = mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret(&hkey, &olen, buf, MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES, random_gen, NULL);
if (ret != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdh_free(&hkey);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf));
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
ret = mbedtls_hkdf(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256), NULL, 0, buf, olen, mse.Qpt, sizeof(mse.Qpt), mse.key_enc, sizeof(mse.key_enc));
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf));
if (ret != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdh_free(&hkey);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&hkey.ctx.mbed_ecdh.grp, &hkey.ctx.mbed_ecdh.Q, MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED, &olen, res_APDU, 4096);
mbedtls_ecdh_free(&hkey);
if (ret != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
mse.init = true;
res_APDU_size = (uint16_t)olen;
}
else if (P2(apdu) == SECURE_LOCK_ENABLE || P2(apdu) == SECURE_LOCK_MASK || P2(apdu) == SECURE_LOCK_DISABLE) {
if (mse.init == false) {
return SW_COMMAND_NOT_ALLOWED();
}
int ret = mse_decrypt_ct(apdu.data, apdu.nc);
if (ret != 0) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
if (P2(apdu) == SECURE_LOCK_ENABLE || P2(apdu) == SECURE_LOCK_DISABLE) { // Enable
uint16_t opts = get_device_options();
uint8_t newopts[] = { opts >> 8, (opts & 0xff) };
if ((P2(apdu) == SECURE_LOCK_ENABLE && !(opts & HSM_OPT_SECURE_LOCK)) ||
(P2(apdu) == SECURE_LOCK_DISABLE && (opts & HSM_OPT_SECURE_LOCK))) {
uint16_t tfids[] = { EF_MKEK, EF_MKEK_SO };
for (int t = 0; t < sizeof(tfids) / sizeof(uint16_t); t++) {
file_t *tf = search_file(tfids[t]);
if (tf) {
uint8_t *tmp = (uint8_t *) calloc(1, file_get_size(tf));
memcpy(tmp, file_get_data(tf), file_get_size(tf));
for (int i = 0; i < MKEK_KEY_SIZE; i++) {
MKEK_KEY(tmp)[i] ^= apdu.data[i];
}
file_put_data(tf, tmp, file_get_size(tf));
free(tmp);
}
}
}
if (P2(apdu) == SECURE_LOCK_ENABLE) {
newopts[0] |= HSM_OPT_SECURE_LOCK >> 8;
}
else if (P2(apdu) == SECURE_LOCK_DISABLE) {
newopts[0] &= ~HSM_OPT_SECURE_LOCK >> 8;
}
file_t *tf = search_file(EF_DEVOPS);
file_put_data(tf, newopts, sizeof(newopts));
low_flash_available();
}
else if (P2(apdu) == SECURE_LOCK_MASK) {
memcpy(mkek_mask, apdu.data, apdu.nc);
has_mkek_mask = true;
}
}
}
#ifndef ENABLE_EMULATION
else if (P1(apdu) == CMD_PHY) { // Set PHY
if (apdu.nc == 0) {
if (file_has_data(ef_phy)) {
res_APDU_size = file_get_size(ef_phy);
memcpy(res_APDU, file_get_data(ef_phy), res_APDU_size);
}
}
else {
if (P2(apdu) == PHY_VIDPID) { // VIDPID
if (apdu.nc != 4) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
phy_data.vid = (apdu.data[0] << 8) | apdu.data[1];
phy_data.pid = (apdu.data[2] << 8) | apdu.data[3];
phy_data.vidpid_present = true;
}
else if (P2(apdu) == PHY_LED_GPIO) {
phy_data.led_gpio = apdu.data[0];
phy_data.led_gpio_present = true;
}
else if (P2(apdu) == PHY_LED_BTNESS) {
phy_data.led_brightness = apdu.data[0];
phy_data.led_brightness_present = true;
}
else if (P2(apdu) == PHY_OPTS) {
if (apdu.nc != 2) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
phy_data.opts = (apdu.data[0] << 8) | apdu.data[1];
}
else {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
uint8_t tmp[PHY_MAX_SIZE];
uint16_t tmp_len = 0;
memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp));
if (phy_serialize_data(&phy_data, tmp, &tmp_len) != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
file_put_data(ef_phy, tmp, tmp_len);
low_flash_available();
}
}
#endif
#if PICO_RP2350
else if (P1(apdu) == CMD_OTP) {
if (apdu.nc < 2) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
uint16_t row = (apdu.data[0] << 8) | apdu.data[1];
bool israw = P2(apdu) == 0x1;
if (apdu.nc == 2) {
if (row > 0xbf && row < 0xf48) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
if (israw) {
memcpy(res_APDU, otp_buffer_raw(row), apdu.ne);
}
else {
memcpy(res_APDU, otp_buffer(row), apdu.ne);
}
res_APDU_size = apdu.ne;
}
else {
apdu.nc -= 2;
apdu.data += 2;
if (apdu.nc > 1024) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
if (apdu.nc % (israw ? 4 : 2)) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
uint8_t adata[1024] __attribute__((aligned(4)));
memcpy(adata, apdu.data, apdu.nc);
int ret = 0;
if (israw) {
ret = otp_write_data_raw(row, adata, apdu.nc);
}
else {
ret = otp_write_data(row, adata, apdu.nc);
}
if (ret != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
}
#endif
else {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
return SW_OK();
}

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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "mbedtls/ecdh.h"
#include "asn1.h"
#include "random.h"
#include "oid.h"
#include "eac.h"
#include "files.h"
int cmd_general_authenticate() {
if (P1(apdu) == 0x0 && P2(apdu) == 0x0) {
if (apdu.data[0] == 0x7C) {
int r = 0;
uint16_t pubkey_len = 0;
const uint8_t *pubkey = NULL;
uint16_t tag = 0x0;
uint8_t *tag_data = NULL, *p = NULL;
uint16_t tag_len = 0;
asn1_ctx_t ctxi;
asn1_ctx_init(apdu.data + 2, (uint16_t)(apdu.nc - 2), &ctxi);
while (walk_tlv(&ctxi, &p, &tag, &tag_len, &tag_data)) {
if (tag == 0x80) {
pubkey = tag_data - 1; //mbedtls ecdh starts reading one pos before
pubkey_len = tag_len + 1;
}
}
file_t *fkey = search_file(EF_KEY_DEV);
if (!fkey) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
mbedtls_ecp_keypair ectx;
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(&ectx);
r = load_private_key_ecdh(&ectx, fkey);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ectx);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
mbedtls_ecdh_context ctx;
mbedtls_ecdh_init(&ctx);
mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1;
r = mbedtls_ecdh_setup(&ctx, gid);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ectx);
mbedtls_ecdh_free(&ctx);
return SW_DATA_INVALID();
}
r = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx.ctx.mbed_ecdh.d, &ectx.d);
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ectx);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdh_free(&ctx);
return SW_DATA_INVALID();
}
r = mbedtls_ecdh_read_public(&ctx, pubkey, pubkey_len);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdh_free(&ctx);
return SW_DATA_INVALID();
}
size_t olen = 0;
uint8_t derived[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES];
r = mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret(&ctx,
&olen,
derived,
MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES,
random_gen,
NULL);
mbedtls_ecdh_free(&ctx);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
sm_derive_all_keys(derived, olen);
uint8_t *t = (uint8_t *) calloc(1, pubkey_len + 16);
memcpy(t, "\x7F\x49\x4F\x06\x0A", 5);
if (sm_get_protocol() == MSE_AES) {
memcpy(t + 5, OID_ID_CA_ECDH_AES_CBC_CMAC_128, 10);
}
t[15] = 0x86;
memcpy(t + 16, pubkey, pubkey_len);
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = 0x7C;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = 20;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = 0x81;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = 8;
memcpy(res_APDU + res_APDU_size, sm_get_nonce(), 8);
res_APDU_size += 8;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = 0x82;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = 8;
r = sm_sign(t, pubkey_len + 16, res_APDU + res_APDU_size);
free(t);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU_size += 8;
}
}
return SW_OK();
}

256
src/hsm/cmd_initialize.c Normal file
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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "crypto_utils.h"
#include "files.h"
#include "random.h"
#include "kek.h"
#include "version.h"
#include "asn1.h"
#include "cvc.h"
#include "otp.h"
extern void scan_all();
extern char __StackLimit;
int heapLeft() {
#if !defined(ENABLE_EMULATION) && !defined(ESP_PLATFORM)
char *p = malloc(256); // try to avoid undue fragmentation
int left = &__StackLimit - p;
free(p);
#else
int left = 1024 * 1024;
#endif
return left;
}
extern void reset_puk_store();
int cmd_initialize() {
if (apdu.nc > 0) {
uint8_t mkek[MKEK_SIZE];
int ret_mkek = load_mkek(mkek); //Try loading MKEK with previous session
initialize_flash(true);
scan_all();
has_session_pin = has_session_sopin = false;
uint16_t tag = 0x0;
uint8_t *tag_data = NULL, *p = NULL, *kds = NULL, *dkeks = NULL;
uint16_t tag_len = 0;
asn1_ctx_t ctxi;
asn1_ctx_init(apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc, &ctxi);
while (walk_tlv(&ctxi, &p, &tag, &tag_len, &tag_data)) {
if (tag == 0x80) { //options
file_t *tf = search_file(EF_DEVOPS);
file_put_data(tf, tag_data, tag_len);
}
else if (tag == 0x81) { //user pin
if (file_pin1 && file_pin1->data) {
uint8_t dhash[33];
dhash[0] = (uint8_t)tag_len;
double_hash_pin(tag_data, tag_len, dhash + 1);
file_put_data(file_pin1, dhash, sizeof(dhash));
hash_multi(tag_data, tag_len, session_pin);
has_session_pin = true;
}
}
else if (tag == 0x82) { //sopin pin
if (file_sopin && file_sopin->data) {
uint8_t dhash[33];
dhash[0] = (uint8_t)tag_len;
double_hash_pin(tag_data, tag_len, dhash + 1);
file_put_data(file_sopin, dhash, sizeof(dhash));
hash_multi(tag_data, tag_len, session_sopin);
has_session_sopin = true;
}
}
else if (tag == 0x91) { //retries user pin
file_t *tf = search_file(EF_PIN1_MAX_RETRIES);
if (tf && tf->data) {
file_put_data(tf, tag_data, tag_len);
}
if (file_retries_pin1 && file_retries_pin1->data) {
file_put_data(file_retries_pin1, tag_data, tag_len);
}
}
else if (tag == 0x92) {
dkeks = tag_data;
file_t *tf = file_new(EF_DKEK);
if (!tf) {
release_mkek(mkek);
return SW_MEMORY_FAILURE();
}
file_put_data(tf, NULL, 0);
}
else if (tag == 0x93) {
file_t *ef_puk = search_file(EF_PUKAUT);
if (!ef_puk) {
release_mkek(mkek);
return SW_MEMORY_FAILURE();
}
uint8_t pk_status[4], puks = MIN(tag_data[0], MAX_PUK);
memset(pk_status, 0, sizeof(pk_status));
pk_status[0] = puks;
pk_status[1] = puks;
pk_status[2] = tag_data[1];
file_put_data(ef_puk, pk_status, sizeof(pk_status));
for (uint8_t i = 0; i < puks; i++) {
file_t *tf = file_new(EF_PUK + i);
if (!tf) {
release_mkek(mkek);
return SW_MEMORY_FAILURE();
}
file_put_data(tf, NULL, 0);
}
}
else if (tag == 0x97) {
kds = tag_data;
/*
for (int i = 0; i < MIN(*kds,MAX_KEY_DOMAINS); i++) {
file_t *tf = file_new(EF_DKEK+i);
if (!tf)
return SW_MEMORY_FAILURE();
file_put_data(tf, NULL, 0);
}
*/
}
}
file_t *tf_kd = search_file(EF_KEY_DOMAIN);
if (!tf_kd) {
release_mkek(mkek);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
if (ret_mkek != PICOKEY_OK) {
ret_mkek = load_mkek(mkek); //Try again with new PIN/SO-PIN just in case some is the same
}
if (store_mkek(ret_mkek == PICOKEY_OK ? mkek : NULL) != PICOKEY_OK) {
release_mkek(mkek);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
release_mkek(mkek);
if (dkeks) {
if (*dkeks > 0) {
uint16_t d = *dkeks;
if (file_put_data(tf_kd, (const uint8_t *) &d, sizeof(d)) != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
else {
int r = save_dkek_key(0, random_bytes_get(32));
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
uint16_t d = 0x0101;
if (file_put_data(tf_kd, (const uint8_t *) &d, sizeof(d)) != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
}
else {
uint16_t d = 0x0000;
if (file_put_data(tf_kd, (const uint8_t *) &d, sizeof(d)) != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
if (kds) {
uint8_t t[MAX_KEY_DOMAINS * 2], k = MIN(*kds, MAX_KEY_DOMAINS);
memset(t, 0xff, 2 * k);
if (file_put_data(tf_kd, t, 2 * k) != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
/* When initialized, it has all credentials */
isUserAuthenticated = true;
/* Create terminal private key */
file_t *fdkey = search_file(EF_KEY_DEV);
if (!fdkey) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
int ret = 0;
if (ret_mkek != PICOKEY_OK || !file_has_data(fdkey)) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_context ecdsa;
mbedtls_ecdsa_init(&ecdsa);
mbedtls_ecp_group_id ec_id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1;
uint8_t key_id = 0;
if (otp_key_2) {
ret = mbedtls_ecp_read_key(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1, &ecdsa, otp_key_2, 32);
if (ret != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
ret = mbedtls_ecp_mul(&ecdsa.grp, &ecdsa.Q, &ecdsa.d, &ecdsa.grp.G, random_gen, NULL);
}
else {
ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey(&ecdsa, ec_id, random_gen, NULL);
}
if (ret != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
ret = store_keys(&ecdsa, PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC, key_id);
if (ret != PICOKEY_OK) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
uint16_t ee_len = 0, term_len = 0;
if ((ee_len = asn1_cvc_aut(&ecdsa, PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC, res_APDU, 4096, NULL, 0)) == 0) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
file_t *fpk = search_file(EF_EE_DEV);
ret = file_put_data(fpk, res_APDU, ee_len);
if (ret != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
if ((term_len = asn1_cvc_cert(&ecdsa, PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC, res_APDU + ee_len, 4096 - ee_len, NULL, 0, true)) == 0) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa);
fpk = search_file(EF_TERMCA);
ret = file_put_data(fpk, res_APDU, ee_len + term_len);
if (ret != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
const uint8_t *keyid = (const uint8_t *) "\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0",
*label = (const uint8_t *) "ESPICOHSMTR";
uint16_t prkd_len = asn1_build_prkd_ecc(label, (uint16_t)strlen((const char *) label), keyid, 20, 256, res_APDU, 4096);
fpk = search_file(EF_PRKD_DEV);
ret = file_put_data(fpk, res_APDU, prkd_len);
}
if (ret != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
low_flash_available();
reset_puk_store();
}
else { //free memory bytes request
int heap_left = heapLeft();
res_APDU[0] = ((heap_left >> 24) & 0xff);
res_APDU[1] = ((heap_left >> 16) & 0xff);
res_APDU[2] = ((heap_left >> 8) & 0xff);
res_APDU[3] = ((heap_left >> 0) & 0xff);
res_APDU[4] = 0;
res_APDU[5] = HSM_VERSION_MAJOR;
res_APDU[6] = HSM_VERSION_MINOR;
res_APDU_size = 7;
}
return SW_OK();
}

212
src/hsm/cmd_key_domain.c Normal file
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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "crypto_utils.h"
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "cvc.h"
#include "kek.h"
#include "files.h"
uint8_t get_key_domain(file_t *fkey) {
uint16_t tag_len = 0;
if (!file_has_data(fkey)) {
return 0xff;
}
const uint8_t *meta_tag = get_meta_tag(fkey, 0x92, &tag_len);
if (meta_tag) {
return *meta_tag;
}
return 0x0;
}
int cmd_key_domain() {
//if (dkeks == 0)
// return SW_COMMAND_NOT_ALLOWED();
uint8_t p1 = P1(apdu), p2 = P2(apdu);
if ((has_session_pin == false || isUserAuthenticated == false) && apdu.nc > 0 &&
!(p1 == 0x0 && p2 == 0x0)) {
return SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
if (p2 >= MAX_KEY_DOMAINS) {
return SW_WRONG_P1P2();
}
file_t *tf_kd = search_file(EF_KEY_DOMAIN);
if (!tf_kd) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
uint16_t tf_kd_size = file_get_size(tf_kd);
if (tf_kd_size == 0) {
return SW_WRONG_P1P2();
}
if (2 * p2 >= tf_kd_size) {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
uint8_t *kdata = file_get_data(tf_kd), dkeks = kdata ? kdata[2 * p2] : 0,
current_dkeks = kdata ? kdata[2 * p2 + 1] : 0;
if (p1 == 0x0) { //dkek import
if (apdu.nc > 0) {
file_t *tf = file_new(EF_DKEK + p2);
if (!tf) {
return SW_MEMORY_FAILURE();
}
if (apdu.nc < 32) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
if (current_dkeks == dkeks) {
return SW_COMMAND_NOT_ALLOWED();
}
import_dkek_share(p2, apdu.data);
if (++current_dkeks >= dkeks) {
int r = save_dkek_key(p2, NULL);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
if (r == PICOKEY_NO_LOGIN) {
pending_save_dkek = p2;
}
else {
/* On fail, it will return to previous dkek state. */
import_dkek_share(p2, apdu.data);
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
}
}
uint8_t t[MAX_KEY_DOMAINS * 2];
memcpy(t, kdata, tf_kd_size);
t[2 * p2 + 1] = current_dkeks;
if (file_put_data(tf_kd, t, tf_kd_size) != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
low_flash_available();
}
else {
file_t *tf = search_file(EF_XKEK + p2);
if (current_dkeks == 0xff && !file_has_data(tf)) { //XKEK have always 0xff
return SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND();
}
}
}
else if (p1 == 0x1 || p1 == 0x3 || p1 == 0x4) { //key domain setup
if (p1 == 0x1 && apdu.nc != 1) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
if (p1 == 0x3) { //if key domain is not empty, command is denied
for (uint16_t i = 1; i < 256; i++) {
file_t *fkey = search_file(KEY_PREFIX << 8 | (uint8_t)i);
if (get_key_domain(fkey) == p2) {
return SW_FILE_EXISTS();
}
}
}
uint8_t t[MAX_KEY_DOMAINS * 2];
memcpy(t, kdata, tf_kd_size);
if (p1 == 0x1) {
if (t[2 * p2] != 0xff || t[2 * p2 + 1] != 0xff) {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
t[2 * p2] = dkeks = apdu.data[0];
t[2 * p2 + 1] = current_dkeks = 0;
}
else if (p1 == 0x3) {
if (t[2 * p2] == 0xff && t[2 * p2 + 1] == 0xff) {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
t[2 * p2] = dkeks = 0xff;
t[2 * p2 + 1] = 0xff;
}
else if (p1 == 0x4) {
t[2 * p2 + 1] = current_dkeks = 0;
}
if (file_put_data(tf_kd, t, tf_kd_size) != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
file_t *tf = NULL;
if ((tf = search_file(EF_DKEK + p2))) {
if (delete_file(tf) != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
if (p1 == 0x3 && (tf = search_file(EF_XKEK + p2))) {
if (delete_file(tf) != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
low_flash_available();
if (p1 == 0x3) {
return SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND();
}
}
else if (p1 == 0x2) { //XKEK Key Domain creation
if (apdu.nc > 0) {
uint16_t pub_len = 0;
file_t *fterm = search_file(EF_TERMCA);
if (!fterm) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
const uint8_t *pub = cvc_get_pub(file_get_data(fterm), file_get_size(fterm), &pub_len);
if (!pub) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
uint16_t t86_len = 0;
const uint8_t *t86 = cvc_get_field(pub, pub_len, &t86_len, 0x86);
if (!t86 || t86[0] != 0x4) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
uint16_t t54_len = 0;
const uint8_t *t54 = cvc_get_field(apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc, &t54_len, 0x54);
if (!t54) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
uint8_t hash[32], *input = (uint8_t *) calloc(1, (t86_len - 1) / 2 + 1);
input[0] = 0x54;
memcpy(input + 1, t86 + 1, (t86_len - 1) / 2);
hash256(input, (t86_len - 1) / 2 + 1, hash);
free(input);
int r = puk_verify(t54, t54_len, hash, 32, apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
file_t *tf = file_new(EF_XKEK + p2);
if (!tf) {
return SW_MEMORY_FAILURE();
}
//All checks done. Get Key Domain UID
pub = cvc_get_pub(apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc, &pub_len);
if (pub) {
t86_len = 0;
t86 = cvc_get_field(pub, pub_len, &t86_len, 0x86);
if (t86) {
file_put_data(tf, t86 + 1, (uint16_t)t86_len - 1);
low_flash_available();
}
}
}
}
else {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
memset(res_APDU, 0, 10);
res_APDU[0] = dkeks;
res_APDU[1] = dkeks > current_dkeks ? dkeks - current_dkeks : 0;
dkek_kcv(p2, res_APDU + 2);
res_APDU_size = 2 + 8;
file_t *tf = search_file(EF_XKEK + p2);
if (file_has_data(tf)) {
memcpy(res_APDU + 10, file_get_data(tf), file_get_size(tf));
res_APDU_size += file_get_size(tf);
}
return SW_OK();
}

67
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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "crypto_utils.h"
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "random.h"
int cmd_key_gen() {
uint8_t key_id = P1(apdu);
uint8_t p2 = P2(apdu);
uint8_t key_size = 32;
int r;
if (!isUserAuthenticated) {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
if (p2 == 0xB3) {
key_size = 64;
}
else if (p2 == 0xB2) {
key_size = 32;
}
else if (p2 == 0xB1) {
key_size = 24;
}
else if (p2 == 0xB0) {
key_size = 16;
}
//at this moment, we do not use the template, as only CBC is supported by the driver (encrypt, decrypt and CMAC)
uint8_t aes_key[64]; //maximum AES key size
memcpy(aes_key, random_bytes_get(key_size), key_size);
int aes_type = 0x0;
if (key_size == 16) {
aes_type = PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_128;
}
else if (key_size == 24) {
aes_type = PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_192;
}
else if (key_size == 32) {
aes_type = PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_256;
}
else if (key_size == 64) {
aes_type = PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_512;
}
r = store_keys(aes_key, aes_type, key_id);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_MEMORY_FAILURE();
}
if (find_and_store_meta_key(key_id) != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
low_flash_available();
return SW_OK();
}

153
src/hsm/cmd_key_unwrap.c Normal file
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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "crypto_utils.h"
#include "kek.h"
#include "cvc.h"
int cmd_key_unwrap() {
uint8_t key_id = P1(apdu);
int r = 0;
if (P2(apdu) != 0x93) {
return SW_WRONG_P1P2();
}
if (!isUserAuthenticated) {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
uint8_t *data = apdu.data;
uint16_t data_len = apdu.nc;
if (data_len == 0) { // New style
file_t *tef = search_file(0x2F10);
if (!file_has_data(tef)) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
data = file_get_data(tef);
data_len = file_get_size(tef);
}
int key_type = dkek_type_key(data);
uint8_t *allowed = NULL;
int16_t kdom = -1;
uint16_t allowed_len = 0;
if (key_type == 0x0) {
return SW_DATA_INVALID();
}
if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_RSA) {
mbedtls_rsa_context ctx;
mbedtls_rsa_init(&ctx);
do {
r = dkek_decode_key((uint8_t)++kdom, &ctx, data, data_len, NULL, &allowed, &allowed_len);
} while ((r == PICOKEY_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND || r == PICOKEY_WRONG_DKEK) && kdom < MAX_KEY_DOMAINS);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(&ctx);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
r = store_keys(&ctx, PICO_KEYS_KEY_RSA, key_id);
if ((res_APDU_size = (uint16_t)asn1_cvc_aut(&ctx, PICO_KEYS_KEY_RSA, res_APDU, 4096, NULL, 0)) == 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(&ctx);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
mbedtls_rsa_free(&ctx);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
else if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC) {
mbedtls_ecp_keypair ctx;
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(&ctx);
do {
r = dkek_decode_key((uint8_t)++kdom, &ctx, data, data_len, NULL, &allowed, &allowed_len);
} while ((r == PICOKEY_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND || r == PICOKEY_WRONG_DKEK) && kdom < MAX_KEY_DOMAINS);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
r = store_keys(&ctx, PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC, key_id);
if ((res_APDU_size = (uint16_t)asn1_cvc_aut(&ctx, PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC, res_APDU, 4096, NULL, 0)) == 0) {
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
else if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES) {
uint8_t aes_key[64];
int key_size = 0, aes_type = 0;
do {
r = dkek_decode_key((uint8_t)++kdom,
aes_key,
data,
data_len,
&key_size,
&allowed,
&allowed_len);
} while ((r == PICOKEY_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND || r == PICOKEY_WRONG_DKEK) && kdom < MAX_KEY_DOMAINS);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
if (key_size == 64) {
aes_type = PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_512;
}
else if (key_size == 32) {
aes_type = PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_256;
}
else if (key_size == 24) {
aes_type = PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_192;
}
else if (key_size == 16) {
aes_type = PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_128;
}
else {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
r = store_keys(aes_key, aes_type, key_id);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
if ((allowed != NULL && allowed_len > 0) || kdom >= 0) {
uint16_t meta_len = (allowed_len > 0 ? 2 + allowed_len : 0) + (kdom >= 0 ? 3 : 0);
uint8_t *meta = (uint8_t *) calloc(1, meta_len), *m = meta;
if (allowed_len > 0) {
*m++ = 0x91;
*m++ = (uint8_t)allowed_len;
memcpy(m, allowed, allowed_len); m += allowed_len;
}
if (kdom >= 0) {
*m++ = 0x92;
*m++ = 1;
*m++ = (uint8_t)kdom;
}
r = meta_add((KEY_PREFIX << 8) | key_id, meta, meta_len);
free(meta);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
return r;
}
}
if (res_APDU_size > 0) {
file_t *fpk = file_new((EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX << 8) | key_id);
r = file_put_data(fpk, res_APDU, res_APDU_size);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU_size = 0;
}
low_flash_available();
return SW_OK();
}

118
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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "crypto_utils.h"
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "asn1.h"
#include "kek.h"
#include "files.h"
extern uint8_t get_key_domain(file_t *fkey);
int cmd_key_wrap() {
int r = 0;
uint8_t key_id = P1(apdu);
if (P2(apdu) != 0x92) {
return SW_WRONG_P1P2();
}
if (!isUserAuthenticated) {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
file_t *ef = search_file((KEY_PREFIX << 8) | key_id);
if (!ef) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
uint8_t kdom = get_key_domain(ef);
if (kdom == 0xff) {
return SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND();
}
file_t *tf_kd = search_file(EF_KEY_DOMAIN);
uint8_t *kdata = file_get_data(tf_kd), dkeks = kdata ? kdata[2 * kdom] : 0,
current_dkeks = kdata ? kdata[2 * kdom + 1] : 0;
if (dkeks != current_dkeks || dkeks == 0 || dkeks == 0xff) {
return SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND();
}
if (key_has_purpose(ef, ALGO_WRAP) == false) {
return SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
file_t *prkd = search_file((PRKD_PREFIX << 8) | key_id);
if (!prkd) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
const uint8_t *dprkd = file_get_data(prkd);
uint16_t wrap_len = MAX_DKEK_ENCODE_KEY_BUFFER, tag_len = 0;
const uint8_t *meta_tag = get_meta_tag(ef, 0x91, &tag_len);
if (*dprkd == P15_KEYTYPE_RSA) {
mbedtls_rsa_context ctx;
mbedtls_rsa_init(&ctx);
r = load_private_key_rsa(&ctx, ef);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(&ctx);
if (r == PICOKEY_VERIFICATION_FAILED) {
return SW_SECURE_MESSAGE_EXEC_ERROR();
}
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
r = dkek_encode_key(kdom, &ctx, PICO_KEYS_KEY_RSA, res_APDU, &wrap_len, meta_tag, tag_len);
mbedtls_rsa_free(&ctx);
}
else if (*dprkd == P15_KEYTYPE_ECC) {
mbedtls_ecp_keypair ctx;
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(&ctx);
r = load_private_key_ec(&ctx, ef);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
if (r == PICOKEY_VERIFICATION_FAILED) {
return SW_SECURE_MESSAGE_EXEC_ERROR();
}
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
r = dkek_encode_key(kdom, &ctx, PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC, res_APDU, &wrap_len, meta_tag, tag_len);
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
}
else if (*dprkd == P15_KEYTYPE_AES) {
uint8_t kdata_aes[64]; //maximum AES key size
if (wait_button_pressed() == true) { //timeout
return SW_SECURE_MESSAGE_EXEC_ERROR();
}
uint16_t key_size = file_get_size(ef), aes_type = PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES;
memcpy(kdata_aes, file_get_data(ef), key_size);
if (mkek_decrypt(kdata_aes, key_size) != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
if (key_size == 64) {
aes_type = PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_512;
}
else if (key_size == 32) {
aes_type = PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_256;
}
else if (key_size == 24) {
aes_type = PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_192;
}
else if (key_size == 16) {
aes_type = PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_128;
}
r = dkek_encode_key(kdom, kdata_aes, aes_type, res_APDU, &wrap_len, meta_tag, tag_len);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata_aes, sizeof(kdata_aes));
}
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU_size = wrap_len;
return SW_OK();
}

170
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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "crypto_utils.h"
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "files.h"
#include "asn1.h"
#include "cvc.h"
#include "oid.h"
#include "random.h"
#include "kek.h"
int cmd_keypair_gen() {
uint8_t key_id = P1(apdu);
if (!isUserAuthenticated) {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
int ret = 0;
//sc_asn1_print_tags(apdu.data, apdu.nc);
//DEBUG_DATA(apdu.data,apdu.nc);
asn1_ctx_t ctxi, ctxo = { 0 };
asn1_ctx_init(apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc, &ctxi);
if (asn1_find_tag(&ctxi, 0x7f49, &ctxo) && asn1_len(&ctxo) > 0) {
asn1_ctx_t oid = { 0 };
if (asn1_find_tag(&ctxo, 0x6, &oid) && asn1_len(&oid) > 0) {
if (memcmp(oid.data, OID_ID_TA_RSA_V1_5_SHA_256, oid.len) == 0) { //RSA
asn1_ctx_t ex = { 0 }, ks = { 0 };
uint32_t exponent = 65537, key_size = 2048;
if (asn1_find_tag(&ctxo, 0x82, &ex) && asn1_len(&ex) > 0) {
exponent = asn1_get_uint(&ex);
}
if (asn1_find_tag(&ctxo, 0x2, &ks) && asn1_len(&ks) > 0) {
key_size = asn1_get_uint(&ks);
}
printf("KEYPAIR RSA %lu (%lx)\n",
(unsigned long) key_size,
(unsigned long) exponent);
mbedtls_rsa_context rsa;
mbedtls_rsa_init(&rsa);
uint8_t index = 0;
ret = mbedtls_rsa_gen_key(&rsa, random_gen, &index, key_size, exponent);
if (ret != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(&rsa);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
if ((res_APDU_size =
(uint16_t)asn1_cvc_aut(&rsa, PICO_KEYS_KEY_RSA, res_APDU, 4096, NULL, 0)) == 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
ret = store_keys(&rsa, PICO_KEYS_KEY_RSA, key_id);
if (ret != PICOKEY_OK) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(&rsa);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
mbedtls_rsa_free(&rsa);
}
else if (memcmp(oid.data, OID_ID_TA_ECDSA_SHA_256, MIN(oid.len, 10)) == 0) { //ECC
asn1_ctx_t prime = { 0 };
if (asn1_find_tag(&ctxo, 0x81, &prime) != true) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
mbedtls_ecp_group_id ec_id = ec_get_curve_from_prime(prime.data, prime.len);
printf("KEYPAIR ECC %d\n", ec_id);
if (ec_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) {
return SW_FUNC_NOT_SUPPORTED();
}
if (ec_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519 || ec_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448) {
asn1_ctx_t g = { 0 };
if (asn1_find_tag(&ctxo, 0x83, &g) != true) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
if (ec_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519 && (g.data[0] != 9)) {
ec_id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_ED25519;
}
else if (ec_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448 && (g.len != 56 || g.data[0] != 5)) {
ec_id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_ED448;
}
}
printf("KEYPAIR ECC %d\r\n", ec_id);
mbedtls_ecdsa_context ecdsa;
mbedtls_ecdsa_init(&ecdsa);
uint8_t index = 0;
ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey(&ecdsa, ec_id, random_gen, &index);
if (ret != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
asn1_ctx_t a91 = { 0 }, ext = { 0 };
if (asn1_find_tag(&ctxi, 0x91, &a91) && asn1_len(&a91) > 0) {
for (size_t n = 0; n < a91.len; n++) {
if (a91.data[n] == ALGO_EC_DH_XKEK) {
asn1_ctx_t a92 = {0};
if (!asn1_find_tag(&ctxi, 0x92, &a92) || asn1_len(&a92) == 0) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
if (a92.data[0] > MAX_KEY_DOMAINS) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
file_t *tf_xkek = search_file(EF_XKEK + a92.data[0]);
if (!tf_xkek) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
ext.len = 2 + 2 + (uint16_t)strlen(OID_ID_KEY_DOMAIN_UID) + 2 + file_get_size(
tf_xkek);
ext.data = (uint8_t *) calloc(1, ext.len);
uint8_t *pe = ext.data;
*pe++ = 0x73;
*pe++ = (uint8_t)ext.len - 2;
*pe++ = 0x6;
*pe++ = (uint8_t)strlen(OID_ID_KEY_DOMAIN_UID);
memcpy(pe, OID_ID_KEY_DOMAIN_UID, strlen(OID_ID_KEY_DOMAIN_UID));
pe += strlen(OID_ID_KEY_DOMAIN_UID);
*pe++ = 0x80;
*pe++ = (uint8_t)file_get_size(tf_xkek);
memcpy(pe, file_get_data(tf_xkek), file_get_size(tf_xkek));
}
}
}
if ((res_APDU_size =
(uint16_t)asn1_cvc_aut(&ecdsa, PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC, res_APDU, 4096, ext.data, ext.len)) == 0) {
if (ext.data) {
free(ext.data);
}
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
if (ext.data) {
free(ext.data);
}
ret = store_keys(&ecdsa, PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC, key_id);
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa);
if (ret != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
}
}
else {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
if (find_and_store_meta_key(key_id) != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
file_t *fpk = file_new((EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX << 8) | key_id);
ret = file_put_data(fpk, res_APDU, res_APDU_size);
if (ret != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
if (apdu.ne == 0) {
apdu.ne = res_APDU_size;
}
low_flash_available();
return SW_OK();
}

70
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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "files.h"
int cmd_list_keys() {
/* First we send DEV private key */
/* Both below conditions should be always TRUE */
if (search_file(EF_PRKD_DEV)) {
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = EF_PRKD_DEV >> 8;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = EF_PRKD_DEV & 0xff;
}
if (search_file(EF_KEY_DEV)) {
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = EF_KEY_DEV >> 8;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = EF_KEY_DEV & 0xff;
}
//first CC
for (int i = 0; i < dynamic_files; i++) {
file_t *f = &dynamic_file[i];
if ((f->fid & 0xff00) == (KEY_PREFIX << 8)) {
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = KEY_PREFIX;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = f->fid & 0xff;
}
}
for (int i = 0; i < dynamic_files; i++) {
file_t *f = &dynamic_file[i];
if ((f->fid & 0xff00) == (PRKD_PREFIX << 8)) {
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = PRKD_PREFIX;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = f->fid & 0xff;
}
}
//second CD
for (int i = 0; i < dynamic_files; i++) {
file_t *f = &dynamic_file[i];
if ((f->fid & 0xff00) == (CD_PREFIX << 8)) {
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = CD_PREFIX;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = f->fid & 0xff;
}
}
for (int i = 0; i < dynamic_files; i++) {
file_t *f = &dynamic_file[i];
if ((f->fid & 0xff00) == (DCOD_PREFIX << 8)) {
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = DCOD_PREFIX;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = f->fid & 0xff;
}
}
#if !defined(ENABLE_EMULATION) && !defined(ESP_PLATFORM)
if ((apdu.rlen + 2 + 10) % 64 == 0) { // FIX for strange behaviour with PSCS and multiple of 64
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = 0;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = 0;
}
#endif
return SW_OK();
}

89
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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "asn1.h"
#include "oid.h"
#include "eac.h"
#include "files.h"
#include "cvc.h"
file_t *ef_puk_aut = NULL;
int cmd_mse() {
int p1 = P1(apdu);
int p2 = P2(apdu);
if (p2 != 0xA4 && p2 != 0xA6 && p2 != 0xAA && p2 != 0xB4 && p2 != 0xB6 && p2 != 0xB8) {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
if (p1 & 0x1) { //SET
uint16_t tag = 0x0;
uint8_t *tag_data = NULL, *p = NULL;
uint16_t tag_len = 0;
asn1_ctx_t ctxi;
asn1_ctx_init(apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc, &ctxi);
while (walk_tlv(&ctxi, &p, &tag, &tag_len, &tag_data)) {
if (tag == 0x80) {
if (p2 == 0xA4) {
if (tag_len == 10 &&
memcmp(tag_data, OID_ID_CA_ECDH_AES_CBC_CMAC_128, tag_len) == 0) {
sm_set_protocol(MSE_AES);
}
}
}
else if (tag == 0x83) {
if (tag_len == 1) {
}
else {
if (p2 == 0xB6) {
if (puk_store_select_chr(tag_data) == PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_OK();
}
}
else if (p2 == 0xA4) { /* Aut */
for (uint8_t i = 0; i < MAX_PUK; i++) {
file_t *ef = search_file(EF_PUK + i);
if (!ef) {
break;
}
if (!file_has_data(ef)) {
break;
}
uint16_t chr_len = 0;
const uint8_t *chr = cvc_get_chr(file_get_data(ef),
file_get_size(ef),
&chr_len);
if (memcmp(chr, tag_data, chr_len) == 0) {
ef_puk_aut = ef;
if (puk_status[i] == 1) {
return SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED(); // It is correct
}
return SW_OK();
}
}
}
return SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND();
}
}
}
}
else {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
return SW_OK();
}

161
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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "oid.h"
#include "asn1.h"
#include "cvc.h"
extern int add_cert_puk_store(const uint8_t *data, uint16_t data_len, bool copy);
extern PUK *current_puk;
int cmd_pso() {
uint8_t p1 = P1(apdu), p2 = P2(apdu);
if (p1 == 0x0 && (p2 == 0x92 || p2 == 0xAE || p2 == 0xBE)) { /* Verify certificate */
if (apdu.nc == 0) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
if (current_puk == NULL) {
return SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND();
}
if (apdu.data[0] != 0x7F || apdu.data[1] != 0x21) {
uint8_t tlv_len = 2 + format_tlv_len((uint16_t)apdu.nc, NULL);
memmove(apdu.data + tlv_len, apdu.data, apdu.nc);
memcpy(apdu.data, "\x7F\x21", 2);
format_tlv_len((uint16_t)apdu.nc, apdu.data + 2);
apdu.nc += tlv_len;
}
int r = cvc_verify(apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc, current_puk->cvcert, current_puk->cvcert_len);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
if (r == PICOKEY_WRONG_DATA) {
return SW_DATA_INVALID();
}
else if (r == PICOKEY_WRONG_SIGNATURE) {
return SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
for (uint8_t i = 0; i < 0xfe; i++) {
uint16_t fid = (CA_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX << 8) | i;
file_t *ca_ef = search_file(fid);
if (!ca_ef) {
ca_ef = file_new(fid);
file_put_data(ca_ef, apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc);
if (add_cert_puk_store(file_get_data(ca_ef), file_get_size(ca_ef),
false) != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_FILE_FULL();
}
uint16_t chr_len = 0;
const uint8_t *chr = cvc_get_chr(apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc, &chr_len);
if (chr == NULL) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
uint16_t puk_len = 0, puk_bin_len = 0;
const uint8_t *puk = cvc_get_pub(apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc, &puk_len), *puk_bin = NULL;
if (puk == NULL) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
uint16_t oid_len = 0;
const uint8_t *oid = cvc_get_field(puk, puk_len, &oid_len, 0x6);
if (oid == NULL) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
if (memcmp(oid, OID_ID_TA_RSA, 9) == 0) { //RSA
puk_bin = cvc_get_field(puk, puk_len, &puk_bin_len, 0x81);
if (!puk_bin) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
}
else if (memcmp(oid, OID_ID_TA_ECDSA, 9) == 0) { //ECC
mbedtls_ecp_group_id ec_id = cvc_inherite_ec_group(apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc);
mbedtls_ecp_group grp;
mbedtls_ecp_group_init(&grp);
if (mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&grp, ec_id) != 0) {
mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&grp);
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
uint16_t plen = (uint16_t)mbedtls_mpi_size(&grp.P);
uint16_t t86_len = 0;
const uint8_t *t86 = cvc_get_field(puk, puk_len, &t86_len, 0x86);
if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(&grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY) {
if (plen != t86_len) {
mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&grp);
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
puk_bin = t86;
puk_bin_len = t86_len;
}
else if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(&grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS) {
if (t86[0] == 0x2 || t86[0] == 0x3) {
if (t86_len != plen + 1) {
mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&grp);
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
}
else if (t86[0] == 0x4) {
if (t86_len != 2 * plen + 1) {
mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&grp);
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
}
else {
mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&grp);
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
puk_bin = t86 + 1;
puk_bin_len = plen;
}
mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&grp);
if (!puk_bin) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
}
file_t *cd_ef = file_new((CD_PREFIX << 8) | i);
uint16_t cd_len = (uint16_t)asn1_build_cert_description(chr,
chr_len,
puk_bin,
puk_bin_len,
fid,
NULL,
0);
if (cd_len == 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
uint8_t *buf = (uint8_t *) calloc(cd_len, sizeof(uint8_t));
r = (int)asn1_build_cert_description(chr,
chr_len,
puk_bin,
puk_bin_len,
fid,
buf,
cd_len);
file_put_data(cd_ef, buf, cd_len);
free(buf);
if (r == 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
low_flash_available();
break;
}
}
}
else {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
return SW_OK();
}

99
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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "files.h"
#include "cvc.h"
int cmd_puk_auth() {
uint8_t p1 = P1(apdu), p2 = P2(apdu);
file_t *ef_puk = search_file(EF_PUKAUT);
if (!file_has_data(ef_puk)) {
if (apdu.nc > 0) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
uint8_t *puk_data = file_get_data(ef_puk);
if (apdu.nc > 0) {
if (p1 == 0x0 || p1 == 0x1) {
file_t *ef = NULL;
if (p1 == 0x0) { /* Add */
if (p2 != 0x0) {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
for (uint8_t i = 0; i < puk_data[0]; i++) {
ef = search_file(EF_PUK + i);
if (!ef) { /* Never should not happen */
return SW_MEMORY_FAILURE();
}
if (!file_has_data(ef)) { /* found first empty slot */
break;
}
}
uint8_t *tmp = (uint8_t *) calloc(file_get_size(ef_puk), sizeof(uint8_t));
memcpy(tmp, puk_data, file_get_size(ef_puk));
tmp[1] = puk_data[1] - 1;
file_put_data(ef_puk, tmp, file_get_size(ef_puk));
puk_data = file_get_data(ef_puk);
free(tmp);
}
else if (p1 == 0x1) { /* Replace */
if (p2 >= puk_data[0]) {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
ef = search_file(EF_PUK + p2);
if (!ef) { /* Never should not happen */
return SW_MEMORY_FAILURE();
}
}
file_put_data(ef, apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc);
low_flash_available();
}
else {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
}
if (p1 == 0x2) {
if (p2 >= puk_data[0]) {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
file_t *ef = search_file(EF_PUK + p2);
if (!ef) {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
if (!file_has_data(ef)) {
return SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND();
}
uint16_t chr_len = 0;
const uint8_t *chr = cvc_get_chr(file_get_data(ef), file_get_size(ef), &chr_len);
if (chr) {
memcpy(res_APDU, chr, chr_len);
res_APDU_size = chr_len;
}
return set_res_sw(0x90, puk_status[p2]);
}
else {
memcpy(res_APDU, puk_data, 3);
res_APDU[3] = 0;
for (int i = 0; i < puk_data[0]; i++) {
res_APDU[3] += puk_status[i];
}
res_APDU_size = 4;
}
return SW_OK();
}

98
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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "sc_hsm.h"
int cmd_read_binary() {
uint16_t offset = 0;
uint8_t ins = INS(apdu), p1 = P1(apdu), p2 = P2(apdu);
const file_t *ef = NULL;
if ((ins & 0x1) == 0) {
if ((p1 & 0x80) != 0) {
if (!(ef = search_file(p1 & 0x1f))) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
offset = p2;
}
else {
offset = make_uint16_t(p1, p2) & 0x7fff;
ef = currentEF;
}
}
else {
if (p1 == 0 && (p2 & 0xE0) == 0 && (p2 & 0x1f) != 0 && (p2 & 0x1f) != 0x1f) {
if (!(ef = search_file(p2 & 0x1f))) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
}
else {
uint16_t file_id = make_uint16_t(p1, p2); // & 0x7fff;
if (file_id == 0x0) {
ef = currentEF;
}
else if (!(ef = search_file(file_id))) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
if (apdu.data[0] != 0x54) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
offset = 0;
for (int d = 0; d < apdu.data[1]; d++) {
offset |= apdu.data[2 + d] << (apdu.data[1] - 1 - d) * 8;
}
}
}
if ((ef->fid >> 8) == KEY_PREFIX || !authenticate_action(ef, ACL_OP_READ_SEARCH)) {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
if (ef->data) {
if ((ef->type & FILE_DATA_FUNC) == FILE_DATA_FUNC) {
uint16_t data_len = (uint16_t)((int (*)(const file_t *, int))(ef->data))((const file_t *) ef, 1); //already copies content to res_APDU
if (offset > data_len) {
return SW_WRONG_P1P2();
}
uint16_t maxle = data_len - offset;
if (apdu.ne > maxle) {
apdu.ne = maxle;
}
if (offset) {
memmove(res_APDU, res_APDU + offset, res_APDU_size - offset);
//res_APDU += offset;
res_APDU_size -= offset;
}
}
else {
uint16_t data_len = file_get_size(ef);
if (offset > data_len) {
return SW_WARNING_EOF();
}
//uint16_t maxle = data_len - offset;
//if (apdu.ne > maxle) {
// apdu.ne = maxle;
//}
memcpy(res_APDU, file_get_data(ef) + offset, data_len - offset);
res_APDU_size = data_len - offset;
}
}
return SW_OK();
}

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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "crypto_utils.h"
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "kek.h"
int cmd_reset_retry() {
if (P2(apdu) != 0x81) {
return SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND();
}
if (!file_sopin || !file_pin1) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
if (!file_has_data(file_sopin)) {
return SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND();
}
uint16_t opts = get_device_options();
if (!(opts & HSM_OPT_RRC)) {
return SW_COMMAND_NOT_ALLOWED();
}
if (P1(apdu) == 0x0 || P1(apdu) == 0x2) {
uint8_t newpin_len = 0;
if (P1(apdu) == 0x0) {
uint8_t so_pin_len = file_read_uint8(file_sopin);
if ((uint16_t)apdu.nc <= so_pin_len + 1) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
uint16_t r = check_pin(file_sopin, apdu.data, so_pin_len);
if (r != 0x9000) {
return r;
}
newpin_len = (uint8_t)apdu.nc - so_pin_len;
}
else if (P1(apdu) == 0x2) {
if (!has_session_sopin) {
return SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
if (apdu.nc > 16) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
newpin_len = (uint8_t)apdu.nc;
}
uint8_t dhash[33];
dhash[0] = newpin_len;
double_hash_pin(apdu.data + (apdu.nc - newpin_len), newpin_len, dhash + 1);
file_put_data(file_pin1, dhash, sizeof(dhash));
if (pin_reset_retries(file_pin1, true) != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_MEMORY_FAILURE();
}
uint8_t mkek[MKEK_SIZE];
int r = load_mkek(mkek); //loads the MKEK with SO pin
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
hash_multi(apdu.data + (apdu.nc - newpin_len), newpin_len, session_pin);
has_session_pin = true;
r = store_mkek(mkek);
release_mkek(mkek);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
low_flash_available();
return SW_OK();
}
else if (P1(apdu) == 0x1 || P1(apdu) == 0x3) {
if (!(opts & HSM_OPT_RRC_RESET_ONLY)) {
return SW_COMMAND_NOT_ALLOWED();
}
if (P1(apdu) == 0x1) {
uint8_t so_pin_len = file_read_uint8(file_sopin);
if (apdu.nc != so_pin_len) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
uint16_t r = check_pin(file_sopin, apdu.data, so_pin_len);
if (r != 0x9000) {
return r;
}
}
else if (P1(apdu) == 0x3) {
if (!has_session_sopin) {
return SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
if (apdu.nc != 0) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
}
if (pin_reset_retries(file_pin1, true) != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_MEMORY_FAILURE();
}
return SW_OK();
}
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}

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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "version.h"
void select_file(file_t *pe) {
if (!pe) {
currentDF = (file_t *) MF;
currentEF = NULL;
}
else if (pe->type & (FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF|FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF)) {
currentEF = pe;
currentDF = &file_entries[pe->parent];
}
else {
currentDF = pe;
}
if (currentEF == file_openpgp || currentEF == file_sc_hsm) {
selected_applet = currentEF;
//sc_hsm_unload(); //reset auth status
}
}
int cmd_select() {
uint8_t p1 = P1(apdu);
uint8_t p2 = P2(apdu);
file_t *pe = NULL;
uint16_t fid = 0x0;
// Only "first or only occurence" supported
//if ((p2 & 0xF3) != 0x00) {
// return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
//}
if (apdu.nc == 2) {
fid = get_uint16_t(apdu.data, 0);
}
//if ((fid & 0xff00) == (KEY_PREFIX << 8))
// fid = (PRKD_PREFIX << 8) | (fid & 0xff);
/*uint8_t pfx = fid >> 8;*/
/*if (pfx == PRKD_PREFIX ||
pfx == CD_PREFIX ||
pfx == CA_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX ||
pfx == KEY_PREFIX ||
pfx == EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX ||
pfx == DCOD_PREFIX ||
pfx == DATA_PREFIX ||
pfx == PROT_DATA_PREFIX) {*/
if (fid != 0x0 && !(pe = search_file(fid))) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
/*}*/
if (!pe) {
if (p1 == 0x0) { //Select MF, DF or EF - File identifier or absent
if (apdu.nc == 0) {
pe = (file_t *) MF;
//ac_fini();
}
else if (apdu.nc == 2) {
if (!(pe = search_by_fid(fid, NULL, SPECIFY_ANY))) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
}
}
else if (p1 == 0x01) { //Select child DF - DF identifier
if (!(pe = search_by_fid(fid, currentDF, SPECIFY_DF))) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
}
else if (p1 == 0x02) { //Select EF under the current DF - EF identifier
if (!(pe = search_by_fid(fid, currentDF, SPECIFY_EF))) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
}
else if (p1 == 0x03) { //Select parent DF of the current DF - Absent
if (apdu.nc != 0) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
}
else if (p1 == 0x04) { //Select by DF name - e.g., [truncated] application identifier
if (!(pe = search_by_name(apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc))) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
if (card_terminated) {
return set_res_sw(0x62, 0x85);
}
}
else if (p1 == 0x08) { //Select from the MF - Path without the MF identifier
if (!(pe = search_by_path(apdu.data, (uint8_t)apdu.nc, MF))) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
}
else if (p1 == 0x09) { //Select from the current DF - Path without the current DF identifier
if (!(pe = search_by_path(apdu.data, (uint8_t)apdu.nc, currentDF))) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
}
}
if ((p2 & 0xfc) == 0x00 || (p2 & 0xfc) == 0x04) {
process_fci(pe, 0);
if (pe == file_sc_hsm) {
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = 0x85;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = 5;
uint16_t opts = get_device_options();
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = opts >> 8;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = opts & 0xff;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = 0xFF;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = HSM_VERSION_MAJOR;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = HSM_VERSION_MINOR;
res_APDU[1] = (uint8_t)res_APDU_size - 2;
}
}
else {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
select_file(pe);
return SW_OK();
}

35
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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "random.h"
#include "eac.h"
int cmd_session_pin() {
if (P1(apdu) == 0x01 && P2(apdu) == 0x81) {
memcpy(sm_session_pin, random_bytes_get(8), 8);
sm_session_pin_len = 8;
memcpy(res_APDU, sm_session_pin, sm_session_pin_len);
res_APDU_size = sm_session_pin_len;
apdu.ne = sm_session_pin_len;
}
else {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
return SW_OK();
}

320
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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "crypto_utils.h"
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "asn1.h"
#include "mbedtls/oid.h"
#include "random.h"
#include "mbedtls/eddsa.h"
extern mbedtls_ecp_keypair hd_context;
extern uint8_t hd_keytype;
//-----
/* From OpenSC */
static const uint8_t hdr_md5[] = {
0x30, 0x20, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7,
0x0d, 0x02, 0x05, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x10
};
static const uint8_t hdr_sha1[] = {
0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05, 0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a,
0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14
};
static const uint8_t hdr_sha256[] = {
0x30, 0x31, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65,
0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x20
};
static const uint8_t hdr_sha384[] = {
0x30, 0x41, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65,
0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x30
};
static const uint8_t hdr_sha512[] = {
0x30, 0x51, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65,
0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x40
};
static const uint8_t hdr_sha224[] = {
0x30, 0x2d, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65,
0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x04, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x1c
};
static const uint8_t hdr_ripemd160[] = {
0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05, 0x2b, 0x24, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01,
0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14
};
static const struct digest_info_prefix {
mbedtls_md_type_t algorithm;
const uint8_t *hdr;
uint16_t hdr_len;
uint16_t hash_len;
} digest_info_prefix[] = {
{ MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, hdr_md5, sizeof(hdr_md5), 16 },
{ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, hdr_sha1, sizeof(hdr_sha1), 20 },
{ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, hdr_sha256, sizeof(hdr_sha256), 32 },
{ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, hdr_sha384, sizeof(hdr_sha384), 48 },
{ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, hdr_sha512, sizeof(hdr_sha512), 64 },
{ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, hdr_sha224, sizeof(hdr_sha224), 28 },
{ MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160, hdr_ripemd160, sizeof(hdr_ripemd160), 20 },
{ 0, NULL, 0, 0 }
};
int pkcs1_strip_digest_info_prefix(mbedtls_md_type_t *algorithm,
const uint8_t *in_dat,
uint16_t in_len,
uint8_t *out_dat,
uint16_t *out_len) {
for (int i = 0; digest_info_prefix[i].algorithm != 0; i++) {
uint16_t hdr_len = digest_info_prefix[i].hdr_len, hash_len = digest_info_prefix[i].hash_len;
const uint8_t *hdr = digest_info_prefix[i].hdr;
if (in_len == (hdr_len + hash_len) && !memcmp(in_dat, hdr, hdr_len)) {
if (algorithm) {
*algorithm = digest_info_prefix[i].algorithm;
}
if (out_dat == NULL) {
return PICOKEY_OK;
}
if (*out_len < hash_len) {
return PICOKEY_WRONG_DATA;
}
memmove(out_dat, in_dat + hdr_len, hash_len);
*out_len = hash_len;
return PICOKEY_OK;
}
}
return PICOKEY_EXEC_ERROR;
}
//-----
int cmd_signature() {
uint8_t key_id = P1(apdu);
uint8_t p2 = P2(apdu);
mbedtls_md_type_t md = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;
file_t *fkey;
if (!isUserAuthenticated) {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
if (!(fkey = search_file((KEY_PREFIX << 8) | key_id)) || !file_has_data(fkey)) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
if (get_key_counter(fkey) == 0) {
return SW_FILE_FULL();
}
if (key_has_purpose(fkey, p2) == false) {
return SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
uint16_t key_size = file_get_size(fkey);
if (p2 == ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA1 || p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA1) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;
}
else if (p2 == ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA256 || p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA256) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256;
}
else if (p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA224 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA224 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA224) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224;
}
else if (p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA384 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA384) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384;
}
else if (p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA512 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA512) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512;
}
if (p2 == ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA1 || p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA1 ||
p2 == ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA256 || p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA256 ||
p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA224 || p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA384 || p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA512 ||
p2 == ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA224 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512 ||
p2 == ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA224 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA384 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA512) {
generic_hash(md, apdu.data, apdu.nc, apdu.data);
apdu.nc = mbedtls_md_get_size(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md));
}
if (p2 >= ALGO_RSA_RAW && p2 <= ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA512) {
mbedtls_rsa_context ctx;
mbedtls_rsa_init(&ctx);
int r = load_private_key_rsa(&ctx, fkey);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(&ctx);
if (r == PICOKEY_VERIFICATION_FAILED) {
return SW_SECURE_MESSAGE_EXEC_ERROR();
}
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
asn1_ctx_t hash = {.len = (uint16_t)apdu.nc, .data = apdu.data};
if (p2 == ALGO_RSA_PKCS1) { //DigestInfo attached
uint16_t nc = (uint16_t)apdu.nc;
if (pkcs1_strip_digest_info_prefix(&md, apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc, apdu.data,
&nc) != PICOKEY_OK) { //gets the MD algo id and strips it off
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
apdu.nc = nc;
}
else {
//sc_asn1_print_tags(apdu.data, apdu.nc);
asn1_ctx_t ctxi, ctxo = { 0 }, oid = { 0 };
asn1_ctx_init(apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc, &ctxi);
if (asn1_find_tag(&ctxi, 0x30, &ctxo) && asn1_len(&ctxo) > 0) {
asn1_ctx_t a30 = { 0 };
if (asn1_find_tag(&ctxo, 0x30, &a30) && asn1_len(&a30) > 0) {
asn1_find_tag(&a30, 0x6, &oid);
}
asn1_find_tag(&ctxo, 0x4, &hash);
}
if (asn1_len(&oid)) {
if (memcmp(oid.data, MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA1, oid.len) == 0) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;
}
else if (memcmp(oid.data, MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA224, oid.len) == 0) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224;
}
else if (memcmp(oid.data, MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA256, oid.len) == 0) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256;
}
else if (memcmp(oid.data, MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA384, oid.len) == 0) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384;
}
else if (memcmp(oid.data, MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA512, oid.len) == 0) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512;
}
}
if (p2 >= ALGO_RSA_PSS && p2 <= ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA512) {
if (p2 == ALGO_RSA_PSS && asn1_len(&oid) == 0) {
if (apdu.nc == 20) { //default is sha1
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;
}
else if (apdu.nc == 28) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224;
}
else if (apdu.nc == 32) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256;
}
else if (apdu.nc == 48) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384;
}
else if (apdu.nc == 64) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512;
}
}
mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(&ctx, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21, md);
}
}
if (md == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) {
if (apdu.nc < key_size) { //needs padding
memset(apdu.data + apdu.nc, 0, key_size - apdu.nc);
}
r = mbedtls_rsa_private(&ctx, random_gen, NULL, apdu.data, res_APDU);
}
else {
uint8_t *signature = (uint8_t *) calloc(key_size, sizeof(uint8_t));
r = mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign(&ctx, random_gen, NULL, md, hash.len, hash.data, signature);
memcpy(res_APDU, signature, key_size);
free(signature);
}
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(&ctx);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU_size = key_size;
apdu.ne = key_size;
mbedtls_rsa_free(&ctx);
}
else if (p2 >= ALGO_EC_RAW && p2 <= ALGO_EC_SHA512) {
mbedtls_ecp_keypair ctx;
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(&ctx);
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256;
if (p2 == ALGO_EC_RAW) {
if (apdu.nc == 32) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256;
}
else if (apdu.nc == 20) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;
}
else if (apdu.nc == 28) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224;
}
else if (apdu.nc == 48) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384;
}
else if (apdu.nc == 64) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512;
}
}
if (p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA1) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;
}
else if (p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA224) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224;
}
else if (p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA256) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256;
}
else if (p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA384) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384;
}
else if (p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA512) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512;
}
int r = load_private_key_ec(&ctx, fkey);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
if (r == PICOKEY_VERIFICATION_FAILED) {
return SW_SECURE_MESSAGE_EXEC_ERROR();
}
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
size_t olen = 0;
uint8_t buf[MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN];
if (ctx.grp.id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_ED25519 || ctx.grp.id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_ED448) {
r = mbedtls_eddsa_write_signature(&ctx, apdu.data, apdu.nc, buf, sizeof(buf), &olen, MBEDTLS_EDDSA_PURE, NULL, 0, random_gen, NULL);
}
else {
r = mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature(&ctx, md, apdu.data, apdu.nc, buf, MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN,
&olen, random_gen, NULL);
}
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
memcpy(res_APDU, buf, olen);
res_APDU_size = (uint16_t)olen;
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
}
else if (p2 == ALGO_HD) {
size_t olen = 0;
uint8_t buf[MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN] = {0};
if (hd_context.grp.id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&hd_context);
return SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
if (hd_keytype != 0x1 && hd_keytype != 0x2) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&hd_context);
return SW_INCORRECT_PARAMS();
}
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256;
if (mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature(&hd_context, md, apdu.data, apdu.nc, buf,
MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN,
&olen, random_gen, NULL) != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&hd_context);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
memcpy(res_APDU, buf, olen);
res_APDU_size = (uint16_t)olen;
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&hd_context);
hd_keytype = 0;
}
else {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
decrement_key_counter(fkey);
return SW_OK();
}

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/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "asn1.h"
extern void select_file(file_t *pe);
int cmd_update_ef() {
uint8_t p1 = P1(apdu), p2 = P2(apdu);
uint16_t fid = (p1 << 8) | p2;
uint8_t *data = NULL;
uint16_t offset = 0;
uint16_t data_len = 0;
file_t *ef = NULL;
if (!isUserAuthenticated) {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
if (fid == 0x0) {
ef = currentEF;
}
/*
// This should not happen
else if (p1 != EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX && p1 != PRKD_PREFIX && p1 != CA_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX &&
p1 != CD_PREFIX && p1 != DATA_PREFIX && p1 != DCOD_PREFIX &&
p1 != PROT_DATA_PREFIX) {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
*/
if (ef && !authenticate_action(ef, ACL_OP_UPDATE_ERASE)) {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
uint16_t tag = 0x0;
uint8_t *tag_data = NULL, *p = NULL;
uint16_t tag_len = 0;
asn1_ctx_t ctxi;
asn1_ctx_init(apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc, &ctxi);
while (walk_tlv(&ctxi, &p, &tag, &tag_len, &tag_data)) {
if (tag == 0x54) { //ofset tag
for (size_t i = 1; i <= tag_len; i++) {
offset |= (*tag_data++ << (8 * (tag_len - i)));
}
}
else if (tag == 0x53) { //data
data_len = (uint16_t)tag_len;
data = tag_data;
}
}
if (data_len == 0 && offset == 0) { //new file
ef = file_new(fid);
//if ((fid & 0xff00) == (EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX << 8))
// add_file_to_chain(ef, &ef_pukdf);
select_file(ef);
}
else {
if (fid == 0x0 && !ef) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
else if (fid != 0x0 && !(ef = search_file(fid))) { //if does not exist, create it
//return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
ef = file_new(fid);
}
if (offset == 0) {
int r = file_put_data(ef, data, data_len);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_MEMORY_FAILURE();
}
}
else {
if (!file_has_data(ef)) {
return SW_DATA_INVALID();
}
uint8_t *data_merge = (uint8_t *) calloc(1, offset + data_len);
memcpy(data_merge, file_get_data(ef), offset);
memcpy(data_merge + offset, data, data_len);
int r = file_put_data(ef, data_merge, offset + data_len);
free(data_merge);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
return SW_MEMORY_FAILURE();
}
}
low_flash_available();
}
return SW_OK();
}

66
src/hsm/cmd_verify.c Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "sc_hsm.h"
int cmd_verify() {
uint8_t p1 = P1(apdu);
uint8_t p2 = P2(apdu);
if (p1 != 0x0 || (p2 & 0x60) != 0x0) {
return SW_WRONG_P1P2();
}
if (p2 == 0x81) { //UserPin
uint16_t opts = get_device_options();
if (opts & HSM_OPT_TRANSPORT_PIN) {
return SW_DATA_INVALID();
}
if (has_session_pin && apdu.nc == 0) {
return SW_OK();
}
if (*file_get_data(file_pin1) == 0 && pka_enabled() == false) { //not initialized
return SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND();
}
if (apdu.nc > 0) {
return check_pin(file_pin1, apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc);
}
if (file_read_uint8(file_retries_pin1) == 0) {
return SW_PIN_BLOCKED();
}
return set_res_sw(0x63, 0xc0 | file_read_uint8(file_retries_pin1));
}
else if (p2 == 0x88) { //SOPin
if (file_read_uint8(file_sopin) == 0) { //not initialized
return SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND();
}
if (apdu.nc > 0) {
return check_pin(file_sopin, apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc);
}
if (file_read_uint8(file_retries_sopin) == 0) {
return SW_PIN_BLOCKED();
}
if (has_session_sopin) {
return SW_OK();
}
return set_res_sw(0x63, 0xc0 | file_read_uint8(file_retries_sopin));
}
else if (p2 == 0x85) {
return SW_OK();
}
return SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND();
}

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -1,17 +1,17 @@
/*
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
@@ -19,33 +19,87 @@
#define _CVC_H_
#include <stdlib.h>
#if !defined(ENABLE_EMULATION) && !defined(ESP_PLATFORM)
#include "pico/stdlib.h"
#else
#include <stdbool.h>
#endif
#include "mbedtls/ecp.h"
typedef struct PUK {
const uint8_t *puk;
size_t puk_len;
uint16_t puk_len;
const uint8_t *car;
size_t car_len;
uint16_t car_len;
const uint8_t *chr;
size_t chr_len;
uint16_t chr_len;
const uint8_t *cvcert;
size_t cvcert_len;
uint16_t cvcert_len;
bool copied;
} PUK;
#define MAX_PUK_STORE_ENTRIES 4
extern size_t asn1_cvc_cert(void *rsa_ecdsa, uint8_t key_type, uint8_t *buf, size_t buf_len);
extern size_t asn1_cvc_aut(void *rsa_ecdsa, uint8_t key_type, uint8_t *buf, size_t buf_len);
extern size_t asn1_build_cert_description(const uint8_t *label, size_t label_len, const uint8_t *puk, size_t puk_len, uint16_t fid, uint8_t *buf, size_t buf_len);
extern const uint8_t *cvc_get_field(const uint8_t *data, size_t len, size_t *olen, uint16_t tag);
extern const uint8_t *cvc_get_car(const uint8_t *data, size_t len, size_t *olen);
extern const uint8_t *cvc_get_chr(const uint8_t *data, size_t len, size_t *olen);
extern const uint8_t *cvc_get_pub(const uint8_t *data, size_t len, size_t *olen);
extern int cvc_verify(const uint8_t *cert, size_t cert_len, const uint8_t *ca, size_t ca_len);
extern mbedtls_ecp_group_id cvc_inherite_ec_group(const uint8_t *ca, size_t ca_len);
extern int puk_verify(const uint8_t *sig, size_t sig_len, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_len, const uint8_t *ca, size_t ca_len);
extern size_t asn1_build_prkd_ecc(const uint8_t *label, size_t label_len, const uint8_t *keyid, size_t keyid_len, size_t keysize, uint8_t *buf, size_t buf_len);
extern uint16_t asn1_cvc_cert(void *rsa_ecdsa,
uint8_t key_type,
uint8_t *buf,
uint16_t buf_len,
const uint8_t *ext,
uint16_t ext_len,
bool full);
extern uint16_t asn1_cvc_aut(void *rsa_ecdsa,
uint8_t key_type,
uint8_t *buf,
uint16_t buf_len,
const uint8_t *ext,
uint16_t ext_len);
extern uint16_t asn1_build_cert_description(const uint8_t *label,
uint16_t label_len,
const uint8_t *puk,
uint16_t puk_len,
uint16_t fid,
uint8_t *buf,
uint16_t buf_len);
extern const uint8_t *cvc_get_field(const uint8_t *data, uint16_t len, uint16_t *olen, uint16_t tag);
extern const uint8_t *cvc_get_car(const uint8_t *data, uint16_t len, uint16_t *olen);
extern const uint8_t *cvc_get_chr(const uint8_t *data, uint16_t len, uint16_t *olen);
extern const uint8_t *cvc_get_pub(const uint8_t *data, uint16_t len, uint16_t *olen);
extern const uint8_t *cvc_get_ext(const uint8_t *data, uint16_t len, uint16_t *olen);
extern int cvc_verify(const uint8_t *cert, uint16_t cert_len, const uint8_t *ca, uint16_t ca_len);
extern mbedtls_ecp_group_id cvc_inherite_ec_group(const uint8_t *ca, uint16_t ca_len);
extern int puk_verify(const uint8_t *sig,
uint16_t sig_len,
const uint8_t *hash,
uint16_t hash_len,
const uint8_t *ca,
uint16_t ca_len);
extern uint16_t asn1_build_prkd_ecc(const uint8_t *label,
uint16_t label_len,
const uint8_t *keyid,
uint16_t keyid_len,
uint16_t keysize,
uint8_t *buf,
uint16_t buf_len);
extern uint16_t asn1_build_prkd_rsa(const uint8_t *label,
uint16_t label_len,
const uint8_t *keyid,
uint16_t keyid_len,
uint16_t keysize,
uint8_t *buf,
uint16_t buf_len);
extern uint16_t asn1_build_prkd_aes(const uint8_t *label,
uint16_t label_len,
const uint8_t *keyid,
uint16_t keyid_len,
uint16_t keysize,
uint8_t *buf,
uint16_t buf_len);
extern uint16_t asn1_build_prkd_generic(const uint8_t *label,
uint16_t label_len,
const uint8_t *keyid,
uint16_t keyid_len,
uint16_t keysize,
int key_tpe,
uint8_t *buf,
uint16_t buf_len);
#endif

View File

@@ -1,511 +0,0 @@
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include <string.h>
#include "common.h"
#include "stdlib.h"
#include "pico/stdlib.h"
#include "dkek.h"
#include "crypto_utils.h"
#include "random.h"
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "mbedtls/md.h"
#include "mbedtls/cmac.h"
#include "mbedtls/rsa.h"
#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h"
#include "files.h"
extern bool has_session_pin;
extern uint8_t session_pin[32];
#define POLY 0xedb88320
uint32_t crc32c(const uint8_t *buf, size_t len)
{
uint32_t crc = ~0;
while (len--) {
crc ^= *buf++;
for (int k = 0; k < 8; k++)
crc = (crc >> 1) ^ (POLY & (0 - (crc & 1)));
}
return ~crc;
}
int load_dkek(uint8_t id, uint8_t *dkek) {
if (has_session_pin == false)
return CCID_NO_LOGIN;
file_t *tf = search_dynamic_file(EF_DKEK+id);
if (!tf)
return CCID_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
memcpy(dkek, file_get_data(tf), DKEK_SIZE);
int ret = aes_decrypt_cfb_256(session_pin, DKEK_IV(dkek), DKEK_KEY(dkek), DKEK_KEY_SIZE+DKEK_KEY_CS_SIZE);
if (ret != 0)
return CCID_EXEC_ERROR;
if (crc32c(DKEK_KEY(dkek), DKEK_KEY_SIZE) != *(uint32_t*)DKEK_CHECKSUM(dkek))
return CCID_WRONG_DKEK;
return CCID_OK;
}
void release_dkek(uint8_t *dkek) {
memset(dkek, 0, DKEK_SIZE);
}
int store_dkek_key(uint8_t id, uint8_t *dkek) {
file_t *tf = search_dynamic_file(EF_DKEK+id);
if (!tf)
return CCID_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
*(uint32_t*)DKEK_CHECKSUM(dkek) = crc32c(DKEK_KEY(dkek), DKEK_KEY_SIZE);
aes_encrypt_cfb_256(session_pin, DKEK_IV(dkek), DKEK_KEY(dkek), DKEK_KEY_SIZE+DKEK_KEY_CS_SIZE);
flash_write_data_to_file(tf, dkek, DKEK_SIZE);
low_flash_available();
release_dkek(dkek);
return CCID_OK;
}
int save_dkek_key(uint8_t id, const uint8_t *key) {
uint8_t dkek[DKEK_SIZE];
const uint8_t *iv = random_bytes_get(32);
memcpy(dkek, iv, DKEK_IV_SIZE);
if (!key) {
file_t *tf = search_dynamic_file(EF_DKEK+id);
if (!tf)
return CCID_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
memcpy(DKEK_KEY(dkek), file_get_data(tf), DKEK_KEY_SIZE);
}
else
memcpy(DKEK_KEY(dkek), key, DKEK_KEY_SIZE);
return store_dkek_key(id, dkek);
}
int import_dkek_share(uint8_t id, const uint8_t *share) {
uint8_t tmp_dkek[DKEK_KEY_SIZE];
file_t *tf = search_dynamic_file(EF_DKEK+id);
if (!tf)
return CCID_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
memset(tmp_dkek, 0, sizeof(tmp_dkek));
if (file_get_size(tf) == DKEK_KEY_SIZE)
memcpy(tmp_dkek, file_get_data(tf),DKEK_KEY_SIZE);
for (int i = 0; i < DKEK_KEY_SIZE; i++)
tmp_dkek[i] ^= share[i];
flash_write_data_to_file(tf, tmp_dkek, DKEK_KEY_SIZE);
low_flash_available();
return CCID_OK;
}
int dkek_kcv(uint8_t id, uint8_t *kcv) { //kcv 8 bytes
uint8_t hsh[32], dkek[DKEK_SIZE];
int r = load_dkek(id, dkek);
if (r != CCID_OK)
return r;
hash256(DKEK_KEY(dkek), DKEK_KEY_SIZE, hsh);
release_dkek(dkek);
memcpy(kcv, hsh, 8);
return CCID_OK;
}
int dkek_kenc(uint8_t id, uint8_t *kenc) { //kenc 32 bytes
uint8_t dkek[DKEK_SIZE+4];
int r = load_dkek(id, dkek);
if (r != CCID_OK)
return r;
memcpy(DKEK_KEY(dkek)+DKEK_KEY_SIZE, "\x0\x0\x0\x1", 4);
hash256(DKEK_KEY(dkek), DKEK_KEY_SIZE+4, kenc);
release_dkek(dkek);
return CCID_OK;
}
int dkek_kmac(uint8_t id, uint8_t *kmac) { //kmac 32 bytes
uint8_t dkek[DKEK_SIZE+4];
int r = load_dkek(id, dkek);
if (r != CCID_OK)
return r;
memcpy(DKEK_KEY(dkek)+DKEK_KEY_SIZE, "\x0\x0\x0\x2", 4);
hash256(DKEK_KEY(dkek), DKEK_KEY_SIZE+4, kmac);
release_dkek(dkek);
return CCID_OK;
}
int dkek_encrypt(uint8_t id, uint8_t *data, size_t len) {
int r;
uint8_t dkek[DKEK_SIZE+4];
if ((r = load_dkek(id, dkek)) != CCID_OK)
return r;
r = aes_encrypt_cfb_256(DKEK_KEY(dkek), DKEK_IV(dkek), data, len);
release_dkek(dkek);
return r;
}
int dkek_decrypt(uint8_t id, uint8_t *data, size_t len) {
int r;
uint8_t dkek[DKEK_SIZE+4];
if ((r = load_dkek(id, dkek)) != CCID_OK)
return r;
r = aes_decrypt_cfb_256(DKEK_KEY(dkek), DKEK_IV(dkek), data, len);
release_dkek(dkek);
return r;
}
int dkek_encode_key(uint8_t id, void *key_ctx, int key_type, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len) {
if (!(key_type & HSM_KEY_RSA) && !(key_type & HSM_KEY_EC) && !(key_type & HSM_KEY_AES))
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
uint8_t kb[8+2*4+2*4096/8+3+13]; //worst case: RSA-4096 (plus, 13 bytes padding)
memset(kb, 0, sizeof(kb));
int kb_len = 0, r = 0;
uint8_t *algo = NULL;
uint8_t algo_len = 0;
uint8_t *allowed = NULL;
uint8_t allowed_len = 0;
uint8_t kenc[32];
memset(kenc, 0, sizeof(kenc));
r = dkek_kenc(id, kenc);
if (r != CCID_OK)
return r;
uint8_t kcv[8];
memset(kcv, 0, sizeof(kcv));
r = dkek_kcv(id, kcv);
if (r != CCID_OK)
return r;
uint8_t kmac[32];
memset(kmac, 0, sizeof(kmac));
r = dkek_kmac(id, kmac);
if (r != CCID_OK)
return r;
if (key_type & HSM_KEY_AES) {
if (key_type & HSM_KEY_AES_128)
kb_len = 16;
else if (key_type & HSM_KEY_AES_192)
kb_len = 24;
else if (key_type & HSM_KEY_AES_256)
kb_len = 32;
if (kb_len != 16 && kb_len != 24 && kb_len != 32)
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
if (*out_len < 8+1+10+6+4+(2+32+14)+16)
return CCID_WRONG_LENGTH;
put_uint16_t(kb_len, kb+8);
memcpy(kb+10, key_ctx, kb_len);
kb_len += 2;
algo = (uint8_t *)"\x00\x08\x60\x86\x48\x01\x65\x03\x04\x01"; //2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1 (2+8)
algo_len = 10;
allowed = (uint8_t *)"\x00\x04\x10\x11\x18\x99"; //(2+4)
allowed_len = 6;
}
else if (key_type & HSM_KEY_RSA) {
if (*out_len < 8+1+12+6+(8+2*4+2*4096/8+3+13)+16) //13 bytes pading
return CCID_WRONG_LENGTH;
mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *)key_ctx;
kb_len = 0;
put_uint16_t(mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa)*8, kb+8+kb_len); kb_len += 2;
put_uint16_t(mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->D), kb+8+kb_len); kb_len += 2;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&rsa->D, kb+8+kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->D)); kb_len += mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->D);
put_uint16_t(mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->N), kb+8+kb_len); kb_len += 2;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&rsa->N, kb+8+kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->N)); kb_len += mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->N);
put_uint16_t(mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->E), kb+8+kb_len); kb_len += 2;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&rsa->E, kb+8+kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->E)); kb_len += mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->E);
algo = (uint8_t *)"\x00\x0A\x04\x00\x7F\x00\x07\x02\x02\x02\x01\x02";
algo_len = 12;
}
else if (key_type & HSM_KEY_EC) {
if (*out_len < 8+1+12+6+(8+2*8+9*66+2+4)+16) //4 bytes pading
return CCID_WRONG_LENGTH;
mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ecdsa = (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *)key_ctx;
kb_len = 0;
put_uint16_t(mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.P)*8, kb+8+kb_len); kb_len += 2;
put_uint16_t(mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.A), kb+8+kb_len); kb_len += 2;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp.A, kb+8+kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.A)); kb_len += mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.A);
put_uint16_t(mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.B), kb+8+kb_len); kb_len += 2;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp.B, kb+8+kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.B)); kb_len += mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.B);
put_uint16_t(mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.P), kb+8+kb_len); kb_len += 2;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp.P, kb+8+kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.P)); kb_len += mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.P);
put_uint16_t(mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.N), kb+8+kb_len); kb_len += 2;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp.N, kb+8+kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.N)); kb_len += mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.N);
put_uint16_t(1+mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.G.X)+mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.G.Y), kb+8+kb_len); kb_len += 2;
kb[8+kb_len++] = 0x4;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp.G.X, kb+8+kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.G.X)); kb_len += mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.G.X);
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp.G.Y, kb+8+kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.G.Y)); kb_len += mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.G.Y);
put_uint16_t(mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->d), kb+8+kb_len); kb_len += 2;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->d, kb+8+kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->d)); kb_len += mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->d);
put_uint16_t(1+mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->Q.X)+mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->Q.Y), kb+8+kb_len); kb_len += 2;
kb[8+kb_len++] = 0x4;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->Q.X, kb+8+kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->Q.X)); kb_len += mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->Q.X);
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->Q.Y, kb+8+kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->Q.Y)); kb_len += mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->Q.Y);
algo = (uint8_t *)"\x00\x0A\x04\x00\x7F\x00\x07\x02\x02\x02\x02\x03";
algo_len = 12;
}
memset(out, 0, *out_len);
*out_len = 0;
memcpy(out+*out_len, kcv, 8);
*out_len += 8;
if (key_type & HSM_KEY_AES)
out[*out_len] = 15;
else if (key_type & HSM_KEY_RSA)
out[*out_len] = 5;
else if (key_type & HSM_KEY_EC)
out[*out_len] = 12;
*out_len += 1;
if (algo) {
memcpy(out+*out_len, algo, algo_len);
*out_len += algo_len;
}
else
*out_len += 2;
if (allowed) {
memcpy(out+*out_len, allowed, allowed_len);
*out_len += allowed_len;
}
else
*out_len += 2;
//add 4 zeros
*out_len += 4;
memcpy(kb, random_bytes_get(8), 8);
kb_len += 8; //8 random bytes
int kb_len_pad = ((int)(kb_len/16))*16;
if (kb_len % 16 > 0)
kb_len_pad = ((int)(kb_len/16)+1)*16;
//key already copied at kb+10
if (kb_len < kb_len_pad) {
kb[kb_len] = 0x80;
}
r = aes_encrypt(kenc, NULL, 256, HSM_AES_MODE_CBC, kb, kb_len_pad);
if (r != CCID_OK)
return r;
memcpy(out+*out_len, kb, kb_len_pad);
*out_len += kb_len_pad;
r = mbedtls_cipher_cmac(mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB), kmac, 256, out, *out_len, out+*out_len);
*out_len += 16;
if (r != 0)
return r;
return CCID_OK;
}
int dkek_type_key(const uint8_t *in) {
if (in[8] == 5 || in[8] == 6)
return HSM_KEY_RSA;
else if (in[8] == 12)
return HSM_KEY_EC;
else if (in[8] == 15)
return HSM_KEY_AES;
return 0x0;
}
int dkek_decode_key(uint8_t id, void *key_ctx, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, int *key_size_out) {
uint8_t kcv[8];
int r = 0;
memset(kcv, 0, sizeof(kcv));
r = dkek_kcv(id, kcv);
if (r != CCID_OK)
return r;
uint8_t kmac[32];
memset(kmac, 0, sizeof(kmac));
r = dkek_kmac(id, kmac);
if (r != CCID_OK)
return r;
uint8_t kenc[32];
memset(kenc, 0, sizeof(kenc));
r = dkek_kenc(id, kenc);
if (r != CCID_OK)
return r;
if (memcmp(kcv, in, 8) != 0)
return CCID_WRONG_DKEK;
uint8_t signature[16];
r = mbedtls_cipher_cmac(mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB), kmac, 256, in, in_len-16, signature);
if (r != 0)
return CCID_WRONG_SIGNATURE;
if (memcmp(signature, in+in_len-16, 16) != 0)
return CCID_WRONG_SIGNATURE;
int key_type = in[8];
if (key_type != 5 && key_type != 6 && key_type != 12 && key_type != 15)
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
if ((key_type == 5 || key_type == 6) && memcmp(in+9, "\x00\x0A\x04\x00\x7F\x00\x07\x02\x02\x02\x01\x02", 12) != 0)
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
if (key_type == 12 && memcmp(in+9, "\x00\x0A\x04\x00\x7F\x00\x07\x02\x02\x02\x02\x03", 12) != 0)
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
if (key_type == 15 && memcmp(in+9, "\x00\x08\x60\x86\x48\x01\x65\x03\x04\x01", 10) != 0)
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
size_t ofs = 9;
//OID
size_t len = get_uint16_t(in, ofs);
ofs += len+2;
//Allowed algorithms
len = get_uint16_t(in, ofs);
ofs += len+2;
//Access conditions
len = get_uint16_t(in, ofs);
ofs += len+2;
//Key OID
len = get_uint16_t(in, ofs);
ofs += len+2;
if ((in_len-16-ofs) % 16 != 0)
return CCID_WRONG_PADDING;
uint8_t kb[8+2*4+2*4096/8+3+13]; //worst case: RSA-4096 (plus, 13 bytes padding)
memset(kb, 0, sizeof(kb));
memcpy(kb, in+ofs, in_len-16-ofs);
r = aes_decrypt(kenc, NULL, 256, HSM_AES_MODE_CBC, kb, in_len-16-ofs);
if (r != CCID_OK)
return r;
int key_size = get_uint16_t(kb, 8);
if (key_size_out)
*key_size_out = key_size;
ofs = 10;
if (key_type == 5 || key_type == 6) {
mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *)key_ctx;
mbedtls_rsa_init(rsa);
if (key_type == 5) {
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += 2;
r = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&rsa->D, kb+ofs, len); ofs += len;
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa);
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
}
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += 2;
r = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&rsa->N, kb+ofs, len); ofs += len;
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa);
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
}
}
else if (key_type == 6) {
//DP-1
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += len+2;
//DQ-1
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += len+2;
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += 2;
r = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&rsa->P, kb+ofs, len); ofs += len;
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa);
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
}
//PQ
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += len+2;
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += 2;
r = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&rsa->Q, kb+ofs, len); ofs += len;
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa);
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
}
//N
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += len+2;
}
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += 2;
r = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&rsa->E, kb+ofs, len); ofs += len;
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa);
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
}
if (key_type == 5) {
r = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, &rsa->N, NULL, NULL, &rsa->D, &rsa->E);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa);
return CCID_EXEC_ERROR;
}
}
else if (key_type == 6) {
r = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, NULL, &rsa->P, &rsa->Q, NULL, &rsa->E);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa);
return CCID_EXEC_ERROR;
}
}
r = mbedtls_rsa_complete(rsa);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa);
return CCID_EXEC_ERROR;
}
r = mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey(rsa);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa);
return CCID_EXEC_ERROR;
}
}
else if (key_type == 12) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ecdsa = (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *)key_ctx;
mbedtls_ecdsa_init(ecdsa);
//A
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += len+2;
//B
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += len+2;
//P
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += 2;
mbedtls_ecp_group_id ec_id = ec_get_curve_from_prime(kb+ofs, len);
if (ec_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(ecdsa);
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
}
ofs += len;
//N
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += len+2;
//G
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += len+2;
//d
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += 2;
r = mbedtls_ecp_read_key(ec_id, ecdsa, kb+ofs, len);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(ecdsa);
return CCID_EXEC_ERROR;
}
}
else if (key_type == 15) {
memcpy(key_ctx, kb+ofs, key_size);
}
return CCID_OK;
}

View File

@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#ifndef _DKEK_H_
#define _DKEK_H_
extern int load_dkek(uint8_t, uint8_t *);
extern int save_dkek_key(uint8_t, const uint8_t *key);
extern int store_dkek_key(uint8_t, uint8_t *);
extern void init_dkek();
extern void release_dkek(uint8_t *);
extern int import_dkek_share(uint8_t, const uint8_t *share);
extern int dkek_kcv(uint8_t, uint8_t *kcv);
extern int dkek_encrypt(uint8_t, uint8_t *data, size_t len);
extern int dkek_decrypt(uint8_t, uint8_t *data, size_t len);
extern int dkek_encode_key(uint8_t, void *key_ctx, int key_type, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len);
extern int dkek_type_key(const uint8_t *in);
extern int dkek_decode_key(uint8_t, void *key_ctx, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, int *key_size_out);
#define MAX_DKEK_ENCODE_KEY_BUFFER (8+1+12+6+(8+2*4+2*4096/8+3+13)+16)
#define MAX_KEY_DOMAINS 16
#define DKEK_IV_SIZE (IV_SIZE)
#define DKEK_KEY_SIZE (32)
#define DKEK_KEY_CS_SIZE (4)
#define DKEK_SIZE (DKEK_IV_SIZE+DKEK_KEY_SIZE+DKEK_KEY_CS_SIZE)
#define DKEK_KEY(p) (p+DKEK_IV_SIZE)
#define DKEK_IV(p) (p)
#define DKEK_CHECKSUM(p) (p+DKEK_IV_SIZE+DKEK_KEY_SIZE)
#endif

View File

@@ -1,17 +1,17 @@
/*
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
@@ -19,47 +19,98 @@
extern const uint8_t sc_hsm_aid[];
extern int parse_token_info(const file_t *f, int mode);
extern int parse_cvca(const file_t *f, int mode);
extern int parse_ef_dir(const file_t *f, int mode);
file_t file_entries[] = {
/* 0 */ { .fid = 0x3f00 , .parent = 0xff, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_DF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = 0, .acl = {0} }, // MF
/* 1 */ { .fid = 0x2f00 , .parent = 0, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} }, //EF.DIR
/* 2 */ { .fid = 0x2f01 , .parent = 0, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} }, //EF.ATR
/* 3 */ { .fid = 0x2f02 , .parent = 0, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF | FILE_DATA_FUNC,.data = (uint8_t *)parse_cvca, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} }, //EF.GDO
/* 4 */ { .fid = 0x2f03 , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF | FILE_DATA_FUNC,.data = (uint8_t *)parse_token_info, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} }, //EF.TokenInfo
/* 5 */ { .fid = 0x5015 , .parent = 0, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_DF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = 0, .acl = {0} }, //DF.PKCS15
/* 6 */ { .fid = 0x5031 , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} }, //EF.ODF
/* 7 */ { .fid = 0x5032 , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} }, //EF.TokenInfo
/* 8 */ { .fid = 0x5033 , .parent = 0, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} }, //EF.UnusedSpace
/* 9 */ { .fid = 0x1081 , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0xff} }, //PIN (PIN1)
/* 10 */ { .fid = 0x1082 , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0xff} }, //max retries PIN (PIN1)
/* 11 */ { .fid = 0x1083 , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0xff} }, //retries PIN (PIN1)
/* 12 */ { .fid = 0x1088 , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0xff} }, //PIN (SOPIN)
/* 13 */ { .fid = 0x1089 , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0xff} }, //max retries PIN (SOPIN)
/* 14 */ { .fid = 0x108A , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0xff} }, //retries PIN (SOPIN)
/* 15 */ { .fid = EF_DEVOPS , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0xff} }, //Device options
/* 16 */ { .fid = EF_PRKDFS , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} }, //EF.PrKDFs
/* 17 */ { .fid = EF_PUKDFS , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} }, //EF.PuKDFs
/* 18 */ { .fid = EF_CDFS , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} }, //EF.CDFs
/* 19 */ { .fid = EF_AODFS , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} }, //EF.AODFs
/* 20 */ { .fid = EF_DODFS , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} }, //EF.DODFs
/* 21 */ { .fid = EF_SKDFS , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} }, //EF.SKDFs
/* 22 */ { .fid = EF_KEY_DOMAIN, .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0xff} }, //Key domain options
/* 23 */ { .fid = EF_META , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0xff} }, //EF.CDFs
/* 24 */ { .fid = EF_PUKAUT, .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0xff} }, //Public Key Authentication
/* 25 */ { .fid = EF_KEY_DEV, .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0xff} }, //Device Key
/* 26 */ { .fid = EF_PRKD_DEV, .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0xff} }, //PrKD Device
/* 27 */ { .fid = EF_EE_DEV, .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0xff} }, //End Entity Certificate Device
///* 28 */ { .fid = 0x0000, .parent = 0, .name = openpgpcard_aid, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} },
/* 29 */ { .fid = 0x0000, .parent = 5, .name = sc_hsm_aid, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} },
/* 30 */ { .fid = 0x0000, .parent = 0xff, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_UNKNOWN, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = 0, .acl = {0} } //end
/* 0 */ { .fid = 0x3f00, .parent = 0xff, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_DF, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = 0, .acl = { 0 } }, // MF
/* 1 */ { .fid = 0x2f00, .parent = 0, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF | FILE_DATA_FUNC, .data = (uint8_t *) parse_ef_dir,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0 } }, //EF.DIR
/* 2 */ { .fid = 0x2f01, .parent = 0, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0 } }, //EF.ATR
/* 3 */ { .fid = EF_TERMCA, .parent = 0, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH | FILE_PERSISTENT, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0 } }, //EF.GDO
/* 4 */ { .fid = 0x2f03, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF | FILE_DATA_FUNC, .data = (uint8_t *) parse_token_info,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0 } }, //EF.TokenInfo
/* 5 */ { .fid = 0x5015, .parent = 0, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_DF, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = 0, .acl = { 0 } }, //DF.PKCS15
/* 6 */ { .fid = 0x5031, .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0 } }, //EF.ODF
/* 7 */ { .fid = 0x5032, .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0 } }, //EF.TokenInfo
/* 8 */ { .fid = 0x5033, .parent = 0, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0 } }, //EF.UnusedSpace
/* 9 */ { .fid = EF_PIN1, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0xff } }, //PIN (PIN1)
/* 10 */ { .fid = EF_PIN1_MAX_RETRIES, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0xff } }, //max retries PIN (PIN1)
/* 11 */ { .fid = EF_PIN1_RETRIES, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0xff } }, //retries PIN (PIN1)
/* 12 */ { .fid = EF_SOPIN, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0xff } }, //PIN (SOPIN)
/* 13 */ { .fid = EF_SOPIN_MAX_RETRIES, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0xff } }, //max retries PIN (SOPIN)
/* 14 */ { .fid = EF_SOPIN_RETRIES, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0xff } }, //retries PIN (SOPIN)
/* 15 */ { .fid = EF_DEVOPS, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0xff } }, //Device options
/* 16 */ { .fid = EF_PRKDFS, .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF,
.data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0 } }, //EF.PrKDFs
/* 17 */ { .fid = EF_PUKDFS, .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF,
.data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0 } }, //EF.PuKDFs
/* 18 */ { .fid = EF_CDFS, .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF,
.data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0 } }, //EF.CDFs
/* 19 */ { .fid = EF_AODFS, .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF,
.data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0 } }, //EF.AODFs
/* 20 */ { .fid = EF_DODFS, .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF,
.data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0 } }, //EF.DODFs
/* 21 */ { .fid = EF_SKDFS, .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF,
.data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0 } }, //EF.SKDFs
/* 22 */ { .fid = EF_KEY_DOMAIN, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0xff } }, //Key domain options
/* 23 */ { .fid = EF_META, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0xff } }, //EF.CDFs
/* 24 */ { .fid = EF_PUKAUT, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0xff } }, //Public Key Authentication
/* 25 */ { .fid = EF_KEY_DEV, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH | FILE_PERSISTENT, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0xff } }, //Device Key
/* 26 */ { .fid = EF_PRKD_DEV, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH | FILE_PERSISTENT, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0xff } }, //PrKD Device
/* 27 */ { .fid = EF_EE_DEV, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH | FILE_PERSISTENT, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0xff } }, //End Entity Certificate Device
/* 28 */ { .fid = EF_MKEK, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH | FILE_PERSISTENT, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0xff } }, //MKEK
/* 29 */ { .fid = EF_MKEK_SO, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH | FILE_PERSISTENT, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0xff } }, //MKEK with SO-PIN
///* 30 */ { .fid = 0x0000, .parent = 0, .name = openpgpcard_aid, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} },
/* 31 */ { .fid = 0x0000, .parent = 5, .name = sc_hsm_aid, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF,
.data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0 } },
/* 32 */ { .fid = 0x0000, .parent = 0xff, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_NOT_KNOWN, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = 0, .acl = { 0 } } //end
};
const file_t *MF = &file_entries[0];
const file_t *file_last = &file_entries[sizeof(file_entries)/sizeof(file_t)-1];
const file_t *file_openpgp = &file_entries[sizeof(file_entries)/sizeof(file_t)-3];
const file_t *file_sc_hsm = &file_entries[sizeof(file_entries)/sizeof(file_t)-2];
const file_t *file_last = &file_entries[sizeof(file_entries) / sizeof(file_t) - 1];
const file_t *file_openpgp = &file_entries[sizeof(file_entries) / sizeof(file_t) - 3];
const file_t *file_sc_hsm = &file_entries[sizeof(file_entries) / sizeof(file_t) - 2];
file_t *file_pin1 = NULL;
file_t *file_retries_pin1 = NULL;
file_t *file_sopin = NULL;
file_t *file_retries_sopin = NULL;
file_t *file_retries_sopin = NULL;

View File

@@ -1,17 +1,17 @@
/*
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
@@ -22,10 +22,20 @@
#include "file.h"
#define EF_DEVOPS 0x100E
#define EF_MKEK 0x100A
#define EF_MKEK_SO 0x100B
#define EF_XKEK 0x1070
#define EF_PIN1 0x1081
#define EF_PIN1_MAX_RETRIES 0x1082
#define EF_PIN1_RETRIES 0x1083
#define EF_SOPIN 0x1088
#define EF_SOPIN_MAX_RETRIES 0x1089
#define EF_SOPIN_RETRIES 0x108A
#define EF_DKEK 0x1090
#define EF_KEY_DOMAIN 0x10A0
#define EF_PUKAUT 0x10C0
#define EF_PUK 0X10D0
#define EF_PUK 0x10D0
#define EF_MASTER_SEED 0x1110
#define EF_PRKDFS 0x6040
#define EF_PUKDFS 0x6041
#define EF_CDFS 0x6042
@@ -37,9 +47,13 @@
#define EF_PRKD_DEV 0xC400
#define EF_EE_DEV 0xCE00
#define EF_TERMCA 0x2F02
#define EF_TOKENINFO 0x2F03
#define EF_STATICTOKEN 0xCB00
extern file_t *file_pin1;
extern file_t *file_retries_pin1;
extern file_t *file_sopin;
extern file_t *file_retries_sopin;
#endif
#endif

697
src/hsm/kek.c Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,697 @@
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "stdlib.h"
#if !defined(ENABLE_EMULATION) && !defined(ESP_PLATFORM)
#include "pico/stdlib.h"
#endif
#include "kek.h"
#include "crypto_utils.h"
#include "random.h"
#include "mbedtls/md.h"
#include "mbedtls/cmac.h"
#include "mbedtls/rsa.h"
#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h"
#include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h"
#include "files.h"
#include "otp.h"
extern bool has_session_pin, has_session_sopin;
extern uint8_t session_pin[32], session_sopin[32];
uint8_t mkek_mask[MKEK_KEY_SIZE];
bool has_mkek_mask = false;
uint8_t pending_save_dkek = 0xff;
#define POLY 0xedb88320
uint32_t crc32c(const uint8_t *buf, size_t len) {
uint32_t crc = 0xffffffff;
while (len--) {
crc ^= *buf++;
for (int k = 0; k < 8; k++) {
crc = (crc >> 1) ^ (POLY & (0 - (crc & 1)));
}
}
return ~crc;
}
int load_mkek(uint8_t *mkek) {
if (has_session_pin == false && has_session_sopin == false) {
return PICOKEY_NO_LOGIN;
}
const uint8_t *pin = NULL;
if (pin == NULL && has_session_pin == true) {
file_t *tf = search_file(EF_MKEK);
if (file_has_data(tf)) {
memcpy(mkek, file_get_data(tf), MKEK_SIZE);
pin = session_pin;
}
}
if (pin == NULL && has_session_sopin == true) {
file_t *tf = search_file(EF_MKEK_SO);
if (file_has_data(tf)) {
memcpy(mkek, file_get_data(tf), MKEK_SIZE);
pin = session_sopin;
}
}
if (pin == NULL) { //Should never happen
return PICOKEY_EXEC_ERROR;
}
int ret = aes_decrypt_cfb_256(pin, MKEK_IV(mkek), MKEK_KEY(mkek), MKEK_KEY_SIZE + MKEK_KEY_CS_SIZE);
if (ret != 0) {
return PICOKEY_EXEC_ERROR;
}
if (crc32c(MKEK_KEY(mkek), MKEK_KEY_SIZE) != *(uint32_t *) MKEK_CHECKSUM(mkek)) {
return PICOKEY_WRONG_DKEK;
}
if (has_mkek_mask || otp_key_1) {
const uint8_t *mask = otp_key_1 ? otp_key_1 : mkek_mask;
for (int i = 0; i < MKEK_KEY_SIZE; i++) {
MKEK_KEY(mkek)[i] ^= mask[i];
}
}
return PICOKEY_OK;
}
mse_t mse = { .init = false };
int mse_decrypt_ct(uint8_t *data, size_t len) {
mbedtls_chachapoly_context chatx;
mbedtls_chachapoly_init(&chatx);
mbedtls_chachapoly_setkey(&chatx, mse.key_enc + 12);
int ret = mbedtls_chachapoly_auth_decrypt(&chatx, len - 16, mse.key_enc, mse.Qpt, 65, data + len - 16, data, data);
mbedtls_chachapoly_free(&chatx);
return ret;
}
int load_dkek(uint8_t id, uint8_t *dkek) {
file_t *tf = search_file(EF_DKEK + id);
if (!file_has_data(tf)) {
return PICOKEY_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
}
memcpy(dkek, file_get_data(tf), DKEK_KEY_SIZE);
return mkek_decrypt(dkek, DKEK_KEY_SIZE);
}
void release_mkek(uint8_t *mkek) {
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(mkek, MKEK_SIZE);
}
int store_mkek(const uint8_t *mkek) {
if (has_session_pin == false && has_session_sopin == false) {
return PICOKEY_NO_LOGIN;
}
uint8_t tmp_mkek[MKEK_SIZE];
if (mkek == NULL) {
const uint8_t *rd = random_bytes_get(MKEK_IV_SIZE + MKEK_KEY_SIZE);
memcpy(tmp_mkek, rd, MKEK_IV_SIZE + MKEK_KEY_SIZE);
}
else {
memcpy(tmp_mkek, mkek, MKEK_SIZE);
}
*(uint32_t *) MKEK_CHECKSUM(tmp_mkek) = crc32c(MKEK_KEY(tmp_mkek), MKEK_KEY_SIZE);
if (has_session_pin) {
uint8_t tmp_mkek_pin[MKEK_SIZE];
memcpy(tmp_mkek_pin, tmp_mkek, MKEK_SIZE);
file_t *tf = search_file(EF_MKEK);
if (!tf) {
release_mkek(tmp_mkek);
release_mkek(tmp_mkek_pin);
return PICOKEY_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
}
aes_encrypt_cfb_256(session_pin, MKEK_IV(tmp_mkek_pin), MKEK_KEY(tmp_mkek_pin), MKEK_KEY_SIZE + MKEK_KEY_CS_SIZE);
file_put_data(tf, tmp_mkek_pin, MKEK_SIZE);
release_mkek(tmp_mkek_pin);
}
if (has_session_sopin) {
uint8_t tmp_mkek_sopin[MKEK_SIZE];
memcpy(tmp_mkek_sopin, tmp_mkek, MKEK_SIZE);
file_t *tf = search_file(EF_MKEK_SO);
if (!tf) {
release_mkek(tmp_mkek);
release_mkek(tmp_mkek_sopin);
return PICOKEY_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
}
aes_encrypt_cfb_256(session_sopin, MKEK_IV(tmp_mkek_sopin), MKEK_KEY(tmp_mkek_sopin), MKEK_KEY_SIZE + MKEK_KEY_CS_SIZE);
file_put_data(tf, tmp_mkek_sopin, MKEK_SIZE);
release_mkek(tmp_mkek_sopin);
}
low_flash_available();
release_mkek(tmp_mkek);
return PICOKEY_OK;
}
int store_dkek_key(uint8_t id, uint8_t *dkek) {
file_t *tf = search_file(EF_DKEK + id);
if (!tf) {
return PICOKEY_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
}
int r = mkek_encrypt(dkek, DKEK_KEY_SIZE);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
return r;
}
file_put_data(tf, dkek, DKEK_KEY_SIZE);
low_flash_available();
return PICOKEY_OK;
}
int save_dkek_key(uint8_t id, const uint8_t *key) {
uint8_t dkek[DKEK_KEY_SIZE];
if (!key) {
file_t *tf = search_file(EF_DKEK + id);
if (!tf) {
return PICOKEY_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
}
memcpy(dkek, file_get_data(tf), DKEK_KEY_SIZE);
}
else {
memcpy(dkek, key, DKEK_KEY_SIZE);
}
return store_dkek_key(id, dkek);
}
int import_dkek_share(uint8_t id, const uint8_t *share) {
uint8_t tmp_dkek[DKEK_KEY_SIZE];
file_t *tf = search_file(EF_DKEK + id);
if (!tf) {
return PICOKEY_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
}
memset(tmp_dkek, 0, sizeof(tmp_dkek));
if (file_get_size(tf) == DKEK_KEY_SIZE) {
memcpy(tmp_dkek, file_get_data(tf), DKEK_KEY_SIZE);
}
for (int i = 0; i < DKEK_KEY_SIZE; i++) {
tmp_dkek[i] ^= share[i];
}
file_put_data(tf, tmp_dkek, DKEK_KEY_SIZE);
low_flash_available();
return PICOKEY_OK;
}
int dkek_kcv(uint8_t id, uint8_t *kcv) { //kcv 8 bytes
uint8_t hsh[32], dkek[DKEK_KEY_SIZE];
memset(kcv, 0, 8);
memset(hsh, 0, sizeof(hsh));
int r = load_dkek(id, dkek);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
return r;
}
hash256(dkek, DKEK_KEY_SIZE, hsh);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(dkek, sizeof(dkek));
memcpy(kcv, hsh, 8);
return PICOKEY_OK;
}
int dkek_kenc(uint8_t id, uint8_t *kenc) { //kenc 32 bytes
uint8_t dkek[DKEK_KEY_SIZE + 4];
memset(kenc, 0, 32);
int r = load_dkek(id, dkek);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
return r;
}
memcpy(dkek + DKEK_KEY_SIZE, "\x0\x0\x0\x1", 4);
hash256(dkek, sizeof(dkek), kenc);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(dkek, sizeof(dkek));
return PICOKEY_OK;
}
int dkek_kmac(uint8_t id, uint8_t *kmac) { //kmac 32 bytes
uint8_t dkek[DKEK_KEY_SIZE + 4];
memset(kmac, 0, 32);
int r = load_dkek(id, dkek);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
return r;
}
memcpy(dkek + DKEK_KEY_SIZE, "\x0\x0\x0\x2", 4);
hash256(dkek, DKEK_KEY_SIZE + 4, kmac);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(dkek, sizeof(dkek));
return PICOKEY_OK;
}
int mkek_encrypt(uint8_t *data, uint16_t len) {
int r;
uint8_t mkek[MKEK_SIZE + 4];
if ((r = load_mkek(mkek)) != PICOKEY_OK) {
return r;
}
r = aes_encrypt_cfb_256(MKEK_KEY(mkek), MKEK_IV(mkek), data, len);
release_mkek(mkek);
return r;
}
int mkek_decrypt(uint8_t *data, uint16_t len) {
int r;
uint8_t mkek[MKEK_SIZE + 4];
if ((r = load_mkek(mkek)) != PICOKEY_OK) {
return r;
}
r = aes_decrypt_cfb_256(MKEK_KEY(mkek), MKEK_IV(mkek), data, len);
release_mkek(mkek);
return r;
}
int dkek_encode_key(uint8_t id, void *key_ctx, int key_type, uint8_t *out, uint16_t *out_len, const uint8_t *allowed, uint16_t allowed_len) {
if (!(key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_RSA) && !(key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC) && !(key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES)) {
return PICOKEY_WRONG_DATA;
}
uint8_t kb[8 + 2 * 4 + 2 * 4096 / 8 + 3 + 13]; //worst case: RSA-4096 (plus, 13 bytes padding)
memset(kb, 0, sizeof(kb));
uint16_t kb_len = 0;
int r = 0;
uint8_t *algo = NULL;
uint8_t algo_len = 0;
uint8_t kenc[32];
memset(kenc, 0, sizeof(kenc));
r = dkek_kenc(id, kenc);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
return r;
}
uint8_t kcv[8];
memset(kcv, 0, sizeof(kcv));
r = dkek_kcv(id, kcv);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
return r;
}
uint8_t kmac[32];
memset(kmac, 0, sizeof(kmac));
r = dkek_kmac(id, kmac);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
return r;
}
if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES) {
if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_128) {
kb_len = 16;
}
else if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_192) {
kb_len = 24;
}
else if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_256) {
kb_len = 32;
}
else if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_512) {
kb_len = 64;
}
if (kb_len != 16 && kb_len != 24 && kb_len != 32 && kb_len != 64) {
return PICOKEY_WRONG_DATA;
}
if (*out_len < 8 + 1 + 10 + 6 + (2 + 64 + 14) + 16) { // 14 bytes padding
return PICOKEY_WRONG_LENGTH;
}
put_uint16_t(kb_len, kb + 8);
memcpy(kb + 10, key_ctx, kb_len);
kb_len += 2;
algo = (uint8_t *) "\x00\x08\x60\x86\x48\x01\x65\x03\x04\x01"; //2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1 (2+8)
algo_len = 10;
}
else if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_RSA) {
if (*out_len < 8 + 1 + 12 + 6 + (8 + 2 * 4 + 2 * 4096 / 8 + 3 + 13) + 16) { //13 bytes pading
return PICOKEY_WRONG_LENGTH;
}
mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) key_ctx;
kb_len = 0;
put_uint16_t((uint16_t)mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa) * 8, kb + 8 + kb_len); kb_len += 2;
put_uint16_t((uint16_t)mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->D), kb + 8 + kb_len); kb_len += 2;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&rsa->D, kb + 8 + kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->D));
kb_len += (uint16_t)mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->D);
put_uint16_t((uint16_t)mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->N), kb + 8 + kb_len); kb_len += 2;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&rsa->N, kb + 8 + kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->N));
kb_len += (uint16_t)mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->N);
put_uint16_t((uint16_t)mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->E), kb + 8 + kb_len); kb_len += 2;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&rsa->E, kb + 8 + kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->E));
kb_len += (uint16_t)mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->E);
algo = (uint8_t *) "\x00\x0A\x04\x00\x7F\x00\x07\x02\x02\x02\x01\x02";
algo_len = 12;
}
else if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC) {
if (*out_len < 8 + 1 + 12 + 6 + (8 + 2 * 8 + 9 * 66 + 2 + 4) + 16) { //4 bytes pading
return PICOKEY_WRONG_LENGTH;
}
mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ecdsa = (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) key_ctx;
kb_len = 0;
put_uint16_t((uint16_t)mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.P) * 8, kb + 8 + kb_len); kb_len += 2;
put_uint16_t((uint16_t)mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.A), kb + 8 + kb_len); kb_len += 2;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp.A, kb + 8 + kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.A));
kb_len += (uint16_t)mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.A);
put_uint16_t((uint16_t)mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.B), kb + 8 + kb_len); kb_len += 2;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp.B, kb + 8 + kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.B));
kb_len += (uint16_t)mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.B);
put_uint16_t((uint16_t)mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.P), kb + 8 + kb_len); kb_len += 2;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp.P, kb + 8 + kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.P));
kb_len += (uint16_t)mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.P);
put_uint16_t((uint16_t)mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.N), kb + 8 + kb_len); kb_len += 2;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp.N, kb + 8 + kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.N));
kb_len += (uint16_t)mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.N);
size_t olen = 0;
mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp, &ecdsa->grp.G, MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED, &olen, kb + 8 + kb_len + 2, sizeof(kb) - 8 - kb_len - 2);
put_uint16_t((uint16_t)olen, kb + 8 + kb_len);
kb_len += 2 + (uint16_t)olen;
put_uint16_t((uint16_t)mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->d), kb + 8 + kb_len); kb_len += 2;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->d, kb + 8 + kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->d));
kb_len += (uint16_t)mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->d);
mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp, &ecdsa->Q, MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED, &olen, kb + 8 + kb_len + 2, sizeof(kb) - 8 - kb_len - 2);
put_uint16_t((uint16_t)olen, kb + 8 + kb_len);
kb_len += 2 + (uint16_t)olen;
algo = (uint8_t *) "\x00\x0A\x04\x00\x7F\x00\x07\x02\x02\x02\x02\x03";
algo_len = 12;
}
memset(out, 0, *out_len);
*out_len = 0;
memcpy(out + *out_len, kcv, 8);
*out_len += 8;
if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES) {
out[*out_len] = 15;
}
else if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_RSA) {
out[*out_len] = 5;
}
else if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC) {
out[*out_len] = 12;
}
*out_len += 1;
if (algo) {
memcpy(out + *out_len, algo, algo_len);
*out_len += algo_len;
}
else {
*out_len += 2;
}
if (allowed && allowed_len > 0) {
put_uint16_t(allowed_len, out + *out_len); *out_len += 2;
memcpy(out + *out_len, allowed, allowed_len);
*out_len += allowed_len;
}
else {
*out_len += 2;
}
//add 4 zeros
*out_len += 4;
memcpy(kb, random_bytes_get(8), 8);
kb_len += 8; //8 random bytes
uint16_t kb_len_pad = ((uint16_t) (kb_len / 16)) * 16;
if (kb_len % 16 > 0) {
kb_len_pad = ((int) (kb_len / 16) + 1) * 16;
}
//key already copied at kb+10
if (kb_len < kb_len_pad) {
kb[kb_len] = 0x80;
}
r = aes_encrypt(kenc, NULL, 256, PICO_KEYS_AES_MODE_CBC, kb, kb_len_pad);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
return r;
}
memcpy(out + *out_len, kb, kb_len_pad);
*out_len += kb_len_pad;
r = mbedtls_cipher_cmac(mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB), kmac, 256, out, *out_len, out + *out_len);
*out_len += 16;
if (r != 0) {
return r;
}
return PICOKEY_OK;
}
int dkek_type_key(const uint8_t *in) {
if (in[8] == 5 || in[8] == 6) {
return PICO_KEYS_KEY_RSA;
}
else if (in[8] == 12) {
return PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC;
}
else if (in[8] == 15) {
return PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES;
}
return 0x0;
}
int dkek_decode_key(uint8_t id, void *key_ctx, const uint8_t *in, uint16_t in_len, int *key_size_out, uint8_t **allowed, uint16_t *allowed_len) {
uint8_t kcv[8];
int r = 0;
memset(kcv, 0, sizeof(kcv));
r = dkek_kcv(id, kcv);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
return r;
}
uint8_t kmac[32];
memset(kmac, 0, sizeof(kmac));
r = dkek_kmac(id, kmac);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
return r;
}
uint8_t kenc[32];
memset(kenc, 0, sizeof(kenc));
r = dkek_kenc(id, kenc);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
return r;
}
if (memcmp(kcv, in, 8) != 0) {
return PICOKEY_WRONG_DKEK;
}
uint8_t signature[16];
r = mbedtls_cipher_cmac(mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB), kmac, 256, in, in_len - 16, signature);
if (r != 0) {
return PICOKEY_WRONG_SIGNATURE;
}
if (memcmp(signature, in + in_len - 16, 16) != 0) {
return PICOKEY_WRONG_SIGNATURE;
}
int key_type = in[8];
if (key_type != 5 && key_type != 6 && key_type != 12 && key_type != 15) {
return PICOKEY_WRONG_DATA;
}
if ((key_type == 5 || key_type == 6) &&
memcmp(in + 9, "\x00\x0A\x04\x00\x7F\x00\x07\x02\x02\x02\x01\x02", 12) != 0) {
return PICOKEY_WRONG_DATA;
}
if (key_type == 12 &&
memcmp(in + 9, "\x00\x0A\x04\x00\x7F\x00\x07\x02\x02\x02\x02\x03", 12) != 0) {
return PICOKEY_WRONG_DATA;
}
if (key_type == 15 && memcmp(in + 9, "\x00\x08\x60\x86\x48\x01\x65\x03\x04\x01", 10) != 0) {
return PICOKEY_WRONG_DATA;
}
uint16_t ofs = 9;
//OID
uint16_t len = get_uint16_t(in, ofs);
ofs += len + 2;
//Allowed algorithms
len = get_uint16_t(in, ofs);
*allowed = (uint8_t *) (in + ofs + 2);
*allowed_len = len;
ofs += len + 2;
//Access conditions
len = get_uint16_t(in, ofs);
ofs += len + 2;
//Key OID
len = get_uint16_t(in, ofs);
ofs += len + 2;
if ((in_len - 16 - ofs) % 16 != 0) {
return PICOKEY_WRONG_PADDING;
}
uint8_t kb[8 + 2 * 4 + 2 * 4096 / 8 + 3 + 13]; //worst case: RSA-4096 (plus, 13 bytes padding)
memset(kb, 0, sizeof(kb));
memcpy(kb, in + ofs, in_len - 16 - ofs);
r = aes_decrypt(kenc, NULL, 256, PICO_KEYS_AES_MODE_CBC, kb, in_len - 16 - ofs);
if (r != PICOKEY_OK) {
return r;
}
int key_size = get_uint16_t(kb, 8);
if (key_size_out) {
*key_size_out = key_size;
}
ofs = 10;
if (key_type == 5 || key_type == 6) {
mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) key_ctx;
mbedtls_rsa_init(rsa);
if (key_type == 5) {
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += 2;
r = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&rsa->D, kb + ofs, len); ofs += len;
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa);
return PICOKEY_WRONG_DATA;
}
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += 2;
r = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&rsa->N, kb + ofs, len); ofs += len;
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa);
return PICOKEY_WRONG_DATA;
}
}
else if (key_type == 6) {
//DP-1
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += len + 2;
//DQ-1
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += len + 2;
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += 2;
r = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&rsa->P, kb + ofs, len); ofs += len;
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa);
return PICOKEY_WRONG_DATA;
}
//PQ
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += len + 2;
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += 2;
r = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&rsa->Q, kb + ofs, len); ofs += len;
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa);
return PICOKEY_WRONG_DATA;
}
//N
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += len + 2;
}
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += 2;
r = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&rsa->E, kb + ofs, len); ofs += len;
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa);
return PICOKEY_WRONG_DATA;
}
if (key_type == 5) {
r = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, &rsa->N, NULL, NULL, &rsa->D, &rsa->E);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa);
return PICOKEY_EXEC_ERROR;
}
}
else if (key_type == 6) {
r = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, NULL, &rsa->P, &rsa->Q, NULL, &rsa->E);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa);
return PICOKEY_EXEC_ERROR;
}
}
r = mbedtls_rsa_complete(rsa);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa);
return PICOKEY_EXEC_ERROR;
}
r = mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey(rsa);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa);
return PICOKEY_EXEC_ERROR;
}
}
else if (key_type == 12) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ecdsa = (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) key_ctx;
mbedtls_ecdsa_init(ecdsa);
//A
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += len + 2;
//B
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += len + 2;
//P
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += 2;
mbedtls_ecp_group_id ec_id = ec_get_curve_from_prime(kb + ofs, len);
if (ec_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(ecdsa);
return PICOKEY_WRONG_DATA;
}
ofs += len;
//N
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += len + 2;
//G
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs);
if (ec_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519 && kb[ofs + 2] != 0x09) {
ec_id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_ED25519;
}
else if (ec_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448 && (len != 56 || kb[ofs + 2] != 0x05)) {
ec_id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_ED448;
}
ofs += len + 2;
//d
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += 2;
r = mbedtls_ecp_read_key(ec_id, ecdsa, kb + ofs, len);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(ecdsa);
return PICOKEY_EXEC_ERROR;
}
ofs += len;
//Q
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += 2;
r = mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary(&ecdsa->grp, &ecdsa->Q, kb + ofs, len);
if (r != 0) {
if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(&ecdsa->grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_EDWARDS) {
r = mbedtls_ecp_point_edwards(&ecdsa->grp, &ecdsa->Q, &ecdsa->d, random_gen, NULL);
}
else {
r = mbedtls_ecp_mul(&ecdsa->grp, &ecdsa->Q, &ecdsa->d, &ecdsa->grp.G, random_gen, NULL);
}
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(ecdsa);
return PICOKEY_EXEC_ERROR;
}
}
r = mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv(ecdsa, ecdsa, random_gen, NULL);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(ecdsa);
return PICOKEY_EXEC_ERROR;
}
}
else if (key_type == 15) {
memcpy(key_ctx, kb + ofs, key_size);
}
return PICOKEY_OK;
}

80
src/hsm/kek.h Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#ifndef _DKEK_H_
#define _DKEK_H_
#include "crypto_utils.h"
#if defined(ENABLE_EMULATION) || defined(ESP_PLATFORM)
#include <stdbool.h>
#endif
extern int load_mkek(uint8_t *);
extern int store_mkek(const uint8_t *);
extern int save_dkek_key(uint8_t, const uint8_t *key);
extern int store_dkek_key(uint8_t, uint8_t *);
extern void init_mkek();
extern void release_mkek(uint8_t *);
extern int import_dkek_share(uint8_t, const uint8_t *share);
extern int dkek_kcv(uint8_t, uint8_t *kcv);
extern int mkek_encrypt(uint8_t *data, uint16_t len);
extern int mkek_decrypt(uint8_t *data, uint16_t len);
extern int dkek_encode_key(uint8_t,
void *key_ctx,
int key_type,
uint8_t *out,
uint16_t *out_len,
const uint8_t *,
uint16_t);
extern int dkek_type_key(const uint8_t *in);
extern int dkek_decode_key(uint8_t,
void *key_ctx,
const uint8_t *in,
uint16_t in_len,
int *key_size_out,
uint8_t **,
uint16_t *);
#define MAX_DKEK_ENCODE_KEY_BUFFER (8 + 1 + 12 + 6 + (8 + 2 * 4 + 2 * 4096 / 8 + 3 + 13) + 16)
#define MAX_KEY_DOMAINS 16
#define MKEK_IV_SIZE (IV_SIZE)
#define MKEK_KEY_SIZE (32)
#define MKEK_KEY_CS_SIZE (4)
#define MKEK_SIZE (MKEK_IV_SIZE + MKEK_KEY_SIZE + MKEK_KEY_CS_SIZE)
#define MKEK_IV(p) (p)
#define MKEK_KEY(p) (MKEK_IV(p) + MKEK_IV_SIZE)
#define MKEK_CHECKSUM(p) (MKEK_KEY(p) + MKEK_KEY_SIZE)
#define DKEK_KEY_SIZE (32)
extern uint8_t mkek_mask[MKEK_KEY_SIZE];
extern bool has_mkek_mask;
typedef struct mse {
uint8_t Qpt[65];
uint8_t key_enc[12 + 32];
bool init;
} mse_t;
extern mse_t mse;
extern int mse_decrypt_ct(uint8_t *, size_t);
extern uint8_t pending_save_dkek;
#endif

View File

@@ -1,17 +1,17 @@
/*
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/

View File

@@ -1,45 +1,42 @@
/*
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#ifndef _OID_H_
#define _OID_H_
#include <stdlib.h>
#include "pico/stdlib.h"
#define OID_BSI_DE "\x04\x00\x7F\x00\x07"
#define OID_ID_CA OID_BSI_DE "\x02\x02\x03"
#define OID_ECKA OID_BSI_DE "\x01\x01\x05"
#define OID_ECKA_EG OID_ECKA "\x01"
#define OID_ECKA_EG_X963KDF OID_ECKA_EG "\x01"
#define OID_ECKA_EG_X963KDF_SHA1 OID_ECKA_EG_X963KDF "\x01"
#define OID_ECKA_EG_X963KDF_SHA224 OID_ECKA_EG_X963KDF "\x02"
#define OID_ECKA_EG_X963KDF_SHA256 OID_ECKA_EG_X963KDF "\x03"
#define OID_ECKA_EG_X963KDF_SHA384 OID_ECKA_EG_X963KDF "\x04"
#define OID_ECKA_EG_X963KDF_SHA512 OID_ECKA_EG_X963KDF "\x05"
#define OID_ECKA_DH OID_ECKA "\x02"
#define OID_ECKA_DH_X963KDF OID_ECKA_DH "\x01"
#define OID_ECKA_DH_X963KDF_SHA1 OID_ECKA_DH_X963KDF "\x01"
#define OID_ECKA_DH_X963KDF_SHA224 OID_ECKA_DH_X963KDF "\x02"
#define OID_ECKA_DH_X963KDF_SHA256 OID_ECKA_DH_X963KDF "\x03"
#define OID_ECKA_DH_X963KDF_SHA384 OID_ECKA_DH_X963KDF "\x04"
#define OID_ECKA_DH_X963KDF_SHA512 OID_ECKA_DH_X963KDF "\x05"
#define OID_ID_CA_DH OID_ID_CA "\x01"
#define OID_ID_CA_DH_3DES_CBC_CBC OID_ID_CA_DH "\x01"
#define OID_ID_CA_DH_AES_CBC_CMAC_128 OID_ID_CA_DH "\x02"
#define OID_ID_CA_DH_AES_CBC_CMAC_192 OID_ID_CA_DH "\x03"
#define OID_ID_CA_DH_AES_CBC_CMAC_256 OID_ID_CA_DH "\x04"
#define OID_ID_CA_ECDH OID_ID_CA "\x02"
#define OID_ID_CA_ECDH_3DES_CBC_CBC OID_ID_CA_ECDH "\x01"
#define OID_ID_CA_ECDH_AES_CBC_CMAC_128 OID_ID_CA_ECDH "\x02"
#define OID_ID_CA_ECDH_AES_CBC_CMAC_192 OID_ID_CA_ECDH "\x03"
#define OID_ID_CA_ECDH_AES_CBC_CMAC_256 OID_ID_CA_ECDH "\x04"
#define OID_ID_PK OID_BSI_DE "\x02\x02\0x1"
#define OID_ID_PK OID_BSI_DE "\x02\x02\x01"
#define OID_ID_PK_DH OID_ID_PK "\x01"
#define OID_ID_PK_ECDH OID_ID_PK "\x02"
@@ -56,11 +53,25 @@
#define OID_ID_TA_ECDSA OID_ID_TA "\x02"
#define OID_IT_TA_ECDSA_SHA_1 OID_ID_TA_ECDSA "\x01"
#define OID_IT_TA_ECDSA_SHA_224 OID_ID_TA_ECDSA "\x02"
#define OID_IT_TA_ECDSA_SHA_256 OID_ID_TA_ECDSA "\x03"
#define OID_IT_TA_ECDSA_SHA_384 OID_ID_TA_ECDSA "\x04"
#define OID_IT_TA_ECDSA_SHA_512 OID_ID_TA_ECDSA "\x05"
#define OID_ID_TA_ECDSA_SHA_1 OID_ID_TA_ECDSA "\x01"
#define OID_ID_TA_ECDSA_SHA_224 OID_ID_TA_ECDSA "\x02"
#define OID_ID_TA_ECDSA_SHA_256 OID_ID_TA_ECDSA "\x03"
#define OID_ID_TA_ECDSA_SHA_384 OID_ID_TA_ECDSA "\x04"
#define OID_ID_TA_ECDSA_SHA_512 OID_ID_TA_ECDSA "\x05"
#define OID_ID_CA OID_BSI_DE "\x02\x02\x03"
#define OID_ID_CA_DH OID_ID_CA "\x01"
#define OID_ID_CA_DH_3DES_CBC_CBC OID_ID_CA_DH "\x01"
#define OID_ID_CA_DH_AES_CBC_CMAC_128 OID_ID_CA_DH "\x02"
#define OID_ID_CA_DH_AES_CBC_CMAC_192 OID_ID_CA_DH "\x03"
#define OID_ID_CA_DH_AES_CBC_CMAC_256 OID_ID_CA_DH "\x04"
#define OID_ID_CA_ECDH OID_ID_CA "\x02"
#define OID_ID_CA_ECDH_3DES_CBC_CBC OID_ID_CA_ECDH "\x01"
#define OID_ID_CA_ECDH_AES_CBC_CMAC_128 OID_ID_CA_ECDH "\x02"
#define OID_ID_CA_ECDH_AES_CBC_CMAC_192 OID_ID_CA_ECDH "\x03"
#define OID_ID_CA_ECDH_AES_CBC_CMAC_256 OID_ID_CA_ECDH "\x04"
#define OID_ID_RI OID_BSI_DE "\x02\x02\x05"
@@ -70,7 +81,7 @@
#define OID_ID_RI_DH_SHA_224 OID_ID_RI_DH "\x02"
#define OID_ID_RI_DH_SHA_256 OID_ID_RI_DH "\x03"
#define OID_ID_RI_ECDH OID_ID_RI "\x02"
#define OID_ID_RI_ECDH OID_ID_RI "\x02"
#define OID_ID_RI_ECDH_SHA_1 OID_ID_RI_ECDH "\x01"
#define OID_ID_RI_ECDH_SHA_224 OID_ID_RI_ECDH "\x02"
@@ -78,4 +89,89 @@
#define OID_ID_CI OID_BSI_DE "\x02\x02\x06"
#define OID_CARDCONTACT "\x2B\x06\x01\x04\x01\x81\xC3\x1F"
#define OID_OPENSCDP OID_CARDCONTACT "\x01"
#define OID_CC_ISO7816 OID_CARDCONTACT "\x02"
#define OID_CC_PKI OID_CARDCONTACT "\x03"
#define OID_CC_FORMAT OID_CARDCONTACT "\x04"
#define OID_CC_GP_PROFILES OID_CARDCONTACT "\x10"
#define OID_SCSH3 OID_OPENSCDP "\x01"
#define OID_SCSH3GUI OID_OPENSCDP "\x02"
#define OID_SMARCARD_HSM OID_CC_ISO7816 "\x01"
#define OID_CC_APDUTEST OID_CC_ISO7816 "\x02"
#define OID_CC_PACKAGES OID_CC_ISO7816 "\x7F"
#define OID_CC_ROLES OID_CC_PKI "\x01"
#define OID_CC_ROLE_SC_HSM OID_CC_ROLES "\x01"
#define OID_CC_EXTENSIONS OID_CC_PKI "\x02"
#define OID_ID_IMPU OID_CC_EXTENSIONS "\x01"
#define OID_ID_KEY_DOMAIN_UID OID_CC_EXTENSIONS "\x02"
#define OID_CC_FF_DEVICEID OID_CC_FORMAT "\x01"
#define OID_CC_FF_KDM OID_CC_FORMAT "\x02"
#define OID_CC_FF_PKA OID_CC_FORMAT "\x03"
#define OID_CC_FF_KDA OID_CC_FORMAT "\x04"
#define OID_RSADSI "\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x0D"
#define OID_PKCS OID_RSADSI "\x01"
#define OID_PKCS_5 OID_PKCS "\x05"
#define OID_PKCS5_PBKDF2 OID_PKCS_5 "\x0C"
#define OID_PKCS5_PBES2 OID_PKCS_5 "\x0D"
#define OID_PKCS_9 OID_PKCS "\x09"
#define OID_PKCS9_SMIME_ALG OID_PKCS_9 "\x10\x03"
#define OID_CHACHA20_POLY1305 OID_PKCS9_SMIME_ALG "\x12"
#define OID_HKDF_SHA256 OID_PKCS9_SMIME_ALG "\x1D"
#define OID_HKDF_SHA384 OID_PKCS9_SMIME_ALG "\x1E"
#define OID_HKDF_SHA512 OID_PKCS9_SMIME_ALG "\x1F"
#define OID_DIGEST OID_RSADSI "\x02"
#define OID_HMAC_SHA1 OID_DIGEST "\x07"
#define OID_HMAC_SHA224 OID_DIGEST "\x08"
#define OID_HMAC_SHA256 OID_DIGEST "\x09"
#define OID_HMAC_SHA384 OID_DIGEST "\x0A"
#define OID_HMAC_SHA512 OID_DIGEST "\x0B"
#define OID_KDF_X963 "\x2B\x81\x05\x10\x86\x48\x3F"
#define OID_NIST_ALG "\x60\x86\x48\x01\x65\x03\x04"
#define OID_NIST_AES OID_NIST_ALG "\x01"
#define OID_AES128_ECB OID_NIST_AES "\x01"
#define OID_AES128_CBC OID_NIST_AES "\x02"
#define OID_AES128_OFB OID_NIST_AES "\x03"
#define OID_AES128_CFB OID_NIST_AES "\x04"
#define OID_AES128_GCM OID_NIST_AES "\x06"
#define OID_AES128_CCM OID_NIST_AES "\x07"
#define OID_AES128_CTR OID_NIST_AES "\x09" // Not existing
#define OID_AES192_ECB OID_NIST_AES "\x15"
#define OID_AES192_CBC OID_NIST_AES "\x16"
#define OID_AES192_OFB OID_NIST_AES "\x17"
#define OID_AES192_CFB OID_NIST_AES "\x18"
#define OID_AES192_GCM OID_NIST_AES "\x1A"
#define OID_AES192_CCM OID_NIST_AES "\x1B"
#define OID_AES192_CTR OID_NIST_AES "\x1D" // Not existing
#define OID_AES256_ECB OID_NIST_AES "\x29"
#define OID_AES256_CBC OID_NIST_AES "\x2A"
#define OID_AES256_OFB OID_NIST_AES "\x2B"
#define OID_AES256_CFB OID_NIST_AES "\x2C"
#define OID_AES256_GCM OID_NIST_AES "\x2E"
#define OID_AES256_CCM OID_NIST_AES "\x2F"
#define OID_AES256_CTR OID_NIST_AES "\x31" // Not existing
#define OID_IEEE_ALG "\x2B\x6F\x02\x8C\x53\x00\x00\x01"
#define OID_AES128_XTS OID_IEEE_ALG "\x01"
#define OID_AES256_XTS OID_IEEE_ALG "\x02"
#define OID_HD "\x2B\x06\x01\x04\x01\x83\xA8\x78\x05\x8D\x6B"
#endif

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -1,17 +1,17 @@
/*
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
@@ -19,48 +19,63 @@
#define _SC_HSM_H_
#include <stdlib.h>
#ifndef ESP_PLATFORM
#include "common.h"
#else
#define MBEDTLS_ALLOW_PRIVATE_ACCESS
#endif
#include "mbedtls/rsa.h"
#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h"
#if !defined(ENABLE_EMULATION) && !defined(ESP_PLATFORM)
#include "pico/stdlib.h"
#include "ccid2040.h"
#endif
#include "file.h"
#include "apdu.h"
#include "pico_keys.h"
extern const uint8_t sc_hsm_aid[];
#define ALGO_RSA_RAW 0x20 /* RSA signature with external padding */
#define ALGO_RSA_DECRYPT 0x21 /* RSA raw decrypt */
#define ALGO_RSA_RAW 0x20 /* RSA signature with external padding */
#define ALGO_RSA_DECRYPT 0x21 /* RSA raw decrypt */
#define ALGO_RSA_DECRYPT_PKCS1 0x22
#define ALGO_RSA_DECRYPT_OEP 0x23
#define ALGO_RSA_PKCS1 0x30 /* RSA signature with DigestInfo input and PKCS#1 V1.5 padding */
#define ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1 0x31 /* RSA signature with SHA-1 hash and PKCS#1 V1.5 padding */
#define ALGO_RSA_PKCS1 0x30 /* RSA signature with DigestInfo input and PKCS#1 V1.5 padding */
#define ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1 0x31 /* RSA signature with SHA-1 hash and PKCS#1 V1.5 padding */
#define ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA224 0x32
#define ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256 0x33 /* RSA signature with SHA-256 hash and PKCS#1 V1.5 padding */
#define ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256 0x33 /* RSA signature with SHA-256 hash and PKCS#1 V1.5 padding */
#define ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384 0x34
#define ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512 0x35
#define ALGO_RSA_PSS 0x40 /* RSA signature with external hash and PKCS#1 PSS padding*/
#define ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA1 0x41 /* RSA signature with SHA-1 hash and PKCS#1 PSS padding */
#define ALGO_RSA_PSS 0x40 /* RSA signature with external hash and PKCS#1 PSS padding*/
#define ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA1 0x41 /* RSA signature with SHA-1 hash and PKCS#1 PSS padding */
#define ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA224 0x42
#define ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA256 0x43 /* RSA signature with SHA-256 hash and PKCS#1 PSS padding */
#define ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA256 0x43 /* RSA signature with SHA-256 hash and PKCS#1 PSS padding */
#define ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA384 0x44
#define ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA512 0x45
#define ALGO_EC_RAW 0x70 /* ECDSA signature with hash input */
#define ALGO_EC_SHA1 0x71 /* ECDSA signature with SHA-1 hash */
#define ALGO_EC_SHA224 0x72 /* ECDSA signature with SHA-224 hash */
#define ALGO_EC_SHA256 0x73 /* ECDSA signature with SHA-256 hash */
#define ALGO_EC_RAW 0x70 /* ECDSA signature with hash input */
#define ALGO_EC_SHA1 0x71 /* ECDSA signature with SHA-1 hash */
#define ALGO_EC_SHA224 0x72 /* ECDSA signature with SHA-224 hash */
#define ALGO_EC_SHA256 0x73 /* ECDSA signature with SHA-256 hash */
#define ALGO_EC_SHA384 0x74
#define ALGO_EC_SHA512 0x75
#define ALGO_EC_DH 0x80 /* ECDH key derivation */
#define ALGO_EC_DH 0x80 /* ECDH key derivation */
#define ALGO_EC_DH_AUTPUK 0x83
#define ALGO_EC_DH_XKEK 0x84
#define ALGO_HD 0xA0
#define ALGO_WRAP 0x92
#define ALGO_UNWRAP 0x93
#define ALGO_REPLACE 0x94
#define ALGO_EC_DERIVE 0x98 /* Derive EC key from EC key */
#define ALGO_EC_DERIVE 0x98 /* Derive EC key from EC key */
#define ALGO_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT 0x10
#define ALGO_AES_CBC_DECRYPT 0x11
#define ALGO_AES_CMAC 0x18
#define ALGO_AES_DERIVE 0x99
#define ALGO_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT 0x10
#define ALGO_AES_CBC_DECRYPT 0x11
#define ALGO_AES_CMAC 0x18
#define ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_ENCRYPT 0x51 /* Extended ciphering Encrypt */
#define ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_DECRYPT 0x52 /* Extended ciphering Decrypt */
#define ALGO_AES_DERIVE 0x99
#define HSM_OPT_RRC 0x0001
#define HSM_OPT_TRANSPORT_PIN 0x0002
@@ -71,27 +86,46 @@ extern const uint8_t sc_hsm_aid[];
#define HSM_OPT_RRC_RESET_ONLY 0x0020
#define HSM_OPT_BOOTSEL_BUTTON 0x0100
#define HSM_OPT_KEY_COUNTER_ALL 0x0200
#define HSM_OPT_SECURE_LOCK 0x0400
#define PRKD_PREFIX 0xC4 /* Hi byte in file identifier for PKCS#15 PRKD objects */
#define CD_PREFIX 0xC8 /* Hi byte in file identifier for PKCS#15 CD objects */
#define DCOD_PREFIX 0xC9 /* Hi byte in file identifier for PKCS#15 DCOD objects */
#define CA_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX 0xCA /* Hi byte in file identifier for CA certificates */
#define KEY_PREFIX 0xCC /* Hi byte in file identifier for key objects */
#define PROT_DATA_PREFIX 0xCD /* Hi byte in file identifier for PIN protected data objects */
#define EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX 0xCE /* Hi byte in file identifier for EE certificates */
#define DATA_PREFIX 0xCF /* Hi byte in file identifier for readable data objects */
#define PRKD_PREFIX 0xC4 /* Hi byte in file identifier for PKCS#15 PRKD objects */
#define CD_PREFIX 0xC8 /* Hi byte in file identifier for PKCS#15 CD objects */
#define DCOD_PREFIX 0xC9 /* Hi byte in file identifier for PKCS#15 DCOD objects */
#define CA_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX 0xCA /* Hi byte in file identifier for CA certificates */
#define KEY_PREFIX 0xCC /* Hi byte in file identifier for key objects */
#define PROT_DATA_PREFIX 0xCD /* Hi byte in file identifier for PIN protected data objects */
#define EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX 0xCE /* Hi byte in file identifier for EE certificates */
#define DATA_PREFIX 0xCF /* Hi byte in file identifier for readable data objects */
#define P15_KEYTYPE_RSA 0x30
#define P15_KEYTYPE_ECC 0xA0
#define P15_KEYTYPE_AES 0xA8
#define MAX_PUK 8
extern int pin_reset_retries(const file_t *pin, bool);
extern int pin_wrong_retry(const file_t *pin);
extern void hash(const uint8_t *input, size_t len, uint8_t output[32]);
extern void hash_multi(const uint8_t *input, size_t len, uint8_t output[32]);
extern void double_hash_pin(const uint8_t *pin, size_t len, uint8_t output[32]);
extern void hash(const uint8_t *input, uint16_t len, uint8_t output[32]);
extern uint16_t get_device_options();
extern bool has_session_pin, has_session_sopin;
extern uint8_t session_pin[32], session_sopin[32];
extern uint16_t check_pin(const file_t *pin, const uint8_t *data, uint16_t len);
extern bool pka_enabled();
extern const uint8_t *dev_name;
extern uint16_t dev_name_len;
extern uint8_t puk_status[MAX_PUK];
extern int puk_store_select_chr(const uint8_t *chr);
extern int delete_file(file_t *ef);
extern const uint8_t *get_meta_tag(file_t *ef, uint16_t meta_tag, uint16_t *tag_len);
extern bool key_has_purpose(file_t *ef, uint8_t purpose);
extern int load_private_key_rsa(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, file_t *fkey);
extern int load_private_key_ec(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ctx, file_t *fkey);
extern int load_private_key_ecdh(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ctx, file_t *fkey);
extern bool wait_button_pressed();
extern int store_keys(void *key_ctx, int type, uint8_t key_id);
extern int find_and_store_meta_key(uint8_t key_id);
extern uint32_t get_key_counter(file_t *fkey);
extern uint32_t decrement_key_counter(file_t *fkey);
#endif
#endif

View File

@@ -1,27 +1,26 @@
/*
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#ifndef __VERSION_H_
#define __VERSION_H_
#define HSM_VERSION 0x0206
#define HSM_VERSION 0x0500
#define HSM_VERSION_MAJOR ((HSM_VERSION >> 8) & 0xff)
#define HSM_VERSION_MINOR (HSM_VERSION & 0xff)
#endif

14
tests/build-in-docker.sh Executable file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
#!/bin/bash -eu
source tests/docker_env.sh
build_image
#run_in_docker rm -rf CMakeFiles
run_in_docker mkdir -p build_in_docker
run_in_docker -w "$PWD/build_in_docker" cmake -DENABLE_EMULATION=1 -D__FOR_CI=1 ..
run_in_docker -w "$PWD/build_in_docker" make -j ${NUM_PROC}
docker create --name temp_container pico-hsm-test:bullseye
docker cp $PWD/build_in_docker/pico_hsm temp_container:/pico_hsm
docker commit temp_container pico-hsm-test:bullseye
docker stop temp_container
docker rm temp_container
docker image prune -f

33
tests/conftest.py Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import sys
import pytest
try:
from picohsm import PicoHSM
except ModuleNotFoundError:
print('ERROR: picohsm module not found! Install picohsm package.\nTry with `pip install pypicohsm`')
sys.exit(-1)
@pytest.fixture(scope="session")
def device():
dev = PicoHSM()
return dev

25
tests/const.py Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
from binascii import unhexlify
DEFAULT_DKEK = [0x1] * 32
TERM_CERT = unhexlify('7F2181E57F4E819E5F290100421045535049434F48534D445630303030317F494F060A04007F00070202020203864104F571E53AA8E75C929D925081CF0F893CB5991D48BD546C1A3F22199F037E4B12D601ACD91C67C88D3C5B3D04C08EC0A372485F7A248E080EE0C6237C1B075E1C5F201045535049434F48534D54525A474E50327F4C0E060904007F0007030102025301005F25060203000300055F24060204000300045F374041BF5E970739135770DBCC5DDA81FFD8B13419A9257D44CAF8404267C644E8F435B43F5E57EB2A8CF4B198045ACD094E0CB34E6217D9C8922CFB9BBEFD4088AD')
DICA_CERT = unhexlify('7F2181E97F4E81A25F290100421045535049434F48534D434130303030317F494F060A04007F0007020202020386410421EE4A21C16A10F737F12E78E5091B266612038CDABEBB722B15BF6D41B877FBF64D9AB69C39B9831B1AE00BEF2A4E81976F7688D45189BB232A24703D8A96A55F201045535049434F48534D445630303030317F4C12060904007F000703010202530580000000005F25060202000801085F24060203000601045F37403F75C08FFFC9186B56E6147199E82BFC327CEEF72495BC567961CD54D702F13E3C2766FCD1D11BD6A9D1F4A229B76B248CEB9AF88D59A74D0AB149448705159B')

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
FROM debian:bullseye
ARG DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive
RUN apt update && apt upgrade -y
RUN apt install -y apt-utils
RUN apt autoremove -y
RUN rm -rf /var/cache/apt/archives/*
RUN apt install -y libccid \
libpcsclite-dev \
git \
autoconf \
pkg-config \
libtool \
help2man \
automake \
gcc \
make \
build-essential \
python3 \
python3-pip \
swig \
libssl-dev \
cmake \
vsmartcard-vpcd \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
RUN pip3 install pytest pycvc cryptography pyscard base58
WORKDIR /
RUN git clone https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC
WORKDIR /OpenSC
RUN git checkout tags/0.25.1
RUN ./bootstrap
RUN ./configure --enable-openssl
RUN make -j `nproc`
RUN make install
RUN make clean
RUN ldconfig
WORKDIR /
RUN git clone https://github.com/polhenarejos/pypicohsm.git
RUN pip3 install -e pypicohsm
RUN git clone https://github.com/CardContact/sc-hsm-embedded
WORKDIR /sc-hsm-embedded
RUN autoreconf -fi
RUN ./configure
RUN make -j `nproc`
RUN make install
RUN cp ./src/tests/sc-hsm-pkcs11-test /usr/local/bin/sc-hsm-pkcs11-test
RUN make clean
WORKDIR /

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
FROM ubuntu:jammy
ARG DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive
RUN apt update && apt upgrade -y
RUN apt install -y apt-utils
RUN apt install -y libccid \
libpcsclite-dev \
git \
autoconf \
pkg-config \
libtool \
help2man \
automake \
gcc \
make \
build-essential \
opensc \
python3 \
python3-pip \
swig \
cmake \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
RUN pip3 install pytest pycvc cryptography pyscard
RUN git clone https://github.com/polhenarejos/vsmartcard.git
WORKDIR /vsmartcard/virtualsmartcard
RUN autoreconf --verbose --install
RUN ./configure --sysconfdir=/etc
RUN make && make install
WORKDIR /

108
tests/docker_env.sh Executable file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
#!/bin/bash -eu
# Taken from Mbed-TLS project
# https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/blob/master/tests/scripts/docker_env.sh
#
# docker_env.sh
#
# Purpose
# -------
#
# This is a helper script to enable running tests under a Docker container,
# thus making it easier to get set up as well as isolating test dependencies
# (which include legacy/insecure configurations of openssl and gnutls).
#
# WARNING: the Dockerfile used by this script is no longer maintained! See
# https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls-test/blob/master/README.md#quick-start
# for the set of Docker images we use on the CI.
#
# Notes for users
# ---------------
# This script expects a Linux x86_64 system with a recent version of Docker
# installed and available for use, as well as http/https access. If a proxy
# server must be used, invoke this script with the usual environment variables
# (http_proxy and https_proxy) set appropriately. If an alternate Docker
# registry is needed, specify MBEDTLS_DOCKER_REGISTRY to point at the
# host name.
#
#
# Running this script directly will check for Docker availability and set up
# the Docker image.
# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
#
# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
# not use this file except in compliance with the License.
# You may obtain a copy of the License at
#
# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
#
# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
# limitations under the License.
# default values, can be overridden by the environment
: ${MBEDTLS_DOCKER_GUEST:=bullseye}
DOCKER_IMAGE_TAG="pico-hsm-test:${MBEDTLS_DOCKER_GUEST}"
# Make sure docker is available
if ! which docker > /dev/null; then
echo "Docker is required but doesn't seem to be installed. See https://www.docker.com/ to get started"
exit 1
fi
# Figure out if we need to 'sudo docker'
if groups | grep docker > /dev/null; then
DOCKER="docker"
else
echo "Using sudo to invoke docker since you're not a member of the docker group..."
DOCKER="docker"
fi
# Figure out the number of processors available
if [ "$(uname)" == "Darwin" ]; then
NUM_PROC="$(sysctl -n hw.logicalcpu)"
else
NUM_PROC="$(nproc)"
fi
build_image() {
# Build the Docker image
echo "Getting docker image up to date (this may take a few minutes)..."
${DOCKER} image build \
-t ${DOCKER_IMAGE_TAG} \
--cache-from=${DOCKER_IMAGE_TAG} \
--network host \
--build-arg MAKEFLAGS_PARALLEL="-j ${NUM_PROC}" \
tests/docker/${MBEDTLS_DOCKER_GUEST}
}
run_in_docker()
{
ENV_ARGS=""
while [ "$1" == "-e" ]; do
ENV_ARGS="${ENV_ARGS} $1 $2"
shift 2
done
WORKDIR="${PWD}"
if [ "$1" == '-w' ]; then
WORKDIR="$2"
shift 2
fi
${DOCKER} container run --rm \
--cap-add SYS_PTRACE \
--volume $PWD:$PWD \
--workdir ${WORKDIR} \
-e MAKEFLAGS \
${ENV_ARGS} \
${DOCKER_IMAGE_TAG} \
$@
}

BIN
tests/memory.tar.gz Normal file

Binary file not shown.

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
def test_select(device):
device.select_applet()
def test_initialization(device):
device.initialize()
def test_termca(device):
data = device.get_termca()
assert(b'ESPICOHSMTR' == data['cv']['chr'][:11])
assert(b'ESPICOHSMDV' == data['cv']['car'][:11] or b'ESPICOHSMTR' == data['cv']['car'][:11])
assert(b'ESPICOHSMDV' == data['dv']['chr'][:11] or b'ESPICOHSMTR' == data['dv']['chr'][:11])
assert(b'ESPICOHSMCA' == data['dv']['car'][:11] or b'ESPICOHSMTR' == data['dv']['car'][:11])
assert(data['cv']['car'] == data['dv']['chr'])
def test_get_version(device):
version = device.get_version()

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
import math
from collections import Counter
def mean(x):
sum = 0
for i in x:
sum += i
return sum/len(x)
def var(x):
sum = 0
m = mean(x)
for i in x:
sum += (i-m)**2
return sum/len(x)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"length", [1, 256, 1024]
)
def test_challenge(device, length):
data = device.get_challenge(length)
assert(len(data) == length)
def test_randomness(device):
data = []
N = 1000
for k2 in range(N):
data += device.get_challenge(1024)
_, values = zip(*Counter(data).items())
nm = mean(values)/(N*1024/256)
sm = math.sqrt(var(values))/mean(values)
assert(0.99 <= nm <= 1.01)
assert(sm <= 0.02)

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
import hashlib
from const import DEFAULT_DKEK
from picohsm import APDUResponse, SWCodes
from picohsm.const import DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES
KEY_DOMAINS = 3
TEST_KEY_DOMAIN = 1
def test_key_domains(device):
device.initialize(key_domains=KEY_DOMAINS)
for k in range(KEY_DOMAINS):
kd = device.get_key_domain(key_domain=k)
assert('error' in kd)
assert(kd['error'] == 0x6A88)
kd = device.get_key_domain(key_domain=KEY_DOMAINS)
assert('error' in kd)
assert(kd['error'] == 0x6A86)
assert(device.get_key_domains() == KEY_DOMAINS)
def test_import_dkek_wrong_key_domain(device):
with pytest.raises(APDUResponse) as e:
device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK, key_domain=0)
assert(e.value.sw == SWCodes.SW_COMMAND_NOT_ALLOWED)
def test_import_dkek_fail(device):
with pytest.raises(APDUResponse) as e:
device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK, key_domain=TEST_KEY_DOMAIN)
assert(e.value.sw == SWCodes.SW_COMMAND_NOT_ALLOWED)
def test_set_key_domain_fail(device):
with pytest.raises(APDUResponse) as e:
device.set_key_domain(key_domain=10)
assert(e.value.sw == SWCodes.SW_INCORRECT_P1P2)
def test_set_key_domain_ok(device):
kd = device.get_key_domain(key_domain=TEST_KEY_DOMAIN)
assert('error' in kd)
assert(kd['error'] == 0x6A88)
device.set_key_domain(key_domain=TEST_KEY_DOMAIN)
kd = device.get_key_domain(key_domain=TEST_KEY_DOMAIN)
assert('error' not in kd)
assert('dkek' in kd)
assert('total' in kd['dkek'])
assert(kd['dkek']['total'] == DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
assert('missing' in kd['dkek'])
assert(kd['dkek']['missing'] == DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
def test_import_dkek_ok(device):
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK, key_domain=TEST_KEY_DOMAIN)
assert('dkek' in resp)
assert('kcv' in resp)
assert(resp['dkek']['total'] == DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
assert(resp['dkek']['missing'] == DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES-1)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK, key_domain=TEST_KEY_DOMAIN)
assert('dkek' in resp)
assert('kcv' in resp)
assert(resp['dkek']['total'] == DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
assert(resp['dkek']['missing'] == DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES-2)
kcv = hashlib.sha256(b'\x00'*32).digest()[:8]
assert(resp['kcv'] == kcv)
def test_clear_key_domain(device):
kd = device.get_key_domain(key_domain=0)
assert('error' in kd)
assert(kd['error'] == SWCodes.SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND)
kd = device.get_key_domain(key_domain=TEST_KEY_DOMAIN)
assert(kd['dkek']['total'] == DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
device.clear_key_domain(key_domain=TEST_KEY_DOMAIN)
kd = device.get_key_domain(key_domain=TEST_KEY_DOMAIN)
assert(kd['dkek']['missing'] == DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
def test_delete_key_domain(device):
assert(device.get_key_domains() == KEY_DOMAINS)
kd = device.get_key_domain(key_domain=TEST_KEY_DOMAIN)
assert(kd['dkek']['total'] == DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
with pytest.raises(APDUResponse) as e:
device.delete_key_domain(key_domain=0)
assert(e.value.sw == SWCodes.SW_INCORRECT_P1P2)
def test_delete_key_domain(device):
assert(device.get_key_domains() == KEY_DOMAINS)
kd = device.get_key_domain(key_domain=TEST_KEY_DOMAIN)
assert(kd['dkek']['total'] == DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
device.delete_key_domain(key_domain=TEST_KEY_DOMAIN)
assert(device.get_key_domains() == KEY_DOMAINS)
kd = device.get_key_domain(key_domain=TEST_KEY_DOMAIN)
assert('error' in kd)
assert(kd['error'] == 0x6A88)

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@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
import hashlib
from picohsm.const import DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES, DEFAULT_PIN, DEFAULT_RETRIES
from const import DEFAULT_DKEK
def test_dkek(device):
device.initialize(retries=DEFAULT_RETRIES, dkek_shares=DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
device.login(DEFAULT_PIN)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
assert('dkek' in resp)
assert('kcv' in resp)
assert(resp['dkek']['total'] == DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
assert(resp['dkek']['missing'] == DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES-1)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
assert('dkek' in resp)
assert('kcv' in resp)
assert(resp['dkek']['total'] == DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
assert(resp['dkek']['missing'] == DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES-2)
kcv = hashlib.sha256(b'\x00'*32).digest()[:8]
assert(resp['kcv'] == kcv)

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@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
from picohsm import APDUResponse, SWCodes
from picohsm.const import DEFAULT_PIN, DEFAULT_RETRIES
WRONG_PIN = '112233'
def test_pin_init_retries(device):
device.initialize(retries=DEFAULT_RETRIES)
retries = device.get_login_retries()
assert(retries == DEFAULT_RETRIES)
def test_pin_login(device):
device.initialize(retries=DEFAULT_RETRIES)
device.login(DEFAULT_PIN)
def test_pin_retries(device):
device.initialize(retries=DEFAULT_RETRIES)
device.login(DEFAULT_PIN)
for ret in range(DEFAULT_RETRIES-1):
with pytest.raises(APDUResponse) as e:
device.login(WRONG_PIN)
assert(e.value.sw1 == 0x63 and e.value.sw2 == (0xC0 | (DEFAULT_RETRIES-1-ret)))
with pytest.raises(APDUResponse) as e:
device.login(WRONG_PIN)
assert(e.value.sw == SWCodes.SW_PIN_BLOCKED)
device.initialize(retries=DEFAULT_RETRIES)
retries = device.get_login_retries()
assert(retries == DEFAULT_RETRIES)

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@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
from picohsm import KeyType, DOPrefixes
def test_gen_initialize(device):
device.initialize()
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"curve", ['secp192r1', 'secp256r1', 'secp384r1', 'secp521r1', 'brainpoolP256r1', 'brainpoolP384r1', 'brainpoolP512r1', 'secp192k1', 'secp256k1', 'curve25519', 'curve448', 'ed25519', 'ed448']
)
def test_gen_ecc(device, curve):
keyid = device.key_generation(KeyType.ECC, curve)
resp = device.list_keys()
assert((DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid) in resp)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX, keyid)
resp = device.list_keys()
assert((DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid) not in resp)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"modulus", [1024, 2048, 4096]
)
def test_gen_rsa(device, modulus):
keyid = device.key_generation(KeyType.RSA, modulus)
resp = device.list_keys()
assert((DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid) in resp)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX, keyid)

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@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
import hashlib
import os
from picohsm import DOPrefixes
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import rsa, ec, x25519, x448, ed25519, ed448
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.serialization import Encoding, PublicFormat
from picohsm.const import DEFAULT_RETRIES, DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES
from const import DEFAULT_DKEK
def test_prepare_dkek(device):
device.initialize(retries=DEFAULT_RETRIES, dkek_shares=DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
kcv = hashlib.sha256(b'\x00'*32).digest()[:8]
assert(resp['kcv'] == kcv)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"modulus", [1024, 2048, 4096]
)
def test_import_rsa(device, modulus):
pkey = rsa.generate_private_key(
public_exponent=65537,
key_size=modulus,
)
keyid = device.import_key(pkey)
pubkey = device.public_key(keyid)
assert(pubkey.public_numbers() == pkey.public_key().public_numbers())
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX, keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"curve", [ec.SECP192R1, ec.SECP256R1, ec.SECP384R1, ec.SECP521R1, ec.SECP256K1, ec.BrainpoolP256R1, ec.BrainpoolP384R1, ec.BrainpoolP512R1]
)
def test_import_ecc(device, curve):
pkey = ec.generate_private_key(curve())
keyid = device.import_key(pkey)
pubkey = device.public_key(keyid, param=curve().name)
assert(pubkey.public_numbers() == pkey.public_key().public_numbers())
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX, keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"curve", [x25519.X25519PrivateKey, x448.X448PrivateKey]
)
def test_import_montgomery(device, curve):
pkey = curve.generate()
keyid = device.import_key(pkey)
pubkey = device.public_key(keyid, param=curve)
assert(pubkey.public_bytes(Encoding.Raw, PublicFormat.Raw) == pkey.public_key().public_bytes(Encoding.Raw, PublicFormat.Raw))
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX, keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"curve", [ed25519.Ed25519PrivateKey, ed448.Ed448PrivateKey]
)
def test_import_edwards(device, curve):
pkey = curve.generate()
keyid = device.import_key(pkey)
pubkey = device.public_key(keyid, param=curve)
assert(pubkey.public_bytes(Encoding.Raw, PublicFormat.Raw) == pkey.public_key().public_bytes(Encoding.Raw, PublicFormat.Raw))
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX, keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
def test_import_aes(device, size):
pkey = os.urandom(size // 8)
keyid = device.import_key(pkey)

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@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
import hashlib
from picohsm import DOPrefixes
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec, x25519, x448
from picohsm.const import DEFAULT_RETRIES, DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES
from const import DEFAULT_DKEK
def test_prepare_dkek(device):
device.initialize(retries=DEFAULT_RETRIES, dkek_shares=DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
kcv = hashlib.sha256(b'\x00'*32).digest()[:8]
assert(resp['kcv'] == kcv)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"curve", [ec.SECP192R1, ec.SECP256R1, ec.SECP384R1, ec.SECP521R1, ec.SECP256K1, ec.BrainpoolP256R1, ec.BrainpoolP384R1, ec.BrainpoolP512R1]
)
def test_exchange_ecc(device, curve):
pkeyA = ec.generate_private_key(curve())
pbkeyA = pkeyA.public_key()
keyid = device.import_key(pkeyA)
pkeyB = ec.generate_private_key(curve())
pbkeyB = pkeyB.public_key()
sharedB = pkeyB.exchange(ec.ECDH(), pbkeyA)
sharedA = device.exchange(keyid, pbkeyB)
assert(sharedA == sharedB)
sharedAA = pkeyA.exchange(ec.ECDH(), pbkeyB)
assert(sharedA == sharedAA)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX, keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"curve", [x25519.X25519PrivateKey, x448.X448PrivateKey]
)
def test_exchange_montgomery(device, curve):
pkeyA = curve.generate()
pbkeyA = pkeyA.public_key()
keyid = device.import_key(pkeyA)
pkeyB = curve.generate()
pbkeyB = pkeyB.public_key()
sharedB = pkeyB.exchange(pbkeyA)
sharedA = device.exchange(keyid, pbkeyB)
assert(sharedA == sharedB)
sharedAA = pkeyA.exchange(pbkeyB)
assert(sharedA == sharedAA)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX, keyid)

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@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
from picohsm import KeyType, DOPrefixes
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
def test_gen_aes(device, size):
keyid = device.key_generation(KeyType.AES, size)
resp = device.list_keys()
assert((DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid) in resp)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)

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@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2023 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
from picohsm import KeyType, DOPrefixes, APDUResponse, SWCodes
from binascii import hexlify
import hashlib
from const import DEFAULT_DKEK
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import cmac
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers import algorithms, Cipher, modes
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
def test_initialize(device):
device.initialize(key_domains=1)
assert(device.get_key_domains() == 1)
device.set_key_domain(key_domain=0, total=2)
keyid_in = -1
keyid_out = -1
def test_key_generation_no_key_domain(device):
global keyid_out
keyid_out = device.key_generation(KeyType.ECC, 'brainpoolP256r1')
device.put_contents(p1=DOPrefixes.PRKD_PREFIX, p2=keyid_out, data=[0xA0])
resp = device.list_keys()
assert((DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid_out) in resp)
assert((DOPrefixes.PRKD_PREFIX, keyid_out) in resp)
def test_key_generation_with_key_domain(device):
global keyid_in
keyid_in = device.key_generation(KeyType.ECC, 'brainpoolP256r1', key_domain=0)
device.put_contents(p1=DOPrefixes.PRKD_PREFIX, p2=keyid_in, data=[0xA0])
resp = device.list_keys()
assert((DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid_in) in resp)
assert((DOPrefixes.PRKD_PREFIX, keyid_in) in resp)
def test_export_key_out(device):
with pytest.raises(APDUResponse) as e:
device.export_key(keyid_out)
assert(e.value.sw == SWCodes.SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND)
def test_export_key_in_fail(device):
with pytest.raises(APDUResponse) as e:
device.export_key(keyid_in)
assert(e.value.sw == SWCodes.SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND)
def test_export_import_dkek(device):
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK, key_domain=0)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK, key_domain=0)
def test_export_key_in_ok(device):
resp = device.export_key(keyid_in)
kcv = hashlib.sha256(b'\x00'*32).digest()[:8]
assert(kcv == resp[:8])
assert(resp[8] == 12)
assert(resp[9:21] == b"\x00\x0A\x04\x00\x7F\x00\x07\x02\x02\x02\x02\x03")
pkey = hashlib.sha256(b'\x00'*32+b'\x00\x00\x00\x02').digest()
c = cmac.CMAC(algorithms.AES(pkey))
c.update(resp[:-16])
resCMAC = c.finalize()
assert(resCMAC == resp[-16:])
def test_delete_keys_in_out(device):
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid_in)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX, keyid_in)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid_out)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX, keyid_out)
def test_export_import(device):
pkey_gen = ec.generate_private_key(ec.BrainpoolP256R1())
keyid = device.import_key(pkey_gen)
resp = device.export_key(keyid)
kcv = hashlib.sha256(b'\x00'*32).digest()[:8]
assert(kcv == resp[:8])
assert(resp[8] == 12)
assert(resp[9:21] == b"\x00\x0A\x04\x00\x7F\x00\x07\x02\x02\x02\x02\x03")
pkey = hashlib.sha256(b'\x00'*32+b'\x00\x00\x00\x02').digest()
c = cmac.CMAC(algorithms.AES(pkey))
c.update(resp[:-16])
resCMAC = c.finalize()
assert(resCMAC == resp[-16:])
iv = b'\x00'*16
pkey = hashlib.sha256(b'\x00'*32+b'\x00\x00\x00\x01').digest()
cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.CBC(iv))
decryptor = cipher.decryptor()
payload = decryptor.update(resp[27:-16]) + decryptor.finalize()
rnd = payload[:8]
ofs = 8
key_size = int.from_bytes(payload[ofs:ofs+2], 'big')
ofs += 2
A_len = int.from_bytes(payload[ofs:ofs+2], 'big')
ofs += 2+A_len
B_len = int.from_bytes(payload[ofs:ofs+2], 'big')
ofs += 2+B_len
P_len = int.from_bytes(payload[ofs:ofs+2], 'big')
ofs += 2+P_len
N_len = int.from_bytes(payload[ofs:ofs+2], 'big')
ofs += 2+N_len
G_len = int.from_bytes(payload[ofs:ofs+2], 'big')
ofs += 2+G_len
d_len = int.from_bytes(payload[ofs:ofs+2], 'big')
ofs += 2
d = payload[ofs:ofs+d_len]
ofs += d_len
Q_len = int.from_bytes(payload[ofs:ofs+2], 'big')
ofs += 2
Q = payload[ofs:ofs+Q_len]
ofs += Q_len
pkey_ex = ec.EllipticCurvePrivateNumbers(int.from_bytes(d, 'big'), ec.EllipticCurvePublicKey.from_encoded_point(ec.BrainpoolP256R1(), Q).public_numbers()).private_key()
assert(pkey_gen.private_bytes(serialization.Encoding.DER, serialization.PrivateFormat.PKCS8, serialization.NoEncryption()) == pkey_ex.private_bytes(serialization.Encoding.DER, serialization.PrivateFormat.PKCS8, serialization.NoEncryption()))
assert(pkey_gen.public_key().public_bytes(serialization.Encoding.X962, serialization.PublicFormat.UncompressedPoint) == pkey_ex.public_key().public_bytes(serialization.Encoding.X962, serialization.PublicFormat.UncompressedPoint))
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX, keyid)

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@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
from picohsm import KeyType, DOPrefixes, Algorithm
from binascii import hexlify
import hashlib
data = b'Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Nullam neque urna, iaculis quis auctor scelerisque, auctor ut risus. In rhoncus, odio consequat consequat ultrices, ex libero dictum risus, accumsan interdum nisi orci ac neque. Ut vitae sem in metus hendrerit facilisis. Mauris maximus tristique mi, quis blandit lectus convallis eget.'
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"curve", ['secp192r1', 'secp256r1', 'secp384r1', 'secp521r1', 'brainpoolP256r1', 'brainpoolP384r1', 'brainpoolP512r1', 'secp256k1']
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"scheme", [Algorithm.ALGO_EC_RAW, Algorithm.ALGO_EC_SHA1, Algorithm.ALGO_EC_SHA224, Algorithm.ALGO_EC_SHA256, Algorithm.ALGO_EC_SHA384, Algorithm.ALGO_EC_SHA512]
)
def test_signature_ecc(device, curve, scheme):
keyid = device.key_generation(KeyType.ECC, curve)
pubkey = device.public_key(keyid=keyid, param=curve)
if (scheme == Algorithm.ALGO_EC_RAW):
datab = hashlib.sha512(data).digest()
else:
datab = data
signature = device.sign(keyid=keyid, scheme=scheme, data=datab)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
device.verify(pubkey, datab, signature, scheme)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"modulus", [1024,2048,4096]
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"scheme", [Algorithm.ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1, Algorithm.ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA224, Algorithm.ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256, Algorithm.ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384, Algorithm.ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512, Algorithm.ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA1, Algorithm.ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA224, Algorithm.ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA256, Algorithm.ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA384, Algorithm.ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA512]
)
def test_signature_rsa(device, modulus, scheme):
keyid = device.key_generation(KeyType.RSA, modulus)
pubkey = device.public_key(keyid=keyid)
signature = device.sign(keyid=keyid, scheme=scheme, data=data)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
device.verify(pubkey, data, signature, scheme)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"curve", ['ed25519', 'ed448']
)
def test_signature_edwards(device, curve):
keyid = device.key_generation(KeyType.ECC, curve)
pubkey = device.public_key(keyid=keyid)
signature = device.sign(keyid=keyid, scheme=Algorithm.ALGO_EC_RAW, data=data)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
device.verify(pubkey, data, signature)

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@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
from picohsm import KeyType, DOPrefixes
from binascii import hexlify
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import padding
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
data = b'Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Nullam neque urna, iaculis quis auctor scelerisque, auctor ut risus. In rhoncus, odio consequat consequat ultrices, ex libero dictum risus, accumsan interdum nisi orci ac neque. Ut vitae sem in metus hendrerit facilisis. Mauris maximus tristique mi, quis blandit lectus convallis eget.'
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"modulus", [1024,2048,4096]
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"pad", [padding.PKCS1v15(), padding.OAEP(
mgf=padding.MGF1(algorithm=hashes.SHA256()),
algorithm=hashes.SHA256(),
label=None
)]
)
def test_decrypt_rsa(device, modulus, pad):
keyid = device.key_generation(KeyType.RSA, modulus)
pubkey = device.public_key(keyid=keyid)
message = data[:(modulus//8)-100]
ciphered = pubkey.encrypt(message, pad)
datab = device.decrypt(keyid, ciphered, pad)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
assert(datab == message)

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@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
import os
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers import Cipher, algorithms, modes
from picohsm import Algorithm, DOPrefixes
from picohsm.const import DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES
from const import DEFAULT_DKEK
MESSAGE = b'a secret message'
def test_prepare_aes(device):
device.initialize(dkek_shares=DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
def test_cipher_aes_cipher(device, size):
pkey = os.urandom(size // 8)
iv = b'\x00'*16
keyid = device.import_key(pkey)
cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.CBC(iv))
encryptor = cipher.encryptor()
ctA = encryptor.update(MESSAGE) + encryptor.finalize()
ctB = device.cipher(Algorithm.ALGO_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT, keyid, MESSAGE)
assert(ctB == ctA)
decryptor = cipher.decryptor()
plA = decryptor.update(ctA) + decryptor.finalize()
plB = device.cipher(Algorithm.ALGO_AES_CBC_DECRYPT, keyid, ctA)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
assert(plB == plA)
assert(plB == MESSAGE)

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@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
import os
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers import aead
import cryptography.exceptions
from picohsm import APDUResponse, DOPrefixes, EncryptionMode, SWCodes
from picohsm.const import DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES
from const import DEFAULT_DKEK
from binascii import hexlify
MESSAGE = b'a secret message'
AAD = b'this is a tag for AAD'
def test_prepare_chachapoly(device):
device.initialize(dkek_shares=DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
def generate_key(device):
# ChaCha uses 32 bytes key
pkey = os.urandom(256 // 8)
keyid = device.import_key(pkey)
return pkey, keyid
def test_cipher_chachapoly_cipher(device):
iv = b'\x00'*12
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device)
ctd = device.chachapoly(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, data=MESSAGE, aad=AAD)
chacha = aead.ChaCha20Poly1305(pkey)
ctg = chacha.encrypt(iv, MESSAGE, AAD)
assert(ctd == ctg)
pld = device.chachapoly(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, data=ctd, aad=AAD)
plg = chacha.decrypt(iv, ctg, AAD)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
assert(pld == plg)
assert(pld == MESSAGE)
def test_cipher_chachapoly_random_iv(device):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device)
iv = os.urandom(12)
ctd = device.chachapoly(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, data=MESSAGE, iv=iv, aad=AAD)
chacha = aead.ChaCha20Poly1305(pkey)
ctg = chacha.encrypt(iv, MESSAGE, AAD)
assert(ctd == ctg)
pld = device.chachapoly(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, data=ctd, iv=iv, aad=AAD)
plg = chacha.decrypt(iv, ctg, AAD)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
assert(pld == plg)
assert(pld == MESSAGE)
def test_cipher_chachapoly_no_aad(device):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device)
iv = os.urandom(12)
ctd = device.chachapoly(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, data=MESSAGE, iv=iv)
chacha = aead.ChaCha20Poly1305(pkey)
ctg = chacha.encrypt(iv, MESSAGE, b'')
assert(ctd == ctg)
pld = device.chachapoly(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, data=ctd, iv=iv)
plg = chacha.decrypt(iv, ctg, b'')
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
assert(pld == plg)
assert(pld == MESSAGE)
def test_cipher_chachapoly_bad_random_iv(device):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device)
iv = os.urandom(12)
ctd = device.chachapoly(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, data=MESSAGE, iv=iv, aad=AAD)
chacha = aead.ChaCha20Poly1305(pkey)
ctg = chacha.encrypt(iv, MESSAGE, AAD)
assert(ctd == ctg)
iv = os.urandom(12)
with pytest.raises(APDUResponse) as e:
pld = device.chachapoly(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, data=ctd, iv=iv, aad=AAD)
assert (e.value.sw == SWCodes.SW_WRONG_DATA)
with pytest.raises(cryptography.exceptions.InvalidTag):
plg = chacha.decrypt(iv, ctg, AAD)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
def test_cipher_chachapoly_bad_aad(device):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device)
iv = os.urandom(12)
ctd = device.chachapoly(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, data=MESSAGE, iv=iv, aad=AAD)
chacha = aead.ChaCha20Poly1305(pkey)
ctg = chacha.encrypt(iv, MESSAGE, AAD)
assert(ctd == ctg)
with pytest.raises(APDUResponse) as e:
pld = device.chachapoly(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, data=ctd, iv=iv, aad=AAD + b'bad')
assert (e.value.sw == SWCodes.SW_WRONG_DATA)
with pytest.raises(cryptography.exceptions.InvalidTag):
plg = chacha.decrypt(iv, ctg, AAD + b'bad')
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,342 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
import os
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers import Cipher, algorithms, modes, aead
import cryptography.exceptions
from picohsm import APDUResponse, DOPrefixes, EncryptionMode, SWCodes, AES
from picohsm.const import DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES
from const import DEFAULT_DKEK
from binascii import hexlify
MESSAGE = b'a secret message'
AAD = b'this is a tag for AAD'
def test_prepare_aes(device):
device.initialize(dkek_shares=DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
def generate_key(device, size):
pkey = os.urandom(size // 8)
keyid = device.import_key(pkey)
return pkey, keyid
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
def test_aes_ecb(device, size):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device, size)
ctA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, AES.ECB, MESSAGE)
cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.ECB())
encryptor = cipher.encryptor()
ctB = encryptor.update(MESSAGE) + encryptor.finalize()
assert(ctA == ctB)
dtA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, AES.ECB, ctA)
decryptor = cipher.decryptor()
dtB = decryptor.update(ctB) + decryptor.finalize()
assert(dtA == dtB)
assert(dtA == MESSAGE)
device.delete_key(keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
def test_aes_cbc_no_iv(device, size):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device, size)
ctA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, AES.CBC, MESSAGE)
iv = b'\x00' * 16
cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.CBC(iv))
encryptor = cipher.encryptor()
ctB = encryptor.update(MESSAGE) + encryptor.finalize()
assert(ctA == ctB)
dtA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, AES.CBC, ctA)
decryptor = cipher.decryptor()
dtB = decryptor.update(ctB) + decryptor.finalize()
assert(dtA == dtB)
assert(dtA == MESSAGE)
device.delete_key(keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
def test_aes_cbc_iv(device, size):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device, size)
iv = os.urandom(16)
ctA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, AES.CBC, MESSAGE, iv=iv)
cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.CBC(iv))
encryptor = cipher.encryptor()
ctB = encryptor.update(MESSAGE) + encryptor.finalize()
assert(ctA == ctB)
dtA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, AES.CBC, ctA, iv=iv)
decryptor = cipher.decryptor()
dtB = decryptor.update(ctB) + decryptor.finalize()
assert(dtA == dtB)
assert(dtA == MESSAGE)
device.delete_key(keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
def test_aes_ofb_no_iv(device, size):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device, size)
ctA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, AES.OFB, MESSAGE)
iv = b'\x00' * 16
cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.OFB(iv))
encryptor = cipher.encryptor()
ctB = encryptor.update(MESSAGE) + encryptor.finalize()
assert(ctA == ctB)
dtA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, AES.OFB, ctA)
decryptor = cipher.decryptor()
dtB = decryptor.update(ctB) + decryptor.finalize()
assert(dtA == dtB)
assert(dtA == MESSAGE)
device.delete_key(keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
def test_aes_ofb_iv(device, size):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device, size)
iv = os.urandom(16)
ctA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, AES.OFB, MESSAGE, iv=iv)
cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.OFB(iv))
encryptor = cipher.encryptor()
ctB = encryptor.update(MESSAGE) + encryptor.finalize()
assert(ctA == ctB)
dtA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, AES.OFB, ctA, iv=iv)
decryptor = cipher.decryptor()
dtB = decryptor.update(ctB) + decryptor.finalize()
assert(dtA == dtB)
assert(dtA == MESSAGE)
device.delete_key(keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
def test_aes_cfb_no_iv(device, size):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device, size)
ctA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, AES.CFB, MESSAGE)
iv = b'\x00' * 16
cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.CFB(iv))
encryptor = cipher.encryptor()
ctB = encryptor.update(MESSAGE) + encryptor.finalize()
assert(ctA == ctB)
dtA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, AES.CFB, ctA)
decryptor = cipher.decryptor()
dtB = decryptor.update(ctB) + decryptor.finalize()
assert(dtA == dtB)
assert(dtA == MESSAGE)
device.delete_key(keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
def test_aes_cfb_iv(device, size):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device, size)
iv = os.urandom(16)
ctA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, AES.CFB, MESSAGE, iv=iv)
cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.CFB(iv))
encryptor = cipher.encryptor()
ctB = encryptor.update(MESSAGE) + encryptor.finalize()
assert(ctA == ctB)
dtA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, AES.CFB, ctA, iv=iv)
decryptor = cipher.decryptor()
dtB = decryptor.update(ctB) + decryptor.finalize()
assert(dtA == dtB)
assert(dtA == MESSAGE)
device.delete_key(keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
def test_aes_gcm_no_iv(device, size):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device, size)
ctA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, AES.GCM, MESSAGE, aad=AAD)
iv = b'\x00' * 16
encryptor = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.GCM(iv)).encryptor()
encryptor.authenticate_additional_data(AAD)
ctB = encryptor.update(MESSAGE) + encryptor.finalize()
assert(ctA == ctB + encryptor.tag)
dtA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, AES.GCM, ctA, aad=AAD)
decryptor = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.GCM(iv, encryptor.tag)).decryptor()
decryptor.authenticate_additional_data(AAD)
dtB = decryptor.update(ctB) + decryptor.finalize()
assert(dtA == dtB)
assert(dtA == MESSAGE)
device.delete_key(keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
def test_aes_gcm_iv(device, size):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device, size)
iv = os.urandom(16)
ctA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, AES.GCM, MESSAGE, iv=iv, aad=AAD)
encryptor = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.GCM(iv)).encryptor()
encryptor.authenticate_additional_data(AAD)
ctB = encryptor.update(MESSAGE) + encryptor.finalize()
assert(ctA == ctB + encryptor.tag)
dtA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, AES.GCM, ctA, iv=iv, aad=AAD)
decryptor = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.GCM(iv, encryptor.tag)).decryptor()
decryptor.authenticate_additional_data(AAD)
dtB = decryptor.update(ctB) + decryptor.finalize()
assert(dtA == dtB)
assert(dtA == MESSAGE)
device.delete_key(keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [256, 512]
)
def test_aes_xts_no_iv(device, size):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device, size)
ctA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, AES.XTS, MESSAGE)
iv = b'\x00' * 16
cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.XTS(iv))
encryptor = cipher.encryptor()
ctB = encryptor.update(MESSAGE) + encryptor.finalize()
assert(ctA == ctB)
dtA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, AES.XTS, ctA)
decryptor = cipher.decryptor()
dtB = decryptor.update(ctB) + decryptor.finalize()
assert(dtA == dtB)
assert(dtA == MESSAGE)
device.delete_key(keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [256, 512]
)
def test_aes_xts_iv(device, size):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device, size)
iv = os.urandom(16)
ctA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, AES.XTS, MESSAGE, iv=iv)
cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.XTS(iv))
encryptor = cipher.encryptor()
ctB = encryptor.update(MESSAGE) + encryptor.finalize()
assert(ctA == ctB)
dtA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, AES.XTS, ctA, iv=iv)
decryptor = cipher.decryptor()
dtB = decryptor.update(ctB) + decryptor.finalize()
assert(dtA == dtB)
assert(dtA == MESSAGE)
device.delete_key(keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
def test_aes_ctr_no_iv(device, size):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device, size)
ctA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, AES.CTR, MESSAGE)
iv = b'\x00' * 16
cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.CTR(iv))
encryptor = cipher.encryptor()
ctB = encryptor.update(MESSAGE) + encryptor.finalize()
assert(ctA == ctB)
dtA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, AES.CTR, ctA)
decryptor = cipher.decryptor()
dtB = decryptor.update(ctB) + decryptor.finalize()
assert(dtA == dtB)
assert(dtA == MESSAGE)
device.delete_key(keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
def test_aes_ctr_iv(device, size):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device, size)
iv = os.urandom(16)
ctA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, AES.CTR, MESSAGE, iv=iv)
cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.CTR(iv))
encryptor = cipher.encryptor()
ctB = encryptor.update(MESSAGE) + encryptor.finalize()
assert(ctA == ctB)
dtA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, AES.CTR, ctA, iv=iv)
decryptor = cipher.decryptor()
dtB = decryptor.update(ctB) + decryptor.finalize()
assert(dtA == dtB)
assert(dtA == MESSAGE)
device.delete_key(keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
def test_aes_ccm_no_iv(device, size):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device, size)
ctA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, AES.CCM, MESSAGE, aad=AAD)
iv = b'\x00' * 12
encryptor = aead.AESCCM(pkey)
ctB = encryptor.encrypt(iv, MESSAGE, AAD)
assert(ctA == ctB)
dtA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, AES.CCM, ctA, aad=AAD)
decryptor = encryptor
dtB = decryptor.decrypt(iv, ctB, AAD)
assert(dtA == dtB)
assert(dtA == MESSAGE)
device.delete_key(keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"iv_len", [7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13]
)
def test_aes_ccm_iv(device, size, iv_len):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device, size)
iv = os.urandom(iv_len)
ctA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, AES.CCM, MESSAGE, iv=iv, aad=AAD)
encryptor = aead.AESCCM(pkey)
ctB = encryptor.encrypt(iv, MESSAGE, AAD)
assert(ctA == ctB)
dtA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, AES.CCM, ctA, iv=iv, aad=AAD)
decryptor = encryptor
dtB = decryptor.decrypt(iv, ctB, AAD)
assert(dtA == dtB)
assert(dtA == MESSAGE)
device.delete_key(keyid)

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
import os
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes, hmac, cmac
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers import algorithms
from picohsm import DOPrefixes
from picohsm.const import DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES
from const import DEFAULT_DKEK
MESSAGE = b'a secret message'
def test_prepare_aes(device):
device.initialize(dkek_shares=DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"algo", [hashes.SHA1, hashes.SHA224, hashes.SHA256, hashes.SHA384, hashes.SHA512]
)
def test_mac_hmac(device, size, algo):
pkey = os.urandom(size // 8)
keyid = device.import_key(pkey)
resA = device.hmac(algo, keyid, MESSAGE)
h = hmac.HMAC(pkey, algo())
h.update(MESSAGE)
resB = h.finalize()
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
assert(resA == resB)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
def test_mac_cmac(device, size):
pkey = os.urandom(size // 8)
keyid = device.import_key(pkey)
resA = device.cmac(keyid, MESSAGE)
c = cmac.CMAC(algorithms.AES(pkey))
c.update(MESSAGE)
resB = c.finalize()
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
assert(resA == resB)

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@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
import os
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.kdf.hkdf import HKDF
from cryptography import exceptions
from picohsm.const import DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES
from const import DEFAULT_DKEK
from picohsm import DOPrefixes
INFO = b'info message'
def test_prepare_kd(device):
device.initialize(dkek_shares=DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"algo", [hashes.SHA256, hashes.SHA384, hashes.SHA512]
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"out_len", [32, 64, 256, 1024]
)
class TestHKDF:
def test_hkdf_ok(self, device, size, algo, out_len):
pkey = os.urandom(size // 8)
keyid = device.import_key(pkey)
salt = os.urandom(16)
resA = device.hkdf(algo, keyid, INFO, salt, out_len=out_len)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
hkdf = HKDF(
algorithm=algo(),
length=out_len,
salt=salt,
info=INFO,
)
resB = hkdf.derive(pkey)
assert(resA == resB)
hkdf = HKDF(
algorithm=algo(),
length=out_len,
salt=salt,
info=INFO,
)
hkdf.verify(pkey, resA)
def test_hkdf_fail(self, device, size, algo, out_len):
pkey = os.urandom(size // 8)
keyid = device.import_key(pkey)
salt = os.urandom(16)
resA = device.hkdf(algo, keyid, INFO, salt, out_len=out_len)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
hkdf = HKDF(
algorithm=algo(),
length=out_len,
salt=salt,
info=INFO,
)
pkey = os.urandom(size // 8)
with pytest.raises(exceptions.InvalidKey):
hkdf.verify(pkey, resA)

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@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
import os
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.kdf.pbkdf2 import PBKDF2HMAC
from cryptography import exceptions
from picohsm.const import DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES
from const import DEFAULT_DKEK
from picohsm import DOPrefixes
INFO = b'info message'
def test_prepare_kd(device):
device.initialize(dkek_shares=DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"algo", [hashes.SHA1, hashes.SHA224, hashes.SHA256, hashes.SHA384, hashes.SHA512]
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"out_len", [32, 64, 256, 1024]
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"iterations", [1024, 2048]
)
class TestPBKDF2:
def test_pbkdf2_ok(self, device, size, algo, out_len, iterations):
pkey = os.urandom(size // 8)
keyid = device.import_key(pkey)
salt = os.urandom(16)
resA = device.pbkdf2(algo, keyid, salt, iterations=iterations, out_len=out_len)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
kdf = PBKDF2HMAC(
algorithm=algo(),
length=out_len,
salt=salt,
iterations=iterations,
)
resB = kdf.derive(pkey)
assert(resA == resB)
kdf = PBKDF2HMAC(
algorithm=algo(),
length=out_len,
salt=salt,
iterations=iterations,
)
kdf.verify(pkey, resA)
def test_pbkdf2_fail(self, device, size, algo, out_len, iterations):
pkey = os.urandom(size // 8)
keyid = device.import_key(pkey)
salt = os.urandom(16)
resA = device.pbkdf2(algo, keyid, salt, iterations=iterations, out_len=out_len)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
kdf = PBKDF2HMAC(
algorithm=algo(),
length=out_len,
salt=salt,
iterations=iterations,
)
pkey = os.urandom(size // 8)
with pytest.raises(exceptions.InvalidKey):
kdf.verify(pkey, resA)

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@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
import os
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.kdf.x963kdf import X963KDF
from cryptography import exceptions
from picohsm.const import DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES
from const import DEFAULT_DKEK
from picohsm import DOPrefixes
INFO = b'shared message'
def test_prepare_kd(device):
device.initialize(dkek_shares=DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"algo", [hashes.SHA1, hashes.SHA224, hashes.SHA256, hashes.SHA384, hashes.SHA512]
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"out_len", [32, 64, 256, 1024]
)
class TestX963:
def test_x963_ok(self, device, size, algo, out_len):
pkey = os.urandom(size // 8)
keyid = device.import_key(pkey)
resA = device.x963(algo, keyid, INFO, out_len=out_len)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
xkdf = X963KDF(
algorithm=algo(),
length=out_len,
sharedinfo=INFO,
)
resB = xkdf.derive(pkey)
assert(resA == resB)
xkdf = X963KDF(
algorithm=algo(),
length=out_len,
sharedinfo=INFO,
)
xkdf.verify(pkey, resA)
def test_x963_fail(self, device, size, algo, out_len):
pkey = os.urandom(size // 8)
keyid = device.import_key(pkey)
resA = device.x963(algo, keyid, INFO, out_len=out_len)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
xkdf = X963KDF(
algorithm=algo(),
length=out_len,
sharedinfo=INFO,
)
pkey = os.urandom(size // 8)
with pytest.raises(exceptions.InvalidKey):
xkdf.verify(pkey, resA)

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@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2023 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
from binascii import unhexlify, hexlify
from cvc.certificates import CVC
from picohsm.utils import int_to_bytes
from picohsm import APDUResponse, SWCodes
from const import TERM_CERT, DICA_CERT
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec, utils
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
AUT_KEY = unhexlify('0A40E11E672C28C558B72C25D93BCF28C08D39AFDD5A1A2FD3BAF7A6B27F0C2E')
aut_pk = ec.derive_private_key(int.from_bytes(AUT_KEY, 'big'), ec.BrainpoolP256R1())
AUT_PUK = unhexlify('678201ed7f218201937f4e82014b5f290100421045535049434f48534d54525a474e50327f4982011d060a04007f000702020202038120a9fb57dba1eea9bc3e660a909d838d726e3bf623d52620282013481d1f6e537782207d5a0975fc2c3057eef67530417affe7fb8055c126dc5c6ce94a4b44f330b5d9832026dc5c6ce94a4b44f330b5d9bbd77cbf958416295cf7e1ce6bccdc18ff8c07b68441048bd2aeb9cb7e57cb2c4b482ffc81b7afb9de27e1e3bd23c23a4453bd9ace3262547ef835c3dac4fd97f8461a14611dc9c27745132ded8e545c1d54c72f0469978520a9fb57dba1eea9bc3e660a909d838d718c397aa3b561a6f7901e0e82974856a78641040cc18ce246da678239af0913a1579dda58c07be404da4a65327794fac93f57a333267979905b5d046da7020226cc4e5fc477e8fc651a0cf87095259aafa88e648701015f201045535049434f48534d54525a474e50325f37401fc90bdab2a58c3cd25f18a90baa2c21d3d087002ba240fb274ff066759297f79e130053d902d637a448c8cdcd0670fe8ebcc06d8a3ee82079f08d1ff8660393421045535049434f48534d54525a474e50325f3740e24e7e23eae3c78f9fa88391004369a293c43ef99e2279170983e1dbe707fbf0382d09de3e60ef1addd2f055947c3efcef17926065ddb7a031f4905da474ed1d')
term_chr = CVC().decode(TERM_CERT).chr()
def test_initialize(device):
device.initialize(puk_auts=1, puk_min_auts=1)
device.logout()
def test_register_puk(device):
status = device.get_puk_status()
assert(status == bytes([1,1,1,0]))
status = device.register_puk(AUT_PUK, TERM_CERT, DICA_CERT)
assert(status == bytes([1,0,1,0]))
assert(device.check_puk_key(term_chr) == 0)
def test_enumerate_puk_reg(device):
puks = device.enumerate_puk()
assert(len(puks) == 1)
assert(puks[0]['status'] == 0)
def test_authentication(device):
input = device.puk_prepare_signature()
signature = aut_pk.sign(input, ec.ECDSA(hashes.SHA256()))
r,s = utils.decode_dss_signature(signature)
signature = list(int_to_bytes(r) + int_to_bytes(s))
device.authenticate_puk(term_chr, signature)
status = device.get_puk_status()
assert(status == bytes([1,0,1,1]))
def test_enumerate_puk_ok(device):
puks = device.enumerate_puk()
assert(len(puks) == 1)
assert(puks[0]['status'] == 1)
def test_check_key(device):
assert(device.check_puk_key(term_chr) == 1)
bad_chr = b'XXXXX'
assert(device.check_puk_key(bad_chr) == -1)
assert(device.check_puk_key(bad_chr) != 0)
assert(device.check_puk_key(bad_chr) != 1)
def test_puk_reset(device):
device.logout()
status = device.get_puk_status()
assert(status == bytes([1,0,1,0]))
assert(device.check_puk_key(term_chr) == 0)
def test_authentication_fail(device):
input = b'this is a fake input'
signature = aut_pk.sign(input, ec.ECDSA(hashes.SHA256()))
r,s = utils.decode_dss_signature(signature)
signature = list(int_to_bytes(r) + int_to_bytes(s))
with pytest.raises(APDUResponse) as e:
device.authenticate_puk(term_chr, signature)
assert(e.value.sw == SWCodes.SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED)
status = device.get_puk_status()
assert(status == bytes([1,0,1,0]))
assert(device.check_puk_key(term_chr) == 0)
def test_enumerate_puk_1(device):
device.initialize(puk_auts=1, puk_min_auts=1)
puks = device.enumerate_puk()
assert(len(puks) == 1)
assert(puks[0]['status'] == -1)
device.register_puk(AUT_PUK, TERM_CERT, DICA_CERT)
puks = device.enumerate_puk()
assert(len(puks) == 1)
assert(puks[0]['status'] == 0)
def test_enumerate_puk_2(device):
device.initialize(puk_auts=2, puk_min_auts=1)
puks = device.enumerate_puk()
assert(len(puks) == 2)
assert(puks[0]['status'] == -1)
assert(puks[1]['status'] == -1)
device.register_puk(AUT_PUK, TERM_CERT, DICA_CERT)
puks = device.enumerate_puk()
assert(len(puks) == 2)
assert(puks[0]['status'] == 0)
assert(puks[1]['status'] == -1)
def test_register_more_puks(device):
device.initialize(puk_auts=2, puk_min_auts=1)
status = device.get_puk_status()
assert(status == bytes([2,2,1,0]))
status = device.register_puk(AUT_PUK, TERM_CERT, DICA_CERT)
assert(status == bytes([2,1,1,0]))
def test_is_pku(device):
device.initialize(puk_auts=1, puk_min_auts=1)
assert(device.is_puk() == True)
device.initialize()
assert(device.is_puk() == False)
def test_check_puk_key(device):
device.initialize(puk_auts=1, puk_min_auts=1)
status = device.check_puk_key(term_chr)
assert(status == -1)
status = device.register_puk(AUT_PUK, TERM_CERT, DICA_CERT)
status = device.check_puk_key(term_chr)
assert(status == 0)
def test_register_puk_with_no_puk(device):
device.initialize()
with pytest.raises(APDUResponse) as e:
device.register_puk(AUT_PUK, TERM_CERT, DICA_CERT)
assert(e.value.sw == SWCodes.SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND)

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@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2023 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
from binascii import unhexlify, hexlify
from picohsm.utils import int_to_bytes
from const import TERM_CERT, DICA_CERT
from cvc.asn1 import ASN1
from cvc.certificates import CVC
from cvc import oid
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec
from picohsm import DOPrefixes, APDUResponse, SWCodes
KDM = unhexlify(b'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')
def test_initialize(device):
device.initialize(key_domains=1)
device.logout()
def test_create_xkek(device):
with pytest.raises(APDUResponse) as e:
device.create_xkek(KDM)
assert(e.value.sw == SWCodes.SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED)
device.login()
kcv, did = device.create_xkek(KDM)
assert(kcv == b'\x00'*8)
gskcert = ASN1().decode(KDM).find(0x30).find(0x63).data()
gskQ = CVC().decode(gskcert).pubkey().find(0x86).data()
pub = ec.EllipticCurvePublicKey.from_encoded_point(ec.BrainpoolP256R1(), bytes(gskQ))
assert(did == int_to_bytes(pub.public_numbers().x)+int_to_bytes(pub.public_numbers().y))
keyid = -1
def test_derive_xkek(device):
global keyid
keyid = device.generate_xkek_key()
resp = device.list_keys()
assert((DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid) in resp)
xkek_dom = device.get_key_domain()['xkek']
pkey = ec.generate_private_key(ec.BrainpoolP256R1())
pubkey = pkey.public_key()
cert = CVC().cert(pubkey=pubkey, scheme=oid.ID_TA_ECDSA_SHA_256, signkey=pkey, signscheme=oid.ID_TA_ECDSA_SHA_256, car=b"UTCA00001", chr=b"UTCDUMMY00001", extensions=[
{
'tag': 0x73,
'oid': b'\x2B\x06\x01\x04\x01\x81\xC3\x1F\x03\x02\x02',
'contexts': {
0: xkek_dom
}
}
]).encode()
device.derive_xkek(keyid, cert)
resp = device.get_key_domain()
assert(resp['kcv'] != b'\x00'*8)
def test_delete_xkek(device):
device.delete_xkek()
resp = device.get_key_domain()
assert(resp['kcv'] == b'\x00'*8)
def test_delete_domain_with_key(device):
with pytest.raises(APDUResponse) as e:
device.delete_key_domain()
assert(e.value.sw == SWCodes.SW_FILE_EXISTS)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX, keyid)
def test_delete_domain(device):
device.delete_key_domain()
resp = device.get_key_domain()
assert('kcv' not in resp)
assert('xkek' not in resp)
assert('error' in resp)
assert(resp['error'] == SWCodes.SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND)

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@@ -0,0 +1,453 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2023 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
from binascii import unhexlify, hexlify
from picohsm.utils import int_to_bytes
from picohsm.const import DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES
from const import DEFAULT_DKEK
from cvc.asn1 import ASN1
from cvc.certificates import CVC
from cvc import oid
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
from picohsm import EncryptionMode, APDUResponse, SWCodes, PicoHSM
import hashlib
TEST_STRING = b'Pico Keys are awesome!'
def sha256_sha256(data):
return hashlib.sha256(hashlib.sha256(data).digest()).digest()
def test_initialize(device):
device.initialize(dkek_shares=DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
seeds = [
{
'name': 'secp256k1',
'id': 0,
'seed': unhexlify('000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f'),
},
{
'name': 'secp256k1',
'id': 1,
'seed': unhexlify('fffcf9f6f3f0edeae7e4e1dedbd8d5d2cfccc9c6c3c0bdbab7b4b1aeaba8a5a29f9c999693908d8a8784817e7b7875726f6c696663605d5a5754514e4b484542'),
},
{
'name': 'secp256k1',
'id': 2,
'seed': unhexlify('4b381541583be4423346c643850da4b320e46a87ae3d2a4e6da11eba819cd4acba45d239319ac14f863b8d5ab5a0d0c64d2e8a1e7d1457df2e5a3c51c73235be'),
},
{
'name': 'secp256k1',
'id': 3,
'seed': unhexlify('3ddd5602285899a946114506157c7997e5444528f3003f6134712147db19b678'),
},
{
'name': 'secp256r1',
'id': 4,
'seed': unhexlify('000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f'),
},
{
'name': 'secp256r1',
'id': 5,
'seed': unhexlify('fffcf9f6f3f0edeae7e4e1dedbd8d5d2cfccc9c6c3c0bdbab7b4b1aeaba8a5a29f9c999693908d8a8784817e7b7875726f6c696663605d5a5754514e4b484542'),
},
{
'name': 'secp256r1',
'id': 6,
'seed': unhexlify('a7305bc8df8d0951f0cb224c0e95d7707cbdf2c6ce7e8d481fec69c7ff5e9446'),
},
{
'name': 'symmetric',
'id': 7,
'seed': unhexlify('c76c4ac4f4e4a00d6b274d5c39c700bb4a7ddc04fbc6f78e85ca75007b5b495f74a9043eeb77bdd53aa6fc3a0e31462270316fa04b8c19114c8798706cd02ac8'),
},
]
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"seed", seeds
)
def test_generate_master(device, seed):
resp = device.hd_generate_master_node(curve=seed['name'], id=seed['id'], seed=seed['seed'])
def hardened(i):
return 0x80000000 + i
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"path", [
{
'path': [0],
'xpub': b'xpub661MyMwAqRbcFtXgS5sYJABqqG9YLmC4Q1Rdap9gSE8NqtwybGhePY2gZ29ESFjqJoCu1Rupje8YtGqsefD265TMg7usUDFdp6W1EGMcet8',
},
{
'path': [0, hardened(0)],
'xpub': b'xpub68Gmy5EdvgibQVfPdqkBBCHxA5htiqg55crXYuXoQRKfDBFA1WEjWgP6LHhwBZeNK1VTsfTFUHCdrfp1bgwQ9xv5ski8PX9rL2dZXvgGDnw',
},
{
'path': [0, hardened(0), 1],
'xpub': b'xpub6ASuArnXKPbfEwhqN6e3mwBcDTgzisQN1wXN9BJcM47sSikHjJf3UFHKkNAWbWMiGj7Wf5uMash7SyYq527Hqck2AxYysAA7xmALppuCkwQ',
},
{
'path': [0, hardened(0), 1, hardened(2)],
'xpub': b'xpub6D4BDPcP2GT577Vvch3R8wDkScZWzQzMMUm3PWbmWvVJrZwQY4VUNgqFJPMM3No2dFDFGTsxxpG5uJh7n7epu4trkrX7x7DogT5Uv6fcLW5',
},
{
'path': [0, hardened(0), 1, hardened(2), 2],
'xpub': b'xpub6FHa3pjLCk84BayeJxFW2SP4XRrFd1JYnxeLeU8EqN3vDfZmbqBqaGJAyiLjTAwm6ZLRQUMv1ZACTj37sR62cfN7fe5JnJ7dh8zL4fiyLHV',
},
{
'path': [0, hardened(0), 1, hardened(2), 2, 1000000000],
'xpub': b'xpub6H1LXWLaKsWFhvm6RVpEL9P4KfRZSW7abD2ttkWP3SSQvnyA8FSVqNTEcYFgJS2UaFcxupHiYkro49S8yGasTvXEYBVPamhGW6cFJodrTHy',
},
{
'path': [1],
'xpub': b'xpub661MyMwAqRbcFW31YEwpkMuc5THy2PSt5bDMsktWQcFF8syAmRUapSCGu8ED9W6oDMSgv6Zz8idoc4a6mr8BDzTJY47LJhkJ8UB7WEGuduB',
},
{
'path': [1, 0],
'xpub': b'xpub69H7F5d8KSRgmmdJg2KhpAK8SR3DjMwAdkxj3ZuxV27CprR9LgpeyGmXUbC6wb7ERfvrnKZjXoUmmDznezpbZb7ap6r1D3tgFxHmwMkQTPH',
},
{
'path': [1, 0, hardened(2147483647)],
'xpub': b'xpub6ASAVgeehLbnwdqV6UKMHVzgqAG8Gr6riv3Fxxpj8ksbH9ebxaEyBLZ85ySDhKiLDBrQSARLq1uNRts8RuJiHjaDMBU4Zn9h8LZNnBC5y4a',
},
{
'path': [1, 0, hardened(2147483647), 1],
'xpub': b'xpub6DF8uhdarytz3FWdA8TvFSvvAh8dP3283MY7p2V4SeE2wyWmG5mg5EwVvmdMVCQcoNJxGoWaU9DCWh89LojfZ537wTfunKau47EL2dhHKon',
},
{
'path': [1, 0, hardened(2147483647), 1, hardened(2147483646)],
'xpub': b'xpub6ERApfZwUNrhLCkDtcHTcxd75RbzS1ed54G1LkBUHQVHQKqhMkhgbmJbZRkrgZw4koxb5JaHWkY4ALHY2grBGRjaDMzQLcgJvLJuZZvRcEL',
},
{
'path': [1, 0, hardened(2147483647), 1, hardened(2147483646), 2],
'xpub': b'xpub6FnCn6nSzZAw5Tw7cgR9bi15UV96gLZhjDstkXXxvCLsUXBGXPdSnLFbdpq8p9HmGsApME5hQTZ3emM2rnY5agb9rXpVGyy3bdW6EEgAtqt',
},
{
'path': [2],
'xpub': b'xpub661MyMwAqRbcEZVB4dScxMAdx6d4nFc9nvyvH3v4gJL378CSRZiYmhRoP7mBy6gSPSCYk6SzXPTf3ND1cZAceL7SfJ1Z3GC8vBgp2epUt13',
},
{
'path': [2, hardened(0)],
'xpub': b'xpub68NZiKmJWnxxS6aaHmn81bvJeTESw724CRDs6HbuccFQN9Ku14VQrADWgqbhhTHBaohPX4CjNLf9fq9MYo6oDaPPLPxSb7gwQN3ih19Zm4Y',
},
{
'path': [3],
'xpub': b'xpub661MyMwAqRbcGczjuMoRm6dXaLDEhW1u34gKenbeYqAix21mdUKJyuyu5F1rzYGVxyL6tmgBUAEPrEz92mBXjByMRiJdba9wpnN37RLLAXa',
},
{
'path': [3, hardened(0)],
'xpub': b'xpub69AUMk3qDBi3uW1sXgjCmVjJ2G6WQoYSnNHyzkmdCHEhSZ4tBok37xfFEqHd2AddP56Tqp4o56AePAgCjYdvpW2PU2jbUPFKsav5ut6Ch1m',
},
{
'path': [3, hardened(0), hardened(1)],
'xpub': b'xpub6BJA1jSqiukeaesWfxe6sNK9CCGaujFFSJLomWHprUL9DePQ4JDkM5d88n49sMGJxrhpjazuXYWdMf17C9T5XnxkopaeS7jGk1GyyVziaMt',
},
]
)
def test_derive_node_bip(device, path):
resp = device.hd_derive_node(path['path'])
assert(resp == path['xpub'])
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"path", [
{
'path': [0],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('00000000'),
'chain': unhexlify('873dff81c02f525623fd1fe5167eac3a55a049de3d314bb42ee227ffed37d508'),
'public': unhexlify('0339a36013301597daef41fbe593a02cc513d0b55527ec2df1050e2e8ff49c85c2')
},
{
'path': [0, hardened(0)],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('3442193e'),
'chain': unhexlify('47fdacbd0f1097043b78c63c20c34ef4ed9a111d980047ad16282c7ae6236141'),
'public': unhexlify('035a784662a4a20a65bf6aab9ae98a6c068a81c52e4b032c0fb5400c706cfccc56')
},
{
'path': [0, hardened(0), 1],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('5c1bd648'),
'chain': unhexlify('2a7857631386ba23dacac34180dd1983734e444fdbf774041578e9b6adb37c19'),
'public': unhexlify('03501e454bf00751f24b1b489aa925215d66af2234e3891c3b21a52bedb3cd711c')
},
{
'path': [0, hardened(0), 1, hardened(2)],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('bef5a2f9'),
'chain': unhexlify('04466b9cc8e161e966409ca52986c584f07e9dc81f735db683c3ff6ec7b1503f'),
'public': unhexlify('0357bfe1e341d01c69fe5654309956cbea516822fba8a601743a012a7896ee8dc2')
},
{
'path': [0, hardened(0), 1, hardened(2), 2],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('ee7ab90c'),
'chain': unhexlify('cfb71883f01676f587d023cc53a35bc7f88f724b1f8c2892ac1275ac822a3edd'),
'public': unhexlify('02e8445082a72f29b75ca48748a914df60622a609cacfce8ed0e35804560741d29')
},
{
'path': [0, hardened(0), 1, hardened(2), 2, 1000000000],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('d880d7d8'),
'chain': unhexlify('c783e67b921d2beb8f6b389cc646d7263b4145701dadd2161548a8b078e65e9e'),
'public': unhexlify('022a471424da5e657499d1ff51cb43c47481a03b1e77f951fe64cec9f5a48f7011')
},
{
'path': [4],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('00000000'),
'chain': unhexlify('beeb672fe4621673f722f38529c07392fecaa61015c80c34f29ce8b41b3cb6ea'),
'public': unhexlify('0266874dc6ade47b3ecd096745ca09bcd29638dd52c2c12117b11ed3e458cfa9e8')
},
{
'path': [4, hardened(0)],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('be6105b5'),
'chain': unhexlify('3460cea53e6a6bb5fb391eeef3237ffd8724bf0a40e94943c98b83825342ee11'),
'public': unhexlify('0384610f5ecffe8fda089363a41f56a5c7ffc1d81b59a612d0d649b2d22355590c')
},
{
'path': [4, hardened(0), 1],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('9b02312f'),
'chain': unhexlify('4187afff1aafa8445010097fb99d23aee9f599450c7bd140b6826ac22ba21d0c'),
'public': unhexlify('03526c63f8d0b4bbbf9c80df553fe66742df4676b241dabefdef67733e070f6844')
},
{
'path': [4, hardened(0), 1, hardened(2)],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('b98005c1'),
'chain': unhexlify('98c7514f562e64e74170cc3cf304ee1ce54d6b6da4f880f313e8204c2a185318'),
'public': unhexlify('0359cf160040778a4b14c5f4d7b76e327ccc8c4a6086dd9451b7482b5a4972dda0')
},
{
'path': [4, hardened(0), 1, hardened(2), 2],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('0e9f3274'),
'chain': unhexlify('ba96f776a5c3907d7fd48bde5620ee374d4acfd540378476019eab70790c63a0'),
'public': unhexlify('029f871f4cb9e1c97f9f4de9ccd0d4a2f2a171110c61178f84430062230833ff20')
},
{
'path': [4, hardened(0), 1, hardened(2), 2, 1000000000],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('8b2b5c4b'),
'chain': unhexlify('b9b7b82d326bb9cb5b5b121066feea4eb93d5241103c9e7a18aad40f1dde8059'),
'public': unhexlify('02216cd26d31147f72427a453c443ed2cde8a1e53c9cc44e5ddf739725413fe3f4')
},
{
'path': [1],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('00000000'),
'chain': unhexlify('60499f801b896d83179a4374aeb7822aaeaceaa0db1f85ee3e904c4defbd9689'),
'public': unhexlify('03cbcaa9c98c877a26977d00825c956a238e8dddfbd322cce4f74b0b5bd6ace4a7')
},
{
'path': [1, 0],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('bd16bee5'),
'chain': unhexlify('f0909affaa7ee7abe5dd4e100598d4dc53cd709d5a5c2cac40e7412f232f7c9c'),
'public': unhexlify('02fc9e5af0ac8d9b3cecfe2a888e2117ba3d089d8585886c9c826b6b22a98d12ea')
},
{
'path': [1, 0, hardened(2147483647)],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('5a61ff8e'),
'chain': unhexlify('be17a268474a6bb9c61e1d720cf6215e2a88c5406c4aee7b38547f585c9a37d9'),
'public': unhexlify('03c01e7425647bdefa82b12d9bad5e3e6865bee0502694b94ca58b666abc0a5c3b')
},
{
'path': [1, 0, hardened(2147483647), 1],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('d8ab4937'),
'chain': unhexlify('f366f48f1ea9f2d1d3fe958c95ca84ea18e4c4ddb9366c336c927eb246fb38cb'),
'public': unhexlify('03a7d1d856deb74c508e05031f9895dab54626251b3806e16b4bd12e781a7df5b9')
},
{
'path': [1, 0, hardened(2147483647), 1, hardened(2147483646)],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('78412e3a'),
'chain': unhexlify('637807030d55d01f9a0cb3a7839515d796bd07706386a6eddf06cc29a65a0e29'),
'public': unhexlify('02d2b36900396c9282fa14628566582f206a5dd0bcc8d5e892611806cafb0301f0')
},
{
'path': [1, 0, hardened(2147483647), 1, hardened(2147483646), 2],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('31a507b8'),
'chain': unhexlify('9452b549be8cea3ecb7a84bec10dcfd94afe4d129ebfd3b3cb58eedf394ed271'),
'public': unhexlify('024d902e1a2fc7a8755ab5b694c575fce742c48d9ff192e63df5193e4c7afe1f9c')
},
{
'path': [5],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('00000000'),
'chain': unhexlify('96cd4465a9644e31528eda3592aa35eb39a9527769ce1855beafc1b81055e75d'),
'public': unhexlify('02c9e16154474b3ed5b38218bb0463e008f89ee03e62d22fdcc8014beab25b48fa')
},
{
'path': [5, 0],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('607f628f'),
'chain': unhexlify('84e9c258bb8557a40e0d041115b376dd55eda99c0042ce29e81ebe4efed9b86a'),
'public': unhexlify('039b6df4bece7b6c81e2adfeea4bcf5c8c8a6e40ea7ffa3cf6e8494c61a1fc82cc')
},
{
'path': [5, 0, hardened(2147483647)],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('946d2a54'),
'chain': unhexlify('f235b2bc5c04606ca9c30027a84f353acf4e4683edbd11f635d0dcc1cd106ea6'),
'public': unhexlify('02f89c5deb1cae4fedc9905f98ae6cbf6cbab120d8cb85d5bd9a91a72f4c068c76')
},
{
'path': [5, 0, hardened(2147483647), 1],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('218182d8'),
'chain': unhexlify('7c0b833106235e452eba79d2bdd58d4086e663bc8cc55e9773d2b5eeda313f3b'),
'public': unhexlify('03abe0ad54c97c1d654c1852dfdc32d6d3e487e75fa16f0fd6304b9ceae4220c64')
},
{
'path': [5, 0, hardened(2147483647), 1, hardened(2147483646)],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('931223e4'),
'chain': unhexlify('5794e616eadaf33413aa309318a26ee0fd5163b70466de7a4512fd4b1a5c9e6a'),
'public': unhexlify('03cb8cb067d248691808cd6b5a5a06b48e34ebac4d965cba33e6dc46fe13d9b933')
},
{
'path': [5, 0, hardened(2147483647), 1, hardened(2147483646), 2],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('956c4629'),
'chain': unhexlify('3bfb29ee8ac4484f09db09c2079b520ea5616df7820f071a20320366fbe226a7'),
'public': unhexlify('020ee02e18967237cf62672983b253ee62fa4dd431f8243bfeccdf39dbe181387f')
},
{
'path': [4],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('00000000'),
'chain': unhexlify('beeb672fe4621673f722f38529c07392fecaa61015c80c34f29ce8b41b3cb6ea'),
'public': unhexlify('0266874dc6ade47b3ecd096745ca09bcd29638dd52c2c12117b11ed3e458cfa9e8')
},
{
'path': [4, hardened(28578)],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('be6105b5'),
'chain': unhexlify('e94c8ebe30c2250a14713212f6449b20f3329105ea15b652ca5bdfc68f6c65c2'),
'public': unhexlify('02519b5554a4872e8c9c1c847115363051ec43e93400e030ba3c36b52a3e70a5b7')
},
{
'path': [4, hardened(28578), 33941],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('3e2b7bc6'),
'chain': unhexlify('9e87fe95031f14736774cd82f25fd885065cb7c358c1edf813c72af535e83071'),
'public': unhexlify('0235bfee614c0d5b2cae260000bb1d0d84b270099ad790022c1ae0b2e782efe120')
},
{
'path': [6],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('00000000'),
'chain': unhexlify('7762f9729fed06121fd13f326884c82f59aa95c57ac492ce8c9654e60efd130c'),
'public': unhexlify('0383619fadcde31063d8c5cb00dbfe1713f3e6fa169d8541a798752a1c1ca0cb20')
},
]
)
def test_derive_node_xpub(device, path):
resp = device.hd_derive_node(path['path'])
xpub = PicoHSM.hd_decode_xpub(resp)
assert(xpub['fingerprint'] == path['fingerprint'])
assert(xpub['chain'] == path['chain'])
assert(xpub['public'] == path['public'])
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"path", [
{
'path': [7],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('00000000'),
'chain': unhexlify('8F8C33732530A0417DD446097EDB6F6617D52D627C6DB28581D74D11B385D25A'),
'public': unhexlify('dbf12b44133eaab506a740f6565cc117228cbf1dd70635cfa8ddfdc9af734756')
},
{
'path': [7, b"SLIP-0021"],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('0e521cdd'),
'chain': unhexlify('446ADED06078CF950DAB737F014C7BAE81EEB6E7BEECC260A38E2E0FA9973104'),
'public': unhexlify('1d065e3ac1bbe5c7fad32cf2305f7d709dc070d672044a19e610c77cdf33de0d')
},
{
'path': [7, b"SLIP-0021", b"Master encryption key"],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('4a6e721d'),
'chain': unhexlify('7072D5593032B84A90E2E2E42996D277026FF55C1082AC82A121D775FED0ACEB'),
'public': unhexlify('ea163130e35bbafdf5ddee97a17b39cef2be4b4f390180d65b54cf05c6a82fde')
},
{
'path': [7, b"SLIP-0021", b"Authentication key"],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('4a6e721d'),
'chain': unhexlify('3D5C87DC62CE006681B8C3DF723AE50FEEA40D6C26AEF8135BD321BA390A5B42'),
'public': unhexlify('47194e938ab24cc82bfa25f6486ed54bebe79c40ae2a5a32ea6db294d81861a6')
},
]
)
def test_derive_node_slip(device, path):
resp = device.hd_derive_node(path['path'])
xpub = PicoHSM.hd_decode_xpub(resp)
assert(xpub['fingerprint'] == path['fingerprint'])
assert(xpub['chain'] == sha256_sha256(path['chain']))
assert(xpub['public'] == sha256_sha256(path['public']))
def get_master_curve(mid):
for m in seeds:
if (m['id'] == mid):
if (m['name'] == 'secp256k1'):
return ec.SECP256K1()
elif (m['name'] == 'secp256r1'):
return ec.SECP256R1()
return None
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"path", [
[0],
[0, hardened(0)],
[0, hardened(0), 1],
[0, hardened(0), 1, hardened(2)],
[0, hardened(0), 1, hardened(2), 2],
[0, hardened(0), 1, hardened(2), 2, 1000000000],
[1],
[1, 0],
[1, 0, hardened(2147483647)],
[1, 0, hardened(2147483647), 1],
[1, 0, hardened(2147483647), 1, hardened(2147483646)],
[1, 0, hardened(2147483647), 1, hardened(2147483646), 2],
[4],
[4, hardened(0)],
[4, hardened(0), 1],
[4, hardened(0), 1, hardened(2)],
[4, hardened(0), 1, hardened(2), 2],
[4, hardened(0), 1, hardened(2), 2, 1000000000],
[5],
[5, 0],
[5, 0, hardened(2147483647)],
[5, 0, hardened(2147483647), 1],
[5, 0, hardened(2147483647), 1, hardened(2147483646)],
[5, 0, hardened(2147483647), 1, hardened(2147483646), 2],
]
)
def test_signature(device, path):
pub = device.hd_derive_node(path)
xpub = PicoHSM.hd_decode_xpub(pub)
curve = get_master_curve(path[0])
pubkey = ec.EllipticCurvePublicKey.from_encoded_point(curve, xpub['public'])
resp = device.hd_signature(path, TEST_STRING)
pubkey.verify(resp, TEST_STRING, ec.ECDSA(hashes.SHA256()))
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"path", [
[7],
[7, b"SLIP-0021"],
[7, b"SLIP-0021", b"Master encryption key"],
[7, b"SLIP-0021", b"Authentication key"],
]
)
def test_signature_slip(device, path):
pub = device.hd_derive_node(path)
with pytest.raises(APDUResponse) as e:
resp = device.hd_signature(path, TEST_STRING)
assert (e.value.sw == SWCodes.SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"ask_on_encrypt", [True, False]
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"ask_on_decrypt", [True, False]
)
def test_cipher_slip(device, ask_on_encrypt, ask_on_decrypt):
MSG1 = b"testing message!"
enctext = device.hd_cipher([7, b"\x01", b"\x02"], b"test", MSG1, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, ask_on_encrypt, ask_on_decrypt)
resp = device.hd_cipher([7, b"\x01", b"\x02"], b"test", enctext, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, ask_on_encrypt, ask_on_decrypt)
assert(resp == MSG1)

11
tests/run-test-in-docker.sh Executable file
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#!/bin/bash -eu
source tests/docker_env.sh
if [[ $1 == "pkcs11" ]]; then
run_in_docker ./tests/start-up-and-test-pkcs11.sh
elif [[ $1 == "sc-hsm-pkcs11" ]]; then
run_in_docker ./tests/scripts/sc_hsm_test.sh
else
run_in_docker ./tests/start-up-and-test.sh
fi

38
tests/scripts/aes.sh Executable file
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#!/bin/bash
source ./tests/scripts/func.sh
reset
test $? -eq 0 || exit $?
TEST_DATA="This is a text."
echo "${TEST_DATA}" > test
sc_tool() {
pkcs11-tool --module /usr/local/lib/libsc-hsm-pkcs11.so -l --pin 648219 $@
}
aeses=("16" "24" "32")
for aes in ${aeses[*]}; do
echo " Test AES (AES:${aes})"
echo -n " Keygen... "
sc_tool --keygen --key-type "AES:${aes}" --id 1 --label "AES:${aes}" > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
e=$(sc_tool --list-object --type secrkey 2>&1)
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
grep -q "AES length ${aes}" <<< $e && echo -n "." || exit $?
grep -q "AES:${aes}" <<< $e && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
echo -n " Encryption..."
sc_tool --encrypt --id 1 --input-file test --mechanism aes-cbc > crypted.aes 2>/dev/null
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
echo -n " Decryption..."
e=$(sc_tool --decrypt --id 1 --input-file crypted.aes --mechanism aes-cbc 2>/dev/null)
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
grep -q "${TEST_DATA}" <<< $e && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
sc_tool --delete --type secrkey --id 1 > /dev/null 2>&1
done
rm -rf test crypted.aes

62
tests/scripts/asym_cipher.sh Executable file
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#!/bin/bash
source ./tests/scripts/func.sh
reset
test $? -eq 0 || exit $?
rsa_encrypt_decrypt() {
openssl pkeyutl -encrypt -pubin -inkey 1.pub $2 -in $1 -out data.crypt
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
TDATA=$(tr -d '\0' < <(pkcs11-tool --id 1 --pin 648219 --decrypt $3 -i data.crypt 2>/dev/null))
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
if [[ ${TEST_STRING} != "$TDATA" ]]; then
exit 1
fi
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
}
TEST_STRING="This is a test string. Be safe, be secure."
echo ${TEST_STRING} > data
echo -n " Keygen RSA 2048..."
keygen_and_export rsa:2048
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
echo -n " Test RSA-PKCS ciphering..."
rsa_encrypt_decrypt data "-pkeyopt rsa_padding_mode:pkcs1" "--mechanism RSA-PKCS"
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
echo -n " Test RSA-X-509 ciphering..."
cp data data_pad
tlen=${#TEST_STRING}
dd if=/dev/zero bs=1 count=$((256-$tlen-1)) >> data_pad 2> /dev/null
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
rsa_encrypt_decrypt data_pad "-pkeyopt rsa_padding_mode:none" "--mechanism RSA-X-509"
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
echo -n " Test RSA-PKCS-OAEP ciphering..."
rsa_encrypt_decrypt data "-pkeyopt rsa_padding_mode:oaep -pkeyopt rsa_oaep_md:sha256 -pkeyopt rsa_mgf1_md:sha256" "--mechanism RSA-PKCS-OAEP"
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
rm -rf data* 1.*
pkcs11-tool -l --pin 648219 --delete-object --type privkey --id 1 > /dev/null 2>&1
algs=("secp192r1" "secp256r1" "secp384r1" "secp521r1" "brainpoolP256r1" "brainpoolP384r1" "brainpoolP512r1" "secp192k1" "secp256k1")
for alg in ${algs[*]}; do
echo -n " Test EC derive with ${alg}..."
keygen_and_export ec:${alg}
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
openssl ecparam -genkey -name ${alg} > bob.pem 2>/dev/null
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
openssl ec -in bob.pem -pubout -outform DER > bob.der 2>/dev/null
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
pkcs11-tool --pin 648219 --id 1 --derive -i bob.der -o mine-bob.der > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
openssl pkeyutl -derive -out bob-mine.der -inkey bob.pem -peerkey 1.pub 2>/dev/null
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
cmp bob-mine.der mine-bob.der
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
rm -rf data* 1.*
pkcs11-tool -l --pin 648219 --delete-object --type privkey --id 1 > /dev/null 2>&1
done

60
tests/scripts/backup.sh Executable file
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#!/bin/bash
source ./tests/scripts/func.sh
reset
test $? -eq 0 || exit $?
sc_backup() {
for i in $(seq 1 $1); do
sc-hsm-tool --create-dkek-share dkek.${i}.pbe --password testpw > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
done
sc-hsm-tool --initialize --so-pin 3537363231383830 --pin 648219 --dkek-shares $1 > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
pkcs11-tool -l --pin 648219 -I > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
for i in $(seq 1 $1); do
e=$(sc-hsm-tool --import-dkek-share dkek.${i}.pbe --password testpw 2>&1)
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
grep -q "DKEK share imported" <<< $e && echo -n "." || exit $?
grep -q "DKEK shares[[:blank:]]*: $1" <<< $e && echo -n "." || exit $?
if [[ $i -lt $1 ]]; then
grep -q "DKEK import pending, $(( $1 - $i ))" <<< $e && echo -n "." || exit $?
fi
done
# Store DKEK, since it is not logged in
pkcs11-tool -l --pin 648219 -I > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
}
echo -n " Test single DKEK..."
sc_backup 1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
echo -n " Test multiple DKEK..."
sc_backup 3
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
rm -rf dkek.*.pbe
echo " Test backup and restore"
algs=("rsa:1024" "rsa:2048" "ec:secp192r1" "ec:secp256r1" "ec:secp384r1" "ec:secp521r1" "ec:brainpoolP256r1" "ec:brainpoolP384r1" "ec:brainpoolP512r1" "ec:secp192k1" "ec:secp256k1")
for alg in ${algs[*]}; do
echo -n " Keygen ${alg}..."
gen_and_check ${alg}
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
echo -n " Wrap key..."
sc-hsm-tool --wrap-key wrap-key.bin --key-reference 1 --pin 648219 > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
e=$(pkcs15-tool -D 2>&1)
grep -q "Key ref[[:blank:]]*: 10" <<< $e && exit $? || echo -e ".\t${OK}"
echo -n " Unwrap key..."
sc-hsm-tool --unwrap-key wrap-key.bin --key-reference 10 --pin 648219 --force > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
e=$(pkcs15-tool -D 2>&1)
grep -q "Key ref[[:blank:]]*: 10" <<< $e && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
echo -n " Cleaning..."
pkcs11-tool -l --pin 648219 --delete-object --type privkey --id 1 > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
pkcs11-tool -l --pin 648219 --delete-object --type privkey --id 1 > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
done

52
tests/scripts/func.sh Executable file
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#!/bin/bash
OK="\033[32mok\033[0m"
FAIL="\033[31mfail\033[0m"
gen_and_check() {
e=$(pkcs11-tool -l --pin 648219 --keypairgen --key-type $1 --id 1 --label "TestLabel" 2>&1)
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
glabel=""
case $1 in
*"192"*)
glabel="EC_POINT 192 bits"
;;
*"256"*)
glabel="EC_POINT 256 bits"
;;
*"384"*)
glabel="EC_POINT 384 bits"
;;
*"512"*)
glabel="EC_POINT 512 bits"
;;
*"521"*)
glabel="EC_POINT 528 bits"
;;
*"rsa"*)
IFS=: read -r v1 bits <<< "$1"
glabel="RSA ${bits} bits"
;;
esac
grep -q "${glabel}" <<< $e && echo -n "." || exit $?
}
gen_and_delete() {
gen_and_check $1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
pkcs11-tool -l --pin 648219 --delete-object --type privkey --id 1 > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
}
reset() {
python3 tools/pico-hsm-tool.py --pin 648219 initialize --so-pin 57621880 --silent --no-dev-cert > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 || exit $?
}
keygen_and_export() {
gen_and_check $1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
pkcs11-tool --read-object --pin 648219 --id 1 --type pubkey > 1.der 2>/dev/null
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
IFS=: read -r mk bts <<< "$1"
openssl ${mk} -inform DER -outform PEM -in 1.der -pubin > 1.pub 2>/dev/null
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
}

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