420 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Pol Henarejos
7493f9eb3e Upgrade to version 4.0.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-08-15 00:03:56 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d44b780970 Fix PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-08-14 16:57:33 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
e7080d6f82 Upgrade to MbedTLS 3.6 with EdDSA.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-08-14 15:32:22 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
9258c9ff70 Fix merge.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-08-14 15:32:09 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
ad18577e98 Merge branch 'master' into development-eddsa
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-08-14 13:34:40 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
3cae928de8 Fix for Pico Patcher.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-07-15 14:41:28 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b429616895 Fix potential infinite loop when bad ASN1 is processed.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-07-08 10:53:25 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
0c2e728c35 Add EF.DIR list aid.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-28 22:59:52 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
5630043a4d Fix binary read permission.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-28 22:59:16 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c1a47ed023 Fix EF.DIR selection.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-28 22:05:10 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
bf2f961b85 Fix windows compatibility. Fixes #44.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-27 21:02:04 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
0811b8022e Update README.md 2024-06-24 20:37:03 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
fd12758551 Upgrade to version 4.0
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-24 19:44:58 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c65f921188 Update README.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-24 19:44:46 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
55cf9292d2 Update ESP32 CMake
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-23 02:09:38 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
db5c7adef4 Update tests for OpenSC 0.25.1
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-23 01:59:32 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d3751e3918 Upgrade opensc version in workflows.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-23 01:18:19 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d708158fea Fix key unwrap with latest OpenSC. Fixes #41.
SC-HSM driver in OpenSC has changed the procedure for unwraping. It stores the wrap into a temporary file (0x2F10) and then it calls unwrap cmd.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-23 01:17:01 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
dc979194fa Fix crash in mbedtls 3.6
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-23 01:00:14 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
237e687c3b Upgrade to Pico Keys SDK v6.0
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-22 20:57:28 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
ed89175edc Fix rare overflow (never happens).
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-22 19:03:58 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
9a7be98e6e Settings proper phy options
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-21 22:08:36 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c4a08aff0f Upgrade to Mbedtls 3.6
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-21 21:29:32 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
223fc117dd Enable patch only for RPI
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-21 21:15:29 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d1fb4d0c65 Merge branch 'master' into development
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-21 21:14:43 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
47acef71c8 Only when not emulation.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-21 21:11:18 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
bb641ee134 Merge pull request #43 from al-heisner/master
Fix for multiples of 64 bytes on cmd_list_keys
2024-06-21 21:05:27 +02:00
al heisner
99c777c780 Fix for multiples of 64 bytes on cmd_list_keys 2024-06-21 11:35:05 -05:00
Pol Henarejos
79f76a176d Fix time.h header.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-19 23:36:41 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
dd68554782 Added support for enable/disable Web CCID on the fly.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-19 23:29:05 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
f20fdc9bda Add missing header.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-19 22:42:19 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
e7d4a5dd3d Fix tusb initialization.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-19 22:35:04 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b4671c2ecb Merge branch 'esp32' into development 2024-06-19 22:03:47 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
50a29519bd First release to support ESP32.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-19 22:03:39 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
54cdbfc22c Add PHY OPTS.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-19 22:01:15 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
4a40cebe1f Merge pull request #40 from fastchain/extras-button-check
Security fix for issue 39
2024-06-17 11:30:31 +02:00
fastchain
87ffd21543 Update cmd_extras.c
This security fix ensures that the extra settings, cannot be silently disabled, if button control enabled. So the button control setting cannot be silently (without button push) disabled, even if the user's PC is fully compromised.
2024-06-13 16:09:54 +09:00
Pol Henarejos
7cb0bbf982 Merge branch 'development' into esp32
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-06-03 13:06:39 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
07079b6ba1 Add descriptive message.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-05-30 19:19:02 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
294ca81d7d Upgrade patch_vidpid with newer Pico Keys SDK.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-05-30 19:18:37 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
218660e694 Only allow change PHY without PIN. PIN is required for other extra options.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-22 23:47:08 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
de89d61359 Use new file methods.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-22 23:44:00 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
8e8192362c Use macros for referring system fids.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-17 19:43:10 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
25c93c279f Fix potential crash on loading dkek.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-17 19:42:47 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
001d076fdf Better check for XKEK content.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-17 19:42:23 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
35d5d5e94e Use search_file() method.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-17 19:19:45 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b034303193 Use new methods search_file() and file_put_data().
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-17 16:36:34 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
623cf10dba Add phy command to pico-hsm-tool to change VIDPID dynamically.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-17 11:51:25 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
fdc41e5856 Add support for PHY command to store and change VIDPID and LED no. dynamically on reboot.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-17 11:50:44 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
5d0dc210da Use external unique ID.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-17 11:48:23 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
a674410826 Remove carriage return \r for better debug.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-17 11:46:34 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
920d22212a Add phy command to pico-hsm-tool to change VIDPID dynamically.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-16 23:23:20 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
aeeb540a2f Add support for PHY command to store and change VIDPID and LED no. dynamically on reboot.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-16 23:22:49 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
be071b0bc1 Add support for dynamic VID / PID.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-16 00:05:01 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
8bbbdb4dd8 Build WCID interface.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-16 00:04:48 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
45b633cc9d More defaults.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-16 00:04:33 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
842919a26b Use external unique ID.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-15 23:45:30 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
3dbcefea85 Upate build parameters.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-11 15:15:18 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
60038f9345 Fix flash issues.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-10 20:29:02 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d8c7fb0856 Remove carriage return \r for better debug.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-10 18:16:38 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d6456b4dde First attempt to add support to ESP32.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-04-08 19:41:39 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
ac781c1db6 Fix asn1 struct initialization.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-03-13 21:21:37 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
c3b66773e8 Use new asn1 structs.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-03-13 18:11:28 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
3ca23b932c Fix Windows emulation build.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-01-09 11:43:59 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
9fad920c3b Fix Windows emulation build.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-01-09 11:43:46 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
38bef5b43f Fix error message
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-01-09 11:26:26 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
2034e436d1 Fix CVC outer signature length.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-01-08 10:59:34 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
215221b30e Let's add pico and local CodeQL modes.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-01-02 20:51:08 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
de4d95beb8 Fix Pico build.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-01-02 20:43:24 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
963b6f4f87 Fix CodeQL build.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-01-02 20:36:54 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
fa9b244c42 Fix LE computation in a wrapped APDU.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-01-02 19:57:52 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
2b92d89ab7 Fix size_t casting.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-01-02 19:56:38 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
a1d7733b95 Fix key exchange.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-01-02 02:44:59 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
39f1041dbb Fix byte overwrite for long chained RAPDU.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-01-02 02:36:21 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
2e4fc568db Fix new return format for import_kek.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-01-02 02:36:09 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
4f4e6e09a2 Fix size var load.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-01-02 02:31:38 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
08c0aaee6f Fix SM wrap for large RAPDU.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-01-02 01:03:57 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
de98e79c99 Try to fix CodeQL build.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-01-01 21:09:42 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
481cd5fd69 Some fixes for emulation.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-01-01 20:58:40 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
d9a8826a32 Stupid bug integer overflow.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-01-01 02:01:22 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
d82affa880 Added support for building emulation in Windows.
It has not been tested but it should not break any linux build.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2024-01-01 01:55:49 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
ab31a6615c Fix ATR overwrite.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-12-29 19:07:28 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
677cceb130 Update to latest PicoHSM.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-12-29 19:07:20 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
29967c067a Add -DVIDPID=<VALUE> to build a project with a known VID/PID. Supported values: NitroHSM, NitroFIDO2, NitroStart, NitroPro, Nitro3, Yubikey5, YubikeyNeo, YubiHSM, Gnuk, GnuPG
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-12-11 18:14:04 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
2974aa234a Added required for subparsers.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-13 16:59:15 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
d90b296237 Added keygen command to generate AES, X25519 and X448 keys.
It replaces x25519/x448 commands and cipher keygen subcommand.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-13 16:57:11 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
e98b26fee5 Flush stderr.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-13 15:34:33 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
2086a68c53 Key id not needed on keygen.
It also returns the fresh new generated key id.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-13 15:34:21 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
74afa07512 Do not make a PRKD on key unwrap since it is already done when storing.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-13 15:33:52 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
e96e1d0097 When a key is generated and stored, it creates its PRKD.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-13 15:33:27 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
4d47f0224e Fix emulation in apple.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-13 14:26:46 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
58692b2711 Fix PRKD cert on key unwrap.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-13 14:14:10 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
a5ab1cabc5 Add support for AES-ECB, AES-CBC with custom IV, AES-OFB, AES-CFB, AES-GCM, AES-CCM, AES-CTR and AES-XTS.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-11 21:19:31 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
1c7cdc8564 Added support for CMAC.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-11 20:28:13 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
d74b3418bc Fix typo
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-11 20:13:38 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
fb5be153ed Fix merge.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-06 23:51:15 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
0ac71f2fff Removed old SDK
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-06 23:47:21 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
6ec5235cc3 Upgrade Pico Keys SDK and mbedtls 3.5
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-06 23:38:33 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
ff74d6306e mbedtls 3.5
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-06 23:27:02 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
ba562da00e Merge branch 'development' into development-eddsa
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-06 23:11:08 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
98e9b72b42 Upgrade version to 3.6.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-06 17:26:43 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
1b0d23cf24 Add two new boards.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-06 17:26:24 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
3ccff7881f Upgrade to Pico Keys SDK 5.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-06 17:25:04 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
a3bf2e9e14 If no key is found, generate a new one.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-06 17:10:19 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
88ff27f354 Fix mbedTLS 3.5 build.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-06 17:01:27 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
ed2925cfb6 Use new Pico Keys SDK.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-06 14:25:42 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
cc19f8f061 Use new pico-keys-sdk submodule.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-06 14:20:39 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
b6831a4650 Rename pico-hsm-sdk submodule to new name.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-06 14:20:19 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
652a0f0d21 Fix managing spaces.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-12 21:04:02 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
9dbf4b3172 Removing pkcs11-tool test for EC.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-12 19:03:37 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
76522829ef User must log in after DKEK import.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-12 17:42:49 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
6b1eeb4004 Fix DKEK import when no logged.
DKEK shall accept import even if it is not logged in. However, to store the DKEK, the PIN is used for MKEK, which is not available if it is nog logged in. I added a queueing system to store a pending DKEK after login.

Therefore, to import a DKEK, the user must import it AND call VERIFY command if it is not already logged in.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-12 17:42:31 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
2693ab4926 Fix applet selection.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-12 17:40:56 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
5d21e39aa6 Fix deleting key domain.
It only checks if contains keys and no other files.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-12 17:40:20 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
1bf0d6337b Added backup and restore tests (pkcs11 wrap/unwrap).
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-11 21:12:06 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
1950b03d35 Add more pkcs11-tool tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-11 21:11:41 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
4be258f4c7 Fix applet loading.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-11 21:04:53 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
eddb1baf7b Use new applet selection format.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-11 21:03:17 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
11bb00e186 Default key domain is 0.
It allows to wrap keys not associated to any key domain.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-11 21:03:09 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
aaed6bd7b6 New format for applet selection.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-11 21:02:18 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
2853b38b08 Add PKCS11 tool test
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-11 13:00:24 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
654cb1e4e0 Added AES pkcs11 tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-11 12:13:21 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
185d19504f Add plaintext debug.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-11 12:12:53 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
dbe0ef19de Fix store binary test script.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 22:17:22 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c3b57b229f Add sc-hsm-pkcs11-test to test matrix.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 21:56:41 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
43c46e9112 Add sc-hsm-embedd pkcs11 driver and test.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 21:56:18 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d5af9160c1 Build in docker with for CI flag.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 21:55:55 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
e27c8d4ff6 Added flag for compile for CI or production.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 21:55:31 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
2ecfff0ebb Add store binary data tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 21:15:51 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
3057aba041 Fix redundant line.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 21:15:23 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
011a594fe4 Also use artifacts@v3 on upload.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 19:18:04 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
448d61dd2d Use artifact@v3
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 19:00:36 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
fa821c43c8 Prune images autom.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 19:00:23 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
9db3e78d32 Not necessary rmi
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 18:41:01 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b74c4070d1 When build, it copies generated binaries to image, which will be used later by other jobs.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 18:26:16 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
a7770a7e57 Check Pico HSM PCSC connectivity.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 18:25:10 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
78cbe59e64 Fix startup
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 17:58:32 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
42a9434c50 Not used
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 17:46:01 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
11a3472941 Refactor test workflow
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 17:45:49 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
2f177eb8df Build image only during build
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 16:46:51 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c97680772d Use artifacts
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 16:36:37 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
345ae2be69 Not used
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 16:36:00 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
ba036f4c0f Add EC derive tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 16:35:51 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
4493afa84d Fix workflow
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 14:46:37 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d118b787a2 Try using reusable workflows
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 14:44:52 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
205356b848 Let's try different jobs
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 14:21:55 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c435764978 Add PKCS11 asymmetric ciphering tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 13:10:10 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
2e633abb2c Use dynamic dd size.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 13:09:16 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
3514c7ad82 Fix pkcs11 runner test.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 09:30:15 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
4bba3c6f64 Merge branch 'master' into development 2023-10-09 08:30:53 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
8321996a14 Fix +x flag.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 08:30:24 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c3af303468 Split pytest and pkcs11 test suites.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 00:58:49 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c44d7db4e1 Refactor tests
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 00:34:50 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
cb1bba4f13 Enable pytest tests
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-02 01:12:09 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
48301a5d71 Fix chunking
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-02 00:50:34 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
1105a1263c Add signature and verification tests for RSA and ECDSA.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-02 00:48:54 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
37421d9aad Added pkcs11 keygen test script.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-09-26 20:09:43 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d906df2809 Add initialization test script with pkcs11
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-09-24 10:30:59 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
08e7d74a81 Fix sending binary when ne=0
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-09-24 10:30:09 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
433e509c94 Add initialize with pkcs11-tool test script.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-09-05 19:56:11 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
9f08d612ae Add base58 to dockerfile.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-09-05 19:56:11 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
173ca7678d Accept arbitrary SO-PIN length on reset retry.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-09-05 19:56:11 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
3d7f714936 Fix initialization with so-pin.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-09-05 19:56:11 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
f4a537f156 Added NO_DELAY in emulation env.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-09-05 19:56:11 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
f09654ccf4 Added --silent flag to initialization to avoid prompt display.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-09-05 19:56:11 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
7506ccd263 Update usage.md 2023-09-05 19:45:51 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
ee442ac084 Get vpcd from repo instead of building it.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-24 16:39:57 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b94810d31d Added triggers to development-eddsa branch.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-24 16:17:06 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
2c4be41ecf Remove print.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-24 16:12:40 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
447d223de4 Fix mbedtls ed448 bugs.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-24 16:12:34 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
4f9f7f14fe Add support for Edwards cvc.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-24 16:08:39 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
6699913eff Add edwards signature test.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-24 16:06:02 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b0057bc3fe Add edwards key import test.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-24 16:05:52 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
e3a773d145 Add edwards key generation test.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-24 16:05:43 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
10a47f9177 Uniform ec key loading.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-24 16:05:34 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
9f49a144ac Add support for Edwards key import.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-24 16:05:11 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
e67a7091ff Add support for Edwards key generation.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-24 16:04:45 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
1d3232df36 Fix loading and saving Montgomery keys.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-24 16:01:39 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
7376817724 Fix G export.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-24 16:00:59 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
5e801fbae7 Merge branch 'development' into development-eddsa 2023-08-24 10:35:51 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
e18c413268 Added X25519 and X448 exchange test.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-23 16:42:34 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
0e1c82196a Added test for Curve25519 and Curve448 key import.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-23 16:39:32 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c6a5272340 Added test for Curve25519 and Curve448 keypair generation.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-23 16:39:21 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
a6072b4ce8 Curve25519 and Curve448 are encoded using ECDH template.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-23 16:38:51 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
5bdba8e1e8 Move to ecp_keypair instead of ecdsa.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-22 17:20:56 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
5df4e62f81 Revert previous fix.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-22 17:20:11 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
685c7f25fc Revert previous fix.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-22 17:19:23 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
faef2dc278 Added support for EdDSA signature.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-22 17:10:03 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
22d8793683 Add fix in EdDSA.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-22 15:29:26 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
32c8bc4a24 Enable EdDSA for curves Ed25519 and Ed448 in config file.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-16 15:05:46 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b5174d64af Using SDK with EdDSA support.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-14 02:45:16 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
235bf342b3 Update README.md
Added description for hierarchical deterministic key generation.
2023-08-02 14:34:12 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
57188ff877 Added some tests for HD ciphering.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-07-24 11:45:11 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
f631e4a5f3 Code style.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-07-17 12:56:16 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
f880ee6c93 Added support for HD symmetric ciphering.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-07-17 12:55:14 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
6af4cc7fec Fix getting RTC with pico-hsm-tool.
Closes #25.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-06-20 13:32:30 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
e3f1f45a9f Added more tests for HD Signature.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-27 19:00:13 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
fe315e7326 Fix AES derivation (HKDF).
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-27 19:00:04 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
02903bbc65 Added tests for HD signatures.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-26 18:07:26 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
ee3ee21e40 Added support for signatures based on HD BIP/SLIP.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-26 18:07:06 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c6c00e7e43 Added tests for SLIP-0021 node derivation.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-26 17:15:30 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
29544a3f17 Added support for SLIP-0021 node derivation.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-26 17:15:14 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
5135404083 Fix node derivation.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-25 15:17:39 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
55520ce184 Added support for master key generation for symmetric derivation.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-25 14:07:48 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
525b05b7ef Small refactoring to avoid unnecessary casts from uint32 to byte strings.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-25 12:18:28 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b61a34d415 Added more tests for secp256r1 curves.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-24 12:47:49 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
0eea0fb096 Fix deriving nodes with retries (invalid first key).
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-24 12:47:27 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
82c03ee6c4 Fix memory free on error.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-24 12:40:51 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
20dfbcaaed Fix xpub for masters.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-24 11:25:36 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
a9fb170c58 Added tests for BIP and SLIP.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-23 20:40:31 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
46d85c029e Added first commit with BIP and SLIP support for cryptowallets.
Needs more work.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-23 20:40:16 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
1c6f4cfd7f Update FUNDING.yml 2023-05-17 09:44:59 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
526869bc06 Create FUNDING.yml 2023-05-17 09:42:57 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
279df32acc Update README.md
Added link to Pico Patcher tool.
2023-05-11 20:05:28 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c402b884cc Upgrade to mbedtls 3.4
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-10 00:17:32 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
8316196b42 Using forked vsmartcard just in case
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-04 11:10:58 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
7a6dafd7b6 Moving HSM SDK pointer
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-04 09:13:15 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
6d3809a792 Allow signatures with device key.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-04-06 14:09:18 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
f22f58f983 Fix returning EOF when reading an element outside the size.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-04-06 14:08:43 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
405bf92e18 Added support for TokenInfo and StaticTokenInfo files.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-04-04 09:53:26 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b5b6dcd2e6 Fix conditional build for WS2812.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-26 20:16:09 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d637dbec01 Added CMAC and AES generation to README.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-26 18:42:12 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
ebcac9dfdc Upgrade to pico-hsm-tool to use the newer PicoHSM python package.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-23 20:19:53 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
510b148adf Update README with latest AES algorithms.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-23 20:19:15 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
371ae93fcd Added support for AES CCM.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-23 19:20:33 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
f5e875a6b7 Added support for AES CTR.
Note: the OID used by CTR does not exist.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-23 18:47:32 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
ad3304a384 Added AES XTS tests, with and without IV.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-22 23:29:31 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
4d647ba3c8 Add sanity check if wrong oid is provided.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-22 23:28:55 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
008db87fa7 Fix AES XTS call.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-22 23:28:22 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
1d80b45439 Add tests for AES extended.
It tests ECB, CBC, OFB, CFB and GCM.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-22 23:25:25 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
17560034ec Fix AES extended encoding call.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-22 23:23:12 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
8b0d85fbd4 Fix PRKD generation for AES.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-22 22:57:15 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
3dcb2e9d70 A PRKD is generated on every key import, regardless it might be replaced later.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-22 22:56:55 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
0f12ff1c48 Added support for PRKD for AES.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-22 22:07:34 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
2a5fe1cc6d Added initialization with self-signed certificate.
It will allow the initialization with OpenSC tool (sc-hsm-tool --initialize). However, it will not allow the use of card with SCS3, as it needs a PKI with trust chain. In this case, pico-hsm-tool.py shall be used for initialization.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-22 01:04:24 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
5e0f62265d Fix key size of terminal cert.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-20 21:41:38 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
0990805fb6 More code style.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-20 20:08:29 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
18bcf532e7 PicoHSM always returns bytes().
No need for casting.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-20 20:07:33 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
9f0316aedd Add chachapoly tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-20 18:08:00 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
088002863c Before cloning, it should be removed.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-20 18:03:49 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
7876f4b32a pypicohsm is built everytime that test is run, since it could implement more features used by tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-20 18:02:33 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
a5e3d4e0e5 Added dockerfile for debian.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-20 18:01:48 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
0c842773d2 Move to debian docker.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-20 17:58:43 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
0aaf339353 Fix error message.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-20 17:58:17 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
efba39adc5 Add SW_WRONG_DATA return on bad tag for Chachapoly.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-20 17:58:01 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
13755cb4d5 Fix buffer overflow when importing AES 512 key.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-20 17:06:06 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
11a30863e8 Using new package pypicohsm.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-20 17:05:46 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
a69d06b2d9 Fixed chachapoly crypt algorithm.
It missed setkey function. So, no key was used at any moment.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-19 20:24:32 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
1c7bc18161 Added support for AES 512 bit key size.
AES XTS uses two keys. Therefore, XTS with 2 AES 256 implies 64 bytes key length.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-19 20:22:40 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
86ce01cac2 Added AES XTS via AES_EXT command.
Note that it requires 32 bytes or 64 bytes key length.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-19 19:42:37 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
9cb60ba420 Added AES ECB (insecure), CBC (with custom IV), OFB, CFB and GCM (with 16-byte tag) via AES_EXT command.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-19 19:34:34 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
99f1620e7d Fixes #22.
SC-HSM returns the result with a 0x04 prepended. This comes from OpenSC but it is not clear the exact reason. 0x04 is usually for encoding uncompressed EC points but in that case it does not seem to make sense.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-18 18:40:27 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
755570e01a Fix deletion key in test 50.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-18 18:38:05 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
4b264597d6 Fix race condition.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-14 09:58:06 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
67e3d908b3 Fix test key deletion.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-14 09:57:25 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
7ae76354ef Added more tests for key_export.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-13 18:03:21 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
9291c2b4e3 delete_file() supports p1/p2
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-13 18:02:47 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
657ee18730 Added assert on deletion
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-13 18:02:31 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
132054c9b9 Public point is calculated everytime a private key is loaded.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-13 18:01:56 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
2a3b9b7474 Fix wrapping points.
Now it uses mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary() for better control.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-13 18:01:20 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
4e73723747 Fix checking key domain set.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-10 15:59:52 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
09724d95db Fix XKEK key generation.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-10 07:34:15 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
c1bfb597bc Added first tests of key wrapping.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-09 20:10:25 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
fd53b88397 Added more tests to key domain tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-09 20:09:58 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
11e5338736 Check if key domain is not already initialized when initializing.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-09 20:09:32 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
3660120b11 Before wrapping, check if DKEK is properly configured.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-09 20:09:03 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
75ca1b57d9 Added support of counter, algorithms and key domain to AES too.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-09 18:39:06 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
7af67713e7 Add support for counter, algorithms and key domain in key generation.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-09 18:38:29 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
63c465138b Added delete XKEK tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-09 18:28:31 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
4d569df108 Added dkek import in key domain tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-09 18:28:08 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
bee6a7bb92 Return error if a non-initialized key domain is deleted.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-09 18:27:47 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
e4583eb9c0 Fix potential crash on delete file.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-09 18:16:38 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
1c8582365d Add manual trigger
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-09 08:48:09 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
daf71678c5 Added first XKEK tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-08 22:15:44 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
26f0775772 Move some certs to common place.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-08 22:15:11 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
ed674b379c Zeroize ecdh key.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-08 11:15:02 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
6aa8d37d07 If a key does not belong to any key domain, it cannot be wrapped.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-07 23:45:37 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
963456051e If public point is not found, it is computed automatically.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-07 23:45:10 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
1e90699a3f Added more PKA tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-07 23:16:12 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
f8110a9d75 Update README.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-07 23:16:01 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
d81b21695f If no key domain is found, 0 is used by default.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-07 23:15:50 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
51e9e6722e Reset puk status on failed authentication.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-07 23:14:55 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
dba4630895 Add Public Key Authorization tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-07 17:28:56 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
ee73c6e781 Code style
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-07 17:28:23 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
2f63966c60 Fix checking status of PUK.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-07 15:55:59 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
e624f9ff72 Fix checking if PKU is enabled.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-07 11:15:07 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
fb4ff9424e Call reset puk store on init.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-07 11:14:42 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
63b245b858 Fix initialize with PUK store memory.
Now it is cleared.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-07 11:14:13 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
cd525d91a3 Updated base flash memory for emulation to include CA CVC.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-06 01:09:00 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
8fd3b4d858 CA cert is also uploaded to perform PKA.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-06 01:01:20 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
3c160f69c0 Add DV cert to PUK store.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-06 00:40:31 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
2c9fa8b19f Add two new boards for build.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-06 00:39:00 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
ccfe7ca8a8 Upgrade to version 3.4
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-04 14:38:28 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
d2d038f14d Upgrade to version 3.4
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-04 14:35:33 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
1a05d7b51f Fix conditional interface compilation.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-04 14:16:59 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
fa60ed5049 Update code style.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-04 14:05:51 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
35aec06391 Adding support for CCID GET, SET and RESET PARAMS.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-20 13:17:32 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
61359c7ebd Add key derivation tests (HKDF, PBKDF2 and X963).
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-17 23:54:40 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
20c01eb08d Fix name of x963 function.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-17 23:54:06 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
0b71bf693d Added CMAC tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-17 22:46:16 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
a1f478239d Added HMAC tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-17 22:43:28 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
420e55901c Fix HMAC computation.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-17 22:43:09 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
414cab78e3 Enabling entropy and ctr_drbg for emulation mode.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-16 23:43:11 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
36e5282d19 Update codeql.yml
Enable CodeQL to development branch.
2023-02-16 23:36:08 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
367651fe75 Upgrade to mbedtls v3.3.0
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-16 23:34:13 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
7b62ca5327 Upgrade to mbedtls v3.3.0 2023-02-16 23:33:13 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
9be176e523 Fixes for Pico SDK 1.5
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-16 22:55:36 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
b24e109a3c Fix error message when no card is detected.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-16 22:50:53 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
f61d0dd677 Update codeql.yml
Added development branch to CodeQL workflow.
2023-02-15 19:55:13 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
215fdca9f8 Added AES cipher tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-15 19:47:16 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
9279773073 Removed printf
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-15 19:46:42 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
d5b718ca58 Move pointer again...
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-15 00:14:37 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
cd6e280f4f Switching to new style.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-15 00:10:35 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
e7495d11f2 Moving pointer.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-14 23:25:13 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
daaa5bf402 Harmonize coding style.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-14 23:13:46 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
cab72f200a Moving pointer
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-14 23:12:48 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
380d47faa1 Renaming for avoiding confusions
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-14 23:05:37 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
962d1c6916 When runing a test, load a initial flash image that contains KEYDEV.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-14 22:53:30 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
d81d51d6fc Fix get public key.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-14 21:51:46 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
319000df1a Add challenge tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-14 21:38:06 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
5508e531a0 Added key domain tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-14 18:52:12 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
1e846600dd Add test info
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-14 18:51:50 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
43a49d2a14 Return reference not found when deleting a key domain.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-14 18:51:30 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
3b9c2d159b Fix returning existing key domain.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-14 18:47:43 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
14c7852143 Fix returning shared secret.
I do not know why a 0x04 was prepended.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-14 11:28:27 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
407110def4 Added ECDH tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-14 11:25:02 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
79d86a335c Adding more tests and renaming old ones.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-13 23:54:41 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
0685be5f1e EE_CERTIFICATE is added when importing key.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-13 23:53:41 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
8f6ae52c70 Added routines for import key.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-13 23:52:58 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
af16be64a2 Adding checks on ec import.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-13 23:30:27 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
68071825c2 Fix EC public key computation when importing.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-13 23:24:04 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
fbabb81acd Fix asymmetric decrypt for OAEP. It only supports SHA256.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-12 21:53:47 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
8bc4b133ca Adding routine for asymmetric decryption.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-12 21:53:19 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
2ce458dad5 Adding BP curves and RSA 4k to signature test.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-02-12 21:53:01 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
478b186094 Finally it seems to work.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 16:09:57 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
ab71b3163b Adding sleep just in case.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 16:07:41 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
c4de88e6c6 Moving pointer
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 15:39:31 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
3b0e34f465 More tries...
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 13:23:39 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
9077e78315 More flags to debug
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 13:15:04 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
2f5fcd1f14 Start pcscd with debug flag to get more debug info.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 13:09:17 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
24d430a3ac Updating pointer to include aesni
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 13:04:34 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
307eb63ee5 Init submodules in actions.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 12:59:03 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
07f85dc4b8 Add warning removal
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 12:18:18 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
a4026e0ca0 Submodules must be pulled.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 12:09:46 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
ebd8dc7bb8 Add apt-utils package.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 12:08:16 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
bac15d5472 Removing TTY from docker.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 12:05:03 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
8540fdcf19 Updating pointer.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 12:01:20 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
fc8d39882f Add missing build file.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 12:00:57 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
ca093eb81e Add emulation and test workflow.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 11:59:26 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
35c42bccb4 List PRKD if exist.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 01:25:25 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
52114b2d85 Added initialization on each keypairgen.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 01:25:05 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
8f593f6357 Added support for build emulation in Apple and Linux.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 01:24:35 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
6f8769ee8d Added scripts for testing in a docker container.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-30 01:24:10 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
1af461c206 Add first battery of tests.
It contains keypair generation for ECC and RSA, PIN blocking and signature generation and verification.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-17 13:41:10 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
8976dc1f79 Added support for RSA-PKCSv15-SHA224, SHA384 and SHA512. Also added support for RSA-PSS-SHA224, SHA384 and SHA512.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-17 00:41:46 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
9d47e62041 Fix signature for secp521r1.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-17 00:05:46 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
0daddfd477 Fix ECDSA-SHA384 and ECDSA-SHA512.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-17 00:05:31 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
89d617110f Add asn1_build_prkd_rsa()
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-16 18:54:28 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
17941397e9 Fix exporting large ECC key.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-16 18:54:20 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
f2aa4aae79 Moving pointer to latest bug fixes.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-14 00:41:23 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
e29b3143ed Moving pointer
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-13 18:49:08 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
5419ff74ee Using file_has_data() to check contents.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-13 18:07:50 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
723011078c Using file_has_data() instead of data directly.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-12 20:06:31 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
fe7c0333ab Some emulation fixes.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-12 20:06:11 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
c01940b62b Fix accessing way to data.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-12 20:05:59 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
7195a8f3ec Fix headers in emulation mode.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-12 20:05:46 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
7764de4e10 Unused headers.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-12 20:05:16 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
e05c526b4d Fix printf format.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-12 20:04:55 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
bc20f98b44 In emulation, return always 1mb of memory.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-12 20:04:44 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
742c3f3e3c RTC command is not available in emulation.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-12 20:04:23 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
9793977ffc Fixed double counter increment.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-12 20:04:05 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
6c85772fff Added emulated build capability.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-01-12 20:03:42 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
9ff3254a4c Update to latest HSM SDK.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-12-22 22:50:54 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
7d906851dd Updating to newer version of Pico HSM SDK.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-12-20 23:51:49 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
691aa3308c Fix when importing a dkek and it fails.
Now the dkek state is returned to the previous one.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-12-06 20:11:26 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
6a57e67629 Fix importing dkek twice.
It is not allowed anymore.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-12-06 20:04:18 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
202c8a4b22 Credentials are not necessary when importing DKEK.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-12-06 20:00:32 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
f2874ae3ef Fix when ping is provided during the initialization.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-12-06 20:00:19 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
9e9cf9b768 Upgrading version to v3.2.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-12-06 19:00:44 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
c95dee84f2 Changing backend service url.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-12-06 19:00:35 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
65cde9960f Upgrading version to v3.2.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-12-04 17:42:03 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
7ca96178fb Moving HSM SDK pointer to latest release.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-28 18:54:22 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
020feaf325 Update README.md
Fix header
2022-11-15 22:42:43 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
e70461e551 Merge branch 'master' into development 2022-11-15 17:40:29 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
0e918434a2 Update README.md 2022-11-15 17:38:33 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
63c85000d0 Added support for kdf.
It supports HKDF, PBKDF2 and X963, with multiple MD (SHA family), salt/nonces and configurable output size.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-15 00:15:59 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
4113f6a65d Fix parsing PBKDF2 params.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-15 00:14:39 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
f98d744076 Add apdu.ne check for large buffers.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-14 18:04:44 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
bb4c293736 Adding subparsers for subcommands.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-14 16:27:51 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
aa8b1e6efe Added support for X963 KDF.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-14 15:38:16 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
0cb2e8ec2e Added PBES2 key derivation with encryption and decryption support.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-14 13:07:49 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
0e96753ccb Added support for PBKDF2.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-14 12:01:27 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
2b2df22d75 Added support for configurable HKDF.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-14 10:14:54 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
f65167e3c7 Adding support for keypair generation for Curve25519 and Curve448.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-11 17:10:34 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
8fe2677a56 Fix cofactor return with cvc.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-11 17:08:36 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
d09a7cf9c8 If self-signature fails, puts all-0.
When generating a keypair and returns a self-signed CVREQ, the signature might fail for Curve25519 and Curve448. Instead of returning null, it puts zeros in order to return what is expected to return.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-11 17:04:17 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
6bf72e5a59 Added support for HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA224, HMAC-SHA256, HMAC-SHA384 and HMAC-SHA512.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-08 17:26:32 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
7c877ebea2 Using file_out parameter.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-07 22:31:19 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
e1983f7bcc Now is possible pipe encrypt & decrypt commands.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-07 22:16:10 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
a5e025a4e5 If no applet is selected, then select it.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-07 21:37:42 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
a7682d2639 Adding Extended Cipher feature.
With this new subcommand, Pico HSM will support newer cipher algorithms.
ChaCha20-Poly1305 is the first. It will be based on a custom P2 subcommand to support an arbitrary structure with multiple parameters (AAD, IV, etc.)

pico-hsm-tool.py shall be used.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-07 21:37:11 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
30301c68f1 Linux uses the generic interface. Needs deep testing.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-07 13:14:37 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
abf980d84e Fixes in windows backend.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-03 18:41:02 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
8718f55df2 Adding secure_key for windows.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-03 18:26:35 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
d1a3a24527 Import secure_key only when needed.
Now, it does not block anymore the entire execution of pico tool.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-03 16:09:42 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
f363b77a07 Adding secure_key for macOS.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-11-03 16:06:06 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
d5899a90c1 Merge pull request #10 from rrottmann/small-fixes
Small fixes
2022-11-03 16:05:56 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
f1058ea611 Merge branch 'master' into small-fixes 2022-11-03 15:48:33 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
00279da8d5 Adding Secure Lock to lock the device with a random 256 bit key.
This is an extra layer of security to avoid brute force attacks if PIN is too weak.
At every hard reset (on device plug), the device must be unlocked prior any other command. Once unlocked, the device can be used as usual.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-31 15:09:54 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
eda8b53949 Memory cleanup on ECDH.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-31 12:54:44 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
cfc0cc8f6e Some optimizations.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-31 00:38:30 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
ab61b2a2d5 Fix returning public key of koblitz curve secp_k1.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-31 00:38:21 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
f79a6ed30a Do not override Ne.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-30 23:42:12 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
4313722b06 Fix memory free on keygen ecc.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-30 23:15:22 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
eec4612a6f Fix when secure message cannot be correctly processed.
It is discarded.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-30 21:11:06 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
b2ac893efc Fix general authentication with AES.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-30 21:09:41 +01:00
Reiner Rottmann
14e8d9cd04 Fixing typo in command. 2022-10-30 08:52:28 +01:00
Reiner Rottmann
1a6cfd17cb Small fix in ModuleNotFoundError handling. 2022-10-30 08:51:57 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
3835507e00 Fix displaying error message if pycvc is missing.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-29 11:35:54 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
4536589e2c Added error message if package is missing.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2022-10-10 11:02:07 +02:00
99 changed files with 8134 additions and 1733 deletions

4
.github/FUNDING.yml vendored Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
# These are supported funding model platforms
github: polhenarejos
custom: ["https://www.paypal.me/polhenarejos"]

View File

@@ -13,12 +13,13 @@ name: "CodeQL"
on:
push:
branches: [ "master" ]
branches: [ "master", "development", "development-eddsa" ]
pull_request:
# The branches below must be a subset of the branches above
branches: [ "master" ]
branches: [ "master", "development", "development-eddsa" ]
schedule:
- cron: '23 5 * * 4'
workflow_dispatch:
jobs:
analyze:
@@ -35,6 +36,7 @@ jobs:
language: [ 'cpp', 'python' ]
# CodeQL supports [ 'cpp', 'csharp', 'go', 'java', 'javascript', 'python', 'ruby' ]
# Learn more about CodeQL language support at https://aka.ms/codeql-docs/language-support
mode: [ 'pico', 'local' ]
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
@@ -48,11 +50,11 @@ jobs:
# If you wish to specify custom queries, you can do so here or in a config file.
# By default, queries listed here will override any specified in a config file.
# Prefix the list here with "+" to use these queries and those in the config file.
# Details on CodeQL's query packs refer to : https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/code-scanning/automatically-scanning-your-code-for-vulnerabilities-and-errors/configuring-code-scanning#using-queries-in-ql-packs
# queries: security-extended,security-and-quality
# Autobuild attempts to build any compiled languages (C/C++, C#, or Java).
# If this step fails, then you should remove it and run the build manually (see below)
# - name: Autobuild
@@ -61,12 +63,12 @@ jobs:
# Command-line programs to run using the OS shell.
# 📚 See https://docs.github.com/en/actions/using-workflows/workflow-syntax-for-github-actions#jobsjob_idstepsrun
# If the Autobuild fails above, remove it and uncomment the following three lines.
# If the Autobuild fails above, remove it and uncomment the following three lines.
# modify them (or add more) to build your code if your project, please refer to the EXAMPLE below for guidance.
- run: |
echo "Run, Build Application using script"
./workflows/autobuild.sh
./workflows/autobuild.sh ${{ matrix.mode }}
- name: Perform CodeQL Analysis
uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@v2

66
.github/workflows/test.yml vendored Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
# For most projects, this workflow file will not need changing; you simply need
# to commit it to your repository.
#
# You may wish to alter this file to override the set of languages analyzed,
# or to provide custom queries or build logic.
#
# ******** NOTE ********
# We have attempted to detect the languages in your repository. Please check
# the `language` matrix defined below to confirm you have the correct set of
# supported CodeQL languages.
#
name: "Emulation and test"
on:
push:
branches: [ "master", "development", "development-eddsa" ]
pull_request:
# The branches below must be a subset of the branches above
branches: [ "master", "development", "development-eddsa" ]
schedule:
- cron: '23 5 * * 4'
workflow_dispatch:
jobs:
build:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Checkout repository and submodules
uses: actions/checkout@v3
with:
submodules: recursive
- name: Build in container
run: ./tests/build-in-docker.sh
- name: Export image
run: |
mkdir -p artifacts
docker save pico-hsm-test:bullseye -o artifacts/docker-image.tar
- name: Temporarily save image
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v3
with:
name: docker-artifact
path: artifacts
retention-days: 1
test:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: build
strategy:
matrix:
suite: ["pkcs11", "pytest", "sc-hsm-pkcs11"]
steps:
- name: Checkout repository and submodules
uses: actions/checkout@v3
with:
submodules: recursive
- name: Retrieve saved image
uses: actions/download-artifact@v3
with:
name: docker-artifact
path: artifacts
- name: Load image
run: |
cd artifacts
docker load -q -i docker-image.tar
- name: Test ${{ matrix.suite }}
run: ./tests/run-test-in-docker.sh ${{ matrix.suite }}

6
.gitmodules vendored
View File

@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
[submodule "pico-hsm-sdk"]
path = pico-hsm-sdk
url = ../pico-hsm-sdk
[submodule "pico-keys-sdk"]
path = pico-keys-sdk
url = https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-keys-sdk

317
.uncrustify.cfg Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,317 @@
#
# Uncrustify Configuration File
# File Created With UncrustifyX 0.4.3 (252)
#
# Code-Modifying
# --------------
## Braces
# Braces on single-line do statement
mod_full_brace_do = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Braces on single-line else statement
mod_full_brace_if = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Braces on single-line for statement
mod_full_brace_for = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Braces on single-line while statement
mod_full_brace_while = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
## Parentheses
# Remove unnecessary parentheses on return statement
mod_paren_on_return = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Comments
# --------
## Other
# Remove leading spaces from multi-line comments
cmt_multi_check_last = false # boolean (false/true)
# General
# -------
## Other
# Input tab size
input_tab_size = 4 # number
# Indentation
# -----------
## Indentation Size
# Indentation column size
indent_columns = 4 # number
# Indentation size between case and switch
indent_switch_case = 4 # number
## Other
# Align strings broken by backslash
indent_align_string = true # boolean (false/true)
# Indent with tabs
indent_with_tabs = 0 # number
# Line-Splitting
# --------------
## Splitting
# Code width
code_width = 100 # number
# Split long for statements at semicolons
ls_for_split_full = true # boolean (false/true)
# Split long function prototypes/calls at commas
ls_func_split_full = true # boolean (false/true)
# Newlines
# --------
## Newline Between
# Newline between assignment and open brace
nl_assign_brace = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Newline between close brace and else
nl_brace_else = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Newline between close brace and while
nl_brace_while = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Newline between do and open brace
nl_do_brace = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Newline between else and open brace
nl_else_brace = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Newline between enum and open brace
nl_enum_brace = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Newline between for and open brace
nl_for_brace = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Newline between function call and open brace
nl_fcall_brace = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Newline between function signature and open brace
nl_fdef_brace = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Newline between if and open brace
nl_if_brace = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Newline between struct and open brace
nl_struct_brace = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Newline between switch and open brace
nl_switch_brace = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Newline between union and open brace
nl_union_brace = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Newline between while and open brace
nl_while_brace = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
## Other
# Newline count at end of file
nl_end_of_file_min = 1 # number
# Newlines at end of file
nl_end_of_file = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Newlines at start of file
nl_start_of_file = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Spacing
# -------
## Space After
# Space after address-of operator
sp_addr = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space after cast
sp_after_cast = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space after comma
sp_after_comma = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space after dereference operator
sp_deref = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space after final semicolon in empty for statement
sp_after_semi_for_empty = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space after invert operator
sp_inv = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space after not operator
sp_not = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space after pointer star
sp_after_ptr_star = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space after pointer star followed by function
sp_after_ptr_star_func = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space after semicolon
sp_after_semi = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space after semicolon in non-empty for statements
sp_after_semi_for = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space after sign in assignment
sp_sign = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space after type
sp_after_type = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
## Space Around
# Space around arithmetic operators
sp_arith = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space around assignment operator
sp_assign = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space around boolean operators
sp_bool = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space around compare operators
sp_compare = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space around increment/decrement operators
sp_incdec = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space around member operators
sp_member = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space around preprocessor concatenation operator
sp_pp_concat = ignore # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space around ternary condition colon
sp_cond_colon = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space around ternary condition question mark
sp_cond_question = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
## Space Before
# Space before backslash-newline at end of line
sp_before_nl_cont = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space before case colon
sp_before_case_colon = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space before comma
sp_before_comma = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space before if/for/switch/while open parenthesis
sp_before_sparen = force # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space before pointer star
sp_before_ptr_star = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space before semicolon
sp_before_semi = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space before semicolon in empty for statement
sp_before_semi_for_empty = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space before semicolon in for statements
sp_before_semi_for = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
## Space Between
# Space between __attribute__ and open parenthesis
sp_attribute_paren = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between close brace and else
sp_brace_else = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between close brace and typedef name
sp_brace_typedef = force # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between closing parenthesis and open brace
sp_fparen_brace = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between defined and open parenthesis
sp_defined_paren = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between else and open brace
sp_else_brace = force # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between function name and open parenthesis
sp_func_call_paren = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between function name and open parenthesis in declaration
sp_func_proto_paren = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between function name and open parenthesis in function definition
sp_func_def_paren = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between if/for/switch/while close parenthesis and open brace
sp_sparen_brace = force # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between macro and value
sp_macro = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between macro function close parenthesis and value
sp_macro_func = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between nested parentheses
sp_paren_paren = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between pointer stars
sp_between_ptr_star = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between preprocessor else and comment
sp_endif_cmt = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between return type and function name
sp_type_func = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space between sizeof and open parenthesis
sp_sizeof_paren = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
## Space Inside
# Space inside braces
sp_inside_braces = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space inside cast parentheses
sp_inside_paren_cast = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space inside empty function parentheses
sp_inside_fparens = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space inside enum braces
sp_inside_braces_enum = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space inside function parentheses
sp_inside_fparen = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space inside if-condition parentheses
sp_inside_sparen = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space inside non-empty square brackets
sp_inside_square = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space inside parentheses
sp_inside_paren = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space inside parentheses in function type
sp_inside_tparen = remove # string (add/force/ignore/remove)
# Space inside struct/union braces
sp_inside_braces_struct = add # string (add/force/ignore/remove)

View File

@@ -17,18 +17,36 @@
cmake_minimum_required(VERSION 3.13)
if(ESP_PLATFORM)
set(EXTRA_COMPONENT_DIRS src pico-keys-sdk/src)
include($ENV{IDF_PATH}/tools/cmake/project.cmake)
set(USB_ITF_CCID 1)
set(USB_ITF_WCID 1)
else()
if(ENABLE_EMULATION)
else()
include(pico_sdk_import.cmake)
endif()
project(pico_hsm C CXX ASM)
set(CMAKE_C_STANDARD 11)
set(CMAKE_CXX_STANDARD 17)
if(NOT ENABLE_EMULATION)
pico_sdk_init()
endif()
if (NOT DEFINED __FOR_CI)
set(__FOR_CI 0)
endif()
if (__FOR_CI)
add_definitions(-D__FOR_CI)
endif()
add_executable(pico_hsm)
target_sources(pico_hsm PUBLIC
endif()
set(SOURCES ${SOURCES}
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/sc_hsm.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_select.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_list_keys.c
@@ -56,45 +74,59 @@ target_sources(pico_hsm PUBLIC
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_session_pin.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_puk_auth.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_pso.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_bip_slip.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cvc.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/files.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/kek.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/oid.c
)
set(HSM_DRIVER "ccid")
include(pico-hsm-sdk/pico_hsm_sdk_import.cmake)
set(USB_ITF_CCID 1)
set(USB_ITF_WCID 1)
include(pico-keys-sdk/pico_keys_sdk_import.cmake)
if(ESP_PLATFORM)
project(pico_hsm)
endif()
target_include_directories(pico_hsm PUBLIC
set(INCLUDES ${INCLUDES}
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm
)
if(NOT ESP_PLATFORM)
target_sources(pico_hsm PUBLIC ${SOURCES})
target_include_directories(pico_hsm PUBLIC ${INCLUDES})
target_compile_options(pico_hsm PUBLIC
-Wall
-Werror
)
if (NOT MSVC)
target_compile_options(pico_hsm PUBLIC
-Werror
)
endif()
if(ENABLE_EMULATION)
if (NOT MSVC)
target_compile_options(pico_hsm PUBLIC
-fdata-sections
-ffunction-sections
)
endif()
if(APPLE)
target_link_options(pico_hsm PUBLIC
-Wl,-dead_strip
)
elseif(MSVC)
target_compile_options(pico_hsm PUBLIC
-WX
)
target_link_libraries(pico_hsm PUBLIC wsock32 ws2_32 Bcrypt)
else()
target_link_options(pico_hsm PUBLIC
-Wl,--gc-sections
)
endif (APPLE)
else()
pico_add_extra_outputs(pico_hsm)
target_link_libraries(pico_hsm PRIVATE pico_hsm_sdk pico_stdlib pico_multicore hardware_flash hardware_sync hardware_adc pico_unique_id hardware_rtc tinyusb_device tinyusb_board)
#
#project(flash_nuke C CXX ASM)
#add_executable(flash_nuke nuke.c)
#target_link_libraries(flash_nuke
# pico_stdlib
# hardware_flash
# )
#pico_set_binary_type(flash_nuke no_flash)
#
#pico_add_extra_outputs(flash_nuke)
#project(memory C CXX ASM)
#add_executable(memory memory.c)
#target_link_libraries(memory
# pico_stdlib
# hardware_flash
# )
#pico_set_binary_type(memory no_flash)
#
#pico_add_extra_outputs(memory)
target_link_libraries(pico_hsm PRIVATE pico_keys_sdk pico_stdlib pico_multicore hardware_flash hardware_sync hardware_adc pico_unique_id hardware_rtc tinyusb_device tinyusb_board)
endif()
endif()

277
README.md
View File

@@ -1,140 +1,184 @@
# Raspberry Pico HSM
This is a project to create a Hardware Security Module (HSM) with a Raspberry Pico. It converts your Pico board into a HSM which is able to generate and store private keys, encrypt or decrypt with AES or signing data without to disclose the private key. In detail, the private key never leaves the board and it cannot be retrieved as it is encrypted in the flash memory.
This project aims to transform a Raspberry Pi Pico or ESP32 microcontroller into a Hardware Security Module (HSM). The modified Pico or ESP32 board will be capable of generating and storing private keys, performing AES encryption or decryption, and signing data without exposing the private key. Specifically, the private key remains securely on the board and cannot be retrieved since it is encrypted within the flash memory.
## Capabilities
### > Key generation and encrypted storage
Private and secret keys are stored with a master AES 256 key (DKEK). The DKEK is, at the same time, encrypted with a hashed and salted version of the PIN.
Private and secret keys are secured using a master AES 256 key (MKEK). The MKEK is encrypted with a hashed and salted version of the PIN.
**No private/secret keys, DKEK or PIN are stored in plain text ever. Never.**
### > RSA key generation from 1024 to 4096 bits
RSA key generation in place for 1024, 2048, 3072 and 4096 bits. Private keys never leave the device.
### > RSA Key Generation (1024 to 4096 Bits)
RSA key generation is supported for 1024, 2048, 3072, and 4096 bits. Private keys never leave the device.
### > ECDSA key generation from 192 to 521 bits
ECDSA key generation in place for different curves, from 192 to 521 bits.
### > ECDSA Key Generation (192 to 521 Bits)
ECDSA key generation supports various curves from 192 to 521 bits.
### > ECC curves
It supports secp192r1, secp256r1, secp384r1, secp521r1, brainpoolP256r1, brainpoolP384r1, brainpoolP512r1, secp192k1 (insecure), secp256k1 curves.
### > ECC Curves
Supported ECC curves include secp192r1, secp256r1, secp384r1, secp521r1, brainpoolP256r1, brainpoolP384r1, brainpoolP512r1, secp192k1 (insecure), secp256k1, Curve25519, and Curve448.
### > SHA1, SHA224, SHA256, SHA384, SHA512 digests
ECDSA and RSA signature can be combined with SHA digest in place.
### > SHA Digests
ECDSA and RSA signatures can be combined with SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 digests.
### > Multiple RSA signature algorithms
It supports RSA-PSS, RSA-PKCS and raw RSA signatures.
### > Multiple RSA Signature Algorithms
Supported RSA signature algorithms include RSA-PSS, RSA-PKCS, and raw RSA signatures.
### > ECDSA raw and hash signature
ECDSA signatures can be in raw or pre-hashed formats.
### > ECDSA Signatures
ECDSA signatures can be raw or pre-hashed.
### > ECDH key derivation
It supports the calculation of shared secrets with ECDH algorithm.
### > ECDH Key Derivation
Supports the ECDH algorithm for calculating shared secrets.
### > EC private key derivation
It allows ECDSA key derivation.[^1]
### > EC Private Key Derivation
Allows ECDSA key derivation.
### > RSA-OEP and RSA-X-509 decryption
It allows private decryption in place with RSA-OEP and RSA-X-509 algorithms.
### > RSA Decryption
Supports RSA-OEP and RSA-X.509 decryption.
### > AES key generation
It supports AES key generation in place with keys of 128, 192 and 256 bits.
### > AES Key Generation
Supports AES key generation with keys of 128, 192, and 256 bits.
### > AES-CBC encryption/decryption
AES encryption and decryption is performed in place.
### > AES-CBC Encryption/Decryption
Performs AES-CBC encryption and decryption.
### > Advanced AES Modes
Supports AES encryption and decryption in ECB, CBC, CFB, OFB, XTS, CTR, GCM, and CCM modes, with customizable IV/nonce and additional authenticated data (AAD).[^4]
### > AES Key Generation (128, 192, 256, 512 Bits)
Supports AES key generation up to 512 bits, useful for AES XTS where two 256-bit keys are concatenated.
### > CMAC
It supports AES-CMAC authentication.[^1]
Supports AES-CMAC authentication.[^1]
### > AES derivation
It supports AES secret key derivation.[^1]
### > AES Secret Key Derivation
Supports AES secret key derivation.[^1]
### > PIN authorization
Private and secret keys cannot be used without prior PIN authentication. It supports alphanumeric PIN.
### > PIN Authorization
Private and secret keys require prior PIN authentication. Supports alphanumeric PINs.
### > PKCS11 compliant interface
The module can be interfaced with PKCS11 standard.
### > PKCS11 Compliant Interface
Interfacing with the PKCS11 standard is supported.
### > HRNG (hardware random number generator)
It contains a harware random number generator properly modeled to guarantee maximum entropy.
### > Hardware Random Number Generator (HRNG)
Contains an HRNG designed for maximum entropy.
### > Device Key Encryption Key (DKEK) shares
It supports DKEK share imports. DKEK are used to wrap, unwrap and encrypt private and secret keys in the device.
### > Device Key Encryption Key (DKEK) Shares
Supports importing DKEK shares to wrap, unwrap, and encrypt keys.
### > DKEK n-of-m threshold scheme
It supports a n-of-m threshold scheme to minimize outage when a DKEK custodian is not available during the import process.
### > DKEK n-of-m Threshold Scheme
Supports an n-of-m threshold scheme to prevent outages when a DKEK custodian is unavailable.
### > USB/CCID support with OpenSC, openssl, etc.
Pico HSM has a full USB CCID stack to communicate with the host via OpenSC and PCSC. It allows the use of frontend applications such as OpenSSL via PKCS11 module.
### > USB/CCID Support
Full USB CCID stack for communication with the host via OpenSC and PCSC, allowing the use of frontend applications like OpenSSL via the PKCS11 module.
### > Extended APDU support
It supports extended APDU packets, which allows up to 65535 bytes.
### > Extended APDU Support
Supports extended APDU packets, allowing up to 65535 bytes.
### > CV Certificates
Pico HSM manipulates CVC certificates and requests to minimize the storage of internal certificates.
Handles CVC certificates and requests to minimize internal certificate storage.
### > Attestation
Every generated key is attached to a certificate, signed by an external PKI to ensure that a particular key is effectively generated by this specific device.
Each generated key is attached to a certificate signed by an external PKI, ensuring the key was generated by the specific device.
### > Import external private keys and certificates
It allows private key and certificates import via WKY or PKCS#12 files.[^2][^3]
### > Import External Keys and Certificates
Allows importing private keys and certificates via WKY or PKCS#12 files.[^2][^3]
### > Tranport PIN
It allows transport PIN for provisioning and forcing to set a new PIN.[^2] It is a tampered mechanism that ensures the device has not been unsealed during the transportation from the issuer to the legitimate user.
### > Transport PIN
Allows a transport PIN for provisioning, ensuring the device has not been tampered with during transportation.[^2]
### > Press-to-confirm button
It allows the use of BOOTSEL button to confirm operations with private/secret keys, such as signatures and decryption. When a private/secret key is loaded, the user has 15 seconds to press the button to confirm the operation.
This feature protects the user from unwanted uses from background applications that may sign data without user notice.
### > Press-to-Confirm Button
Uses the BOOTSEL button to confirm operations with private/secret keys, providing a 15-second window to confirm the operation to protect against unauthorized use.
### > Store and retrieve binary data
It allows the storage of arbitrary files with binary data.
### > Store and Retrieve Binary Data
Allows the storage of arbitrary binary data files.
### > Real time clock (RTC)
Pico HSM has a RTC with external datetime setting and getting.
### > Real-Time Clock (RTC)
Includes an RTC with external date and time setting and retrieval.
### > Secure Messaging (secure channel)
Pico HSM supports secure channel, where the data packets between the host and device are encrypted to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks.
### > Secure Messaging
Supports secure channels to encrypt data packets between the host and device, preventing man-in-the-middle attacks.
### > Session PIN
A specific session PIN can be set during the session opening to avoid the systemmatic use of PIN.
A specific session PIN can be set during session opening to avoid systematic PIN usage.
### > PKI CVCert remote issuing for Secure Message
### > PKI CVCert Remote Issuing for Secure Messaging
Secure channel messages are secured with a certificate issued by an external PKI.
### > Multiple key domains
Key domains are domains to store separate private/secret keys. Each domain is protected by a DKEK, independent from the other domains. Private/secret keys can be generated in different key domains to be used with separated DKEK.
Therefore, a single device may contain different domains with independent keys.
### > Multiple Key Domains
Supports separate key domains protected by independent DKEKs, allowing different keys in different domains.
### > Key usage counter
A key usage counter is a counter that is reduced by 1 everytime that the private/secret key is used for signing, decrypting, derivation, etc. When it reaches 0, the key is disabled and cannot be used anymore.
### > Key Usage Counter
Tracks and limits the usage of private/secret keys, disabling keys once their usage counter reaches zero.
Key usage can also be used to perform and auditory and track the usage of a particular key.
### > Public Key Authentication (PKA)
Supports PKA for enhanced security, requiring a secondary device for authentication using a challenge-response mechanism.
### > Public Key Authentication
Public Key Authentication (PKA) allows to authenticate by using a secondary device with a private key and a registered public key in the primary device. A challenge is generated by the primary Pico HSM and given to the secondary for signature. The secondary device signs the challenge and returns the signature. Then, the primary device verifies the signature with the registered public key and if it is valid, it grants full access, as normal PIN authentication.
### > Secure Lock
Adds an extra layer of security by locking the Pico HSM to a specific computer using a private key.
In PKA, the PIN is used for protecting the DKEK, as classic method with only PIN, and PKA is used for adding an extra security layer. Therefore, this mechanism provides a higher degree of security, since it needs a secondary Pico HSM to authenticate the primary one.
### > ChaCha20-Poly1305
Supports the ChaCha20-Poly1305 encryption algorithm for secure data encryption.[^4]
### > X25519 and X448
Supports DH X25519 and X448 for key agreement, though these cannot be used for signing.
### > Key Derivation Functions
Supports HKDF, PBKDF2, and X963-KDF for symmetric key derivation.
### > HMAC
Supports HMAC generation with SHA digest algorithms.
### > CMAC
Supports CMAC with AES for keys of 128, 192, and 256 bits.
### > XKEK
Supports an advanced key sharing scheme (XKEK) for securely wrapping and unwrapping keys within authorized domains.
### > Master Key Encryption Key (MKEK)
Uses an MKEK to securely store all keys, encrypted with an ephemeral key derived from the hashed PIN.
### > Hierarchical Deterministic Key Generation
Supports BIP32 for asymmetric key derivation and SLIP10 for symmetric key derivation, enabling crypto wallet deployment with infinite key generation. Supports NIST 256 and Koblitz 256 curves for master key generation.[^4]
[^1]: PKCS11 modules (`pkcs11-tool` and `sc-tool`) do not support CMAC and key derivation. It must be processed through raw APDU command (`opensc-tool -s`).
[^2]: Available via SCS3 tool. See [SCS3](/doc/scs3.md "SCS3") for more information.
[^3]: Imports are available only if the Pico HSM is previously initialized with a DKEK and the DKEK shares are available during the import process.
[^3]: Imports are available only if the Pico HSM is previously initialized with a DKEK and DKEK shares are available during the import process.
[^4]: Available by using PicoHSM python tool.
### > ESP32-S3 support
Pico HSM also supports ESP32-S3 boards, which add secure storage, flash encryption and secure boot.
### > Dynamic VID/PID
Supports setting VID & PID on-the-fly. Use `pico-hsm-tool.py` for specify VID/PID values and reboot the device.
### > Rescue Pico HSM Tool
Pico HSM Tool implements a new CCID stack to rescue the Pico HSM in case it has wrong VID/PID values and it is not recognized by the OS.
## Security considerations
All secret keys (asymmetric and symmetric) are stored encrypted in the flash memory of the Raspberry Pico. DKEK is used as a 256 bit AES key to protect private and secret keys. Keys are never stored in RAM except for signature and decryption operations and only during the process. All keys (including DKEK) are loaded and cleared every time to avoid potential security flaws.
All secret keys (both asymmetric and symmetric) are encrypted and stored in the flash memory of the Raspberry Pico. The DKEK, a 256-bit AES key, is used to protect these private and secret keys. Keys are only held in RAM during signature and decryption operations, and are loaded and cleared each time to avoid potential security vulnerabilities.
At the same time, DKEK is encrypted with doubled salted and hashed PIN. Also, the PIN is hashed in memory during the session. Hence, PIN is never stored in plain text neither in flash nor in memory. Note that PIN is conveyed from the host to the HSM in plain text if no secure channel is provided.
The DKEK itself is encrypted using a doubly salted and hashed PIN, and the PIN is hashed in memory during sessions. This ensures that the PIN is never stored in plain text, either in flash memory or in RAM. However, if no secure channel is used, the PIN is transmitted in plain text from the host to the HSM.
If the Pico is stolen the contents of private and secret keys cannot be read without the PIN, even if the flash memory is dumped.
In the event that the Pico is stolen, the private and secret key contents cannot be accessed without the PIN, even if the flash memory is dumped.
## Download
**If you own an ESP32-S3 board, go to [ESP32 support](https://www.picokeys.com/esp32-support/) for further information.**
Please, go to the Release page and download the UF2 file for your board.
Note that UF2 files are shiped with a dummy VID/PID to avoid license issues (FEFF:FCFD). If you are planning to use it with OpenSC or similar, you should modify Info.plist of CCID driver to add these VID/PID or use the VID/PID patcher as follows:
Note that UF2 files are shiped with a dummy VID/PID to avoid license issues (FEFF:FCFD). If you plan to use it with OpenSC or similar tools, you should modify Info.plist of CCID driver to add these VID/PID or use the [Pico Patcher tool](https://www.picokeys.com/pico-patcher/).
Alternatively you can use the legacy VID/PID patcher as follows:
`./patch_vidpid.sh VID:PID input_hsm_file.uf2 output_hsm_file.uf2`
You can use whatever VID/PID (i.e., 234b:0000 from FISJ), but remember that you are not authorized to distribute the binary with a VID/PID that you do not own.
Note that the pure-browser option [Pico Patcher tool](https://www.picokeys.com/pico-patcher/) is the most recommended.
## Build
Before building, ensure you have installed the toolchain for the Pico and the Pico SDK is properly located in your drive.
```
git clone https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm
git submodule update --init --recursive
cd pico-hsm
mkdir build
cd build
@@ -143,17 +187,34 @@ make
```
Note that `PICO_BOARD`, `USB_VID` and `USB_PID` are optional. If not provided, `pico` board and VID/PID `FEFF:FCFD` will be used.
After `make` ends, the binary file `pico_hsm.uf2` will be generated. Put your pico board into loading mode, by pushing `BOOTSEL` button while pluging on, and copy the UF2 to the new fresh usb mass storage Pico device. Once copied, the pico mass storage will be disconnected automatically and the pico board will reset with the new firmware. A blinking led will indicate the device is ready to work.
Additionally, you can pass the `VIDPID=value` parameter to build the firmware with a known VID/PID. The supported values are:
- `NitroHSM`
- `NitroFIDO2`
- `NitroStart`
- `NitroPro`
- `Nitro3`
- `Yubikey5`
- `YubikeyNeo`
- `YubiHSM`
- `Gnuk`
- `GnuPG`
After running `make`, the binary file `pico_hsm.uf2` will be generated. To load this onto your Pico board:
1. Put the Pico board into loading mode by holding the `BOOTSEL` button while plugging it in.
2. Copy the `pico_hsm.uf2` file to the new USB mass storage device that appears.
3. Once the file is copied, the Pico mass storage device will automatically disconnect, and the Pico board will reset with the new firmware.
4. A blinking LED will indicate that the device is ready to work.
### Docker
Independent from your Linux distribution or when using another OS that supports Docker, you could build a specific pico-hsm version in a Linux container.
```
sudo docker build \
--build-arg VERSION_PICO_SDK=1.4.0 \
--build-arg VERSION_MAJOR=2 \
--build-arg VERSION_MINOR=6 \
--build-arg VERSION_PICO_SDK=1.5.0 \
--build-arg VERSION_MAJOR=3 \
--build-arg VERSION_MINOR=4 \
--build-arg PICO_BOARD=waveshare_rp2040_zero \
--build-arg USB_VID=0xfeff \
--build-arg USB_PID=0xfcfd \
@@ -170,36 +231,31 @@ sudo docker rm mybuild
```
## Usage
The firmware uploaded to the Pico contains a reader and a virtual smart card. It is like having a physical reader with an inserted SIM card.
We recommend the use of [OpenSC](http://github.com/opensc/opensc/ "OpenSC") to communicate with the reader. If it is not installed, you can download and build it or install the binaries for your system. The first command is to ensure that the Pico is detected as a HSM:
```
The firmware uploaded to the Pico contains a reader and a virtual smart card, similar to having a physical reader with an inserted SIM card. We recommend using [OpenSC](http://github.com/opensc/opensc/ "OpenSC") to communicate with the reader. If OpenSC is not installed, you can download and build it or install the binaries for your system.
To ensure that the Pico is detected as an HSM, use the following command:
```sh
opensc-tool -an
```
It should return a text like the following:
```
It should return a text similar to:
```sh
Using reader with a card: Free Software Initiative of Japan Gnuk
3b:fe:18:00:00:81:31:fe:45:80:31:81:54:48:53:4d:31:73:80:21:40:81:07:fa
SmartCard-HSM
```
The name of the reader may vary if you modified the VID/PID.
For initialization and asymmetric operations, check [doc/usage.md](/doc/usage.md).
For further details and operations, refer to the following documentation:
For signing and verification operations, check [doc/sign-verify.md](/doc/sign-verify.md).
For asymmetric encryption and decryption, check [doc/asymmetric-ciphering.md](/doc/asymmetric-ciphering.md).
For backup, restore and DKEK share management, check [doc/backup-and-restore.md](/doc/backup-and-restore.md).
For AES key generation, encryption and decryption, check [doc/aes.md](/doc/aes.md).
For 4096 bits RSA support, check [doc/scs3.md](/doc/scs3.md).
For storing and retrieving arbitrary data, check [doc/store_data.md](/doc/store_data.md).
For extra options, such as set/get real datetime or enable/disable press-to-confirm button, check [doc/extra_command.md](/doc/extra_command.md).
For Public Key Authentication, check [doc/public_key_authentication.md](/doc/public_key_authentication.md).
- Initialization and Asymmetric Operations [doc/usage.md](/doc/usage.md)
- Signing and Verification Operations [doc/sign-verify.md](/doc/sign-verify.md)
- Asymmetric Encryption and Decryption [doc/asymmetric-ciphering.md](/doc/asymmetric-ciphering.md)
- Backup, Restore, and DKEK Share Management [doc/backup-and-restore.md](/doc/backup-and-restore.md)
- AES Key Generation, Encryption, and Decryption [doc/aes.md](/doc/aes.md)
- 4096 Bits RSA Support [doc/scs3.md](/doc/scs3.md)
- Storing and Retrieving Arbitrary Data [doc/store_data.md](/doc/store_data.md)
- Extra Options (e.g., set/get real datetime, enable/disable press-to-confirm button [doc/extra_command.md](/doc/extra_command.md)
- Public Key Authentication [doc/public_key_authentication.md](/doc/public_key_authentication.md)
## Operation time
### Keypair generation
@@ -221,14 +277,17 @@ Generating EC keys is almost instant. RSA keypair generation takes some time, sp
| 4096 | 15 |
## Press-to-confirm button
Raspberry Pico comes with the BOOTSEL button to load the firmware. When this firmware is running, the button can be used for other purposes. Pico HSM uses this button to confirm private/secret operations. This feature is optional and it shall be enabled. For more information, see [doc/extra_command.md](/doc/extra_command.md).
The Raspberry Pico includes a BOOTSEL button used for loading firmware initially. Once the Pico HSM firmware is running, this button can be repurposed for additional functionalities. Specifically, the Pico HSM utilizes this button to confirm private and secret operations, a feature that is optional but highly recommended for enhanced security.
With this feature enabled, everytime that a private/secret key is loaded, the Pico HSM awaits for the user confirmation by pressing the BOOTSEL button. The Led of the Pico HSM will remain almost illuminated, turning off quickly once a second, indicating that the user must press the button to confirm the operation. Otherwise, the Pico HSM waits indefinitely. See [Led blink](#press-to-confirm) for a picture of the blinking sequence. When in this mode, the Pico HSM sends periodic timeout commands to the host to do not trigger the timeout operation.
When enabled, each time a private or secret key operation is initiated, the Pico HSM enters a waiting state where it awaits user confirmation by pressing the BOOTSEL button. During this waiting period, the Pico HSM's LED remains mostly illuminated but blinks off briefly every second, signaling to the user to press the button for confirmation. If no action is taken, the Pico HSM will continue to wait indefinitely. This operation mode includes periodic timeout commands sent to the host to prevent the session from timing out prematurely.
This feature is an extra layer of security, as it requires the user intervention to sign or decrypt and it ensures that any application will use the Pico HSM without user awareness. However, it is not recommended for servers or other environments where operations are authomatized, since it requires a physical access to the Pico HSM to push the button.
This feature adds an additional layer of security by requiring physical user intervention for sensitive operations such as signing or decrypting data. It mitigates risks associated with unauthorized applications or scripts using the Pico HSM without user awareness. However, it is not recommended for server environments or other automated settings where physical access to press the button may not be practical.
For more details on configuring and using this feature, refer to the [doc/extra_command.md](/doc/extra_command.md) document.
## Led blink
Pico HSM uses the led to indicate the current status. Four states are available:
### Press to confirm
The Led is almost on all the time. It goes off for 100 miliseconds every second.
@@ -251,18 +310,20 @@ While processing, the Pico HSM is busy and cannot receive additional commands un
## Driver
Pico HSM uses the `sc-hsm` driver provided by [OpenSC](https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/ "OpenSC") or the `sc-hsm-embedded` driver provided by [CardContact](https://github.com/CardContact/sc-hsm-embedded "CardContact"). This driver utilizes the standardized PKCS#11 interface to communicate with the user and it can be used with many engines that accept PKCS#11 interface, such as OpenSSL, P11 library or pkcs11-tool.
The Pico HSM uses either the `sc-hsm` driver from [OpenSC](https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/) or the `sc-hsm-embedded` driver from [CardContact](https://github.com/CardContact/sc-hsm-embedded/) to interface with external applications. These drivers employ the standardized PKCS#11 interface, making it compatible with various cryptographic engines that support PKCS#11, such as OpenSSL, P11 library, or pkcs11-tool.
Pico HSM relies on PKCS#15 structure to store and manipulate the internal files (PINs, private keys, certificates, etc.) and directories. Therefore, it accepts the commands from `pkcs15-tool`. For instance, `pkcs15-tool -D` will list all elements stored in the Pico HSM.
Internally, the Pico HSM organizes and manages its data using the PKCS#15 structure, which includes elements like PINs, private keys, and certificates. Commands can be issued to interact with these stored elements using tools such as `pkcs15-tool`. For example, `pkcs15-tool -D` lists all elements stored within the Pico HSM.
The way to communicate is exactly the same as with other cards, such as OpenPGP or similar.
Communication with the Pico HSM follows the same protocols and methods used with other smart cards, such as OpenPGP cards or similar devices.
For an advanced usage, see the docs and examples.
Pico HSM also supports SCS3 tool for advanced use and multiple key domain. See [SCS3](/doc/scs3.md) for more information.
For advanced usage scenarios, refer to the documentation and examples provided. Additionally, the Pico HSM supports the SCS3 tool for more sophisticated operations and includes features like multiple key domains. For detailed information on SCS3 usage, refer to [SCS3 documentation](/doc/scs3.md).
### Important
OpenSC relies on PCSC driver, which reads a list (`Info.plist`) that contains a pair of VID/PID of supported readers. In order to be detectable, you must patch the UF2 binary (if you just downloaded from the [Release section](https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm/releases "Release section")) or configure the project with the proper VID/PID with `USB_VID` and `USB_PID` parameters in `CMake` (see [Build section](#build "Build section")). Note that you cannot distribute the patched/compiled binary if you do not own the VID/PID or have an explicit authorization.
OpenSC relies on PCSC driver, which reads a list (`Info.plist`) that contains a pair of VID/PID of supported readers. In order to be detectable, you have several options:
- Use `pico-hsm-tool.py` to modify VID/PID on-the-fly.
- Use the online [Pico Patcher tool](https://www.picokeys.com/pico-patcher/).
- Patch the UF2 binary (if you just downloaded from the [Release section](https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm/releases "Release section"))
- Build and configure the project with the proper VID/PID with `USB_VID` and `USB_PID` parameters in `CMake` (see [Build section](#build "Build section")). Note that you cannot distribute the patched/compiled binary if you do not own the VID/PID or have an explicit authorization.
## Credits
Pico HSM uses the following libraries or portion of code:

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
#!/bin/bash
VERSION_MAJOR="3"
VERSION_MINOR="0"
VERSION_MAJOR="4"
VERSION_MINOR="0-eddsa1"
rm -rf release/*
cd build_release
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ for board in adafruit_feather_rp2040 \
eetree_gamekit_rp2040 \
garatronic_pybstick26_rp2040 \
melopero_shake_rp2040 \
nullbits_bit_c_pro \
pico \
pico_w \
pimoroni_badger2040 \
@@ -31,6 +32,7 @@ for board in adafruit_feather_rp2040 \
pimoroni_servo2040 \
pimoroni_tiny2040 \
pimoroni_tiny2040_2mb \
pololu_3pi_2040_robot \
seeed_xiao_rp2040 \
solderparty_rp2040_stamp \
solderparty_rp2040_stamp_carrier \
@@ -40,6 +42,8 @@ for board in adafruit_feather_rp2040 \
sparkfun_thingplus \
vgaboard \
waveshare_rp2040_lcd_0.96 \
waveshare_rp2040_lcd_1.28 \
waveshare_rp2040_one \
waveshare_rp2040_plus_4mb \
waveshare_rp2040_plus_16mb \
waveshare_rp2040_zero \

View File

@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ PIN=648219
## Initialization
The first step is to initialize the HSM. To do so, use the `pico-hsm-tool.py` in `tools` folder:
```
$ python3 pico-hsm-tool initialize --so-pin 3537363231383830 --pin 648219
$ python3 tools/pico-hsm-tool.py --pin 648219 initialize --so-pin 57621880
```
The PIN number is used to manage all private keys in the device. It supports three attemps. After the third PIN failure, it gets blocked.
The PIN accepts from 6 to 16 characters.
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ $ pkcs11-tool --login --pin 648219 --change-pin --new-pin 123456
To unblock the PIN:
```
$ pkcs11-tool --login --login-type so --so-pin=3537363231383830 --init-pin --new-pin=648219
$ pkcs11-tool --login --login-type so --so-pin 3537363231383830 --init-pin --new-pin 648219
```
## Keypair generation

Submodule pico-hsm-sdk deleted from 1e66e51595

1
pico-keys-sdk Submodule

Submodule pico-keys-sdk added at b945ae4f0e

53
sdkconfig.defaults Executable file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
# This file was generated using idf.py save-defconfig. It can be edited manually.
# Espressif IoT Development Framework (ESP-IDF) Project Minimal Configuration
#
IGNORE_UNKNOWN_FILES_FOR_MANAGED_COMPONENTS=1
CONFIG_TINYUSB=y
CONFIG_PARTITION_TABLE_CUSTOM=y
CONFIG_PARTITION_TABLE_CUSTOM_FILENAME="pico-keys-sdk/partitions.csv"
CONFIG_PARTITION_TABLE_FILENAME="pico-keys-sdk/partitions.csv"
CONFIG_ESPTOOLPY_FLASHSIZE_4MB=y
CONFIG_WL_SECTOR_SIZE_512=y
CONFIG_WL_SECTOR_MODE_PERF=y
CONFIG_MBEDTLS_CMAC_C=y
CONFIG_MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C=y
CONFIG_MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C=y
CONFIG_MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C=y
CONFIG_MBEDTLS_HKDF_C=y
CONFIG_MBEDTLS_HARDWARE_ECC=y
CONFIG_MBEDTLS_HARDWARE_GCM=y
# CONFIG_MBEDTLS_HARDWARE_MPI is not set
CONFIG_MBEDTLS_HARDWARE_SHA=y
CONFIG_MBEDTLS_HARDWARE_AES=y
# CONFIG_MBEDTLS_ROM_MD5 is not set
CONFIG_MBEDTLS_SHA512_C=y
CONFIG_MBEDTLS_TLS_DISABLED=y
# CONFIG_MBEDTLS_TLS_ENABLED is not set
# CONFIG_ESP_TLS_USE_DS_PERIPHERAL is not set
# CONFIG_ESP_WIFI_ENABLED is not set
# CONFIG_ESP_WIFI_MBEDTLS_CRYPTO is not set
# CONFIG_ESP_WIFI_MBEDTLS_TLS_CLIENT is not set
# CONFIG_WPA_MBEDTLS_CRYPTO is not set
# CONFIG_MBEDTLS_PSK_MODES is not set
# CONFIG_MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA is not set
# CONFIG_MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ELLIPTIC_CURVE is not set
# CONFIG_MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA is not set
# CONFIG_MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA is not set
# CONFIG_MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA is not set
# CONFIG_MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA is not set
# CONFIG_MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION is not set
# CONFIG_MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 is not set
# CONFIG_MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_GMTSSL1_1 is not set
# CONFIG_MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS is not set
# CONFIG_MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN is not set
# CONFIG_MBEDTLS_CLIENT_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS is not set
# CONFIG_MBEDTLS_SERVER_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS is not set
# CONFIG_ESP32_WIFI_ENABLE_WPA3_SAE is not set
# CONFIG_ESP32_WIFI_ENABLE_WPA3_OWE_STA is not set
# CONFIG_ESP_WIFI_ENABLE_WPA3_SAE is not set
# CONFIG_ESP_WIFI_ENABLE_WPA3_OWE_STA is not set
CONFIG_ESP_COREDUMP_ENABLE_TO_UART=y

6
src/hsm/CMakeLists.txt Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
idf_component_register(
SRCS ${SOURCES}
INCLUDE_DIRS . ../../pico-keys-sdk/src ../../pico-keys-sdk/src/fs ../../pico-keys-sdk/src/rng ../../pico-keys-sdk/src/usb
REQUIRES bootloader_support esp_partition esp_tinyusb zorxx__neopixel mbedtls efuse
)
idf_component_set_property(${COMPONENT_NAME} WHOLE_ARCHIVE ON)

326
src/hsm/cmd_bip_slip.c Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,326 @@
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "files.h"
#include "random.h"
#include "kek.h"
#include "asn1.h"
const uint8_t *k1_seed = (const uint8_t *) "Bitcoin seed";
const uint8_t *p1_seed = (const uint8_t *) "Nist256p1 seed";
const uint8_t *sym_seed = (const uint8_t *) "Symmetric key seed";
mbedtls_ecp_keypair hd_context = { 0 };
uint8_t hd_keytype = 0;
int node_derive_bip_child(const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *parent,
const uint8_t cpar[32],
const uint8_t *i,
mbedtls_ecp_keypair *child,
uint8_t cchild[32]) {
uint8_t data[1 + 32 + 4], I[64], *iL = I, *iR = I + 32;
mbedtls_mpi il, kchild;
mbedtls_mpi_init(&il);
mbedtls_mpi_init(&kchild);
if (i[0] >= 0x80) {
if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&parent->d, 0) == 0) {
return CCID_ERR_NULL_PARAM;
}
data[0] = 0x00;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&parent->d, data + 1, 32);
}
else {
size_t olen = 0;
mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&parent->grp,
&parent->Q,
MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED,
&olen,
data,
33);
}
do {
memcpy(data + 33, i, 4);
mbedtls_md_hmac(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512),
cpar,
32,
data,
sizeof(data),
I);
mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&il, iL, 32);
mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&kchild, &il, &parent->d);
mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&kchild, &kchild, &parent->grp.N);
data[0] = 0x01;
memcpy(data + 1, iR, 32);
} while (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&il,
&parent->grp.N) != -1 || mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&kchild, 0) == 0);
mbedtls_mpi_copy(&child->d, &kchild);
mbedtls_ecp_mul(&child->grp, &child->Q, &child->d, &child->grp.G, random_gen, NULL);
memcpy(cchild, iR, 32);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&il);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&kchild);
return CCID_OK;
}
int sha256_ripemd160(const uint8_t *buffer, size_t buffer_len, uint8_t *output) {
mbedtls_md(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256), buffer, buffer_len, output);
mbedtls_md(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160), output, 32, output);
return CCID_OK;
}
int sha256_sha256(const uint8_t *buffer, size_t buffer_len, uint8_t *output) {
mbedtls_md(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256), buffer, buffer_len, output);
mbedtls_md(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256), output, 32, output);
return CCID_OK;
}
int node_fingerprint_bip(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ctx, uint8_t fingerprint[4]) {
size_t olen = 0;
uint8_t buffer[33];
mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&ctx->grp,
&ctx->Q,
MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED,
&olen,
buffer,
sizeof(buffer));
sha256_ripemd160(buffer, sizeof(buffer), buffer);
memcpy(fingerprint, buffer, 4);
return CCID_OK;
}
int node_fingerprint_slip(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ctx, uint8_t fingerprint[4]) {
uint8_t buffer[32];
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ctx->d, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
sha256_ripemd160(buffer, sizeof(buffer), buffer);
memcpy(fingerprint, buffer, 4);
return CCID_OK;
}
int load_master_bip(uint16_t mid, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ctx, uint8_t chain[32],
uint8_t key_type[1]) {
uint8_t mkey[65];
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(ctx);
file_t *ef = search_file(EF_MASTER_SEED | mid);
if (!file_has_data(ef)) {
return CCID_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
}
memcpy(mkey, file_get_data(ef), sizeof(mkey));
int r = mkek_decrypt(mkey + 1,
sizeof(mkey) - 1);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return CCID_EXEC_ERROR;
}
if (mkey[0] == 0x1 || mkey[0] == 0x2) {
if (mkey[0] == 0x1) {
mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&ctx->grp, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1);
}
else if (mkey[0] == 0x2) {
mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&ctx->grp, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1);
}
else {
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
}
mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx->d, mkey + 1, 32);
memcpy(chain, mkey + 33, 32);
mbedtls_ecp_mul(&ctx->grp, &ctx->Q, &ctx->d, &ctx->grp.G, random_gen, NULL);
}
else if (mkey[0] == 0x3) {
mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx->d, mkey + 33, 32);
memcpy(chain, mkey + 1, 32);
}
key_type[0] = mkey[0];
return CCID_OK;
}
int node_derive_path(const uint8_t *path,
uint16_t path_len,
mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ctx,
uint8_t chain[32],
uint8_t fingerprint[4],
uint8_t *nodes,
uint8_t last_node[4],
uint8_t key_type[1]) {
uint8_t *tag_data = NULL, *p = NULL;
uint16_t tag_len = 0, tag = 0x0;
uint8_t node = 0, N[64] = { 0 };
int r = 0;
memset(last_node, 0, 4);
memset(fingerprint, 0, 4);
asn1_ctx_t ctxi;
asn1_ctx_init((uint8_t *)path, path_len, &ctxi);
for (; walk_tlv(&ctxi, &p, &tag, &tag_len, &tag_data); node++) {
if (tag == 0x02) {
if ((node == 0 && tag_len != 1) || (node != 0 && tag_len != 4)) {
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
}
if (node == 0) {
if ((r = load_master_bip(tag_data[0], ctx, chain, key_type)) != CCID_OK) {
return r;
}
}
else if (node > 0) {
node_fingerprint_bip(ctx, fingerprint);
if ((r = node_derive_bip_child(ctx, chain, tag_data, ctx, chain)) != CCID_OK) {
return r;
}
memcpy(last_node, tag_data, 4);
}
}
else if (tag == 0x04) {
if (node == 0) {
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
}
else if (node > 0) {
node_fingerprint_slip(ctx, fingerprint);
*(tag_data - 1) = 0;
mbedtls_md_hmac(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512),
chain,
32,
tag_data - 1,
tag_len + 1,
N);
memcpy(chain, N, 32);
mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx->d, N + 32, 32);
}
}
}
if (nodes) {
*nodes = node;
}
return CCID_OK;
}
int cmd_bip_slip() {
uint8_t p1 = P1(apdu), p2 = P2(apdu);
if (p1 == 0x1 || p1 == 0x2 || p1 == 0x3) { // Master generation (K1 and P1)
if (p2 >= 10) {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
uint8_t mkey[65], *seed = mkey + 1, seed_len = 64;
const uint8_t *key_seed = NULL;
mbedtls_mpi il;
mbedtls_mpi_init(&il);
mbedtls_ecp_group grp;
mbedtls_ecp_group_init(&grp);
if (p1 == 0x1) {
mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&grp, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1);
key_seed = k1_seed;
}
else if (p1 == 0x2) {
mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&grp, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1);
key_seed = p1_seed;
}
else if (p1 == 0x3) {
key_seed = sym_seed;
}
if (apdu.nc == 0) {
seed_len = 64;
random_gen(NULL, seed, seed_len);
}
else {
seed_len = MIN((uint8_t)apdu.nc, 64);
memcpy(seed, apdu.data, seed_len);
}
if (p1 == 0x1 || p1 == 0x2) {
do {
mbedtls_md_hmac(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512), key_seed,
strlen((char *) key_seed), seed, seed_len, seed);
mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&il, seed, 32);
seed_len = 64;
} while (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&il, 0) == 0 || mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&il, &grp.N) != -1);
mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&grp);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&il);
}
else if (p1 == 0x3) {
mbedtls_md_hmac(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512), key_seed,
strlen((char *) key_seed), seed, seed_len, seed);
}
mkey[0] = p1;
file_t *ef = file_new(EF_MASTER_SEED | p2);
int r = mkek_encrypt(mkey + 1, sizeof(mkey) - 1);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
r = file_put_data(ef, mkey, sizeof(mkey));
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
low_flash_available();
}
else if (p1 == 0xA) {
if (apdu.nc == 0) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
mbedtls_ecp_keypair ctx;
uint8_t chain[32] = { 0 }, fgpt[4] = { 0 }, last_node[4] = { 0 }, key_type = 0, nodes = 0;
size_t olen = 0;
int r =
node_derive_path(apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc, &ctx, chain, fgpt, &nodes, last_node, &key_type);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
uint8_t pubkey[33];
res_APDU_size = 0;
memcpy(res_APDU, "\x04\x88\xB2\x1E", 4);
res_APDU_size += 4;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = nodes - 1;
memcpy(res_APDU + res_APDU_size, fgpt, 4);
res_APDU_size += 4;
memcpy(res_APDU + res_APDU_size, last_node, 4);
res_APDU_size += 4;
if (key_type == 0x1 || key_type == 0x2) {
memcpy(res_APDU + res_APDU_size, chain, 32);
res_APDU_size += 32;
mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&ctx.grp,
&ctx.Q,
MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED,
&olen,
pubkey,
sizeof(pubkey));
memcpy(res_APDU + res_APDU_size, pubkey, olen);
res_APDU_size += (uint16_t)olen;
}
else if (key_type == 0x3) {
sha256_sha256(chain, 32, chain);
memcpy(res_APDU + res_APDU_size, chain, 32);
res_APDU_size += 32;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ctx.d, pubkey, 32);
sha256_sha256(pubkey, 32, pubkey);
memcpy(res_APDU + res_APDU_size, pubkey, 32);
res_APDU_size += 32;
}
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
}
else if (p1 == 0x10) {
uint8_t chain[32] = { 0 }, fgpt[4] = { 0 }, last_node[4] = { 0 }, nodes = 0;
int r = node_derive_path(apdu.data,
(uint16_t)apdu.nc,
&hd_context,
chain,
fgpt,
&nodes,
last_node,
&hd_keytype);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&hd_context);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
return SW_OK();
}

View File

@@ -22,12 +22,13 @@ uint8_t challenge[256];
uint8_t challenge_len = 0;
int cmd_challenge() {
uint8_t *rb = (uint8_t *)random_bytes_get(apdu.ne);
if (!rb)
uint8_t *rb = (uint8_t *) random_bytes_get(apdu.ne);
if (!rb) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
memcpy(res_APDU, rb, apdu.ne);
challenge_len = MIN(apdu.ne, sizeof(challenge));
challenge_len = (uint8_t)MIN(apdu.ne, sizeof(challenge));
memcpy(challenge, rb, challenge_len);
res_APDU_size = apdu.ne;
res_APDU_size = (uint16_t)apdu.ne;
return SW_OK();
}

View File

@@ -23,42 +23,47 @@ int cmd_change_pin() {
if (P1(apdu) == 0x0) {
if (P2(apdu) == 0x81 || P2(apdu) == 0x88) {
file_t *file_pin = NULL;
if (P2(apdu) == 0x81)
if (P2(apdu) == 0x81) {
file_pin = file_pin1;
else if (P2(apdu) == 0x88)
}
else if (P2(apdu) == 0x88) {
file_pin = file_sopin;
}
if (!file_pin) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
if (!file_has_data(file_pin)) {
return SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND();
}
uint8_t pin_len = file_read_uint8(file_get_data(file_pin));
uint8_t pin_len = file_read_uint8(file_pin);
int r = check_pin(file_pin, apdu.data, pin_len);
if (r != 0x9000)
if (r != 0x9000) {
return r;
}
uint8_t mkek[MKEK_SIZE];
r = load_mkek(mkek); //loads the MKEK with old pin
if (r != CCID_OK)
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
//encrypt MKEK with new pin
if (P2(apdu) == 0x81) {
hash_multi(apdu.data+pin_len, apdu.nc-pin_len, session_pin);
hash_multi(apdu.data + pin_len, (uint16_t)(apdu.nc - pin_len), session_pin);
has_session_pin = true;
}
else if (P2(apdu) == 0x88) {
hash_multi(apdu.data+pin_len, apdu.nc-pin_len, session_sopin);
hash_multi(apdu.data + pin_len, (uint16_t)(apdu.nc - pin_len), session_sopin);
has_session_sopin = true;
}
r = store_mkek(mkek);
release_mkek(mkek);
if (r != CCID_OK)
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
uint8_t dhash[33];
dhash[0] = apdu.nc-pin_len;
double_hash_pin(apdu.data+pin_len, apdu.nc-pin_len, dhash+1);
flash_write_data_to_file(file_pin, dhash, sizeof(dhash));
dhash[0] = (uint8_t)apdu.nc - pin_len;
double_hash_pin(apdu.data + pin_len, (uint16_t)(apdu.nc - pin_len), dhash + 1);
file_put_data(file_pin, dhash, sizeof(dhash));
low_flash_available();
return SW_OK();
}

View File

@@ -15,95 +15,694 @@
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "common.h"
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "mbedtls/aes.h"
#include "mbedtls/cmac.h"
#include "mbedtls/hkdf.h"
#include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h"
#include "mbedtls/gcm.h"
//#include "mbedtls/md_wrap.h"
#include "mbedtls/md.h"
#include "crypto_utils.h"
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "kek.h"
#include "asn1.h"
#include "oid.h"
#include "mbedtls/pkcs5.h"
#include "mbedtls/error.h"
#include "mbedtls/asn1.h"
#include "mbedtls/cipher.h"
#include "mbedtls/oid.h"
#include "mbedtls/ccm.h"
extern mbedtls_ecp_keypair hd_context;
extern uint8_t hd_keytype;
/* This is copied from pkcs5.c Mbedtls */
/** Unfortunately it is declared as static, so I cannot call it. **/
static int pkcs5_parse_pbkdf2_params(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params,
mbedtls_asn1_buf *salt, int *iterations,
uint16_t *keylen, mbedtls_md_type_t *md_type) {
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
mbedtls_asn1_buf prf_alg_oid;
unsigned char *p = params->p;
const unsigned char *end = params->p + params->len;
if (params->tag != (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) {
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT,
MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG);
}
/*
* PBKDF2-params ::= SEQUENCE {
* salt OCTET STRING,
* iterationCount INTEGER,
* keyLength INTEGER OPTIONAL
* prf AlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT algid-hmacWithSHA1
* }
*
*/
if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &salt->len,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) != 0) {
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
}
salt->p = p;
p += salt->len;
if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int(&p, end, iterations)) != 0) {
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
}
if (p == end) {
return 0;
}
if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int(&p, end, (int *)keylen)) != 0) {
if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) {
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
}
}
if (p == end) {
return 0;
}
if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg_null(&p, end, &prf_alg_oid)) != 0) {
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
}
if (mbedtls_oid_get_md_hmac(&prf_alg_oid, md_type) != 0) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
}
if (p != end) {
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT,
MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
}
return 0;
}
/* Taken from https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/2335 */
int mbedtls_ansi_x963_kdf(mbedtls_md_type_t md_type,
uint16_t input_len,
uint8_t *input,
uint16_t shared_info_len,
uint8_t *shared_info,
uint16_t output_len,
uint8_t *output) {
mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx;
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = NULL;
int hashlen = 0, exit_code = MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
uint8_t counter_buf[4], tmp_output[64]; //worst case
mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx);
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_type);
if (md_info == NULL) {
return exit_code;
}
if (mbedtls_md_setup(&md_ctx, md_info, 0)) {
return exit_code;
}
if (input_len + shared_info_len + 4 >= (1ULL << 61) - 1) {
return exit_code;
}
// keydatalen equals output_len
hashlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info);
if (output_len >= hashlen * ((1ULL << 32) - 1)) {
return exit_code;
}
for (int i = 0, counter = 1; i < output_len; counter++) {
mbedtls_md_starts(&md_ctx);
mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, input, input_len);
//TODO: be careful with architecture little vs. big
counter_buf[0] = (uint8_t) ((counter >> 24) & 0xff);
counter_buf[1] = (uint8_t) ((counter >> 16) & 0xff);
counter_buf[2] = (uint8_t) ((counter >> 8) & 0xff);
counter_buf[3] = (uint8_t) ((counter >> 0) & 0xff);
mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, counter_buf, 4);
if (shared_info_len > 0 && shared_info != NULL) {
mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, shared_info, shared_info_len);
}
mbedtls_md_finish(&md_ctx, tmp_output);
memcpy(&output[i], tmp_output, (output_len - i < hashlen) ? output_len - i : hashlen);
i += hashlen;
}
mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx);
return 0;
}
int cmd_cipher_sym() {
int key_id = P1(apdu);
int algo = P2(apdu);
if (!isUserAuthenticated)
uint8_t key_id = P1(apdu), algo = P2(apdu);
if (!isUserAuthenticated) {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();
file_t *ef = search_dynamic_file((KEY_PREFIX << 8) | key_id);
if (!ef)
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
if (key_has_purpose(ef, algo) == false)
return SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED();
if ((apdu.nc % 16) != 0) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
if (wait_button_pressed() == true) // timeout
if (wait_button_pressed() == true) { // timeout
return SW_SECURE_MESSAGE_EXEC_ERROR();
int key_size = file_get_size(ef);
uint8_t kdata[32]; //maximum AES key size
}
file_t *ef = search_file((KEY_PREFIX << 8) | key_id);
if (hd_keytype == 0) {
if (!ef) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
if (key_has_purpose(ef, algo) == false) {
return SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
}
uint16_t key_size = file_get_size(ef);
uint8_t kdata[64]; //maximum AES key size
memcpy(kdata, file_get_data(ef), key_size);
if (mkek_decrypt(kdata, key_size) != 0) {
if (hd_keytype == 0 && mkek_decrypt(kdata, key_size) != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
if (algo == ALGO_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT || algo == ALGO_AES_CBC_DECRYPT) {
if ((apdu.nc % 16) != 0) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
mbedtls_aes_context aes;
mbedtls_aes_init(&aes);
uint8_t tmp_iv[IV_SIZE];
memset(tmp_iv, 0, sizeof(tmp_iv));
if (algo == ALGO_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT) {
int r = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&aes, kdata, key_size*8);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
mbedtls_aes_free(&aes);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
r = mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc(&aes, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, apdu.nc, tmp_iv, apdu.data, res_APDU);
int r = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&aes, kdata, key_size * 8);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_aes_free(&aes);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
r = mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc(&aes,
MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT,
apdu.nc,
tmp_iv,
apdu.data,
res_APDU);
mbedtls_aes_free(&aes);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
else if (algo == ALGO_AES_CBC_DECRYPT) {
int r = mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec(&aes, kdata, key_size*8);
int r = mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec(&aes, kdata, key_size * 8);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
mbedtls_aes_free(&aes);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
r = mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc(&aes, MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT, apdu.nc, tmp_iv, apdu.data, res_APDU);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
r = mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc(&aes,
MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT,
apdu.nc,
tmp_iv,
apdu.data,
res_APDU);
mbedtls_aes_free(&aes);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_aes_free(&aes);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
res_APDU_size = apdu.nc;
mbedtls_aes_free(&aes);
res_APDU_size = (uint16_t)apdu.nc;
}
else if (algo == ALGO_AES_CMAC) {
const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info;
if (key_size == 16)
if (key_size == 16) {
cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB);
else if (key_size == 24)
}
else if (key_size == 24) {
cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB);
else if (key_size == 32)
}
else if (key_size == 32) {
cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB);
}
else {
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
int r = mbedtls_cipher_cmac(cipher_info, kdata, key_size*8, apdu.data, apdu.nc, res_APDU);
int r = mbedtls_cipher_cmac(cipher_info, kdata, key_size * 8, apdu.data, apdu.nc, res_APDU);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
if (r != 0)
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU_size = 16;
}
else if (algo == ALGO_AES_DERIVE) {
int r = mbedtls_hkdf(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256), NULL, 0, file_get_data(ef), key_size, apdu.data, apdu.nc, res_APDU, apdu.nc);
int r = mbedtls_hkdf(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256),
NULL,
0,
kdata,
key_size,
apdu.data,
apdu.nc,
res_APDU,
apdu.nc);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
if (r != 0)
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
res_APDU_size = apdu.nc;
}
res_APDU_size = (uint16_t)apdu.nc;
}
else if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_ENCRYPT || algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_DECRYPT) {
asn1_ctx_t ctxi, oid = {0}, enc = {0}, iv = {0}, aad = {0};
asn1_ctx_init(apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc, &ctxi);
if (!asn1_find_tag(&ctxi, 0x6, &oid) || asn1_len(&oid) == 0) {
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
asn1_find_tag(&ctxi, 0x81, &enc);
asn1_find_tag(&ctxi, 0x82, &iv);
asn1_find_tag(&ctxi, 0x83, &aad);
uint8_t tmp_iv[16];
memset(tmp_iv, 0, sizeof(tmp_iv));
if (memcmp(oid.data, OID_CHACHA20_POLY1305, oid.len) == 0) {
if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_DECRYPT && enc.len < 16) {
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
int r = 0;
mbedtls_chachapoly_context ctx;
mbedtls_chachapoly_init(&ctx);
mbedtls_chachapoly_setkey(&ctx, kdata);
if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_ENCRYPT) {
r = mbedtls_chachapoly_encrypt_and_tag(&ctx,
enc.len,
asn1_len(&iv) > 0 ? iv.data : tmp_iv,
aad.data,
aad.len,
enc.data,
res_APDU,
res_APDU + enc.len);
}
else if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_DECRYPT) {
r = mbedtls_chachapoly_auth_decrypt(&ctx,
enc.len - 16,
asn1_len(&iv) > 0 ? iv.data : tmp_iv,
aad.data,
aad.len,
enc.data + enc.len - 16,
enc.data,
res_APDU);
}
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
mbedtls_chachapoly_free(&ctx);
if (r != 0) {
if (r == MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_AUTH_FAILED) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_ENCRYPT) {
res_APDU_size = enc.len + 16;
}
else if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_DECRYPT) {
res_APDU_size = enc.len - 16;
}
}
else if (memcmp(oid.data, OID_DIGEST, 7) == 0) {
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = NULL;
if (memcmp(oid.data, OID_HMAC_SHA1, oid.len) == 0) {
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1);
}
else if (memcmp(oid.data, OID_HMAC_SHA224, oid.len) == 0) {
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224);
}
else if (memcmp(oid.data, OID_HMAC_SHA256, oid.len) == 0) {
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256);
}
else if (memcmp(oid.data, OID_HMAC_SHA384, oid.len) == 0) {
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384);
}
else if (memcmp(oid.data, OID_HMAC_SHA512, oid.len) == 0) {
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512);
}
if (md_info == NULL) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
int r = mbedtls_md_hmac(md_info, kdata, key_size, enc.data, enc.len, res_APDU);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU_size = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info);
}
else if (memcmp(oid.data, OID_HKDF_SHA256,
oid.len) == 0 ||
memcmp(oid.data, OID_HKDF_SHA384,
oid.len) == 0 || memcmp(oid.data, OID_HKDF_SHA512, oid.len) == 0) {
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = NULL;
if (memcmp(oid.data, OID_HKDF_SHA256, oid.len) == 0) {
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256);
}
else if (memcmp(oid.data, OID_HKDF_SHA384, oid.len) == 0) {
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384);
}
else if (memcmp(oid.data, OID_HKDF_SHA512, oid.len) == 0) {
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512);
}
int r = mbedtls_hkdf(md_info,
iv.data,
iv.len,
kdata,
key_size,
enc.data,
enc.len,
res_APDU,
apdu.ne > 0 &&
apdu.ne < 65536 ? apdu.ne : mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info));
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU_size = apdu.ne > 0 && apdu.ne < 65536 ? (uint16_t)apdu.ne : (uint16_t)mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info);
}
else if (memcmp(oid.data, OID_PKCS5_PBKDF2, oid.len) == 0) {
int iterations = 0;
uint16_t keylen = 0;
mbedtls_asn1_buf salt,
params =
{ .p = enc.data, .len = enc.len, .tag = (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) };
mbedtls_md_type_t md_type = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;
int r = pkcs5_parse_pbkdf2_params(&params, &salt, &iterations, &keylen, &md_type);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
r = mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac_ext(md_type,
kdata,
key_size,
salt.p,
salt.len,
iterations,
keylen ? keylen : (apdu.ne > 0 &&
apdu.ne < 65536 ? apdu.ne : 32),
res_APDU);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU_size = keylen ? keylen : (apdu.ne > 0 && apdu.ne < 65536 ? (uint16_t)apdu.ne : 32);
}
else if (memcmp(oid.data, OID_PKCS5_PBES2, oid.len) == 0) {
size_t olen = 0;
mbedtls_asn1_buf params =
{.p = aad.data, .len = aad.len, .tag = (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)};
int r = mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2_ext(&params,
algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_ENCRYPT ? MBEDTLS_PKCS5_ENCRYPT : MBEDTLS_PKCS5_DECRYPT,
kdata,
key_size,
enc.data,
enc.len,
res_APDU, 4096, &olen);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
if (r != 0) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
res_APDU_size = (uint16_t)olen;
}
else if (memcmp(oid.data, OID_KDF_X963, oid.len) == 0) {
mbedtls_md_type_t md_type = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;
if (memcmp(enc.data, OID_HMAC_SHA1, enc.len) == 0) {
md_type = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;
}
else if (memcmp(enc.data, OID_HMAC_SHA224, enc.len) == 0) {
md_type = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224;
}
else if (memcmp(enc.data, OID_HMAC_SHA256, enc.len) == 0) {
md_type = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256;
}
else if (memcmp(enc.data, OID_HMAC_SHA384, enc.len) == 0) {
md_type = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384;
}
else if (memcmp(enc.data, OID_HMAC_SHA512, enc.len) == 0) {
md_type = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512;
}
int r = mbedtls_ansi_x963_kdf(md_type,
key_size,
kdata,
aad.len,
aad.data,
apdu.ne > 0 && apdu.ne < 65536 ? (uint16_t)apdu.ne : 32,
res_APDU);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
if (r != 0) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
res_APDU_size = apdu.ne > 0 && apdu.ne < 65536 ? (uint16_t)apdu.ne : 32;
}
else if (memcmp(oid.data, OID_NIST_AES, 8) == 0) {
if (oid.len != 9) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
uint8_t aes_algo = oid.data[8],
mode =
(algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_ENCRYPT ? MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT : MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT);
if ((aes_algo >= 0x01 && aes_algo <= 0x09 && key_size != 16) ||
(aes_algo >= 0x15 && aes_algo <= 0x1D && key_size != 24) ||
(aes_algo >= 0x29 && aes_algo <= 0x31 && key_size != 32)) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
mbedtls_aes_context ctx;
int r = 0;
mbedtls_aes_init(&ctx);
if (asn1_len(&iv) == 0) {
iv.data = tmp_iv;
iv.len = sizeof(tmp_iv);
}
if (aes_algo == 0x01 || aes_algo == 0x15 || aes_algo == 0x29) { /* ECB */
if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_ENCRYPT) {
r = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx, kdata, key_size * 8);
}
else if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_DECRYPT) {
r = mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec(&ctx, kdata, key_size * 8);
}
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
r = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(&ctx, mode, enc.data, res_APDU);
mbedtls_aes_free(&ctx);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU_size = MIN(enc.len, 16); // ECB operates with 16-byte blocks
}
else if (aes_algo == 0x02 || aes_algo == 0x16 || aes_algo == 0x2A) { /* CBC */
if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_ENCRYPT) {
r = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx, kdata, key_size * 8);
}
else if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_DECRYPT) {
r = mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec(&ctx, kdata, key_size * 8);
}
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
r = mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc(&ctx, mode, enc.len, iv.data, enc.data, res_APDU);
mbedtls_aes_free(&ctx);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU_size = enc.len;
}
else if (aes_algo == 0x03 || aes_algo == 0x17 || aes_algo == 0x2B) { /* OFB */
size_t iv_off = 0;
r = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx, kdata, key_size * 8);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
r = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ofb(&ctx, enc.len, &iv_off, iv.data, enc.data, res_APDU);
mbedtls_aes_free(&ctx);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU_size = enc.len;
}
else if (aes_algo == 0x04 || aes_algo == 0x18 || aes_algo == 0x2C) { /* CFB */
size_t iv_off = 0;
r = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx, kdata, key_size * 8);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
r = mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb128(&ctx, mode, enc.len, &iv_off, iv.data, enc.data, res_APDU);
mbedtls_aes_free(&ctx);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU_size = enc.len;
}
else if (aes_algo == 0x06 || aes_algo == 0x1A || aes_algo == 0x2E) { /* GCM */
mbedtls_aes_free(&ctx); // No AES ctx used
mbedtls_gcm_context gctx;
mbedtls_gcm_init(&gctx);
r = mbedtls_gcm_setkey(&gctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, kdata, key_size * 8);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_ENCRYPT) {
r = mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag(&gctx,
MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT,
enc.len,
iv.data,
iv.len,
aad.data,
aad.len,
enc.data,
res_APDU,
16,
res_APDU + enc.len);
res_APDU_size = enc.len + 16;
}
else if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_DECRYPT) {
r = mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt(&gctx,
enc.len - 16,
iv.data,
iv.len,
aad.data,
aad.len,
enc.data + enc.len - 16,
16,
enc.data,
res_APDU);
res_APDU_size = enc.len - 16;
}
mbedtls_gcm_free(&gctx);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
else if (aes_algo == 0x09 || aes_algo == 0x1D || aes_algo == 0x31) { /* CTR */
size_t iv_off = 0;
uint8_t stream_block[16];
r = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx, kdata, key_size * 8);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
r = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ctr(&ctx, enc.len, &iv_off, iv.data, stream_block, enc.data, res_APDU);
mbedtls_aes_free(&ctx);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU_size = enc.len;
}
else if (aes_algo == 0x07 || aes_algo == 0x1B || aes_algo == 0x2F) { /* CCM */
mbedtls_aes_free(&ctx); // No AES ctx used
mbedtls_ccm_context gctx;
mbedtls_ccm_init(&gctx);
r = mbedtls_ccm_setkey(&gctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, kdata, key_size * 8);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
if (iv.len == 16) {
iv.len = 12;
}
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_ENCRYPT) {
r = mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag(&gctx,
enc.len,
iv.data,
iv.len,
aad.data,
aad.len,
enc.data,
res_APDU,
res_APDU + enc.len,
16);
res_APDU_size = enc.len + 16;
}
else if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_DECRYPT) {
r = mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt(&gctx,
enc.len - 16,
iv.data,
iv.len,
aad.data,
aad.len,
enc.data,
res_APDU,
enc.data + enc.len - 16,
16);
res_APDU_size = enc.len - 16;
}
mbedtls_ccm_free(&gctx);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
}
else if (memcmp(oid.data, OID_IEEE_ALG, 8) == 0) {
if (oid.len != 9) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
uint8_t aes_algo = oid.data[8],
mode =
(algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_ENCRYPT ? MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT : MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT);
int r = 0;
memset(tmp_iv, 0, sizeof(tmp_iv));
if (asn1_len(&iv) == 0) {
iv.data = tmp_iv;
iv.len = sizeof(tmp_iv);
}
if ((aes_algo == 0x01 && key_size != 32) || (aes_algo == 0x02 && key_size != 64)) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
mbedtls_aes_xts_context ctx;
mbedtls_aes_xts_init(&ctx);
if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_ENCRYPT) {
r = mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_enc(&ctx, kdata, key_size * 8);
}
else if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_DECRYPT) {
r = mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_dec(&ctx, kdata, key_size * 8);
}
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
r = mbedtls_aes_crypt_xts(&ctx, mode, enc.len, iv.data, enc.data, res_APDU);
mbedtls_aes_xts_free(&ctx);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU_size = enc.len;
}
else if (memcmp(oid.data, OID_HD, 11) == 0) {
mbedtls_aes_context ctx;
int r = 0;
uint8_t mode =
(algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_ENCRYPT ? MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT : MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT),
secret[64] = { 0 };
mbedtls_aes_init(&ctx);
if (hd_keytype != 0x3) {
return SW_INCORRECT_PARAMS();
}
key_size = 32;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&hd_context.d, kdata, key_size);
r = mbedtls_md_hmac(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512),
kdata,
key_size,
aad.data,
aad.len,
secret);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
if (iv.data == tmp_iv || iv.len == 0) {
iv.data = secret + 32;
iv.len = 16;
}
if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_ENCRYPT) {
r = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx, secret, key_size * 8);
}
else if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_DECRYPT) {
r = mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec(&ctx, secret, key_size * 8);
}
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
r = mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc(&ctx, mode, enc.len, iv.data, enc.data, res_APDU);
mbedtls_aes_free(&ctx);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU_size = enc.len;
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&hd_context);
hd_keytype = 0;
}
else {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
}
else {
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));

View File

@@ -15,10 +15,9 @@
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "common.h"
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "mbedtls/ecdh.h"
#include "crypto_utils.h"
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "kek.h"
#include "files.h"
#include "asn1.h"
@@ -27,42 +26,51 @@
#include "oid.h"
int cmd_decrypt_asym() {
int key_id = P1(apdu);
uint8_t key_id = P1(apdu);
uint8_t p2 = P2(apdu);
if (!isUserAuthenticated)
if (!isUserAuthenticated) {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();
file_t *ef = search_dynamic_file((KEY_PREFIX << 8) | key_id);
if (!ef)
}
file_t *ef = search_file((KEY_PREFIX << 8) | key_id);
if (!ef) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
if (get_key_counter(ef) == 0)
}
if (get_key_counter(ef) == 0) {
return SW_FILE_FULL();
if (key_has_purpose(ef, p2) == false)
}
if (key_has_purpose(ef, p2) == false) {
return SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
if (p2 >= ALGO_RSA_DECRYPT && p2 <= ALGO_RSA_DECRYPT_OEP) {
mbedtls_rsa_context ctx;
mbedtls_rsa_init(&ctx);
if (p2 == ALGO_RSA_DECRYPT_OEP)
mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(&ctx, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE);
if (p2 == ALGO_RSA_DECRYPT_OEP) {
mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(&ctx, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256);
}
int r = load_private_key_rsa(&ctx, ef);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(&ctx);
if (r == CCID_VERIFICATION_FAILED)
if (r == CCID_VERIFICATION_FAILED) {
return SW_SECURE_MESSAGE_EXEC_ERROR();
}
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
int key_size = file_get_size(ef);
if (apdu.nc < key_size) //needs padding
memset(apdu.data+apdu.nc, 0, key_size-apdu.nc);
uint16_t key_size = file_get_size(ef);
if (apdu.nc < key_size) { //needs padding
memset(apdu.data + apdu.nc, 0, key_size - apdu.nc);
}
if (p2 == ALGO_RSA_DECRYPT_PKCS1 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_DECRYPT_OEP) {
size_t olen = apdu.nc;
r = mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt(&ctx, random_gen, NULL, &olen, apdu.data, res_APDU, 512);
if (r == 0)
res_APDU_size = olen;
if (r == 0) {
res_APDU_size = (uint16_t)olen;
}
}
else {
r = mbedtls_rsa_private(&ctx, random_gen, NULL, apdu.data, res_APDU);
if (r == 0)
if (r == 0) {
res_APDU_size = key_size;
}
}
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(&ctx);
@@ -72,10 +80,11 @@ int cmd_decrypt_asym() {
}
else if (p2 == ALGO_EC_DH || p2 == ALGO_EC_DH_XKEK) {
mbedtls_ecdh_context ctx;
if (wait_button_pressed() == true) //timeout
if (wait_button_pressed() == true) { //timeout
return SW_SECURE_MESSAGE_EXEC_ERROR();
int key_size = file_get_size(ef);
uint8_t *kdata = (uint8_t *)calloc(1,key_size);
}
uint16_t key_size = file_get_size(ef);
uint8_t *kdata = (uint8_t *) calloc(1, key_size);
memcpy(kdata, file_get_data(ef), key_size);
if (mkek_decrypt(kdata, key_size) != 0) {
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, key_size);
@@ -92,7 +101,7 @@ int cmd_decrypt_asym() {
free(kdata);
return SW_DATA_INVALID();
}
r = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx.ctx.mbed_ecdh.d, kdata+1, key_size-1);
r = mbedtls_ecp_read_key(gid, (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *)&ctx.ctx.mbed_ecdh, kdata + 1, key_size - 1);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, key_size);
free(kdata);
if (r != 0) {
@@ -100,16 +109,20 @@ int cmd_decrypt_asym() {
return SW_DATA_INVALID();
}
r = -1;
if (p2 == ALGO_EC_DH)
r = mbedtls_ecdh_read_public(&ctx, apdu.data-1, apdu.nc+1);
if (p2 == ALGO_EC_DH) {
*(apdu.data - 1) = (uint8_t)apdu.nc;
r = mbedtls_ecdh_read_public(&ctx, apdu.data - 1, apdu.nc + 1);
}
else if (p2 == ALGO_EC_DH_XKEK) {
size_t pub_len = 0;
const uint8_t *pub = cvc_get_pub(apdu.data, apdu.nc, &pub_len);
uint16_t pub_len = 0;
const uint8_t *pub = cvc_get_pub(apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc, &pub_len);
if (pub) {
size_t t86_len = 0;
uint16_t t86_len = 0;
const uint8_t *t86 = cvc_get_field(pub, pub_len, &t86_len, 0x86);
uint8_t *t86w = (uint8_t *)t86;
if (t86) {
r = mbedtls_ecdh_read_public(&ctx, t86-1, t86_len+1);
*(t86w - 1) = (uint8_t)t86_len;
r = mbedtls_ecdh_read_public(&ctx, t86 - 1, t86_len + 1);
}
}
}
@@ -118,53 +131,67 @@ int cmd_decrypt_asym() {
return SW_DATA_INVALID();
}
size_t olen = 0;
// The SmartCard-HSM returns the point result of the DH operation
// with a leading '04'
res_APDU[0] = 0x04;
r = mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret(&ctx, &olen, res_APDU+1, MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES, random_gen, NULL);
r =
mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret(&ctx, &olen, res_APDU + 1, MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES, random_gen,
NULL);
mbedtls_ecdh_free(&ctx);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdh_free(&ctx);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
if (p2 == ALGO_EC_DH)
res_APDU_size = olen+1;
if (p2 == ALGO_EC_DH) {
res_APDU_size = (uint16_t)(olen + 1);
}
else {
res_APDU_size = 0;
size_t ext_len = 0;
uint16_t ext_len = 0;
const uint8_t *ext = NULL;
if ((ext = cvc_get_ext(apdu.data, apdu.nc, &ext_len)) == NULL)
if ((ext = cvc_get_ext(apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc, &ext_len)) == NULL) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
uint8_t *p = NULL, *tag_data = NULL, *kdom_uid = NULL;
}
uint8_t *p = NULL;
uint16_t tag = 0;
size_t tag_len = 0, kdom_uid_len = 0;
while (walk_tlv(ext, ext_len, &p, &tag, &tag_len, &tag_data)) {
asn1_ctx_t ctxi, ctxo = { 0 }, kdom_uid = { 0 };
asn1_ctx_init((uint8_t *)ext, ext_len, &ctxi);
while (walk_tlv(&ctxi, &p, &tag, &ctxo.len, &ctxo.data)) {
if (tag == 0x73) {
size_t oid_len = 0;
uint8_t *oid_data = NULL;
if (asn1_find_tag(tag_data, tag_len, 0x6, &oid_len, &oid_data) == true && oid_len == strlen(OID_ID_KEY_DOMAIN_UID) && memcmp(oid_data, OID_ID_KEY_DOMAIN_UID, strlen(OID_ID_KEY_DOMAIN_UID)) == 0) {
if (asn1_find_tag(tag_data, tag_len, 0x80, &kdom_uid_len, &kdom_uid) == false)
asn1_ctx_t oid = {0};
if (asn1_find_tag(&ctxo, 0x6, &oid) == true &&
oid.len == strlen(OID_ID_KEY_DOMAIN_UID) &&
memcmp(oid.data, OID_ID_KEY_DOMAIN_UID,
strlen(OID_ID_KEY_DOMAIN_UID)) == 0) {
if (asn1_find_tag(&ctxo, 0x80, &kdom_uid) == false) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
break;
}
}
}
if (kdom_uid_len == 0 || kdom_uid == NULL)
if (asn1_len(&kdom_uid) == 0) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
for (int n = 0; n < MAX_KEY_DOMAINS; n++) {
file_t *tf = search_dynamic_file(EF_XKEK+n);
}
for (uint8_t n = 0; n < MAX_KEY_DOMAINS; n++) {
file_t *tf = search_file(EF_XKEK + n);
if (tf) {
if (file_get_size(tf) == kdom_uid_len && memcmp(file_get_data(tf), kdom_uid, kdom_uid_len) == 0) {
file_new(EF_DKEK+n);
if (store_dkek_key(n, res_APDU+1) != CCID_OK)
if (file_get_size(tf) == kdom_uid.len &&
memcmp(file_get_data(tf), kdom_uid.data, kdom_uid.len) == 0) {
file_new(EF_DKEK + n);
if (store_dkek_key(n, res_APDU + 1) != CCID_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(res_APDU, 32);
return SW_OK();
}
}
}
return SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND();
}
mbedtls_ecdh_free(&ctx);
}
else
else {
return SW_WRONG_P1P2();
}
decrement_key_counter(ef);
return SW_OK();
}

View File

@@ -19,22 +19,27 @@
int cmd_delete_file() {
file_t *ef = NULL;
if (!isUserAuthenticated)
if (!isUserAuthenticated) {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
if (apdu.nc == 0) {
ef = currentEF;
if (!(ef = search_dynamic_file(ef->fid)))
if (!(ef = search_file(ef->fid))) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
}
else {
uint16_t fid = (apdu.data[0] << 8) | apdu.data[1];
if (!(ef = search_dynamic_file(fid)))
if (!(ef = search_file(fid))) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
}
if (!authenticate_action(ef, ACL_OP_DELETE_SELF))
if (!authenticate_action(ef, ACL_OP_DELETE_SELF)) {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();
if (delete_file(ef) != CCID_OK)
}
if (delete_file(ef) != CCID_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
return SW_OK();
}

View File

@@ -15,88 +15,87 @@
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "common.h"
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h"
#include "crypto_utils.h"
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "cvc.h"
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED -0x006E
#define MOD_ADD( N ) \
while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &(N), &grp->P ) >= 0 ) \
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( &(N), &(N), &grp->P ) )
static inline int mbedtls_mpi_add_mod( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
mbedtls_mpi *X,
const mbedtls_mpi *A,
const mbedtls_mpi *B )
{
#define MOD_ADD(N) \
while (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&(N), &grp->P) >= 0) \
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs(&(N), &(N), &grp->P))
static inline int mbedtls_mpi_add_mod(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
mbedtls_mpi *X,
const mbedtls_mpi *A,
const mbedtls_mpi *B) {
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( X, A, B ) );
MOD_ADD( *X );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(X, A, B));
MOD_ADD(*X);
cleanup:
return( ret );
return ret;
}
int cmd_derive_asym() {
uint8_t key_id = P1(apdu);
uint8_t dest_id = P2(apdu);
file_t *fkey;
if (!isUserAuthenticated)
if (!isUserAuthenticated) {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();
if (!(fkey = search_dynamic_file((KEY_PREFIX << 8) | key_id)) || !fkey->data || file_get_size(fkey) == 0)
}
if (!(fkey = search_file((KEY_PREFIX << 8) | key_id)) || !file_has_data(fkey)) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
if (key_has_purpose(fkey, ALGO_EC_DERIVE) == false)
}
if (key_has_purpose(fkey, ALGO_EC_DERIVE) == false) {
return SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED();
if (apdu.nc == 0)
}
if (apdu.nc == 0) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
if (apdu.data[0] == ALGO_EC_DERIVE) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_context ctx;
mbedtls_ecdsa_init(&ctx);
mbedtls_ecp_keypair ctx;
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(&ctx);
int r;
r = load_private_key_ecdsa(&ctx, fkey);
r = load_private_key_ec(&ctx, fkey);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ctx);
if (r == CCID_VERIFICATION_FAILED)
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
if (r == CCID_VERIFICATION_FAILED) {
return SW_SECURE_MESSAGE_EXEC_ERROR();
}
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
mbedtls_mpi a, nd;
mbedtls_mpi_init(&a);
mbedtls_mpi_init(&nd);
r = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&a, apdu.data+1, apdu.nc-1);
r = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&a, apdu.data + 1, apdu.nc - 1);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ctx);
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&a);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&nd);
return SW_DATA_INVALID();
}
r = mbedtls_mpi_add_mod(&ctx.grp, &nd, &ctx.d, &a);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&a);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ctx);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&a);
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&nd);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
r = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx.d, &nd);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ctx);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&a);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&nd);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
r = store_keys(&ctx, HSM_KEY_EC, dest_id);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ctx);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&a);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&nd);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ctx);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&a);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&nd);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
r = store_keys(&ctx, PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC, dest_id);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
}
else
else {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
return SW_OK();
}

View File

@@ -25,28 +25,41 @@ extern uint8_t challenge[256];
extern uint8_t challenge_len;
int cmd_external_authenticate() {
if (P1(apdu) != 0x0 || P2(apdu) != 0x0)
if (P1(apdu) != 0x0 || P2(apdu) != 0x0) {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
if (ef_puk_aut == NULL)
}
if (ef_puk_aut == NULL) {
return SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND();
if (apdu.nc == 0)
}
if (apdu.nc == 0) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
file_t *ef_puk = search_by_fid(EF_PUKAUT, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
if (!ef_puk || !ef_puk->data || file_get_size(ef_puk) == 0)
}
file_t *ef_puk = search_file(EF_PUKAUT);
if (!file_has_data(ef_puk)) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
puk_status[ef_puk_aut->fid & (MAX_PUK - 1)] = 0;
uint8_t *puk_data = file_get_data(ef_puk);
uint8_t *input = (uint8_t *)calloc(dev_name_len+challenge_len, sizeof(uint8_t)), hash[32];
uint8_t *input = (uint8_t *) calloc(dev_name_len + challenge_len, sizeof(uint8_t)), hash[32];
memcpy(input, dev_name, dev_name_len);
memcpy(input+dev_name_len, challenge, challenge_len);
hash256(input, dev_name_len+challenge_len, hash);
int r = puk_verify(apdu.data, apdu.nc, hash, 32, file_get_data(ef_puk_aut), file_get_size(ef_puk_aut));
memcpy(input + dev_name_len, challenge, challenge_len);
hash256(input, dev_name_len + challenge_len, hash);
int r =
puk_verify(apdu.data,
(uint16_t)apdu.nc,
hash,
32,
file_get_data(ef_puk_aut),
file_get_size(ef_puk_aut));
free(input);
if (r != 0)
if (r != 0) {
return SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED();
puk_status[ef_puk_aut->fid & (MAX_PUK-1)] = 1;
}
puk_status[ef_puk_aut->fid & (MAX_PUK - 1)] = 1;
uint8_t auts = 0;
for (int i = 0; i < puk_data[0]; i++)
for (int i = 0; i < puk_data[0]; i++) {
auts += puk_status[i];
}
if (auts >= puk_data[2]) {
isUserAuthenticated = true;
}

View File

@@ -16,17 +16,40 @@
*/
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "mbedtls/ecdh.h"
#if !defined(ENABLE_EMULATION) && !defined(ESP_PLATFORM)
#include "hardware/rtc.h"
#else
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <time.h>
#endif
#include "files.h"
#include "random.h"
#include "kek.h"
#include "mbedtls/hkdf.h"
#include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h"
int cmd_extras() {
if (P2(apdu) != 0x0)
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
#ifndef ENABLE_EMULATION
// Only allow change PHY without PIN
if (!isUserAuthenticated && P1(apdu) != 0x1B) {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
#endif
//check button (if enabled)
if (wait_button_pressed() == true) {
return SW_SECURE_MESSAGE_EXEC_ERROR();
}
if (P1(apdu) == 0xA) { //datetime operations
if (P2(apdu) != 0x0) {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
if (apdu.nc == 0) {
#if !defined(ENABLE_EMULATION) && !defined(ESP_PLATFORM)
datetime_t dt;
if (!rtc_get_datetime(&dt))
if (!rtc_get_datetime(&dt)) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = dt.year >> 8;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = dt.year & 0xff;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = dt.month;
@@ -35,10 +58,26 @@ int cmd_extras() {
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = dt.hour;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = dt.min;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = dt.sec;
#else
struct timeval tv;
struct tm *tm;
gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
tm = localtime(&tv.tv_sec);
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = (tm->tm_year + 1900) >> 8;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = (tm->tm_year + 1900) & 0xff;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = tm->tm_mon;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = tm->tm_mday;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = tm->tm_wday;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = tm->tm_hour;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = tm->tm_min;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = tm->tm_sec;
#endif
}
else {
if (apdu.nc != 8)
if (apdu.nc != 8) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
#if !defined(ENABLE_EMULATION) && !defined(ESP_PLATFORM)
datetime_t dt;
dt.year = (apdu.data[0] << 8) | (apdu.data[1]);
dt.month = apdu.data[2];
@@ -47,13 +86,31 @@ int cmd_extras() {
dt.hour = apdu.data[5];
dt.min = apdu.data[6];
dt.sec = apdu.data[7];
if (!rtc_set_datetime(&dt))
if (!rtc_set_datetime(&dt)) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
#else
struct tm tm;
struct timeval tv;
tm.tm_year = ((apdu.data[0] << 8) | (apdu.data[1])) - 1900;
tm.tm_mon = apdu.data[2];
tm.tm_mday = apdu.data[3];
tm.tm_wday = apdu.data[4];
tm.tm_hour = apdu.data[5];
tm.tm_min = apdu.data[6];
tm.tm_sec = apdu.data[7];
tv.tv_sec = mktime(&tm);
settimeofday(&tv, NULL);
#endif
}
}
else if (P1(apdu) == 0x6) { //dynamic options
if (apdu.nc > sizeof(uint8_t))
else if (P1(apdu) == 0x6) { //dynamic options
if (P2(apdu) != 0x0) {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
if (apdu.nc > sizeof(uint8_t)) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
uint16_t opts = get_device_options();
if (apdu.nc == 0) {
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = opts >> 8;
@@ -61,12 +118,176 @@ int cmd_extras() {
}
else {
uint8_t newopts[] = { apdu.data[0], (opts & 0xff) };
file_t *tf = search_by_fid(EF_DEVOPS, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
flash_write_data_to_file(tf, newopts, sizeof(newopts));
file_t *tf = search_file(EF_DEVOPS);
file_put_data(tf, newopts, sizeof(newopts));
low_flash_available();
}
}
else
else if (P1(apdu) == 0x3A) { // secure lock
if (apdu.nc == 0) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
if (P2(apdu) == 0x01) { // Key Agreement
mbedtls_ecdh_context hkey;
mbedtls_ecdh_init(&hkey);
mbedtls_ecdh_setup(&hkey, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1);
int ret = mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public(&hkey.ctx.mbed_ecdh.grp,
&hkey.ctx.mbed_ecdh.d,
&hkey.ctx.mbed_ecdh.Q,
random_gen,
NULL);
mbedtls_mpi_lset(&hkey.ctx.mbed_ecdh.Qp.Z, 1);
ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary(&hkey.ctx.mbed_ecdh.grp,
&hkey.ctx.mbed_ecdh.Qp,
apdu.data,
apdu.nc);
if (ret != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdh_free(&hkey);
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
memcpy(mse.Qpt, apdu.data, sizeof(mse.Qpt));
uint8_t buf[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES];
size_t olen = 0;
ret = mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret(&hkey,
&olen,
buf,
MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES,
random_gen,
NULL);
if (ret != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdh_free(&hkey);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf));
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
ret = mbedtls_hkdf(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256),
NULL,
0,
buf,
olen,
mse.Qpt,
sizeof(mse.Qpt),
mse.key_enc,
sizeof(mse.key_enc));
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf));
if (ret != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdh_free(&hkey);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&hkey.ctx.mbed_ecdh.grp,
&hkey.ctx.mbed_ecdh.Q,
MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED,
&olen,
res_APDU,
4096);
mbedtls_ecdh_free(&hkey);
if (ret != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
mse.init = true;
res_APDU_size = (uint16_t)olen;
}
else if (P2(apdu) == 0x02 || P2(apdu) == 0x03 || P2(apdu) == 0x04) {
if (mse.init == false) {
return SW_COMMAND_NOT_ALLOWED();
}
int ret = mse_decrypt_ct(apdu.data, apdu.nc);
if (ret != 0) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
if (P2(apdu) == 0x02 || P2(apdu) == 0x04) { // Enable
uint16_t opts = get_device_options();
uint8_t newopts[] = { opts >> 8, (opts & 0xff) };
if ((P2(apdu) == 0x02 && !(opts & HSM_OPT_SECURE_LOCK)) ||
(P2(apdu) == 0x04 && (opts & HSM_OPT_SECURE_LOCK))) {
uint16_t tfids[] = { EF_MKEK, EF_MKEK_SO };
for (int t = 0; t < sizeof(tfids) / sizeof(uint16_t); t++) {
file_t *tf = search_file(tfids[t]);
if (tf) {
uint8_t *tmp = (uint8_t *) calloc(1, file_get_size(tf));
memcpy(tmp, file_get_data(tf), file_get_size(tf));
for (int i = 0; i < MKEK_KEY_SIZE; i++) {
MKEK_KEY(tmp)[i] ^= apdu.data[i];
}
file_put_data(tf, tmp, file_get_size(tf));
free(tmp);
}
}
}
if (P2(apdu) == 0x02) {
newopts[0] |= HSM_OPT_SECURE_LOCK >> 8;
}
else if (P2(apdu) == 0x04) {
newopts[0] &= ~HSM_OPT_SECURE_LOCK >> 8;
}
file_t *tf = search_file(EF_DEVOPS);
file_put_data(tf, newopts, sizeof(newopts));
low_flash_available();
}
else if (P2(apdu) == 0x03) {
memcpy(mkek_mask, apdu.data, apdu.nc);
has_mkek_mask = true;
}
}
}
#ifndef ENABLE_EMULATION
else if (P1(apdu) == 0x1B) { // Set PHY
if (apdu.nc == 0) {
if (file_has_data(ef_phy)) {
res_APDU_size = file_get_size(ef_phy);
memcpy(res_APDU, file_get_data(ef_phy), res_APDU_size);
}
}
else {
uint8_t tmp[PHY_MAX_SIZE];
memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp));
uint16_t opts = 0;
if (file_has_data(ef_phy)) {
memcpy(tmp, file_get_data(ef_phy), MIN(sizeof(tmp), file_get_size(ef_phy)));
if (file_get_size(ef_phy) >= 8) {
opts = (tmp[PHY_OPTS] << 8) | tmp[PHY_OPTS + 1];
}
}
if (P2(apdu) == PHY_VID) { // VIDPID
if (apdu.nc != 4) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
memcpy(tmp + PHY_VID, apdu.data, 4);
opts |= PHY_OPT_VPID;
}
else if (P2(apdu) == PHY_LED_GPIO || P2(apdu) == PHY_LED_MODE) {
if (apdu.nc != 1) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
tmp[P2(apdu)] = apdu.data[0];
if (P2(apdu) == PHY_LED_GPIO) {
opts |= PHY_OPT_GPIO;
}
else if (P2(apdu) == PHY_LED_MODE) {
opts |= PHY_OPT_LED;
}
}
else if (P2(apdu) == PHY_OPTS) {
if (apdu.nc != 2) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
uint16_t opt = (apdu.data[0] << 8) | apdu.data[1];
opts = (opts & ~PHY_OPT_MASK) | (opt & PHY_OPT_MASK);
}
else {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
tmp[PHY_OPTS] = opts >> 8;
tmp[PHY_OPTS + 1] = opts & 0xff;
file_put_data(ef_phy, tmp, sizeof(tmp));
low_flash_available();
}
}
#endif
else {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
return SW_OK();
}

View File

@@ -15,10 +15,9 @@
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "common.h"
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "mbedtls/ecdh.h"
#include "asn1.h"
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "random.h"
#include "oid.h"
#include "eac.h"
@@ -28,25 +27,28 @@ int cmd_general_authenticate() {
if (P1(apdu) == 0x0 && P2(apdu) == 0x0) {
if (apdu.data[0] == 0x7C) {
int r = 0;
size_t pubkey_len = 0;
uint16_t pubkey_len = 0;
const uint8_t *pubkey = NULL;
uint16_t tag = 0x0;
uint8_t *tag_data = NULL, *p = NULL;
size_t tag_len = 0;
while (walk_tlv(apdu.data+2, apdu.nc-2, &p, &tag, &tag_len, &tag_data)) {
uint16_t tag_len = 0;
asn1_ctx_t ctxi;
asn1_ctx_init(apdu.data + 2, (uint16_t)(apdu.nc - 2), &ctxi);
while (walk_tlv(&ctxi, &p, &tag, &tag_len, &tag_data)) {
if (tag == 0x80) {
pubkey = tag_data-1; //mbedtls ecdh starts reading one pos before
pubkey_len = tag_len+1;
pubkey = tag_data - 1; //mbedtls ecdh starts reading one pos before
pubkey_len = tag_len + 1;
}
}
file_t *fkey = search_by_fid(EF_KEY_DEV, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
if (!fkey)
file_t *fkey = search_file(EF_KEY_DEV);
if (!fkey) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
mbedtls_ecdsa_context ectx;
mbedtls_ecdsa_init(&ectx);
r = load_private_key_ecdsa(&ectx, fkey);
}
mbedtls_ecp_keypair ectx;
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(&ectx);
r = load_private_key_ecdh(&ectx, fkey);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ectx);
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ectx);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
mbedtls_ecdh_context ctx;
@@ -54,12 +56,12 @@ int cmd_general_authenticate() {
mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1;
r = mbedtls_ecdh_setup(&ctx, gid);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ectx);
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ectx);
mbedtls_ecdh_free(&ctx);
return SW_DATA_INVALID();
}
r = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx.ctx.mbed_ecdh.d, &ectx.d);
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ectx);
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ectx);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdh_free(&ctx);
return SW_DATA_INVALID();
@@ -71,7 +73,12 @@ int cmd_general_authenticate() {
}
size_t olen = 0;
uint8_t derived[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES];
r = mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret(&ctx, &olen, derived, MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES, random_gen, NULL);
r = mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret(&ctx,
&olen,
derived,
MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES,
random_gen,
NULL);
mbedtls_ecdh_free(&ctx);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
@@ -79,27 +86,29 @@ int cmd_general_authenticate() {
sm_derive_all_keys(derived, olen);
uint8_t *t = (uint8_t *)calloc(1, pubkey_len+16);
memcpy(t, "\x7F\x49\x3F\x06\x0A", 5);
if (sm_get_protocol() == MSE_AES)
memcpy(t+5, OID_ID_CA_ECDH_AES_CBC_CMAC_128, 10);
uint8_t *t = (uint8_t *) calloc(1, pubkey_len + 16);
memcpy(t, "\x7F\x49\x4F\x06\x0A", 5);
if (sm_get_protocol() == MSE_AES) {
memcpy(t + 5, OID_ID_CA_ECDH_AES_CBC_CMAC_128, 10);
}
t[15] = 0x86;
memcpy(t+16, pubkey, pubkey_len);
memcpy(t + 16, pubkey, pubkey_len);
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = 0x7C;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = 20;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = 0x81;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = 8;
memcpy(res_APDU+res_APDU_size, sm_get_nonce(), 8);
memcpy(res_APDU + res_APDU_size, sm_get_nonce(), 8);
res_APDU_size += 8;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = 0x82;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = 8;
r = sm_sign(t, pubkey_len+16, res_APDU+res_APDU_size);
r = sm_sign(t, pubkey_len + 16, res_APDU + res_APDU_size);
free(t);
if (r != CCID_OK)
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU_size += 8;
}
}

View File

@@ -28,12 +28,17 @@ extern void scan_all();
extern char __StackLimit;
int heapLeft() {
#if !defined(ENABLE_EMULATION) && !defined(ESP_PLATFORM)
char *p = malloc(256); // try to avoid undue fragmentation
int left = &__StackLimit - p;
free(p);
#else
int left = 1024 * 1024;
#endif
return left;
}
extern void reset_puk_store();
int cmd_initialize() {
if (apdu.nc > 0) {
uint8_t mkek[MKEK_SIZE];
@@ -43,39 +48,41 @@ int cmd_initialize() {
has_session_pin = has_session_sopin = false;
uint16_t tag = 0x0;
uint8_t *tag_data = NULL, *p = NULL, *kds = NULL, *dkeks = NULL;
size_t tag_len = 0;
while (walk_tlv(apdu.data, apdu.nc, &p, &tag, &tag_len, &tag_data)) {
uint16_t tag_len = 0;
asn1_ctx_t ctxi;
asn1_ctx_init(apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc, &ctxi);
while (walk_tlv(&ctxi, &p, &tag, &tag_len, &tag_data)) {
if (tag == 0x80) { //options
file_t *tf = search_by_fid(EF_DEVOPS, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
flash_write_data_to_file(tf, tag_data, tag_len);
file_t *tf = search_file(EF_DEVOPS);
file_put_data(tf, tag_data, tag_len);
}
else if (tag == 0x81) { //user pin
else if (tag == 0x81) { //user pin
if (file_pin1 && file_pin1->data) {
uint8_t dhash[33];
dhash[0] = tag_len;
double_hash_pin(tag_data, tag_len, dhash+1);
flash_write_data_to_file(file_pin1, dhash, sizeof(dhash));
dhash[0] = (uint8_t)tag_len;
double_hash_pin(tag_data, tag_len, dhash + 1);
file_put_data(file_pin1, dhash, sizeof(dhash));
hash_multi(tag_data, tag_len, session_pin);
has_session_pin = true;
}
}
else if (tag == 0x82) { //sopin pin
else if (tag == 0x82) { //sopin pin
if (file_sopin && file_sopin->data) {
uint8_t dhash[33];
dhash[0] = tag_len;
double_hash_pin(tag_data, tag_len, dhash+1);
flash_write_data_to_file(file_sopin, dhash, sizeof(dhash));
dhash[0] = (uint8_t)tag_len;
double_hash_pin(tag_data, tag_len, dhash + 1);
file_put_data(file_sopin, dhash, sizeof(dhash));
hash_multi(tag_data, tag_len, session_sopin);
has_session_sopin = true;
}
}
else if (tag == 0x91) { //retries user pin
file_t *tf = search_by_fid(0x1082, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
else if (tag == 0x91) { //retries user pin
file_t *tf = search_file(EF_PIN1_MAX_RETRIES);
if (tf && tf->data) {
flash_write_data_to_file(tf, tag_data, tag_len);
file_put_data(tf, tag_data, tag_len);
}
if (file_retries_pin1 && file_retries_pin1->data) {
flash_write_data_to_file(file_retries_pin1, tag_data, tag_len);
file_put_data(file_retries_pin1, tag_data, tag_len);
}
}
else if (tag == 0x92) {
@@ -85,48 +92,49 @@ int cmd_initialize() {
release_mkek(mkek);
return SW_MEMORY_FAILURE();
}
flash_write_data_to_file(tf, NULL, 0);
file_put_data(tf, NULL, 0);
}
else if (tag == 0x93) {
file_t *ef_puk = search_by_fid(EF_PUKAUT, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
file_t *ef_puk = search_file(EF_PUKAUT);
if (!ef_puk) {
release_mkek(mkek);
return SW_MEMORY_FAILURE();
}
uint8_t pk_status[4], puks = MIN(tag_data[0],MAX_PUK);
uint8_t pk_status[4], puks = MIN(tag_data[0], MAX_PUK);
memset(pk_status, 0, sizeof(pk_status));
pk_status[0] = puks;
pk_status[1] = puks;
pk_status[2] = tag_data[1];
flash_write_data_to_file(ef_puk, pk_status, sizeof(pk_status));
for (int i = 0; i < puks; i++) {
file_t *tf = file_new(EF_PUK+i);
file_put_data(ef_puk, pk_status, sizeof(pk_status));
for (uint8_t i = 0; i < puks; i++) {
file_t *tf = file_new(EF_PUK + i);
if (!tf) {
release_mkek(mkek);
return SW_MEMORY_FAILURE();
}
flash_write_data_to_file(tf, NULL, 0);
file_put_data(tf, NULL, 0);
}
}
else if (tag == 0x97) {
kds = tag_data;
/*
for (int i = 0; i < MIN(*kds,MAX_KEY_DOMAINS); i++) {
for (int i = 0; i < MIN(*kds,MAX_KEY_DOMAINS); i++) {
file_t *tf = file_new(EF_DKEK+i);
if (!tf)
return SW_MEMORY_FAILURE();
flash_write_data_to_file(tf, NULL, 0);
}
*/
file_put_data(tf, NULL, 0);
}
*/
}
}
file_t *tf_kd = search_by_fid(EF_KEY_DOMAIN, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
file_t *tf_kd = search_file(EF_KEY_DOMAIN);
if (!tf_kd) {
release_mkek(mkek);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
if (ret_mkek != CCID_OK)
if (ret_mkek != CCID_OK) {
ret_mkek = load_mkek(mkek); //Try again with new PIN/SO-PIN just in case some is the same
}
if (store_mkek(ret_mkek == CCID_OK ? mkek : NULL) != CCID_OK) {
release_mkek(mkek);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
@@ -135,37 +143,43 @@ int cmd_initialize() {
if (dkeks) {
if (*dkeks > 0) {
uint16_t d = *dkeks;
if (flash_write_data_to_file(tf_kd, (const uint8_t *)&d, sizeof(d)) != CCID_OK)
if (file_put_data(tf_kd, (const uint8_t *) &d, sizeof(d)) != CCID_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
else {
int r = save_dkek_key(0, random_bytes_get(32));
if (r != CCID_OK)
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
uint16_t d = 0x0101;
if (flash_write_data_to_file(tf_kd, (const uint8_t *)&d, sizeof(d)) != CCID_OK)
if (file_put_data(tf_kd, (const uint8_t *) &d, sizeof(d)) != CCID_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
}
else {
uint16_t d = 0x0000;
if (flash_write_data_to_file(tf_kd, (const uint8_t *)&d, sizeof(d)) != CCID_OK)
if (file_put_data(tf_kd, (const uint8_t *) &d, sizeof(d)) != CCID_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
if (kds) {
uint8_t t[MAX_KEY_DOMAINS*2], k = MIN(*kds,MAX_KEY_DOMAINS);
memset(t, 0xff, 2*k);
if (flash_write_data_to_file(tf_kd, t, 2*k) != CCID_OK)
uint8_t t[MAX_KEY_DOMAINS * 2], k = MIN(*kds, MAX_KEY_DOMAINS);
memset(t, 0xff, 2 * k);
if (file_put_data(tf_kd, t, 2 * k) != CCID_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
/* When initialized, it has all credentials */
isUserAuthenticated = true;
/* Create terminal private key */
file_t *fdkey = search_by_fid(EF_KEY_DEV, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
if (!fdkey)
file_t *fdkey = search_file(EF_KEY_DEV);
if (!fdkey) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
int ret = 0;
if (ret_mkek != CCID_OK || file_get_size(fdkey) == 0 || file_get_data(fdkey) == NULL) {
if (ret_mkek != CCID_OK || !file_has_data(fdkey)) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_context ecdsa;
mbedtls_ecdsa_init(&ecdsa);
mbedtls_ecp_group_id ec_id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1;
@@ -175,33 +189,57 @@ int cmd_initialize() {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
ret = store_keys(&ecdsa, HSM_KEY_EC, key_id);
ret = store_keys(&ecdsa, PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC, key_id);
if (ret != CCID_OK) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
size_t cvc_len = 0;
if ((cvc_len = asn1_cvc_aut(&ecdsa, HSM_KEY_EC, res_APDU, 4096, NULL, 0)) == 0) {
if ((cvc_len = asn1_cvc_aut(&ecdsa, PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC, res_APDU, 4096, NULL, 0)) == 0) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa);
file_t *fpk = search_by_fid(EF_EE_DEV, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
ret = flash_write_data_to_file(fpk, res_APDU, cvc_len);
if (ret != 0)
file_t *fpk = search_file(EF_EE_DEV);
ret = file_put_data(fpk, res_APDU, (uint16_t)cvc_len);
if (ret != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
if ((cvc_len = asn1_cvc_cert(&ecdsa, PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC, res_APDU, 4096, NULL, 0, true)) == 0) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
memcpy(res_APDU + cvc_len, res_APDU, cvc_len);
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa);
fpk = search_file(EF_TERMCA);
ret = file_put_data(fpk, res_APDU, (uint16_t)(2 * cvc_len));
if (ret != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
const uint8_t *keyid =
(const uint8_t *) "\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0",
*label = (const uint8_t *) "ESPICOHSMTR";
uint16_t prkd_len = asn1_build_prkd_ecc(label,
(uint16_t)strlen((const char *) label),
keyid,
20,
256,
res_APDU,
4096);
fpk = search_file(EF_PRKD_DEV);
ret = file_put_data(fpk, res_APDU, prkd_len);
const uint8_t *keyid = (const uint8_t *)"\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0", *label = (const uint8_t *)"ESTERMHSM";
size_t prkd_len = asn1_build_prkd_ecc(label, strlen((const char *)label), keyid, 20, 192, res_APDU, 4096);
fpk = search_by_fid(EF_PRKD_DEV, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
ret = flash_write_data_to_file(fpk, res_APDU, prkd_len);
}
if (ret != 0)
if (ret != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
low_flash_available();
reset_puk_store();
}
else { //free memory bytes request
else { //free memory bytes request
int heap_left = heapLeft();
res_APDU[0] = ((heap_left >> 24) & 0xff);
res_APDU[1] = ((heap_left >> 16) & 0xff);

View File

@@ -22,141 +22,190 @@
#include "files.h"
uint8_t get_key_domain(file_t *fkey) {
size_t tag_len = 0;
uint16_t tag_len = 0;
if (!file_has_data(fkey)) {
return 0xff;
}
const uint8_t *meta_tag = get_meta_tag(fkey, 0x92, &tag_len);
if (meta_tag)
if (meta_tag) {
return *meta_tag;
return 0xff;
}
return 0x0;
}
int cmd_key_domain() {
//if (dkeks == 0)
// return SW_COMMAND_NOT_ALLOWED();
uint8_t p1 = P1(apdu), p2 = P2(apdu);
if ((has_session_pin == false || isUserAuthenticated == false) && apdu.nc > 0)
if ((has_session_pin == false || isUserAuthenticated == false) && apdu.nc > 0 &&
!(p1 == 0x0 && p2 == 0x0)) {
return SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED();
if (p2 >= MAX_KEY_DOMAINS)
}
if (p2 >= MAX_KEY_DOMAINS) {
return SW_WRONG_P1P2();
file_t *tf_kd = search_by_fid(EF_KEY_DOMAIN, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
if (!tf_kd)
}
file_t *tf_kd = search_file(EF_KEY_DOMAIN);
if (!tf_kd) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
uint16_t tf_kd_size = file_get_size(tf_kd);
if (tf_kd_size == 0)
if (tf_kd_size == 0) {
return SW_WRONG_P1P2();
uint8_t *kdata = file_get_data(tf_kd), dkeks = kdata ? kdata[2*p2] : 0, current_dkeks = kdata ? kdata[2*p2+1] : 0;
}
uint8_t *kdata = file_get_data(tf_kd), dkeks = kdata ? kdata[2 * p2] : 0,
current_dkeks = kdata ? kdata[2 * p2 + 1] : 0;
if (p1 == 0x0) { //dkek import
if (apdu.nc > 0) {
file_t *tf = file_new(EF_DKEK+p2);
if (!tf)
file_t *tf = file_new(EF_DKEK + p2);
if (!tf) {
return SW_MEMORY_FAILURE();
if (apdu.nc < 32)
}
if (apdu.nc < 32) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
if (current_dkeks == dkeks) {
return SW_COMMAND_NOT_ALLOWED();
}
import_dkek_share(p2, apdu.data);
if (++current_dkeks >= dkeks) {
if (save_dkek_key(p2, NULL) != CCID_OK)
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
int r = save_dkek_key(p2, NULL);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
if (r == CCID_NO_LOGIN) {
pending_save_dkek = p2;
}
else {
/* On fail, it will return to previous dkek state. */
import_dkek_share(p2, apdu.data);
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
}
}
uint8_t t[MAX_KEY_DOMAINS*2];
uint8_t t[MAX_KEY_DOMAINS * 2];
memcpy(t, kdata, tf_kd_size);
t[2*p2+1] = current_dkeks;
if (flash_write_data_to_file(tf_kd, t, tf_kd_size) != CCID_OK)
t[2 * p2 + 1] = current_dkeks;
if (file_put_data(tf_kd, t, tf_kd_size) != CCID_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
low_flash_available();
}
else {
file_t *tf = search_dynamic_file(EF_XKEK+p2);
if (2*p2 >= tf_kd_size || current_dkeks == 0)
file_t *tf = search_file(EF_XKEK + p2);
if (2 * p2 >= tf_kd_size) {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
if (current_dkeks == 0xff && !tf) //XKEK have always 0xff
}
if (current_dkeks == 0xff && !file_has_data(tf)) { //XKEK have always 0xff
return SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND();
}
}
else if (p1 == 0x1 || p1 == 0x3 || p1 == 0x4) { //key domain setup
if (p1 == 0x1 && apdu.nc != 1)
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
if (p1 == 0x3) { //if key domain is not empty, command is denied
for (int i = 0; i < dynamic_files; i++) {
if (get_key_domain(&dynamic_file[i]) == p2)
return SW_FILE_EXISTS();
}
}
uint8_t t[MAX_KEY_DOMAINS*2];
}
else if (p1 == 0x1 || p1 == 0x3 || p1 == 0x4) { //key domain setup
if (p1 == 0x1 && apdu.nc != 1) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
if (p1 == 0x3) { //if key domain is not empty, command is denied
for (uint16_t i = 1; i < 256; i++) {
file_t *fkey = search_file(KEY_PREFIX << 8 | (uint8_t)i);
if (get_key_domain(fkey) == p2) {
return SW_FILE_EXISTS();
}
}
}
uint8_t t[MAX_KEY_DOMAINS * 2];
memcpy(t, kdata, tf_kd_size);
if (p1 == 0x1) {
t[2*p2] = dkeks = apdu.data[0];
t[2*p2+1] = current_dkeks = 0;
if (t[2 * p2] != 0xff || t[2 * p2 + 1] != 0xff) {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
t[2 * p2] = dkeks = apdu.data[0];
t[2 * p2 + 1] = current_dkeks = 0;
}
else if (p1 == 0x3) {
t[2*p2] = dkeks = 0xff;
t[2*p2+1] = 0xff;
if (t[2 * p2] == 0xff && t[2 * p2 + 1] == 0xff) {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
t[2 * p2] = dkeks = 0xff;
t[2 * p2 + 1] = 0xff;
}
else if (p1 == 0x4) {
t[2*p2+1] = current_dkeks = 0;
t[2 * p2 + 1] = current_dkeks = 0;
}
if (flash_write_data_to_file(tf_kd, t, tf_kd_size) != CCID_OK)
if (file_put_data(tf_kd, t, tf_kd_size) != CCID_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
file_t *tf = NULL;
if ((tf = search_dynamic_file(EF_DKEK+p2))) {
if (delete_file(tf) != CCID_OK)
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
if (p1 == 0x3 && (tf = search_dynamic_file(EF_XKEK+p2))) {
if (delete_file(tf) != CCID_OK)
file_t *tf = NULL;
if ((tf = search_file(EF_DKEK + p2))) {
if (delete_file(tf) != CCID_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
if (p1 == 0x3 && (tf = search_file(EF_XKEK + p2))) {
if (delete_file(tf) != CCID_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
low_flash_available();
if (p1 == 0x3) {
return SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND();
}
}
else if (p1 == 0x2) { //XKEK Key Domain creation
else if (p1 == 0x2) { //XKEK Key Domain creation
if (apdu.nc > 0) {
size_t pub_len = 0;
file_t *fterm = search_by_fid(EF_TERMCA, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
if (!fterm)
uint16_t pub_len = 0;
file_t *fterm = search_file(EF_TERMCA);
if (!fterm) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
const uint8_t *pub = cvc_get_pub(file_get_data(fterm), file_get_size(fterm), &pub_len);
if (!pub)
if (!pub) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
size_t t86_len = 0;
}
uint16_t t86_len = 0;
const uint8_t *t86 = cvc_get_field(pub, pub_len, &t86_len, 0x86);
if (!t86 || t86[0] != 0x4)
if (!t86 || t86[0] != 0x4) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
size_t t54_len = 0;
const uint8_t *t54 = cvc_get_field(apdu.data, apdu.nc, &t54_len, 0x54);
if (!t54)
}
uint16_t t54_len = 0;
const uint8_t *t54 = cvc_get_field(apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc, &t54_len, 0x54);
if (!t54) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
uint8_t hash[32], *input = (uint8_t *)calloc(1, (t86_len-1)/2+1);
}
uint8_t hash[32], *input = (uint8_t *) calloc(1, (t86_len - 1) / 2 + 1);
input[0] = 0x54;
memcpy(input+1, t86+1, (t86_len-1)/2);
hash256(input, (t86_len-1)/2+1, hash);
memcpy(input + 1, t86 + 1, (t86_len - 1) / 2);
hash256(input, (t86_len - 1) / 2 + 1, hash);
free(input);
int r = puk_verify(t54, t54_len, hash, 32, apdu.data, apdu.nc);
if (r != 0)
int r = puk_verify(t54, t54_len, hash, 32, apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED();
file_t *tf = file_new(EF_XKEK+p2);
if (!tf)
}
file_t *tf = file_new(EF_XKEK + p2);
if (!tf) {
return SW_MEMORY_FAILURE();
}
//All checks done. Get Key Domain UID
pub = cvc_get_pub(apdu.data, apdu.nc, &pub_len);
pub = cvc_get_pub(apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc, &pub_len);
if (pub) {
size_t t86_len = 0;
const uint8_t *t86 = cvc_get_field(pub, pub_len, &t86_len, 0x86);
t86_len = 0;
t86 = cvc_get_field(pub, pub_len, &t86_len, 0x86);
if (t86) {
flash_write_data_to_file(tf, t86+1, t86_len-1);
file_put_data(tf, t86 + 1, (uint16_t)t86_len - 1);
low_flash_available();
}
}
}
}
else
else {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
memset(res_APDU,0,10);
}
memset(res_APDU, 0, 10);
res_APDU[0] = dkeks;
res_APDU[1] = dkeks > current_dkeks ? dkeks-current_dkeks : 0;
dkek_kcv(p2, res_APDU+2);
res_APDU_size = 2+8;
file_t *tf = search_dynamic_file(EF_XKEK+p2);
if (tf) {
memcpy(res_APDU+10, file_get_data(tf), file_get_size(tf));
res_APDU[1] = dkeks > current_dkeks ? dkeks - current_dkeks : 0;
dkek_kcv(p2, res_APDU + 2);
res_APDU_size = 2 + 8;
file_t *tf = search_file(EF_XKEK + p2);
if (file_has_data(tf)) {
memcpy(res_APDU + 10, file_get_data(tf), file_get_size(tf));
res_APDU_size += file_get_size(tf);
}
return SW_OK();

View File

@@ -24,29 +24,44 @@ int cmd_key_gen() {
uint8_t p2 = P2(apdu);
uint8_t key_size = 32;
int r;
if (!isUserAuthenticated)
if (!isUserAuthenticated) {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();
if (p2 == 0xB2)
}
if (p2 == 0xB3) {
key_size = 64;
}
else if (p2 == 0xB2) {
key_size = 32;
else if (p2 == 0xB1)
}
else if (p2 == 0xB1) {
key_size = 24;
else if (p2 == 0xB0)
}
else if (p2 == 0xB0) {
key_size = 16;
}
//at this moment, we do not use the template, as only CBC is supported by the driver (encrypt, decrypt and CMAC)
uint8_t aes_key[32]; //maximum AES key size
uint8_t aes_key[64]; //maximum AES key size
memcpy(aes_key, random_bytes_get(key_size), key_size);
int aes_type = 0x0;
if (key_size == 16)
aes_type = HSM_KEY_AES_128;
else if (key_size == 24)
aes_type = HSM_KEY_AES_192;
else if (key_size == 32)
aes_type = HSM_KEY_AES_256;
if (key_size == 16) {
aes_type = PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_128;
}
else if (key_size == 24) {
aes_type = PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_192;
}
else if (key_size == 32) {
aes_type = PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_256;
}
else if (key_size == 64) {
aes_type = PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_512;
}
r = store_keys(aes_key, aes_type, key_id);
if (r != CCID_OK)
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return SW_MEMORY_FAILURE();
if (find_and_store_meta_key(key_id) != CCID_OK)
}
if (find_and_store_meta_key(key_id) != CCID_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
low_flash_available();
return SW_OK();
}

View File

@@ -15,92 +15,139 @@
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "crypto_utils.h"
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "crypto_utils.h"
#include "kek.h"
#include "cvc.h"
int cmd_key_unwrap() {
int key_id = P1(apdu), r = 0;
if (P2(apdu) != 0x93)
uint8_t key_id = P1(apdu);
int r = 0;
if (P2(apdu) != 0x93) {
return SW_WRONG_P1P2();
if (!isUserAuthenticated)
}
if (!isUserAuthenticated) {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();
int key_type = dkek_type_key(apdu.data);
uint8_t kdom = -1, *allowed = NULL;
size_t allowed_len = 0;
if (key_type == 0x0)
}
uint8_t *data = apdu.data;
uint16_t data_len = apdu.nc;
if (data_len == 0) { // New style
file_t *tef = search_file(0x2F10);
if (!file_has_data(tef)) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
data = file_get_data(tef);
data_len = file_get_size(tef);
}
int key_type = dkek_type_key(data);
uint8_t *allowed = NULL;
int16_t kdom = -1;
uint16_t allowed_len = 0;
if (key_type == 0x0) {
return SW_DATA_INVALID();
if (key_type == HSM_KEY_RSA) {
}
if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_RSA) {
mbedtls_rsa_context ctx;
mbedtls_rsa_init(&ctx);
do {
r = dkek_decode_key(++kdom, &ctx, apdu.data, apdu.nc, NULL, &allowed, &allowed_len);
} while((r == CCID_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND || r == CCID_WRONG_DKEK) && kdom < MAX_KEY_DOMAINS);
r = dkek_decode_key((uint8_t)++kdom, &ctx, data, data_len, NULL, &allowed, &allowed_len);
} while ((r == CCID_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND || r == CCID_WRONG_DKEK) && kdom < MAX_KEY_DOMAINS);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(&ctx);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
r = store_keys(&ctx, HSM_KEY_RSA, key_id);
r = store_keys(&ctx, PICO_KEYS_KEY_RSA, key_id);
if ((res_APDU_size = (uint16_t)asn1_cvc_aut(&ctx, PICO_KEYS_KEY_RSA, res_APDU, 4096, NULL, 0)) == 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(&ctx);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
mbedtls_rsa_free(&ctx);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
else if (key_type == HSM_KEY_EC) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_context ctx;
mbedtls_ecdsa_init(&ctx);
else if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC) {
mbedtls_ecp_keypair ctx;
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(&ctx);
do {
r = dkek_decode_key(++kdom, &ctx, apdu.data, apdu.nc, NULL, &allowed, &allowed_len);
} while((r == CCID_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND || r == CCID_WRONG_DKEK) && kdom < MAX_KEY_DOMAINS);
r = dkek_decode_key((uint8_t)++kdom, &ctx, data, data_len, NULL, &allowed, &allowed_len);
} while ((r == CCID_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND || r == CCID_WRONG_DKEK) && kdom < MAX_KEY_DOMAINS);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ctx);
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
r = store_keys(&ctx, HSM_KEY_EC, key_id);
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ctx);
r = store_keys(&ctx, PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC, key_id);
if ((res_APDU_size = (uint16_t)asn1_cvc_aut(&ctx, PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC, res_APDU, 4096, NULL, 0)) == 0) {
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
else if (key_type == HSM_KEY_AES) {
uint8_t aes_key[32];
else if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES) {
uint8_t aes_key[64];
int key_size = 0, aes_type = 0;
do {
r = dkek_decode_key(++kdom, aes_key, apdu.data, apdu.nc, &key_size, &allowed, &allowed_len);
} while((r == CCID_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND || r == CCID_WRONG_DKEK) && kdom < MAX_KEY_DOMAINS);
r = dkek_decode_key((uint8_t)++kdom,
aes_key,
data,
data_len,
&key_size,
&allowed,
&allowed_len);
} while ((r == CCID_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND || r == CCID_WRONG_DKEK) && kdom < MAX_KEY_DOMAINS);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
if (key_size == 32)
aes_type = HSM_KEY_AES_256;
else if (key_size == 24)
aes_type = HSM_KEY_AES_192;
else if (key_size == 16)
aes_type = HSM_KEY_AES_128;
else
if (key_size == 64) {
aes_type = PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_512;
}
else if (key_size == 32) {
aes_type = PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_256;
}
else if (key_size == 24) {
aes_type = PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_192;
}
else if (key_size == 16) {
aes_type = PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_128;
}
else {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
r = store_keys(aes_key, aes_type, key_id);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
if ((allowed != NULL && allowed_len > 0) || kdom >= 0) {
size_t meta_len = (allowed_len > 0 ? 2+allowed_len : 0) + (kdom >= 0 ? 3 : 0);
uint8_t *meta = (uint8_t *)calloc(1,meta_len), *m = meta;
uint16_t meta_len = (allowed_len > 0 ? 2 + allowed_len : 0) + (kdom >= 0 ? 3 : 0);
uint8_t *meta = (uint8_t *) calloc(1, meta_len), *m = meta;
if (allowed_len > 0) {
*m++ = 0x91;
*m++ = allowed_len;
*m++ = (uint8_t)allowed_len;
memcpy(m, allowed, allowed_len); m += allowed_len;
}
if (kdom >= 0) {
*m++ = 0x92;
*m++ = 1;
*m++ = kdom;
*m++ = (uint8_t)kdom;
}
r = meta_add((KEY_PREFIX << 8) | key_id, meta, meta_len);
free(meta);
if (r != CCID_OK)
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return r;
}
}
if (res_APDU_size > 0) {
file_t *fpk = file_new((EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX << 8) | key_id);
r = file_put_data(fpk, res_APDU, res_APDU_size);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU_size = 0;
}
low_flash_available();
return SW_OK();
}

View File

@@ -19,27 +19,42 @@
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "asn1.h"
#include "kek.h"
#include "files.h"
extern uint8_t get_key_domain(file_t *fkey);
int cmd_key_wrap() {
int key_id = P1(apdu), r = 0;
if (P2(apdu) != 0x92)
int r = 0;
uint8_t key_id = P1(apdu);
if (P2(apdu) != 0x92) {
return SW_WRONG_P1P2();
if (!isUserAuthenticated)
}
if (!isUserAuthenticated) {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();
file_t *ef = search_dynamic_file((KEY_PREFIX << 8) | key_id);
}
file_t *ef = search_file((KEY_PREFIX << 8) | key_id);
if (!ef) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
uint8_t kdom = get_key_domain(ef);
if (!ef)
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
if (key_has_purpose(ef, ALGO_WRAP) == false)
if (kdom == 0xff) {
return SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND();
}
file_t *tf_kd = search_file(EF_KEY_DOMAIN);
uint8_t *kdata = file_get_data(tf_kd), dkeks = kdata ? kdata[2 * kdom] : 0,
current_dkeks = kdata ? kdata[2 * kdom + 1] : 0;
if (dkeks != current_dkeks || dkeks == 0 || dkeks == 0xff) {
return SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND();
}
if (key_has_purpose(ef, ALGO_WRAP) == false) {
return SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED();
file_t *prkd = search_dynamic_file((PRKD_PREFIX << 8) | key_id);
if (!prkd)
}
file_t *prkd = search_file((PRKD_PREFIX << 8) | key_id);
if (!prkd) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
const uint8_t *dprkd = file_get_data(prkd);
size_t wrap_len = MAX_DKEK_ENCODE_KEY_BUFFER;
size_t tag_len = 0;
uint16_t wrap_len = MAX_DKEK_ENCODE_KEY_BUFFER, tag_len = 0;
const uint8_t *meta_tag = get_meta_tag(ef, 0x91, &tag_len);
if (*dprkd == P15_KEYTYPE_RSA) {
mbedtls_rsa_context ctx;
@@ -47,47 +62,57 @@ int cmd_key_wrap() {
r = load_private_key_rsa(&ctx, ef);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(&ctx);
if (r == CCID_VERIFICATION_FAILED)
if (r == CCID_VERIFICATION_FAILED) {
return SW_SECURE_MESSAGE_EXEC_ERROR();
}
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
r = dkek_encode_key(kdom, &ctx, HSM_KEY_RSA, res_APDU, &wrap_len, meta_tag, tag_len);
r = dkek_encode_key(kdom, &ctx, PICO_KEYS_KEY_RSA, res_APDU, &wrap_len, meta_tag, tag_len);
mbedtls_rsa_free(&ctx);
}
else if (*dprkd == P15_KEYTYPE_ECC) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_context ctx;
mbedtls_ecdsa_init(&ctx);
r = load_private_key_ecdsa(&ctx, ef);
mbedtls_ecp_keypair ctx;
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(&ctx);
r = load_private_key_ec(&ctx, ef);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ctx);
if (r == CCID_VERIFICATION_FAILED)
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
if (r == CCID_VERIFICATION_FAILED) {
return SW_SECURE_MESSAGE_EXEC_ERROR();
}
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
r = dkek_encode_key(kdom, &ctx, HSM_KEY_EC, res_APDU, &wrap_len, meta_tag, tag_len);
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ctx);
r = dkek_encode_key(kdom, &ctx, PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC, res_APDU, &wrap_len, meta_tag, tag_len);
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
}
else if (*dprkd == P15_KEYTYPE_AES) {
uint8_t kdata[32]; //maximum AES key size
if (wait_button_pressed() == true) //timeout
uint8_t kdata_aes[64]; //maximum AES key size
if (wait_button_pressed() == true) { //timeout
return SW_SECURE_MESSAGE_EXEC_ERROR();
}
int key_size = file_get_size(ef), aes_type = HSM_KEY_AES;
memcpy(kdata, file_get_data(ef), key_size);
if (mkek_decrypt(kdata, key_size) != 0) {
uint16_t key_size = file_get_size(ef), aes_type = PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES;
memcpy(kdata_aes, file_get_data(ef), key_size);
if (mkek_decrypt(kdata_aes, key_size) != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
if (key_size == 32)
aes_type = HSM_KEY_AES_256;
else if (key_size == 24)
aes_type = HSM_KEY_AES_192;
else if (key_size == 16)
aes_type = HSM_KEY_AES_128;
r = dkek_encode_key(kdom, kdata, aes_type, res_APDU, &wrap_len, meta_tag, tag_len);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
if (key_size == 64) {
aes_type = PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_512;
}
else if (key_size == 32) {
aes_type = PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_256;
}
else if (key_size == 24) {
aes_type = PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_192;
}
else if (key_size == 16) {
aes_type = PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_128;
}
r = dkek_encode_key(kdom, kdata_aes, aes_type, res_APDU, &wrap_len, meta_tag, tag_len);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata_aes, sizeof(kdata_aes));
}
if (r != CCID_OK)
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU_size = wrap_len;
return SW_OK();
}

View File

@@ -26,64 +26,72 @@
int cmd_keypair_gen() {
uint8_t key_id = P1(apdu);
if (!isUserAuthenticated)
if (!isUserAuthenticated) {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
int ret = 0;
size_t tout = 0;
//sc_asn1_print_tags(apdu.data, apdu.nc);
uint8_t *p = NULL;
if (asn1_find_tag(apdu.data, apdu.nc, 0x7f49, &tout, &p) && tout > 0 && p != NULL) {
size_t oid_len = 0;
uint8_t *oid = NULL;
if (asn1_find_tag(p, tout, 0x6, &oid_len, &oid) && oid_len > 0 && oid != NULL) {
if (memcmp(oid, OID_ID_TA_RSA_V1_5_SHA_256, oid_len) == 0) { //RSA
size_t ex_len = 3, ks_len = 2;
uint8_t *ex = NULL, *ks = NULL;
//DEBUG_DATA(apdu.data,apdu.nc);
asn1_ctx_t ctxi, ctxo = { 0 };
asn1_ctx_init(apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc, &ctxi);
if (asn1_find_tag(&ctxi, 0x7f49, &ctxo) && asn1_len(&ctxo) > 0) {
asn1_ctx_t oid = { 0 };
if (asn1_find_tag(&ctxo, 0x6, &oid) && asn1_len(&oid) > 0) {
if (memcmp(oid.data, OID_ID_TA_RSA_V1_5_SHA_256, oid.len) == 0) { //RSA
asn1_ctx_t ex = { 0 }, ks = { 0 };
uint32_t exponent = 65537, key_size = 2048;
if (asn1_find_tag(p, tout, 0x82, &ex_len, &ex) && ex_len > 0 && ex != NULL) {
uint8_t *dt = ex;
exponent = 0;
for (int i = 0; i < ex_len; i++) {
exponent = (exponent << 8) | *dt++;
}
if (asn1_find_tag(&ctxo, 0x82, &ex) && asn1_len(&ex) > 0) {
exponent = asn1_get_uint(&ex);
}
if (asn1_find_tag(p, tout, 0x2, &ks_len, &ks) && ks_len > 0 && ks != NULL) {
uint8_t *dt = ks;
key_size = 0;
for (int i = 0; i < ks_len; i++) {
key_size = (key_size << 8) | *dt++;
}
if (asn1_find_tag(&ctxo, 0x2, &ks) && asn1_len(&ks) > 0) {
key_size = asn1_get_uint(&ks);
}
printf("KEYPAIR RSA %ld (%lx)\r\n",key_size,exponent);
printf("KEYPAIR RSA %lu (%lx)\n",
(unsigned long) key_size,
(unsigned long) exponent);
mbedtls_rsa_context rsa;
mbedtls_rsa_init(&rsa);
uint8_t index = 0;
ret = mbedtls_rsa_gen_key(&rsa, random_gen, &index, key_size, exponent);
if (ret != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(&rsa);
mbedtls_rsa_free(&rsa);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
if ((res_APDU_size = asn1_cvc_aut(&rsa, HSM_KEY_RSA, res_APDU, 4096, NULL, 0)) == 0) {
if ((res_APDU_size =
(uint16_t)asn1_cvc_aut(&rsa, PICO_KEYS_KEY_RSA, res_APDU, 4096, NULL, 0)) == 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
ret = store_keys(&rsa, HSM_KEY_RSA, key_id);
if (ret != CCID_OK) {
ret = store_keys(&rsa, PICO_KEYS_KEY_RSA, key_id);
if (ret != CCID_OK) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(&rsa);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
mbedtls_rsa_free(&rsa);
}
else if (memcmp(oid, OID_ID_TA_ECDSA_SHA_256,MIN(oid_len,10)) == 0) { //ECC
size_t prime_len;
uint8_t *prime = NULL;
if (asn1_find_tag(p, tout, 0x81, &prime_len, &prime) != true)
else if (memcmp(oid.data, OID_ID_TA_ECDSA_SHA_256, MIN(oid.len, 10)) == 0) { //ECC
asn1_ctx_t prime = { 0 };
if (asn1_find_tag(&ctxo, 0x81, &prime) != true) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
mbedtls_ecp_group_id ec_id = ec_get_curve_from_prime(prime, prime_len);
printf("KEYPAIR ECC %d\r\n",ec_id);
}
mbedtls_ecp_group_id ec_id = ec_get_curve_from_prime(prime.data, prime.len);
printf("KEYPAIR ECC %d\n", ec_id);
if (ec_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) {
return SW_FUNC_NOT_SUPPORTED();
}
if (ec_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519 || ec_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448) {
asn1_ctx_t g = { 0 };
if (asn1_find_tag(&ctxo, 0x83, &g) != true) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
if (ec_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519 && (g.data[0] != 9)) {
ec_id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_ED25519;
}
else if (ec_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448 && (g.len != 56 || g.data[0] != 5)) {
ec_id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_ED448;
}
}
printf("KEYPAIR ECC %d\r\n", ec_id);
mbedtls_ecdsa_context ecdsa;
mbedtls_ecdsa_init(&ecdsa);
uint8_t index = 0;
@@ -92,58 +100,71 @@ int cmd_keypair_gen() {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
size_t l91 = 0, ext_len = 0;
uint8_t *p91 = NULL, *ext = NULL;
if (asn1_find_tag(apdu.data, apdu.nc, 0x91, &l91, &p91) && p91 != NULL && l91 > 0) {
for (int n = 0; n < l91; n++) {
if (p91[n] == ALGO_EC_DH_XKEK) {
size_t l92 = 0;
uint8_t *p92 = NULL;
if (!asn1_find_tag(apdu.data, apdu.nc, 0x92, &l92, &p92) || p92 == NULL || l92 == 0)
asn1_ctx_t a91 = { 0 }, ext = { 0 };
if (asn1_find_tag(&ctxi, 0x91, &a91) && asn1_len(&a91) > 0) {
for (size_t n = 0; n < a91.len; n++) {
if (a91.data[n] == ALGO_EC_DH_XKEK) {
asn1_ctx_t a92 = {0};
if (!asn1_find_tag(&ctxi, 0x92, &a92) || asn1_len(&a92) == 0) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
if (p92[0] > MAX_KEY_DOMAINS)
}
if (a92.data[0] > MAX_KEY_DOMAINS) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
file_t *tf_xkek = search_dynamic_file(EF_XKEK+p92[0]);
if (!tf_xkek)
}
file_t *tf_xkek = search_file(EF_XKEK + a92.data[0]);
if (!tf_xkek) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
ext_len = 2+2+strlen(OID_ID_KEY_DOMAIN_UID)+2+file_get_size(tf_xkek);
ext = (uint8_t *)calloc(1, ext_len);
uint8_t *pe = ext;
}
ext.len = 2 + 2 + (uint16_t)strlen(OID_ID_KEY_DOMAIN_UID) + 2 + file_get_size(
tf_xkek);
ext.data = (uint8_t *) calloc(1, ext.len);
uint8_t *pe = ext.data;
*pe++ = 0x73;
*pe++ = ext_len-2;
*pe++ = (uint8_t)ext.len - 2;
*pe++ = 0x6;
*pe++ = strlen(OID_ID_KEY_DOMAIN_UID);
*pe++ = (uint8_t)strlen(OID_ID_KEY_DOMAIN_UID);
memcpy(pe, OID_ID_KEY_DOMAIN_UID, strlen(OID_ID_KEY_DOMAIN_UID));
pe += strlen(OID_ID_KEY_DOMAIN_UID);
*pe++ = 0x80;
*pe++ = file_get_size(tf_xkek);
*pe++ = (uint8_t)file_get_size(tf_xkek);
memcpy(pe, file_get_data(tf_xkek), file_get_size(tf_xkek));
}
}
}
if ((res_APDU_size = asn1_cvc_aut(&ecdsa, HSM_KEY_EC, res_APDU, 4096, ext, ext_len)) == 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
ret = store_keys(&ecdsa, HSM_KEY_EC, key_id);
if (ret != CCID_OK) {
if ((res_APDU_size =
(uint16_t)asn1_cvc_aut(&ecdsa, PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC, res_APDU, 4096, ext.data, ext.len)) == 0) {
if (ext.data) {
free(ext.data);
}
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
if (ext.data) {
free(ext.data);
}
ret = store_keys(&ecdsa, PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC, key_id);
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa);
if (ret != CCID_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
}
}
else
else {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
if (find_and_store_meta_key(key_id) != CCID_OK)
}
if (find_and_store_meta_key(key_id) != CCID_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
file_t *fpk = file_new((EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX << 8) | key_id);
ret = flash_write_data_to_file(fpk, res_APDU, res_APDU_size);
if (ret != 0)
ret = file_put_data(fpk, res_APDU, res_APDU_size);
if (ret != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
if (apdu.ne == 0)
}
if (apdu.ne == 0) {
apdu.ne = res_APDU_size;
}
low_flash_available();
return SW_OK();
}

View File

@@ -18,26 +18,30 @@
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "files.h"
int cmd_list_keys()
{
int cmd_list_keys() {
/* First we send DEV private key */
/* Both below conditions should be always TRUE */
if (search_by_fid(EF_PRKD_DEV, NULL, SPECIFY_EF)) {
if (search_file(EF_PRKD_DEV)) {
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = EF_PRKD_DEV >> 8;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = EF_PRKD_DEV & 0xff;
}
if (search_by_fid(EF_KEY_DEV, NULL, SPECIFY_EF)) {
if (search_file(EF_KEY_DEV)) {
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = EF_KEY_DEV >> 8;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = EF_KEY_DEV & 0xff;
}
//first CC
for (int i = 0; i < dynamic_files; i++) {
file_t *f = &dynamic_file[i];
if ((f->fid & 0xff00) == (KEY_PREFIX << 8)) {
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = KEY_PREFIX;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = f->fid & 0xff;
}
}
for (int i = 0; i < dynamic_files; i++) {
file_t *f = &dynamic_file[i];
if ((f->fid & 0xff00) == (PRKD_PREFIX << 8)) {
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = PRKD_PREFIX;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = f->fid & 0xff;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = KEY_PREFIX;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = f->fid & 0xff;
}
}
//second CD
@@ -56,5 +60,11 @@ int cmd_list_keys()
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = f->fid & 0xff;
}
}
#if !defined(ENABLE_EMULATION) && !defined(ESP_PLATFORM)
if ((apdu.rlen + 2 + 10) % 64 == 0) { // FIX for strange behaviour with PSCS and multiple of 64
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = 0;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = 0;
}
#endif
return SW_OK();
}

View File

@@ -27,17 +27,22 @@ file_t *ef_puk_aut = NULL;
int cmd_mse() {
int p1 = P1(apdu);
int p2 = P2(apdu);
if (p2 != 0xA4 && p2 != 0xA6 && p2 != 0xAA && p2 != 0xB4 && p2 != 0xB6 && p2 != 0xB8)
if (p2 != 0xA4 && p2 != 0xA6 && p2 != 0xAA && p2 != 0xB4 && p2 != 0xB6 && p2 != 0xB8) {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
if (p1 & 0x1) { //SET
uint16_t tag = 0x0;
uint8_t *tag_data = NULL, *p = NULL;
size_t tag_len = 0;
while (walk_tlv(apdu.data, apdu.nc, &p, &tag, &tag_len, &tag_data)) {
uint16_t tag_len = 0;
asn1_ctx_t ctxi;
asn1_ctx_init(apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc, &ctxi);
while (walk_tlv(&ctxi, &p, &tag, &tag_len, &tag_data)) {
if (tag == 0x80) {
if (p2 == 0xA4) {
if (tag_len == 10 && memcmp(tag_data, OID_ID_CA_ECDH_AES_CBC_CMAC_128, tag_len) == 0)
if (tag_len == 10 &&
memcmp(tag_data, OID_ID_CA_ECDH_AES_CBC_CMAC_128, tag_len) == 0) {
sm_set_protocol(MSE_AES);
}
}
}
else if (tag == 0x83) {
@@ -46,20 +51,28 @@ int cmd_mse() {
}
else {
if (p2 == 0xB6) {
if (puk_store_select_chr(tag_data) == CCID_OK)
if (puk_store_select_chr(tag_data) == CCID_OK) {
return SW_OK();
}
}
else if (p2 == 0xA4) { /* Aut */
for (int i = 0; i < MAX_PUK; i++) {
file_t *ef = search_dynamic_file(EF_PUK+i);
if (!ef)
else if (p2 == 0xA4) { /* Aut */
for (uint8_t i = 0; i < MAX_PUK; i++) {
file_t *ef = search_file(EF_PUK + i);
if (!ef) {
break;
if (ef->data == NULL || file_get_size(ef) == 0)
}
if (!file_has_data(ef)) {
break;
size_t chr_len = 0;
const uint8_t *chr = cvc_get_chr(file_get_data(ef), file_get_size(ef), &chr_len);
}
uint16_t chr_len = 0;
const uint8_t *chr = cvc_get_chr(file_get_data(ef),
file_get_size(ef),
&chr_len);
if (memcmp(chr, tag_data, chr_len) == 0) {
ef_puk_aut = ef;
if (puk_status[i] == 1) {
return SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED(); // It is correct
}
return SW_OK();
}
}
@@ -69,7 +82,8 @@ int cmd_mse() {
}
}
}
else
else {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
return SW_OK();
}

View File

@@ -20,67 +20,77 @@
#include "asn1.h"
#include "cvc.h"
extern int add_cert_puk_store(const uint8_t *data, size_t data_len, bool copy);
extern int add_cert_puk_store(const uint8_t *data, uint16_t data_len, bool copy);
extern PUK *current_puk;
int cmd_pso() {
uint8_t p1 = P1(apdu), p2 = P2(apdu);
if (p1 == 0x0 && (p2 == 0x92 || p2 == 0xAE || p2 == 0xBE)) { /* Verify certificate */
if (apdu.nc == 0)
if (apdu.nc == 0) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
if (current_puk == NULL)
}
if (current_puk == NULL) {
return SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND();
}
if (apdu.data[0] != 0x7F || apdu.data[1] != 0x21) {
uint8_t tlv_len = 2+format_tlv_len(apdu.nc, NULL);
memmove(apdu.data+tlv_len, apdu.data, apdu.nc);
uint8_t tlv_len = 2 + format_tlv_len((uint16_t)apdu.nc, NULL);
memmove(apdu.data + tlv_len, apdu.data, apdu.nc);
memcpy(apdu.data, "\x7F\x21", 2);
format_tlv_len(apdu.nc, apdu.data+2);
format_tlv_len((uint16_t)apdu.nc, apdu.data + 2);
apdu.nc += tlv_len;
}
int r = cvc_verify(apdu.data, apdu.nc, current_puk->cvcert, current_puk->cvcert_len);
int r = cvc_verify(apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc, current_puk->cvcert, current_puk->cvcert_len);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
if (r == CCID_WRONG_DATA)
if (r == CCID_WRONG_DATA) {
return SW_DATA_INVALID();
else if (r == CCID_WRONG_SIGNATURE)
}
else if (r == CCID_WRONG_SIGNATURE) {
return SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
for (int i = 0; i < 0xfe; i++) {
for (uint8_t i = 0; i < 0xfe; i++) {
uint16_t fid = (CA_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX << 8) | i;
file_t *ca_ef = search_dynamic_file(fid);
file_t *ca_ef = search_file(fid);
if (!ca_ef) {
ca_ef = file_new(fid);
flash_write_data_to_file(ca_ef, apdu.data, apdu.nc);
if (add_cert_puk_store(file_get_data(ca_ef), file_get_size(ca_ef), false) != CCID_OK)
file_put_data(ca_ef, apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc);
if (add_cert_puk_store(file_get_data(ca_ef), file_get_size(ca_ef),
false) != CCID_OK) {
return SW_FILE_FULL();
}
size_t chr_len = 0;
const uint8_t *chr = cvc_get_chr(apdu.data, apdu.nc, &chr_len);
if (chr == NULL)
uint16_t chr_len = 0;
const uint8_t *chr = cvc_get_chr(apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc, &chr_len);
if (chr == NULL) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
size_t puk_len = 0, puk_bin_len = 0;
const uint8_t *puk = cvc_get_pub(apdu.data, apdu.nc, &puk_len), *puk_bin = NULL;
if (puk == NULL)
}
uint16_t puk_len = 0, puk_bin_len = 0;
const uint8_t *puk = cvc_get_pub(apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc, &puk_len), *puk_bin = NULL;
if (puk == NULL) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
size_t oid_len = 0;
}
uint16_t oid_len = 0;
const uint8_t *oid = cvc_get_field(puk, puk_len, &oid_len, 0x6);
if (oid == NULL)
if (oid == NULL) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
if (memcmp(oid, OID_ID_TA_RSA, 9) == 0) { //RSA
puk_bin = cvc_get_field(puk, puk_len, &puk_bin_len, 0x81);
if (!puk_bin)
if (!puk_bin) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
}
else if (memcmp(oid, OID_ID_TA_ECDSA, 9) == 0) { //ECC
mbedtls_ecp_group_id ec_id = cvc_inherite_ec_group(apdu.data, apdu.nc);
else if (memcmp(oid, OID_ID_TA_ECDSA, 9) == 0) { //ECC
mbedtls_ecp_group_id ec_id = cvc_inherite_ec_group(apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc);
mbedtls_ecp_group grp;
mbedtls_ecp_group_init(&grp);
if (mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&grp, ec_id) != 0) {
mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&grp);
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
size_t plen = mbedtls_mpi_size(&grp.P);
size_t t86_len = 0;
uint16_t plen = (uint16_t)mbedtls_mpi_size(&grp.P);
uint16_t t86_len = 0;
const uint8_t *t86 = cvc_get_field(puk, puk_len, &t86_len, 0x86);
if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(&grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY) {
if (plen != t86_len) {
@@ -92,13 +102,13 @@ int cmd_pso() {
}
else if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(&grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS) {
if (t86[0] == 0x2 || t86[0] == 0x3) {
if (t86_len != plen+1) {
if (t86_len != plen + 1) {
mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&grp);
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
}
else if (t86[0] == 0x4) {
if (t86_len != 2*plen+1) {
if (t86_len != 2 * plen + 1) {
mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&grp);
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
@@ -107,30 +117,45 @@ int cmd_pso() {
mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&grp);
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
puk_bin = t86+1;
puk_bin = t86 + 1;
puk_bin_len = plen;
}
mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&grp);
if (!puk_bin)
if (!puk_bin) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
}
file_t *cd_ef = file_new((CD_PREFIX << 8) | i);
size_t cd_len = asn1_build_cert_description(chr, chr_len, puk_bin, puk_bin_len, fid, NULL, 0);
if (cd_len == 0)
uint16_t cd_len = (uint16_t)asn1_build_cert_description(chr,
chr_len,
puk_bin,
puk_bin_len,
fid,
NULL,
0);
if (cd_len == 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
uint8_t *buf = (uint8_t *)calloc(cd_len, sizeof(uint8_t));
int r = asn1_build_cert_description(chr, chr_len, puk_bin, puk_bin_len, fid, buf, cd_len);
flash_write_data_to_file(cd_ef, buf, cd_len);
}
uint8_t *buf = (uint8_t *) calloc(cd_len, sizeof(uint8_t));
r = (int)asn1_build_cert_description(chr,
chr_len,
puk_bin,
puk_bin_len,
fid,
buf,
cd_len);
file_put_data(cd_ef, buf, cd_len);
free(buf);
if (r == 0)
if (r == 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
low_flash_available();
break;
}
}
return SW_OK();
}
else
else {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
return SW_OK();
}

View File

@@ -21,52 +21,65 @@
int cmd_puk_auth() {
uint8_t p1 = P1(apdu), p2 = P2(apdu);
file_t *ef_puk = search_by_fid(EF_PUKAUT, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
if (!ef_puk || !ef_puk->data || file_get_size(ef_puk) == 0)
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
file_t *ef_puk = search_file(EF_PUKAUT);
if (!file_has_data(ef_puk)) {
if (apdu.nc > 0) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
uint8_t *puk_data = file_get_data(ef_puk);
if (apdu.nc > 0) {
if (p1 == 0x0 || p1 == 0x1) {
file_t *ef = NULL;
if (p1 == 0x0) { /* Add */
if (p2 != 0x0)
if (p2 != 0x0) {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
for (int i = 0; i < puk_data[0]; i++) {
ef = search_dynamic_file(EF_PUK+i);
if (!ef) /* Never should not happen */
return SW_MEMORY_FAILURE();
if (ef->data == NULL || file_get_size(ef) == 0) /* found first empty slot */
break;
}
uint8_t *tmp = (uint8_t *)calloc(file_get_size(ef_puk), sizeof(uint8_t));
for (uint8_t i = 0; i < puk_data[0]; i++) {
ef = search_file(EF_PUK + i);
if (!ef) { /* Never should not happen */
return SW_MEMORY_FAILURE();
}
if (!file_has_data(ef)) { /* found first empty slot */
break;
}
}
uint8_t *tmp = (uint8_t *) calloc(file_get_size(ef_puk), sizeof(uint8_t));
memcpy(tmp, puk_data, file_get_size(ef_puk));
tmp[1] = puk_data[1]-1;
flash_write_data_to_file(ef_puk, tmp, file_get_size(ef_puk));
tmp[1] = puk_data[1] - 1;
file_put_data(ef_puk, tmp, file_get_size(ef_puk));
puk_data = file_get_data(ef_puk);
free(tmp);
}
else if (p1 == 0x1) { /* Replace */
if (p2 >= puk_data[0])
else if (p1 == 0x1) { /* Replace */
if (p2 >= puk_data[0]) {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
ef = search_dynamic_file(EF_PUK+p2);
if (!ef) /* Never should not happen */
}
ef = search_file(EF_PUK + p2);
if (!ef) { /* Never should not happen */
return SW_MEMORY_FAILURE();
}
}
flash_write_data_to_file(ef, apdu.data, apdu.nc);
file_put_data(ef, apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc);
low_flash_available();
}
else
else {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
}
if (p1 == 0x2) {
if (p2 >= puk_data[0])
if (p2 >= puk_data[0]) {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
file_t *ef = search_dynamic_file(EF_PUK+p2);
if (!ef)
}
file_t *ef = search_file(EF_PUK + p2);
if (!ef) {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
if (ef->data == NULL || file_get_size(ef) == 0)
}
if (!file_has_data(ef)) {
return SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND();
size_t chr_len = 0;
}
uint16_t chr_len = 0;
const uint8_t *chr = cvc_get_chr(file_get_data(ef), file_get_size(ef), &chr_len);
if (chr) {
memcpy(res_APDU, chr, chr_len);
@@ -77,8 +90,9 @@ int cmd_puk_auth() {
else {
memcpy(res_APDU, puk_data, 3);
res_APDU[3] = 0;
for (int i = 0; i < puk_data[0]; i++)
for (int i = 0; i < puk_data[0]; i++) {
res_APDU[3] += puk_status[i];
}
res_APDU_size = 4;
}
return SW_OK();

View File

@@ -18,16 +18,15 @@
#include "sc_hsm.h"
int cmd_read_binary() {
uint16_t fid = 0x0;
uint32_t offset = 0;
uint16_t offset = 0;
uint8_t ins = INS(apdu), p1 = P1(apdu), p2 = P2(apdu);
const file_t *ef = NULL;
if ((ins & 0x1) == 0)
{
if ((ins & 0x1) == 0) {
if ((p1 & 0x80) != 0) {
if (!(ef = search_by_fid(p1&0x1f, NULL, SPECIFY_EF)))
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND ();
if (!(ef = search_file(p1 & 0x1f))) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
offset = p2;
}
else {
@@ -37,52 +36,61 @@ int cmd_read_binary() {
}
else {
if (p1 == 0 && (p2 & 0xE0) == 0 && (p2 & 0x1f) != 0 && (p2 & 0x1f) != 0x1f) {
if (!(ef = search_by_fid(p2&0x1f, NULL, SPECIFY_EF)))
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND ();
if (!(ef = search_file(p2 & 0x1f))) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
}
else {
uint16_t file_id = make_uint16_t(p1, p2); // & 0x7fff;
if (file_id == 0x0)
if (file_id == 0x0) {
ef = currentEF;
else if (!(ef = search_by_fid(file_id, NULL, SPECIFY_EF)) && !(ef = search_dynamic_file(file_id)))
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND ();
}
else if (!(ef = search_file(file_id))) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
if (apdu.data[0] != 0x54)
if (apdu.data[0] != 0x54) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
offset = 0;
for (int d = 0; d < apdu.data[1]; d++)
offset |= apdu.data[2+d]<<(apdu.data[1]-1-d)*8;
for (int d = 0; d < apdu.data[1]; d++) {
offset |= apdu.data[2 + d] << (apdu.data[1] - 1 - d) * 8;
}
}
}
if ((fid >> 8) == KEY_PREFIX || !authenticate_action(ef, ACL_OP_READ_SEARCH)) {
if ((ef->fid >> 8) == KEY_PREFIX || !authenticate_action(ef, ACL_OP_READ_SEARCH)) {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
if (ef->data) {
if ((ef->type & FILE_DATA_FUNC) == FILE_DATA_FUNC) {
uint16_t data_len = ((int (*)(const file_t *, int))(ef->data))((const file_t *)ef, 1); //already copies content to res_APDU
if (offset > data_len)
uint16_t data_len = (uint16_t)((int (*)(const file_t *, int))(ef->data))((const file_t *) ef, 1); //already copies content to res_APDU
if (offset > data_len) {
return SW_WRONG_P1P2();
uint16_t maxle = data_len-offset;
if (apdu.ne > maxle)
}
uint16_t maxle = data_len - offset;
if (apdu.ne > maxle) {
apdu.ne = maxle;
}
if (offset) {
memmove(res_APDU, res_APDU+offset, res_APDU_size-offset);
memmove(res_APDU, res_APDU + offset, res_APDU_size - offset);
//res_APDU += offset;
res_APDU_size -= offset;
}
}
else {
uint16_t data_len = file_get_size(ef);
if (offset > data_len)
return SW_WRONG_P1P2();
if (offset > data_len) {
return SW_WARNING_EOF();
}
uint16_t maxle = data_len-offset;
if (apdu.ne > maxle)
apdu.ne = maxle;
memcpy(res_APDU, file_get_data(ef)+offset, data_len-offset);
res_APDU_size = data_len-offset;
//uint16_t maxle = data_len - offset;
//if (apdu.ne > maxle) {
// apdu.ne = maxle;
//}
memcpy(res_APDU, file_get_data(ef) + offset, data_len - offset);
res_APDU_size = data_len - offset;
}
}

View File

@@ -20,75 +20,88 @@
#include "kek.h"
int cmd_reset_retry() {
if (P2(apdu) != 0x81)
if (P2(apdu) != 0x81) {
return SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND();
}
if (!file_sopin || !file_pin1) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
if (!file_sopin->data) {
if (!file_has_data(file_sopin)) {
return SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND();
}
uint16_t opts = get_device_options();
if (!(opts & HSM_OPT_RRC))
if (!(opts & HSM_OPT_RRC)) {
return SW_COMMAND_NOT_ALLOWED();
}
if (P1(apdu) == 0x0 || P1(apdu) == 0x2) {
int newpin_len = 0;
uint8_t newpin_len = 0;
if (P1(apdu) == 0x0) {
if (apdu.nc <= 8)
uint8_t so_pin_len = file_read_uint8(file_sopin);
if ((uint16_t)apdu.nc <= so_pin_len + 1) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
uint16_t r = check_pin(file_sopin, apdu.data, 8);
if (r != 0x9000)
}
uint16_t r = check_pin(file_sopin, apdu.data, so_pin_len);
if (r != 0x9000) {
return r;
newpin_len = apdu.nc-8;
has_session_sopin = true;
hash_multi(apdu.data, 8, session_sopin);
}
newpin_len = (uint8_t)apdu.nc - so_pin_len;
}
else if (P1(apdu) == 0x2) {
if (!has_session_sopin)
if (!has_session_sopin) {
return SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED();
if (apdu.nc > 16)
}
if (apdu.nc > 16) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
newpin_len = apdu.nc;
}
newpin_len = (uint8_t)apdu.nc;
}
uint8_t dhash[33];
dhash[0] = newpin_len;
double_hash_pin(apdu.data+(apdu.nc-newpin_len), newpin_len, dhash+1);
flash_write_data_to_file(file_pin1, dhash, sizeof(dhash));
if (pin_reset_retries(file_pin1, true) != CCID_OK)
double_hash_pin(apdu.data + (apdu.nc - newpin_len), newpin_len, dhash + 1);
file_put_data(file_pin1, dhash, sizeof(dhash));
if (pin_reset_retries(file_pin1, true) != CCID_OK) {
return SW_MEMORY_FAILURE();
}
uint8_t mkek[MKEK_SIZE];
int r = load_mkek(mkek); //loads the MKEK with SO pin
if (r != CCID_OK)
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
hash_multi(apdu.data+(apdu.nc-newpin_len), newpin_len, session_pin);
}
hash_multi(apdu.data + (apdu.nc - newpin_len), newpin_len, session_pin);
has_session_pin = true;
r = store_mkek(mkek);
release_mkek(mkek);
if (r != CCID_OK)
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
low_flash_available();
return SW_OK();
}
else if (P1(apdu) == 0x1 || P1(apdu) == 0x3) {
if (!(opts & HSM_OPT_RRC_RESET_ONLY))
if (!(opts & HSM_OPT_RRC_RESET_ONLY)) {
return SW_COMMAND_NOT_ALLOWED();
}
if (P1(apdu) == 0x1) {
if (apdu.nc != 8)
uint8_t so_pin_len = file_read_uint8(file_sopin);
if (apdu.nc != so_pin_len) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
uint16_t r = check_pin(file_sopin, apdu.data, 8);
if (r != 0x9000)
}
uint16_t r = check_pin(file_sopin, apdu.data, so_pin_len);
if (r != 0x9000) {
return r;
has_session_sopin = true;
hash_multi(apdu.data, 8, session_sopin);
}
}
else if (P1(apdu) == 0x3) {
if (!has_session_sopin)
if (!has_session_sopin) {
return SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED();
if (apdu.nc != 0)
}
if (apdu.nc != 0) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
}
if (pin_reset_retries(file_pin1, true) != CCID_OK)
if (pin_reset_retries(file_pin1, true) != CCID_OK) {
return SW_MEMORY_FAILURE();
}
return SW_OK();
}
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();

View File

@@ -19,12 +19,11 @@
#include "version.h"
void select_file(file_t *pe) {
if (!pe)
{
currentDF = (file_t *)MF;
if (!pe) {
currentDF = (file_t *) MF;
currentEF = NULL;
}
else if (pe->type & FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF) {
else if (pe->type & (FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF|FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF)) {
currentEF = pe;
currentDF = &file_entries[pe->parent];
}
@@ -48,29 +47,31 @@ int cmd_select() {
// return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
//}
if (apdu.nc >= 2)
if (apdu.nc == 2) {
fid = get_uint16_t(apdu.data, 0);
}
//if ((fid & 0xff00) == (KEY_PREFIX << 8))
// fid = (PRKD_PREFIX << 8) | (fid & 0xff);
uint8_t pfx = fid >> 8;
if (pfx == PRKD_PREFIX ||
/*uint8_t pfx = fid >> 8;*/
/*if (pfx == PRKD_PREFIX ||
pfx == CD_PREFIX ||
pfx == CA_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX ||
pfx == KEY_PREFIX ||
pfx == EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX ||
pfx == DCOD_PREFIX ||
pfx == DATA_PREFIX ||
pfx == PROT_DATA_PREFIX) {
if (!(pe = search_dynamic_file(fid)) && !(pe = search_by_fid(fid, NULL, SPECIFY_EF)))
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
pfx == PROT_DATA_PREFIX) {*/
if (fid != 0x0 && !(pe = search_file(fid))) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
/*}*/
if (!pe) {
if (p1 == 0x0) { //Select MF, DF or EF - File identifier or absent
if (apdu.nc == 0) {
pe = (file_t *)MF;
//ac_fini();
pe = (file_t *) MF;
//ac_fini();
}
else if (apdu.nc == 2) {
if (!(pe = search_by_fid(fid, NULL, SPECIFY_ANY))) {
@@ -78,41 +79,42 @@ int cmd_select() {
}
}
}
else if (p1 == 0x01) { //Select child DF - DF identifier
else if (p1 == 0x01) { //Select child DF - DF identifier
if (!(pe = search_by_fid(fid, currentDF, SPECIFY_DF))) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
}
else if (p1 == 0x02) { //Select EF under the current DF - EF identifier
else if (p1 == 0x02) { //Select EF under the current DF - EF identifier
if (!(pe = search_by_fid(fid, currentDF, SPECIFY_EF))) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
}
else if (p1 == 0x03) { //Select parent DF of the current DF - Absent
if (apdu.nc != 0)
else if (p1 == 0x03) { //Select parent DF of the current DF - Absent
if (apdu.nc != 0) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
}
else if (p1 == 0x04) { //Select by DF name - e.g., [truncated] application identifier
if (!(pe = search_by_name(apdu.data, apdu.nc))) {
else if (p1 == 0x04) { //Select by DF name - e.g., [truncated] application identifier
if (!(pe = search_by_name(apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc))) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
if (card_terminated) {
return set_res_sw(0x62, 0x85);
}
}
else if (p1 == 0x08) { //Select from the MF - Path without the MF identifier
if (!(pe = search_by_path(apdu.data, apdu.nc, MF))) {
else if (p1 == 0x08) { //Select from the MF - Path without the MF identifier
if (!(pe = search_by_path(apdu.data, (uint8_t)apdu.nc, MF))) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
}
else if (p1 == 0x09) { //Select from the current DF - Path without the current DF identifier
if (!(pe = search_by_path(apdu.data, apdu.nc, currentDF))) {
else if (p1 == 0x09) { //Select from the current DF - Path without the current DF identifier
if (!(pe = search_by_path(apdu.data, (uint8_t)apdu.nc, currentDF))) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
}
}
if ((p2 & 0xfc) == 0x00 || (p2 & 0xfc) == 0x04) {
process_fci(pe,0);
process_fci(pe, 0);
if (pe == file_sc_hsm) {
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = 0x85;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = 5;
@@ -122,11 +124,12 @@ int cmd_select() {
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = 0xFF;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = HSM_VERSION_MAJOR;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = HSM_VERSION_MINOR;
res_APDU[1] = res_APDU_size-2;
res_APDU[1] = (uint8_t)res_APDU_size - 2;
}
}
else
else {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
select_file(pe);
return SW_OK ();
return SW_OK();
}

View File

@@ -28,7 +28,8 @@ int cmd_session_pin() {
res_APDU_size = sm_session_pin_len;
apdu.ne = sm_session_pin_len;
}
else
else {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
return SW_OK();
}

View File

@@ -14,76 +14,86 @@
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "crypto_utils.h"
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "asn1.h"
#include "mbedtls/oid.h"
#include "random.h"
#include "mbedtls/eddsa.h"
extern mbedtls_ecp_keypair hd_context;
extern uint8_t hd_keytype;
//-----
/* From OpenSC */
static const uint8_t hdr_md5[] = {
0x30, 0x20, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7,
0x0d, 0x02, 0x05, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x10
0x30, 0x20, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7,
0x0d, 0x02, 0x05, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x10
};
static const uint8_t hdr_sha1[] = {
0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05, 0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a,
0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14
0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05, 0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a,
0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14
};
static const uint8_t hdr_sha256[] = {
0x30, 0x31, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65,
0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x20
0x30, 0x31, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65,
0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x20
};
static const uint8_t hdr_sha384[] = {
0x30, 0x41, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65,
0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x30
0x30, 0x41, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65,
0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x30
};
static const uint8_t hdr_sha512[] = {
0x30, 0x51, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65,
0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x40
0x30, 0x51, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65,
0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x40
};
static const uint8_t hdr_sha224[] = {
0x30, 0x2d, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65,
0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x04, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x1c
0x30, 0x2d, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65,
0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x04, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x1c
};
static const uint8_t hdr_ripemd160[] = {
0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05, 0x2b, 0x24, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01,
0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14
0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05, 0x2b, 0x24, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01,
0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14
};
static const struct digest_info_prefix {
mbedtls_md_type_t algorithm;
const uint8_t * hdr;
size_t hdr_len;
size_t hash_len;
mbedtls_md_type_t algorithm;
const uint8_t *hdr;
uint16_t hdr_len;
uint16_t hash_len;
} digest_info_prefix[] = {
{ MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, hdr_md5, sizeof(hdr_md5), 16 },
{ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, hdr_sha1, sizeof(hdr_sha1), 20 },
{ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, hdr_sha256, sizeof(hdr_sha256), 32 },
{ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, hdr_sha384, sizeof(hdr_sha384), 48 },
{ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, hdr_sha512, sizeof(hdr_sha512), 64 },
{ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, hdr_sha224, sizeof(hdr_sha224), 28 },
{ MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160,hdr_ripemd160, sizeof(hdr_ripemd160), 20 },
{ 0, NULL, 0, 0 }
{ MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, hdr_md5, sizeof(hdr_md5), 16 },
{ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, hdr_sha1, sizeof(hdr_sha1), 20 },
{ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, hdr_sha256, sizeof(hdr_sha256), 32 },
{ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, hdr_sha384, sizeof(hdr_sha384), 48 },
{ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, hdr_sha512, sizeof(hdr_sha512), 64 },
{ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, hdr_sha224, sizeof(hdr_sha224), 28 },
{ MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160, hdr_ripemd160, sizeof(hdr_ripemd160), 20 },
{ 0, NULL, 0, 0 }
};
int pkcs1_strip_digest_info_prefix(mbedtls_md_type_t *algorithm, const uint8_t *in_dat, size_t in_len, uint8_t *out_dat, size_t *out_len)
{
for (int i = 0; digest_info_prefix[i].algorithm != 0; i++) {
size_t hdr_len = digest_info_prefix[i].hdr_len, hash_len = digest_info_prefix[i].hash_len;
const uint8_t *hdr = digest_info_prefix[i].hdr;
if (in_len == (hdr_len + hash_len) && !memcmp(in_dat, hdr, hdr_len)) {
if (algorithm)
*algorithm = digest_info_prefix[i].algorithm;
if (out_dat == NULL)
return CCID_OK;
if (*out_len < hash_len)
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
memmove(out_dat, in_dat + hdr_len, hash_len);
*out_len = hash_len;
return CCID_OK;
}
}
return CCID_EXEC_ERROR;
int pkcs1_strip_digest_info_prefix(mbedtls_md_type_t *algorithm,
const uint8_t *in_dat,
uint16_t in_len,
uint8_t *out_dat,
uint16_t *out_len) {
for (int i = 0; digest_info_prefix[i].algorithm != 0; i++) {
uint16_t hdr_len = digest_info_prefix[i].hdr_len, hash_len = digest_info_prefix[i].hash_len;
const uint8_t *hdr = digest_info_prefix[i].hdr;
if (in_len == (hdr_len + hash_len) && !memcmp(in_dat, hdr, hdr_len)) {
if (algorithm) {
*algorithm = digest_info_prefix[i].algorithm;
}
if (out_dat == NULL) {
return CCID_OK;
}
if (*out_len < hash_len) {
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
}
memmove(out_dat, in_dat + hdr_len, hash_len);
*out_len = hash_len;
return CCID_OK;
}
}
return CCID_EXEC_ERROR;
}
//-----
@@ -92,22 +102,39 @@ int cmd_signature() {
uint8_t p2 = P2(apdu);
mbedtls_md_type_t md = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;
file_t *fkey;
if (!isUserAuthenticated)
if (!isUserAuthenticated) {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();
if (!(fkey = search_dynamic_file((KEY_PREFIX << 8) | key_id)) || !fkey->data || file_get_size(fkey) == 0)
}
if (!(fkey = search_file((KEY_PREFIX << 8) | key_id)) || !file_has_data(fkey)) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
if (get_key_counter(fkey) == 0)
}
if (get_key_counter(fkey) == 0) {
return SW_FILE_FULL();
if (key_has_purpose(fkey, p2) == false)
}
if (key_has_purpose(fkey, p2) == false) {
return SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED();
int key_size = file_get_size(fkey);
if (p2 == ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA1 || p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA1)
}
uint16_t key_size = file_get_size(fkey);
if (p2 == ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA1 || p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA1) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;
else if (p2 == ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA256 || p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA256)
}
else if (p2 == ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA256 || p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA256) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256;
else if (p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA224)
}
else if (p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA224 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA224 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA224) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224;
if (p2 == ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA1 || p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA1 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA256 || p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA256 || p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA224) {
}
else if (p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA384 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA384) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384;
}
else if (p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA512 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA512) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512;
}
if (p2 == ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA1 || p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA1 ||
p2 == ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA256 || p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA256 ||
p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA224 || p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA384 || p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA512 ||
p2 == ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA224 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512 ||
p2 == ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA224 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA384 || p2 == ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA512) {
generic_hash(md, apdu.data, apdu.nc, apdu.data);
apdu.nc = mbedtls_md_get_size(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md));
}
@@ -115,70 +142,81 @@ int cmd_signature() {
mbedtls_rsa_context ctx;
mbedtls_rsa_init(&ctx);
int r;
r = load_private_key_rsa(&ctx, fkey);
int r = load_private_key_rsa(&ctx, fkey);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(&ctx);
if (r == CCID_VERIFICATION_FAILED)
if (r == CCID_VERIFICATION_FAILED) {
return SW_SECURE_MESSAGE_EXEC_ERROR();
}
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
uint8_t *hash = apdu.data;
size_t hash_len = apdu.nc;
asn1_ctx_t hash = {.len = (uint16_t)apdu.nc, .data = apdu.data};
if (p2 == ALGO_RSA_PKCS1) { //DigestInfo attached
size_t nc = apdu.nc;
if (pkcs1_strip_digest_info_prefix(&md, apdu.data, apdu.nc, apdu.data, &nc) != CCID_OK) //gets the MD algo id and strips it off
uint16_t nc = (uint16_t)apdu.nc;
if (pkcs1_strip_digest_info_prefix(&md, apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc, apdu.data,
&nc) != CCID_OK) { //gets the MD algo id and strips it off
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
apdu.nc = nc;
}
else {
//sc_asn1_print_tags(apdu.data, apdu.nc);
size_t tout = 0, oid_len = 0;
uint8_t *p = NULL, *oid = NULL;
if (asn1_find_tag(apdu.data, apdu.nc, 0x30, &tout, &p) && tout > 0 && p != NULL) {
size_t tout30 = 0;
uint8_t *c30 = NULL;
if (asn1_find_tag(p, tout, 0x30, &tout30, &c30) && tout30 > 0 && c30 != NULL) {
asn1_find_tag(c30, tout30, 0x6, &oid_len, &oid);
asn1_ctx_t ctxi, ctxo = { 0 }, oid = { 0 };
asn1_ctx_init(apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc, &ctxi);
if (asn1_find_tag(&ctxi, 0x30, &ctxo) && asn1_len(&ctxo) > 0) {
asn1_ctx_t a30 = { 0 };
if (asn1_find_tag(&ctxo, 0x30, &a30) && asn1_len(&a30) > 0) {
asn1_find_tag(&a30, 0x6, &oid);
}
asn1_find_tag(p, tout, 0x4, &hash_len, &hash);
asn1_find_tag(&ctxo, 0x4, &hash);
}
if (oid && oid_len > 0) {
if (memcmp(oid, MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA1, oid_len) == 0)
if (asn1_len(&oid)) {
if (memcmp(oid.data, MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA1, oid.len) == 0) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;
else if (memcmp(oid, MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA224, oid_len) == 0)
}
else if (memcmp(oid.data, MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA224, oid.len) == 0) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224;
else if (memcmp(oid, MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA256, oid_len) == 0)
}
else if (memcmp(oid.data, MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA256, oid.len) == 0) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256;
else if (memcmp(oid, MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA384, oid_len) == 0)
}
else if (memcmp(oid.data, MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA384, oid.len) == 0) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384;
else if (memcmp(oid, MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA512, oid_len) == 0)
}
else if (memcmp(oid.data, MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA512, oid.len) == 0) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512;
}
}
if (p2 >= ALGO_RSA_PSS && p2 <= ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA512) {
if (p2 == ALGO_RSA_PSS && !oid) {
if (apdu.nc == 20) //default is sha1
if (p2 == ALGO_RSA_PSS && asn1_len(&oid) == 0) {
if (apdu.nc == 20) { //default is sha1
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;
else if (apdu.nc == 28)
}
else if (apdu.nc == 28) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224;
else if (apdu.nc == 32)
}
else if (apdu.nc == 32) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256;
else if (apdu.nc == 48)
}
else if (apdu.nc == 48) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384;
else if (apdu.nc == 64)
}
else if (apdu.nc == 64) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512;
}
}
mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(&ctx, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21, md);
}
}
if (md == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) {
if (apdu.nc < key_size) //needs padding
memset(apdu.data+apdu.nc, 0, key_size-apdu.nc);
if (apdu.nc < key_size) { //needs padding
memset(apdu.data + apdu.nc, 0, key_size - apdu.nc);
}
r = mbedtls_rsa_private(&ctx, random_gen, NULL, apdu.data, res_APDU);
}
else {
uint8_t *signature = (uint8_t *)calloc(key_size, sizeof(uint8_t));
r = mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign(&ctx, random_gen, NULL, md, hash_len, hash, signature);
uint8_t *signature = (uint8_t *) calloc(key_size, sizeof(uint8_t));
r = mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign(&ctx, random_gen, NULL, md, hash.len, hash.data, signature);
memcpy(res_APDU, signature, key_size);
free(signature);
}
@@ -191,51 +229,90 @@ int cmd_signature() {
mbedtls_rsa_free(&ctx);
}
else if (p2 >= ALGO_EC_RAW && p2 <= ALGO_EC_SHA512) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_context ctx;
mbedtls_ecdsa_init(&ctx);
mbedtls_ecp_keypair ctx;
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(&ctx);
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256;
if (p2 == ALGO_EC_RAW) {
if (apdu.nc == 32)
if (apdu.nc == 32) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256;
else if (apdu.nc == 20)
}
else if (apdu.nc == 20) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;
else if (apdu.nc == 28)
}
else if (apdu.nc == 28) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224;
else if (apdu.nc == 48)
}
else if (apdu.nc == 48) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384;
else if (apdu.nc == 64)
}
else if (apdu.nc == 64) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512;
}
}
if (p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA1)
if (p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA1) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;
else if (p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA224)
}
else if (p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA224) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224;
else if (p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA256)
}
else if (p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA256) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256;
else if (p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA384)
}
else if (p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA384) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384;
else if (p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA512)
}
else if (p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA512) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512;
int r;
r = load_private_key_ecdsa(&ctx, fkey);
}
int r = load_private_key_ec(&ctx, fkey);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ctx);
if (r == CCID_VERIFICATION_FAILED)
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
if (r == CCID_VERIFICATION_FAILED) {
return SW_SECURE_MESSAGE_EXEC_ERROR();
}
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
size_t olen = 0;
uint8_t buf[MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN];
if (mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature(&ctx, md, apdu.data, apdu.nc, buf, MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN, &olen, random_gen, NULL) != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ctx);
if (ctx.grp.id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_ED25519 || ctx.grp.id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_ED448) {
r = mbedtls_eddsa_write_signature(&ctx, apdu.data, apdu.nc, buf, sizeof(buf), &olen, MBEDTLS_EDDSA_PURE, NULL, 0, random_gen, NULL);
}
else {
r = mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature(&ctx, md, apdu.data, apdu.nc, buf, MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN,
&olen, random_gen, NULL);
}
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
memcpy(res_APDU, buf, olen);
res_APDU_size = olen;
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ctx);
res_APDU_size = (uint16_t)olen;
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
}
else
else if (p2 == ALGO_HD) {
size_t olen = 0;
uint8_t buf[MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN];
if (hd_context.grp.id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) {
return SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
if (hd_keytype != 0x1 && hd_keytype != 0x2) {
return SW_INCORRECT_PARAMS();
}
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256;
if (mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature(&hd_context, md, apdu.data, apdu.nc, buf,
MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN,
&olen, random_gen, NULL) != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&hd_context);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
memcpy(res_APDU, buf, olen);
res_APDU_size = (uint16_t)olen;
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&hd_context);
hd_keytype = 0;
}
else {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
decrement_key_counter(fkey);
return SW_OK();
}

View File

@@ -27,26 +27,38 @@ int cmd_update_ef() {
uint16_t offset = 0;
uint16_t data_len = 0;
file_t *ef = NULL;
if (!isUserAuthenticated)
if (!isUserAuthenticated) {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();
if (fid == 0x0)
}
if (fid == 0x0) {
ef = currentEF;
else if (p1 != EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX && p1 != PRKD_PREFIX && p1 != CA_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX && p1 != CD_PREFIX && p1 != DATA_PREFIX && p1 != DCOD_PREFIX && p1 != PROT_DATA_PREFIX)
}
/*
// This should not happen
else if (p1 != EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX && p1 != PRKD_PREFIX && p1 != CA_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX &&
p1 != CD_PREFIX && p1 != DATA_PREFIX && p1 != DCOD_PREFIX &&
p1 != PROT_DATA_PREFIX) {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
*/
if (ef && !authenticate_action(ef, ACL_OP_UPDATE_ERASE))
if (ef && !authenticate_action(ef, ACL_OP_UPDATE_ERASE)) {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
uint16_t tag = 0x0;
uint8_t *tag_data = NULL, *p = NULL;
size_t tag_len = 0;
while (walk_tlv(apdu.data, apdu.nc, &p, &tag, &tag_len, &tag_data)) {
uint16_t tag_len = 0;
asn1_ctx_t ctxi;
asn1_ctx_init(apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc, &ctxi);
while (walk_tlv(&ctxi, &p, &tag, &tag_len, &tag_data)) {
if (tag == 0x54) { //ofset tag
for (int i = 1; i <= tag_len; i++)
offset |= (*tag_data++ << (8*(tag_len-i)));
for (size_t i = 1; i <= tag_len; i++) {
offset |= (*tag_data++ << (8 * (tag_len - i)));
}
}
else if (tag == 0x53) { //data
data_len = tag_len;
else if (tag == 0x53) { //data
data_len = (uint16_t)tag_len;
data = tag_data;
}
}
@@ -57,28 +69,32 @@ int cmd_update_ef() {
select_file(ef);
}
else {
if (fid == 0x0 && !ef)
if (fid == 0x0 && !ef) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
else if (fid != 0x0 && !(ef = search_by_fid(fid, NULL, SPECIFY_EF)) && !(ef = search_dynamic_file(fid))) { //if does not exist, create it
}
else if (fid != 0x0 && !(ef = search_file(fid))) { //if does not exist, create it
//return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
ef = file_new(fid);
}
if (offset == 0) {
int r = flash_write_data_to_file(ef, data, data_len);
if (r != CCID_OK)
int r = file_put_data(ef, data, data_len);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return SW_MEMORY_FAILURE();
}
}
else {
if (!ef->data)
if (!file_has_data(ef)) {
return SW_DATA_INVALID();
}
uint8_t *data_merge = (uint8_t *)calloc(1, offset+data_len);
uint8_t *data_merge = (uint8_t *) calloc(1, offset + data_len);
memcpy(data_merge, file_get_data(ef), offset);
memcpy(data_merge+offset, data, data_len);
int r = flash_write_data_to_file(ef, data_merge, offset+data_len);
memcpy(data_merge + offset, data, data_len);
int r = file_put_data(ef, data_merge, offset + data_len);
free(data_merge);
if (r != CCID_OK)
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return SW_MEMORY_FAILURE();
}
}
low_flash_available();
}

View File

@@ -21,35 +21,43 @@ int cmd_verify() {
uint8_t p1 = P1(apdu);
uint8_t p2 = P2(apdu);
if (p1 != 0x0 || (p2 & 0x60) != 0x0)
if (p1 != 0x0 || (p2 & 0x60) != 0x0) {
return SW_WRONG_P1P2();
}
if (p2 == 0x81) { //UserPin
uint16_t opts = get_device_options();
if (opts & HSM_OPT_TRANSPORT_PIN)
if (opts & HSM_OPT_TRANSPORT_PIN) {
return SW_DATA_INVALID();
if (has_session_pin && apdu.nc == 0)
return SW_OK();
if (*file_get_data(file_pin1) == 0 && pka_enabled() == false) //not initialized
return SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND();
if (apdu.nc > 0) {
return check_pin(file_pin1, apdu.data, apdu.nc);
}
if (file_read_uint8(file_get_data(file_retries_pin1)) == 0)
if (has_session_pin && apdu.nc == 0) {
return SW_OK();
}
if (*file_get_data(file_pin1) == 0 && pka_enabled() == false) { //not initialized
return SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND();
}
if (apdu.nc > 0) {
return check_pin(file_pin1, apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc);
}
if (file_read_uint8(file_retries_pin1) == 0) {
return SW_PIN_BLOCKED();
return set_res_sw(0x63, 0xc0 | file_read_uint8(file_get_data(file_retries_pin1)));
}
return set_res_sw(0x63, 0xc0 | file_read_uint8(file_retries_pin1));
}
else if (p2 == 0x88) { //SOPin
if (file_read_uint8(file_get_data(file_sopin)) == 0) //not initialized
else if (p2 == 0x88) { //SOPin
if (file_read_uint8(file_sopin) == 0) { //not initialized
return SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND();
if (apdu.nc > 0) {
return check_pin(file_sopin, apdu.data, apdu.nc);
}
if (file_read_uint8(file_get_data(file_retries_sopin)) == 0)
if (apdu.nc > 0) {
return check_pin(file_sopin, apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc);
}
if (file_read_uint8(file_retries_sopin) == 0) {
return SW_PIN_BLOCKED();
if (has_session_sopin)
}
if (has_session_sopin) {
return SW_OK();
return set_res_sw(0x63, 0xc0 | file_read_uint8(file_get_data(file_retries_sopin)));
}
return set_res_sw(0x63, 0xc0 | file_read_uint8(file_retries_sopin));
}
else if (p2 == 0x85) {
return SW_OK();

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -19,34 +19,87 @@
#define _CVC_H_
#include <stdlib.h>
#if !defined(ENABLE_EMULATION) && !defined(ESP_PLATFORM)
#include "pico/stdlib.h"
#else
#include <stdbool.h>
#endif
#include "mbedtls/ecp.h"
typedef struct PUK {
const uint8_t *puk;
size_t puk_len;
uint16_t puk_len;
const uint8_t *car;
size_t car_len;
uint16_t car_len;
const uint8_t *chr;
size_t chr_len;
uint16_t chr_len;
const uint8_t *cvcert;
size_t cvcert_len;
uint16_t cvcert_len;
bool copied;
} PUK;
#define MAX_PUK_STORE_ENTRIES 4
extern size_t asn1_cvc_cert(void *rsa_ecdsa, uint8_t key_type, uint8_t *buf, size_t buf_len, const uint8_t *ext, size_t ext_len);
extern size_t asn1_cvc_aut(void *rsa_ecdsa, uint8_t key_type, uint8_t *buf, size_t buf_len, const uint8_t *ext, size_t ext_len);
extern size_t asn1_build_cert_description(const uint8_t *label, size_t label_len, const uint8_t *puk, size_t puk_len, uint16_t fid, uint8_t *buf, size_t buf_len);
extern const uint8_t *cvc_get_field(const uint8_t *data, size_t len, size_t *olen, uint16_t tag);
extern const uint8_t *cvc_get_car(const uint8_t *data, size_t len, size_t *olen);
extern const uint8_t *cvc_get_chr(const uint8_t *data, size_t len, size_t *olen);
extern const uint8_t *cvc_get_pub(const uint8_t *data, size_t len, size_t *olen);
extern const uint8_t *cvc_get_ext(const uint8_t *data, size_t len, size_t *olen);
extern int cvc_verify(const uint8_t *cert, size_t cert_len, const uint8_t *ca, size_t ca_len);
extern mbedtls_ecp_group_id cvc_inherite_ec_group(const uint8_t *ca, size_t ca_len);
extern int puk_verify(const uint8_t *sig, size_t sig_len, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_len, const uint8_t *ca, size_t ca_len);
extern size_t asn1_build_prkd_ecc(const uint8_t *label, size_t label_len, const uint8_t *keyid, size_t keyid_len, size_t keysize, uint8_t *buf, size_t buf_len);
extern uint16_t asn1_cvc_cert(void *rsa_ecdsa,
uint8_t key_type,
uint8_t *buf,
uint16_t buf_len,
const uint8_t *ext,
uint16_t ext_len,
bool full);
extern uint16_t asn1_cvc_aut(void *rsa_ecdsa,
uint8_t key_type,
uint8_t *buf,
uint16_t buf_len,
const uint8_t *ext,
uint16_t ext_len);
extern uint16_t asn1_build_cert_description(const uint8_t *label,
uint16_t label_len,
const uint8_t *puk,
uint16_t puk_len,
uint16_t fid,
uint8_t *buf,
uint16_t buf_len);
extern const uint8_t *cvc_get_field(const uint8_t *data, uint16_t len, uint16_t *olen, uint16_t tag);
extern const uint8_t *cvc_get_car(const uint8_t *data, uint16_t len, uint16_t *olen);
extern const uint8_t *cvc_get_chr(const uint8_t *data, uint16_t len, uint16_t *olen);
extern const uint8_t *cvc_get_pub(const uint8_t *data, uint16_t len, uint16_t *olen);
extern const uint8_t *cvc_get_ext(const uint8_t *data, uint16_t len, uint16_t *olen);
extern int cvc_verify(const uint8_t *cert, uint16_t cert_len, const uint8_t *ca, uint16_t ca_len);
extern mbedtls_ecp_group_id cvc_inherite_ec_group(const uint8_t *ca, uint16_t ca_len);
extern int puk_verify(const uint8_t *sig,
uint16_t sig_len,
const uint8_t *hash,
uint16_t hash_len,
const uint8_t *ca,
uint16_t ca_len);
extern uint16_t asn1_build_prkd_ecc(const uint8_t *label,
uint16_t label_len,
const uint8_t *keyid,
uint16_t keyid_len,
uint16_t keysize,
uint8_t *buf,
uint16_t buf_len);
extern uint16_t asn1_build_prkd_rsa(const uint8_t *label,
uint16_t label_len,
const uint8_t *keyid,
uint16_t keyid_len,
uint16_t keysize,
uint8_t *buf,
uint16_t buf_len);
extern uint16_t asn1_build_prkd_aes(const uint8_t *label,
uint16_t label_len,
const uint8_t *keyid,
uint16_t keyid_len,
uint16_t keysize,
uint8_t *buf,
uint16_t buf_len);
extern uint16_t asn1_build_prkd_generic(const uint8_t *label,
uint16_t label_len,
const uint8_t *keyid,
uint16_t keyid_len,
uint16_t keysize,
int key_tpe,
uint8_t *buf,
uint16_t buf_len);
#endif

View File

@@ -19,48 +19,98 @@
extern const uint8_t sc_hsm_aid[];
extern int parse_token_info(const file_t *f, int mode);
extern int parse_ef_dir(const file_t *f, int mode);
file_t file_entries[] = {
/* 0 */ { .fid = 0x3f00 , .parent = 0xff, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_DF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = 0, .acl = {0} }, // MF
/* 1 */ { .fid = 0x2f00 , .parent = 0, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} }, //EF.DIR
/* 2 */ { .fid = 0x2f01 , .parent = 0, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} }, //EF.ATR
/* 3 */ { .fid = EF_TERMCA , .parent = 0, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH | FILE_PERSISTENT, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} }, //EF.GDO
/* 4 */ { .fid = 0x2f03 , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF | FILE_DATA_FUNC,.data = (uint8_t *)parse_token_info, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} }, //EF.TokenInfo
/* 5 */ { .fid = 0x5015 , .parent = 0, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_DF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = 0, .acl = {0} }, //DF.PKCS15
/* 6 */ { .fid = 0x5031 , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} }, //EF.ODF
/* 7 */ { .fid = 0x5032 , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} }, //EF.TokenInfo
/* 8 */ { .fid = 0x5033 , .parent = 0, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} }, //EF.UnusedSpace
/* 9 */ { .fid = 0x1081 , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0xff} }, //PIN (PIN1)
/* 10 */ { .fid = 0x1082 , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0xff} }, //max retries PIN (PIN1)
/* 11 */ { .fid = 0x1083 , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0xff} }, //retries PIN (PIN1)
/* 12 */ { .fid = 0x1088 , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0xff} }, //PIN (SOPIN)
/* 13 */ { .fid = 0x1089 , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0xff} }, //max retries PIN (SOPIN)
/* 14 */ { .fid = 0x108A , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0xff} }, //retries PIN (SOPIN)
/* 15 */ { .fid = EF_DEVOPS , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0xff} }, //Device options
/* 16 */ { .fid = EF_PRKDFS , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} }, //EF.PrKDFs
/* 17 */ { .fid = EF_PUKDFS , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} }, //EF.PuKDFs
/* 18 */ { .fid = EF_CDFS , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} }, //EF.CDFs
/* 19 */ { .fid = EF_AODFS , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} }, //EF.AODFs
/* 20 */ { .fid = EF_DODFS , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} }, //EF.DODFs
/* 21 */ { .fid = EF_SKDFS , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} }, //EF.SKDFs
/* 22 */ { .fid = EF_KEY_DOMAIN, .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0xff} }, //Key domain options
/* 23 */ { .fid = EF_META , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0xff} }, //EF.CDFs
/* 24 */ { .fid = EF_PUKAUT, .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0xff} }, //Public Key Authentication
/* 25 */ { .fid = EF_KEY_DEV, .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH | FILE_PERSISTENT, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0xff} }, //Device Key
/* 26 */ { .fid = EF_PRKD_DEV, .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH | FILE_PERSISTENT, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0xff} }, //PrKD Device
/* 27 */ { .fid = EF_EE_DEV, .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH | FILE_PERSISTENT, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0xff} }, //End Entity Certificate Device
/* 28 */ { .fid = EF_MKEK , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH | FILE_PERSISTENT, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0xff} }, //MKEK
/* 29 */ { .fid = EF_MKEK_SO , .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH | FILE_PERSISTENT, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0xff} }, //MKEK with SO-PIN
/* 0 */ { .fid = 0x3f00, .parent = 0xff, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_DF, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = 0, .acl = { 0 } }, // MF
/* 1 */ { .fid = 0x2f00, .parent = 0, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF | FILE_DATA_FUNC, .data = (uint8_t *) parse_ef_dir,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0 } }, //EF.DIR
/* 2 */ { .fid = 0x2f01, .parent = 0, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0 } }, //EF.ATR
/* 3 */ { .fid = EF_TERMCA, .parent = 0, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH | FILE_PERSISTENT, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0 } }, //EF.GDO
/* 4 */ { .fid = 0x2f03, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF | FILE_DATA_FUNC, .data = (uint8_t *) parse_token_info,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0 } }, //EF.TokenInfo
/* 5 */ { .fid = 0x5015, .parent = 0, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_DF, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = 0, .acl = { 0 } }, //DF.PKCS15
/* 6 */ { .fid = 0x5031, .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0 } }, //EF.ODF
/* 7 */ { .fid = 0x5032, .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0 } }, //EF.TokenInfo
/* 8 */ { .fid = 0x5033, .parent = 0, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0 } }, //EF.UnusedSpace
/* 9 */ { .fid = EF_PIN1, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0xff } }, //PIN (PIN1)
/* 10 */ { .fid = EF_PIN1_MAX_RETRIES, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0xff } }, //max retries PIN (PIN1)
/* 11 */ { .fid = EF_PIN1_RETRIES, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0xff } }, //retries PIN (PIN1)
/* 12 */ { .fid = EF_SOPIN, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0xff } }, //PIN (SOPIN)
/* 13 */ { .fid = EF_SOPIN_MAX_RETRIES, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0xff } }, //max retries PIN (SOPIN)
/* 14 */ { .fid = EF_SOPIN_RETRIES, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0xff } }, //retries PIN (SOPIN)
/* 15 */ { .fid = EF_DEVOPS, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0xff } }, //Device options
/* 16 */ { .fid = EF_PRKDFS, .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF,
.data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0 } }, //EF.PrKDFs
/* 17 */ { .fid = EF_PUKDFS, .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF,
.data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0 } }, //EF.PuKDFs
/* 18 */ { .fid = EF_CDFS, .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF,
.data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0 } }, //EF.CDFs
/* 19 */ { .fid = EF_AODFS, .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF,
.data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0 } }, //EF.AODFs
/* 20 */ { .fid = EF_DODFS, .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF,
.data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0 } }, //EF.DODFs
/* 21 */ { .fid = EF_SKDFS, .parent = 5, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF,
.data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0 } }, //EF.SKDFs
/* 22 */ { .fid = EF_KEY_DOMAIN, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0xff } }, //Key domain options
/* 23 */ { .fid = EF_META, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0xff } }, //EF.CDFs
/* 24 */ { .fid = EF_PUKAUT, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0xff } }, //Public Key Authentication
/* 25 */ { .fid = EF_KEY_DEV, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH | FILE_PERSISTENT, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0xff } }, //Device Key
/* 26 */ { .fid = EF_PRKD_DEV, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH | FILE_PERSISTENT, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0xff } }, //PrKD Device
/* 27 */ { .fid = EF_EE_DEV, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH | FILE_PERSISTENT, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0xff } }, //End Entity Certificate Device
/* 28 */ { .fid = EF_MKEK, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH | FILE_PERSISTENT, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0xff } }, //MKEK
/* 29 */ { .fid = EF_MKEK_SO, .parent = 5, .name = NULL,
.type = FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF | FILE_DATA_FLASH | FILE_PERSISTENT, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0xff } }, //MKEK with SO-PIN
///* 30 */ { .fid = 0x0000, .parent = 0, .name = openpgpcard_aid, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} },
/* 31 */ { .fid = 0x0000, .parent = 5, .name = sc_hsm_aid, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = {0} },
/* 32 */ { .fid = 0x0000, .parent = 0xff, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_UNKNOWN, .data = NULL, .ef_structure = 0, .acl = {0} } //end
/* 31 */ { .fid = 0x0000, .parent = 5, .name = sc_hsm_aid, .type = FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF,
.data = NULL, .ef_structure = FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT, .acl = { 0 } },
/* 32 */ { .fid = 0x0000, .parent = 0xff, .name = NULL, .type = FILE_TYPE_NOT_KNOWN, .data = NULL,
.ef_structure = 0, .acl = { 0 } } //end
};
const file_t *MF = &file_entries[0];
const file_t *file_last = &file_entries[sizeof(file_entries)/sizeof(file_t)-1];
const file_t *file_openpgp = &file_entries[sizeof(file_entries)/sizeof(file_t)-3];
const file_t *file_sc_hsm = &file_entries[sizeof(file_entries)/sizeof(file_t)-2];
const file_t *file_last = &file_entries[sizeof(file_entries) / sizeof(file_t) - 1];
const file_t *file_openpgp = &file_entries[sizeof(file_entries) / sizeof(file_t) - 3];
const file_t *file_sc_hsm = &file_entries[sizeof(file_entries) / sizeof(file_t) - 2];
file_t *file_pin1 = NULL;
file_t *file_retries_pin1 = NULL;
file_t *file_sopin = NULL;
file_t *file_retries_sopin = NULL;
file_t *file_retries_sopin = NULL;

View File

@@ -24,11 +24,18 @@
#define EF_DEVOPS 0x100E
#define EF_MKEK 0x100A
#define EF_MKEK_SO 0x100B
#define EF_XKEK 0x1080
#define EF_XKEK 0x1070
#define EF_PIN1 0x1081
#define EF_PIN1_MAX_RETRIES 0x1082
#define EF_PIN1_RETRIES 0x1083
#define EF_SOPIN 0x1088
#define EF_SOPIN_MAX_RETRIES 0x1089
#define EF_SOPIN_RETRIES 0x108A
#define EF_DKEK 0x1090
#define EF_KEY_DOMAIN 0x10A0
#define EF_PUKAUT 0x10C0
#define EF_PUK 0X10D0
#define EF_PUK 0x10D0
#define EF_MASTER_SEED 0x1110
#define EF_PRKDFS 0x6040
#define EF_PUKDFS 0x6041
#define EF_CDFS 0x6042
@@ -40,11 +47,13 @@
#define EF_PRKD_DEV 0xC400
#define EF_EE_DEV 0xCE00
#define EF_TERMCA 0x2f02
#define EF_TERMCA 0x2F02
#define EF_TOKENINFO 0x2F03
#define EF_STATICTOKEN 0xCB00
extern file_t *file_pin1;
extern file_t *file_retries_pin1;
extern file_t *file_sopin;
extern file_t *file_retries_sopin;
#endif
#endif

View File

@@ -15,68 +15,102 @@
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include <string.h>
#include "common.h"
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "stdlib.h"
#if !defined(ENABLE_EMULATION) && !defined(ESP_PLATFORM)
#include "pico/stdlib.h"
#endif
#include "kek.h"
#include "crypto_utils.h"
#include "random.h"
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "mbedtls/md.h"
#include "mbedtls/cmac.h"
#include "mbedtls/rsa.h"
#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h"
#include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h"
#include "files.h"
extern bool has_session_pin, has_session_sopin;
extern uint8_t session_pin[32], session_sopin[32];
uint8_t mkek_mask[MKEK_KEY_SIZE];
bool has_mkek_mask = false;
uint8_t pending_save_dkek = 0xff;
#define POLY 0xedb88320
uint32_t crc32c(const uint8_t *buf, size_t len)
{
uint32_t crc = ~0;
uint32_t crc32c(const uint8_t *buf, size_t len) {
uint32_t crc = 0xffffffff;
while (len--) {
crc ^= *buf++;
for (int k = 0; k < 8; k++)
for (int k = 0; k < 8; k++) {
crc = (crc >> 1) ^ (POLY & (0 - (crc & 1)));
}
}
return ~crc;
}
int load_mkek(uint8_t *mkek) {
if (has_session_pin == false && has_session_sopin == false)
if (has_session_pin == false && has_session_sopin == false) {
return CCID_NO_LOGIN;
}
const uint8_t *pin = NULL;
if (pin == NULL && has_session_pin == true) {
file_t *tf = search_by_fid(EF_MKEK, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
if (tf) {
file_t *tf = search_file(EF_MKEK);
if (file_has_data(tf)) {
memcpy(mkek, file_get_data(tf), MKEK_SIZE);
pin = session_pin;
}
}
if (pin == NULL && has_session_sopin == true) {
file_t *tf = search_by_fid(EF_MKEK_SO, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
if (tf) {
file_t *tf = search_file(EF_MKEK_SO);
if (file_has_data(tf)) {
memcpy(mkek, file_get_data(tf), MKEK_SIZE);
pin = session_sopin;
}
}
if (pin == NULL) //Should never happen
if (pin == NULL) { //Should never happen
return CCID_EXEC_ERROR;
int ret = aes_decrypt_cfb_256(pin, MKEK_IV(mkek), MKEK_KEY(mkek), MKEK_KEY_SIZE+MKEK_KEY_CS_SIZE);
if (ret != 0)
}
if (has_mkek_mask) {
for (int i = 0; i < MKEK_KEY_SIZE; i++) {
MKEK_KEY(mkek)[i] ^= mkek_mask[i];
}
}
int ret =
aes_decrypt_cfb_256(pin, MKEK_IV(mkek), MKEK_KEY(mkek), MKEK_KEY_SIZE + MKEK_KEY_CS_SIZE);
if (ret != 0) {
return CCID_EXEC_ERROR;
if (crc32c(MKEK_KEY(mkek), MKEK_KEY_SIZE) != *(uint32_t *)MKEK_CHECKSUM(mkek))
}
if (crc32c(MKEK_KEY(mkek), MKEK_KEY_SIZE) != *(uint32_t *) MKEK_CHECKSUM(mkek)) {
return CCID_WRONG_DKEK;
}
return CCID_OK;
}
mse_t mse = { .init = false };
int mse_decrypt_ct(uint8_t *data, size_t len) {
mbedtls_chachapoly_context chatx;
mbedtls_chachapoly_init(&chatx);
mbedtls_chachapoly_setkey(&chatx, mse.key_enc + 12);
int ret = mbedtls_chachapoly_auth_decrypt(&chatx,
len - 16,
mse.key_enc,
mse.Qpt,
65,
data + len - 16,
data,
data);
mbedtls_chachapoly_free(&chatx);
return ret;
}
int load_dkek(uint8_t id, uint8_t *dkek) {
file_t *tf = search_dynamic_file(EF_DKEK+id);
if (!tf)
file_t *tf = search_file(EF_DKEK + id);
if (!file_has_data(tf)) {
return CCID_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
}
memcpy(dkek, file_get_data(tf), DKEK_KEY_SIZE);
return mkek_decrypt(dkek, DKEK_KEY_SIZE);
}
@@ -86,40 +120,48 @@ void release_mkek(uint8_t *mkek) {
}
int store_mkek(const uint8_t *mkek) {
if (has_session_pin == false && has_session_sopin == false)
if (has_session_pin == false && has_session_sopin == false) {
return CCID_NO_LOGIN;
}
uint8_t tmp_mkek[MKEK_SIZE];
if (mkek == NULL) {
const uint8_t *rd = random_bytes_get(MKEK_IV_SIZE+MKEK_KEY_SIZE);
memcpy(tmp_mkek, rd, MKEK_IV_SIZE+MKEK_KEY_SIZE);
const uint8_t *rd = random_bytes_get(MKEK_IV_SIZE + MKEK_KEY_SIZE);
memcpy(tmp_mkek, rd, MKEK_IV_SIZE + MKEK_KEY_SIZE);
}
else
else {
memcpy(tmp_mkek, mkek, MKEK_SIZE);
*(uint32_t*)MKEK_CHECKSUM(tmp_mkek) = crc32c(MKEK_KEY(tmp_mkek), MKEK_KEY_SIZE);
}
*(uint32_t *) MKEK_CHECKSUM(tmp_mkek) = crc32c(MKEK_KEY(tmp_mkek), MKEK_KEY_SIZE);
if (has_session_pin) {
uint8_t tmp_mkek_pin[MKEK_SIZE];
memcpy(tmp_mkek_pin, tmp_mkek, MKEK_SIZE);
file_t *tf = search_by_fid(EF_MKEK, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
file_t *tf = search_file(EF_MKEK);
if (!tf) {
release_mkek(tmp_mkek);
release_mkek(tmp_mkek_pin);
return CCID_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
}
aes_encrypt_cfb_256(session_pin, MKEK_IV(tmp_mkek_pin), MKEK_KEY(tmp_mkek_pin), MKEK_KEY_SIZE+MKEK_KEY_CS_SIZE);
flash_write_data_to_file(tf, tmp_mkek_pin, MKEK_SIZE);
aes_encrypt_cfb_256(session_pin,
MKEK_IV(tmp_mkek_pin),
MKEK_KEY(tmp_mkek_pin),
MKEK_KEY_SIZE + MKEK_KEY_CS_SIZE);
file_put_data(tf, tmp_mkek_pin, MKEK_SIZE);
release_mkek(tmp_mkek_pin);
}
if (has_session_sopin) {
uint8_t tmp_mkek_sopin[MKEK_SIZE];
memcpy(tmp_mkek_sopin, tmp_mkek, MKEK_SIZE);
file_t *tf = search_by_fid(EF_MKEK_SO, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
file_t *tf = search_file(EF_MKEK_SO);
if (!tf) {
release_mkek(tmp_mkek);
release_mkek(tmp_mkek_sopin);
return CCID_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
}
aes_encrypt_cfb_256(session_sopin, MKEK_IV(tmp_mkek_sopin), MKEK_KEY(tmp_mkek_sopin), MKEK_KEY_SIZE + MKEK_KEY_CS_SIZE);
flash_write_data_to_file(tf, tmp_mkek_sopin, MKEK_SIZE);
aes_encrypt_cfb_256(session_sopin,
MKEK_IV(tmp_mkek_sopin),
MKEK_KEY(tmp_mkek_sopin),
MKEK_KEY_SIZE + MKEK_KEY_CS_SIZE);
file_put_data(tf, tmp_mkek_sopin, MKEK_SIZE);
release_mkek(tmp_mkek_sopin);
}
low_flash_available();
@@ -128,13 +170,15 @@ int store_mkek(const uint8_t *mkek) {
}
int store_dkek_key(uint8_t id, uint8_t *dkek) {
file_t *tf = search_dynamic_file(EF_DKEK+id);
if (!tf)
file_t *tf = search_file(EF_DKEK + id);
if (!tf) {
return CCID_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
}
int r = mkek_encrypt(dkek, DKEK_KEY_SIZE);
if (r != CCID_OK)
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return r;
flash_write_data_to_file(tf, dkek, DKEK_KEY_SIZE);
}
file_put_data(tf, dkek, DKEK_KEY_SIZE);
low_flash_available();
return CCID_OK;
}
@@ -142,27 +186,32 @@ int store_dkek_key(uint8_t id, uint8_t *dkek) {
int save_dkek_key(uint8_t id, const uint8_t *key) {
uint8_t dkek[DKEK_KEY_SIZE];
if (!key) {
file_t *tf = search_dynamic_file(EF_DKEK+id);
if (!tf)
file_t *tf = search_file(EF_DKEK + id);
if (!tf) {
return CCID_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
}
memcpy(dkek, file_get_data(tf), DKEK_KEY_SIZE);
}
else
else {
memcpy(dkek, key, DKEK_KEY_SIZE);
}
return store_dkek_key(id, dkek);
}
int import_dkek_share(uint8_t id, const uint8_t *share) {
uint8_t tmp_dkek[DKEK_KEY_SIZE];
file_t *tf = search_dynamic_file(EF_DKEK+id);
if (!tf)
file_t *tf = search_file(EF_DKEK + id);
if (!tf) {
return CCID_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
}
memset(tmp_dkek, 0, sizeof(tmp_dkek));
if (file_get_size(tf) == DKEK_KEY_SIZE)
memcpy(tmp_dkek, file_get_data(tf),DKEK_KEY_SIZE);
for (int i = 0; i < DKEK_KEY_SIZE; i++)
if (file_get_size(tf) == DKEK_KEY_SIZE) {
memcpy(tmp_dkek, file_get_data(tf), DKEK_KEY_SIZE);
}
for (int i = 0; i < DKEK_KEY_SIZE; i++) {
tmp_dkek[i] ^= share[i];
flash_write_data_to_file(tf, tmp_dkek, DKEK_KEY_SIZE);
}
file_put_data(tf, tmp_dkek, DKEK_KEY_SIZE);
low_flash_available();
return CCID_OK;
}
@@ -172,8 +221,9 @@ int dkek_kcv(uint8_t id, uint8_t *kcv) { //kcv 8 bytes
memset(kcv, 0, 8);
memset(hsh, 0, sizeof(hsh));
int r = load_dkek(id, dkek);
if (r != CCID_OK)
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return r;
}
hash256(dkek, DKEK_KEY_SIZE, hsh);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(dkek, sizeof(dkek));
memcpy(kcv, hsh, 8);
@@ -181,295 +231,382 @@ int dkek_kcv(uint8_t id, uint8_t *kcv) { //kcv 8 bytes
}
int dkek_kenc(uint8_t id, uint8_t *kenc) { //kenc 32 bytes
uint8_t dkek[DKEK_KEY_SIZE+4];
uint8_t dkek[DKEK_KEY_SIZE + 4];
memset(kenc, 0, 32);
int r = load_dkek(id, dkek);
if (r != CCID_OK)
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return r;
memcpy(dkek+DKEK_KEY_SIZE, "\x0\x0\x0\x1", 4);
}
memcpy(dkek + DKEK_KEY_SIZE, "\x0\x0\x0\x1", 4);
hash256(dkek, sizeof(dkek), kenc);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(dkek, sizeof(dkek));
return CCID_OK;
}
int dkek_kmac(uint8_t id, uint8_t *kmac) { //kmac 32 bytes
uint8_t dkek[DKEK_KEY_SIZE+4];
uint8_t dkek[DKEK_KEY_SIZE + 4];
memset(kmac, 0, 32);
int r = load_dkek(id, dkek);
if (r != CCID_OK)
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return r;
memcpy(dkek+DKEK_KEY_SIZE, "\x0\x0\x0\x2", 4);
hash256(dkek, DKEK_KEY_SIZE+4, kmac);
}
memcpy(dkek + DKEK_KEY_SIZE, "\x0\x0\x0\x2", 4);
hash256(dkek, DKEK_KEY_SIZE + 4, kmac);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(dkek, sizeof(dkek));
return CCID_OK;
}
int mkek_encrypt(uint8_t *data, size_t len) {
int mkek_encrypt(uint8_t *data, uint16_t len) {
int r;
uint8_t mkek[MKEK_SIZE+4];
if ((r = load_mkek(mkek)) != CCID_OK)
uint8_t mkek[MKEK_SIZE + 4];
if ((r = load_mkek(mkek)) != CCID_OK) {
return r;
}
r = aes_encrypt_cfb_256(MKEK_KEY(mkek), MKEK_IV(mkek), data, len);
release_mkek(mkek);
return r;
}
int mkek_decrypt(uint8_t *data, size_t len) {
int mkek_decrypt(uint8_t *data, uint16_t len) {
int r;
uint8_t mkek[MKEK_SIZE+4];
if ((r = load_mkek(mkek)) != CCID_OK)
uint8_t mkek[MKEK_SIZE + 4];
if ((r = load_mkek(mkek)) != CCID_OK) {
return r;
}
r = aes_decrypt_cfb_256(MKEK_KEY(mkek), MKEK_IV(mkek), data, len);
release_mkek(mkek);
return r;
}
int dkek_encode_key(uint8_t id, void *key_ctx, int key_type, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, const uint8_t *allowed, size_t allowed_len) {
if (!(key_type & HSM_KEY_RSA) && !(key_type & HSM_KEY_EC) && !(key_type & HSM_KEY_AES))
int dkek_encode_key(uint8_t id,
void *key_ctx,
int key_type,
uint8_t *out,
uint16_t *out_len,
const uint8_t *allowed,
uint16_t allowed_len) {
if (!(key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_RSA) && !(key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC) && !(key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES)) {
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
}
uint8_t kb[8+2*4+2*4096/8+3+13]; //worst case: RSA-4096 (plus, 13 bytes padding)
uint8_t kb[8 + 2 * 4 + 2 * 4096 / 8 + 3 + 13]; //worst case: RSA-4096 (plus, 13 bytes padding)
memset(kb, 0, sizeof(kb));
int kb_len = 0, r = 0;
uint16_t kb_len = 0;
int r = 0;
uint8_t *algo = NULL;
uint8_t algo_len = 0;
uint8_t kenc[32];
memset(kenc, 0, sizeof(kenc));
r = dkek_kenc(id, kenc);
if (r != CCID_OK)
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return r;
}
uint8_t kcv[8];
memset(kcv, 0, sizeof(kcv));
r = dkek_kcv(id, kcv);
if (r != CCID_OK)
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return r;
}
uint8_t kmac[32];
memset(kmac, 0, sizeof(kmac));
r = dkek_kmac(id, kmac);
if (r != CCID_OK)
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return r;
}
if (key_type & HSM_KEY_AES) {
if (key_type & HSM_KEY_AES_128)
if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES) {
if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_128) {
kb_len = 16;
else if (key_type & HSM_KEY_AES_192)
}
else if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_192) {
kb_len = 24;
else if (key_type & HSM_KEY_AES_256)
}
else if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_256) {
kb_len = 32;
}
else if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_512) {
kb_len = 64;
}
if (kb_len != 16 && kb_len != 24 && kb_len != 32)
if (kb_len != 16 && kb_len != 24 && kb_len != 32 && kb_len != 64) {
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
if (*out_len < 8+1+10+6+4+(2+32+14)+16)
}
if (*out_len < 8 + 1 + 10 + 6 + (2 + 64 + 14) + 16) { // 14 bytes padding
return CCID_WRONG_LENGTH;
}
put_uint16_t(kb_len, kb+8);
memcpy(kb+10, key_ctx, kb_len);
put_uint16_t(kb_len, kb + 8);
memcpy(kb + 10, key_ctx, kb_len);
kb_len += 2;
algo = (uint8_t *)"\x00\x08\x60\x86\x48\x01\x65\x03\x04\x01"; //2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1 (2+8)
algo = (uint8_t *) "\x00\x08\x60\x86\x48\x01\x65\x03\x04\x01"; //2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1 (2+8)
algo_len = 10;
}
else if (key_type & HSM_KEY_RSA) {
if (*out_len < 8+1+12+6+(8+2*4+2*4096/8+3+13)+16) //13 bytes pading
else if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_RSA) {
if (*out_len < 8 + 1 + 12 + 6 + (8 + 2 * 4 + 2 * 4096 / 8 + 3 + 13) + 16) { //13 bytes pading
return CCID_WRONG_LENGTH;
mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *)key_ctx;
}
mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) key_ctx;
kb_len = 0;
put_uint16_t(mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa)*8, kb+8+kb_len); kb_len += 2;
put_uint16_t((uint16_t)mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa) * 8, kb + 8 + kb_len); kb_len += 2;
put_uint16_t(mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->D), kb+8+kb_len); kb_len += 2;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&rsa->D, kb+8+kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->D)); kb_len += mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->D);
put_uint16_t(mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->N), kb+8+kb_len); kb_len += 2;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&rsa->N, kb+8+kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->N)); kb_len += mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->N);
put_uint16_t(mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->E), kb+8+kb_len); kb_len += 2;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&rsa->E, kb+8+kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->E)); kb_len += mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->E);
put_uint16_t((uint16_t)mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->D), kb + 8 + kb_len); kb_len += 2;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&rsa->D, kb + 8 + kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->D));
kb_len += (uint16_t)mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->D);
put_uint16_t((uint16_t)mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->N), kb + 8 + kb_len); kb_len += 2;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&rsa->N, kb + 8 + kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->N));
kb_len += (uint16_t)mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->N);
put_uint16_t((uint16_t)mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->E), kb + 8 + kb_len); kb_len += 2;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&rsa->E, kb + 8 + kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->E));
kb_len += (uint16_t)mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->E);
algo = (uint8_t *)"\x00\x0A\x04\x00\x7F\x00\x07\x02\x02\x02\x01\x02";
algo = (uint8_t *) "\x00\x0A\x04\x00\x7F\x00\x07\x02\x02\x02\x01\x02";
algo_len = 12;
}
else if (key_type & HSM_KEY_EC) {
if (*out_len < 8+1+12+6+(8+2*8+9*66+2+4)+16) //4 bytes pading
else if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC) {
if (*out_len < 8 + 1 + 12 + 6 + (8 + 2 * 8 + 9 * 66 + 2 + 4) + 16) { //4 bytes pading
return CCID_WRONG_LENGTH;
mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ecdsa = (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *)key_ctx;
}
mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ecdsa = (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) key_ctx;
kb_len = 0;
put_uint16_t(mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.P)*8, kb+8+kb_len); kb_len += 2;
put_uint16_t(mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.A), kb+8+kb_len); kb_len += 2;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp.A, kb+8+kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.A)); kb_len += mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.A);
put_uint16_t(mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.B), kb+8+kb_len); kb_len += 2;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp.B, kb+8+kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.B)); kb_len += mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.B);
put_uint16_t(mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.P), kb+8+kb_len); kb_len += 2;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp.P, kb+8+kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.P)); kb_len += mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.P);
put_uint16_t(mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.N), kb+8+kb_len); kb_len += 2;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp.N, kb+8+kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.N)); kb_len += mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.N);
put_uint16_t(1+mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.G.X)+mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.G.Y), kb+8+kb_len); kb_len += 2;
kb[8+kb_len++] = 0x4;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp.G.X, kb+8+kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.G.X)); kb_len += mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.G.X);
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp.G.Y, kb+8+kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.G.Y)); kb_len += mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.G.Y);
put_uint16_t(mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->d), kb+8+kb_len); kb_len += 2;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->d, kb+8+kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->d)); kb_len += mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->d);
put_uint16_t(1+mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->Q.X)+mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->Q.Y), kb+8+kb_len); kb_len += 2;
kb[8+kb_len++] = 0x4;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->Q.X, kb+8+kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->Q.X)); kb_len += mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->Q.X);
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->Q.Y, kb+8+kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->Q.Y)); kb_len += mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->Q.Y);
put_uint16_t((uint16_t)mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.P) * 8, kb + 8 + kb_len); kb_len += 2;
put_uint16_t((uint16_t)mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.A), kb + 8 + kb_len); kb_len += 2;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp.A, kb + 8 + kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.A));
kb_len += (uint16_t)mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.A);
put_uint16_t((uint16_t)mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.B), kb + 8 + kb_len); kb_len += 2;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp.B, kb + 8 + kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.B));
kb_len += (uint16_t)mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.B);
put_uint16_t((uint16_t)mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.P), kb + 8 + kb_len); kb_len += 2;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp.P, kb + 8 + kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.P));
kb_len += (uint16_t)mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.P);
put_uint16_t((uint16_t)mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.N), kb + 8 + kb_len); kb_len += 2;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp.N, kb + 8 + kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.N));
kb_len += (uint16_t)mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.N);
algo = (uint8_t *)"\x00\x0A\x04\x00\x7F\x00\x07\x02\x02\x02\x02\x03";
size_t olen = 0;
mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp,
&ecdsa->grp.G,
MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED,
&olen,
kb + 8 + kb_len + 2,
sizeof(kb) - 8 - kb_len - 2);
put_uint16_t((uint16_t)olen, kb + 8 + kb_len);
kb_len += 2 + (uint16_t)olen;
put_uint16_t((uint16_t)mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->d), kb + 8 + kb_len); kb_len += 2;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->d, kb + 8 + kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->d));
kb_len += (uint16_t)mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->d);
mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp,
&ecdsa->Q,
MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED,
&olen,
kb + 8 + kb_len + 2,
sizeof(kb) - 8 - kb_len - 2);
put_uint16_t((uint16_t)olen, kb + 8 + kb_len);
kb_len += 2 + (uint16_t)olen;
algo = (uint8_t *) "\x00\x0A\x04\x00\x7F\x00\x07\x02\x02\x02\x02\x03";
algo_len = 12;
}
memset(out, 0, *out_len);
*out_len = 0;
memcpy(out+*out_len, kcv, 8);
memcpy(out + *out_len, kcv, 8);
*out_len += 8;
if (key_type & HSM_KEY_AES)
if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES) {
out[*out_len] = 15;
else if (key_type & HSM_KEY_RSA)
}
else if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_RSA) {
out[*out_len] = 5;
else if (key_type & HSM_KEY_EC)
}
else if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC) {
out[*out_len] = 12;
}
*out_len += 1;
if (algo) {
memcpy(out+*out_len, algo, algo_len);
memcpy(out + *out_len, algo, algo_len);
*out_len += algo_len;
}
else
else {
*out_len += 2;
}
if (allowed && allowed_len > 0) {
put_uint16_t(allowed_len, out+*out_len); *out_len += 2;
memcpy(out+*out_len, allowed, allowed_len);
put_uint16_t(allowed_len, out + *out_len); *out_len += 2;
memcpy(out + *out_len, allowed, allowed_len);
*out_len += allowed_len;
}
else
else {
*out_len += 2;
}
//add 4 zeros
*out_len += 4;
memcpy(kb, random_bytes_get(8), 8);
kb_len += 8; //8 random bytes
int kb_len_pad = ((int)(kb_len/16))*16;
if (kb_len % 16 > 0)
kb_len_pad = ((int)(kb_len/16)+1)*16;
uint16_t kb_len_pad = ((uint16_t) (kb_len / 16)) * 16;
if (kb_len % 16 > 0) {
kb_len_pad = ((int) (kb_len / 16) + 1) * 16;
}
//key already copied at kb+10
if (kb_len < kb_len_pad) {
kb[kb_len] = 0x80;
}
r = aes_encrypt(kenc, NULL, 256, HSM_AES_MODE_CBC, kb, kb_len_pad);
if (r != CCID_OK)
r = aes_encrypt(kenc, NULL, 256, PICO_KEYS_AES_MODE_CBC, kb, kb_len_pad);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return r;
}
memcpy(out+*out_len, kb, kb_len_pad);
memcpy(out + *out_len, kb, kb_len_pad);
*out_len += kb_len_pad;
r = mbedtls_cipher_cmac(mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB), kmac, 256, out, *out_len, out+*out_len);
r = mbedtls_cipher_cmac(mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB),
kmac,
256,
out,
*out_len,
out + *out_len);
*out_len += 16;
if (r != 0)
if (r != 0) {
return r;
}
return CCID_OK;
}
int dkek_type_key(const uint8_t *in) {
if (in[8] == 5 || in[8] == 6)
return HSM_KEY_RSA;
else if (in[8] == 12)
return HSM_KEY_EC;
else if (in[8] == 15)
return HSM_KEY_AES;
if (in[8] == 5 || in[8] == 6) {
return PICO_KEYS_KEY_RSA;
}
else if (in[8] == 12) {
return PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC;
}
else if (in[8] == 15) {
return PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES;
}
return 0x0;
}
int dkek_decode_key(uint8_t id, void *key_ctx, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, int *key_size_out, uint8_t **allowed, size_t *allowed_len) {
int dkek_decode_key(uint8_t id,
void *key_ctx,
const uint8_t *in,
uint16_t in_len,
int *key_size_out,
uint8_t **allowed,
uint16_t *allowed_len) {
uint8_t kcv[8];
int r = 0;
memset(kcv, 0, sizeof(kcv));
r = dkek_kcv(id, kcv);
if (r != CCID_OK)
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return r;
}
uint8_t kmac[32];
memset(kmac, 0, sizeof(kmac));
r = dkek_kmac(id, kmac);
if (r != CCID_OK)
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return r;
}
uint8_t kenc[32];
memset(kenc, 0, sizeof(kenc));
r = dkek_kenc(id, kenc);
if (r != CCID_OK)
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return r;
}
if (memcmp(kcv, in, 8) != 0)
if (memcmp(kcv, in, 8) != 0) {
return CCID_WRONG_DKEK;
}
uint8_t signature[16];
r = mbedtls_cipher_cmac(mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB), kmac, 256, in, in_len-16, signature);
if (r != 0)
r = mbedtls_cipher_cmac(mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB),
kmac,
256,
in,
in_len - 16,
signature);
if (r != 0) {
return CCID_WRONG_SIGNATURE;
if (memcmp(signature, in+in_len-16, 16) != 0)
}
if (memcmp(signature, in + in_len - 16, 16) != 0) {
return CCID_WRONG_SIGNATURE;
}
int key_type = in[8];
if (key_type != 5 && key_type != 6 && key_type != 12 && key_type != 15)
if (key_type != 5 && key_type != 6 && key_type != 12 && key_type != 15) {
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
}
if ((key_type == 5 || key_type == 6) && memcmp(in+9, "\x00\x0A\x04\x00\x7F\x00\x07\x02\x02\x02\x01\x02", 12) != 0)
if ((key_type == 5 || key_type == 6) &&
memcmp(in + 9, "\x00\x0A\x04\x00\x7F\x00\x07\x02\x02\x02\x01\x02", 12) != 0) {
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
}
if (key_type == 12 && memcmp(in+9, "\x00\x0A\x04\x00\x7F\x00\x07\x02\x02\x02\x02\x03", 12) != 0)
if (key_type == 12 &&
memcmp(in + 9, "\x00\x0A\x04\x00\x7F\x00\x07\x02\x02\x02\x02\x03", 12) != 0) {
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
}
if (key_type == 15 && memcmp(in+9, "\x00\x08\x60\x86\x48\x01\x65\x03\x04\x01", 10) != 0)
if (key_type == 15 && memcmp(in + 9, "\x00\x08\x60\x86\x48\x01\x65\x03\x04\x01", 10) != 0) {
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
}
size_t ofs = 9;
uint16_t ofs = 9;
//OID
size_t len = get_uint16_t(in, ofs);
ofs += len+2;
uint16_t len = get_uint16_t(in, ofs);
ofs += len + 2;
//Allowed algorithms
len = get_uint16_t(in, ofs);
*allowed = (uint8_t *)(in+ofs+2);
*allowed = (uint8_t *) (in + ofs + 2);
*allowed_len = len;
ofs += len+2;
ofs += len + 2;
//Access conditions
len = get_uint16_t(in, ofs);
ofs += len+2;
ofs += len + 2;
//Key OID
len = get_uint16_t(in, ofs);
ofs += len+2;
ofs += len + 2;
if ((in_len-16-ofs) % 16 != 0)
if ((in_len - 16 - ofs) % 16 != 0) {
return CCID_WRONG_PADDING;
uint8_t kb[8+2*4+2*4096/8+3+13]; //worst case: RSA-4096 (plus, 13 bytes padding)
}
uint8_t kb[8 + 2 * 4 + 2 * 4096 / 8 + 3 + 13]; //worst case: RSA-4096 (plus, 13 bytes padding)
memset(kb, 0, sizeof(kb));
memcpy(kb, in+ofs, in_len-16-ofs);
r = aes_decrypt(kenc, NULL, 256, HSM_AES_MODE_CBC, kb, in_len-16-ofs);
if (r != CCID_OK)
memcpy(kb, in + ofs, in_len - 16 - ofs);
r = aes_decrypt(kenc, NULL, 256, PICO_KEYS_AES_MODE_CBC, kb, in_len - 16 - ofs);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return r;
}
int key_size = get_uint16_t(kb, 8);
if (key_size_out)
if (key_size_out) {
*key_size_out = key_size;
}
ofs = 10;
if (key_type == 5 || key_type == 6) {
mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *)key_ctx;
mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) key_ctx;
mbedtls_rsa_init(rsa);
if (key_type == 5) {
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += 2;
r = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&rsa->D, kb+ofs, len); ofs += len;
r = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&rsa->D, kb + ofs, len); ofs += len;
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa);
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
}
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += 2;
r = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&rsa->N, kb+ofs, len); ofs += len;
r = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&rsa->N, kb + ofs, len); ofs += len;
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa);
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
@@ -477,33 +614,33 @@ int dkek_decode_key(uint8_t id, void *key_ctx, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
}
else if (key_type == 6) {
//DP-1
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += len+2;
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += len + 2;
//DQ-1
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += len+2;
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += len + 2;
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += 2;
r = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&rsa->P, kb+ofs, len); ofs += len;
r = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&rsa->P, kb + ofs, len); ofs += len;
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa);
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
}
//PQ
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += len+2;
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += len + 2;
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += 2;
r = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&rsa->Q, kb+ofs, len); ofs += len;
r = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&rsa->Q, kb + ofs, len); ofs += len;
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa);
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
}
//N
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += len+2;
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += len + 2;
}
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += 2;
r = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&rsa->E, kb+ofs, len); ofs += len;
r = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&rsa->E, kb + ofs, len); ofs += len;
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa);
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
@@ -536,18 +673,18 @@ int dkek_decode_key(uint8_t id, void *key_ctx, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
}
}
else if (key_type == 12) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ecdsa = (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *)key_ctx;
mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ecdsa = (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) key_ctx;
mbedtls_ecdsa_init(ecdsa);
//A
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += len+2;
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += len + 2;
//B
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += len+2;
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += len + 2;
//P
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += 2;
mbedtls_ecp_group_id ec_id = ec_get_curve_from_prime(kb+ofs, len);
mbedtls_ecp_group_id ec_id = ec_get_curve_from_prime(kb + ofs, len);
if (ec_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(ecdsa);
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
@@ -555,21 +692,50 @@ int dkek_decode_key(uint8_t id, void *key_ctx, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
ofs += len;
//N
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += len+2;
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += len + 2;
//G
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += len+2;
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs);
if (ec_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519 && kb[ofs + 2] != 0x09) {
ec_id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_ED25519;
}
else if (ec_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448 && (len != 56 || kb[ofs + 2] != 0x05)) {
ec_id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_ED448;
}
ofs += len + 2;
//d
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += 2;
r = mbedtls_ecp_read_key(ec_id, ecdsa, kb+ofs, len);
r = mbedtls_ecp_read_key(ec_id, ecdsa, kb + ofs, len);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(ecdsa);
return CCID_EXEC_ERROR;
}
ofs += len;
//Q
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += 2;
r = mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary(&ecdsa->grp, &ecdsa->Q, kb + ofs, len);
if (r != 0) {
if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(&ecdsa->grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_EDWARDS) {
r = mbedtls_ecp_point_edwards(&ecdsa->grp, &ecdsa->Q, &ecdsa->d, random_gen, NULL);
}
else {
r = mbedtls_ecp_mul(&ecdsa->grp, &ecdsa->Q, &ecdsa->d, &ecdsa->grp.G, random_gen, NULL);
}
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(ecdsa);
return CCID_EXEC_ERROR;
}
}
r = mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv(ecdsa, ecdsa, random_gen, NULL);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(ecdsa);
return CCID_EXEC_ERROR;
}
}
else if (key_type == 15) {
memcpy(key_ctx, kb+ofs, key_size);
memcpy(key_ctx, kb + ofs, key_size);
}
return CCID_OK;
}

View File

@@ -18,6 +18,12 @@
#ifndef _DKEK_H_
#define _DKEK_H_
#include "crypto_utils.h"
#if defined(ENABLE_EMULATION) || defined(ESP_PLATFORM)
#include <stdbool.h>
#endif
extern int load_mkek(uint8_t *);
extern int store_mkek(const uint8_t *);
extern int save_dkek_key(uint8_t, const uint8_t *key);
@@ -26,23 +32,49 @@ extern void init_mkek();
extern void release_mkek(uint8_t *);
extern int import_dkek_share(uint8_t, const uint8_t *share);
extern int dkek_kcv(uint8_t, uint8_t *kcv);
extern int mkek_encrypt(uint8_t *data, size_t len);
extern int mkek_decrypt(uint8_t *data, size_t len);
extern int dkek_encode_key(uint8_t, void *key_ctx, int key_type, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, const uint8_t *, size_t);
extern int mkek_encrypt(uint8_t *data, uint16_t len);
extern int mkek_decrypt(uint8_t *data, uint16_t len);
extern int dkek_encode_key(uint8_t,
void *key_ctx,
int key_type,
uint8_t *out,
uint16_t *out_len,
const uint8_t *,
uint16_t);
extern int dkek_type_key(const uint8_t *in);
extern int dkek_decode_key(uint8_t, void *key_ctx, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, int *key_size_out, uint8_t **, size_t *);
extern int dkek_decode_key(uint8_t,
void *key_ctx,
const uint8_t *in,
uint16_t in_len,
int *key_size_out,
uint8_t **,
uint16_t *);
#define MAX_DKEK_ENCODE_KEY_BUFFER (8+1+12+6+(8+2*4+2*4096/8+3+13)+16)
#define MAX_DKEK_ENCODE_KEY_BUFFER (8 + 1 + 12 + 6 + (8 + 2 * 4 + 2 * 4096 / 8 + 3 + 13) + 16)
#define MAX_KEY_DOMAINS 16
#define MKEK_IV_SIZE (IV_SIZE)
#define MKEK_KEY_SIZE (32)
#define MKEK_KEY_CS_SIZE (4)
#define MKEK_SIZE (MKEK_IV_SIZE+MKEK_KEY_SIZE+MKEK_KEY_CS_SIZE)
#define MKEK_SIZE (MKEK_IV_SIZE + MKEK_KEY_SIZE + MKEK_KEY_CS_SIZE)
#define MKEK_IV(p) (p)
#define MKEK_KEY(p) (MKEK_IV(p)+MKEK_IV_SIZE)
#define MKEK_CHECKSUM(p) (MKEK_KEY(p)+MKEK_KEY_SIZE)
#define MKEK_KEY(p) (MKEK_IV(p) + MKEK_IV_SIZE)
#define MKEK_CHECKSUM(p) (MKEK_KEY(p) + MKEK_KEY_SIZE)
#define DKEK_KEY_SIZE (32)
extern uint8_t mkek_mask[MKEK_KEY_SIZE];
extern bool has_mkek_mask;
typedef struct mse {
uint8_t Qpt[65];
uint8_t key_enc[12 + 32];
bool init;
} mse_t;
extern mse_t mse;
extern int mse_decrypt_ct(uint8_t *, size_t);
extern uint8_t pending_save_dkek;
#endif

View File

@@ -18,11 +18,24 @@
#ifndef _OID_H_
#define _OID_H_
#include <stdlib.h>
#include "pico/stdlib.h"
#define OID_BSI_DE "\x04\x00\x7F\x00\x07"
#define OID_ECKA OID_BSI_DE "\x01\x01\x05"
#define OID_ECKA_EG OID_ECKA "\x01"
#define OID_ECKA_EG_X963KDF OID_ECKA_EG "\x01"
#define OID_ECKA_EG_X963KDF_SHA1 OID_ECKA_EG_X963KDF "\x01"
#define OID_ECKA_EG_X963KDF_SHA224 OID_ECKA_EG_X963KDF "\x02"
#define OID_ECKA_EG_X963KDF_SHA256 OID_ECKA_EG_X963KDF "\x03"
#define OID_ECKA_EG_X963KDF_SHA384 OID_ECKA_EG_X963KDF "\x04"
#define OID_ECKA_EG_X963KDF_SHA512 OID_ECKA_EG_X963KDF "\x05"
#define OID_ECKA_DH OID_ECKA "\x02"
#define OID_ECKA_DH_X963KDF OID_ECKA_DH "\x01"
#define OID_ECKA_DH_X963KDF_SHA1 OID_ECKA_DH_X963KDF "\x01"
#define OID_ECKA_DH_X963KDF_SHA224 OID_ECKA_DH_X963KDF "\x02"
#define OID_ECKA_DH_X963KDF_SHA256 OID_ECKA_DH_X963KDF "\x03"
#define OID_ECKA_DH_X963KDF_SHA384 OID_ECKA_DH_X963KDF "\x04"
#define OID_ECKA_DH_X963KDF_SHA512 OID_ECKA_DH_X963KDF "\x05"
#define OID_ID_PK OID_BSI_DE "\x02\x02\x01"
#define OID_ID_PK_DH OID_ID_PK "\x01"
#define OID_ID_PK_ECDH OID_ID_PK "\x02"
@@ -103,4 +116,62 @@
#define OID_CC_FF_PKA OID_CC_FORMAT "\x03"
#define OID_CC_FF_KDA OID_CC_FORMAT "\x04"
#define OID_RSADSI "\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x0D"
#define OID_PKCS OID_RSADSI "\x01"
#define OID_PKCS_5 OID_PKCS "\x05"
#define OID_PKCS5_PBKDF2 OID_PKCS_5 "\x0C"
#define OID_PKCS5_PBES2 OID_PKCS_5 "\x0D"
#define OID_PKCS_9 OID_PKCS "\x09"
#define OID_PKCS9_SMIME_ALG OID_PKCS_9 "\x10\x03"
#define OID_CHACHA20_POLY1305 OID_PKCS9_SMIME_ALG "\x12"
#define OID_HKDF_SHA256 OID_PKCS9_SMIME_ALG "\x1D"
#define OID_HKDF_SHA384 OID_PKCS9_SMIME_ALG "\x1E"
#define OID_HKDF_SHA512 OID_PKCS9_SMIME_ALG "\x1F"
#define OID_DIGEST OID_RSADSI "\x02"
#define OID_HMAC_SHA1 OID_DIGEST "\x07"
#define OID_HMAC_SHA224 OID_DIGEST "\x08"
#define OID_HMAC_SHA256 OID_DIGEST "\x09"
#define OID_HMAC_SHA384 OID_DIGEST "\x0A"
#define OID_HMAC_SHA512 OID_DIGEST "\x0B"
#define OID_KDF_X963 "\x2B\x81\x05\x10\x86\x48\x3F"
#define OID_NIST_ALG "\x60\x86\x48\x01\x65\x03\x04"
#define OID_NIST_AES OID_NIST_ALG "\x01"
#define OID_AES128_ECB OID_NIST_AES "\x01"
#define OID_AES128_CBC OID_NIST_AES "\x02"
#define OID_AES128_OFB OID_NIST_AES "\x03"
#define OID_AES128_CFB OID_NIST_AES "\x04"
#define OID_AES128_GCM OID_NIST_AES "\x06"
#define OID_AES128_CCM OID_NIST_AES "\x07"
#define OID_AES128_CTR OID_NIST_AES "\x09" // Not existing
#define OID_AES192_ECB OID_NIST_AES "\x15"
#define OID_AES192_CBC OID_NIST_AES "\x16"
#define OID_AES192_OFB OID_NIST_AES "\x17"
#define OID_AES192_CFB OID_NIST_AES "\x18"
#define OID_AES192_GCM OID_NIST_AES "\x1A"
#define OID_AES192_CCM OID_NIST_AES "\x1B"
#define OID_AES192_CTR OID_NIST_AES "\x1D" // Not existing
#define OID_AES256_ECB OID_NIST_AES "\x29"
#define OID_AES256_CBC OID_NIST_AES "\x2A"
#define OID_AES256_OFB OID_NIST_AES "\x2B"
#define OID_AES256_CFB OID_NIST_AES "\x2C"
#define OID_AES256_GCM OID_NIST_AES "\x2E"
#define OID_AES256_CCM OID_NIST_AES "\x2F"
#define OID_AES256_CTR OID_NIST_AES "\x31" // Not existing
#define OID_IEEE_ALG "\x2B\x6F\x02\x8C\x53\x00\x00\x01"
#define OID_AES128_XTS OID_IEEE_ALG "\x01"
#define OID_AES256_XTS OID_IEEE_ALG "\x02"
#define OID_HD "\x2B\x06\x01\x04\x01\x83\xA8\x78\x05\x8D\x6B"
#endif

View File

@@ -17,30 +17,31 @@
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "files.h"
#include "common.h"
#include "version.h"
#include "crypto_utils.h"
#include "kek.h"
#include "eac.h"
#include "cvc.h"
#include "asn1.h"
#include "ccid.h"
#include "pico_keys.h"
#include "usb.h"
#include "random.h"
const uint8_t sc_hsm_aid[] = {
11,
0xE8,0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0x81,0xC3,0x1F,0x02,0x01
0xE8, 0x2B, 0x06, 0x01, 0x04, 0x01, 0x81, 0xC3, 0x1F, 0x02, 0x01
};
const uint8_t atr_sc_hsm[] = {
24,
0x3B,0xFE,0x18,0x00,0x00,0x81,0x31,0xFE,0x45,0x80,0x31,0x81,0x54,0x48,0x53,0x4D,0x31,0x73,0x80,0x21,0x40,0x81,0x07,0xFA
0x3B, 0xFE, 0x18, 0x00, 0x00, 0x81, 0x31, 0xFE, 0x45, 0x80, 0x31, 0x81, 0x54, 0x48, 0x53, 0x4D,
0x31, 0x73, 0x80, 0x21, 0x40, 0x81, 0x07, 0xFA
};
uint8_t session_pin[32], session_sopin[32];
bool has_session_pin = false, has_session_sopin = false;
const uint8_t *dev_name = NULL;
size_t dev_name_len = 0;
uint16_t dev_name_len = 0;
static int sc_hsm_process_apdu();
@@ -50,6 +51,7 @@ static int sc_hsm_unload();
extern int cmd_select();
extern void select_file(file_t *pe);
extern int cmd_list_keys();
extern int cmd_read_binary();
extern int cmd_verify();
extern int cmd_reset_retry();
@@ -74,91 +76,91 @@ extern int cmd_general_authenticate();
extern int cmd_session_pin();
extern int cmd_puk_auth();
extern int cmd_pso();
extern int cmd_bip_slip();
app_t *sc_hsm_select_aid(app_t *a) {
if (!memcmp(apdu.data, sc_hsm_aid+1, MIN(apdu.nc,sc_hsm_aid[0]))) {
a->aid = sc_hsm_aid;
a->process_apdu = sc_hsm_process_apdu;
a->unload = sc_hsm_unload;
init_sc_hsm();
return a;
}
return NULL;
extern const uint8_t *ccid_atr;
int sc_hsm_select_aid(app_t *a) {
a->process_apdu = sc_hsm_process_apdu;
a->unload = sc_hsm_unload;
init_sc_hsm();
return CCID_OK;
}
void __attribute__ ((constructor)) sc_hsm_ctor() {
INITIALIZER( sc_hsm_ctor ) {
printf("INITIALIZER\n");
ccid_atr = atr_sc_hsm;
register_app(sc_hsm_select_aid);
register_app(sc_hsm_select_aid, sc_hsm_aid);
}
void scan_files() {
file_pin1 = search_by_fid(0x1081, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
file_pin1 = search_file(EF_PIN1);
if (file_pin1) {
if (!file_pin1->data) {
printf("PIN1 is empty. Initializing with default password\r\n");
printf("PIN1 is empty. Initializing with default password\n");
const uint8_t empty[33] = { 0 };
flash_write_data_to_file(file_pin1, empty, sizeof(empty));
file_put_data(file_pin1, empty, sizeof(empty));
}
}
else {
printf("FATAL ERROR: PIN1 not found in memory!\r\n");
printf("FATAL ERROR: PIN1 not found in memory!\n");
}
file_sopin = search_by_fid(0x1088, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
file_sopin = search_file(EF_SOPIN);
if (file_sopin) {
if (!file_sopin->data) {
printf("SOPIN is empty. Initializing with default password\r\n");
printf("SOPIN is empty. Initializing with default password\n");
const uint8_t empty[33] = { 0 };
flash_write_data_to_file(file_sopin, empty, sizeof(empty));
file_put_data(file_sopin, empty, sizeof(empty));
}
}
else {
printf("FATAL ERROR: SOPIN not found in memory!\r\n");
printf("FATAL ERROR: SOPIN not found in memory!\n");
}
file_retries_pin1 = search_by_fid(0x1083, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
file_retries_pin1 = search_file(EF_PIN1_RETRIES);
if (file_retries_pin1) {
if (!file_retries_pin1->data) {
printf("Retries PIN1 is empty. Initializing with default retriesr\n");
const uint8_t retries = 3;
flash_write_data_to_file(file_retries_pin1, &retries, sizeof(uint8_t));
file_put_data(file_retries_pin1, &retries, sizeof(uint8_t));
}
}
else {
printf("FATAL ERROR: Retries PIN1 not found in memory!\r\n");
printf("FATAL ERROR: Retries PIN1 not found in memory!\n");
}
file_retries_sopin = search_by_fid(0x108A, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
file_retries_sopin = search_file(EF_SOPIN_RETRIES);
if (file_retries_sopin) {
if (!file_retries_sopin->data) {
printf("Retries SOPIN is empty. Initializing with default retries\r\n");
printf("Retries SOPIN is empty. Initializing with default retries\n");
const uint8_t retries = 15;
flash_write_data_to_file(file_retries_sopin, &retries, sizeof(uint8_t));
file_put_data(file_retries_sopin, &retries, sizeof(uint8_t));
}
}
else {
printf("FATAL ERROR: Retries SOPIN not found in memory!\r\n");
printf("FATAL ERROR: Retries SOPIN not found in memory!\n");
}
file_t *tf = NULL;
tf = search_by_fid(0x1082, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
tf = search_file(EF_PIN1_MAX_RETRIES);
if (tf) {
if (!tf->data) {
printf("Max retries PIN1 is empty. Initializing with default max retriesr\n");
const uint8_t retries = 3;
flash_write_data_to_file(tf, &retries, sizeof(uint8_t));
file_put_data(tf, &retries, sizeof(uint8_t));
}
}
else {
printf("FATAL ERROR: Max Retries PIN1 not found in memory!\r\n");
printf("FATAL ERROR: Max Retries PIN1 not found in memory!\n");
}
tf = search_by_fid(0x1089, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
tf = search_file(EF_SOPIN_MAX_RETRIES);
if (tf) {
if (!tf->data) {
printf("Max Retries SOPIN is empty. Initializing with default max retries\r\n");
printf("Max Retries SOPIN is empty. Initializing with default max retries\n");
const uint8_t retries = 15;
flash_write_data_to_file(tf, &retries, sizeof(uint8_t));
file_put_data(tf, &retries, sizeof(uint8_t));
}
}
else {
printf("FATAL ERROR: Retries SOPIN not found in memory!\r\n");
printf("FATAL ERROR: Retries SOPIN not found in memory!\n");
}
low_flash_available();
}
@@ -173,24 +175,33 @@ int puk_store_entries = 0;
PUK *current_puk = NULL;
uint8_t puk_status[MAX_PUK];
int add_cert_puk_store(const uint8_t *data, size_t data_len, bool copy) {
if (data == NULL || data_len == 0)
int add_cert_puk_store(const uint8_t *data, uint16_t data_len, bool copy) {
if (data == NULL || data_len == 0) {
return CCID_ERR_NULL_PARAM;
if (puk_store_entries == MAX_PUK_STORE_ENTRIES)
}
if (puk_store_entries == MAX_PUK_STORE_ENTRIES) {
return CCID_ERR_MEMORY_FATAL;
}
puk_store[puk_store_entries].copied = copy;
if (copy == true) {
uint8_t *tmp = (uint8_t *)calloc(data_len, sizeof(uint8_t));
uint8_t *tmp = (uint8_t *) calloc(data_len, sizeof(uint8_t));
memcpy(tmp, data, data_len);
puk_store[puk_store_entries].cvcert = tmp;
}
else
else {
puk_store[puk_store_entries].cvcert = data;
}
puk_store[puk_store_entries].cvcert_len = data_len;
puk_store[puk_store_entries].chr = cvc_get_chr(puk_store[puk_store_entries].cvcert, data_len, &puk_store[puk_store_entries].chr_len);
puk_store[puk_store_entries].car = cvc_get_car(puk_store[puk_store_entries].cvcert, data_len, &puk_store[puk_store_entries].car_len);
puk_store[puk_store_entries].puk = cvc_get_pub(puk_store[puk_store_entries].cvcert, data_len, &puk_store[puk_store_entries].puk_len);
puk_store[puk_store_entries].chr = cvc_get_chr(puk_store[puk_store_entries].cvcert,
data_len,
&puk_store[puk_store_entries].chr_len);
puk_store[puk_store_entries].car = cvc_get_car(puk_store[puk_store_entries].cvcert,
data_len,
&puk_store[puk_store_entries].car_len);
puk_store[puk_store_entries].puk = cvc_get_pub(puk_store[puk_store_entries].cvcert,
data_len,
&puk_store[puk_store_entries].puk_len);
puk_store_entries++;
return CCID_OK;
@@ -206,29 +217,43 @@ int puk_store_select_chr(const uint8_t *chr) {
return CCID_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
}
void reset_puk_store() {
if (puk_store_entries > 0) { /* From previous session */
for (int i = 0; i < puk_store_entries; i++) {
if (puk_store[i].copied == true) {
free((uint8_t *) puk_store[i].cvcert);
}
}
}
memset(puk_store, 0, sizeof(puk_store));
puk_store_entries = 0;
file_t *fterm = search_file(EF_TERMCA);
if (fterm) {
uint8_t *p = NULL, *fterm_data = file_get_data(fterm), *pq = fterm_data;
uint16_t fterm_data_len = file_get_size(fterm);
asn1_ctx_t ctxi;
asn1_ctx_init(fterm_data, fterm_data_len, &ctxi);
while (walk_tlv(&ctxi, &p, NULL, NULL, NULL)) {
add_cert_puk_store(pq, (uint16_t)(p - pq), false);
pq = p;
}
}
for (int i = 0; i < 0xfe; i++) {
file_t *ef = search_file((CA_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX << 8) | (uint8_t)i);
if (ef && file_get_size(ef) > 0) {
add_cert_puk_store(file_get_data(ef), file_get_size(ef), false);
}
}
dev_name = cvc_get_chr(file_get_data(fterm), file_get_size(fterm), &dev_name_len);
memset(puk_status, 0, sizeof(puk_status));
}
void init_sc_hsm() {
scan_all();
has_session_pin = has_session_sopin = false;
isUserAuthenticated = false;
cmd_select();
if (puk_store_entries > 0) { /* From previous session */
for (int i = 0; i < puk_store_entries; i++) {
if (puk_store[i].copied == true)
free((uint8_t *)puk_store[i].cvcert);
}
}
memset(puk_store, 0, sizeof(puk_store));
puk_store_entries = 0;
file_t *fterm = search_by_fid(EF_TERMCA, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
if (fterm)
add_cert_puk_store(file_get_data(fterm), file_get_size(fterm), false);
for (int i = 0; i < 0xfe; i++) {
file_t *ef = search_dynamic_file((CA_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX << 8) | i);
if (ef && file_get_size(ef) > 0)
add_cert_puk_store(file_get_data(ef), file_get_size(ef), false);
}
dev_name = cvc_get_chr(file_get_data(fterm), file_get_size(fterm), &dev_name_len);
memset(puk_status, 0, sizeof(puk_status));
reset_puk_store();
}
int sc_hsm_unload() {
@@ -239,120 +264,164 @@ int sc_hsm_unload() {
}
uint16_t get_device_options() {
file_t *ef = search_by_fid(EF_DEVOPS, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
if (ef && ef->data && file_get_size(ef))
return (file_read_uint8(file_get_data(ef)) << 8) | file_read_uint8(file_get_data(ef)+1);
file_t *ef = search_file(EF_DEVOPS);
if (file_has_data(ef)) {
return (file_read_uint8(ef) << 8) | file_read_uint8_offset(ef, 1);
}
return 0x0;
}
extern uint32_t board_button_read(void);
bool wait_button_pressed() {
uint16_t opts = get_device_options();
uint32_t val = EV_PRESS_BUTTON;
#ifndef ENABLE_EMULATION
uint16_t opts = get_device_options();
if (opts & HSM_OPT_BOOTSEL_BUTTON) {
queue_try_add(&card_to_usb_q, &val);
do {
do{
queue_remove_blocking(&usb_to_card_q, &val);
}
while (val != EV_BUTTON_PRESSED && val != EV_BUTTON_TIMEOUT);
} while (val != EV_BUTTON_PRESSED && val != EV_BUTTON_TIMEOUT);
}
#endif
return val == EV_BUTTON_TIMEOUT;
}
int parse_token_info(const file_t *f, int mode) {
(void)f;
#ifdef __FOR_CI
char *label = "SmartCard-HSM";
#else
char *label = "Pico-HSM";
#endif
char *manu = "Pol Henarejos";
if (mode == 1) {
uint8_t *p = res_APDU;
*p++ = 0x30;
*p++ = 0; //set later
*p++ = 0x2; *p++ = 1; *p++ = HSM_VERSION_MAJOR;
*p++ = 0x4; *p++ = 8; pico_get_unique_board_id((pico_unique_board_id_t *)p); p += 8;
*p++ = 0xC; *p++ = strlen(manu); strcpy((char *)p, manu); p += strlen(manu);
*p++ = 0x80; *p++ = strlen(label); strcpy((char *)p, label); p += strlen(label);
#ifndef ENABLE_EMULATION
*p++ = 0x4; *p++ = 8; memcpy(p, pico_serial.id, 8); p += 8;
#else
*p++ = 0x4; *p++ = 8; memset(p, 0, 8); p += 8;
#endif
*p++ = 0xC; *p++ = (uint8_t)strlen(manu); strcpy((char *) p, manu); p += strlen(manu);
*p++ = 0x80; *p++ = (uint8_t)strlen(label); strcpy((char *) p, label); p += strlen(label);
*p++ = 0x3; *p++ = 2; *p++ = 4; *p++ = 0x30;
res_APDU_size = p-res_APDU;
res_APDU[1] = res_APDU_size-2;
res_APDU_size = (uint16_t)(p - res_APDU);
res_APDU[1] = (uint8_t)res_APDU_size - 2;
}
return 2+(2+1)+(2+8)+(2+strlen(manu))+(2+strlen(label))+(2+2);
return (int)(2 + (2 + 1) + (2 + 8) + (2 + strlen(manu)) + (2 + strlen(label)) + (2 + 2));
}
int parse_ef_dir(const file_t *f, int mode) {
(void)f;
#ifdef __FOR_CI
char *label = "SmartCard-HSM";
#else
char *label = "Pico-HSM";
#endif
if (mode == 1) {
uint8_t *p = res_APDU;
*p++ = 0x61;
*p++ = 0; //set later
*p++ = 0x4F; *p++ = sc_hsm_aid[0]; memcpy(p, sc_hsm_aid + 1, sc_hsm_aid[0]); p += sc_hsm_aid[0];
*p++ = 0x50; *p++ = (uint8_t)strlen(label); strcpy((char *) p, label); p += strlen(label);
res_APDU_size = (uint16_t)(p - res_APDU);
res_APDU[1] = (uint8_t)res_APDU_size - 2;
}
return (int)(2 + (2 + sc_hsm_aid[0]) + (2 + strlen(label)));
}
int pin_reset_retries(const file_t *pin, bool force) {
if (!pin)
if (!pin) {
return CCID_ERR_NULL_PARAM;
const file_t *max = search_by_fid(pin->fid+1, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
const file_t *act = search_by_fid(pin->fid+2, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
if (!max || !act)
}
const file_t *max = search_file(pin->fid + 1);
const file_t *act = search_file(pin->fid + 2);
if (!max || !act) {
return CCID_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
uint8_t retries = file_read_uint8(file_get_data(act));
if (retries == 0 && force == false) //blocked
}
uint8_t retries = file_read_uint8(act);
if (retries == 0 && force == false) { // blocked
return CCID_ERR_BLOCKED;
retries = file_read_uint8(file_get_data(max));
int r = flash_write_data_to_file((file_t *)act, &retries, sizeof(retries));
}
retries = file_read_uint8(max);
int r = file_put_data((file_t *) act, &retries, sizeof(retries));
low_flash_available();
return r;
}
int pin_wrong_retry(const file_t *pin) {
if (!pin)
if (!pin) {
return CCID_ERR_NULL_PARAM;
const file_t *act = search_by_fid(pin->fid+2, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
if (!act)
}
const file_t *act = search_file(pin->fid + 2);
if (!act) {
return CCID_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
uint8_t retries = file_read_uint8(file_get_data(act));
}
uint8_t retries = file_read_uint8(act);
if (retries > 0) {
retries -= 1;
int r = flash_write_data_to_file((file_t *)act, &retries, sizeof(retries));
if (r != CCID_OK)
int r = file_put_data((file_t *) act, &retries, sizeof(retries));
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return r;
}
low_flash_available();
if (retries == 0)
if (retries == 0) {
return CCID_ERR_BLOCKED;
}
return retries;
}
return CCID_ERR_BLOCKED;
}
bool pka_enabled() {
file_t *ef_puk = search_by_fid(EF_PUKAUT, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
return ef_puk && ef_puk->data && file_get_size(ef_puk) > 0 && file_read_uint8(file_get_data(ef_puk)) > 0;
file_t *ef_puk = search_file(EF_PUKAUT);
return file_has_data(ef_puk) && file_read_uint8(ef_puk) > 0;
}
int check_pin(const file_t *pin, const uint8_t *data, size_t len) {
if (!pin || !pin->data || file_get_size(pin) == 0) {
uint16_t check_pin(const file_t *pin, const uint8_t *data, uint16_t len) {
if (!file_has_data((file_t *) pin)) {
return SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND();
}
if (pka_enabled() == false)
if (pka_enabled() == false) {
isUserAuthenticated = false;
}
has_session_pin = has_session_sopin = false;
if (is_secured_apdu() && sm_session_pin_len > 0 && pin == file_pin1) {
if (len == sm_session_pin_len && memcmp(data, sm_session_pin, len) != 0) {
int retries;
if ((retries = pin_wrong_retry(pin)) < CCID_OK)
if ((retries = pin_wrong_retry(pin)) < CCID_OK) {
return SW_PIN_BLOCKED();
return set_res_sw(0x63, 0xc0 | retries);
}
return set_res_sw(0x63, 0xc0 | (uint8_t)retries);
}
}
else {
uint8_t dhash[32];
double_hash_pin(data, len, dhash);
if (sizeof(dhash) != file_get_size(pin)-1) //1 byte for pin len
if (sizeof(dhash) != file_get_size(pin) - 1) { // 1 byte for pin len
return SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED();
if (memcmp(file_get_data(pin)+1, dhash, sizeof(dhash)) != 0) {
}
if (memcmp(file_get_data(pin) + 1, dhash, sizeof(dhash)) != 0) {
int retries;
if ((retries = pin_wrong_retry(pin)) < CCID_OK)
if ((retries = pin_wrong_retry(pin)) < CCID_OK) {
return SW_PIN_BLOCKED();
return set_res_sw(0x63, 0xc0 | retries);
}
return set_res_sw(0x63, 0xc0 | (uint8_t)retries);
}
}
int r = pin_reset_retries(pin, false);
if (r == CCID_ERR_BLOCKED)
if (r == CCID_ERR_BLOCKED) {
return SW_PIN_BLOCKED();
if (r != CCID_OK)
}
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return SW_MEMORY_FAILURE();
if (pka_enabled() == false)
}
if (pka_enabled() == false) {
isUserAuthenticated = true;
}
if (pin == file_pin1) {
hash_multi(data, len, session_pin);
has_session_pin = true;
@@ -361,18 +430,25 @@ int check_pin(const file_t *pin, const uint8_t *data, size_t len) {
hash_multi(data, len, session_sopin);
has_session_sopin = true;
}
if (pending_save_dkek != 0xff) {
save_dkek_key(pending_save_dkek, NULL);
pending_save_dkek = 0xff;
}
return SW_OK();
}
const uint8_t *get_meta_tag(file_t *ef, uint16_t meta_tag, size_t *tag_len) {
if (ef == NULL)
const uint8_t *get_meta_tag(file_t *ef, uint16_t meta_tag, uint16_t *tag_len) {
if (ef == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
uint8_t *meta_data = NULL;
uint8_t meta_size = meta_find(ef->fid, &meta_data);
uint16_t meta_size = meta_find(ef->fid, &meta_data);
if (meta_size > 0 && meta_data != NULL) {
uint16_t tag = 0x0;
uint8_t *tag_data = NULL, *p = NULL;
while (walk_tlv(meta_data, meta_size, &p, &tag, tag_len, &tag_data)) {
asn1_ctx_t ctxi;
asn1_ctx_init(meta_data, meta_size, &ctxi);
while (walk_tlv(&ctxi, &p, &tag, tag_len, &tag_data)) {
if (tag == meta_tag) {
return tag_data;
}
@@ -382,20 +458,22 @@ const uint8_t *get_meta_tag(file_t *ef, uint16_t meta_tag, size_t *tag_len) {
}
uint32_t get_key_counter(file_t *fkey) {
size_t tag_len = 0;
uint16_t tag_len = 0;
const uint8_t *meta_tag = get_meta_tag(fkey, 0x90, &tag_len);
if (meta_tag)
if (meta_tag) {
return (meta_tag[0] << 24) | (meta_tag[1] << 16) | (meta_tag[2] << 8) | meta_tag[3];
}
return 0xffffffff;
}
bool key_has_purpose(file_t *ef, uint8_t purpose) {
size_t tag_len = 0;
uint16_t tag_len = 0;
const uint8_t *meta_tag = get_meta_tag(ef, 0x91, &tag_len);
if (meta_tag) {
for (int i = 0; i < tag_len; i++) {
if (meta_tag[i] == purpose)
for (unsigned i = 0; i < tag_len; i++) {
if (meta_tag[i] == purpose) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
@@ -403,30 +481,35 @@ bool key_has_purpose(file_t *ef, uint8_t purpose) {
}
uint32_t decrement_key_counter(file_t *fkey) {
if (!fkey)
if (!fkey) {
return 0xffffff;
}
uint8_t *meta_data = NULL;
uint8_t meta_size = meta_find(fkey->fid, &meta_data);
uint16_t meta_size = meta_find(fkey->fid, &meta_data);
if (meta_size > 0 && meta_data != NULL) {
uint16_t tag = 0x0;
uint8_t *tag_data = NULL, *p = NULL;
size_t tag_len = 0;
uint8_t *cmeta = (uint8_t *)calloc(1, meta_size);
uint16_t tag_len = 0;
uint8_t *cmeta = (uint8_t *) calloc(1, meta_size);
/* We cannot modify meta_data, as it comes from flash memory. It must be cpied to an aux buffer */
memcpy(cmeta, meta_data, meta_size);
while (walk_tlv(cmeta, meta_size, &p, &tag, &tag_len, &tag_data)) {
if (tag == 0x90) { //ofset tag
uint32_t val = (tag_data[0] << 24) | (tag_data[1] << 16) | (tag_data[2] << 8) | tag_data[3];
asn1_ctx_t ctxi;
asn1_ctx_init(meta_data, meta_size, &ctxi);
while (walk_tlv(&ctxi, &p, &tag, &tag_len, &tag_data)) {
if (tag == 0x90) { // ofset tag
uint32_t val =
(tag_data[0] << 24) | (tag_data[1] << 16) | (tag_data[2] << 8) | tag_data[3];
val--;
tag_data[0] = (val >> 24) & 0xff;
tag_data[1] = (val >> 16) & 0xff;
tag_data[2] = (val >> 8) & 0xff;
tag_data[3] = val & 0xff;
int r = meta_add(fkey->fid, cmeta, meta_size);
int r = meta_add(fkey->fid, cmeta, (uint16_t)meta_size);
free(cmeta);
if (r != 0)
if (r != 0) {
return 0xffffffff;
}
low_flash_available();
return val;
}
@@ -436,103 +519,125 @@ uint32_t decrement_key_counter(file_t *fkey) {
return 0xffffffff;
}
//Stores the private and public keys in flash
// Stores the private and public keys in flash
int store_keys(void *key_ctx, int type, uint8_t key_id) {
int r, key_size = 0;
uint8_t kdata[4096/8]; //worst case
if (type == HSM_KEY_RSA) {
mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *)key_ctx;
key_size = mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->P)+mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->Q);
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&rsa->P, kdata, key_size/2);
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&rsa->Q, kdata+key_size/2, key_size/2);
int r = 0;
uint16_t key_size = 0;
uint8_t kdata[4096 / 8]; // worst case
if (type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_RSA) {
mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) key_ctx;
key_size = (uint16_t)mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->P) + (uint16_t)mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->Q);
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&rsa->P, kdata, key_size / 2);
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&rsa->Q, kdata + key_size / 2, key_size / 2);
}
else if (type == HSM_KEY_EC) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ecdsa = (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *)key_ctx;
key_size = mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->d);
else if (type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ecdsa = (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) key_ctx;
size_t olen = 0;
kdata[0] = ecdsa->grp.id & 0xff;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->d, kdata+1, key_size);
key_size++;
mbedtls_ecp_write_key_ext(ecdsa, &olen, kdata + 1, sizeof(kdata) - 1);
key_size = olen + 1;
}
else if (type & HSM_KEY_AES) {
if (type == HSM_KEY_AES_128)
else if (type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES) {
if (type == PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_128) {
key_size = 16;
else if (type == HSM_KEY_AES_192)
}
else if (type == PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_192) {
key_size = 24;
else if (type == HSM_KEY_AES_256)
}
else if (type == PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_256) {
key_size = 32;
}
else if (type == PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_512) {
key_size = 64;
}
memcpy(kdata, key_ctx, key_size);
}
else
else {
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
}
file_t *fpk = file_new((KEY_PREFIX << 8) | key_id);
if (!fpk)
if (!fpk) {
return CCID_ERR_MEMORY_FATAL;
}
r = mkek_encrypt(kdata, key_size);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return r;
}
r = flash_write_data_to_file(fpk, kdata, key_size);
if (r != CCID_OK)
r = file_put_data(fpk, kdata, (uint16_t)key_size);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return r;
}
char key_id_str[4] = {0};
sprintf(key_id_str, "%u", key_id);
if (type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC) {
key_size--;
}
uint16_t prkd_len = asn1_build_prkd_generic(NULL, 0, (uint8_t *)key_id_str, (uint16_t)strlen(key_id_str), key_size * 8, type, kdata, sizeof(kdata));
if (prkd_len > 0) {
fpk = file_new((PRKD_PREFIX << 8) | key_id);
r = file_put_data(fpk, kdata, prkd_len);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
low_flash_available();
return CCID_OK;
}
int find_and_store_meta_key(uint8_t key_id) {
size_t lt[4] = { 0,0,0,0 }, meta_size = 0;
uint8_t *pt[4] = { NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL };
uint16_t meta_size = 0;
uint8_t t90[4] = { 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE };
for (int t = 0; t < 4; t++) {
uint8_t *ptt = NULL;
size_t ltt = 0;
if (asn1_find_tag(apdu.data, apdu.nc, 0x90+t, &ltt, &ptt) && ptt != NULL && ltt > 0) {
lt[t] = ltt;
pt[t] = ptt;
meta_size += asn1_len_tag(0x90+t, lt[t]);
asn1_ctx_t ctxi, ctxo[4] = { 0 };
asn1_ctx_init(apdu.data, (uint16_t)apdu.nc, &ctxi);
for (uint16_t t = 0; t < 4; t++) {
if (asn1_find_tag(&ctxi, 0x90 + t, &ctxo[t]) && asn1_len(&ctxo[t]) > 0) {
meta_size += asn1_len_tag(0x90 + t, ctxo[t].len);
}
}
if (lt[0] == 0 && pt[0] == NULL) {
if (asn1_len(&ctxo[0]) == 0) {
uint16_t opts = get_device_options();
if (opts & HSM_OPT_KEY_COUNTER_ALL) {
lt[0] = 4;
pt[0] = t90;
ctxo[0].len = 4;
ctxo[0].data = t90;
meta_size += 6;
}
}
if (meta_size) {
uint8_t *meta = (uint8_t *)calloc(1, meta_size), *m = meta;
for (int t = 0; t < 4; t++) {
if (lt[t] > 0 && pt[t] != NULL) {
*m++ = 0x90+t;
m += format_tlv_len(lt[t], m);
memcpy(m, pt[t], lt[t]);
m += lt[t];
uint8_t *meta = (uint8_t *) calloc(1, meta_size), *m = meta;
for (uint8_t t = 0; t < 4; t++) {
if (asn1_len(&ctxo[t]) > 0) {
*m++ = 0x90 + t;
m += format_tlv_len(ctxo[t].len, m);
memcpy(m, ctxo[t].data, ctxo[t].len);
m += ctxo[t].len;
}
}
int r = meta_add((KEY_PREFIX << 8) | key_id, meta, meta_size);
int r = meta_add((KEY_PREFIX << 8) | key_id, meta, (uint16_t)meta_size);
free(meta);
if (r != 0)
if (r != 0) {
return CCID_EXEC_ERROR;
}
}
return CCID_OK;
}
int load_private_key_rsa(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, file_t *fkey) {
if (wait_button_pressed() == true) //timeout
if (wait_button_pressed() == true) { // timeout
return CCID_VERIFICATION_FAILED;
}
int key_size = file_get_size(fkey);
uint8_t kdata[4096/8];
uint16_t key_size = file_get_size(fkey);
uint8_t kdata[4096 / 8];
memcpy(kdata, file_get_data(fkey), key_size);
if (mkek_decrypt(kdata, key_size) != 0) {
return CCID_EXEC_ERROR;
}
if (mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx->P, kdata, key_size/2) != 0) {
if (mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx->P, kdata, key_size / 2) != 0) {
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
mbedtls_rsa_free(ctx);
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
}
if (mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx->Q, kdata+key_size/2, key_size/2) != 0) {
if (mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx->Q, kdata + key_size / 2, key_size / 2) != 0) {
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
mbedtls_rsa_free(ctx);
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
@@ -560,32 +665,40 @@ int load_private_key_rsa(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, file_t *fkey) {
return CCID_OK;
}
int load_private_key_ecdsa(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, file_t *fkey) {
if (wait_button_pressed() == true) //timeout
int load_private_key_ec(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ctx, file_t *fkey) {
if (wait_button_pressed() == true) { // timeout
return CCID_VERIFICATION_FAILED;
}
int key_size = file_get_size(fkey);
uint8_t kdata[67]; //Worst case, 521 bit + 1byte
uint16_t key_size = file_get_size(fkey);
uint8_t kdata[67]; // Worst case, 521 bit + 1byte
memcpy(kdata, file_get_data(fkey), key_size);
if (mkek_decrypt(kdata, key_size) != 0) {
return CCID_EXEC_ERROR;
}
mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid = kdata[0];
int r = mbedtls_ecp_read_key(gid, ctx, kdata+1, key_size-1);
int r = mbedtls_ecp_read_key(gid, ctx, kdata + 1, key_size - 1);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(ctx);
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(ctx);
return CCID_EXEC_ERROR;
}
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
if (gid == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_ED25519 || gid == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_ED448) {
r = mbedtls_ecp_point_edwards(&ctx->grp, &ctx->Q, &ctx->d, random_gen, NULL);
}
else {
r = mbedtls_ecp_mul(&ctx->grp, &ctx->Q, &ctx->d, &ctx->grp.G, random_gen, NULL);
}
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(ctx);
return CCID_EXEC_ERROR;
}
return CCID_OK;
}
typedef struct cmd
{
uint8_t ins;
int (*cmd_handler)();
} cmd_t;
int load_private_key_ecdh(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ctx, file_t *fkey) {
return load_private_key_ec(ctx, fkey);
}
#define INS_VERIFY 0x20
#define INS_MSE 0x22
@@ -594,6 +707,7 @@ typedef struct cmd
#define INS_RESET_RETRY 0x2C
#define INS_KEYPAIR_GEN 0x46
#define INS_KEY_GEN 0x48
#define INS_BIP_SLIP 0x4A
#define INS_INITIALIZE 0x50
#define INS_KEY_DOMAIN 0x52
#define INS_PUK_AUTH 0x54
@@ -609,8 +723,8 @@ typedef struct cmd
#define INS_EXTERNAL_AUTHENTICATE 0x82
#define INS_CHALLENGE 0x84
#define INS_GENERAL_AUTHENTICATE 0x86
#define INS_SELECT_FILE 0xA4
#define INS_READ_BINARY 0xB0
#define INS_SELECT_FILE 0xA4
#define INS_READ_BINARY 0xB0
#define INS_READ_BINARY_ODD 0xB1
#define INS_UPDATE_EF 0xD7
#define INS_DELETE_FILE 0xE4
@@ -643,16 +757,20 @@ static const cmd_t cmds[] = {
{ INS_PUK_AUTH, cmd_puk_auth },
{ INS_PSO, cmd_pso },
{ INS_EXTERNAL_AUTHENTICATE, cmd_external_authenticate },
{ 0x00, 0x0}
{ INS_BIP_SLIP, cmd_bip_slip },
{ 0x00, 0x0 }
};
int sc_hsm_process_apdu() {
sm_unwrap();
int r = sm_unwrap();
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return SW_DATA_INVALID();
}
for (const cmd_t *cmd = cmds; cmd->ins != 0x00; cmd++) {
if (cmd->ins == INS(apdu)) {
int r = cmd->cmd_handler();
int res = cmd->cmd_handler();
sm_wrap();
return r;
return res;
}
}
return SW_INS_NOT_SUPPORTED();

View File

@@ -19,54 +19,63 @@
#define _SC_HSM_H_
#include <stdlib.h>
#ifndef ESP_PLATFORM
#include "common.h"
#else
#define MBEDTLS_ALLOW_PRIVATE_ACCESS
#endif
#include "mbedtls/rsa.h"
#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h"
#if !defined(ENABLE_EMULATION) && !defined(ESP_PLATFORM)
#include "pico/stdlib.h"
#endif
#include "file.h"
#include "apdu.h"
#include "hsm.h"
#include "pico_keys.h"
extern const uint8_t sc_hsm_aid[];
#define ALGO_RSA_RAW 0x20 /* RSA signature with external padding */
#define ALGO_RSA_DECRYPT 0x21 /* RSA raw decrypt */
#define ALGO_RSA_RAW 0x20 /* RSA signature with external padding */
#define ALGO_RSA_DECRYPT 0x21 /* RSA raw decrypt */
#define ALGO_RSA_DECRYPT_PKCS1 0x22
#define ALGO_RSA_DECRYPT_OEP 0x23
#define ALGO_RSA_PKCS1 0x30 /* RSA signature with DigestInfo input and PKCS#1 V1.5 padding */
#define ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1 0x31 /* RSA signature with SHA-1 hash and PKCS#1 V1.5 padding */
#define ALGO_RSA_PKCS1 0x30 /* RSA signature with DigestInfo input and PKCS#1 V1.5 padding */
#define ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1 0x31 /* RSA signature with SHA-1 hash and PKCS#1 V1.5 padding */
#define ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA224 0x32
#define ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256 0x33 /* RSA signature with SHA-256 hash and PKCS#1 V1.5 padding */
#define ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256 0x33 /* RSA signature with SHA-256 hash and PKCS#1 V1.5 padding */
#define ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384 0x34
#define ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512 0x35
#define ALGO_RSA_PSS 0x40 /* RSA signature with external hash and PKCS#1 PSS padding*/
#define ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA1 0x41 /* RSA signature with SHA-1 hash and PKCS#1 PSS padding */
#define ALGO_RSA_PSS 0x40 /* RSA signature with external hash and PKCS#1 PSS padding*/
#define ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA1 0x41 /* RSA signature with SHA-1 hash and PKCS#1 PSS padding */
#define ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA224 0x42
#define ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA256 0x43 /* RSA signature with SHA-256 hash and PKCS#1 PSS padding */
#define ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA256 0x43 /* RSA signature with SHA-256 hash and PKCS#1 PSS padding */
#define ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA384 0x44
#define ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA512 0x45
#define ALGO_EC_RAW 0x70 /* ECDSA signature with hash input */
#define ALGO_EC_SHA1 0x71 /* ECDSA signature with SHA-1 hash */
#define ALGO_EC_SHA224 0x72 /* ECDSA signature with SHA-224 hash */
#define ALGO_EC_SHA256 0x73 /* ECDSA signature with SHA-256 hash */
#define ALGO_EC_RAW 0x70 /* ECDSA signature with hash input */
#define ALGO_EC_SHA1 0x71 /* ECDSA signature with SHA-1 hash */
#define ALGO_EC_SHA224 0x72 /* ECDSA signature with SHA-224 hash */
#define ALGO_EC_SHA256 0x73 /* ECDSA signature with SHA-256 hash */
#define ALGO_EC_SHA384 0x74
#define ALGO_EC_SHA512 0x75
#define ALGO_EC_DH 0x80 /* ECDH key derivation */
#define ALGO_EC_DH 0x80 /* ECDH key derivation */
#define ALGO_EC_DH_AUTPUK 0x83
#define ALGO_EC_DH_XKEK 0x84
#define ALGO_HD 0xA0
#define ALGO_WRAP 0x92
#define ALGO_UNWRAP 0x93
#define ALGO_REPLACE 0x94
#define ALGO_EC_DERIVE 0x98 /* Derive EC key from EC key */
#define ALGO_EC_DERIVE 0x98 /* Derive EC key from EC key */
#define ALGO_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT 0x10
#define ALGO_AES_CBC_DECRYPT 0x11
#define ALGO_AES_CMAC 0x18
#define ALGO_AES_DERIVE 0x99
#define ALGO_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT 0x10
#define ALGO_AES_CBC_DECRYPT 0x11
#define ALGO_AES_CMAC 0x18
#define ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_ENCRYPT 0x51 /* Extended ciphering Encrypt */
#define ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_DECRYPT 0x52 /* Extended ciphering Decrypt */
#define ALGO_AES_DERIVE 0x99
#define HSM_OPT_RRC 0x0001
#define HSM_OPT_TRANSPORT_PIN 0x0002
@@ -77,15 +86,16 @@ extern const uint8_t sc_hsm_aid[];
#define HSM_OPT_RRC_RESET_ONLY 0x0020
#define HSM_OPT_BOOTSEL_BUTTON 0x0100
#define HSM_OPT_KEY_COUNTER_ALL 0x0200
#define HSM_OPT_SECURE_LOCK 0x0400
#define PRKD_PREFIX 0xC4 /* Hi byte in file identifier for PKCS#15 PRKD objects */
#define CD_PREFIX 0xC8 /* Hi byte in file identifier for PKCS#15 CD objects */
#define DCOD_PREFIX 0xC9 /* Hi byte in file identifier for PKCS#15 DCOD objects */
#define CA_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX 0xCA /* Hi byte in file identifier for CA certificates */
#define KEY_PREFIX 0xCC /* Hi byte in file identifier for key objects */
#define PROT_DATA_PREFIX 0xCD /* Hi byte in file identifier for PIN protected data objects */
#define EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX 0xCE /* Hi byte in file identifier for EE certificates */
#define DATA_PREFIX 0xCF /* Hi byte in file identifier for readable data objects */
#define PRKD_PREFIX 0xC4 /* Hi byte in file identifier for PKCS#15 PRKD objects */
#define CD_PREFIX 0xC8 /* Hi byte in file identifier for PKCS#15 CD objects */
#define DCOD_PREFIX 0xC9 /* Hi byte in file identifier for PKCS#15 DCOD objects */
#define CA_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX 0xCA /* Hi byte in file identifier for CA certificates */
#define KEY_PREFIX 0xCC /* Hi byte in file identifier for key objects */
#define PROT_DATA_PREFIX 0xCD /* Hi byte in file identifier for PIN protected data objects */
#define EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX 0xCE /* Hi byte in file identifier for EE certificates */
#define DATA_PREFIX 0xCF /* Hi byte in file identifier for readable data objects */
#define P15_KEYTYPE_RSA 0x30
#define P15_KEYTYPE_ECC 0xA0
@@ -96,27 +106,26 @@ extern const uint8_t sc_hsm_aid[];
extern int pin_reset_retries(const file_t *pin, bool);
extern int pin_wrong_retry(const file_t *pin);
extern void hash(const uint8_t *input, size_t len, uint8_t output[32]);
extern void hash_multi(const uint8_t *input, size_t len, uint8_t output[32]);
extern void double_hash_pin(const uint8_t *pin, size_t len, uint8_t output[32]);
extern void hash(const uint8_t *input, uint16_t len, uint8_t output[32]);
extern uint16_t get_device_options();
extern bool has_session_pin, has_session_sopin;
extern uint8_t session_pin[32], session_sopin[32];
extern int check_pin(const file_t *pin, const uint8_t *data, size_t len);
extern uint16_t check_pin(const file_t *pin, const uint8_t *data, uint16_t len);
extern bool pka_enabled();
extern const uint8_t *dev_name;
extern size_t dev_name_len;
extern uint16_t dev_name_len;
extern uint8_t puk_status[MAX_PUK];
extern int puk_store_select_chr(const uint8_t *chr);
extern int delete_file(file_t *ef);
extern const uint8_t *get_meta_tag(file_t *ef, uint16_t meta_tag, size_t *tag_len);
extern const uint8_t *get_meta_tag(file_t *ef, uint16_t meta_tag, uint16_t *tag_len);
extern bool key_has_purpose(file_t *ef, uint8_t purpose);
extern int load_private_key_rsa(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, file_t *fkey);
extern int load_private_key_ecdsa(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, file_t *fkey);
extern int load_private_key_ec(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ctx, file_t *fkey);
extern int load_private_key_ecdh(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ctx, file_t *fkey);
extern bool wait_button_pressed();
extern int store_keys(void *key_ctx, int type, uint8_t key_id);
extern int find_and_store_meta_key(uint8_t key_id);
extern uint32_t get_key_counter(file_t *fkey);
extern uint32_t decrement_key_counter(file_t *fkey);
#endif
#endif

View File

@@ -18,10 +18,9 @@
#ifndef __VERSION_H_
#define __VERSION_H_
#define HSM_VERSION 0x0300
#define HSM_VERSION 0x0400
#define HSM_VERSION_MAJOR ((HSM_VERSION >> 8) & 0xff)
#define HSM_VERSION_MINOR (HSM_VERSION & 0xff)
#endif

14
tests/build-in-docker.sh Executable file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
#!/bin/bash -eu
source tests/docker_env.sh
build_image
#run_in_docker rm -rf CMakeFiles
run_in_docker mkdir -p build_in_docker
run_in_docker -w "$PWD/build_in_docker" cmake -DENABLE_EMULATION=1 -D__FOR_CI=1 ..
run_in_docker -w "$PWD/build_in_docker" make -j ${NUM_PROC}
docker create --name temp_container pico-hsm-test:bullseye
docker cp $PWD/build_in_docker/pico_hsm temp_container:/pico_hsm
docker commit temp_container pico-hsm-test:bullseye
docker stop temp_container
docker rm temp_container
docker image prune -f

33
tests/conftest.py Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import sys
import pytest
try:
from picohsm import PicoHSM
except ModuleNotFoundError:
print('ERROR: picohsm module not found! Install picohsm package.\nTry with `pip install pypicohsm`')
sys.exit(-1)
@pytest.fixture(scope="session")
def device():
dev = PicoHSM()
return dev

25
tests/const.py Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
from binascii import unhexlify
DEFAULT_DKEK = [0x1] * 32
TERM_CERT = unhexlify('7F2181E57F4E819E5F290100421045535049434F48534D445630303030317F494F060A04007F00070202020203864104F571E53AA8E75C929D925081CF0F893CB5991D48BD546C1A3F22199F037E4B12D601ACD91C67C88D3C5B3D04C08EC0A372485F7A248E080EE0C6237C1B075E1C5F201045535049434F48534D54525A474E50327F4C0E060904007F0007030102025301005F25060203000300055F24060204000300045F374041BF5E970739135770DBCC5DDA81FFD8B13419A9257D44CAF8404267C644E8F435B43F5E57EB2A8CF4B198045ACD094E0CB34E6217D9C8922CFB9BBEFD4088AD')
DICA_CERT = unhexlify('7F2181E97F4E81A25F290100421045535049434F48534D434130303030317F494F060A04007F0007020202020386410421EE4A21C16A10F737F12E78E5091B266612038CDABEBB722B15BF6D41B877FBF64D9AB69C39B9831B1AE00BEF2A4E81976F7688D45189BB232A24703D8A96A55F201045535049434F48534D445630303030317F4C12060904007F000703010202530580000000005F25060202000801085F24060203000601045F37403F75C08FFFC9186B56E6147199E82BFC327CEEF72495BC567961CD54D702F13E3C2766FCD1D11BD6A9D1F4A229B76B248CEB9AF88D59A74D0AB149448705159B')

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
FROM debian:bullseye
ARG DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive
RUN apt update && apt upgrade -y
RUN apt install -y apt-utils
RUN apt autoremove -y
RUN rm -rf /var/cache/apt/archives/*
RUN apt install -y libccid \
libpcsclite-dev \
git \
autoconf \
pkg-config \
libtool \
help2man \
automake \
gcc \
make \
build-essential \
python3 \
python3-pip \
swig \
libssl-dev \
cmake \
vsmartcard-vpcd \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
RUN pip3 install pytest pycvc cryptography pyscard base58
WORKDIR /
RUN git clone https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC
WORKDIR /OpenSC
RUN git checkout tags/0.25.1
RUN ./bootstrap
RUN ./configure --enable-openssl
RUN make -j `nproc`
RUN make install
RUN make clean
RUN ldconfig
WORKDIR /
RUN git clone https://github.com/polhenarejos/pypicohsm.git
RUN pip3 install -e pypicohsm
RUN git clone https://github.com/CardContact/sc-hsm-embedded
WORKDIR /sc-hsm-embedded
RUN autoreconf -fi
RUN ./configure
RUN make -j `nproc`
RUN make install
RUN cp ./src/tests/sc-hsm-pkcs11-test /usr/local/bin/sc-hsm-pkcs11-test
RUN make clean
WORKDIR /

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
FROM ubuntu:jammy
ARG DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive
RUN apt update && apt upgrade -y
RUN apt install -y apt-utils
RUN apt install -y libccid \
libpcsclite-dev \
git \
autoconf \
pkg-config \
libtool \
help2man \
automake \
gcc \
make \
build-essential \
opensc \
python3 \
python3-pip \
swig \
cmake \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
RUN pip3 install pytest pycvc cryptography pyscard
RUN git clone https://github.com/polhenarejos/vsmartcard.git
WORKDIR /vsmartcard/virtualsmartcard
RUN autoreconf --verbose --install
RUN ./configure --sysconfdir=/etc
RUN make && make install
WORKDIR /

108
tests/docker_env.sh Executable file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
#!/bin/bash -eu
# Taken from Mbed-TLS project
# https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/blob/master/tests/scripts/docker_env.sh
#
# docker_env.sh
#
# Purpose
# -------
#
# This is a helper script to enable running tests under a Docker container,
# thus making it easier to get set up as well as isolating test dependencies
# (which include legacy/insecure configurations of openssl and gnutls).
#
# WARNING: the Dockerfile used by this script is no longer maintained! See
# https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls-test/blob/master/README.md#quick-start
# for the set of Docker images we use on the CI.
#
# Notes for users
# ---------------
# This script expects a Linux x86_64 system with a recent version of Docker
# installed and available for use, as well as http/https access. If a proxy
# server must be used, invoke this script with the usual environment variables
# (http_proxy and https_proxy) set appropriately. If an alternate Docker
# registry is needed, specify MBEDTLS_DOCKER_REGISTRY to point at the
# host name.
#
#
# Running this script directly will check for Docker availability and set up
# the Docker image.
# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
#
# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
# not use this file except in compliance with the License.
# You may obtain a copy of the License at
#
# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
#
# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
# limitations under the License.
# default values, can be overridden by the environment
: ${MBEDTLS_DOCKER_GUEST:=bullseye}
DOCKER_IMAGE_TAG="pico-hsm-test:${MBEDTLS_DOCKER_GUEST}"
# Make sure docker is available
if ! which docker > /dev/null; then
echo "Docker is required but doesn't seem to be installed. See https://www.docker.com/ to get started"
exit 1
fi
# Figure out if we need to 'sudo docker'
if groups | grep docker > /dev/null; then
DOCKER="docker"
else
echo "Using sudo to invoke docker since you're not a member of the docker group..."
DOCKER="docker"
fi
# Figure out the number of processors available
if [ "$(uname)" == "Darwin" ]; then
NUM_PROC="$(sysctl -n hw.logicalcpu)"
else
NUM_PROC="$(nproc)"
fi
build_image() {
# Build the Docker image
echo "Getting docker image up to date (this may take a few minutes)..."
${DOCKER} image build \
-t ${DOCKER_IMAGE_TAG} \
--cache-from=${DOCKER_IMAGE_TAG} \
--network host \
--build-arg MAKEFLAGS_PARALLEL="-j ${NUM_PROC}" \
tests/docker/${MBEDTLS_DOCKER_GUEST}
}
run_in_docker()
{
ENV_ARGS=""
while [ "$1" == "-e" ]; do
ENV_ARGS="${ENV_ARGS} $1 $2"
shift 2
done
WORKDIR="${PWD}"
if [ "$1" == '-w' ]; then
WORKDIR="$2"
shift 2
fi
${DOCKER} container run --rm \
--cap-add SYS_PTRACE \
--volume $PWD:$PWD \
--workdir ${WORKDIR} \
-e MAKEFLAGS \
${ENV_ARGS} \
${DOCKER_IMAGE_TAG} \
$@
}

BIN
tests/memory.tar.gz Normal file

Binary file not shown.

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
def test_select(device):
device.select_applet()
def test_initialization(device):
device.initialize()
def test_termca(device):
data = device.get_termca()
assert(b'ESPICOHSMTR' == data['cv']['chr'][:11])
assert(b'ESPICOHSMDV' == data['cv']['car'][:11] or b'ESPICOHSMTR' == data['cv']['car'][:11])
assert(b'ESPICOHSMDV' == data['dv']['chr'][:11] or b'ESPICOHSMTR' == data['dv']['chr'][:11])
assert(b'ESPICOHSMCA' == data['dv']['car'][:11] or b'ESPICOHSMTR' == data['dv']['car'][:11])
assert(data['cv']['car'] == data['dv']['chr'])
def test_get_version(device):
version = device.get_version()

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
import math
from collections import Counter
def mean(x):
sum = 0
for i in x:
sum += i
return sum/len(x)
def var(x):
sum = 0
m = mean(x)
for i in x:
sum += (i-m)**2
return sum/len(x)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"length", [1, 256, 1024]
)
def test_challenge(device, length):
data = device.get_challenge(length)
assert(len(data) == length)
def test_randomness(device):
data = []
N = 1000
for k2 in range(N):
data += device.get_challenge(1024)
_, values = zip(*Counter(data).items())
nm = mean(values)/(N*1024/256)
sm = math.sqrt(var(values))/mean(values)
assert(0.99 <= nm <= 1.01)
assert(sm <= 0.02)

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
import hashlib
from const import DEFAULT_DKEK
from picohsm import APDUResponse, SWCodes
from picohsm.const import DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES
KEY_DOMAINS = 3
TEST_KEY_DOMAIN = 1
def test_key_domains(device):
device.initialize(key_domains=KEY_DOMAINS)
for k in range(KEY_DOMAINS):
kd = device.get_key_domain(key_domain=k)
assert('error' in kd)
assert(kd['error'] == 0x6A88)
kd = device.get_key_domain(key_domain=KEY_DOMAINS)
assert('error' in kd)
assert(kd['error'] == 0x6A86)
assert(device.get_key_domains() == KEY_DOMAINS)
def test_import_dkek_wrong_key_domain(device):
with pytest.raises(APDUResponse) as e:
device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK, key_domain=0)
assert(e.value.sw == SWCodes.SW_COMMAND_NOT_ALLOWED)
def test_import_dkek_fail(device):
with pytest.raises(APDUResponse) as e:
device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK, key_domain=TEST_KEY_DOMAIN)
assert(e.value.sw == SWCodes.SW_COMMAND_NOT_ALLOWED)
def test_set_key_domain_fail(device):
with pytest.raises(APDUResponse) as e:
device.set_key_domain(key_domain=10)
assert(e.value.sw == SWCodes.SW_INCORRECT_P1P2)
def test_set_key_domain_ok(device):
kd = device.get_key_domain(key_domain=TEST_KEY_DOMAIN)
assert('error' in kd)
assert(kd['error'] == 0x6A88)
device.set_key_domain(key_domain=TEST_KEY_DOMAIN)
kd = device.get_key_domain(key_domain=TEST_KEY_DOMAIN)
assert('error' not in kd)
assert('dkek' in kd)
assert('total' in kd['dkek'])
assert(kd['dkek']['total'] == DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
assert('missing' in kd['dkek'])
assert(kd['dkek']['missing'] == DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
def test_import_dkek_ok(device):
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK, key_domain=TEST_KEY_DOMAIN)
assert('dkek' in resp)
assert('kcv' in resp)
assert(resp['dkek']['total'] == DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
assert(resp['dkek']['missing'] == DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES-1)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK, key_domain=TEST_KEY_DOMAIN)
assert('dkek' in resp)
assert('kcv' in resp)
assert(resp['dkek']['total'] == DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
assert(resp['dkek']['missing'] == DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES-2)
kcv = hashlib.sha256(b'\x00'*32).digest()[:8]
assert(resp['kcv'] == kcv)
def test_clear_key_domain(device):
kd = device.get_key_domain(key_domain=0)
assert('error' in kd)
assert(kd['error'] == SWCodes.SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND)
kd = device.get_key_domain(key_domain=TEST_KEY_DOMAIN)
assert(kd['dkek']['total'] == DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
device.clear_key_domain(key_domain=TEST_KEY_DOMAIN)
kd = device.get_key_domain(key_domain=TEST_KEY_DOMAIN)
assert(kd['dkek']['missing'] == DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
def test_delete_key_domain(device):
assert(device.get_key_domains() == KEY_DOMAINS)
kd = device.get_key_domain(key_domain=TEST_KEY_DOMAIN)
assert(kd['dkek']['total'] == DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
with pytest.raises(APDUResponse) as e:
device.delete_key_domain(key_domain=0)
assert(e.value.sw == SWCodes.SW_INCORRECT_P1P2)
def test_delete_key_domain(device):
assert(device.get_key_domains() == KEY_DOMAINS)
kd = device.get_key_domain(key_domain=TEST_KEY_DOMAIN)
assert(kd['dkek']['total'] == DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
device.delete_key_domain(key_domain=TEST_KEY_DOMAIN)
assert(device.get_key_domains() == KEY_DOMAINS)
kd = device.get_key_domain(key_domain=TEST_KEY_DOMAIN)
assert('error' in kd)
assert(kd['error'] == 0x6A88)

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
import hashlib
from picohsm.const import DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES, DEFAULT_PIN, DEFAULT_RETRIES
from const import DEFAULT_DKEK
def test_dkek(device):
device.initialize(retries=DEFAULT_RETRIES, dkek_shares=DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
device.login(DEFAULT_PIN)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
assert('dkek' in resp)
assert('kcv' in resp)
assert(resp['dkek']['total'] == DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
assert(resp['dkek']['missing'] == DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES-1)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
assert('dkek' in resp)
assert('kcv' in resp)
assert(resp['dkek']['total'] == DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
assert(resp['dkek']['missing'] == DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES-2)
kcv = hashlib.sha256(b'\x00'*32).digest()[:8]
assert(resp['kcv'] == kcv)

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
from picohsm import APDUResponse, SWCodes
from picohsm.const import DEFAULT_PIN, DEFAULT_RETRIES
WRONG_PIN = '112233'
def test_pin_init_retries(device):
device.initialize(retries=DEFAULT_RETRIES)
retries = device.get_login_retries()
assert(retries == DEFAULT_RETRIES)
def test_pin_login(device):
device.initialize(retries=DEFAULT_RETRIES)
device.login(DEFAULT_PIN)
def test_pin_retries(device):
device.initialize(retries=DEFAULT_RETRIES)
device.login(DEFAULT_PIN)
for ret in range(DEFAULT_RETRIES-1):
with pytest.raises(APDUResponse) as e:
device.login(WRONG_PIN)
assert(e.value.sw1 == 0x63 and e.value.sw2 == (0xC0 | (DEFAULT_RETRIES-1-ret)))
with pytest.raises(APDUResponse) as e:
device.login(WRONG_PIN)
assert(e.value.sw == SWCodes.SW_PIN_BLOCKED)
device.initialize(retries=DEFAULT_RETRIES)
retries = device.get_login_retries()
assert(retries == DEFAULT_RETRIES)

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
from picohsm import KeyType, DOPrefixes
def test_gen_initialize(device):
device.initialize()
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"curve", ['secp192r1', 'secp256r1', 'secp384r1', 'secp521r1', 'brainpoolP256r1', 'brainpoolP384r1', 'brainpoolP512r1', 'secp192k1', 'secp256k1', 'curve25519', 'curve448', 'ed25519', 'ed448']
)
def test_gen_ecc(device, curve):
keyid = device.key_generation(KeyType.ECC, curve)
resp = device.list_keys()
assert((DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid) in resp)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX, keyid)
resp = device.list_keys()
assert((DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid) not in resp)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"modulus", [1024, 2048, 4096]
)
def test_gen_rsa(device, modulus):
keyid = device.key_generation(KeyType.RSA, modulus)
resp = device.list_keys()
assert((DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid) in resp)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX, keyid)

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
import hashlib
import os
from picohsm import DOPrefixes
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import rsa, ec, x25519, x448, ed25519, ed448
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.serialization import Encoding, PublicFormat
from picohsm.const import DEFAULT_RETRIES, DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES
from const import DEFAULT_DKEK
def test_prepare_dkek(device):
device.initialize(retries=DEFAULT_RETRIES, dkek_shares=DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
kcv = hashlib.sha256(b'\x00'*32).digest()[:8]
assert(resp['kcv'] == kcv)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"modulus", [1024, 2048, 4096]
)
def test_import_rsa(device, modulus):
pkey = rsa.generate_private_key(
public_exponent=65537,
key_size=modulus,
)
keyid = device.import_key(pkey)
pubkey = device.public_key(keyid)
assert(pubkey.public_numbers() == pkey.public_key().public_numbers())
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX, keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"curve", [ec.SECP192R1, ec.SECP256R1, ec.SECP384R1, ec.SECP521R1, ec.SECP256K1, ec.BrainpoolP256R1, ec.BrainpoolP384R1, ec.BrainpoolP512R1]
)
def test_import_ecc(device, curve):
pkey = ec.generate_private_key(curve())
keyid = device.import_key(pkey)
pubkey = device.public_key(keyid, param=curve().name)
assert(pubkey.public_numbers() == pkey.public_key().public_numbers())
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX, keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"curve", [x25519.X25519PrivateKey, x448.X448PrivateKey]
)
def test_import_montgomery(device, curve):
pkey = curve.generate()
keyid = device.import_key(pkey)
pubkey = device.public_key(keyid, param=curve)
assert(pubkey.public_bytes(Encoding.Raw, PublicFormat.Raw) == pkey.public_key().public_bytes(Encoding.Raw, PublicFormat.Raw))
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX, keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"curve", [ed25519.Ed25519PrivateKey, ed448.Ed448PrivateKey]
)
def test_import_edwards(device, curve):
pkey = curve.generate()
keyid = device.import_key(pkey)
pubkey = device.public_key(keyid, param=curve)
assert(pubkey.public_bytes(Encoding.Raw, PublicFormat.Raw) == pkey.public_key().public_bytes(Encoding.Raw, PublicFormat.Raw))
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX, keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
def test_import_aes(device, size):
pkey = os.urandom(size // 8)
keyid = device.import_key(pkey)

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
import hashlib
from picohsm import DOPrefixes
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec, x25519, x448
from picohsm.const import DEFAULT_RETRIES, DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES
from const import DEFAULT_DKEK
def test_prepare_dkek(device):
device.initialize(retries=DEFAULT_RETRIES, dkek_shares=DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
kcv = hashlib.sha256(b'\x00'*32).digest()[:8]
assert(resp['kcv'] == kcv)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"curve", [ec.SECP192R1, ec.SECP256R1, ec.SECP384R1, ec.SECP521R1, ec.SECP256K1, ec.BrainpoolP256R1, ec.BrainpoolP384R1, ec.BrainpoolP512R1]
)
def test_exchange_ecc(device, curve):
pkeyA = ec.generate_private_key(curve())
pbkeyA = pkeyA.public_key()
keyid = device.import_key(pkeyA)
pkeyB = ec.generate_private_key(curve())
pbkeyB = pkeyB.public_key()
sharedB = pkeyB.exchange(ec.ECDH(), pbkeyA)
sharedA = device.exchange(keyid, pbkeyB)
assert(sharedA == sharedB)
sharedAA = pkeyA.exchange(ec.ECDH(), pbkeyB)
assert(sharedA == sharedAA)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX, keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"curve", [x25519.X25519PrivateKey, x448.X448PrivateKey]
)
def test_exchange_montgomery(device, curve):
pkeyA = curve.generate()
pbkeyA = pkeyA.public_key()
keyid = device.import_key(pkeyA)
pkeyB = curve.generate()
pbkeyB = pkeyB.public_key()
sharedB = pkeyB.exchange(pbkeyA)
sharedA = device.exchange(keyid, pbkeyB)
assert(sharedA == sharedB)
sharedAA = pkeyA.exchange(pbkeyB)
assert(sharedA == sharedAA)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX, keyid)

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
from picohsm import KeyType, DOPrefixes
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
def test_gen_aes(device, size):
keyid = device.key_generation(KeyType.AES, size)
resp = device.list_keys()
assert((DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid) in resp)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2023 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
from picohsm import KeyType, DOPrefixes, APDUResponse, SWCodes
from binascii import hexlify
import hashlib
from const import DEFAULT_DKEK
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import cmac
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers import algorithms, Cipher, modes
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
def test_initialize(device):
device.initialize(key_domains=1)
assert(device.get_key_domains() == 1)
device.set_key_domain(key_domain=0, total=2)
keyid_in = -1
keyid_out = -1
def test_key_generation_no_key_domain(device):
global keyid_out
keyid_out = device.key_generation(KeyType.ECC, 'brainpoolP256r1')
device.put_contents(p1=DOPrefixes.PRKD_PREFIX, p2=keyid_out, data=[0xA0])
resp = device.list_keys()
assert((DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid_out) in resp)
assert((DOPrefixes.PRKD_PREFIX, keyid_out) in resp)
def test_key_generation_with_key_domain(device):
global keyid_in
keyid_in = device.key_generation(KeyType.ECC, 'brainpoolP256r1', key_domain=0)
device.put_contents(p1=DOPrefixes.PRKD_PREFIX, p2=keyid_in, data=[0xA0])
resp = device.list_keys()
assert((DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid_in) in resp)
assert((DOPrefixes.PRKD_PREFIX, keyid_in) in resp)
def test_export_key_out(device):
with pytest.raises(APDUResponse) as e:
device.export_key(keyid_out)
assert(e.value.sw == SWCodes.SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND)
def test_export_key_in_fail(device):
with pytest.raises(APDUResponse) as e:
device.export_key(keyid_in)
assert(e.value.sw == SWCodes.SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND)
def test_export_import_dkek(device):
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK, key_domain=0)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK, key_domain=0)
def test_export_key_in_ok(device):
resp = device.export_key(keyid_in)
kcv = hashlib.sha256(b'\x00'*32).digest()[:8]
assert(kcv == resp[:8])
assert(resp[8] == 12)
assert(resp[9:21] == b"\x00\x0A\x04\x00\x7F\x00\x07\x02\x02\x02\x02\x03")
pkey = hashlib.sha256(b'\x00'*32+b'\x00\x00\x00\x02').digest()
c = cmac.CMAC(algorithms.AES(pkey))
c.update(resp[:-16])
resCMAC = c.finalize()
assert(resCMAC == resp[-16:])
def test_delete_keys_in_out(device):
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid_in)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX, keyid_in)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid_out)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX, keyid_out)
def test_export_import(device):
pkey_gen = ec.generate_private_key(ec.BrainpoolP256R1())
keyid = device.import_key(pkey_gen)
resp = device.export_key(keyid)
kcv = hashlib.sha256(b'\x00'*32).digest()[:8]
assert(kcv == resp[:8])
assert(resp[8] == 12)
assert(resp[9:21] == b"\x00\x0A\x04\x00\x7F\x00\x07\x02\x02\x02\x02\x03")
pkey = hashlib.sha256(b'\x00'*32+b'\x00\x00\x00\x02').digest()
c = cmac.CMAC(algorithms.AES(pkey))
c.update(resp[:-16])
resCMAC = c.finalize()
assert(resCMAC == resp[-16:])
iv = b'\x00'*16
pkey = hashlib.sha256(b'\x00'*32+b'\x00\x00\x00\x01').digest()
cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.CBC(iv))
decryptor = cipher.decryptor()
payload = decryptor.update(resp[27:-16]) + decryptor.finalize()
rnd = payload[:8]
ofs = 8
key_size = int.from_bytes(payload[ofs:ofs+2], 'big')
ofs += 2
A_len = int.from_bytes(payload[ofs:ofs+2], 'big')
ofs += 2+A_len
B_len = int.from_bytes(payload[ofs:ofs+2], 'big')
ofs += 2+B_len
P_len = int.from_bytes(payload[ofs:ofs+2], 'big')
ofs += 2+P_len
N_len = int.from_bytes(payload[ofs:ofs+2], 'big')
ofs += 2+N_len
G_len = int.from_bytes(payload[ofs:ofs+2], 'big')
ofs += 2+G_len
d_len = int.from_bytes(payload[ofs:ofs+2], 'big')
ofs += 2
d = payload[ofs:ofs+d_len]
ofs += d_len
Q_len = int.from_bytes(payload[ofs:ofs+2], 'big')
ofs += 2
Q = payload[ofs:ofs+Q_len]
ofs += Q_len
pkey_ex = ec.EllipticCurvePrivateNumbers(int.from_bytes(d, 'big'), ec.EllipticCurvePublicKey.from_encoded_point(ec.BrainpoolP256R1(), Q).public_numbers()).private_key()
assert(pkey_gen.private_bytes(serialization.Encoding.DER, serialization.PrivateFormat.PKCS8, serialization.NoEncryption()) == pkey_ex.private_bytes(serialization.Encoding.DER, serialization.PrivateFormat.PKCS8, serialization.NoEncryption()))
assert(pkey_gen.public_key().public_bytes(serialization.Encoding.X962, serialization.PublicFormat.UncompressedPoint) == pkey_ex.public_key().public_bytes(serialization.Encoding.X962, serialization.PublicFormat.UncompressedPoint))
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX, keyid)

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
from picohsm import KeyType, DOPrefixes, Algorithm
from binascii import hexlify
import hashlib
data = b'Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Nullam neque urna, iaculis quis auctor scelerisque, auctor ut risus. In rhoncus, odio consequat consequat ultrices, ex libero dictum risus, accumsan interdum nisi orci ac neque. Ut vitae sem in metus hendrerit facilisis. Mauris maximus tristique mi, quis blandit lectus convallis eget.'
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"curve", ['secp192r1', 'secp256r1', 'secp384r1', 'secp521r1', 'brainpoolP256r1', 'brainpoolP384r1', 'brainpoolP512r1', 'secp256k1']
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"scheme", [Algorithm.ALGO_EC_RAW, Algorithm.ALGO_EC_SHA1, Algorithm.ALGO_EC_SHA224, Algorithm.ALGO_EC_SHA256, Algorithm.ALGO_EC_SHA384, Algorithm.ALGO_EC_SHA512]
)
def test_signature_ecc(device, curve, scheme):
keyid = device.key_generation(KeyType.ECC, curve)
pubkey = device.public_key(keyid=keyid, param=curve)
if (scheme == Algorithm.ALGO_EC_RAW):
datab = hashlib.sha512(data).digest()
else:
datab = data
signature = device.sign(keyid=keyid, scheme=scheme, data=datab)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
device.verify(pubkey, datab, signature, scheme)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"modulus", [1024,2048,4096]
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"scheme", [Algorithm.ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1, Algorithm.ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA224, Algorithm.ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256, Algorithm.ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384, Algorithm.ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512, Algorithm.ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA1, Algorithm.ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA224, Algorithm.ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA256, Algorithm.ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA384, Algorithm.ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA512]
)
def test_signature_rsa(device, modulus, scheme):
keyid = device.key_generation(KeyType.RSA, modulus)
pubkey = device.public_key(keyid=keyid)
signature = device.sign(keyid=keyid, scheme=scheme, data=data)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
device.verify(pubkey, data, signature, scheme)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"curve", ['ed25519', 'ed448']
)
def test_signature_edwards(device, curve):
keyid = device.key_generation(KeyType.ECC, curve)
pubkey = device.public_key(keyid=keyid)
signature = device.sign(keyid=keyid, scheme=Algorithm.ALGO_EC_RAW, data=data)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
device.verify(pubkey, data, signature)

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
from picohsm import KeyType, DOPrefixes
from binascii import hexlify
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import padding
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
data = b'Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Nullam neque urna, iaculis quis auctor scelerisque, auctor ut risus. In rhoncus, odio consequat consequat ultrices, ex libero dictum risus, accumsan interdum nisi orci ac neque. Ut vitae sem in metus hendrerit facilisis. Mauris maximus tristique mi, quis blandit lectus convallis eget.'
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"modulus", [1024,2048,4096]
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"pad", [padding.PKCS1v15(), padding.OAEP(
mgf=padding.MGF1(algorithm=hashes.SHA256()),
algorithm=hashes.SHA256(),
label=None
)]
)
def test_decrypt_rsa(device, modulus, pad):
keyid = device.key_generation(KeyType.RSA, modulus)
pubkey = device.public_key(keyid=keyid)
message = data[:(modulus//8)-100]
ciphered = pubkey.encrypt(message, pad)
datab = device.decrypt(keyid, ciphered, pad)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
assert(datab == message)

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
import os
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers import Cipher, algorithms, modes
from picohsm import Algorithm, DOPrefixes
from picohsm.const import DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES
from const import DEFAULT_DKEK
MESSAGE = b'a secret message'
def test_prepare_aes(device):
device.initialize(dkek_shares=DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
def test_cipher_aes_cipher(device, size):
pkey = os.urandom(size // 8)
iv = b'\x00'*16
keyid = device.import_key(pkey)
cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.CBC(iv))
encryptor = cipher.encryptor()
ctA = encryptor.update(MESSAGE) + encryptor.finalize()
ctB = device.cipher(Algorithm.ALGO_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT, keyid, MESSAGE)
assert(ctB == ctA)
decryptor = cipher.decryptor()
plA = decryptor.update(ctA) + decryptor.finalize()
plB = device.cipher(Algorithm.ALGO_AES_CBC_DECRYPT, keyid, ctA)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
assert(plB == plA)
assert(plB == MESSAGE)

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
import os
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers import aead
import cryptography.exceptions
from picohsm import APDUResponse, DOPrefixes, EncryptionMode, SWCodes
from picohsm.const import DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES
from const import DEFAULT_DKEK
from binascii import hexlify
MESSAGE = b'a secret message'
AAD = b'this is a tag for AAD'
def test_prepare_chachapoly(device):
device.initialize(dkek_shares=DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
def generate_key(device):
# ChaCha uses 32 bytes key
pkey = os.urandom(256 // 8)
keyid = device.import_key(pkey)
return pkey, keyid
def test_cipher_chachapoly_cipher(device):
iv = b'\x00'*12
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device)
ctd = device.chachapoly(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, data=MESSAGE, aad=AAD)
chacha = aead.ChaCha20Poly1305(pkey)
ctg = chacha.encrypt(iv, MESSAGE, AAD)
assert(ctd == ctg)
pld = device.chachapoly(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, data=ctd, aad=AAD)
plg = chacha.decrypt(iv, ctg, AAD)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
assert(pld == plg)
assert(pld == MESSAGE)
def test_cipher_chachapoly_random_iv(device):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device)
iv = os.urandom(12)
ctd = device.chachapoly(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, data=MESSAGE, iv=iv, aad=AAD)
chacha = aead.ChaCha20Poly1305(pkey)
ctg = chacha.encrypt(iv, MESSAGE, AAD)
assert(ctd == ctg)
pld = device.chachapoly(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, data=ctd, iv=iv, aad=AAD)
plg = chacha.decrypt(iv, ctg, AAD)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
assert(pld == plg)
assert(pld == MESSAGE)
def test_cipher_chachapoly_no_aad(device):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device)
iv = os.urandom(12)
ctd = device.chachapoly(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, data=MESSAGE, iv=iv)
chacha = aead.ChaCha20Poly1305(pkey)
ctg = chacha.encrypt(iv, MESSAGE, b'')
assert(ctd == ctg)
pld = device.chachapoly(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, data=ctd, iv=iv)
plg = chacha.decrypt(iv, ctg, b'')
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
assert(pld == plg)
assert(pld == MESSAGE)
def test_cipher_chachapoly_bad_random_iv(device):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device)
iv = os.urandom(12)
ctd = device.chachapoly(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, data=MESSAGE, iv=iv, aad=AAD)
chacha = aead.ChaCha20Poly1305(pkey)
ctg = chacha.encrypt(iv, MESSAGE, AAD)
assert(ctd == ctg)
iv = os.urandom(12)
with pytest.raises(APDUResponse) as e:
pld = device.chachapoly(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, data=ctd, iv=iv, aad=AAD)
assert (e.value.sw == SWCodes.SW_WRONG_DATA)
with pytest.raises(cryptography.exceptions.InvalidTag):
plg = chacha.decrypt(iv, ctg, AAD)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
def test_cipher_chachapoly_bad_aad(device):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device)
iv = os.urandom(12)
ctd = device.chachapoly(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, data=MESSAGE, iv=iv, aad=AAD)
chacha = aead.ChaCha20Poly1305(pkey)
ctg = chacha.encrypt(iv, MESSAGE, AAD)
assert(ctd == ctg)
with pytest.raises(APDUResponse) as e:
pld = device.chachapoly(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, data=ctd, iv=iv, aad=AAD + b'bad')
assert (e.value.sw == SWCodes.SW_WRONG_DATA)
with pytest.raises(cryptography.exceptions.InvalidTag):
plg = chacha.decrypt(iv, ctg, AAD + b'bad')
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,342 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
import os
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers import Cipher, algorithms, modes, aead
import cryptography.exceptions
from picohsm import APDUResponse, DOPrefixes, EncryptionMode, SWCodes, AES
from picohsm.const import DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES
from const import DEFAULT_DKEK
from binascii import hexlify
MESSAGE = b'a secret message'
AAD = b'this is a tag for AAD'
def test_prepare_aes(device):
device.initialize(dkek_shares=DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
def generate_key(device, size):
pkey = os.urandom(size // 8)
keyid = device.import_key(pkey)
return pkey, keyid
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
def test_aes_ecb(device, size):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device, size)
ctA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, AES.ECB, MESSAGE)
cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.ECB())
encryptor = cipher.encryptor()
ctB = encryptor.update(MESSAGE) + encryptor.finalize()
assert(ctA == ctB)
dtA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, AES.ECB, ctA)
decryptor = cipher.decryptor()
dtB = decryptor.update(ctB) + decryptor.finalize()
assert(dtA == dtB)
assert(dtA == MESSAGE)
device.delete_key(keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
def test_aes_cbc_no_iv(device, size):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device, size)
ctA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, AES.CBC, MESSAGE)
iv = b'\x00' * 16
cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.CBC(iv))
encryptor = cipher.encryptor()
ctB = encryptor.update(MESSAGE) + encryptor.finalize()
assert(ctA == ctB)
dtA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, AES.CBC, ctA)
decryptor = cipher.decryptor()
dtB = decryptor.update(ctB) + decryptor.finalize()
assert(dtA == dtB)
assert(dtA == MESSAGE)
device.delete_key(keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
def test_aes_cbc_iv(device, size):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device, size)
iv = os.urandom(16)
ctA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, AES.CBC, MESSAGE, iv=iv)
cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.CBC(iv))
encryptor = cipher.encryptor()
ctB = encryptor.update(MESSAGE) + encryptor.finalize()
assert(ctA == ctB)
dtA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, AES.CBC, ctA, iv=iv)
decryptor = cipher.decryptor()
dtB = decryptor.update(ctB) + decryptor.finalize()
assert(dtA == dtB)
assert(dtA == MESSAGE)
device.delete_key(keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
def test_aes_ofb_no_iv(device, size):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device, size)
ctA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, AES.OFB, MESSAGE)
iv = b'\x00' * 16
cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.OFB(iv))
encryptor = cipher.encryptor()
ctB = encryptor.update(MESSAGE) + encryptor.finalize()
assert(ctA == ctB)
dtA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, AES.OFB, ctA)
decryptor = cipher.decryptor()
dtB = decryptor.update(ctB) + decryptor.finalize()
assert(dtA == dtB)
assert(dtA == MESSAGE)
device.delete_key(keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
def test_aes_ofb_iv(device, size):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device, size)
iv = os.urandom(16)
ctA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, AES.OFB, MESSAGE, iv=iv)
cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.OFB(iv))
encryptor = cipher.encryptor()
ctB = encryptor.update(MESSAGE) + encryptor.finalize()
assert(ctA == ctB)
dtA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, AES.OFB, ctA, iv=iv)
decryptor = cipher.decryptor()
dtB = decryptor.update(ctB) + decryptor.finalize()
assert(dtA == dtB)
assert(dtA == MESSAGE)
device.delete_key(keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
def test_aes_cfb_no_iv(device, size):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device, size)
ctA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, AES.CFB, MESSAGE)
iv = b'\x00' * 16
cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.CFB(iv))
encryptor = cipher.encryptor()
ctB = encryptor.update(MESSAGE) + encryptor.finalize()
assert(ctA == ctB)
dtA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, AES.CFB, ctA)
decryptor = cipher.decryptor()
dtB = decryptor.update(ctB) + decryptor.finalize()
assert(dtA == dtB)
assert(dtA == MESSAGE)
device.delete_key(keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
def test_aes_cfb_iv(device, size):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device, size)
iv = os.urandom(16)
ctA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, AES.CFB, MESSAGE, iv=iv)
cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.CFB(iv))
encryptor = cipher.encryptor()
ctB = encryptor.update(MESSAGE) + encryptor.finalize()
assert(ctA == ctB)
dtA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, AES.CFB, ctA, iv=iv)
decryptor = cipher.decryptor()
dtB = decryptor.update(ctB) + decryptor.finalize()
assert(dtA == dtB)
assert(dtA == MESSAGE)
device.delete_key(keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
def test_aes_gcm_no_iv(device, size):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device, size)
ctA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, AES.GCM, MESSAGE, aad=AAD)
iv = b'\x00' * 16
encryptor = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.GCM(iv)).encryptor()
encryptor.authenticate_additional_data(AAD)
ctB = encryptor.update(MESSAGE) + encryptor.finalize()
assert(ctA == ctB + encryptor.tag)
dtA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, AES.GCM, ctA, aad=AAD)
decryptor = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.GCM(iv, encryptor.tag)).decryptor()
decryptor.authenticate_additional_data(AAD)
dtB = decryptor.update(ctB) + decryptor.finalize()
assert(dtA == dtB)
assert(dtA == MESSAGE)
device.delete_key(keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
def test_aes_gcm_iv(device, size):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device, size)
iv = os.urandom(16)
ctA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, AES.GCM, MESSAGE, iv=iv, aad=AAD)
encryptor = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.GCM(iv)).encryptor()
encryptor.authenticate_additional_data(AAD)
ctB = encryptor.update(MESSAGE) + encryptor.finalize()
assert(ctA == ctB + encryptor.tag)
dtA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, AES.GCM, ctA, iv=iv, aad=AAD)
decryptor = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.GCM(iv, encryptor.tag)).decryptor()
decryptor.authenticate_additional_data(AAD)
dtB = decryptor.update(ctB) + decryptor.finalize()
assert(dtA == dtB)
assert(dtA == MESSAGE)
device.delete_key(keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [256, 512]
)
def test_aes_xts_no_iv(device, size):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device, size)
ctA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, AES.XTS, MESSAGE)
iv = b'\x00' * 16
cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.XTS(iv))
encryptor = cipher.encryptor()
ctB = encryptor.update(MESSAGE) + encryptor.finalize()
assert(ctA == ctB)
dtA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, AES.XTS, ctA)
decryptor = cipher.decryptor()
dtB = decryptor.update(ctB) + decryptor.finalize()
assert(dtA == dtB)
assert(dtA == MESSAGE)
device.delete_key(keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [256, 512]
)
def test_aes_xts_iv(device, size):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device, size)
iv = os.urandom(16)
ctA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, AES.XTS, MESSAGE, iv=iv)
cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.XTS(iv))
encryptor = cipher.encryptor()
ctB = encryptor.update(MESSAGE) + encryptor.finalize()
assert(ctA == ctB)
dtA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, AES.XTS, ctA, iv=iv)
decryptor = cipher.decryptor()
dtB = decryptor.update(ctB) + decryptor.finalize()
assert(dtA == dtB)
assert(dtA == MESSAGE)
device.delete_key(keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
def test_aes_ctr_no_iv(device, size):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device, size)
ctA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, AES.CTR, MESSAGE)
iv = b'\x00' * 16
cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.CTR(iv))
encryptor = cipher.encryptor()
ctB = encryptor.update(MESSAGE) + encryptor.finalize()
assert(ctA == ctB)
dtA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, AES.CTR, ctA)
decryptor = cipher.decryptor()
dtB = decryptor.update(ctB) + decryptor.finalize()
assert(dtA == dtB)
assert(dtA == MESSAGE)
device.delete_key(keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
def test_aes_ctr_iv(device, size):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device, size)
iv = os.urandom(16)
ctA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, AES.CTR, MESSAGE, iv=iv)
cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.CTR(iv))
encryptor = cipher.encryptor()
ctB = encryptor.update(MESSAGE) + encryptor.finalize()
assert(ctA == ctB)
dtA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, AES.CTR, ctA, iv=iv)
decryptor = cipher.decryptor()
dtB = decryptor.update(ctB) + decryptor.finalize()
assert(dtA == dtB)
assert(dtA == MESSAGE)
device.delete_key(keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
def test_aes_ccm_no_iv(device, size):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device, size)
ctA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, AES.CCM, MESSAGE, aad=AAD)
iv = b'\x00' * 12
encryptor = aead.AESCCM(pkey)
ctB = encryptor.encrypt(iv, MESSAGE, AAD)
assert(ctA == ctB)
dtA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, AES.CCM, ctA, aad=AAD)
decryptor = encryptor
dtB = decryptor.decrypt(iv, ctB, AAD)
assert(dtA == dtB)
assert(dtA == MESSAGE)
device.delete_key(keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"iv_len", [7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13]
)
def test_aes_ccm_iv(device, size, iv_len):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device, size)
iv = os.urandom(iv_len)
ctA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, AES.CCM, MESSAGE, iv=iv, aad=AAD)
encryptor = aead.AESCCM(pkey)
ctB = encryptor.encrypt(iv, MESSAGE, AAD)
assert(ctA == ctB)
dtA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, AES.CCM, ctA, iv=iv, aad=AAD)
decryptor = encryptor
dtB = decryptor.decrypt(iv, ctB, AAD)
assert(dtA == dtB)
assert(dtA == MESSAGE)
device.delete_key(keyid)

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
import os
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes, hmac, cmac
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers import algorithms
from picohsm import DOPrefixes
from picohsm.const import DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES
from const import DEFAULT_DKEK
MESSAGE = b'a secret message'
def test_prepare_aes(device):
device.initialize(dkek_shares=DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"algo", [hashes.SHA1, hashes.SHA224, hashes.SHA256, hashes.SHA384, hashes.SHA512]
)
def test_mac_hmac(device, size, algo):
pkey = os.urandom(size // 8)
keyid = device.import_key(pkey)
resA = device.hmac(algo, keyid, MESSAGE)
h = hmac.HMAC(pkey, algo())
h.update(MESSAGE)
resB = h.finalize()
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
assert(resA == resB)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
def test_mac_cmac(device, size):
pkey = os.urandom(size // 8)
keyid = device.import_key(pkey)
resA = device.cmac(keyid, MESSAGE)
c = cmac.CMAC(algorithms.AES(pkey))
c.update(MESSAGE)
resB = c.finalize()
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
assert(resA == resB)

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
import os
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.kdf.hkdf import HKDF
from cryptography import exceptions
from picohsm.const import DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES
from const import DEFAULT_DKEK
from picohsm import DOPrefixes
INFO = b'info message'
def test_prepare_kd(device):
device.initialize(dkek_shares=DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"algo", [hashes.SHA256, hashes.SHA384, hashes.SHA512]
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"out_len", [32, 64, 256, 1024]
)
class TestHKDF:
def test_hkdf_ok(self, device, size, algo, out_len):
pkey = os.urandom(size // 8)
keyid = device.import_key(pkey)
salt = os.urandom(16)
resA = device.hkdf(algo, keyid, INFO, salt, out_len=out_len)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
hkdf = HKDF(
algorithm=algo(),
length=out_len,
salt=salt,
info=INFO,
)
resB = hkdf.derive(pkey)
assert(resA == resB)
hkdf = HKDF(
algorithm=algo(),
length=out_len,
salt=salt,
info=INFO,
)
hkdf.verify(pkey, resA)
def test_hkdf_fail(self, device, size, algo, out_len):
pkey = os.urandom(size // 8)
keyid = device.import_key(pkey)
salt = os.urandom(16)
resA = device.hkdf(algo, keyid, INFO, salt, out_len=out_len)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
hkdf = HKDF(
algorithm=algo(),
length=out_len,
salt=salt,
info=INFO,
)
pkey = os.urandom(size // 8)
with pytest.raises(exceptions.InvalidKey):
hkdf.verify(pkey, resA)

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
import os
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.kdf.pbkdf2 import PBKDF2HMAC
from cryptography import exceptions
from picohsm.const import DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES
from const import DEFAULT_DKEK
from picohsm import DOPrefixes
INFO = b'info message'
def test_prepare_kd(device):
device.initialize(dkek_shares=DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"algo", [hashes.SHA1, hashes.SHA224, hashes.SHA256, hashes.SHA384, hashes.SHA512]
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"out_len", [32, 64, 256, 1024]
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"iterations", [1024, 2048]
)
class TestPBKDF2:
def test_pbkdf2_ok(self, device, size, algo, out_len, iterations):
pkey = os.urandom(size // 8)
keyid = device.import_key(pkey)
salt = os.urandom(16)
resA = device.pbkdf2(algo, keyid, salt, iterations=iterations, out_len=out_len)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
kdf = PBKDF2HMAC(
algorithm=algo(),
length=out_len,
salt=salt,
iterations=iterations,
)
resB = kdf.derive(pkey)
assert(resA == resB)
kdf = PBKDF2HMAC(
algorithm=algo(),
length=out_len,
salt=salt,
iterations=iterations,
)
kdf.verify(pkey, resA)
def test_pbkdf2_fail(self, device, size, algo, out_len, iterations):
pkey = os.urandom(size // 8)
keyid = device.import_key(pkey)
salt = os.urandom(16)
resA = device.pbkdf2(algo, keyid, salt, iterations=iterations, out_len=out_len)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
kdf = PBKDF2HMAC(
algorithm=algo(),
length=out_len,
salt=salt,
iterations=iterations,
)
pkey = os.urandom(size // 8)
with pytest.raises(exceptions.InvalidKey):
kdf.verify(pkey, resA)

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
import os
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.kdf.x963kdf import X963KDF
from cryptography import exceptions
from picohsm.const import DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES
from const import DEFAULT_DKEK
from picohsm import DOPrefixes
INFO = b'shared message'
def test_prepare_kd(device):
device.initialize(dkek_shares=DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"algo", [hashes.SHA1, hashes.SHA224, hashes.SHA256, hashes.SHA384, hashes.SHA512]
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"out_len", [32, 64, 256, 1024]
)
class TestX963:
def test_x963_ok(self, device, size, algo, out_len):
pkey = os.urandom(size // 8)
keyid = device.import_key(pkey)
resA = device.x963(algo, keyid, INFO, out_len=out_len)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
xkdf = X963KDF(
algorithm=algo(),
length=out_len,
sharedinfo=INFO,
)
resB = xkdf.derive(pkey)
assert(resA == resB)
xkdf = X963KDF(
algorithm=algo(),
length=out_len,
sharedinfo=INFO,
)
xkdf.verify(pkey, resA)
def test_x963_fail(self, device, size, algo, out_len):
pkey = os.urandom(size // 8)
keyid = device.import_key(pkey)
resA = device.x963(algo, keyid, INFO, out_len=out_len)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
xkdf = X963KDF(
algorithm=algo(),
length=out_len,
sharedinfo=INFO,
)
pkey = os.urandom(size // 8)
with pytest.raises(exceptions.InvalidKey):
xkdf.verify(pkey, resA)

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2023 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
from binascii import unhexlify, hexlify
from cvc.certificates import CVC
from picohsm.utils import int_to_bytes
from picohsm import APDUResponse, SWCodes
from const import TERM_CERT, DICA_CERT
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec, utils
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
AUT_KEY = unhexlify('0A40E11E672C28C558B72C25D93BCF28C08D39AFDD5A1A2FD3BAF7A6B27F0C2E')
aut_pk = ec.derive_private_key(int.from_bytes(AUT_KEY, 'big'), ec.BrainpoolP256R1())
AUT_PUK = unhexlify('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')
term_chr = CVC().decode(TERM_CERT).chr()
def test_initialize(device):
device.initialize(puk_auts=1, puk_min_auts=1)
device.logout()
def test_register_puk(device):
status = device.get_puk_status()
assert(status == bytes([1,1,1,0]))
status = device.register_puk(AUT_PUK, TERM_CERT, DICA_CERT)
assert(status == bytes([1,0,1,0]))
assert(device.check_puk_key(term_chr) == 0)
def test_enumerate_puk_reg(device):
puks = device.enumerate_puk()
assert(len(puks) == 1)
assert(puks[0]['status'] == 0)
def test_authentication(device):
input = device.puk_prepare_signature()
signature = aut_pk.sign(input, ec.ECDSA(hashes.SHA256()))
r,s = utils.decode_dss_signature(signature)
signature = list(int_to_bytes(r) + int_to_bytes(s))
device.authenticate_puk(term_chr, signature)
status = device.get_puk_status()
assert(status == bytes([1,0,1,1]))
def test_enumerate_puk_ok(device):
puks = device.enumerate_puk()
assert(len(puks) == 1)
assert(puks[0]['status'] == 1)
def test_check_key(device):
assert(device.check_puk_key(term_chr) == 1)
bad_chr = b'XXXXX'
assert(device.check_puk_key(bad_chr) == -1)
assert(device.check_puk_key(bad_chr) != 0)
assert(device.check_puk_key(bad_chr) != 1)
def test_puk_reset(device):
device.logout()
status = device.get_puk_status()
assert(status == bytes([1,0,1,0]))
assert(device.check_puk_key(term_chr) == 0)
def test_authentication_fail(device):
input = b'this is a fake input'
signature = aut_pk.sign(input, ec.ECDSA(hashes.SHA256()))
r,s = utils.decode_dss_signature(signature)
signature = list(int_to_bytes(r) + int_to_bytes(s))
with pytest.raises(APDUResponse) as e:
device.authenticate_puk(term_chr, signature)
assert(e.value.sw == SWCodes.SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED)
status = device.get_puk_status()
assert(status == bytes([1,0,1,0]))
assert(device.check_puk_key(term_chr) == 0)
def test_enumerate_puk_1(device):
device.initialize(puk_auts=1, puk_min_auts=1)
puks = device.enumerate_puk()
assert(len(puks) == 1)
assert(puks[0]['status'] == -1)
device.register_puk(AUT_PUK, TERM_CERT, DICA_CERT)
puks = device.enumerate_puk()
assert(len(puks) == 1)
assert(puks[0]['status'] == 0)
def test_enumerate_puk_2(device):
device.initialize(puk_auts=2, puk_min_auts=1)
puks = device.enumerate_puk()
assert(len(puks) == 2)
assert(puks[0]['status'] == -1)
assert(puks[1]['status'] == -1)
device.register_puk(AUT_PUK, TERM_CERT, DICA_CERT)
puks = device.enumerate_puk()
assert(len(puks) == 2)
assert(puks[0]['status'] == 0)
assert(puks[1]['status'] == -1)
def test_register_more_puks(device):
device.initialize(puk_auts=2, puk_min_auts=1)
status = device.get_puk_status()
assert(status == bytes([2,2,1,0]))
status = device.register_puk(AUT_PUK, TERM_CERT, DICA_CERT)
assert(status == bytes([2,1,1,0]))
def test_is_pku(device):
device.initialize(puk_auts=1, puk_min_auts=1)
assert(device.is_puk() == True)
device.initialize()
assert(device.is_puk() == False)
def test_check_puk_key(device):
device.initialize(puk_auts=1, puk_min_auts=1)
status = device.check_puk_key(term_chr)
assert(status == -1)
status = device.register_puk(AUT_PUK, TERM_CERT, DICA_CERT)
status = device.check_puk_key(term_chr)
assert(status == 0)
def test_register_puk_with_no_puk(device):
device.initialize()
with pytest.raises(APDUResponse) as e:
device.register_puk(AUT_PUK, TERM_CERT, DICA_CERT)
assert(e.value.sw == SWCodes.SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND)

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2023 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
from binascii import unhexlify, hexlify
from picohsm.utils import int_to_bytes
from const import TERM_CERT, DICA_CERT
from cvc.asn1 import ASN1
from cvc.certificates import CVC
from cvc import oid
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec
from picohsm import DOPrefixes, APDUResponse, SWCodes
KDM = unhexlify(b'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')
def test_initialize(device):
device.initialize(key_domains=1)
device.logout()
def test_create_xkek(device):
with pytest.raises(APDUResponse) as e:
device.create_xkek(KDM)
assert(e.value.sw == SWCodes.SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED)
device.login()
kcv, did = device.create_xkek(KDM)
assert(kcv == b'\x00'*8)
gskcert = ASN1().decode(KDM).find(0x30).find(0x63).data()
gskQ = CVC().decode(gskcert).pubkey().find(0x86).data()
pub = ec.EllipticCurvePublicKey.from_encoded_point(ec.BrainpoolP256R1(), bytes(gskQ))
assert(did == int_to_bytes(pub.public_numbers().x)+int_to_bytes(pub.public_numbers().y))
keyid = -1
def test_derive_xkek(device):
global keyid
keyid = device.generate_xkek_key()
resp = device.list_keys()
assert((DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid) in resp)
xkek_dom = device.get_key_domain()['xkek']
pkey = ec.generate_private_key(ec.BrainpoolP256R1())
pubkey = pkey.public_key()
cert = CVC().cert(pubkey=pubkey, scheme=oid.ID_TA_ECDSA_SHA_256, signkey=pkey, signscheme=oid.ID_TA_ECDSA_SHA_256, car=b"UTCA00001", chr=b"UTCDUMMY00001", extensions=[
{
'tag': 0x73,
'oid': b'\x2B\x06\x01\x04\x01\x81\xC3\x1F\x03\x02\x02',
'contexts': {
0: xkek_dom
}
}
]).encode()
device.derive_xkek(keyid, cert)
resp = device.get_key_domain()
assert(resp['kcv'] != b'\x00'*8)
def test_delete_xkek(device):
device.delete_xkek()
resp = device.get_key_domain()
assert(resp['kcv'] == b'\x00'*8)
def test_delete_domain_with_key(device):
with pytest.raises(APDUResponse) as e:
device.delete_key_domain()
assert(e.value.sw == SWCodes.SW_FILE_EXISTS)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX, keyid)
def test_delete_domain(device):
device.delete_key_domain()
resp = device.get_key_domain()
assert('kcv' not in resp)
assert('xkek' not in resp)
assert('error' in resp)
assert(resp['error'] == SWCodes.SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND)

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,453 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2023 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
from binascii import unhexlify, hexlify
from picohsm.utils import int_to_bytes
from picohsm.const import DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES
from const import DEFAULT_DKEK
from cvc.asn1 import ASN1
from cvc.certificates import CVC
from cvc import oid
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
from picohsm import EncryptionMode, APDUResponse, SWCodes, PicoHSM
import hashlib
TEST_STRING = b'Pico Keys are awesome!'
def sha256_sha256(data):
return hashlib.sha256(hashlib.sha256(data).digest()).digest()
def test_initialize(device):
device.initialize(dkek_shares=DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
seeds = [
{
'name': 'secp256k1',
'id': 0,
'seed': unhexlify('000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f'),
},
{
'name': 'secp256k1',
'id': 1,
'seed': unhexlify('fffcf9f6f3f0edeae7e4e1dedbd8d5d2cfccc9c6c3c0bdbab7b4b1aeaba8a5a29f9c999693908d8a8784817e7b7875726f6c696663605d5a5754514e4b484542'),
},
{
'name': 'secp256k1',
'id': 2,
'seed': unhexlify('4b381541583be4423346c643850da4b320e46a87ae3d2a4e6da11eba819cd4acba45d239319ac14f863b8d5ab5a0d0c64d2e8a1e7d1457df2e5a3c51c73235be'),
},
{
'name': 'secp256k1',
'id': 3,
'seed': unhexlify('3ddd5602285899a946114506157c7997e5444528f3003f6134712147db19b678'),
},
{
'name': 'secp256r1',
'id': 4,
'seed': unhexlify('000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f'),
},
{
'name': 'secp256r1',
'id': 5,
'seed': unhexlify('fffcf9f6f3f0edeae7e4e1dedbd8d5d2cfccc9c6c3c0bdbab7b4b1aeaba8a5a29f9c999693908d8a8784817e7b7875726f6c696663605d5a5754514e4b484542'),
},
{
'name': 'secp256r1',
'id': 6,
'seed': unhexlify('a7305bc8df8d0951f0cb224c0e95d7707cbdf2c6ce7e8d481fec69c7ff5e9446'),
},
{
'name': 'symmetric',
'id': 7,
'seed': unhexlify('c76c4ac4f4e4a00d6b274d5c39c700bb4a7ddc04fbc6f78e85ca75007b5b495f74a9043eeb77bdd53aa6fc3a0e31462270316fa04b8c19114c8798706cd02ac8'),
},
]
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"seed", seeds
)
def test_generate_master(device, seed):
resp = device.hd_generate_master_node(curve=seed['name'], id=seed['id'], seed=seed['seed'])
def hardened(i):
return 0x80000000 + i
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"path", [
{
'path': [0],
'xpub': b'xpub661MyMwAqRbcFtXgS5sYJABqqG9YLmC4Q1Rdap9gSE8NqtwybGhePY2gZ29ESFjqJoCu1Rupje8YtGqsefD265TMg7usUDFdp6W1EGMcet8',
},
{
'path': [0, hardened(0)],
'xpub': b'xpub68Gmy5EdvgibQVfPdqkBBCHxA5htiqg55crXYuXoQRKfDBFA1WEjWgP6LHhwBZeNK1VTsfTFUHCdrfp1bgwQ9xv5ski8PX9rL2dZXvgGDnw',
},
{
'path': [0, hardened(0), 1],
'xpub': b'xpub6ASuArnXKPbfEwhqN6e3mwBcDTgzisQN1wXN9BJcM47sSikHjJf3UFHKkNAWbWMiGj7Wf5uMash7SyYq527Hqck2AxYysAA7xmALppuCkwQ',
},
{
'path': [0, hardened(0), 1, hardened(2)],
'xpub': b'xpub6D4BDPcP2GT577Vvch3R8wDkScZWzQzMMUm3PWbmWvVJrZwQY4VUNgqFJPMM3No2dFDFGTsxxpG5uJh7n7epu4trkrX7x7DogT5Uv6fcLW5',
},
{
'path': [0, hardened(0), 1, hardened(2), 2],
'xpub': b'xpub6FHa3pjLCk84BayeJxFW2SP4XRrFd1JYnxeLeU8EqN3vDfZmbqBqaGJAyiLjTAwm6ZLRQUMv1ZACTj37sR62cfN7fe5JnJ7dh8zL4fiyLHV',
},
{
'path': [0, hardened(0), 1, hardened(2), 2, 1000000000],
'xpub': b'xpub6H1LXWLaKsWFhvm6RVpEL9P4KfRZSW7abD2ttkWP3SSQvnyA8FSVqNTEcYFgJS2UaFcxupHiYkro49S8yGasTvXEYBVPamhGW6cFJodrTHy',
},
{
'path': [1],
'xpub': b'xpub661MyMwAqRbcFW31YEwpkMuc5THy2PSt5bDMsktWQcFF8syAmRUapSCGu8ED9W6oDMSgv6Zz8idoc4a6mr8BDzTJY47LJhkJ8UB7WEGuduB',
},
{
'path': [1, 0],
'xpub': b'xpub69H7F5d8KSRgmmdJg2KhpAK8SR3DjMwAdkxj3ZuxV27CprR9LgpeyGmXUbC6wb7ERfvrnKZjXoUmmDznezpbZb7ap6r1D3tgFxHmwMkQTPH',
},
{
'path': [1, 0, hardened(2147483647)],
'xpub': b'xpub6ASAVgeehLbnwdqV6UKMHVzgqAG8Gr6riv3Fxxpj8ksbH9ebxaEyBLZ85ySDhKiLDBrQSARLq1uNRts8RuJiHjaDMBU4Zn9h8LZNnBC5y4a',
},
{
'path': [1, 0, hardened(2147483647), 1],
'xpub': b'xpub6DF8uhdarytz3FWdA8TvFSvvAh8dP3283MY7p2V4SeE2wyWmG5mg5EwVvmdMVCQcoNJxGoWaU9DCWh89LojfZ537wTfunKau47EL2dhHKon',
},
{
'path': [1, 0, hardened(2147483647), 1, hardened(2147483646)],
'xpub': b'xpub6ERApfZwUNrhLCkDtcHTcxd75RbzS1ed54G1LkBUHQVHQKqhMkhgbmJbZRkrgZw4koxb5JaHWkY4ALHY2grBGRjaDMzQLcgJvLJuZZvRcEL',
},
{
'path': [1, 0, hardened(2147483647), 1, hardened(2147483646), 2],
'xpub': b'xpub6FnCn6nSzZAw5Tw7cgR9bi15UV96gLZhjDstkXXxvCLsUXBGXPdSnLFbdpq8p9HmGsApME5hQTZ3emM2rnY5agb9rXpVGyy3bdW6EEgAtqt',
},
{
'path': [2],
'xpub': b'xpub661MyMwAqRbcEZVB4dScxMAdx6d4nFc9nvyvH3v4gJL378CSRZiYmhRoP7mBy6gSPSCYk6SzXPTf3ND1cZAceL7SfJ1Z3GC8vBgp2epUt13',
},
{
'path': [2, hardened(0)],
'xpub': b'xpub68NZiKmJWnxxS6aaHmn81bvJeTESw724CRDs6HbuccFQN9Ku14VQrADWgqbhhTHBaohPX4CjNLf9fq9MYo6oDaPPLPxSb7gwQN3ih19Zm4Y',
},
{
'path': [3],
'xpub': b'xpub661MyMwAqRbcGczjuMoRm6dXaLDEhW1u34gKenbeYqAix21mdUKJyuyu5F1rzYGVxyL6tmgBUAEPrEz92mBXjByMRiJdba9wpnN37RLLAXa',
},
{
'path': [3, hardened(0)],
'xpub': b'xpub69AUMk3qDBi3uW1sXgjCmVjJ2G6WQoYSnNHyzkmdCHEhSZ4tBok37xfFEqHd2AddP56Tqp4o56AePAgCjYdvpW2PU2jbUPFKsav5ut6Ch1m',
},
{
'path': [3, hardened(0), hardened(1)],
'xpub': b'xpub6BJA1jSqiukeaesWfxe6sNK9CCGaujFFSJLomWHprUL9DePQ4JDkM5d88n49sMGJxrhpjazuXYWdMf17C9T5XnxkopaeS7jGk1GyyVziaMt',
},
]
)
def test_derive_node_bip(device, path):
resp = device.hd_derive_node(path['path'])
assert(resp == path['xpub'])
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"path", [
{
'path': [0],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('00000000'),
'chain': unhexlify('873dff81c02f525623fd1fe5167eac3a55a049de3d314bb42ee227ffed37d508'),
'public': unhexlify('0339a36013301597daef41fbe593a02cc513d0b55527ec2df1050e2e8ff49c85c2')
},
{
'path': [0, hardened(0)],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('3442193e'),
'chain': unhexlify('47fdacbd0f1097043b78c63c20c34ef4ed9a111d980047ad16282c7ae6236141'),
'public': unhexlify('035a784662a4a20a65bf6aab9ae98a6c068a81c52e4b032c0fb5400c706cfccc56')
},
{
'path': [0, hardened(0), 1],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('5c1bd648'),
'chain': unhexlify('2a7857631386ba23dacac34180dd1983734e444fdbf774041578e9b6adb37c19'),
'public': unhexlify('03501e454bf00751f24b1b489aa925215d66af2234e3891c3b21a52bedb3cd711c')
},
{
'path': [0, hardened(0), 1, hardened(2)],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('bef5a2f9'),
'chain': unhexlify('04466b9cc8e161e966409ca52986c584f07e9dc81f735db683c3ff6ec7b1503f'),
'public': unhexlify('0357bfe1e341d01c69fe5654309956cbea516822fba8a601743a012a7896ee8dc2')
},
{
'path': [0, hardened(0), 1, hardened(2), 2],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('ee7ab90c'),
'chain': unhexlify('cfb71883f01676f587d023cc53a35bc7f88f724b1f8c2892ac1275ac822a3edd'),
'public': unhexlify('02e8445082a72f29b75ca48748a914df60622a609cacfce8ed0e35804560741d29')
},
{
'path': [0, hardened(0), 1, hardened(2), 2, 1000000000],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('d880d7d8'),
'chain': unhexlify('c783e67b921d2beb8f6b389cc646d7263b4145701dadd2161548a8b078e65e9e'),
'public': unhexlify('022a471424da5e657499d1ff51cb43c47481a03b1e77f951fe64cec9f5a48f7011')
},
{
'path': [4],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('00000000'),
'chain': unhexlify('beeb672fe4621673f722f38529c07392fecaa61015c80c34f29ce8b41b3cb6ea'),
'public': unhexlify('0266874dc6ade47b3ecd096745ca09bcd29638dd52c2c12117b11ed3e458cfa9e8')
},
{
'path': [4, hardened(0)],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('be6105b5'),
'chain': unhexlify('3460cea53e6a6bb5fb391eeef3237ffd8724bf0a40e94943c98b83825342ee11'),
'public': unhexlify('0384610f5ecffe8fda089363a41f56a5c7ffc1d81b59a612d0d649b2d22355590c')
},
{
'path': [4, hardened(0), 1],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('9b02312f'),
'chain': unhexlify('4187afff1aafa8445010097fb99d23aee9f599450c7bd140b6826ac22ba21d0c'),
'public': unhexlify('03526c63f8d0b4bbbf9c80df553fe66742df4676b241dabefdef67733e070f6844')
},
{
'path': [4, hardened(0), 1, hardened(2)],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('b98005c1'),
'chain': unhexlify('98c7514f562e64e74170cc3cf304ee1ce54d6b6da4f880f313e8204c2a185318'),
'public': unhexlify('0359cf160040778a4b14c5f4d7b76e327ccc8c4a6086dd9451b7482b5a4972dda0')
},
{
'path': [4, hardened(0), 1, hardened(2), 2],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('0e9f3274'),
'chain': unhexlify('ba96f776a5c3907d7fd48bde5620ee374d4acfd540378476019eab70790c63a0'),
'public': unhexlify('029f871f4cb9e1c97f9f4de9ccd0d4a2f2a171110c61178f84430062230833ff20')
},
{
'path': [4, hardened(0), 1, hardened(2), 2, 1000000000],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('8b2b5c4b'),
'chain': unhexlify('b9b7b82d326bb9cb5b5b121066feea4eb93d5241103c9e7a18aad40f1dde8059'),
'public': unhexlify('02216cd26d31147f72427a453c443ed2cde8a1e53c9cc44e5ddf739725413fe3f4')
},
{
'path': [1],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('00000000'),
'chain': unhexlify('60499f801b896d83179a4374aeb7822aaeaceaa0db1f85ee3e904c4defbd9689'),
'public': unhexlify('03cbcaa9c98c877a26977d00825c956a238e8dddfbd322cce4f74b0b5bd6ace4a7')
},
{
'path': [1, 0],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('bd16bee5'),
'chain': unhexlify('f0909affaa7ee7abe5dd4e100598d4dc53cd709d5a5c2cac40e7412f232f7c9c'),
'public': unhexlify('02fc9e5af0ac8d9b3cecfe2a888e2117ba3d089d8585886c9c826b6b22a98d12ea')
},
{
'path': [1, 0, hardened(2147483647)],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('5a61ff8e'),
'chain': unhexlify('be17a268474a6bb9c61e1d720cf6215e2a88c5406c4aee7b38547f585c9a37d9'),
'public': unhexlify('03c01e7425647bdefa82b12d9bad5e3e6865bee0502694b94ca58b666abc0a5c3b')
},
{
'path': [1, 0, hardened(2147483647), 1],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('d8ab4937'),
'chain': unhexlify('f366f48f1ea9f2d1d3fe958c95ca84ea18e4c4ddb9366c336c927eb246fb38cb'),
'public': unhexlify('03a7d1d856deb74c508e05031f9895dab54626251b3806e16b4bd12e781a7df5b9')
},
{
'path': [1, 0, hardened(2147483647), 1, hardened(2147483646)],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('78412e3a'),
'chain': unhexlify('637807030d55d01f9a0cb3a7839515d796bd07706386a6eddf06cc29a65a0e29'),
'public': unhexlify('02d2b36900396c9282fa14628566582f206a5dd0bcc8d5e892611806cafb0301f0')
},
{
'path': [1, 0, hardened(2147483647), 1, hardened(2147483646), 2],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('31a507b8'),
'chain': unhexlify('9452b549be8cea3ecb7a84bec10dcfd94afe4d129ebfd3b3cb58eedf394ed271'),
'public': unhexlify('024d902e1a2fc7a8755ab5b694c575fce742c48d9ff192e63df5193e4c7afe1f9c')
},
{
'path': [5],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('00000000'),
'chain': unhexlify('96cd4465a9644e31528eda3592aa35eb39a9527769ce1855beafc1b81055e75d'),
'public': unhexlify('02c9e16154474b3ed5b38218bb0463e008f89ee03e62d22fdcc8014beab25b48fa')
},
{
'path': [5, 0],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('607f628f'),
'chain': unhexlify('84e9c258bb8557a40e0d041115b376dd55eda99c0042ce29e81ebe4efed9b86a'),
'public': unhexlify('039b6df4bece7b6c81e2adfeea4bcf5c8c8a6e40ea7ffa3cf6e8494c61a1fc82cc')
},
{
'path': [5, 0, hardened(2147483647)],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('946d2a54'),
'chain': unhexlify('f235b2bc5c04606ca9c30027a84f353acf4e4683edbd11f635d0dcc1cd106ea6'),
'public': unhexlify('02f89c5deb1cae4fedc9905f98ae6cbf6cbab120d8cb85d5bd9a91a72f4c068c76')
},
{
'path': [5, 0, hardened(2147483647), 1],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('218182d8'),
'chain': unhexlify('7c0b833106235e452eba79d2bdd58d4086e663bc8cc55e9773d2b5eeda313f3b'),
'public': unhexlify('03abe0ad54c97c1d654c1852dfdc32d6d3e487e75fa16f0fd6304b9ceae4220c64')
},
{
'path': [5, 0, hardened(2147483647), 1, hardened(2147483646)],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('931223e4'),
'chain': unhexlify('5794e616eadaf33413aa309318a26ee0fd5163b70466de7a4512fd4b1a5c9e6a'),
'public': unhexlify('03cb8cb067d248691808cd6b5a5a06b48e34ebac4d965cba33e6dc46fe13d9b933')
},
{
'path': [5, 0, hardened(2147483647), 1, hardened(2147483646), 2],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('956c4629'),
'chain': unhexlify('3bfb29ee8ac4484f09db09c2079b520ea5616df7820f071a20320366fbe226a7'),
'public': unhexlify('020ee02e18967237cf62672983b253ee62fa4dd431f8243bfeccdf39dbe181387f')
},
{
'path': [4],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('00000000'),
'chain': unhexlify('beeb672fe4621673f722f38529c07392fecaa61015c80c34f29ce8b41b3cb6ea'),
'public': unhexlify('0266874dc6ade47b3ecd096745ca09bcd29638dd52c2c12117b11ed3e458cfa9e8')
},
{
'path': [4, hardened(28578)],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('be6105b5'),
'chain': unhexlify('e94c8ebe30c2250a14713212f6449b20f3329105ea15b652ca5bdfc68f6c65c2'),
'public': unhexlify('02519b5554a4872e8c9c1c847115363051ec43e93400e030ba3c36b52a3e70a5b7')
},
{
'path': [4, hardened(28578), 33941],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('3e2b7bc6'),
'chain': unhexlify('9e87fe95031f14736774cd82f25fd885065cb7c358c1edf813c72af535e83071'),
'public': unhexlify('0235bfee614c0d5b2cae260000bb1d0d84b270099ad790022c1ae0b2e782efe120')
},
{
'path': [6],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('00000000'),
'chain': unhexlify('7762f9729fed06121fd13f326884c82f59aa95c57ac492ce8c9654e60efd130c'),
'public': unhexlify('0383619fadcde31063d8c5cb00dbfe1713f3e6fa169d8541a798752a1c1ca0cb20')
},
]
)
def test_derive_node_xpub(device, path):
resp = device.hd_derive_node(path['path'])
xpub = PicoHSM.hd_decode_xpub(resp)
assert(xpub['fingerprint'] == path['fingerprint'])
assert(xpub['chain'] == path['chain'])
assert(xpub['public'] == path['public'])
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"path", [
{
'path': [7],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('00000000'),
'chain': unhexlify('8F8C33732530A0417DD446097EDB6F6617D52D627C6DB28581D74D11B385D25A'),
'public': unhexlify('dbf12b44133eaab506a740f6565cc117228cbf1dd70635cfa8ddfdc9af734756')
},
{
'path': [7, b"SLIP-0021"],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('0e521cdd'),
'chain': unhexlify('446ADED06078CF950DAB737F014C7BAE81EEB6E7BEECC260A38E2E0FA9973104'),
'public': unhexlify('1d065e3ac1bbe5c7fad32cf2305f7d709dc070d672044a19e610c77cdf33de0d')
},
{
'path': [7, b"SLIP-0021", b"Master encryption key"],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('4a6e721d'),
'chain': unhexlify('7072D5593032B84A90E2E2E42996D277026FF55C1082AC82A121D775FED0ACEB'),
'public': unhexlify('ea163130e35bbafdf5ddee97a17b39cef2be4b4f390180d65b54cf05c6a82fde')
},
{
'path': [7, b"SLIP-0021", b"Authentication key"],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('4a6e721d'),
'chain': unhexlify('3D5C87DC62CE006681B8C3DF723AE50FEEA40D6C26AEF8135BD321BA390A5B42'),
'public': unhexlify('47194e938ab24cc82bfa25f6486ed54bebe79c40ae2a5a32ea6db294d81861a6')
},
]
)
def test_derive_node_slip(device, path):
resp = device.hd_derive_node(path['path'])
xpub = PicoHSM.hd_decode_xpub(resp)
assert(xpub['fingerprint'] == path['fingerprint'])
assert(xpub['chain'] == sha256_sha256(path['chain']))
assert(xpub['public'] == sha256_sha256(path['public']))
def get_master_curve(mid):
for m in seeds:
if (m['id'] == mid):
if (m['name'] == 'secp256k1'):
return ec.SECP256K1()
elif (m['name'] == 'secp256r1'):
return ec.SECP256R1()
return None
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"path", [
[0],
[0, hardened(0)],
[0, hardened(0), 1],
[0, hardened(0), 1, hardened(2)],
[0, hardened(0), 1, hardened(2), 2],
[0, hardened(0), 1, hardened(2), 2, 1000000000],
[1],
[1, 0],
[1, 0, hardened(2147483647)],
[1, 0, hardened(2147483647), 1],
[1, 0, hardened(2147483647), 1, hardened(2147483646)],
[1, 0, hardened(2147483647), 1, hardened(2147483646), 2],
[4],
[4, hardened(0)],
[4, hardened(0), 1],
[4, hardened(0), 1, hardened(2)],
[4, hardened(0), 1, hardened(2), 2],
[4, hardened(0), 1, hardened(2), 2, 1000000000],
[5],
[5, 0],
[5, 0, hardened(2147483647)],
[5, 0, hardened(2147483647), 1],
[5, 0, hardened(2147483647), 1, hardened(2147483646)],
[5, 0, hardened(2147483647), 1, hardened(2147483646), 2],
]
)
def test_signature(device, path):
pub = device.hd_derive_node(path)
xpub = PicoHSM.hd_decode_xpub(pub)
curve = get_master_curve(path[0])
pubkey = ec.EllipticCurvePublicKey.from_encoded_point(curve, xpub['public'])
resp = device.hd_signature(path, TEST_STRING)
pubkey.verify(resp, TEST_STRING, ec.ECDSA(hashes.SHA256()))
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"path", [
[7],
[7, b"SLIP-0021"],
[7, b"SLIP-0021", b"Master encryption key"],
[7, b"SLIP-0021", b"Authentication key"],
]
)
def test_signature_slip(device, path):
pub = device.hd_derive_node(path)
with pytest.raises(APDUResponse) as e:
resp = device.hd_signature(path, TEST_STRING)
assert (e.value.sw == SWCodes.SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"ask_on_encrypt", [True, False]
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"ask_on_decrypt", [True, False]
)
def test_cipher_slip(device, ask_on_encrypt, ask_on_decrypt):
MSG1 = b"testing message!"
enctext = device.hd_cipher([7, b"\x01", b"\x02"], b"test", MSG1, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, ask_on_encrypt, ask_on_decrypt)
resp = device.hd_cipher([7, b"\x01", b"\x02"], b"test", enctext, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, ask_on_encrypt, ask_on_decrypt)
assert(resp == MSG1)

11
tests/run-test-in-docker.sh Executable file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
#!/bin/bash -eu
source tests/docker_env.sh
if [[ $1 == "pkcs11" ]]; then
run_in_docker ./tests/start-up-and-test-pkcs11.sh
elif [[ $1 == "sc-hsm-pkcs11" ]]; then
run_in_docker ./tests/scripts/sc_hsm_test.sh
else
run_in_docker ./tests/start-up-and-test.sh
fi

38
tests/scripts/aes.sh Executable file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
#!/bin/bash
source ./tests/scripts/func.sh
reset
test $? -eq 0 || exit $?
TEST_DATA="This is a text."
echo "${TEST_DATA}" > test
sc_tool() {
pkcs11-tool --module /usr/local/lib/libsc-hsm-pkcs11.so -l --pin 648219 $@
}
aeses=("16" "24" "32")
for aes in ${aeses[*]}; do
echo " Test AES (AES:${aes})"
echo -n " Keygen... "
sc_tool --keygen --key-type "AES:${aes}" --id 1 --label "AES:${aes}" > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
e=$(sc_tool --list-object --type secrkey 2>&1)
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
grep -q "AES length ${aes}" <<< $e && echo -n "." || exit $?
grep -q "AES:${aes}" <<< $e && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
echo -n " Encryption..."
sc_tool --encrypt --id 1 --input-file test --mechanism aes-cbc > crypted.aes 2>/dev/null
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
echo -n " Decryption..."
e=$(sc_tool --decrypt --id 1 --input-file crypted.aes --mechanism aes-cbc 2>/dev/null)
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
grep -q "${TEST_DATA}" <<< $e && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
sc_tool --delete --type secrkey --id 1 > /dev/null 2>&1
done
rm -rf test crypted.aes

62
tests/scripts/asym_cipher.sh Executable file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
#!/bin/bash
source ./tests/scripts/func.sh
reset
test $? -eq 0 || exit $?
rsa_encrypt_decrypt() {
openssl pkeyutl -encrypt -pubin -inkey 1.pub $2 -in $1 -out data.crypt
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
TDATA=$(tr -d '\0' < <(pkcs11-tool --id 1 --pin 648219 --decrypt $3 -i data.crypt 2>/dev/null))
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
if [[ ${TEST_STRING} != "$TDATA" ]]; then
exit 1
fi
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
}
TEST_STRING="This is a test string. Be safe, be secure."
echo ${TEST_STRING} > data
echo -n " Keygen RSA 2048..."
keygen_and_export rsa:2048
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
echo -n " Test RSA-PKCS ciphering..."
rsa_encrypt_decrypt data "-pkeyopt rsa_padding_mode:pkcs1" "--mechanism RSA-PKCS"
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
echo -n " Test RSA-X-509 ciphering..."
cp data data_pad
tlen=${#TEST_STRING}
dd if=/dev/zero bs=1 count=$((256-$tlen-1)) >> data_pad 2> /dev/null
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
rsa_encrypt_decrypt data_pad "-pkeyopt rsa_padding_mode:none" "--mechanism RSA-X-509"
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
echo -n " Test RSA-PKCS-OAEP ciphering..."
rsa_encrypt_decrypt data "-pkeyopt rsa_padding_mode:oaep -pkeyopt rsa_oaep_md:sha256 -pkeyopt rsa_mgf1_md:sha256" "--mechanism RSA-PKCS-OAEP"
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
rm -rf data* 1.*
pkcs11-tool -l --pin 648219 --delete-object --type privkey --id 1 > /dev/null 2>&1
algs=("secp192r1" "secp256r1" "secp384r1" "secp521r1" "brainpoolP256r1" "brainpoolP384r1" "brainpoolP512r1" "secp192k1" "secp256k1")
for alg in ${algs[*]}; do
echo -n " Test EC derive with ${alg}..."
keygen_and_export ec:${alg}
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
openssl ecparam -genkey -name ${alg} > bob.pem 2>/dev/null
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
openssl ec -in bob.pem -pubout -outform DER > bob.der 2>/dev/null
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
pkcs11-tool --pin 648219 --id 1 --derive -i bob.der -o mine-bob.der > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
openssl pkeyutl -derive -out bob-mine.der -inkey bob.pem -peerkey 1.pub 2>/dev/null
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
cmp bob-mine.der mine-bob.der
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
rm -rf data* 1.*
pkcs11-tool -l --pin 648219 --delete-object --type privkey --id 1 > /dev/null 2>&1
done

60
tests/scripts/backup.sh Executable file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
#!/bin/bash
source ./tests/scripts/func.sh
reset
test $? -eq 0 || exit $?
sc_backup() {
for i in $(seq 1 $1); do
sc-hsm-tool --create-dkek-share dkek.${i}.pbe --password testpw > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
done
sc-hsm-tool --initialize --so-pin 3537363231383830 --pin 648219 --dkek-shares $1 > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
pkcs11-tool -l --pin 648219 -I > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
for i in $(seq 1 $1); do
e=$(sc-hsm-tool --import-dkek-share dkek.${i}.pbe --password testpw 2>&1)
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
grep -q "DKEK share imported" <<< $e && echo -n "." || exit $?
grep -q "DKEK shares[[:blank:]]*: $1" <<< $e && echo -n "." || exit $?
if [[ $i -lt $1 ]]; then
grep -q "DKEK import pending, $(( $1 - $i ))" <<< $e && echo -n "." || exit $?
fi
done
# Store DKEK, since it is not logged in
pkcs11-tool -l --pin 648219 -I > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
}
echo -n " Test single DKEK..."
sc_backup 1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
echo -n " Test multiple DKEK..."
sc_backup 3
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
rm -rf dkek.*.pbe
echo " Test backup and restore"
algs=("rsa:1024" "rsa:2048" "ec:secp192r1" "ec:secp256r1" "ec:secp384r1" "ec:secp521r1" "ec:brainpoolP256r1" "ec:brainpoolP384r1" "ec:brainpoolP512r1" "ec:secp192k1" "ec:secp256k1")
for alg in ${algs[*]}; do
echo -n " Keygen ${alg}..."
gen_and_check ${alg}
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
echo -n " Wrap key..."
sc-hsm-tool --wrap-key wrap-key.bin --key-reference 1 --pin 648219 > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
e=$(pkcs15-tool -D 2>&1)
grep -q "Key ref[[:blank:]]*: 10" <<< $e && exit $? || echo -e ".\t${OK}"
echo -n " Unwrap key..."
sc-hsm-tool --unwrap-key wrap-key.bin --key-reference 10 --pin 648219 --force > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
e=$(pkcs15-tool -D 2>&1)
grep -q "Key ref[[:blank:]]*: 10" <<< $e && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
echo -n " Cleaning..."
pkcs11-tool -l --pin 648219 --delete-object --type privkey --id 1 > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
pkcs11-tool -l --pin 648219 --delete-object --type privkey --id 1 > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
done

52
tests/scripts/func.sh Executable file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
#!/bin/bash
OK="\033[32mok\033[0m"
FAIL="\033[31mfail\033[0m"
gen_and_check() {
e=$(pkcs11-tool -l --pin 648219 --keypairgen --key-type $1 --id 1 --label "TestLabel" 2>&1)
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
glabel=""
case $1 in
*"192"*)
glabel="EC_POINT 192 bits"
;;
*"256"*)
glabel="EC_POINT 256 bits"
;;
*"384"*)
glabel="EC_POINT 384 bits"
;;
*"512"*)
glabel="EC_POINT 512 bits"
;;
*"521"*)
glabel="EC_POINT 528 bits"
;;
*"rsa"*)
IFS=: read -r v1 bits <<< "$1"
glabel="RSA ${bits} bits"
;;
esac
grep -q "${glabel}" <<< $e && echo -n "." || exit $?
}
gen_and_delete() {
gen_and_check $1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
pkcs11-tool -l --pin 648219 --delete-object --type privkey --id 1 > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
}
reset() {
python3 tools/pico-hsm-tool.py --pin 648219 initialize --so-pin 57621880 --silent > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 || exit $?
}
keygen_and_export() {
gen_and_check $1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
pkcs11-tool --read-object --pin 648219 --id 1 --type pubkey > 1.der 2>/dev/null
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
IFS=: read -r mk bts <<< "$1"
openssl ${mk} -inform DER -outform PEM -in 1.der -pubin > 1.pub 2>/dev/null
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
}

49
tests/scripts/initialize.sh Executable file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
#!/bin/bash
source ./tests/scripts/func.sh
reset
# Change SO-PIN
echo -n " Test SO-PIN change..."
pkcs11-tool --login --login-type so --so-pin 3537363231383830 --change-pin --new-pin 0123456789012345 > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
pkcs11-tool --login --login-type so --so-pin 0123456789012345 --change-pin --new-pin 3537363231383830 > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
# Change PIN
echo -n " Test PIN change..."
pkcs11-tool --login --pin 648219 --change-pin --new-pin 123456 > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
# Reset PIN
echo -n " Test PIN reset..."
pkcs11-tool --login --login-type so --so-pin 3537363231383830 --init-pin --new-pin 648219 > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
# Change PIN
pkcs11-tool --login --pin 648219 --change-pin --new-pin 123456 > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
pkcs11-tool --login --pin 123456 --change-pin --new-pin 648219 > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
# Wrong PIN (1st and 2nd PIN_INCORRECT, 3rd PIN_LOCKED)
echo -n " Test wrong PIN attempts..."
e=$(pkcs11-tool --login --pin 123456 -I 2>&1)
test $? -eq 1 && echo -n "." || exit $?
grep -q CKR_PIN_INCORRECT <<< $e && echo -n "." || exit $?
e=$(pkcs11-tool --login --pin 123456 -I 2>&1)
test $? -eq 1 && echo -n "." || exit $?
grep -q CKR_PIN_INCORRECT <<< $e && echo -n "." || exit $?
e=$(pkcs11-tool --login --pin 123456 -I 2>&1)
test $? -eq 1 && echo -n "." || exit $?
grep -q CKR_PIN_LOCKED <<< $e && echo -e "\t${OK}" || exit $?
# Reset PIN
echo -n " Test restore PIN..."
pkcs11-tool --login --login-type so --so-pin 3537363231383830 --init-pin --new-pin 648219 > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
pkcs11-tool --login --pin 648219 -I > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e "\t${OK}" || exit $?

13
tests/scripts/keygen.sh Executable file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
#!/bin/bash
source ./tests/scripts/func.sh
reset
test $? -eq 0 || exit $?
algs=("rsa:1024" "rsa:2048" "ec:secp192r1" "ec:secp256r1" "ec:secp384r1" "ec:secp521r1" "ec:brainpoolP256r1" "ec:brainpoolP384r1" "ec:brainpoolP512r1" "ec:secp192k1" "ec:secp256k1")
for alg in ${algs[*]}; do
IFS=: read -r a s <<< "${alg}"
au=$(awk '{print toupper($0)}' <<<${a})
echo -n " Test ${au} ${s}..."
gen_and_delete ${alg} && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
done

58
tests/scripts/pkcs11.sh Executable file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
#!/bin/bash
source ./tests/scripts/func.sh
echo "==== Test initialization ===="
./tests/scripts/initialize.sh
test $? -eq 0 || {
echo -e "\t${FAIL}"
exit 1
}
echo "==== Test keygen ===="
./tests/scripts/keygen.sh
test $? -eq 0 || {
echo -e "\t${FAIL}"
exit 1
}
echo "==== Test sign and verify ===="
./tests/scripts/sign_and_verify.sh
test $? -eq 0 || {
echo -e "\t${FAIL}"
exit 1
}
echo "==== Test asymmetric ciphering ===="
./tests/scripts/asym_cipher.sh
test $? -eq 0 || {
echo -e "\t${FAIL}"
exit 1
}
echo "==== Test binary storage ===="
./tests/scripts/store_binary.sh
test $? -eq 0 || {
echo -e "\t${FAIL}"
exit 1
}
echo "==== Test AES ===="
./tests/scripts/aes.sh
test $? -eq 0 || {
echo -e "\t${FAIL}"
exit 1
}
echo "==== Test PKCS11-tool ===="
./tests/scripts/pkcs11_test.sh
test $? -eq 0 || {
echo -e "\t${FAIL}"
exit 1
}
echo "==== Test backup and restore ===="
./tests/scripts/backup.sh
test $? -eq 0 || {
echo -e "\t${FAIL}"
exit 1
}

17
tests/scripts/pkcs11_test.sh Executable file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
#!/bin/bash
source ./tests/scripts/func.sh
reset
test $? -eq 0 || exit $?
echo -n " Test PKCS11 tool..."
gen_and_check rsa:2048
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
e=$(pkcs11-tool --test -l --pin 648219 2>&1)
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
grep -q "No errors" <<< $e && echo -n "." || exit $?
pkcs11-tool -l --pin 648219 --delete-object --type privkey --id 1 > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
#e=$(pkcs11-tool --test-ec -l --pin 648219 --id 1 --key-type ec:secp256r1 2>&1)
#test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
#grep -q "==> OK" <<< $e && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?

24
tests/scripts/sc_hsm_test.sh Executable file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
#!/bin/bash
source ./tests/startup.sh
echo "==== Test SC HSM ===="
echo -n " Running sc-hsm-pkcs11-test..."
pkcs11-tool -l --pin 648219 --keypairgen --key-type ec:secp256r1 --id 1 --label "TestLabel" > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || {
echo -e "\t${FAIL}"
exit 1
}
e=$(/usr/local/bin/sc-hsm-pkcs11-test --module /usr/local/lib/libsc-hsm-pkcs11.so --pin 648219 --invasive 2>&1)
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || {
echo -e "\t${FAIL}"
exit 1
}
grep -q "338 tests performed" <<< $e && echo -n "." || {
echo -e "\t${FAIL}"
exit 1
}
grep -q "0 tests failed" <<< $e && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || {
echo -e "\t${FAIL}"
exit 1
}

126
tests/scripts/sign_and_verify.sh Executable file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
#!/bin/bash
source ./tests/scripts/func.sh
reset
test $? -eq 0 || exit $?
TEST_DATA="This is a test string. Be safe, be secure."
echo ${TEST_DATA} > data
create_dgst() {
openssl dgst -$1 -binary -out data.$1 data > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
}
dgsts=("sha256" "sha384" "sha512")
for dgst in ${dgsts[*]}; do
echo -n " Create digest ${dgst}..."
create_dgst ${dgst}
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
done
# $1 sign mechanism
# $2 sign input file
# $3 sign parameters
# $4 vrfy input file
# $5 vrfy parameters
sign_and_verify() {
pkcs11-tool --id 1 --sign --pin 648219 --mechanism $1 -i $2 -o data.sig $3 > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
e=$(openssl pkeyutl -verify -pubin -inkey 1.pub -in $4 -sigfile data.sig $5 2>&1)
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
grep -q "Signature Verified Successfully" <<< $e && echo -n "." || exit $?
}
sign_and_verify_rsa_pkcs() {
dgstl=$(awk '{print tolower($0)}' <<<$1)
dgstu=$(awk '{print toupper($0)}' <<<$1)
sign_and_verify "${dgstu}-RSA-PKCS" data "" data.${dgstl} "-pkeyopt digest:${dgstl}"
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
}
sign_and_verify_rsa_pss() {
dgstl=$(awk '{print tolower($0)}' <<<$1)
dgstu=$(awk '{print toupper($0)}' <<<$1)
sign_and_verify "RSA-PKCS-PSS" data.${dgstl} "--mgf MGF1-${dgstu} --hash-algorithm ${dgstu}" data.${dgstl} "-pkeyopt rsa_padding_mode:pss -pkeyopt rsa_pss_saltlen:-1 -pkeyopt digest:${dgstl}"
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
}
sign_and_verify_rsa_pss_dgst() {
dgstl=$(awk '{print tolower($0)}' <<<$1)
dgstu=$(awk '{print toupper($0)}' <<<$1)
sign_and_verify "${dgstu}-RSA-PKCS-PSS" data "" data.${dgstl} "-pkeyopt rsa_padding_mode:pss -pkeyopt rsa_pss_saltlen:-1 -pkeyopt digest:${dgstl}"
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
}
keygen_sign_and_verify_ec() {
echo " Test ECDSA with $1"
echo -n " Keygen $1..."
keygen_and_export $1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
for dgst in ${dgsts[*]}; do
dgstu=$(awk '{print toupper($0)}' <<<${dgst})
echo -n " Test ECDSA with ${dgst} and $1..."
sign_and_verify ECDSA "data.${dgst}" "--signature-format openssl" data.${dgst}
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
echo -n " Test ECDSA-${dgstu} with $1..."
sign_and_verify "ECDSA-${dgstu}" data "--signature-format openssl" data.${dgst}
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
done
echo -n " Delete $1..."
pkcs11-tool -l --pin 648219 --delete-object --type privkey --id 1 > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
}
algs=("ec:secp192r1" "ec:secp256r1" "ec:secp384r1" "ec:secp521r1" "ec:brainpoolP256r1" "ec:brainpoolP384r1" "ec:brainpoolP512r1" "ec:secp192k1" "ec:secp256k1")
for alg in ${algs[*]}; do
keygen_sign_and_verify_ec ${alg} || exit $?
done
echo " Test RSA PKCS"
echo -n " Keygen rsa:2048..."
keygen_and_export "rsa:2048"
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
echo -n " Test RSA-PKCS..."
pkcs11-tool --id 1 --sign --pin 648219 --mechanism RSA-PKCS -i data -o data.sig > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
e=$(openssl pkeyutl -verify -pubin -inkey 1.pub -in data -sigfile data.sig 2>&1)
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
grep -q "Signature Verified Successfully" <<< $e && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
for dgst in ${dgsts[*]}; do
dgstu=$(awk '{print toupper($0)}' <<<${dgst})
echo -n " Test RSA-PKCS-${dgstu}..."
sign_and_verify_rsa_pkcs ${dgst}
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
done
echo -n " Test RSA-X-509..."
cp data data_pad
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
tlen=${#TEST_DATA}
dd if=/dev/zero bs=1 count=$((256-$tlen)) >> data_pad > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
pkcs11-tool --id 1 --sign --pin 648219 --mechanism RSA-X-509 -i data_pad -o data.sig > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
TDATA=$(tr -d '\0' < <(openssl rsautl -verify -inkey 1.pub -in data.sig -pubin -raw 2>/dev/null))
if [[ ${TEST_DATA} != "$TDATA" ]]; then
exit 1
fi
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
for dgst in ${dgsts[*]}; do
dgstu=$(awk '{print toupper($0)}' <<<${dgst})
if [[ "${dgst}" != "sha1" ]]; then
echo -n " Test RSA-PKCS-PSS with ${dgst}..."
sign_and_verify_rsa_pss ${dgst}
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
fi
echo -n " Test ${dgstu}-RSA-PKCS-PSS..."
sign_and_verify_rsa_pss_dgst ${dgst}
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
done
rm -rf data* 1.*
pkcs11-tool -l --pin 648219 --delete-object --type privkey --id 1 > /dev/null 2>&1

28
tests/scripts/store_binary.sh Executable file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
#!/bin/bash
source ./tests/scripts/func.sh
reset
test $? -eq 0 || exit $?
TEST_DATA="Pico HSM is awesome!"
echo ${TEST_DATA} > test
echo -n " Test public binary storage..."
pkcs11-tool --pin 648219 --write-object test --type data --id 1 --label 'test1' > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
e=$(pkcs11-tool --read-object --type data --label 'test1' 2>&1)
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
grep -q "${TEST_DATA}" <<< $e && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
pkcs11-tool --pin 648219 --delete-object --type data --label 'test1' > /dev/null 2>&1
echo -n " Test private binary storage..."
pkcs11-tool --pin 648219 --write-object test --type data --id 1 --label 'test1' --private > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
e=$(pkcs11-tool --read-object --type data --label 'test1' --pin 648219 2>&1)
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
grep -q "${TEST_DATA}" <<< $e && echo -n "." || exit $?
e=$(pkcs11-tool --read-object --type data --label 'test1' 2>&1)
test $? -eq 1 && echo -n "." || exit $?
grep -q "error: object not found" <<< $e && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
pkcs11-tool --pin 648219 --delete-object --type data --label 'test1' > /dev/null 2>&1

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
#!/bin/bash
source ./tests/startup.sh
chmod a+x tests/scripts/*.sh
echo "======== PKCS11 Test suite ========"
./tests/scripts/pkcs11.sh

5
tests/start-up-and-test.sh Executable file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
#!/bin/bash
source ./tests/startup.sh
pytest tests -W ignore::DeprecationWarning

27
tests/startup.sh Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
#!/bin/bash
OK="\t\033[32mok\033[0m"
FAIL="\t\033[31mfail\033[0m"
fail() {
echo -e "${FAIL}"
exit 1
}
echo -n "Start PCSC..."
/usr/sbin/pcscd &
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e "${OK}" || {
echo -e "${FAIL}"
exit 1
}
sleep 2
rm -f memory.flash
tar -xf tests/memory.tar.gz
echo -n "Start Pico HSM..."
/pico_hsm > /dev/null 2>&1 &
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || fail
sleep 2
ATR="3b:fe:18:00:00:81:31:fe:45:80:31:81:54:48:53:4d:31:73:80:21:40:81:07:fa"
e=$(opensc-tool -an 2>&1)
grep -q "${ATR}" <<< $e && echo -n "." || fail
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e "${OK}" || fail

View File

@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@
# along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
#
VERSION_MAJOR="3" #Version of Pico CCID Core
VERSION_MINOR="4"
VERSION_MAJOR="6" #Version of Pico Keys SDK
VERSION_MINOR="0"
echo "----------------------------"
echo "VID/PID patcher for Pico HSM"

427
tools/pico-hsm-tool.py Executable file → Normal file
View File

@@ -19,61 +19,60 @@
*/
"""
from smartcard.CardType import AnyCardType
from smartcard.CardRequest import CardRequest
from smartcard.Exceptions import CardRequestTimeoutException
from cvc.certificates import CVC
from cvc.asn1 import ASN1
from cvc.oid import oid2scheme
from cvc.utils import scheme_rsa
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec
import sys
try:
from cvc.certificates import CVC
from cvc.oid import oid2scheme
from cvc.utils import scheme_rsa
except ModuleNotFoundError:
print('ERROR: cvc module not found! Install pycvc package.\nTry with `pip install pycvc`')
sys.exit(-1)
try:
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.kdf.hkdf import HKDF
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.serialization import Encoding, PublicFormat
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers.aead import ChaCha20Poly1305
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
except ModuleNotFoundError:
print('ERROR: cryptography module not found! Install cryptography package.\nTry with `pip install cryptography`')
sys.exit(-1)
try:
from picohsm import PicoHSM, PinType, DOPrefixes, KeyType, EncryptionMode, utils, APDUResponse, SWCodes, AES
except ModuleNotFoundError:
print('ERROR: picohsm module not found! Install picohsm package.\nTry with `pip install pypicohsm`')
sys.exit(-1)
import json
import urllib.request
import base64
from binascii import hexlify
from binascii import hexlify, unhexlify
import sys
import argparse
import os
import platform
from datetime import datetime
from argparse import RawTextHelpFormatter
class APDUResponse(Exception):
def __init__(self, sw1, sw2):
self.sw1 = sw1
self.sw2 = sw2
super().__init__(f'SW:{sw1:02X}{sw2:02X}')
pin = None
def send_apdu(card, command, p1, p2, data=None):
lc = []
dataf = []
if (data):
lc = [0x00] + list(len(data).to_bytes(2, 'big'))
dataf = data
le = [0x00, 0x00]
if (isinstance(command, list) and len(command) > 1):
apdu = command
else:
apdu = [0x00, command]
apdu = apdu + [p1, p2] + lc + dataf + le
response, sw1, sw2 = card.connection.transmit(apdu)
if (sw1 != 0x90):
raise APDUResponse(sw1, sw2)
return response
def hexy(a):
return [hex(i) for i in a]
def parse_args():
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
subparser = parser.add_subparsers(title="commands", dest="command")
subparser = parser.add_subparsers(title="commands", dest="command", required=True)
parser_init = subparser.add_parser('initialize', help='Performs the first initialization of the Pico HSM.')
parser_init.add_argument('--pin', help='PIN number')
parser.add_argument('--pin', help='PIN number')
parser_init.add_argument('--so-pin', help='SO-PIN number')
parser_init.add_argument('--silent', help='Confirms initialization silently.', action='store_true')
parser_attestate = subparser.add_parser('attestate', help='Generates an attestation report for a private key and verifies the private key was generated in the devices or outside.')
parser_attestate.add_argument('-k', '--key', help='The private key index', metavar='KEY_ID')
parser_pki = subparser.add_parser('pki', help='Performs PKI operations.')
subparser_pki = parser_pki.add_subparsers(title='commands', dest='subcommand')
subparser_pki = parser_pki.add_subparsers(title='commands', dest='subcommand', required=True)
parser_pki_init = subparser_pki.add_parser('initialize', help='Initializes the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)')
parser_pki_init.add_argument('--certs-dir', help='Store the PKI certificates into this directory.', default='certs')
@@ -81,12 +80,60 @@ def parse_args():
parser_pki_init.add_argument('--force', help='Forces the download of certificates.', action='store_true')
parser_rtc = subparser.add_parser('datetime', help='Datetime operations with the integrated Real Time Clock (RTC).')
parser_rtc.add_argument('subcommand', choices=['set', 'get'], help='Sets or gets current datetime.')
subparser_rtc = parser_rtc.add_subparsers(title='commands', dest='subcommand', required=True)
parser_rtc_set = subparser_rtc.add_parser('set', help='Sets the current datetime.')
parser_rtc_get = subparser_rtc.add_parser('get', help='Gets the current datetime.')
parser_opts = subparser.add_parser('options', help='Manage extra options.', formatter_class=RawTextHelpFormatter)
parser_opts.add_argument('subcommand', choices=['set', 'get'], help='Sets or gets option OPT.')
parser_opts.add_argument('opt', choices=['button', 'counter'], help='Button: press-to-confirm button.\nCounter: every generated key has an internal counter.')
parser_opts.add_argument('onoff', choices=['on', 'off'], help='Toggles state ON or OFF', metavar='ON/OFF', nargs='?')
subparser_opts = parser_opts.add_subparsers(title='commands', dest='subcommand', required=True)
parser_opts_set = subparser_opts.add_parser('set', help='Sets option OPT.')
parser_opts_get = subparser_opts.add_parser('get', help='Gets option OPT.')
parser_opts.add_argument('opt', choices=['button', 'counter'], help='button: press-to-confirm button.\ncounter: every generated key has an internal counter.', metavar='OPT')
parser_opts_set.add_argument('onoff', choices=['on', 'off'], help='Toggles state ON or OFF', metavar='ON/OFF', nargs='?')
parser_phy = subparser.add_parser('phy', help='Set PHY options.')
subparser_phy = parser_phy.add_subparsers(title='commands', dest='subcommand', required=True)
parser_phy_vp = subparser_phy.add_parser('vidpid', help='Sets VID/PID. Use VID:PID format (e.g. 1234:5678)')
parser_phy_ledn = subparser_phy.add_parser('led', help='Sets LED GPIO number.')
parser_phy_optwcid = subparser_phy.add_parser('wcid', help='Enable/Disable Web CCID interface.')
parser_phy_vp.add_argument('value', help='Value of the PHY option.', metavar='VAL', nargs='?')
parser_phy_ledn.add_argument('value', help='Value of the PHY option.', metavar='VAL', nargs='?')
parser_phy_optwcid.add_argument('value', choices=['enable', 'disable'], help='Enable/Disable Web CCID interface.', nargs='?')
parser_secure = subparser.add_parser('secure', help='Manages security of Pico HSM.')
subparser_secure = parser_secure.add_subparsers(title='commands', dest='subcommand', required=True)
parser_opts_enable = subparser_secure.add_parser('enable', help='Enables secure lock.')
parser_opts_unlock = subparser_secure.add_parser('unlock', help='Unlocks the secure lock.')
parser_opts_disable = subparser_secure.add_parser('disable', help='Disables secure lock.')
parser_cipher = subparser.add_parser('cipher', help='Implements extended symmetric ciphering with new algorithms and options.\n\tIf no file input/output is specified, stdin/stdout will be used.')
subparser_cipher = parser_cipher.add_subparsers(title='commands', dest='subcommand', required=True)
parser_cipher_encrypt = subparser_cipher.add_parser('encrypt', help='Performs encryption.')
parser_cipher_decrypt = subparser_cipher.add_parser('decrypt', help='Performs decryption.')
parser_cipher_hmac = subparser_cipher.add_parser('mac', help='Computes MAC (HMAC or CMAC).')
parser_cipher_kdf = subparser_cipher.add_parser('kdf', help='Performs key derivation function on a secret key.')
parser_cipher_encrypt.add_argument('--alg', choices=['CHACHAPOLY','AES-ECB','AES-CBC','AES-OFB','AES-CFB','AES-GCM','AES-CCM','AES-CTR','AES-XTS'], required=True)
parser_cipher_decrypt.add_argument('--alg', choices=['CHACHAPOLY','AES-ECB','AES-CBC','AES-OFB','AES-CFB','AES-GCM','AES-CCM','AES-CTR','AES-XTS'], required=True)
parser_cipher_hmac.add_argument('--alg', choices=['CMAC', 'HMAC-SHA1', 'HMAC-SHA224', 'HMAC-SHA256', 'HMAC-SHA384', 'HMAC-SHA512'], help='Selects the algorithm.', required=True)
parser_cipher_kdf.add_argument('--alg', choices=['HKDF-SHA256', 'HKDF-SHA384', 'HKDF-SHA512', 'PBKDF2-SHA1', 'PBKDF2-SHA224', 'PBKDF2-SHA256', 'PBKDF2-SHA384', 'PBKDF2-SHA512', 'X963-SHA1', 'X963-SHA224', 'X963-SHA256', 'X963-SHA384', 'X963-SHA512'], help='Selects the algorithm.', required=True)
parser_cipher_kdf.add_argument('--output-len', help='Specifies the output length of derived material.')
parser_cipher_kdf.add_argument('--iteration', help='Iteration count.', required=any(['PBKDF2' in s for s in sys.argv]))
parser_cipher.add_argument('--iv', help='Sets the IV/nonce (hex string).')
parser_cipher.add_argument('--file-in', help='File to encrypt or decrypt.')
parser_cipher.add_argument('--file-out', help='File to write the result.')
parser_cipher.add_argument('--aad', help='Specifies the authentication data (it can be a string or hex string. Combine with --hex if necesary).')
parser_cipher.add_argument('--hex', help='Parses the AAD parameter as a hex string (for binary data).', action='store_true')
parser_cipher.add_argument('-k', '--key', help='The private key index', metavar='KEY_ID', required=all(['keygen' not in s for s in sys.argv]))
parser_cipher.add_argument('-s', '--key-size', default=32, help='Size of the key in bytes.')
parser_keygen = subparser.add_parser('keygen', help='Generates private keypair or secret key.')
subparser_keygen = parser_keygen.add_subparsers(title='commands', dest='subcommand', required=True)
parser_keygen_aes = subparser_keygen.add_parser('aes', help='Generates an AES key.')
parser_keygen_aes.add_argument('--size', help='Specifies the size of AES key [128, 192 or 256]',choices=[128, 192, 256], default=128)
parser_keygen_x25519 = subparser_keygen.add_parser('x25519', help='Generates a private X25519 keypair.')
parser_keygen_x448 = subparser_keygen.add_parser('x448', help='Generates a private X448 keypair.')
args = parser.parse_args()
return args
@@ -97,7 +144,7 @@ def get_pki_data(url, data=None, method='GET'):
method = 'GET'
if (data is not None):
method = 'POST'
req = urllib.request.Request(f"https://www.henarejos.me/pico/pico-hsm/{url}/",
req = urllib.request.Request(f"https://www.picokeys.com/pico/pico-hsm/{url}/",
method=method,
data=data,
headers={'User-Agent': user_agent, })
@@ -120,47 +167,44 @@ def get_pki_certs(certs_dir='certs', force=False):
f.write(base64.urlsafe_b64decode(certs['dvca']['cert']))
print(f'All PKI certificates are stored at {certs_dir} folder')
def pki(card, args):
def pki(_, args):
if (args.subcommand == 'initialize'):
if (args.default is True):
get_pki_certs(certs_dir=args.certs_dir, force=args.force)
else:
print('Error: no PKI is passed. Use --default to retrieve default PKI.')
def initialize(card, args):
print('********************************')
print('* PLEASE READ IT CAREFULLY *')
print('********************************')
print('')
print('This tool will erase and reset your device. It will delete all '
'private and secret keys.')
print('Are you sure?')
_ = input('[Press enter to confirm]')
def initialize(picohsm, args):
if (not args.silent):
print('********************************')
print('* PLEASE READ IT CAREFULLY *')
print('********************************')
print('')
print('This tool will erase and reset your device. It will delete all '
'private and secret keys.')
print('Are you sure?')
_ = input('[Press enter to confirm]')
send_apdu(card, 0xA4, 0x04, 0x00, [0xE8, 0x2B, 0x06, 0x01, 0x04, 0x01, 0x81, 0xC3, 0x1F, 0x02, 0x01])
if (args.pin):
pin = args.pin.encode()
try:
response = send_apdu(card, 0x20, 0x00, 0x81, list(pin))
picohsm.login(args.pin)
except APDUResponse:
pass
pin = args.pin
else:
pin = b'648219'
pin = '648219'
if (args.so_pin):
so_pin = args.so_pin.encode()
try:
response = send_apdu(card, 0x20, 0x00, 0x82, list(so_pin))
picohsm.login(args.so_pin, who=PinType.SO_PIN)
except APDUResponse:
pass
so_pin = args.so_pin
else:
so_pin = b'57621880'
so_pin = '57621880'
pin_data = [0x81, len(pin)] + list(pin)
so_pin_data = [0x82, len(so_pin)] + list(so_pin)
reset_data = [0x80, 0x02, 0x00, 0x01] + pin_data + so_pin_data + [0x91, 0x01, 0x03]
response = send_apdu(card, [0x80, 0x50], 0x00, 0x00, reset_data)
response = send_apdu(card, 0xB1, 0xCE, 0x00, [0x54, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00])
picohsm.initialize(pin=pin, sopin=so_pin)
response = picohsm.get_contents(DOPrefixes.EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX, 0x00)
cert = bytearray(response)
Y = CVC().decode(cert).pubkey().find(0x86).data()
@@ -171,14 +215,10 @@ def initialize(card, args):
j = get_pki_data('cvc', data=data)
print('Device name: '+j['devname'])
dataef = base64.urlsafe_b64decode(
j['cvcert']) + base64.urlsafe_b64decode(j['dvcert'])
j['cvcert']) + base64.urlsafe_b64decode(j['dvcert']) + base64.urlsafe_b64decode(j['cacert'])
response = send_apdu(card, 0xa4, 0x00, 0x00, [0x2f, 0x02])
response = send_apdu(card, 0x20, 0x00, 0x81, list(pin))
apdu_data = [0x54, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00] + \
list(ASN1.make_tag(0x53, dataef))
response = send_apdu(card, 0xd7, 0x00, 0x00, apdu_data)
picohsm.select_file(0x2f02)
response = picohsm.put_contents(0x0000, data=dataef)
print('Certificate uploaded successfully!')
print('')
@@ -187,23 +227,12 @@ def initialize(card, args):
print('Now you can initialize the device as usual with your chosen PIN '
'and configuration options.')
def attestate(card, args):
def attestate(picohsm, args):
kid = int(args.key)
try:
response = send_apdu(card, 0xB1, 0x2F, 0x02, [0x54, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00])
except APDUResponse as a:
print('ERROR: There is an error with the device certificate.')
sys.exit(1)
termca = picohsm.get_termca()
devcert = termca['cv']['data']
cert = picohsm.get_contents(0xCE, kid)
devcert = ASN1().decode(response).find(0x7f21, pos=0).data(return_tag=True)
try:
cert = send_apdu(card, 0xB1, 0xCE, kid, [0x54, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00])
except APDUResponse as a:
if (a.sw1 == 0x6a and a.sw2 == 0x82):
print('ERROR: Key not found')
sys.exit(1)
from binascii import hexlify
print(hexlify(bytearray(cert)))
print(f'Details of key {kid}:\n')
print(f' CAR: {(CVC().decode(cert).car()).decode()}')
@@ -241,60 +270,236 @@ def attestate(card, args):
else:
print(f'Key {kid} is NOT generated by device {chr.decode()}')
def rtc(card, args):
def rtc(picohsm, args):
if (args.subcommand == 'set'):
now = datetime.now()
_ = send_apdu(card, [0x80, 0x64], 0x0A, 0x00, list(now.year.to_bytes(2, 'big')) + [now.month, now.day, now.weekday(), now.hour, now.minute, now.second ])
_ = picohsm.send(cla=0x80, command=0x64, p1=0x0A, data=list(now.year.to_bytes(2, 'big')) + [now.month, now.day, now.weekday(), now.hour, now.minute, now.second ])
elif (args.subcommand == 'get'):
response = send_apdu(card, [0x80, 0x64], 0x0A, 0x00)
response = picohsm.send(cla=0x80, command=0x64, p1=0x0A)
dt = datetime(int.from_bytes(response[:2], 'big'), response[2], response[3], response[5], response[6], response[7])
print(f'Current date and time is: {dt.ctime()}')
def opts(card, args):
def opts(picohsm, args):
opt = 0x0
if (args.opt == 'button'):
opt = 0x1
elif (args.opt == 'counter'):
opt = 0x2
current = send_apdu(card, [0x80, 0x64], 0x6, 0x0)[0]
current = picohsm.send(cla=0x80, command=0x64, p1=0x6)[0]
if (args.subcommand == 'set'):
if (args.onoff == 'on'):
newopt = current | opt
else:
newopt = current & ~opt
send_apdu(card, [0x80, 0x64], 0x6, 0x0, [newopt])
picohsm.send(cla=0x80, command=0x64, p1=0x6, data=[newopt])
elif (args.subcommand == 'get'):
print(f'Option {args.opt.upper()} is {"ON" if current & opt else "OFF"}')
class SecureLock:
def __init__(self, picohsm):
self.picohsm = picohsm
def mse(self):
sk = ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())
pn = sk.public_key().public_numbers()
self.__pb = sk.public_key().public_bytes(Encoding.X962, PublicFormat.UncompressedPoint)
ret = self.picohsm.send(cla=0x80, command=0x64, p1=0x3A, p2=0x01, data=list(self.__pb))
pk = ec.EllipticCurvePublicKey.from_encoded_point(ec.SECP256R1(), bytes(ret))
shared_key = sk.exchange(ec.ECDH(), pk)
xkdf = HKDF(
algorithm=hashes.SHA256(),
length=12+32,
salt=None,
info=self.__pb
)
kdf_out = xkdf.derive(shared_key)
self.__key_enc = kdf_out[12:]
self.__iv = kdf_out[:12]
def encrypt_chacha(self, data):
chacha = ChaCha20Poly1305(self.__key_enc)
ct = chacha.encrypt(self.__iv, data, self.__pb)
return ct
def unlock_device(self):
ct = self.get_skey()
self.picohsm.send(cla=0x80, command=0x64, p1=0x3A, p2=0x03, data=list(ct))
def _get_key_device(self):
if (platform.system() == 'Windows' or platform.system() == 'Linux'):
from secure_key import windows as skey
elif (platform.system() == 'Darwin'):
from secure_key import macos as skey
else:
print('ERROR: platform not supported')
sys.exit(-1)
return skey.get_secure_key()
def get_skey(self):
self.mse()
ct = self.encrypt_chacha(self._get_key_device())
return ct
def enable_device_aut(self):
ct = self.get_skey()
self.picohsm.send(cla=0x80, command=0x64, p1=0x3A, p2=0x02, data=list(ct))
def disable_device_aut(self):
ct = self.get_skey()
self.picohsm.send(cla=0x80, command=0x64, p1=0x3A, p2=0x04, p3=list(ct))
def secure(picohsm, args):
slck = SecureLock(picohsm)
if (args.subcommand == 'enable'):
slck.enable_device_aut()
elif (args.subcommand == 'unlock'):
slck.unlock_device()
elif (args.subcommand == 'disable'):
slck.disable_device_aut()
def cipher(picohsm, args):
if (args.file_in):
fin = open(args.file_in, 'rb')
else:
fin = sys.stdin.buffer
enc = fin.read()
fin.close()
iv = args.iv
if (args.iv and args.hex):
iv = unhexlify(iv)
aad = args.aad
if (args.aad and args.hex):
aad = unhexlify(aad)
kid = int(args.key)
mode = EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT if args.subcommand[0] == 'e' else EncryptionMode.DECRYPT
if (args.alg == 'CHACHAPOLY'):
ret = picohsm.chachapoly(kid, mode, data=enc, iv=iv, aad=aad)
elif (args.alg == 'AES-ECB'):
ret = picohsm.aes(keyid=kid, mode=mode, algorithm=AES.ECB, data=enc, iv=iv, aad=aad)
elif (args.alg == 'AES-CBC'):
ret = picohsm.aes(keyid=kid, mode=mode, algorithm=AES.CBC, data=enc, iv=iv, aad=aad)
elif (args.alg == 'AES-OFB'):
ret = picohsm.aes(keyid=kid, mode=mode, algorithm=AES.OFB, data=enc, iv=iv, aad=aad)
elif (args.alg == 'AES-CFB'):
ret = picohsm.aes(keyid=kid, mode=mode, algorithm=AES.CFB, data=enc, iv=iv, aad=aad)
elif (args.alg == 'AES-GCM'):
ret = picohsm.aes(keyid=kid, mode=mode, algorithm=AES.GCM, data=enc, iv=iv, aad=aad)
elif (args.alg == 'AES-CCM'):
ret = picohsm.aes(keyid=kid, mode=mode, algorithm=AES.CCM, data=enc, iv=iv, aad=aad)
elif (args.alg == 'AES-CTR'):
ret = picohsm.aes(keyid=kid, mode=mode, algorithm=AES.CTR, data=enc, iv=iv, aad=aad)
elif (args.alg == 'AES-XTS'):
ret = picohsm.aes(keyid=kid, mode=mode, algorithm=AES.XTS, data=enc, iv=iv, aad=aad)
elif (args.alg == 'CMAC'):
ret = picohsm.cmac(keyid=kid, data=enc)
elif (args.alg == 'HMAC-SHA1'):
ret = picohsm.hmac(hashes.SHA1, kid, data=enc)
elif (args.alg == 'HMAC-SHA224'):
ret = picohsm.hmac(hashes.SHA224, kid, data=enc)
elif (args.alg == 'HMAC-SHA256'):
ret = picohsm.hmac(hashes.SHA256, kid, data=enc)
elif (args.alg == 'HMAC-SHA384'):
ret = picohsm.hmac(hashes.SHA384, kid, data=enc)
elif (args.alg == 'HMAC-SHA512'):
ret = picohsm.hmac(hashes.SHA512, kid, data=enc)
elif (args.alg == 'HKDF-SHA256'):
ret = picohsm.hkdf(hashes.SHA256, kid, data=enc, salt=iv, out_len=args.output_len)
elif (args.alg == 'HKDF-SHA384'):
ret = picohsm.hkdf(hashes.SHA384, kid, data=enc, salt=iv, out_len=args.output_len)
elif (args.alg == 'HKDF-SHA512'):
ret = picohsm.hkdf(hashes.SHA512, kid, data=enc, salt=iv, out_len=args.output_len)
elif (args.alg == 'PBKDF2-SHA1'):
ret = picohsm.pbkdf2(hashes.SHA1, kid, salt=iv, iterations=args.iteration, out_len=args.output_len)
elif (args.alg == 'PBKDF2-SHA224'):
ret = picohsm.pbkdf2(hashes.SHA224, kid, salt=iv, iterations=args.iteration, out_len=args.output_len)
elif (args.alg == 'PBKDF2-SHA256'):
ret = picohsm.pbkdf2(hashes.SHA256, kid, salt=iv, iterations=args.iteration, out_len=args.output_len)
elif (args.alg == 'PBKDF2-SHA384'):
ret = picohsm.pbkdf2(hashes.SHA384, kid, salt=iv, iterations=args.iteration, out_len=args.output_len)
elif (args.alg == 'PBKDF2-SHA512'):
ret = picohsm.pbkdf2(hashes.SHA512, kid, salt=iv, iterations=args.iteration, out_len=args.output_len)
elif (args.alg == 'X963-SHA1'):
ret = picohsm.x963(hashes.SHA1, kid, data=enc, out_len=args.output_len)
elif (args.alg == 'X963-SHA224'):
ret = picohsm.x963(hashes.SHA224, kid, data=enc, out_len=args.output_len)
elif (args.alg == 'X963-SHA256'):
ret = picohsm.x963(hashes.SHA256, kid, data=enc, out_len=args.output_len)
elif (args.alg == 'X963-SHA384'):
ret = picohsm.x963(hashes.SHA384, kid, data=enc, out_len=args.output_len)
elif (args.alg == 'X963-SHA512'):
ret = picohsm.x963(hashes.SHA512, kid, data=enc, out_len=args.output_len)
if (args.file_out):
fout = open(args.file_out, 'wb')
else:
fout = sys.stdout.buffer
if (args.hex):
fout.write(hexlify(bytes(ret)))
else:
fout.write(bytes(ret))
if (args.file_out):
fout.close()
def keygen(picohsm, args):
if (args.subcommand == 'aes'):
ret = picohsm.key_generation(KeyType.AES, param=args.size)
elif (args.subcommand in ['x25519', 'x448']):
curve = 'curve' + args.subcommand[1:]
ret = picohsm.key_generation(KeyType.ECC, curve)
print('Key generated successfully.')
print(f'Key ID: {ret}')
def phy(picohsm, args):
val = args.value if 'value' in args else None
if (val):
if (args.subcommand == 'vidpid'):
sp = val.split(':')
if (len(sp) != 2):
print('ERROR: VID/PID have wrong format. Use VID:PID format (e.g. 1234:5678)')
val = int(sp[0],16).to_bytes(2, 'big') + int(sp[1],16).to_bytes(2, 'big')
elif (args.subcommand == 'led'):
val = [int(val)]
elif (args.subcommand == 'wcid'):
val = val == 'enable'
ret = picohsm.phy(args.subcommand, val)
if (ret):
print(f'Current value: {hexlify(ret)}')
else:
print('Command executed successfully. Please, restart your Pico Key.')
def main(args):
print('Pico HSM Tool v1.4')
print('Author: Pol Henarejos')
print('Report bugs to https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm/issues')
print('')
print('')
cardtype = AnyCardType()
try:
# request card insertion
cardrequest = CardRequest(timeout=10, cardType=cardtype)
card = cardrequest.waitforcard()
sys.stderr.buffer.write(b'Pico HSM Tool v1.14\n')
sys.stderr.buffer.write(b'Author: Pol Henarejos\n')
sys.stderr.buffer.write(b'Report bugs to https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm/issues\n')
sys.stderr.buffer.write(b'\n\n')
sys.stderr.flush()
# connect to the card and perform a few transmits
card.connection.connect()
except CardRequestTimeoutException:
print('time-out: no card inserted during last 10s')
picohsm = PicoHSM(args.pin)
# Following commands may raise APDU exception on error
if (args.command == 'initialize'):
initialize(card, args)
initialize(picohsm, args)
elif (args.command == 'attestate'):
attestate(card, args)
attestate(picohsm, args)
elif (args.command == 'pki'):
pki(card, args)
pki(picohsm, args)
elif (args.command == 'datetime'):
rtc(card, args)
rtc(picohsm, args)
elif (args.command == 'options'):
opts(card, args)
opts(picohsm, args)
elif (args.command == 'secure'):
secure(picohsm, args)
elif (args.command == 'cipher'):
cipher(picohsm, args)
elif (args.command == 'keygen'):
keygen(picohsm, args)
elif (args.command == 'phy'):
phy(picohsm, args)
def run():
args = parse_args()

61
tools/secure_key/macos.py Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
import sys
import keyring
DOMAIN = "PicoKeys.com"
USERNAME = "Pico-HSM"
try:
import keyring
from keyrings.osx_keychain_keys.backend import OSXKeychainKeysBackend, OSXKeychainKeyType, OSXKeyChainKeyClassType
except:
print('ERROR: keyring module not found! Install keyring package.\nTry with `pip install keyrings.osx-keychain-keys`')
sys.exit(-1)
try:
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.serialization import Encoding, PrivateFormat, NoEncryption
except:
print('ERROR: cryptography module not found! Install cryptography package.\nTry with `pip install cryptography`')
sys.exit(-1)
def get_backend(use_secure_enclave=False):
backend = OSXKeychainKeysBackend(
key_type=OSXKeychainKeyType.EC, # Key type, e.g. RSA, RC, DSA, ...
key_class_type=OSXKeyChainKeyClassType.Private, # Private key, Public key, Symmetric-key
key_size_in_bits=256,
is_permanent=True, # If set, saves the key in keychain; else, returns a transient key
use_secure_enclave=use_secure_enclave, # Saves the key in the T2 (TPM) chip, requires a code-signed interpreter
access_group=None, # Limits key management and retrieval to set group, requires a code-signed interpreter
is_extractable=True # If set, private key is extractable; else, it can't be retrieved, but only operated against
)
return backend
def generate_secure_key(use_secure_enclave=False):
backend = get_backend(use_secure_enclave)
backend.set_password(DOMAIN, USERNAME, password=None)
return backend.get_password(DOMAIN, USERNAME)
def get_d(key):
return key.private_numbers().private_value.to_bytes(32, 'big')
def set_secure_key(pk):
backend = get_backend(False)
try:
backend.delete_password(DOMAIN, USERNAME)
except:
pass
backend.set_password(DOMAIN, USERNAME, pk.private_bytes(Encoding.PEM, PrivateFormat.TraditionalOpenSSL, NoEncryption()))
def get_secure_key():
key = None
try:
backend = get_backend(False)
key = backend.get_password(DOMAIN, USERNAME)[0]
if (key is None):
raise TypeError
except (keyring.errors.KeyringError, TypeError):
try:
key = generate_secure_key(False)[0] # It should be True, but secure enclave causes python segfault
except keyring.errors.PasswordSetError:
key = generate_secure_key(False)[0]
return get_d(key)

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
import sys
import os
import base64
DOMAIN = "PicoKeys.com"
USERNAME = "Pico-HSM"
try:
import keyring
except:
print('ERROR: keyring module not found! Install keyring package.\nTry with `pip install keyring`')
sys.exit(-1)
try:
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.serialization import Encoding, PrivateFormat, NoEncryption, load_pem_private_key
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec
except:
print('ERROR: cryptography module not found! Install cryptography package.\nTry with `pip install cryptography`')
sys.exit(-1)
def generate_secure_key():
pkey = ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())
set_secure_key(pkey)
return keyring.get_password(DOMAIN, USERNAME)
def get_d(key):
return load_pem_private_key(key, password=None).private_numbers().private_value.to_bytes(32, 'big')
def set_secure_key(pk):
try:
keyring.delete_password(DOMAIN, USERNAME)
except:
pass
keyring.set_password(DOMAIN, USERNAME, pk.private_bytes(Encoding.PEM, PrivateFormat.PKCS8, NoEncryption()).decode())
def get_secure_key():
key = None
try:
key = keyring.get_password(DOMAIN, USERNAME)
if (key is None):
raise TypeError
except (keyring.errors.KeyringError, TypeError):
key = generate_secure_key()
return get_d(key.encode())

View File

@@ -9,5 +9,9 @@ git submodule update --init
cd ..
mkdir build
cd build
if [[ $1 == "pico" ]]; then
cmake -DPICO_SDK_PATH=../pico-sdk ..
else
cmake -DENABLE_EMULATION=1 ..
fi
make