197 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Pol Henarejos
fb5be153ed Fix merge.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-06 23:51:15 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
0ac71f2fff Removed old SDK
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-06 23:47:21 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
6ec5235cc3 Upgrade Pico Keys SDK and mbedtls 3.5
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-06 23:38:33 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
ff74d6306e mbedtls 3.5
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-06 23:27:02 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
ba562da00e Merge branch 'development' into development-eddsa
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-06 23:11:08 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
98e9b72b42 Upgrade version to 3.6.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-06 17:26:43 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
1b0d23cf24 Add two new boards.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-06 17:26:24 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
3ccff7881f Upgrade to Pico Keys SDK 5.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-06 17:25:04 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
a3bf2e9e14 If no key is found, generate a new one.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-06 17:10:19 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
88ff27f354 Fix mbedTLS 3.5 build.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-06 17:01:27 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
ed2925cfb6 Use new Pico Keys SDK.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-06 14:25:42 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
cc19f8f061 Use new pico-keys-sdk submodule.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-06 14:20:39 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
b6831a4650 Rename pico-hsm-sdk submodule to new name.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-11-06 14:20:19 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
652a0f0d21 Fix managing spaces.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-12 21:04:02 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
9dbf4b3172 Removing pkcs11-tool test for EC.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-12 19:03:37 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
76522829ef User must log in after DKEK import.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-12 17:42:49 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
6b1eeb4004 Fix DKEK import when no logged.
DKEK shall accept import even if it is not logged in. However, to store the DKEK, the PIN is used for MKEK, which is not available if it is nog logged in. I added a queueing system to store a pending DKEK after login.

Therefore, to import a DKEK, the user must import it AND call VERIFY command if it is not already logged in.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-12 17:42:31 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
2693ab4926 Fix applet selection.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-12 17:40:56 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
5d21e39aa6 Fix deleting key domain.
It only checks if contains keys and no other files.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-12 17:40:20 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
1bf0d6337b Added backup and restore tests (pkcs11 wrap/unwrap).
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-11 21:12:06 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
1950b03d35 Add more pkcs11-tool tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-11 21:11:41 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
4be258f4c7 Fix applet loading.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-11 21:04:53 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
eddb1baf7b Use new applet selection format.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-11 21:03:17 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
11bb00e186 Default key domain is 0.
It allows to wrap keys not associated to any key domain.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-11 21:03:09 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
aaed6bd7b6 New format for applet selection.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-11 21:02:18 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
2853b38b08 Add PKCS11 tool test
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-11 13:00:24 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
654cb1e4e0 Added AES pkcs11 tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-11 12:13:21 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
185d19504f Add plaintext debug.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-11 12:12:53 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
dbe0ef19de Fix store binary test script.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 22:17:22 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c3b57b229f Add sc-hsm-pkcs11-test to test matrix.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 21:56:41 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
43c46e9112 Add sc-hsm-embedd pkcs11 driver and test.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 21:56:18 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d5af9160c1 Build in docker with for CI flag.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 21:55:55 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
e27c8d4ff6 Added flag for compile for CI or production.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 21:55:31 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
2ecfff0ebb Add store binary data tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 21:15:51 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
3057aba041 Fix redundant line.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 21:15:23 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
011a594fe4 Also use artifacts@v3 on upload.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 19:18:04 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
448d61dd2d Use artifact@v3
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 19:00:36 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
fa821c43c8 Prune images autom.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 19:00:23 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
9db3e78d32 Not necessary rmi
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 18:41:01 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b74c4070d1 When build, it copies generated binaries to image, which will be used later by other jobs.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 18:26:16 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
a7770a7e57 Check Pico HSM PCSC connectivity.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 18:25:10 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
78cbe59e64 Fix startup
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 17:58:32 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
42a9434c50 Not used
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 17:46:01 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
11a3472941 Refactor test workflow
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 17:45:49 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
2f177eb8df Build image only during build
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 16:46:51 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c97680772d Use artifacts
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 16:36:37 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
345ae2be69 Not used
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 16:36:00 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
ba036f4c0f Add EC derive tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 16:35:51 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
4493afa84d Fix workflow
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 14:46:37 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d118b787a2 Try using reusable workflows
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 14:44:52 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
205356b848 Let's try different jobs
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 14:21:55 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c435764978 Add PKCS11 asymmetric ciphering tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 13:10:10 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
2e633abb2c Use dynamic dd size.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 13:09:16 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
3514c7ad82 Fix pkcs11 runner test.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 09:30:15 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
4bba3c6f64 Merge branch 'master' into development 2023-10-09 08:30:53 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
8321996a14 Fix +x flag.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 08:30:24 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c3af303468 Split pytest and pkcs11 test suites.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 00:58:49 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c44d7db4e1 Refactor tests
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-09 00:34:50 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
cb1bba4f13 Enable pytest tests
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-02 01:12:09 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
48301a5d71 Fix chunking
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-02 00:50:34 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
1105a1263c Add signature and verification tests for RSA and ECDSA.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-10-02 00:48:54 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
37421d9aad Added pkcs11 keygen test script.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-09-26 20:09:43 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d906df2809 Add initialization test script with pkcs11
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-09-24 10:30:59 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
08e7d74a81 Fix sending binary when ne=0
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-09-24 10:30:09 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
433e509c94 Add initialize with pkcs11-tool test script.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-09-05 19:56:11 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
9f08d612ae Add base58 to dockerfile.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-09-05 19:56:11 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
173ca7678d Accept arbitrary SO-PIN length on reset retry.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-09-05 19:56:11 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
3d7f714936 Fix initialization with so-pin.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-09-05 19:56:11 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
f4a537f156 Added NO_DELAY in emulation env.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-09-05 19:56:11 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
f09654ccf4 Added --silent flag to initialization to avoid prompt display.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-09-05 19:56:11 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
7506ccd263 Update usage.md 2023-09-05 19:45:51 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
ee442ac084 Get vpcd from repo instead of building it.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-24 16:39:57 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b94810d31d Added triggers to development-eddsa branch.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-24 16:17:06 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
2c4be41ecf Remove print.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-24 16:12:40 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
447d223de4 Fix mbedtls ed448 bugs.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-24 16:12:34 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
4f9f7f14fe Add support for Edwards cvc.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-24 16:08:39 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
6699913eff Add edwards signature test.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-24 16:06:02 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b0057bc3fe Add edwards key import test.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-24 16:05:52 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
e3a773d145 Add edwards key generation test.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-24 16:05:43 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
10a47f9177 Uniform ec key loading.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-24 16:05:34 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
9f49a144ac Add support for Edwards key import.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-24 16:05:11 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
e67a7091ff Add support for Edwards key generation.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-24 16:04:45 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
1d3232df36 Fix loading and saving Montgomery keys.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-24 16:01:39 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
7376817724 Fix G export.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-24 16:00:59 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
5e801fbae7 Merge branch 'development' into development-eddsa 2023-08-24 10:35:51 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
e18c413268 Added X25519 and X448 exchange test.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-23 16:42:34 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
0e1c82196a Added test for Curve25519 and Curve448 key import.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-23 16:39:32 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c6a5272340 Added test for Curve25519 and Curve448 keypair generation.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-23 16:39:21 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
a6072b4ce8 Curve25519 and Curve448 are encoded using ECDH template.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-23 16:38:51 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
5bdba8e1e8 Move to ecp_keypair instead of ecdsa.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-22 17:20:56 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
5df4e62f81 Revert previous fix.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-22 17:20:11 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
685c7f25fc Revert previous fix.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-22 17:19:23 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
faef2dc278 Added support for EdDSA signature.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-22 17:10:03 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
22d8793683 Add fix in EdDSA.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-22 15:29:26 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
32c8bc4a24 Enable EdDSA for curves Ed25519 and Ed448 in config file.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-16 15:05:46 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b5174d64af Using SDK with EdDSA support.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-08-14 02:45:16 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
235bf342b3 Update README.md
Added description for hierarchical deterministic key generation.
2023-08-02 14:34:12 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
57188ff877 Added some tests for HD ciphering.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-07-24 11:45:11 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
f631e4a5f3 Code style.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-07-17 12:56:16 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
f880ee6c93 Added support for HD symmetric ciphering.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-07-17 12:55:14 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
6af4cc7fec Fix getting RTC with pico-hsm-tool.
Closes #25.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-06-20 13:32:30 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
e3f1f45a9f Added more tests for HD Signature.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-27 19:00:13 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
fe315e7326 Fix AES derivation (HKDF).
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-27 19:00:04 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
02903bbc65 Added tests for HD signatures.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-26 18:07:26 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
ee3ee21e40 Added support for signatures based on HD BIP/SLIP.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-26 18:07:06 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c6c00e7e43 Added tests for SLIP-0021 node derivation.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-26 17:15:30 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
29544a3f17 Added support for SLIP-0021 node derivation.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-26 17:15:14 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
5135404083 Fix node derivation.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-25 15:17:39 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
55520ce184 Added support for master key generation for symmetric derivation.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-25 14:07:48 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
525b05b7ef Small refactoring to avoid unnecessary casts from uint32 to byte strings.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-25 12:18:28 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b61a34d415 Added more tests for secp256r1 curves.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-24 12:47:49 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
0eea0fb096 Fix deriving nodes with retries (invalid first key).
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-24 12:47:27 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
82c03ee6c4 Fix memory free on error.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-24 12:40:51 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
20dfbcaaed Fix xpub for masters.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-24 11:25:36 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
a9fb170c58 Added tests for BIP and SLIP.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-23 20:40:31 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
46d85c029e Added first commit with BIP and SLIP support for cryptowallets.
Needs more work.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-23 20:40:16 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
1c6f4cfd7f Update FUNDING.yml 2023-05-17 09:44:59 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
526869bc06 Create FUNDING.yml 2023-05-17 09:42:57 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
279df32acc Update README.md
Added link to Pico Patcher tool.
2023-05-11 20:05:28 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
c402b884cc Upgrade to mbedtls 3.4
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-10 00:17:32 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
8316196b42 Using forked vsmartcard just in case
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-04 11:10:58 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
7a6dafd7b6 Moving HSM SDK pointer
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-05-04 09:13:15 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
6d3809a792 Allow signatures with device key.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-04-06 14:09:18 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
f22f58f983 Fix returning EOF when reading an element outside the size.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-04-06 14:08:43 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
405bf92e18 Added support for TokenInfo and StaticTokenInfo files.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-04-04 09:53:26 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
b5b6dcd2e6 Fix conditional build for WS2812.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-26 20:16:09 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
d637dbec01 Added CMAC and AES generation to README.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-26 18:42:12 +02:00
Pol Henarejos
ebcac9dfdc Upgrade to pico-hsm-tool to use the newer PicoHSM python package.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-23 20:19:53 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
510b148adf Update README with latest AES algorithms.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-23 20:19:15 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
371ae93fcd Added support for AES CCM.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-23 19:20:33 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
f5e875a6b7 Added support for AES CTR.
Note: the OID used by CTR does not exist.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-23 18:47:32 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
ad3304a384 Added AES XTS tests, with and without IV.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-22 23:29:31 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
4d647ba3c8 Add sanity check if wrong oid is provided.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-22 23:28:55 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
008db87fa7 Fix AES XTS call.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-22 23:28:22 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
1d80b45439 Add tests for AES extended.
It tests ECB, CBC, OFB, CFB and GCM.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-22 23:25:25 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
17560034ec Fix AES extended encoding call.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-22 23:23:12 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
8b0d85fbd4 Fix PRKD generation for AES.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-22 22:57:15 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
3dcb2e9d70 A PRKD is generated on every key import, regardless it might be replaced later.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-22 22:56:55 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
0f12ff1c48 Added support for PRKD for AES.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-22 22:07:34 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
2a5fe1cc6d Added initialization with self-signed certificate.
It will allow the initialization with OpenSC tool (sc-hsm-tool --initialize). However, it will not allow the use of card with SCS3, as it needs a PKI with trust chain. In this case, pico-hsm-tool.py shall be used for initialization.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-22 01:04:24 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
5e0f62265d Fix key size of terminal cert.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-20 21:41:38 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
0990805fb6 More code style.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-20 20:08:29 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
18bcf532e7 PicoHSM always returns bytes().
No need for casting.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-20 20:07:33 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
9f0316aedd Add chachapoly tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-20 18:08:00 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
088002863c Before cloning, it should be removed.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-20 18:03:49 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
7876f4b32a pypicohsm is built everytime that test is run, since it could implement more features used by tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-20 18:02:33 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
a5e3d4e0e5 Added dockerfile for debian.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-20 18:01:48 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
0c842773d2 Move to debian docker.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-20 17:58:43 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
0aaf339353 Fix error message.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-20 17:58:17 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
efba39adc5 Add SW_WRONG_DATA return on bad tag for Chachapoly.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-20 17:58:01 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
13755cb4d5 Fix buffer overflow when importing AES 512 key.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-20 17:06:06 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
11a30863e8 Using new package pypicohsm.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-20 17:05:46 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
a69d06b2d9 Fixed chachapoly crypt algorithm.
It missed setkey function. So, no key was used at any moment.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-19 20:24:32 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
1c7bc18161 Added support for AES 512 bit key size.
AES XTS uses two keys. Therefore, XTS with 2 AES 256 implies 64 bytes key length.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-19 20:22:40 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
86ce01cac2 Added AES XTS via AES_EXT command.
Note that it requires 32 bytes or 64 bytes key length.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-19 19:42:37 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
9cb60ba420 Added AES ECB (insecure), CBC (with custom IV), OFB, CFB and GCM (with 16-byte tag) via AES_EXT command.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-19 19:34:34 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
99f1620e7d Fixes #22.
SC-HSM returns the result with a 0x04 prepended. This comes from OpenSC but it is not clear the exact reason. 0x04 is usually for encoding uncompressed EC points but in that case it does not seem to make sense.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-18 18:40:27 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
755570e01a Fix deletion key in test 50.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-18 18:38:05 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
4b264597d6 Fix race condition.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-14 09:58:06 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
67e3d908b3 Fix test key deletion.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-14 09:57:25 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
7ae76354ef Added more tests for key_export.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-13 18:03:21 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
9291c2b4e3 delete_file() supports p1/p2
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-13 18:02:47 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
657ee18730 Added assert on deletion
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-13 18:02:31 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
132054c9b9 Public point is calculated everytime a private key is loaded.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-13 18:01:56 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
2a3b9b7474 Fix wrapping points.
Now it uses mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary() for better control.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-13 18:01:20 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
4e73723747 Fix checking key domain set.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-10 15:59:52 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
09724d95db Fix XKEK key generation.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-10 07:34:15 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
c1bfb597bc Added first tests of key wrapping.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-09 20:10:25 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
fd53b88397 Added more tests to key domain tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-09 20:09:58 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
11e5338736 Check if key domain is not already initialized when initializing.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-09 20:09:32 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
3660120b11 Before wrapping, check if DKEK is properly configured.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-09 20:09:03 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
75ca1b57d9 Added support of counter, algorithms and key domain to AES too.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-09 18:39:06 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
7af67713e7 Add support for counter, algorithms and key domain in key generation.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-09 18:38:29 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
63c465138b Added delete XKEK tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-09 18:28:31 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
4d569df108 Added dkek import in key domain tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-09 18:28:08 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
bee6a7bb92 Return error if a non-initialized key domain is deleted.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-09 18:27:47 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
e4583eb9c0 Fix potential crash on delete file.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-09 18:16:38 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
1c8582365d Add manual trigger
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-09 08:48:09 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
daf71678c5 Added first XKEK tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-08 22:15:44 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
26f0775772 Move some certs to common place.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-08 22:15:11 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
ed674b379c Zeroize ecdh key.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-08 11:15:02 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
6aa8d37d07 If a key does not belong to any key domain, it cannot be wrapped.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-07 23:45:37 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
963456051e If public point is not found, it is computed automatically.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-07 23:45:10 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
1e90699a3f Added more PKA tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-07 23:16:12 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
f8110a9d75 Update README.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-07 23:16:01 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
d81b21695f If no key domain is found, 0 is used by default.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-07 23:15:50 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
51e9e6722e Reset puk status on failed authentication.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-07 23:14:55 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
dba4630895 Add Public Key Authorization tests.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-07 17:28:56 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
ee73c6e781 Code style
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-07 17:28:23 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
2f63966c60 Fix checking status of PUK.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-07 15:55:59 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
e624f9ff72 Fix checking if PKU is enabled.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-07 11:15:07 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
fb4ff9424e Call reset puk store on init.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-07 11:14:42 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
63b245b858 Fix initialize with PUK store memory.
Now it is cleared.

Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-07 11:14:13 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
cd525d91a3 Updated base flash memory for emulation to include CA CVC.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-06 01:09:00 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
8fd3b4d858 CA cert is also uploaded to perform PKA.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-06 01:01:20 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
3c160f69c0 Add DV cert to PUK store.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-06 00:40:31 +01:00
Pol Henarejos
2c9fa8b19f Add two new boards for build.
Signed-off-by: Pol Henarejos <pol.henarejos@cttc.es>
2023-03-06 00:39:00 +01:00
85 changed files with 3587 additions and 1362 deletions

4
.github/FUNDING.yml vendored Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
# These are supported funding model platforms
github: polhenarejos
custom: ["https://www.paypal.me/polhenarejos"]

View File

@@ -13,12 +13,13 @@ name: "CodeQL"
on:
push:
branches: [ "master", "development" ]
branches: [ "master", "development", "development-eddsa" ]
pull_request:
# The branches below must be a subset of the branches above
branches: [ "master", "development" ]
branches: [ "master", "development", "development-eddsa" ]
schedule:
- cron: '23 5 * * 4'
workflow_dispatch:
jobs:
analyze:
@@ -48,11 +49,11 @@ jobs:
# If you wish to specify custom queries, you can do so here or in a config file.
# By default, queries listed here will override any specified in a config file.
# Prefix the list here with "+" to use these queries and those in the config file.
# Details on CodeQL's query packs refer to : https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/code-scanning/automatically-scanning-your-code-for-vulnerabilities-and-errors/configuring-code-scanning#using-queries-in-ql-packs
# queries: security-extended,security-and-quality
# Autobuild attempts to build any compiled languages (C/C++, C#, or Java).
# If this step fails, then you should remove it and run the build manually (see below)
# - name: Autobuild
@@ -61,7 +62,7 @@ jobs:
# Command-line programs to run using the OS shell.
# 📚 See https://docs.github.com/en/actions/using-workflows/workflow-syntax-for-github-actions#jobsjob_idstepsrun
# If the Autobuild fails above, remove it and uncomment the following three lines.
# If the Autobuild fails above, remove it and uncomment the following three lines.
# modify them (or add more) to build your code if your project, please refer to the EXAMPLE below for guidance.
- run: |

View File

@@ -13,18 +13,17 @@ name: "Emulation and test"
on:
push:
branches: [ "master", "development" ]
branches: [ "master", "development", "development-eddsa" ]
pull_request:
# The branches below must be a subset of the branches above
branches: [ "master", "development" ]
branches: [ "master", "development", "development-eddsa" ]
schedule:
- cron: '23 5 * * 4'
workflow_dispatch:
jobs:
build:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Checkout repository and submodules
uses: actions/checkout@v3
@@ -32,5 +31,36 @@ jobs:
submodules: recursive
- name: Build in container
run: ./tests/build-in-docker.sh
- name: Start emulation and test
run: ./tests/run-test-in-docker.sh
- name: Export image
run: |
mkdir -p artifacts
docker save pico-hsm-test:bullseye -o artifacts/docker-image.tar
- name: Temporarily save image
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v3
with:
name: docker-artifact
path: artifacts
retention-days: 1
test:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: build
strategy:
matrix:
suite: ["pkcs11", "pytest", "sc-hsm-pkcs11"]
steps:
- name: Checkout repository and submodules
uses: actions/checkout@v3
with:
submodules: recursive
- name: Retrieve saved image
uses: actions/download-artifact@v3
with:
name: docker-artifact
path: artifacts
- name: Load image
run: |
cd artifacts
docker load -q -i docker-image.tar
- name: Test ${{ matrix.suite }}
run: ./tests/run-test-in-docker.sh ${{ matrix.suite }}

6
.gitmodules vendored
View File

@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
[submodule "pico-hsm-sdk"]
path = pico-hsm-sdk
url = ../pico-hsm-sdk
[submodule "pico-keys-sdk"]
path = pico-keys-sdk
url = https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-keys-sdk

View File

@@ -32,6 +32,13 @@ else()
pico_sdk_init()
endif()
if (NOT DEFINED __FOR_CI)
set(__FOR_CI 0)
endif()
if (__FOR_CI)
add_definitions(-D__FOR_CI)
endif()
add_executable(pico_hsm)
set(SOURCES ${SOURCES}
@@ -62,6 +69,7 @@ set(SOURCES ${SOURCES}
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_session_pin.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_puk_auth.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_pso.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cmd_bip_slip.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/cvc.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/files.c
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm/kek.c
@@ -69,7 +77,7 @@ set(SOURCES ${SOURCES}
)
set(USB_ITF_CCID 1)
include(pico-hsm-sdk/pico_hsm_sdk_import.cmake)
include(pico-keys-sdk/pico_keys_sdk_import.cmake)
set(INCLUDES ${INCLUDES}
${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/src/hsm
@@ -101,5 +109,5 @@ endif (APPLE)
else()
pico_add_extra_outputs(pico_hsm)
target_link_libraries(pico_hsm PRIVATE pico_hsm_sdk pico_stdlib pico_multicore hardware_flash hardware_sync hardware_adc pico_unique_id hardware_rtc tinyusb_device tinyusb_board)
target_link_libraries(pico_hsm PRIVATE pico_keys_sdk pico_stdlib pico_multicore hardware_flash hardware_sync hardware_adc pico_unique_id hardware_rtc tinyusb_device tinyusb_board)
endif()

View File

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ This is a project to create a Hardware Security Module (HSM) with a Raspberry Pi
## Capabilities
### > Key generation and encrypted storage
Private and secret keys are stored with a master AES 256 key (DKEK). The DKEK is, at the same time, encrypted with a hashed and salted version of the PIN.
Private and secret keys are stored with a master AES 256 key (MKEK). The MKEK is, at the same time, encrypted with a hashed and salted version of the PIN.
**No private/secret keys, DKEK or PIN are stored in plain text ever. Never.**
### > RSA key generation from 1024 to 4096 bits
@@ -37,7 +37,13 @@ It allows private decryption in place with RSA-OEP and RSA-X-509 algorithms.
It supports AES key generation in place with keys of 128, 192 and 256 bits.
### > AES-CBC encryption/decryption
AES encryption and decryption is performed in place.
Legacy AES encryption and decryption is performed in place.
### > AES ECB, CBC, CFB, OFB, XTS, CTR, GCM and CCM
Advanced AES encryption and decryption with multiples modes and customized IV/nonce and additional authenticated data (AAD).[^4]
### > AES key generation of 128, 192, 256 and 512 bits.
Besides 128, 192 and 256 bits, Pico HSM also supports key generation of 512 bits (64 bytes). These keys are specially indicated for running AES XTS, where two keys of 256 bits are concatenated.
### > CMAC
It supports AES-CMAC authentication.[^1]
@@ -109,13 +115,13 @@ Key usage can also be used to perform and auditory and track the usage of a part
### > Public Key Authentication
Public Key Authentication (PKA) allows to authenticate by using a secondary device with a private key and a registered public key in the primary device. A challenge is generated by the primary Pico HSM and given to the secondary for signature. The secondary device signs the challenge and returns the signature. Then, the primary device verifies the signature with the registered public key and if it is valid, it grants full access, as normal PIN authentication.
In PKA, the PIN is used for protecting the DKEK, as classic method with only PIN, and PKA is used for adding an extra security layer. Therefore, this mechanism provides a higher degree of security, since it needs a secondary Pico HSM to authenticate the primary one.
In PKA, the PIN is used for protecting the MKEK, as classic method with only PIN, and PKA is used for adding an extra security layer. Therefore, this mechanism provides a higher degree of security, since it needs a secondary Pico HSM to authenticate the primary one.
### > Secure Lock
An extra layer can be added to the device by adding a private key stored on the computer to lock that Pico HSM to the specific computer. The content will be completely encrypted with a private key only available from a specific computer.
### > ChaCha20-Poly1305
This is a novel fast and efficient symmetric encryption algorithm. Similarly to AES, it can be used to cipher your private data.
This is a novel fast and efficient symmetric encryption algorithm. Similarly to AES, it can be used to cipher your private data.[^4]
### > X25519 and X448
Both cruves Curve25519 and Curve448 are supported for doing DH X25519 and X448. Remember that cannot be used for signing.
@@ -124,11 +130,24 @@ Both cruves Curve25519 and Curve448 are supported for doing DH X25519 and X448.
It supports symmetric key derivations from different standards and RFC.
### > HMAC
It supports performing HMAC from a secret key on a arbitrary data with SHA digest algorithm.
It supports performing HMAC from a secret key on an arbitrary data with SHA digest algorithm.
### > CMAC
Similarly to HMAC, Pico HSM also supports CMAC with AES algorithm for keys of 128, 192 and 256 bits.
### > XKEK
Besides DKEK, it supports a more advanced scheme to share keys. Based on private key domains, it is possible to wrap and unwrap private and secret keys inside the domain to only authorized devices. If a device outside the domain tries to unwrap a key, it will fail.
### > MKEK
A Master Key Encryption Key is used to store safely all the keys. This key is also ciphered with an ephemereal key derived from the hashed PIN. Therefore, we can ensure all the keys are encrypted and stored.
### > Hierarchical Deterministic key generation
It supports **BIP32** for asymmetric deterministic key derivation and **SLIP10** for symmetric key derivation. With it, crypto wallets can be deployed with Pico HSM, as infinite keys can be derived for signature and symmetric encryption. Curves NIST 256 and Koblitz 256 are supported for master key generation.[^4]
[^1]: PKCS11 modules (`pkcs11-tool` and `sc-tool`) do not support CMAC and key derivation. It must be processed through raw APDU command (`opensc-tool -s`).
[^2]: Available via SCS3 tool. See [SCS3](/doc/scs3.md "SCS3") for more information.
[^3]: Imports are available only if the Pico HSM is previously initialized with a DKEK and the DKEK shares are available during the import process.
[^3]: Imports are available only if the Pico HSM is previously initialized with a DKEK and DKEK shares are available during the import process.
[^4]: Available by using PicoHSM python tool.
## Security considerations
All secret keys (asymmetric and symmetric) are stored encrypted in the flash memory of the Raspberry Pico. DKEK is used as a 256 bit AES key to protect private and secret keys. Keys are never stored in RAM except for signature and decryption operations and only during the process. All keys (including DKEK) are loaded and cleared every time to avoid potential security flaws.
@@ -140,16 +159,21 @@ If the Pico is stolen the contents of private and secret keys cannot be read wit
## Download
Please, go to the Release page and download the UF2 file for your board.
Note that UF2 files are shiped with a dummy VID/PID to avoid license issues (FEFF:FCFD). If you are planning to use it with OpenSC or similar, you should modify Info.plist of CCID driver to add these VID/PID or use the VID/PID patcher as follows:
Note that UF2 files are shiped with a dummy VID/PID to avoid license issues (FEFF:FCFD). If you are planning to use it with OpenSC or similar, you should modify Info.plist of CCID driver to add these VID/PID or use the [Pico Patcher tool](https://www.picokeys.com/pico-patcher/).
Alternatively you can use the legacy VID/PID patcher as follows:
`./patch_vidpid.sh VID:PID input_hsm_file.uf2 output_hsm_file.uf2`
You can use whatever VID/PID (i.e., 234b:0000 from FISJ), but remember that you are not authorized to distribute the binary with a VID/PID that you do not own.
Note that the pure-browser option [Pico Patcher tool](https://www.picokeys.com/pico-patcher/) is the most recommended.
## Build
Before building, ensure you have installed the toolchain for the Pico and the Pico SDK is properly located in your drive.
```
git clone https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm
git submodule update --init --recursive
cd pico-hsm
mkdir build
cd build
@@ -166,9 +190,9 @@ Independent from your Linux distribution or when using another OS that supports
```
sudo docker build \
--build-arg VERSION_PICO_SDK=1.4.0 \
--build-arg VERSION_MAJOR=2 \
--build-arg VERSION_MINOR=6 \
--build-arg VERSION_PICO_SDK=1.5.0 \
--build-arg VERSION_MAJOR=3 \
--build-arg VERSION_MINOR=4 \
--build-arg PICO_BOARD=waveshare_rp2040_zero \
--build-arg USB_VID=0xfeff \
--build-arg USB_PID=0xfcfd \

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
#!/bin/bash
VERSION_MAJOR="3"
VERSION_MINOR="2"
VERSION_MINOR="6"
rm -rf release/*
cd build_release
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ for board in adafruit_feather_rp2040 \
eetree_gamekit_rp2040 \
garatronic_pybstick26_rp2040 \
melopero_shake_rp2040 \
nullbits_bit_c_pro \
pico \
pico_w \
pimoroni_badger2040 \
@@ -31,6 +32,7 @@ for board in adafruit_feather_rp2040 \
pimoroni_servo2040 \
pimoroni_tiny2040 \
pimoroni_tiny2040_2mb \
pololu_3pi_2040_robot \
seeed_xiao_rp2040 \
solderparty_rp2040_stamp \
solderparty_rp2040_stamp_carrier \
@@ -40,6 +42,8 @@ for board in adafruit_feather_rp2040 \
sparkfun_thingplus \
vgaboard \
waveshare_rp2040_lcd_0.96 \
waveshare_rp2040_lcd_1.28 \
waveshare_rp2040_one \
waveshare_rp2040_plus_4mb \
waveshare_rp2040_plus_16mb \
waveshare_rp2040_zero \

View File

@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ PIN=648219
## Initialization
The first step is to initialize the HSM. To do so, use the `pico-hsm-tool.py` in `tools` folder:
```
$ python3 pico-hsm-tool.py initialize --so-pin 3537363231383830 --pin 648219
$ python3 tools/pico-hsm-tool.py --pin 648219 initialize --so-pin 57621880
```
The PIN number is used to manage all private keys in the device. It supports three attemps. After the third PIN failure, it gets blocked.
The PIN accepts from 6 to 16 characters.
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ $ pkcs11-tool --login --pin 648219 --change-pin --new-pin 123456
To unblock the PIN:
```
$ pkcs11-tool --login --login-type so --so-pin=3537363231383830 --init-pin --new-pin=648219
$ pkcs11-tool --login --login-type so --so-pin 3537363231383830 --init-pin --new-pin 648219
```
## Keypair generation

Submodule pico-hsm-sdk deleted from 599e5edbd1

1
pico-keys-sdk Submodule

Submodule pico-keys-sdk added at e5e2169a47

324
src/hsm/cmd_bip_slip.c Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,324 @@
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "files.h"
#include "random.h"
#include "kek.h"
#include "asn1.h"
const uint8_t *k1_seed = (const uint8_t *) "Bitcoin seed";
const uint8_t *p1_seed = (const uint8_t *) "Nist256p1 seed";
const uint8_t *sym_seed = (const uint8_t *) "Symmetric key seed";
mbedtls_ecp_keypair hd_context = { 0 };
uint8_t hd_keytype = 0;
int node_derive_bip_child(const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *parent,
const uint8_t cpar[32],
const uint8_t *i,
mbedtls_ecp_keypair *child,
uint8_t cchild[32]) {
uint8_t data[1 + 32 + 4], I[64], *iL = I, *iR = I + 32;
mbedtls_mpi il, kchild;
mbedtls_mpi_init(&il);
mbedtls_mpi_init(&kchild);
if (i[0] >= 0x80) {
if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&parent->d, 0) == 0) {
return CCID_ERR_NULL_PARAM;
}
data[0] = 0x00;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&parent->d, data + 1, 32);
}
else {
size_t olen = 0;
mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&parent->grp,
&parent->Q,
MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED,
&olen,
data,
33);
}
do {
memcpy(data + 33, i, 4);
mbedtls_md_hmac(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512),
cpar,
32,
data,
sizeof(data),
I);
mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&il, iL, 32);
mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&kchild, &il, &parent->d);
mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&kchild, &kchild, &parent->grp.N);
data[0] = 0x01;
memcpy(data + 1, iR, 32);
} while (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&il,
&parent->grp.N) != -1 || mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&kchild, 0) == 0);
mbedtls_mpi_copy(&child->d, &kchild);
mbedtls_ecp_mul(&child->grp, &child->Q, &child->d, &child->grp.G, random_gen, NULL);
memcpy(cchild, iR, 32);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&il);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&kchild);
return CCID_OK;
}
int sha256_ripemd160(const uint8_t *buffer, size_t buffer_len, uint8_t *output) {
mbedtls_md(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256), buffer, buffer_len, output);
mbedtls_md(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160), output, 32, output);
return CCID_OK;
}
int sha256_sha256(const uint8_t *buffer, size_t buffer_len, uint8_t *output) {
mbedtls_md(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256), buffer, buffer_len, output);
mbedtls_md(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256), output, 32, output);
return CCID_OK;
}
int node_fingerprint_bip(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ctx, uint8_t fingerprint[4]) {
size_t olen = 0;
uint8_t buffer[33];
mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&ctx->grp,
&ctx->Q,
MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED,
&olen,
buffer,
sizeof(buffer));
sha256_ripemd160(buffer, sizeof(buffer), buffer);
memcpy(fingerprint, buffer, 4);
return CCID_OK;
}
int node_fingerprint_slip(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ctx, uint8_t fingerprint[4]) {
uint8_t buffer[32];
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ctx->d, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
sha256_ripemd160(buffer, sizeof(buffer), buffer);
memcpy(fingerprint, buffer, 4);
return CCID_OK;
}
int load_master_bip(uint32_t mid, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ctx, uint8_t chain[32],
uint8_t key_type[1]) {
uint8_t mkey[65];
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(ctx);
file_t *ef = search_dynamic_file(EF_MASTER_SEED | mid);
if (!file_has_data(ef)) {
return CCID_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
}
memcpy(mkey, file_get_data(ef), sizeof(mkey));
int r = mkek_decrypt(mkey + 1,
sizeof(mkey) - 1);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return CCID_EXEC_ERROR;
}
if (mkey[0] == 0x1 || mkey[0] == 0x2) {
if (mkey[0] == 0x1) {
mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&ctx->grp, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1);
}
else if (mkey[0] == 0x2) {
mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&ctx->grp, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1);
}
else {
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
}
mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx->d, mkey + 1, 32);
memcpy(chain, mkey + 33, 32);
mbedtls_ecp_mul(&ctx->grp, &ctx->Q, &ctx->d, &ctx->grp.G, random_gen, NULL);
}
else if (mkey[0] == 0x3) {
mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx->d, mkey + 33, 32);
memcpy(chain, mkey + 1, 32);
}
key_type[0] = mkey[0];
return CCID_OK;
}
int node_derive_path(const uint8_t *path,
size_t path_len,
mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ctx,
uint8_t chain[32],
uint8_t fingerprint[4],
uint8_t *nodes,
uint8_t last_node[4],
uint8_t key_type[1]) {
uint8_t *tag_data = NULL, *p = NULL;
size_t tag_len = 0;
uint16_t tag = 0x0;
uint8_t node = 0, N[64] = { 0 };
int r = 0;
memset(last_node, 0, 4);
memset(fingerprint, 0, 4);
for (; walk_tlv(path, path_len, &p, &tag, &tag_len, &tag_data); node++) {
if (tag == 0x02) {
if ((node == 0 && tag_len != 1) || (node != 0 && tag_len != 4)) {
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
}
if (node == 0) {
if ((r = load_master_bip(tag_data[0], ctx, chain, key_type)) != CCID_OK) {
return r;
}
}
else if (node > 0) {
node_fingerprint_bip(ctx, fingerprint);
if ((r = node_derive_bip_child(ctx, chain, tag_data, ctx, chain)) != CCID_OK) {
return r;
}
memcpy(last_node, tag_data, 4);
}
}
else if (tag == 0x04) {
if (node == 0) {
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
}
else if (node > 0) {
node_fingerprint_slip(ctx, fingerprint);
*(tag_data - 1) = 0;
mbedtls_md_hmac(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512),
chain,
32,
tag_data - 1,
tag_len + 1,
N);
memcpy(chain, N, 32);
mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx->d, N + 32, 32);
}
}
}
if (nodes) {
*nodes = node;
}
return CCID_OK;
}
int cmd_bip_slip() {
uint8_t p1 = P1(apdu), p2 = P2(apdu);
if (p1 == 0x1 || p1 == 0x2 || p1 == 0x3) { // Master generation (K1 and P1)
if (p2 >= 10) {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
uint8_t mkey[65], *seed = mkey + 1, seed_len = 64;
const uint8_t *key_seed = NULL;
mbedtls_mpi il;
mbedtls_mpi_init(&il);
mbedtls_ecp_group grp;
mbedtls_ecp_group_init(&grp);
if (p1 == 0x1) {
mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&grp, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1);
key_seed = k1_seed;
}
else if (p1 == 0x2) {
mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&grp, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1);
key_seed = p1_seed;
}
else if (p1 == 0x3) {
key_seed = sym_seed;
}
if (apdu.nc == 0) {
seed_len = 64;
random_gen(NULL, seed, seed_len);
}
else {
seed_len = MIN(apdu.nc, 64);
memcpy(seed, apdu.data, seed_len);
}
if (p1 == 0x1 || p1 == 0x2) {
do {
mbedtls_md_hmac(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512), key_seed,
strlen((char *) key_seed), seed, seed_len, seed);
mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&il, seed, 32);
seed_len = 64;
} while (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&il, 0) == 0 || mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&il, &grp.N) != -1);
mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&grp);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&il);
}
else if (p1 == 0x3) {
mbedtls_md_hmac(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512), key_seed,
strlen((char *) key_seed), seed, seed_len, seed);
}
mkey[0] = p1;
file_t *ef = file_new(EF_MASTER_SEED | p2);
int r = mkek_encrypt(mkey + 1, sizeof(mkey) - 1);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
r = flash_write_data_to_file(ef, mkey, sizeof(mkey));
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
low_flash_available();
}
else if (p1 == 0xA) {
if (apdu.nc == 0) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
mbedtls_ecp_keypair ctx;
uint8_t chain[32] = { 0 }, fgpt[4] = { 0 }, last_node[4] = { 0 }, key_type = 0, nodes = 0;
size_t olen = 0;
int r =
node_derive_path(apdu.data, apdu.nc, &ctx, chain, fgpt, &nodes, last_node, &key_type);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
uint8_t pubkey[33];
res_APDU_size = 0;
memcpy(res_APDU, "\x04\x88\xB2\x1E", 4);
res_APDU_size += 4;
res_APDU[res_APDU_size++] = nodes - 1;
memcpy(res_APDU + res_APDU_size, fgpt, 4);
res_APDU_size += 4;
memcpy(res_APDU + res_APDU_size, last_node, 4);
res_APDU_size += 4;
if (key_type == 0x1 || key_type == 0x2) {
memcpy(res_APDU + res_APDU_size, chain, 32);
res_APDU_size += 32;
mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&ctx.grp,
&ctx.Q,
MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED,
&olen,
pubkey,
sizeof(pubkey));
memcpy(res_APDU + res_APDU_size, pubkey, olen);
res_APDU_size += olen;
}
else if (key_type == 0x3) {
sha256_sha256(chain, 32, chain);
memcpy(res_APDU + res_APDU_size, chain, 32);
res_APDU_size += 32;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ctx.d, pubkey, 32);
sha256_sha256(pubkey, 32, pubkey);
memcpy(res_APDU + res_APDU_size, pubkey, 32);
res_APDU_size += 32;
}
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
}
else if (p1 == 0x10) {
uint8_t chain[32] = { 0 }, fgpt[4] = { 0 }, last_node[4] = { 0 }, nodes = 0;
int r = node_derive_path(apdu.data,
apdu.nc,
&hd_context,
chain,
fgpt,
&nodes,
last_node,
&hd_keytype);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&hd_context);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
return SW_OK();
}

View File

@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
#include "mbedtls/cmac.h"
#include "mbedtls/hkdf.h"
#include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h"
#include "mbedtls/gcm.h"
#include "md_wrap.h"
#include "mbedtls/md.h"
#include "crypto_utils.h"
@@ -32,6 +33,10 @@
#include "mbedtls/asn1.h"
#include "mbedtls/cipher.h"
#include "mbedtls/oid.h"
#include "mbedtls/ccm.h"
extern mbedtls_ecp_keypair hd_context;
extern uint8_t hd_keytype;
/* This is copied from pkcs5.c Mbedtls */
/** Unfortunately it is declared as static, so I cannot call it. **/
@@ -163,20 +168,22 @@ int cmd_cipher_sym() {
if (!isUserAuthenticated) {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
file_t *ef = search_dynamic_file((KEY_PREFIX << 8) | key_id);
if (!ef) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
if (key_has_purpose(ef, algo) == false) {
return SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
if (wait_button_pressed() == true) { // timeout
return SW_SECURE_MESSAGE_EXEC_ERROR();
}
file_t *ef = search_dynamic_file((KEY_PREFIX << 8) | key_id);
if (hd_keytype == 0) {
if (!ef) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
if (key_has_purpose(ef, algo) == false) {
return SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
}
int key_size = file_get_size(ef);
uint8_t kdata[32]; //maximum AES key size
uint8_t kdata[64]; //maximum AES key size
memcpy(kdata, file_get_data(ef), key_size);
if (mkek_decrypt(kdata, key_size) != 0) {
if (hd_keytype == 0 && mkek_decrypt(kdata, key_size) != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
if (algo == ALGO_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT || algo == ALGO_AES_CBC_DECRYPT) {
@@ -189,8 +196,8 @@ int cmd_cipher_sym() {
memset(tmp_iv, 0, sizeof(tmp_iv));
if (algo == ALGO_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT) {
int r = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&aes, kdata, key_size * 8);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
mbedtls_aes_free(&aes);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
@@ -200,16 +207,14 @@ int cmd_cipher_sym() {
tmp_iv,
apdu.data,
res_APDU);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
mbedtls_aes_free(&aes);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_aes_free(&aes);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
else if (algo == ALGO_AES_CBC_DECRYPT) {
int r = mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec(&aes, kdata, key_size * 8);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
mbedtls_aes_free(&aes);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
@@ -219,14 +224,12 @@ int cmd_cipher_sym() {
tmp_iv,
apdu.data,
res_APDU);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
mbedtls_aes_free(&aes);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_aes_free(&aes);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
res_APDU_size = apdu.nc;
mbedtls_aes_free(&aes);
}
else if (algo == ALGO_AES_CMAC) {
const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info;
@@ -254,7 +257,7 @@ int cmd_cipher_sym() {
int r = mbedtls_hkdf(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256),
NULL,
0,
file_get_data(ef),
kdata,
key_size,
apdu.data,
apdu.nc,
@@ -287,6 +290,7 @@ int cmd_cipher_sym() {
int r = 0;
mbedtls_chachapoly_context ctx;
mbedtls_chachapoly_init(&ctx);
mbedtls_chachapoly_setkey(&ctx, kdata);
if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_ENCRYPT) {
r = mbedtls_chachapoly_encrypt_and_tag(&ctx,
enc_len,
@@ -310,6 +314,9 @@ int cmd_cipher_sym() {
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
mbedtls_chachapoly_free(&ctx);
if (r != 0) {
if (r == MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_AUTH_FAILED) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_ENCRYPT) {
@@ -405,20 +412,21 @@ int cmd_cipher_sym() {
res_APDU_size = keylen ? keylen : (apdu.ne > 0 && apdu.ne < 65536 ? apdu.ne : 32);
}
else if (memcmp(oid, OID_PKCS5_PBES2, oid_len) == 0) {
size_t olen = 0;
mbedtls_asn1_buf params =
{ .p = aad, .len = aad_len, .tag = (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) };
int r = mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2(&params,
{.p = aad, .len = aad_len, .tag = (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)};
int r = mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2_ext(&params,
algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_ENCRYPT ? MBEDTLS_PKCS5_ENCRYPT : MBEDTLS_PKCS5_DECRYPT,
kdata,
key_size,
enc,
enc_len,
res_APDU);
res_APDU, 4096, &olen);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
if (r != 0) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
res_APDU_size = enc_len;
res_APDU_size = olen;
}
else if (memcmp(oid, OID_KDF_X963, oid_len) == 0) {
mbedtls_md_type_t md_type = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;
@@ -450,6 +458,254 @@ int cmd_cipher_sym() {
}
res_APDU_size = apdu.ne > 0 && apdu.ne < 65536 ? apdu.ne : 32;
}
else if (memcmp(oid, OID_NIST_AES, 8) == 0) {
if (oid_len != 9) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
uint8_t aes_algo = oid[8],
mode =
(algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_ENCRYPT ? MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT : MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT);
if ((aes_algo >= 0x01 && aes_algo <= 0x09 && key_size != 16) ||
(aes_algo >= 0x15 && aes_algo <= 0x1D && key_size != 24) ||
(aes_algo >= 0x29 && aes_algo <= 0x31 && key_size != 32)) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
mbedtls_aes_context ctx;
int r = 0;
mbedtls_aes_init(&ctx);
if (iv == NULL || iv_len == 0) {
iv = tmp_iv;
iv_len = sizeof(tmp_iv);
}
if (aes_algo == 0x01 || aes_algo == 0x15 || aes_algo == 0x29) { /* ECB */
if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_ENCRYPT) {
r = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx, kdata, key_size * 8);
}
else if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_DECRYPT) {
r = mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec(&ctx, kdata, key_size * 8);
}
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
r = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(&ctx, mode, enc, res_APDU);
mbedtls_aes_free(&ctx);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU_size = MIN(enc_len, 16); // ECB operates with 16-byte blocks
}
else if (aes_algo == 0x02 || aes_algo == 0x16 || aes_algo == 0x2A) { /* CBC */
if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_ENCRYPT) {
r = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx, kdata, key_size * 8);
}
else if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_DECRYPT) {
r = mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec(&ctx, kdata, key_size * 8);
}
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
r = mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc(&ctx, mode, enc_len, iv, enc, res_APDU);
mbedtls_aes_free(&ctx);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU_size = enc_len;
}
else if (aes_algo == 0x03 || aes_algo == 0x17 || aes_algo == 0x2B) { /* OFB */
size_t iv_off = 0;
r = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx, kdata, key_size * 8);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
r = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ofb(&ctx, enc_len, &iv_off, iv, enc, res_APDU);
mbedtls_aes_free(&ctx);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU_size = enc_len;
}
else if (aes_algo == 0x04 || aes_algo == 0x18 || aes_algo == 0x2C) { /* CFB */
size_t iv_off = 0;
r = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx, kdata, key_size * 8);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
r = mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb128(&ctx, mode, enc_len, &iv_off, iv, enc, res_APDU);
mbedtls_aes_free(&ctx);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU_size = enc_len;
}
else if (aes_algo == 0x06 || aes_algo == 0x1A || aes_algo == 0x2E) { /* GCM */
mbedtls_aes_free(&ctx); // No AES ctx used
mbedtls_gcm_context gctx;
mbedtls_gcm_init(&gctx);
r = mbedtls_gcm_setkey(&gctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, kdata, key_size * 8);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_ENCRYPT) {
r = mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag(&gctx,
MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT,
enc_len,
iv,
iv_len,
aad,
aad_len,
enc,
res_APDU,
16,
res_APDU + enc_len);
res_APDU_size = enc_len + 16;
}
else if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_DECRYPT) {
r = mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt(&gctx,
enc_len - 16,
iv,
iv_len,
aad,
aad_len,
enc + enc_len - 16,
16,
enc,
res_APDU);
res_APDU_size = enc_len - 16;
}
mbedtls_gcm_free(&gctx);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
else if (aes_algo == 0x09 || aes_algo == 0x1D || aes_algo == 0x31) { /* CTR */
size_t iv_off = 0;
uint8_t stream_block[16];
r = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx, kdata, key_size * 8);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
r = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ctr(&ctx, enc_len, &iv_off, iv, stream_block, enc, res_APDU);
mbedtls_aes_free(&ctx);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU_size = enc_len;
}
else if (aes_algo == 0x07 || aes_algo == 0x1B || aes_algo == 0x2F) { /* CCM */
mbedtls_aes_free(&ctx); // No AES ctx used
mbedtls_ccm_context gctx;
mbedtls_ccm_init(&gctx);
r = mbedtls_ccm_setkey(&gctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, kdata, key_size * 8);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
if (iv_len == 16) {
iv_len = 12;
}
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_ENCRYPT) {
r = mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag(&gctx,
enc_len,
iv,
iv_len,
aad,
aad_len,
enc,
res_APDU,
res_APDU + enc_len,
16);
res_APDU_size = enc_len + 16;
}
else if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_DECRYPT) {
r = mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt(&gctx,
enc_len - 16,
iv,
iv_len,
aad,
aad_len,
enc,
res_APDU,
enc + enc_len - 16,
16);
res_APDU_size = enc_len - 16;
}
mbedtls_ccm_free(&gctx);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
}
else if (memcmp(oid, OID_IEEE_ALG, 8) == 0) {
if (oid_len != 9) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
uint8_t aes_algo = oid[8],
mode =
(algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_ENCRYPT ? MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT : MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT);
int r = 0;
uint8_t tmp_iv[16];
memset(tmp_iv, 0, sizeof(tmp_iv));
if (iv == NULL || iv_len == 0) {
iv = tmp_iv;
iv_len = sizeof(tmp_iv);
}
if ((aes_algo == 0x01 && key_size != 32) || (aes_algo == 0x02 && key_size != 64)) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
mbedtls_aes_xts_context ctx;
mbedtls_aes_xts_init(&ctx);
if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_ENCRYPT) {
r = mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_enc(&ctx, kdata, key_size * 8);
}
else if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_DECRYPT) {
r = mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_dec(&ctx, kdata, key_size * 8);
}
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
r = mbedtls_aes_crypt_xts(&ctx, mode, enc_len, iv, enc, res_APDU);
mbedtls_aes_xts_free(&ctx);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU_size = enc_len;
}
else if (memcmp(oid, OID_HD, 11) == 0) {
mbedtls_aes_context ctx;
int r = 0;
uint8_t mode =
(algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_ENCRYPT ? MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT : MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT),
secret[64] = { 0 };
mbedtls_aes_init(&ctx);
if (hd_keytype != 0x3) {
return SW_INCORRECT_PARAMS();
}
key_size = 32;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&hd_context.d, kdata, key_size);
r = mbedtls_md_hmac(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512),
kdata,
key_size,
aad,
aad_len,
secret);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
if (iv == tmp_iv || iv_len == 0) {
iv = secret + 32;
iv_len = 16;
}
if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_ENCRYPT) {
r = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx, secret, key_size * 8);
}
else if (algo == ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_DECRYPT) {
r = mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec(&ctx, secret, key_size * 8);
}
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
r = mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc(&ctx, mode, enc_len, iv, enc, res_APDU);
mbedtls_aes_free(&ctx);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
res_APDU_size = enc_len;
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&hd_context);
hd_keytype = 0;
}
else {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
}
else {
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));

View File

@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ int cmd_decrypt_asym() {
free(kdata);
return SW_DATA_INVALID();
}
r = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx.ctx.mbed_ecdh.d, kdata + 1, key_size - 1);
r = mbedtls_ecp_read_key(gid, (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *)&ctx.ctx.mbed_ecdh, kdata + 1, key_size - 1);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, key_size);
free(kdata);
if (r != 0) {
@@ -129,15 +129,18 @@ int cmd_decrypt_asym() {
return SW_DATA_INVALID();
}
size_t olen = 0;
// The SmartCard-HSM returns the point result of the DH operation
// with a leading '04'
res_APDU[0] = 0x04;
r =
mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret(&ctx, &olen, res_APDU, MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES, random_gen,
mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret(&ctx, &olen, res_APDU + 1, MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES, random_gen,
NULL);
mbedtls_ecdh_free(&ctx);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
if (p2 == ALGO_EC_DH) {
res_APDU_size = olen;
res_APDU_size = olen + 1;
}
else {
res_APDU_size = 0;
@@ -175,9 +178,10 @@ int cmd_decrypt_asym() {
if (file_get_size(tf) == kdom_uid_len &&
memcmp(file_get_data(tf), kdom_uid, kdom_uid_len) == 0) {
file_new(EF_DKEK + n);
if (store_dkek_key(n, res_APDU) != CCID_OK) {
if (store_dkek_key(n, res_APDU + 1) != CCID_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(res_APDU, 32);
return SW_OK();
}
}

View File

@@ -53,13 +53,13 @@ int cmd_derive_asym() {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
if (apdu.data[0] == ALGO_EC_DERIVE) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_context ctx;
mbedtls_ecdsa_init(&ctx);
mbedtls_ecp_keypair ctx;
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(&ctx);
int r;
r = load_private_key_ecdsa(&ctx, fkey);
r = load_private_key_ec(&ctx, fkey);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ctx);
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
if (r == CCID_VERIFICATION_FAILED) {
return SW_SECURE_MESSAGE_EXEC_ERROR();
}
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ int cmd_derive_asym() {
mbedtls_mpi_init(&nd);
r = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&a, apdu.data + 1, apdu.nc - 1);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ctx);
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&a);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&nd);
return SW_DATA_INVALID();
@@ -78,22 +78,22 @@ int cmd_derive_asym() {
r = mbedtls_mpi_add_mod(&ctx.grp, &nd, &ctx.d, &a);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&a);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ctx);
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&nd);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
r = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx.d, &nd);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&nd);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ctx);
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
r = store_keys(&ctx, HSM_KEY_EC, dest_id);
r = store_keys(&ctx, PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC, dest_id);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ctx);
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ctx);
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
}
else {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();

View File

@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ int cmd_external_authenticate() {
if (!file_has_data(ef_puk)) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
puk_status[ef_puk_aut->fid & (MAX_PUK - 1)] = 0;
uint8_t *puk_data = file_get_data(ef_puk);
uint8_t *input = (uint8_t *) calloc(dev_name_len + challenge_len, sizeof(uint8_t)), hash[32];
memcpy(input, dev_name, dev_name_len);

View File

@@ -43,11 +43,11 @@ int cmd_general_authenticate() {
if (!fkey) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
mbedtls_ecdsa_context ectx;
mbedtls_ecdsa_init(&ectx);
r = load_private_key_ecdsa(&ectx, fkey);
mbedtls_ecp_keypair ectx;
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(&ectx);
r = load_private_key_ecdh(&ectx, fkey);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ectx);
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ectx);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
mbedtls_ecdh_context ctx;
@@ -55,12 +55,12 @@ int cmd_general_authenticate() {
mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1;
r = mbedtls_ecdh_setup(&ctx, gid);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ectx);
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ectx);
mbedtls_ecdh_free(&ctx);
return SW_DATA_INVALID();
}
r = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx.ctx.mbed_ecdh.d, &ectx.d);
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ectx);
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ectx);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdh_free(&ctx);
return SW_DATA_INVALID();

View File

@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ int heapLeft() {
return left;
}
extern void reset_puk_store();
int cmd_initialize() {
if (apdu.nc > 0) {
uint8_t mkek[MKEK_SIZE];
@@ -186,41 +187,55 @@ int cmd_initialize() {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
ret = store_keys(&ecdsa, HSM_KEY_EC, key_id);
ret = store_keys(&ecdsa, PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC, key_id);
if (ret != CCID_OK) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
size_t cvc_len = 0;
if ((cvc_len = asn1_cvc_aut(&ecdsa, HSM_KEY_EC, res_APDU, 4096, NULL, 0)) == 0) {
if ((cvc_len = asn1_cvc_aut(&ecdsa, PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC, res_APDU, 4096, NULL, 0)) == 0) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa);
file_t *fpk = search_by_fid(EF_EE_DEV, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
ret = flash_write_data_to_file(fpk, res_APDU, cvc_len);
if (ret != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
if ((cvc_len = asn1_cvc_cert(&ecdsa, PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC, res_APDU, 4096, NULL, 0, true)) == 0) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
memcpy(res_APDU + cvc_len, res_APDU, cvc_len);
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa);
fpk = search_by_fid(EF_TERMCA, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
ret = flash_write_data_to_file(fpk, res_APDU, 2 * cvc_len);
if (ret != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
const uint8_t *keyid =
(const uint8_t *) "\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0",
*label = (const uint8_t *) "ESTERMHSM";
*label = (const uint8_t *) "ESPICOHSMTR";
size_t prkd_len = asn1_build_prkd_ecc(label,
strlen((const char *) label),
keyid,
20,
192,
256,
res_APDU,
4096);
fpk = search_by_fid(EF_PRKD_DEV, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
ret = flash_write_data_to_file(fpk, res_APDU, prkd_len);
}
if (ret != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
low_flash_available();
reset_puk_store();
}
else { //free memory bytes request
int heap_left = heapLeft();

View File

@@ -23,11 +23,14 @@
uint8_t get_key_domain(file_t *fkey) {
size_t tag_len = 0;
if (!file_has_data(fkey)) {
return 0xff;
}
const uint8_t *meta_tag = get_meta_tag(fkey, 0x92, &tag_len);
if (meta_tag) {
return *meta_tag;
}
return 0xff;
return 0x0;
}
int cmd_key_domain() {
@@ -65,10 +68,16 @@ int cmd_key_domain() {
}
import_dkek_share(p2, apdu.data);
if (++current_dkeks >= dkeks) {
if (save_dkek_key(p2, NULL) != CCID_OK) {
/* On fail, it will return to previous dkek state. */
import_dkek_share(p2, apdu.data);
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
int r = save_dkek_key(p2, NULL);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
if (r == CCID_NO_LOGIN) {
pending_save_dkek = p2;
}
else {
/* On fail, it will return to previous dkek state. */
import_dkek_share(p2, apdu.data);
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
}
}
uint8_t t[MAX_KEY_DOMAINS * 2];
@@ -94,8 +103,9 @@ int cmd_key_domain() {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
if (p1 == 0x3) { //if key domain is not empty, command is denied
for (int i = 0; i < dynamic_files; i++) {
if (get_key_domain(&dynamic_file[i]) == p2) {
for (int i = 1; i < 256; i++) {
file_t *fkey = search_dynamic_file(KEY_PREFIX << 8 | i);
if (get_key_domain(fkey) == p2) {
return SW_FILE_EXISTS();
}
}
@@ -103,10 +113,16 @@ int cmd_key_domain() {
uint8_t t[MAX_KEY_DOMAINS * 2];
memcpy(t, kdata, tf_kd_size);
if (p1 == 0x1) {
if (t[2 * p2] != 0xff || t[2 * p2 + 1] != 0xff) {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
t[2 * p2] = dkeks = apdu.data[0];
t[2 * p2 + 1] = current_dkeks = 0;
}
else if (p1 == 0x3) {
if (t[2 * p2] == 0xff && t[2 * p2 + 1] == 0xff) {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
t[2 * p2] = dkeks = 0xff;
t[2 * p2 + 1] = 0xff;
}

View File

@@ -27,7 +27,10 @@ int cmd_key_gen() {
if (!isUserAuthenticated) {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
if (p2 == 0xB2) {
if (p2 == 0xB3) {
key_size = 64;
}
else if (p2 == 0xB2) {
key_size = 32;
}
else if (p2 == 0xB1) {
@@ -37,17 +40,20 @@ int cmd_key_gen() {
key_size = 16;
}
//at this moment, we do not use the template, as only CBC is supported by the driver (encrypt, decrypt and CMAC)
uint8_t aes_key[32]; //maximum AES key size
uint8_t aes_key[64]; //maximum AES key size
memcpy(aes_key, random_bytes_get(key_size), key_size);
int aes_type = 0x0;
if (key_size == 16) {
aes_type = HSM_KEY_AES_128;
aes_type = PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_128;
}
else if (key_size == 24) {
aes_type = HSM_KEY_AES_192;
aes_type = PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_192;
}
else if (key_size == 32) {
aes_type = HSM_KEY_AES_256;
aes_type = PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_256;
}
else if (key_size == 64) {
aes_type = PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_512;
}
r = store_keys(aes_key, aes_type, key_id);
if (r != CCID_OK) {

View File

@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "common.h"
#include "crypto_utils.h"
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "kek.h"
@@ -29,12 +30,12 @@ int cmd_key_unwrap() {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
int key_type = dkek_type_key(apdu.data);
uint8_t kdom = -1, *allowed = NULL;
size_t allowed_len = 0;
uint8_t kdom = -1, *allowed = NULL, prkd_buf[128];
size_t allowed_len = 0, prkd_len = 0;
if (key_type == 0x0) {
return SW_DATA_INVALID();
}
if (key_type == HSM_KEY_RSA) {
if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_RSA) {
mbedtls_rsa_context ctx;
mbedtls_rsa_init(&ctx);
do {
@@ -44,38 +45,42 @@ int cmd_key_unwrap() {
mbedtls_rsa_free(&ctx);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
r = store_keys(&ctx, HSM_KEY_RSA, key_id);
if ((res_APDU_size = asn1_cvc_aut(&ctx, HSM_KEY_RSA, res_APDU, 4096, NULL, 0)) == 0) {
r = store_keys(&ctx, PICO_KEYS_KEY_RSA, key_id);
if ((res_APDU_size = asn1_cvc_aut(&ctx, PICO_KEYS_KEY_RSA, res_APDU, 4096, NULL, 0)) == 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(&ctx);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
int key_size = ctx.len;
mbedtls_rsa_free(&ctx);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
prkd_len = asn1_build_prkd_ecc(NULL, 0, NULL, 0, key_size * 8, prkd_buf, sizeof(prkd_buf));
}
else if (key_type == HSM_KEY_EC) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_context ctx;
mbedtls_ecdsa_init(&ctx);
else if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC) {
mbedtls_ecp_keypair ctx;
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(&ctx);
do {
r = dkek_decode_key(++kdom, &ctx, apdu.data, apdu.nc, NULL, &allowed, &allowed_len);
} while ((r == CCID_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND || r == CCID_WRONG_DKEK) && kdom < MAX_KEY_DOMAINS);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ctx);
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
r = store_keys(&ctx, HSM_KEY_EC, key_id);
if ((res_APDU_size = asn1_cvc_aut(&ctx, HSM_KEY_EC, res_APDU, 4096, NULL, 0)) == 0) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ctx);
r = store_keys(&ctx, PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC, key_id);
if ((res_APDU_size = asn1_cvc_aut(&ctx, PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC, res_APDU, 4096, NULL, 0)) == 0) {
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ctx);
int key_size = ctx.grp.nbits;
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
prkd_len = asn1_build_prkd_ecc(NULL, 0, NULL, 0, key_size, prkd_buf, sizeof(prkd_buf));
}
else if (key_type == HSM_KEY_AES) {
uint8_t aes_key[32];
else if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES) {
uint8_t aes_key[64];
int key_size = 0, aes_type = 0;
do {
r = dkek_decode_key(++kdom,
@@ -89,14 +94,17 @@ int cmd_key_unwrap() {
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
if (key_size == 32) {
aes_type = HSM_KEY_AES_256;
if (key_size == 64) {
aes_type = PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_512;
}
else if (key_size == 32) {
aes_type = PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_256;
}
else if (key_size == 24) {
aes_type = HSM_KEY_AES_192;
aes_type = PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_192;
}
else if (key_size == 16) {
aes_type = HSM_KEY_AES_128;
aes_type = PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_128;
}
else {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
@@ -105,6 +113,7 @@ int cmd_key_unwrap() {
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
prkd_len = asn1_build_prkd_aes(NULL, 0, NULL, 0, key_size * 8, prkd_buf, sizeof(prkd_buf));
}
if ((allowed != NULL && allowed_len > 0) || kdom >= 0) {
size_t meta_len = (allowed_len > 0 ? 2 + allowed_len : 0) + (kdom >= 0 ? 3 : 0);
@@ -125,14 +134,21 @@ int cmd_key_unwrap() {
return r;
}
}
if (prkd_len > 0) {
file_t *fpk = file_new((PRKD_PREFIX << 8) | key_id);
r = flash_write_data_to_file(fpk, prkd_buf, prkd_len);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
}
if (res_APDU_size > 0) {
file_t *fpk = file_new((EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX << 8) | key_id);
r = flash_write_data_to_file(fpk, res_APDU, res_APDU_size);
if (r != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
low_flash_available();
res_APDU_size = 0;
}
low_flash_available();
return SW_OK();
}

View File

@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "asn1.h"
#include "kek.h"
#include "files.h"
extern uint8_t get_key_domain(file_t *fkey);
@@ -31,10 +32,19 @@ int cmd_key_wrap() {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
file_t *ef = search_dynamic_file((KEY_PREFIX << 8) | key_id);
uint8_t kdom = get_key_domain(ef);
if (!ef) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
uint8_t kdom = get_key_domain(ef);
if (kdom == 0xff) {
return SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND();
}
file_t *tf_kd = search_by_fid(EF_KEY_DOMAIN, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
uint8_t *kdata = file_get_data(tf_kd), dkeks = kdata ? kdata[2 * kdom] : 0,
current_dkeks = kdata ? kdata[2 * kdom + 1] : 0;
if (dkeks != current_dkeks || dkeks == 0 || dkeks == 0xff) {
return SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND();
}
if (key_has_purpose(ef, ALGO_WRAP) == false) {
return SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
@@ -57,42 +67,45 @@ int cmd_key_wrap() {
}
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
r = dkek_encode_key(kdom, &ctx, HSM_KEY_RSA, res_APDU, &wrap_len, meta_tag, tag_len);
r = dkek_encode_key(kdom, &ctx, PICO_KEYS_KEY_RSA, res_APDU, &wrap_len, meta_tag, tag_len);
mbedtls_rsa_free(&ctx);
}
else if (*dprkd == P15_KEYTYPE_ECC) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_context ctx;
mbedtls_ecdsa_init(&ctx);
r = load_private_key_ecdsa(&ctx, ef);
mbedtls_ecp_keypair ctx;
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(&ctx);
r = load_private_key_ec(&ctx, ef);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ctx);
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
if (r == CCID_VERIFICATION_FAILED) {
return SW_SECURE_MESSAGE_EXEC_ERROR();
}
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
r = dkek_encode_key(kdom, &ctx, HSM_KEY_EC, res_APDU, &wrap_len, meta_tag, tag_len);
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ctx);
r = dkek_encode_key(kdom, &ctx, PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC, res_APDU, &wrap_len, meta_tag, tag_len);
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
}
else if (*dprkd == P15_KEYTYPE_AES) {
uint8_t kdata[32]; //maximum AES key size
uint8_t kdata[64]; //maximum AES key size
if (wait_button_pressed() == true) { //timeout
return SW_SECURE_MESSAGE_EXEC_ERROR();
}
int key_size = file_get_size(ef), aes_type = HSM_KEY_AES;
int key_size = file_get_size(ef), aes_type = PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES;
memcpy(kdata, file_get_data(ef), key_size);
if (mkek_decrypt(kdata, key_size) != 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
if (key_size == 32) {
aes_type = HSM_KEY_AES_256;
if (key_size == 64) {
aes_type = PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_512;
}
else if (key_size == 32) {
aes_type = PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_256;
}
else if (key_size == 24) {
aes_type = HSM_KEY_AES_192;
aes_type = PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_192;
}
else if (key_size == 16) {
aes_type = HSM_KEY_AES_128;
aes_type = PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_128;
}
r = dkek_encode_key(kdom, kdata, aes_type, res_APDU, &wrap_len, meta_tag, tag_len);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));

View File

@@ -69,10 +69,10 @@ int cmd_keypair_gen() {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
if ((res_APDU_size =
asn1_cvc_aut(&rsa, HSM_KEY_RSA, res_APDU, 4096, NULL, 0)) == 0) {
asn1_cvc_aut(&rsa, PICO_KEYS_KEY_RSA, res_APDU, 4096, NULL, 0)) == 0) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
ret = store_keys(&rsa, HSM_KEY_RSA, key_id);
ret = store_keys(&rsa, PICO_KEYS_KEY_RSA, key_id);
if (ret != CCID_OK) {
mbedtls_rsa_free(&rsa);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
@@ -86,10 +86,23 @@ int cmd_keypair_gen() {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
mbedtls_ecp_group_id ec_id = ec_get_curve_from_prime(prime, prime_len);
printf("KEYPAIR ECC %d\r\n", ec_id);
if (ec_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) {
return SW_FUNC_NOT_SUPPORTED();
}
if (ec_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519 || ec_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448) {
size_t g_len = 0;
uint8_t *g = NULL;
if (asn1_find_tag(p, tout, 0x83, &g_len, &g) != true) {
return SW_WRONG_DATA();
}
if (ec_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519 && (g[0] != 9)) {
ec_id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_ED25519;
}
else if (ec_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448 && (g_len != 56 || g[0] != 5)) {
ec_id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_ED448;
}
}
printf("KEYPAIR ECC %d\r\n", ec_id);
mbedtls_ecdsa_context ecdsa;
mbedtls_ecdsa_init(&ecdsa);
uint8_t index = 0;
@@ -133,7 +146,7 @@ int cmd_keypair_gen() {
}
}
if ((res_APDU_size =
asn1_cvc_aut(&ecdsa, HSM_KEY_EC, res_APDU, 4096, ext, ext_len)) == 0) {
asn1_cvc_aut(&ecdsa, PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC, res_APDU, 4096, ext, ext_len)) == 0) {
if (ext) {
free(ext);
}
@@ -143,7 +156,7 @@ int cmd_keypair_gen() {
if (ext) {
free(ext);
}
ret = store_keys(&ecdsa, HSM_KEY_EC, key_id);
ret = store_keys(&ecdsa, PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC, key_id);
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa);
if (ret != CCID_OK) {
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();

View File

@@ -68,6 +68,9 @@ int cmd_mse() {
&chr_len);
if (memcmp(chr, tag_data, chr_len) == 0) {
ef_puk_aut = ef;
if (puk_status[i] == 1) {
return SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED(); // It is correct
}
return SW_OK();
}
}

View File

@@ -23,7 +23,10 @@ int cmd_puk_auth() {
uint8_t p1 = P1(apdu), p2 = P2(apdu);
file_t *ef_puk = search_by_fid(EF_PUKAUT, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
if (!file_has_data(ef_puk)) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
if (apdu.nc > 0) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
uint8_t *puk_data = file_get_data(ef_puk);
if (apdu.nc > 0) {

View File

@@ -85,13 +85,13 @@ int cmd_read_binary() {
else {
uint16_t data_len = file_get_size(ef);
if (offset > data_len) {
return SW_WRONG_P1P2();
return SW_WARNING_EOF();
}
uint16_t maxle = data_len - offset;
if (apdu.ne > maxle) {
apdu.ne = maxle;
}
//uint16_t maxle = data_len - offset;
//if (apdu.ne > maxle) {
// apdu.ne = maxle;
//}
memcpy(res_APDU, file_get_data(ef) + offset, data_len - offset);
res_APDU_size = data_len - offset;
}

View File

@@ -36,16 +36,15 @@ int cmd_reset_retry() {
if (P1(apdu) == 0x0 || P1(apdu) == 0x2) {
int newpin_len = 0;
if (P1(apdu) == 0x0) {
if (apdu.nc <= 8) {
uint8_t so_pin_len = file_read_uint8(file_get_data(file_sopin));
if (apdu.nc <= so_pin_len + 1) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
uint16_t r = check_pin(file_sopin, apdu.data, 8);
uint16_t r = check_pin(file_sopin, apdu.data, so_pin_len);
if (r != 0x9000) {
return r;
}
newpin_len = apdu.nc - 8;
has_session_sopin = true;
hash_multi(apdu.data, 8, session_sopin);
newpin_len = apdu.nc - so_pin_len;
}
else if (P1(apdu) == 0x2) {
if (!has_session_sopin) {
@@ -83,15 +82,14 @@ int cmd_reset_retry() {
return SW_COMMAND_NOT_ALLOWED();
}
if (P1(apdu) == 0x1) {
if (apdu.nc != 8) {
uint8_t so_pin_len = file_read_uint8(file_get_data(file_sopin));
if (apdu.nc != so_pin_len) {
return SW_WRONG_LENGTH();
}
uint16_t r = check_pin(file_sopin, apdu.data, 8);
uint16_t r = check_pin(file_sopin, apdu.data, so_pin_len);
if (r != 0x9000) {
return r;
}
has_session_sopin = true;
hash_multi(apdu.data, 8, session_sopin);
}
else if (P1(apdu) == 0x3) {
if (!has_session_sopin) {

View File

@@ -47,26 +47,27 @@ int cmd_select() {
// return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
//}
if (apdu.nc >= 2) {
if (apdu.nc == 2) {
fid = get_uint16_t(apdu.data, 0);
}
//if ((fid & 0xff00) == (KEY_PREFIX << 8))
// fid = (PRKD_PREFIX << 8) | (fid & 0xff);
uint8_t pfx = fid >> 8;
if (pfx == PRKD_PREFIX ||
/*uint8_t pfx = fid >> 8;*/
/*if (pfx == PRKD_PREFIX ||
pfx == CD_PREFIX ||
pfx == CA_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX ||
pfx == KEY_PREFIX ||
pfx == EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX ||
pfx == DCOD_PREFIX ||
pfx == DATA_PREFIX ||
pfx == PROT_DATA_PREFIX) {
if (!(pe = search_dynamic_file(fid)) && !(pe = search_by_fid(fid, NULL, SPECIFY_EF))) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
pfx == PROT_DATA_PREFIX) {*/
if (fid != 0x0 && !(pe = search_dynamic_file(fid)) &&
!(pe = search_by_fid(fid, NULL, SPECIFY_EF))) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
/*}*/
if (!pe) {
if (p1 == 0x0) { //Select MF, DF or EF - File identifier or absent
if (apdu.nc == 0) {

View File

@@ -14,12 +14,16 @@
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "crypto_utils.h"
#include "sc_hsm.h"
#include "asn1.h"
#include "mbedtls/oid.h"
#include "random.h"
#include "mbedtls/eddsa.h"
extern mbedtls_ecp_keypair hd_context;
extern uint8_t hd_keytype;
//-----
/* From OpenSC */
@@ -101,7 +105,10 @@ int cmd_signature() {
if (!isUserAuthenticated) {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
if (!(fkey = search_dynamic_file((KEY_PREFIX << 8) | key_id)) || !file_has_data(fkey)) {
if ((!(fkey = search_dynamic_file((KEY_PREFIX << 8) | key_id)) &&
!(fkey =
search_by_fid((KEY_PREFIX << 8) | key_id, NULL,
SPECIFY_EF))) || !file_has_data(fkey)) {
return SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND();
}
if (get_key_counter(fkey) == 0) {
@@ -227,8 +234,8 @@ int cmd_signature() {
mbedtls_rsa_free(&ctx);
}
else if (p2 >= ALGO_EC_RAW && p2 <= ALGO_EC_SHA512) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_context ctx;
mbedtls_ecdsa_init(&ctx);
mbedtls_ecp_keypair ctx;
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(&ctx);
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256;
if (p2 == ALGO_EC_RAW) {
if (apdu.nc == 32) {
@@ -262,9 +269,9 @@ int cmd_signature() {
else if (p2 == ALGO_EC_SHA512) {
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512;
}
int r = load_private_key_ecdsa(&ctx, fkey);
int r = load_private_key_ec(&ctx, fkey);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ctx);
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
if (r == CCID_VERIFICATION_FAILED) {
return SW_SECURE_MESSAGE_EXEC_ERROR();
}
@@ -272,14 +279,41 @@ int cmd_signature() {
}
size_t olen = 0;
uint8_t buf[MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN];
if (mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature(&ctx, md, apdu.data, apdu.nc, buf, MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN,
&olen, random_gen, NULL) != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ctx);
if (ctx.grp.id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_ED25519 || ctx.grp.id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_ED448) {
r = mbedtls_eddsa_write_signature(&ctx, apdu.data, apdu.nc, buf, sizeof(buf), &olen, MBEDTLS_EDDSA_PURE, NULL, 0, random_gen, NULL);
}
else {
r = mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature(&ctx, md, apdu.data, apdu.nc, buf, MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN,
&olen, random_gen, NULL);
}
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
memcpy(res_APDU, buf, olen);
res_APDU_size = olen;
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ctx);
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ctx);
}
else if (p2 == ALGO_HD) {
size_t olen = 0;
uint8_t buf[MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN];
if (hd_context.grp.id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) {
return SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
if (hd_keytype != 0x1 && hd_keytype != 0x2) {
return SW_INCORRECT_PARAMS();
}
md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256;
if (mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature(&hd_context, md, apdu.data, apdu.nc, buf,
MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN,
&olen, random_gen, NULL) != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&hd_context);
return SW_EXEC_ERROR();
}
memcpy(res_APDU, buf, olen);
res_APDU_size = olen;
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&hd_context);
hd_keytype = 0;
}
else {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();

View File

@@ -33,11 +33,14 @@ int cmd_update_ef() {
if (fid == 0x0) {
ef = currentEF;
}
else if (p1 != EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX && p1 != PRKD_PREFIX && p1 != CA_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX &&
/*
// This should not happen
else if (p1 != EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX && p1 != PRKD_PREFIX && p1 != CA_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX &&
p1 != CD_PREFIX && p1 != DATA_PREFIX && p1 != DCOD_PREFIX &&
p1 != PROT_DATA_PREFIX) {
return SW_INCORRECT_P1P2();
}
}
*/
if (ef && !authenticate_action(ef, ACL_OP_UPDATE_ERASE)) {
return SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED();

View File

@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
#include "oid.h"
#include "mbedtls/md.h"
#include "files.h"
#include "mbedtls/eddsa.h"
extern const uint8_t *dev_name;
extern size_t dev_name_len;
@@ -72,33 +73,32 @@ const uint8_t *pointA[] = {
"\x01\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFC",
};
size_t asn1_cvc_public_key_ecdsa(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ecdsa, uint8_t *buf, size_t buf_len) {
uint8_t Y_buf[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_PT_LEN];
size_t asn1_cvc_public_key_ecdsa(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecdsa, uint8_t *buf, size_t buf_len) {
uint8_t Y_buf[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_PT_LEN], G_buf[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_PT_LEN];
const uint8_t oid_ecdsa[] = { 0x04, 0x00, 0x7F, 0x00, 0x07, 0x02, 0x02, 0x02, 0x02, 0x03 };
const uint8_t oid_ri[] = { 0x04, 0x00, 0x7F, 0x00, 0x07, 0x02, 0x02, 0x05, 0x02, 0x03 };
const uint8_t *oid = oid_ecdsa;
size_t p_size = mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.P), a_size = mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.A);
size_t b_size = mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.B),
g_size = 1 + mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.G.X) + mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.G.X);
size_t b_size = mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.B), g_size = 0;
size_t o_size = mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.N), y_size = 0;
mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp,
&ecdsa->Q,
MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED,
&y_size,
Y_buf,
sizeof(Y_buf));
mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp, &ecdsa->grp.G, MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED, &g_size, G_buf, sizeof(G_buf));
mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp, &ecdsa->Q, MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED, &y_size, Y_buf, sizeof(Y_buf));
size_t c_size = 1;
size_t ptot_size = asn1_len_tag(0x81, p_size), atot_size = asn1_len_tag(0x82,
a_size ? a_size : (
pointA[ecdsa->grp.id
] &&
ecdsa->grp.id <
6 ? p_size : 1));
size_t ptot_size = asn1_len_tag(0x81, p_size), atot_size = asn1_len_tag(0x82, a_size ? a_size : (pointA[ecdsa->grp.id] && ecdsa->grp.id < 6 ? p_size : 1));
size_t btot_size = asn1_len_tag(0x83, b_size), gtot_size = asn1_len_tag(0x84, g_size);
size_t otot_size = asn1_len_tag(0x85, o_size), ytot_size = asn1_len_tag(0x86, y_size);
size_t ctot_size = asn1_len_tag(0x87, c_size);
size_t oid_len = asn1_len_tag(0x6, sizeof(oid_ecdsa));
size_t tot_len = asn1_len_tag(0x7f49,
oid_len + ptot_size + atot_size + btot_size + gtot_size + otot_size + ytot_size +
ctot_size);
size_t tot_len = 0, tot_data_len = 0;
if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(&ecdsa->grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY || mbedtls_ecp_get_type(&ecdsa->grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_EDWARDS) {
tot_data_len = oid_len + ptot_size + otot_size + gtot_size + ytot_size;
oid = oid_ri;
}
else {
tot_data_len = oid_len + ptot_size + atot_size + btot_size + gtot_size + otot_size + ytot_size +
ctot_size;
}
tot_len = asn1_len_tag(0x7f49, tot_data_len);
if (buf == NULL || buf_len == 0) {
return tot_len;
}
@@ -107,57 +107,52 @@ size_t asn1_cvc_public_key_ecdsa(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ecdsa, uint8_t *buf, siz
}
uint8_t *p = buf;
memcpy(p, "\x7F\x49", 2); p += 2;
p += format_tlv_len(
oid_len + ptot_size + atot_size + btot_size + gtot_size + otot_size + ytot_size + ctot_size,
p);
p += format_tlv_len(tot_data_len, p);
//oid
*p++ = 0x6; p += format_tlv_len(sizeof(oid_ecdsa), p); memcpy(p, oid_ecdsa, sizeof(oid_ecdsa));
*p++ = 0x6; p += format_tlv_len(sizeof(oid_ecdsa), p); memcpy(p, oid, sizeof(oid_ecdsa));
p += sizeof(oid_ecdsa);
//p
*p++ = 0x81; p += format_tlv_len(p_size, p); mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp.P, p, p_size);
p += p_size;
//A
if (a_size) {
*p++ = 0x82; p += format_tlv_len(a_size, p); mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp.A,
p,
a_size); p += a_size;
}
else { //mbedtls does not set point A for some curves
if (pointA[ecdsa->grp.id] && ecdsa->grp.id < 6) {
*p++ = 0x82; p += format_tlv_len(p_size, p); memcpy(p, pointA[ecdsa->grp.id], p_size);
p += p_size;
}
else {
*p++ = 0x82; p += format_tlv_len(1, p);
*p++ = 0x0;
}
}
//B
*p++ = 0x83; p += format_tlv_len(b_size, p); mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp.B, p, b_size);
p += b_size;
//G
size_t g_new_size = 0;
*p++ = 0x84; p += format_tlv_len(g_size, p); mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp,
&ecdsa->grp.G,
MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED,
&g_new_size,
p,
g_size);
p += g_size;
//order
*p++ = 0x85; p += format_tlv_len(o_size, p); mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp.N, p, o_size);
p += o_size;
//Y
*p++ = 0x86; p += format_tlv_len(y_size, p); memcpy(p, Y_buf, y_size); p += y_size;
//cofactor
*p++ = 0x87; p += format_tlv_len(c_size, p);
if (ecdsa->grp.id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448) {
*p++ = 4;
}
else if (ecdsa->grp.id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519) {
*p++ = 8;
if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(&ecdsa->grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY || mbedtls_ecp_get_type(&ecdsa->grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_EDWARDS) {
//p
*p++ = 0x81; p += format_tlv_len(p_size, p); mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp.P, p, p_size);
p += p_size;
//order
*p++ = 0x82; p += format_tlv_len(o_size, p); mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp.N, p, o_size);
p += o_size;
//G
*p++ = 0x83; p += format_tlv_len(g_size, p); memcpy(p, G_buf, g_size); p += g_size;
//Y
*p++ = 0x84; p += format_tlv_len(y_size, p); memcpy(p, Y_buf, y_size); p += y_size;
}
else {
//p
*p++ = 0x81; p += format_tlv_len(p_size, p); mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp.P, p, p_size);
p += p_size;
//A
if (a_size) {
*p++ = 0x82; p += format_tlv_len(a_size, p); mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp.A, p, a_size); p += a_size;
}
else { //mbedtls does not set point A for some curves
if (pointA[ecdsa->grp.id] && ecdsa->grp.id < 6) {
*p++ = 0x82; p += format_tlv_len(p_size, p); memcpy(p, pointA[ecdsa->grp.id], p_size);
p += p_size;
}
else {
*p++ = 0x82; p += format_tlv_len(1, p);
*p++ = 0x0;
}
}
//B
*p++ = 0x83; p += format_tlv_len(b_size, p); mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp.B, p, b_size);
p += b_size;
//G
*p++ = 0x84; p += format_tlv_len(g_size, p); memcpy(p, G_buf, g_size); p += g_size;
//order
*p++ = 0x85; p += format_tlv_len(o_size, p); mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp.N, p, o_size);
p += o_size;
//Y
*p++ = 0x86; p += format_tlv_len(y_size, p); memcpy(p, Y_buf, y_size); p += y_size;
//cofactor
*p++ = 0x87; p += format_tlv_len(c_size, p);
*p++ = 1;
}
return tot_len;
@@ -168,19 +163,25 @@ size_t asn1_cvc_cert_body(void *rsa_ecdsa,
uint8_t *buf,
size_t buf_len,
const uint8_t *ext,
size_t ext_len) {
size_t ext_len,
bool full) {
size_t pubkey_size = 0;
if (key_type == HSM_KEY_RSA) {
if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_RSA) {
pubkey_size = asn1_cvc_public_key_rsa(rsa_ecdsa, NULL, 0);
}
else if (key_type == HSM_KEY_EC) {
else if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC) {
pubkey_size = asn1_cvc_public_key_ecdsa(rsa_ecdsa, NULL, 0);
}
size_t cpi_size = 4;
size_t ext_size = 0;
size_t cpi_size = 4, ext_size = 0, role_size = 0, valid_size = 0;
if (ext && ext_len > 0) {
ext_size = asn1_len_tag(0x65, ext_len);
}
const uint8_t *role = (const uint8_t *)"\x06\x09\x04\x00\x7F\x00\x07\x03\x01\x02\x02\x53\x01\x00";
size_t rolelen = 14;
if (full) {
role_size = asn1_len_tag(0x7f4c, rolelen);
valid_size = asn1_len_tag(0x5f24, 6) + asn1_len_tag(0x5f25, 6);
}
uint8_t *car = NULL, *chr = NULL;
size_t lencar = 0, lenchr = 0;
@@ -189,15 +190,23 @@ size_t asn1_cvc_cert_body(void *rsa_ecdsa,
&car) == false || lencar == 0 || car == NULL) {
car = (uint8_t *) dev_name;
lencar = dev_name_len;
if (dev_name == NULL) {
car = (uint8_t *)"ESPICOHSMTR00001";
lencar = strlen((const char *)car);
}
}
if (asn1_find_tag(apdu.data, apdu.nc, 0x5f20, &lenchr,
&chr) == false || lenchr == 0 || chr == NULL) {
chr = (uint8_t *) dev_name;
lenchr = dev_name_len;
if (chr == NULL) {
chr = car;
lenchr = lencar;
}
}
size_t car_size = asn1_len_tag(0x42, lencar), chr_size = asn1_len_tag(0x5f20, lenchr);
size_t tot_len = asn1_len_tag(0x7f4e, cpi_size + car_size + pubkey_size + chr_size + ext_size);
size_t tot_len = asn1_len_tag(0x7f4e, cpi_size + car_size + pubkey_size + chr_size + ext_size + role_size + valid_size);
if (buf_len == 0 || buf == NULL) {
return tot_len;
@@ -207,20 +216,39 @@ size_t asn1_cvc_cert_body(void *rsa_ecdsa,
}
uint8_t *p = buf;
memcpy(p, "\x7F\x4E", 2); p += 2;
p += format_tlv_len(cpi_size + car_size + pubkey_size + chr_size + ext_size, p);
p += format_tlv_len(cpi_size + car_size + pubkey_size + chr_size + role_size + valid_size + ext_size, p);
//cpi
*p++ = 0x5f; *p++ = 0x29; *p++ = 1; *p++ = 0;
//car
*p++ = 0x42; p += format_tlv_len(lencar, p); memcpy(p, car, lencar); p += lencar;
//pubkey
if (key_type == HSM_KEY_RSA) {
if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_RSA) {
p += asn1_cvc_public_key_rsa(rsa_ecdsa, p, pubkey_size);
}
else if (key_type == HSM_KEY_EC) {
else if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC) {
p += asn1_cvc_public_key_ecdsa(rsa_ecdsa, p, pubkey_size);
}
//chr
*p++ = 0x5f; *p++ = 0x20; p += format_tlv_len(lenchr, p); memcpy(p, chr, lenchr); p += lenchr;
if (full) {
*p++ = 0x7f;
*p++ = 0x4c;
p += format_tlv_len(rolelen, p);
memcpy(p, role, rolelen);
p += rolelen;
*p++ = 0x5f;
*p++ = 0x25;
p += format_tlv_len(6, p);
memcpy(p, "\x02\x03\x00\x03\x02\x01", 6);
p += 6;
*p++ = 0x5f;
*p++ = 0x24;
p += format_tlv_len(6, p);
memcpy(p, "\x07\x00\x01\x02\x03\x01", 6);
p += 6;
}
if (ext && ext_len > 0) {
*p++ = 0x65;
p += format_tlv_len(ext_len, p);
@@ -235,19 +263,16 @@ size_t asn1_cvc_cert(void *rsa_ecdsa,
uint8_t *buf,
size_t buf_len,
const uint8_t *ext,
size_t ext_len) {
size_t ext_len,
bool full) {
size_t key_size = 0;
if (key_type == HSM_KEY_RSA) {
if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_RSA) {
key_size = mbedtls_mpi_size(&((mbedtls_rsa_context *) rsa_ecdsa)->N);
}
else if (key_type == HSM_KEY_EC) {
key_size = 2 *
(int) ((mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id(((mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) rsa_ecdsa)
->grp.id)->
bit_size + 7) / 8);
else if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC) {
key_size = 2 * (int)((mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id(((mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) rsa_ecdsa)->grp.id)->bit_size + 7) / 8);
}
size_t body_size = asn1_cvc_cert_body(rsa_ecdsa, key_type, NULL, 0, ext, ext_len),
sig_size = asn1_len_tag(0x5f37, key_size);
size_t body_size = asn1_cvc_cert_body(rsa_ecdsa, key_type, NULL, 0, ext, ext_len, full), sig_size = asn1_len_tag(0x5f37, key_size);
size_t tot_len = asn1_len_tag(0x7f21, body_size + sig_size);
if (buf_len == 0 || buf == NULL) {
return tot_len;
@@ -259,26 +284,29 @@ size_t asn1_cvc_cert(void *rsa_ecdsa,
memcpy(p, "\x7F\x21", 2); p += 2;
p += format_tlv_len(body_size + sig_size, p);
body = p;
p += asn1_cvc_cert_body(rsa_ecdsa, key_type, p, body_size, ext, ext_len);
p += asn1_cvc_cert_body(rsa_ecdsa, key_type, p, body_size, ext, ext_len, full);
uint8_t hsh[32];
hash256(body, body_size, hsh);
memcpy(p, "\x5F\x37", 2); p += 2;
p += format_tlv_len(key_size, p);
if (key_type == HSM_KEY_RSA) {
if (mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign(rsa_ecdsa, random_gen, NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, 32,
hsh, p) != 0) {
if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_RSA) {
if (mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign(rsa_ecdsa, random_gen, NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, 32, hsh, p) != 0) {
memset(p, 0, key_size);
}
p += key_size;
}
else if (key_type == HSM_KEY_EC) {
else if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC) {
mbedtls_mpi r, s;
int ret = 0;
mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ecdsa = (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) rsa_ecdsa;
mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecdsa = (mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) rsa_ecdsa;
mbedtls_mpi_init(&r);
mbedtls_mpi_init(&s);
ret =
mbedtls_ecdsa_sign(&ecdsa->grp, &r, &s, &ecdsa->d, hsh, sizeof(hsh), random_gen, NULL);
if (ecdsa->grp.id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_ED25519 || ecdsa->grp.id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_ED448) {
ret = mbedtls_eddsa_sign(&ecdsa->grp, &r, &s, &ecdsa->d, body, body_size, MBEDTLS_EDDSA_PURE, NULL, 0, random_gen, NULL);
}
else {
ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_sign(&ecdsa->grp, &r, &s, &ecdsa->d, hsh, sizeof(hsh), random_gen, NULL);
}
if (ret == 0) {
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&r, p, key_size / 2); p += key_size / 2;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&s, p, key_size / 2); p += key_size / 2;
@@ -299,7 +327,7 @@ size_t asn1_cvc_aut(void *rsa_ecdsa,
size_t buf_len,
const uint8_t *ext,
size_t ext_len) {
size_t cvcert_size = asn1_cvc_cert(rsa_ecdsa, key_type, NULL, 0, ext, ext_len);
size_t cvcert_size = asn1_cvc_cert(rsa_ecdsa, key_type, NULL, 0, ext, ext_len, false);
size_t outcar_len = dev_name_len;
const uint8_t *outcar = dev_name;
size_t outcar_size = asn1_len_tag(0x42, outcar_len);
@@ -307,16 +335,14 @@ size_t asn1_cvc_aut(void *rsa_ecdsa,
if (!fkey) {
return 0;
}
mbedtls_ecdsa_context ectx;
mbedtls_ecdsa_init(&ectx);
if (load_private_key_ecdsa(&ectx, fkey) != CCID_OK) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ectx);
mbedtls_ecp_keypair ectx;
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(&ectx);
if (load_private_key_ec(&ectx, fkey) != CCID_OK) {
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ectx);
return 0;
}
int ret = 0, key_size = 2 * mbedtls_mpi_size(&ectx.d);
size_t outsig_size = asn1_len_tag(0x5f37, key_size), tot_len = asn1_len_tag(0x67,
cvcert_size + outcar_size +
outsig_size);
size_t outsig_size = asn1_len_tag(0x5f37, key_size), tot_len = asn1_len_tag(0x67, cvcert_size + outcar_size + outsig_size);
if (buf_len == 0 || buf == NULL) {
return tot_len;
}
@@ -328,18 +354,23 @@ size_t asn1_cvc_aut(void *rsa_ecdsa,
p += format_tlv_len(cvcert_size + outcar_size + outsig_size, p);
uint8_t *body = p;
//cvcert
p += asn1_cvc_cert(rsa_ecdsa, key_type, p, cvcert_size, ext, ext_len);
p += asn1_cvc_cert(rsa_ecdsa, key_type, p, cvcert_size, ext, ext_len, false);
//outcar
*p++ = 0x42; p += format_tlv_len(outcar_len, p); memcpy(p, outcar, outcar_len); p += outcar_len;
uint8_t hsh[32];
memcpy(p, "\x5f\x37", 2); p += 2;
p += format_tlv_len(key_size, p);
hash256(body, cvcert_size + outcar_size, hsh);
mbedtls_mpi r, s;
mbedtls_mpi_init(&r);
mbedtls_mpi_init(&s);
ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_sign(&ectx.grp, &r, &s, &ectx.d, hsh, sizeof(hsh), random_gen, NULL);
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ectx);
if (ectx.grp.id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_ED25519 || ectx.grp.id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_ED448) {
ret = mbedtls_eddsa_sign(&ectx.grp, &r, &s, &ectx.d, body, cvcert_size + outcar_size, MBEDTLS_EDDSA_PURE, NULL, 0, random_gen, NULL);
}
else {
uint8_t hsh[32];
hash256(body, cvcert_size + outcar_size, hsh);
ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_sign(&ectx.grp, &r, &s, &ectx.d, hsh, sizeof(hsh), random_gen, NULL);
}
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ectx);
if (ret != 0) {
mbedtls_mpi_free(&r);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&s);
@@ -413,18 +444,39 @@ size_t asn1_build_prkd_generic(const uint8_t *label,
const uint8_t *keyid,
size_t keyid_len,
size_t keysize,
const uint8_t *seq,
size_t seq_len,
int key_type,
uint8_t *buf,
size_t buf_len) {
size_t seq_len = 0;
const uint8_t *seq = NULL;
uint8_t first_tag = 0x0;
if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC) {
seq = (const uint8_t *)"\x07\x20\x80";
seq_len = 3;
first_tag = 0xA0;
}
else if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_RSA) {
seq = (const uint8_t *)"\x02\x74";
seq_len = 2;
first_tag = 0x30;
}
else if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES) {
seq = (const uint8_t *)"\x07\xC0\x10";
seq_len = 3;
first_tag = 0xA8;
}
size_t seq1_size = asn1_len_tag(0x30, asn1_len_tag(0xC, label_len));
size_t seq2_size =
asn1_len_tag(0x30, asn1_len_tag(0x4, keyid_len) + asn1_len_tag(0x3, seq_len));
size_t seq3_size =
asn1_len_tag(0xA1,
asn1_len_tag(0x30,
asn1_len_tag(0x30, asn1_len_tag(0x4, 0)) + asn1_len_tag(0x2, 2)));
size_t tot_len = asn1_len_tag(0xA0, seq1_size + seq2_size + seq3_size);
size_t seq3_size = 0, seq4_size = 0;
if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC || key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_RSA) {
seq4_size = asn1_len_tag(0xA1, asn1_len_tag(0x30, asn1_len_tag(0x30, asn1_len_tag(0x4, 0)) + asn1_len_tag(0x2, 2)));
}
else if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES) {
seq3_size = asn1_len_tag(0xA0, asn1_len_tag(0x30, asn1_len_tag(0x2, 2)));
seq4_size = asn1_len_tag(0xA1, asn1_len_tag(0x30, asn1_len_tag(0x30, asn1_len_tag(0x4, 0))));
}
size_t tot_len = asn1_len_tag(first_tag, seq1_size + seq2_size + seq4_size);
if (buf_len == 0 || buf == NULL) {
return tot_len;
}
@@ -432,8 +484,8 @@ size_t asn1_build_prkd_generic(const uint8_t *label,
return 0;
}
uint8_t *p = buf;
*p++ = 0xA0;
p += format_tlv_len(seq1_size + seq2_size + seq3_size, p);
*p++ = first_tag;
p += format_tlv_len(seq1_size + seq2_size + seq3_size + seq4_size, p);
//Seq 1
*p++ = 0x30;
p += format_tlv_len(asn1_len_tag(0xC, label_len), p);
@@ -452,22 +504,36 @@ size_t asn1_build_prkd_generic(const uint8_t *label,
memcpy(p, seq, seq_len); p += seq_len;
//Seq 3
if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES) {
*p++ = 0xA0;
p += format_tlv_len(asn1_len_tag(0x30, asn1_len_tag(0x2, 2)), p);
*p++ = 0x30;
p += format_tlv_len(asn1_len_tag(0x2, 2), p);
*p++ = 0x2;
p += format_tlv_len(2, p);
*p++ = (keysize >> 8) & 0xff;
*p++ = keysize & 0xff;
}
//Seq 4
*p++ = 0xA1;
p +=
format_tlv_len(asn1_len_tag(0x30,
asn1_len_tag(0x30, asn1_len_tag(0x4, 0)) + asn1_len_tag(0x2,
2)),
p);
size_t inseq4_len = asn1_len_tag(0x30, asn1_len_tag(0x4, 0));
if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC || key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_RSA) {
inseq4_len += asn1_len_tag(0x2, 2);
}
p += format_tlv_len(asn1_len_tag(0x30, inseq4_len), p);
*p++ = 0x30;
p += format_tlv_len(asn1_len_tag(0x30, asn1_len_tag(0x4, 0)) + asn1_len_tag(0x2, 2), p);
p += format_tlv_len(inseq4_len, p);
*p++ = 0x30;
p += format_tlv_len(asn1_len_tag(0x4, 0), p);
*p++ = 0x4;
p += format_tlv_len(0, p);
*p++ = 0x2;
p += format_tlv_len(2, p);
*p++ = (keysize >> 8) & 0xff;
*p++ = keysize & 0xff;
if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC || key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_RSA) {
*p++ = 0x2;
p += format_tlv_len(2, p);
*p++ = (keysize >> 8) & 0xff;
*p++ = keysize & 0xff;
}
return p - buf;
}
@@ -483,8 +549,7 @@ size_t asn1_build_prkd_ecc(const uint8_t *label,
keyid,
keyid_len,
keysize,
(const uint8_t *) "\x07\x20\x80",
3,
PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC,
buf,
buf_len);
}
@@ -501,8 +566,24 @@ size_t asn1_build_prkd_rsa(const uint8_t *label,
keyid,
keyid_len,
keysize,
(const uint8_t *) "\x02\x74",
2,
PICO_KEYS_KEY_RSA,
buf,
buf_len);
}
size_t asn1_build_prkd_aes(const uint8_t *label,
size_t label_len,
const uint8_t *keyid,
size_t keyid_len,
size_t keysize,
uint8_t *buf,
size_t buf_len) {
return asn1_build_prkd_generic(label,
label_len,
keyid,
keyid_len,
keysize,
PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES,
buf,
buf_len);
}

View File

@@ -45,7 +45,8 @@ extern size_t asn1_cvc_cert(void *rsa_ecdsa,
uint8_t *buf,
size_t buf_len,
const uint8_t *ext,
size_t ext_len);
size_t ext_len,
bool full);
extern size_t asn1_cvc_aut(void *rsa_ecdsa,
uint8_t key_type,
uint8_t *buf,
@@ -86,4 +87,11 @@ extern size_t asn1_build_prkd_rsa(const uint8_t *label,
size_t keysize,
uint8_t *buf,
size_t buf_len);
extern size_t asn1_build_prkd_aes(const uint8_t *label,
size_t label_len,
const uint8_t *keyid,
size_t keyid_len,
size_t keysize,
uint8_t *buf,
size_t buf_len);
#endif

View File

@@ -28,7 +28,8 @@
#define EF_DKEK 0x1090
#define EF_KEY_DOMAIN 0x10A0
#define EF_PUKAUT 0x10C0
#define EF_PUK 0X10D0
#define EF_PUK 0x10D0
#define EF_MASTER_SEED 0x1110
#define EF_PRKDFS 0x6040
#define EF_PUKDFS 0x6041
#define EF_CDFS 0x6042
@@ -40,7 +41,9 @@
#define EF_PRKD_DEV 0xC400
#define EF_EE_DEV 0xCE00
#define EF_TERMCA 0x2f02
#define EF_TERMCA 0x2F02
#define EF_TOKENINFO 0x2F03
#define EF_STATICTOKEN 0xCB00
extern file_t *file_pin1;
extern file_t *file_retries_pin1;

View File

@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ extern bool has_session_pin, has_session_sopin;
extern uint8_t session_pin[32], session_sopin[32];
uint8_t mkek_mask[MKEK_KEY_SIZE];
bool has_mkek_mask = false;
uint8_t pending_save_dkek = 0xff;
#define POLY 0xedb88320
@@ -286,7 +287,7 @@ int dkek_encode_key(uint8_t id,
size_t *out_len,
const uint8_t *allowed,
size_t allowed_len) {
if (!(key_type & HSM_KEY_RSA) && !(key_type & HSM_KEY_EC) && !(key_type & HSM_KEY_AES)) {
if (!(key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_RSA) && !(key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC) && !(key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES)) {
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
}
@@ -316,21 +317,24 @@ int dkek_encode_key(uint8_t id,
return r;
}
if (key_type & HSM_KEY_AES) {
if (key_type & HSM_KEY_AES_128) {
if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES) {
if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_128) {
kb_len = 16;
}
else if (key_type & HSM_KEY_AES_192) {
else if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_192) {
kb_len = 24;
}
else if (key_type & HSM_KEY_AES_256) {
else if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_256) {
kb_len = 32;
}
else if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_512) {
kb_len = 64;
}
if (kb_len != 16 && kb_len != 24 && kb_len != 32) {
if (kb_len != 16 && kb_len != 24 && kb_len != 32 && kb_len != 64) {
return CCID_WRONG_DATA;
}
if (*out_len < 8 + 1 + 10 + 6 + 4 + (2 + 32 + 14) + 16) {
if (*out_len < 8 + 1 + 10 + 6 + (2 + 64 + 14) + 16) { // 14 bytes padding
return CCID_WRONG_LENGTH;
}
@@ -341,7 +345,7 @@ int dkek_encode_key(uint8_t id,
algo = (uint8_t *) "\x00\x08\x60\x86\x48\x01\x65\x03\x04\x01"; //2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1 (2+8)
algo_len = 10;
}
else if (key_type & HSM_KEY_RSA) {
else if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_RSA) {
if (*out_len < 8 + 1 + 12 + 6 + (8 + 2 * 4 + 2 * 4096 / 8 + 3 + 13) + 16) { //13 bytes pading
return CCID_WRONG_LENGTH;
}
@@ -362,7 +366,7 @@ int dkek_encode_key(uint8_t id,
algo = (uint8_t *) "\x00\x0A\x04\x00\x7F\x00\x07\x02\x02\x02\x01\x02";
algo_len = 12;
}
else if (key_type & HSM_KEY_EC) {
else if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC) {
if (*out_len < 8 + 1 + 12 + 6 + (8 + 2 * 8 + 9 * 66 + 2 + 4) + 16) { //4 bytes pading
return CCID_WRONG_LENGTH;
}
@@ -381,26 +385,29 @@ int dkek_encode_key(uint8_t id,
put_uint16_t(mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.N), kb + 8 + kb_len); kb_len += 2;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp.N, kb + 8 + kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.N));
kb_len += mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.N);
put_uint16_t(1 + mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.G.X) + mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.G.Y),
kb + 8 + kb_len); kb_len += 2;
kb[8 + kb_len++] = 0x4;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp.G.X, kb + 8 + kb_len,
mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.G.X));
kb_len += mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.G.X);
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp.G.Y, kb + 8 + kb_len,
mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.G.Y));
kb_len += mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->grp.G.Y);
size_t olen = 0;
mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp,
&ecdsa->grp.G,
MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED,
&olen,
kb + 8 + kb_len + 2,
sizeof(kb) - 8 - kb_len - 2);
put_uint16_t(olen, kb + 8 + kb_len);
kb_len += 2 + olen;
put_uint16_t(mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->d), kb + 8 + kb_len); kb_len += 2;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->d, kb + 8 + kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->d));
kb_len += mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->d);
put_uint16_t(1 + mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->Q.X) + mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->Q.Y),
kb + 8 + kb_len);
kb_len += 2;
kb[8 + kb_len++] = 0x4;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->Q.X, kb + 8 + kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->Q.X));
kb_len += mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->Q.X);
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->Q.Y, kb + 8 + kb_len, mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->Q.Y));
kb_len += mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->Q.Y);
mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&ecdsa->grp,
&ecdsa->Q,
MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED,
&olen,
kb + 8 + kb_len + 2,
sizeof(kb) - 8 - kb_len - 2);
put_uint16_t(olen, kb + 8 + kb_len);
kb_len += 2 + olen;
algo = (uint8_t *) "\x00\x0A\x04\x00\x7F\x00\x07\x02\x02\x02\x02\x03";
algo_len = 12;
@@ -411,13 +418,13 @@ int dkek_encode_key(uint8_t id,
memcpy(out + *out_len, kcv, 8);
*out_len += 8;
if (key_type & HSM_KEY_AES) {
if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES) {
out[*out_len] = 15;
}
else if (key_type & HSM_KEY_RSA) {
else if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_RSA) {
out[*out_len] = 5;
}
else if (key_type & HSM_KEY_EC) {
else if (key_type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC) {
out[*out_len] = 12;
}
*out_len += 1;
@@ -451,7 +458,7 @@ int dkek_encode_key(uint8_t id,
if (kb_len < kb_len_pad) {
kb[kb_len] = 0x80;
}
r = aes_encrypt(kenc, NULL, 256, HSM_AES_MODE_CBC, kb, kb_len_pad);
r = aes_encrypt(kenc, NULL, 256, PICO_KEYS_AES_MODE_CBC, kb, kb_len_pad);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return r;
}
@@ -475,13 +482,13 @@ int dkek_encode_key(uint8_t id,
int dkek_type_key(const uint8_t *in) {
if (in[8] == 5 || in[8] == 6) {
return HSM_KEY_RSA;
return PICO_KEYS_KEY_RSA;
}
else if (in[8] == 12) {
return HSM_KEY_EC;
return PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC;
}
else if (in[8] == 15) {
return HSM_KEY_AES;
return PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES;
}
return 0x0;
}
@@ -578,7 +585,7 @@ int dkek_decode_key(uint8_t id,
uint8_t kb[8 + 2 * 4 + 2 * 4096 / 8 + 3 + 13]; //worst case: RSA-4096 (plus, 13 bytes padding)
memset(kb, 0, sizeof(kb));
memcpy(kb, in + ofs, in_len - 16 - ofs);
r = aes_decrypt(kenc, NULL, 256, HSM_AES_MODE_CBC, kb, in_len - 16 - ofs);
r = aes_decrypt(kenc, NULL, 256, PICO_KEYS_AES_MODE_CBC, kb, in_len - 16 - ofs);
if (r != CCID_OK) {
return r;
}
@@ -689,7 +696,14 @@ int dkek_decode_key(uint8_t id,
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += len + 2;
//G
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += len + 2;
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs);
if (ec_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519 && kb[ofs + 2] != 0x09) {
ec_id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_ED25519;
}
else if (ec_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448 && (len != 56 || kb[ofs + 2] != 0x05)) {
ec_id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_ED448;
}
ofs += len + 2;
//d
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += 2;
@@ -704,8 +718,16 @@ int dkek_decode_key(uint8_t id,
len = get_uint16_t(kb, ofs); ofs += 2;
r = mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary(&ecdsa->grp, &ecdsa->Q, kb + ofs, len);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(ecdsa);
return CCID_EXEC_ERROR;
if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(&ecdsa->grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_EDWARDS) {
r = mbedtls_ecp_point_edwards(&ecdsa->grp, &ecdsa->Q, &ecdsa->d, random_gen, NULL);
}
else {
r = mbedtls_ecp_mul(&ecdsa->grp, &ecdsa->Q, &ecdsa->d, &ecdsa->grp.G, random_gen, NULL);
}
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(ecdsa);
return CCID_EXEC_ERROR;
}
}
r = mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv(ecdsa, ecdsa, random_gen, NULL);
if (r != 0) {

View File

@@ -74,4 +74,6 @@ extern mse_t mse;
extern int mse_decrypt_ct(uint8_t *, size_t);
extern uint8_t pending_save_dkek;
#endif

View File

@@ -144,4 +144,34 @@
#define OID_KDF_X963 "\x2B\x81\x05\x10\x86\x48\x3F"
#define OID_NIST_ALG "\x60\x86\x48\x01\x65\x03\x04"
#define OID_NIST_AES OID_NIST_ALG "\x01"
#define OID_AES128_ECB OID_NIST_AES "\x01"
#define OID_AES128_CBC OID_NIST_AES "\x02"
#define OID_AES128_OFB OID_NIST_AES "\x03"
#define OID_AES128_CFB OID_NIST_AES "\x04"
#define OID_AES128_GCM OID_NIST_AES "\x06"
#define OID_AES128_CCM OID_NIST_AES "\x07"
#define OID_AES128_CTR OID_NIST_AES "\x09" // Not existing
#define OID_AES192_ECB OID_NIST_AES "\x15"
#define OID_AES192_CBC OID_NIST_AES "\x16"
#define OID_AES192_OFB OID_NIST_AES "\x17"
#define OID_AES192_CFB OID_NIST_AES "\x18"
#define OID_AES192_GCM OID_NIST_AES "\x1A"
#define OID_AES192_CCM OID_NIST_AES "\x1B"
#define OID_AES192_CTR OID_NIST_AES "\x1D" // Not existing
#define OID_AES256_ECB OID_NIST_AES "\x29"
#define OID_AES256_CBC OID_NIST_AES "\x2A"
#define OID_AES256_OFB OID_NIST_AES "\x2B"
#define OID_AES256_CFB OID_NIST_AES "\x2C"
#define OID_AES256_GCM OID_NIST_AES "\x2E"
#define OID_AES256_CCM OID_NIST_AES "\x2F"
#define OID_AES256_CTR OID_NIST_AES "\x31" // Not existing
#define OID_IEEE_ALG "\x2B\x6F\x02\x8C\x53\x00\x00\x01"
#define OID_AES128_XTS OID_IEEE_ALG "\x01"
#define OID_AES256_XTS OID_IEEE_ALG "\x02"
#define OID_HD "\x2B\x06\x01\x04\x01\x83\xA8\x78\x05\x8D\x6B"
#endif

View File

@@ -24,8 +24,9 @@
#include "eac.h"
#include "cvc.h"
#include "asn1.h"
#include "hsm.h"
#include "pico_keys.h"
#include "usb.h"
#include "random.h"
const uint8_t sc_hsm_aid[] = {
11,
@@ -75,23 +76,20 @@ extern int cmd_general_authenticate();
extern int cmd_session_pin();
extern int cmd_puk_auth();
extern int cmd_pso();
extern int cmd_bip_slip();
extern const uint8_t *ccid_atr;
app_t *sc_hsm_select_aid(app_t *a, const uint8_t *aid, uint8_t aid_len) {
if (!memcmp(aid, sc_hsm_aid + 1, MIN(aid_len, sc_hsm_aid[0]))) {
a->aid = sc_hsm_aid;
a->process_apdu = sc_hsm_process_apdu;
a->unload = sc_hsm_unload;
init_sc_hsm();
return a;
}
return NULL;
int sc_hsm_select_aid(app_t *a) {
a->process_apdu = sc_hsm_process_apdu;
a->unload = sc_hsm_unload;
init_sc_hsm();
return CCID_OK;
}
void __attribute__((constructor)) sc_hsm_ctor() {
ccid_atr = atr_sc_hsm;
register_app(sc_hsm_select_aid);
register_app(sc_hsm_select_aid, sc_hsm_aid);
}
void scan_files() {
@@ -218,11 +216,7 @@ int puk_store_select_chr(const uint8_t *chr) {
return CCID_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
}
void init_sc_hsm() {
scan_all();
has_session_pin = has_session_sopin = false;
isUserAuthenticated = false;
cmd_select();
void reset_puk_store() {
if (puk_store_entries > 0) { /* From previous session */
for (int i = 0; i < puk_store_entries; i++) {
if (puk_store[i].copied == true) {
@@ -234,7 +228,12 @@ void init_sc_hsm() {
puk_store_entries = 0;
file_t *fterm = search_by_fid(EF_TERMCA, NULL, SPECIFY_EF);
if (fterm) {
add_cert_puk_store(file_get_data(fterm), file_get_size(fterm), false);
uint8_t *p = NULL, *fterm_data = file_get_data(fterm), *pq = fterm_data;
size_t fterm_data_len = file_get_size(fterm);
while (walk_tlv(fterm_data, fterm_data_len, &p, NULL, NULL, NULL)) {
add_cert_puk_store(pq, p - pq, false);
pq = p;
}
}
for (int i = 0; i < 0xfe; i++) {
file_t *ef = search_dynamic_file((CA_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX << 8) | i);
@@ -246,6 +245,14 @@ void init_sc_hsm() {
memset(puk_status, 0, sizeof(puk_status));
}
void init_sc_hsm() {
scan_all();
has_session_pin = has_session_sopin = false;
isUserAuthenticated = false;
cmd_select();
reset_puk_store();
}
int sc_hsm_unload() {
has_session_pin = has_session_sopin = false;
isUserAuthenticated = false;
@@ -269,7 +276,7 @@ bool wait_button_pressed() {
uint16_t opts = get_device_options();
if (opts & HSM_OPT_BOOTSEL_BUTTON) {
queue_try_add(&card_to_usb_q, &val);
do {
do{
queue_remove_blocking(&usb_to_card_q, &val);
} while (val != EV_BUTTON_PRESSED && val != EV_BUTTON_TIMEOUT);
}
@@ -278,7 +285,11 @@ bool wait_button_pressed() {
}
int parse_token_info(const file_t *f, int mode) {
#ifdef __FOR_CI
char *label = "SmartCard-HSM";
#else
char *label = "Pico-HSM";
#endif
char *manu = "Pol Henarejos";
if (mode == 1) {
uint8_t *p = res_APDU;
@@ -309,7 +320,7 @@ int pin_reset_retries(const file_t *pin, bool force) {
return CCID_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
}
uint8_t retries = file_read_uint8(file_get_data(act));
if (retries == 0 && force == false) { //blocked
if (retries == 0 && force == false) { // blocked
return CCID_ERR_BLOCKED;
}
retries = file_read_uint8(file_get_data(max));
@@ -367,7 +378,7 @@ int check_pin(const file_t *pin, const uint8_t *data, size_t len) {
else {
uint8_t dhash[32];
double_hash_pin(data, len, dhash);
if (sizeof(dhash) != file_get_size(pin) - 1) { //1 byte for pin len
if (sizeof(dhash) != file_get_size(pin) - 1) { // 1 byte for pin len
return SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED();
}
if (memcmp(file_get_data(pin) + 1, dhash, sizeof(dhash)) != 0) {
@@ -396,6 +407,10 @@ int check_pin(const file_t *pin, const uint8_t *data, size_t len) {
hash_multi(data, len, session_sopin);
has_session_sopin = true;
}
if (pending_save_dkek != 0xff) {
save_dkek_key(pending_save_dkek, NULL);
pending_save_dkek = 0xff;
}
return SW_OK();
}
@@ -454,7 +469,7 @@ uint32_t decrement_key_counter(file_t *fkey) {
/* We cannot modify meta_data, as it comes from flash memory. It must be cpied to an aux buffer */
memcpy(cmeta, meta_data, meta_size);
while (walk_tlv(cmeta, meta_size, &p, &tag, &tag_len, &tag_data)) {
if (tag == 0x90) { //ofset tag
if (tag == 0x90) { // ofset tag
uint32_t val =
(tag_data[0] << 24) | (tag_data[1] << 16) | (tag_data[2] << 8) | tag_data[3];
val--;
@@ -477,33 +492,36 @@ uint32_t decrement_key_counter(file_t *fkey) {
return 0xffffffff;
}
//Stores the private and public keys in flash
// Stores the private and public keys in flash
int store_keys(void *key_ctx, int type, uint8_t key_id) {
int r, key_size = 0;
uint8_t kdata[4096 / 8]; //worst case
if (type == HSM_KEY_RSA) {
uint8_t kdata[4096 / 8]; // worst case
if (type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_RSA) {
mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) key_ctx;
key_size = mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->P) + mbedtls_mpi_size(&rsa->Q);
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&rsa->P, kdata, key_size / 2);
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&rsa->Q, kdata + key_size / 2, key_size / 2);
}
else if (type == HSM_KEY_EC) {
else if (type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_EC) {
mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ecdsa = (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) key_ctx;
key_size = mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa->d);
kdata[0] = ecdsa->grp.id & 0xff;
mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ecdsa->d, kdata + 1, key_size);
mbedtls_ecp_write_key(ecdsa, kdata + 1, key_size);
key_size++;
}
else if (type & HSM_KEY_AES) {
if (type == HSM_KEY_AES_128) {
else if (type & PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES) {
if (type == PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_128) {
key_size = 16;
}
else if (type == HSM_KEY_AES_192) {
else if (type == PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_192) {
key_size = 24;
}
else if (type == HSM_KEY_AES_256) {
else if (type == PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_256) {
key_size = 32;
}
else if (type == PICO_KEYS_KEY_AES_512) {
key_size = 64;
}
memcpy(kdata, key_ctx, key_size);
}
else {
@@ -566,7 +584,7 @@ int find_and_store_meta_key(uint8_t key_id) {
}
int load_private_key_rsa(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, file_t *fkey) {
if (wait_button_pressed() == true) { //timeout
if (wait_button_pressed() == true) { // timeout
return CCID_VERIFICATION_FAILED;
}
@@ -609,13 +627,13 @@ int load_private_key_rsa(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, file_t *fkey) {
return CCID_OK;
}
int load_private_key_ecdsa(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, file_t *fkey) {
if (wait_button_pressed() == true) { //timeout
int load_private_key_ec(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ctx, file_t *fkey) {
if (wait_button_pressed() == true) { // timeout
return CCID_VERIFICATION_FAILED;
}
int key_size = file_get_size(fkey);
uint8_t kdata[67]; //Worst case, 521 bit + 1byte
uint8_t kdata[67]; // Worst case, 521 bit + 1byte
memcpy(kdata, file_get_data(fkey), key_size);
if (mkek_decrypt(kdata, key_size) != 0) {
return CCID_EXEC_ERROR;
@@ -624,12 +642,25 @@ int load_private_key_ecdsa(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, file_t *fkey) {
int r = mbedtls_ecp_read_key(gid, ctx, kdata + 1, key_size - 1);
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(ctx);
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(ctx);
return CCID_EXEC_ERROR;
}
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(kdata, sizeof(kdata));
if (gid == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_ED25519 || gid == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_ED448) {
r = mbedtls_ecp_point_edwards(&ctx->grp, &ctx->Q, &ctx->d, random_gen, NULL);
}
else {
r = mbedtls_ecp_mul(&ctx->grp, &ctx->Q, &ctx->d, &ctx->grp.G, random_gen, NULL);
}
if (r != 0) {
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(ctx);
return CCID_EXEC_ERROR;
}
return CCID_OK;
}
int load_private_key_ecdh(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ctx, file_t *fkey) {
return load_private_key_ec(ctx, fkey);
}
#define INS_VERIFY 0x20
#define INS_MSE 0x22
@@ -638,6 +669,7 @@ int load_private_key_ecdsa(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, file_t *fkey) {
#define INS_RESET_RETRY 0x2C
#define INS_KEYPAIR_GEN 0x46
#define INS_KEY_GEN 0x48
#define INS_BIP_SLIP 0x4A
#define INS_INITIALIZE 0x50
#define INS_KEY_DOMAIN 0x52
#define INS_PUK_AUTH 0x54
@@ -687,6 +719,7 @@ static const cmd_t cmds[] = {
{ INS_PUK_AUTH, cmd_puk_auth },
{ INS_PSO, cmd_pso },
{ INS_EXTERNAL_AUTHENTICATE, cmd_external_authenticate },
{ INS_BIP_SLIP, cmd_bip_slip },
{ 0x00, 0x0 }
};

View File

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
#endif
#include "file.h"
#include "apdu.h"
#include "hsm.h"
#include "pico_keys.h"
extern const uint8_t sc_hsm_aid[];
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ extern const uint8_t sc_hsm_aid[];
#define ALGO_EC_DH 0x80 /* ECDH key derivation */
#define ALGO_EC_DH_AUTPUK 0x83
#define ALGO_EC_DH_XKEK 0x84
#define ALGO_HD 0xA0
#define ALGO_WRAP 0x92
#define ALGO_UNWRAP 0x93
@@ -117,7 +118,8 @@ extern int delete_file(file_t *ef);
extern const uint8_t *get_meta_tag(file_t *ef, uint16_t meta_tag, size_t *tag_len);
extern bool key_has_purpose(file_t *ef, uint8_t purpose);
extern int load_private_key_rsa(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, file_t *fkey);
extern int load_private_key_ecdsa(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, file_t *fkey);
extern int load_private_key_ec(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ctx, file_t *fkey);
extern int load_private_key_ecdh(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ctx, file_t *fkey);
extern bool wait_button_pressed();
extern int store_keys(void *key_ctx, int type, uint8_t key_id);
extern int find_and_store_meta_key(uint8_t key_id);

View File

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
#ifndef __VERSION_H_
#define __VERSION_H_
#define HSM_VERSION 0x0304
#define HSM_VERSION 0x0306
#define HSM_VERSION_MAJOR ((HSM_VERSION >> 8) & 0xff)
#define HSM_VERSION_MINOR (HSM_VERSION & 0xff)

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,14 @@
#!/bin/bash -eu
source tests/docker_env.sh
build_image
#run_in_docker rm -rf CMakeFiles
run_in_docker mkdir -p build_in_docker
run_in_docker -w "$PWD/build_in_docker" cmake -DENABLE_EMULATION=1 ..
run_in_docker -w "$PWD/build_in_docker" cmake -DENABLE_EMULATION=1 -D__FOR_CI=1 ..
run_in_docker -w "$PWD/build_in_docker" make -j ${NUM_PROC}
docker create --name temp_container pico-hsm-test:bullseye
docker cp $PWD/build_in_docker/pico_hsm temp_container:/pico_hsm
docker commit temp_container pico-hsm-test:bullseye
docker stop temp_container
docker rm temp_container
docker image prune -f

View File

@@ -19,491 +19,15 @@
import sys
import pytest
import os
from binascii import hexlify
from utils import APDUResponse, DOPrefixes, KeyType, Algorithm, Padding, int_to_bytes
from const import *
import hashlib
try:
from cvc.asn1 import ASN1
from cvc import oid
from cvc.certificates import CVC
from cvc.ec_curves import ec_domain, find_curve
from picohsm import PicoHSM
except ModuleNotFoundError:
print('ERROR: cvc module not found! Install pycvc package.\nTry with `pip install pycvc`')
print('ERROR: picohsm module not found! Install picohsm package.\nTry with `pip install pypicohsm`')
sys.exit(-1)
try:
from smartcard.CardType import AnyCardType
from smartcard.CardRequest import CardRequest
from smartcard.Exceptions import CardRequestTimeoutException, CardConnectionException
except ModuleNotFoundError:
print('ERROR: smarctard module not found! Install pyscard package.\nTry with `pip install pyscard`')
sys.exit(-1)
try:
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec, rsa, utils, padding
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes, cmac
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers import Cipher, algorithms, modes
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.serialization import Encoding, PublicFormat
except ModuleNotFoundError:
print('ERROR: cryptography module not found! Install cryptography package.\nTry with `pip install cryptography`')
sys.exit(-1)
class Device:
class EcDummy:
def __init__(self, name):
self.name = name
def __init__(self,pin='648219'):
self.__pin = pin
cardtype = AnyCardType()
try:
# request card insertion
cardrequest = CardRequest(timeout=10, cardType=cardtype)
self.__card = cardrequest.waitforcard()
# connect to the card and perform a few transmits
self.__card.connection.connect()
except CardRequestTimeoutException:
raise Exception('time-out: no card inserted during last 10s')
self.select_applet()
def select_applet(self):
self.__card.connection.transmit([0x00, 0xA4, 0x04, 0x00, 0xB, 0xE8, 0x2B, 0x06, 0x01, 0x04, 0x01, 0x81, 0xC3, 0x1F, 0x02, 0x01, 0x0])
def send(self, command, cla=0x00, p1=0x00, p2=0x00, ne=None, data=None, codes=[]):
lc = []
dataf = []
if (data):
lc = [0x00] + list(len(data).to_bytes(2, 'big'))
dataf = list(data)
else:
lc = [0x00*3]
if (ne is None):
le = [0x00, 0x00]
else:
le = list(ne.to_bytes(2, 'big'))
if (isinstance(command, list) and len(command) > 1):
apdu = command
else:
apdu = [cla, command]
apdu = apdu + [p1, p2] + lc + dataf + le
try:
response, sw1, sw2 = self.__card.connection.transmit(apdu)
except CardConnectionException:
self.__card.connection.reconnect()
response, sw1, sw2 = self.__card.connection.transmit(apdu)
code = (sw1<<8|sw2)
if (sw1 != 0x90):
if (sw1 == 0x63 and sw2 & 0xF0 == 0xC0):
pass
elif (code == 0x6A82):
self.select_applet()
if (sw1 == 0x90):
response, sw1, sw2 = self.__card.connection.transmit(apdu)
if (sw1 == 0x90):
return response
elif (code == 0x6982):
response, sw1, sw2 = self.__card.connection.transmit([0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x81, len(self.__pin)] + list(self.__pin.encode()) + [0x0])
if (sw1 == 0x90):
response, sw1, sw2 = self.__card.connection.transmit(apdu)
if (sw1 == 0x90):
return response
if (code not in codes):
raise APDUResponse(sw1, sw2)
if (len(codes) > 1):
return response, code
return response
def get_login_retries(self):
self.select_applet()
try:
self.send(command=0x20, p2=0x81)
except APDUResponse as e:
if (e.sw1 == 0x63 and e.sw2 & 0xF0 == 0xC0):
return e.sw2 & 0x0F
raise e
def initialize(self, pin=DEFAULT_PIN, sopin=DEFAULT_SOPIN, options=None, retries=DEFAULT_RETRIES, dkek_shares=None, puk_auts=None, puk_min_auts=None, key_domains=None):
if (retries is not None and not 0 < retries <= 10):
raise ValueError('Retries must be in the range (0,10]')
if (dkek_shares is not None and not 0 <= dkek_shares <= 10):
raise ValueError('DKEK shares must be in the range [0,10]')
if ((puk_auts is not None and puk_min_auts is None) or (puk_auts is None and puk_min_auts is not None)):
raise ValueError('PUK Auts and PUK Min Auts must be specified both')
if (puk_auts is not None and not 0 < puk_auts <= 8):
raise ValueError('PUK Auts must be in the range (0,8]')
if (puk_min_auts is not None and not 0 < puk_min_auts <= 8):
raise ValueError('PUK Min Auts must be in the range (0,8]')
if (puk_auts is not None and puk_min_auts is not None and puk_min_auts > puk_auts):
raise ValueError('PUK Min Auts must be less or equal to PUK Auts')
if (key_domains is not None and not 0 < key_domains <= 8):
raise ValueError('Key Domains must be in the range (0,8]')
a = ASN1()
if (pin is not None):
a = a.add_tag(0x81, pin.encode())
if (sopin is not None):
a = a.add_tag(0x82, sopin.encode())
if (retries is not None):
a = a.add_tag(0x91, bytes([retries]))
if (dkek_shares is not None):
a = a.add_tag(0x92, bytes([dkek_shares]))
if (puk_auts is not None and puk_min_auts is not None):
a = a.add_tag(0x93, bytes([puk_auts, puk_min_auts]))
if (key_domains is not None):
a = a.add_tag(0x97, bytes([key_domains]))
data = a.encode()
self.send(cla=0x80, command=0x50, data=data)
def login(self, pin=None):
if (pin is None):
pin = self.__pin
self.send(command=0x20, p2=0x81, data=pin.encode())
def get_first_free_id(self):
kids = self.list_keys(prefix=DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX)
mset = set(range(max(kids)))-set(kids)
if (len(mset) > 0):
return min(mset)
if (max(kids) == 255):
raise ValueError('Max number of key id reached')
return max(kids)+1
def list_keys(self, prefix=None):
resp = self.send(command=0x58)
if (prefix is not None):
grouped = [(resp[i],resp[i+1]) for i in range(0, len(resp), 2) if resp[i] == prefix.value]
_, kids = zip(*grouped)
return kids
return [(resp[i],resp[i+1]) for i in range(0, len(resp), 2)]
def key_generation(self, type, param):
if (type in [KeyType.RSA, KeyType.ECC]):
a = ASN1().add_tag(0x5f29, bytes([0])).add_tag(0x42, 'UTCA00001'.encode())
if (type == KeyType.RSA):
if (not 1024 <= param <= 4096):
raise ValueError('RSA bits must be in the range [1024,4096]')
a.add_tag(0x7f49, ASN1().add_oid(oid.ID_TA_RSA_V1_5_SHA_256).add_tag(0x2, param.to_bytes(2, 'big')).encode())
elif (type == KeyType.ECC):
if (param not in ('secp192r1', 'secp256r1', 'secp384r1', 'secp521r1', 'brainpoolP256r1', 'brainpoolP384r1', 'brainpoolP512r1', 'secp192k1', 'secp256k1')):
raise ValueError('Bad elliptic curve name')
dom = ec_domain(Device.EcDummy(param))
pubctx = [dom.P, dom.A, dom.B, dom.G, dom.O, None, dom.F]
a.add_object(0x7f49, oid.ID_TA_ECDSA_SHA_256, pubctx)
a.add_tag(0x5f20, 'UTCDUMMY00001'.encode())
data = a.encode()
keyid = self.get_first_free_id()
self.send(command=0x46, p1=keyid, data=list(data))
elif (type == KeyType.AES):
if (param == 128):
p2 = 0xB0
elif (param == 192):
p2 = 0xB1
elif (param == 256):
p2 = 0xB2
else:
raise ValueError('Bad AES key size')
keyid = self.get_first_free_id()
self.send(command=0x48, p1=keyid, p2=p2)
else:
raise ValueError('Bad KeyType')
return keyid
def delete_file(self, fid):
self.send(command=0xE4, data=[fid >> 8, fid & 0xff])
def get_contents(self, p1, p2=None):
if (p2):
resp = self.send(command=0xB1, p1=p1, p2=p2, data=[0x54, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00])
else:
resp = self.get_contents(p1=p1 >> 8, p2=p1 & 0xff)
return bytes(resp)
def public_key(self, keyid, param=None):
response = self.get_contents(p1=DOPrefixes.EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX.value, p2=keyid)
cert = bytearray(response)
roid = CVC().decode(cert).pubkey().oid()
if (roid == oid.ID_TA_ECDSA_SHA_256):
curve = find_curve(ec_domain(Device.EcDummy(param)).P)
Y = bytes(CVC().decode(cert).pubkey().find(0x86).data())
return ec.EllipticCurvePublicKey.from_encoded_point(
curve,
Y,
)
elif (roid == oid.ID_TA_RSA_V1_5_SHA_256):
n = int.from_bytes(bytes(CVC().decode(cert).pubkey().find(0x81).data()), 'big')
e = int.from_bytes(bytes(CVC().decode(cert).pubkey().find(0x82).data()), 'big')
return rsa.RSAPublicNumbers(e, n).public_key()
return None
def sign(self, keyid, scheme, data):
resp = self.send(cla=0x80, command=0x68, p1=keyid, p2=scheme.value, data=data)
return resp
def verify(self, pubkey, data, signature, scheme):
if (Algorithm.ALGO_EC_RAW.value <= scheme.value <= Algorithm.ALGO_EC_SHA512.value):
if (scheme == Algorithm.ALGO_EC_SHA1):
hsh = hashes.SHA1()
elif (scheme == Algorithm.ALGO_EC_SHA224):
hsh = hashes.SHA224()
elif (scheme == Algorithm.ALGO_EC_SHA256):
hsh = hashes.SHA256()
elif (scheme == Algorithm.ALGO_EC_RAW):
hsh = utils.Prehashed(hashes.SHA512())
elif (scheme == Algorithm.ALGO_EC_SHA384):
hsh = hashes.SHA384()
elif (scheme == Algorithm.ALGO_EC_SHA512):
hsh = hashes.SHA512()
return pubkey.verify(signature, data, ec.ECDSA(hsh))
elif (Algorithm.ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1.value <= scheme.value <= Algorithm.ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA512.value):
if (scheme == Algorithm.ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1 or scheme == Algorithm.ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA1):
hsh = hashes.SHA1()
elif (scheme == Algorithm.ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA224 or scheme == Algorithm.ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA224):
hsh = hashes.SHA224()
elif (scheme == Algorithm.ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256 or scheme == Algorithm.ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA256):
hsh = hashes.SHA256()
elif (scheme == Algorithm.ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384 or scheme == Algorithm.ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA384):
hsh = hashes.SHA384()
elif (scheme == Algorithm.ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512 or scheme == Algorithm.ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA512):
hsh = hashes.SHA512()
if (Algorithm.ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1.value <= scheme.value <= Algorithm.ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512.value):
padd = padding.PKCS1v15()
elif (Algorithm.ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA1.value <= scheme.value <= Algorithm.ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA512.value):
padd = padding.PSS(
mgf=padding.MGF1(hsh),
salt_length=padding.PSS.AUTO
)
return pubkey.verify(signature, data, padd, hsh)
def decrypt(self, keyid, data, pad):
if (isinstance(pad, padding.OAEP)):
p2 = Padding.OAEP.value
elif (isinstance(pad, padding.PKCS1v15)):
p2 = Padding.PKCS.value
else:
p2 = Padding.RAW.value
resp = self.send(command=0x62, p1=keyid, p2=p2, data=list(data))
return bytes(resp)
def import_dkek(self, dkek):
resp = self.send(cla=0x80, command=0x52, p1=0x0, p2=0x0, data=dkek)
return resp
def import_key(self, pkey, dkek=None, purposes=None):
data = b''
kcv = hashlib.sha256(dkek or b'\x00'*32).digest()[:8]
kenc = hashlib.sha256((dkek or b'\x00'*32) + b'\x00\x00\x00\x01').digest()
kmac = hashlib.sha256((dkek or b'\x00'*32) + b'\x00\x00\x00\x02').digest()
data += kcv
if (isinstance(pkey, rsa.RSAPrivateKey)):
data += b'\x05'
algo = b'\x00\x0A\x04\x00\x7F\x00\x07\x02\x02\x02\x01\x02'
elif (isinstance(pkey, ec.EllipticCurvePrivateKey)):
data += b'\x0C'
algo = b'\x00\x0A\x04\x00\x7F\x00\x07\x02\x02\x02\x02\x03'
elif (isinstance(pkey, bytes)):
data += b'\x0F'
algo = b'\x00\x08\x60\x86\x48\x01\x65\x03\x04\x01'
data += algo
if (not purposes and isinstance(pkey, bytes)):
purposes = [Algorithm.ALGO_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT.value, Algorithm.ALGO_AES_CBC_DECRYPT.value, Algorithm.ALGO_AES_CMAC.value, Algorithm.ALGO_AES_DERIVE.value, Algorithm.ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_ENCRYPT.value, Algorithm.ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_DECRYPT.value]
if (purposes):
data += b'\x00' + bytes([len(purposes)]) + bytes(purposes) + b'\x00'*4
else:
data += b'\x00'*6
kb = os.urandom(8)
if (isinstance(pkey, rsa.RSAPrivateKey)):
kb += int_to_bytes(pkey.key_size, length=2)
pubnum = pkey.public_key().public_numbers()
pnum = pkey.private_numbers()
kb += int_to_bytes((pnum.d.bit_length()+7)//8, length=2)
kb += int_to_bytes(pnum.d)
kb += int_to_bytes((pubnum.n.bit_length()+7)//8, length=2)
kb += int_to_bytes(pubnum.n)
kb += int_to_bytes((pubnum.e.bit_length()+7)//8, length=2)
kb += int_to_bytes(pubnum.e)
elif (isinstance(pkey, ec.EllipticCurvePrivateKey)):
curve = ec_domain(pkey.curve)
kb += int_to_bytes(len(curve.P)*8, length=2)
kb += int_to_bytes(len(curve.A), length=2)
kb += curve.A
kb += int_to_bytes(len(curve.B), length=2)
kb += curve.B
kb += int_to_bytes(len(curve.P), length=2)
kb += curve.P
kb += int_to_bytes(len(curve.O), length=2)
kb += curve.O
kb += int_to_bytes(len(curve.G), length=2)
kb += curve.G
kb += int_to_bytes((pkey.private_numbers().private_value.bit_length()+7)//8, length=2)
kb += int_to_bytes(pkey.private_numbers().private_value)
p = pkey.public_key().public_bytes(Encoding.X962, PublicFormat.UncompressedPoint)
kb += int_to_bytes(len(p), length=2)
kb += p
elif (isinstance(pkey, bytes)):
kb += int_to_bytes(len(pkey), length=2)
kb += pkey
kb_len_pad = (len(kb)//16)*16
if (len(kb) % 16 > 0):
kb_len_pad = (len(kb)//16 + 1)*16
if (len(kb) < kb_len_pad):
kb += b'\x80'
kb += b'\x00' * (kb_len_pad-len(kb))
cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(kenc), modes.CBC(b'\x00'*16))
encryptor = cipher.encryptor()
ct = encryptor.update(kb) + encryptor.finalize()
data += ct
c = cmac.CMAC(algorithms.AES(kmac))
c.update(data)
data += c.finalize()
p1 = self.get_first_free_id()
_ = self.send(cla=0x80, command=0x74, p1=p1, p2=0x93, data=data)
return p1
def exchange(self, keyid, pubkey):
resp = self.send(cla=0x80, command=0x62, p1=keyid, p2=Algorithm.ALGO_EC_DH.value, data=pubkey.public_bytes(Encoding.X962, PublicFormat.UncompressedPoint))
return resp
def parse_cvc(self, data):
car = CVC().decode(data).car()
chr = CVC().decode(data).chr()
return {'car': car, 'chr': chr}
def get_termca(self):
resp = self.get_contents(EF_TERMCA)
cv_data = self.parse_cvc(resp)
a = ASN1().decode(resp).find(0x7f21).data()
tlen = len(ASN1.calculate_len(len(a)))
ret = {'cv': cv_data}
if (len(a)+2+tlen < len(resp)): # There's more certificate
resp = resp[2+len(a)+tlen:]
dv_data = self.parse_cvc(resp)
ret['dv'] = dv_data
return ret
def get_version(self):
resp = self.send(cla=0x80, command=0x50)
return resp[5]+0.1*resp[6]
def get_key_domain(self, key_domain=0):
resp, code = self.send(cla=0x80, command=0x52, p2=key_domain, codes=[0x9000, 0x6A88, 0x6A86])
if (code == 0x9000):
return {'dkek': { 'total': resp[0], 'missing': resp[1]}, 'kcv': resp[2:10]}
return {'error': code}
def get_key_domains(self):
for k in range(0xFF):
_, code = self.send(cla=0x80, command=0x52, p2=k, codes=[0x9000, 0x6A88, 0x6A86])
if (code == 0x6A86):
return k
return 0
def set_key_domain(self, key_domain=0, total=DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES):
resp = self.send(cla=0x80, command=0x52, p1=0x1, p2=key_domain, data=[total])
return resp
def clear_key_domain(self, key_domain=0):
resp = self.send(cla=0x80, command=0x52, p1=0x4, p2=key_domain)
return resp
def delete_key_domain(self, key_domain=0):
self.send(cla=0x80, command=0x52, p1=0x3, p2=key_domain, codes=[0x6A88])
def get_challenge(self, length):
return self.send(cla=0x80, command=0x84, ne=length)
def cipher(self, algo, keyid, data):
resp = self.send(cla=0x80, command=0x78, p1=keyid, p2=algo.value, data=data)
return resp
def hmac(self, hash, keyid, data):
if (hash == hashes.SHA1):
algo = b'\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x0D\x02\x07'
elif (hash == hashes.SHA224):
algo = b'\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x0D\x02\x08'
elif (hash == hashes.SHA256):
algo = b'\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x0D\x02\x09'
elif (hash == hashes.SHA384):
algo = b'\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x0D\x02\x0A'
elif (hash == hashes.SHA512):
algo = b'\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x0D\x02\x0B'
else:
raise ValueError("Hash not supported")
data = [0x06, len(algo)] + list(algo) + [0x81, len(data)] + list(data)
resp = self.send(cla=0x80, command=0x78, p1=keyid, p2=0x51, data=data)
return resp
def cmac(self, keyid, data):
resp = self.send(cla=0x80, command=0x78, p1=keyid, p2=Algorithm.ALGO_AES_CMAC.value, data=data)
return resp
def hkdf(self, hash, keyid, data, salt, out_len=None):
if (hash == hashes.SHA256):
algo = b'\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x0D\x01\x09\x10\x03\x1D'
elif (hash == hashes.SHA384):
algo = b'\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x0D\x01\x09\x10\x03\x1E'
elif (hash == hashes.SHA512):
algo = b'\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x0D\x01\x09\x10\x03\x1F'
data = [0x06, len(algo)] + list(algo) + [0x81, len(data)] + list(data) + [0x82, len(salt)] + list(salt)
resp = self.send(cla=0x80, command=0x78, p1=keyid, p2=0x51, data=data, ne=out_len)
return resp
def pbkdf2(self, hash, keyid, salt, iterations, out_len=None):
oid = b'\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x0D\x01\x05\x0C'
salt = b'\x04' + bytes([len(salt)]) + salt
iteration = b'\x02' + bytes([len(int_to_bytes(iterations))]) + int_to_bytes(iterations)
prf = b'\x30\x0A\x06\x08\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x0D\x02'
if (hash == hashes.SHA1):
prf += b'\x07'
elif (hash == hashes.SHA224):
prf += b'\x08'
elif (hash == hashes.SHA256):
prf += b'\x09'
elif (hash == hashes.SHA384):
prf += b'\x0A'
elif (hash == hashes.SHA512):
prf += b'\x0B'
data = list(salt + iteration + prf)
data = [0x06, len(oid)] + list(oid) + [0x81, len(data)] + list(data)
resp = self.send(cla=0x80, command=0x78, p1=keyid, p2=0x51, data=data, ne=out_len)
return resp
def x963(self, hash, keyid, data, out_len=None):
oid = b'\x2B\x81\x05\x10\x86\x48\x3F'
enc = b'\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x0D\x02'
if (hash == hashes.SHA1):
enc += b'\x07'
elif (hash == hashes.SHA224):
enc += b'\x08'
elif (hash == hashes.SHA256):
enc += b'\x09'
elif (hash == hashes.SHA384):
enc += b'\x0A'
elif (hash == hashes.SHA512):
enc += b'\x0B'
else:
raise ValueError("Hash not supported")
data = [0x06, len(oid)] + list(oid) + [0x81, len(enc)] + list(enc) + [0x83, len(data)] + list(data)
resp = self.send(cla=0x80, command=0x78, p1=keyid, p2=0x51, data=data, ne=out_len)
return resp
@pytest.fixture(scope="session")
def device():
dev = Device()
dev = PicoHSM()
return dev

View File

@@ -17,10 +17,9 @@
*/
"""
DEFAULT_PIN = '648219'
DEFAULT_SOPIN = '57621880'
DEFAULT_RETRIES = 3
DEFAULT_DKEK = [0x1] * 32
DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES = 2
from binascii import unhexlify
EF_TERMCA = 0x2f02
DEFAULT_DKEK = [0x1] * 32
TERM_CERT = unhexlify('7F2181E57F4E819E5F290100421045535049434F48534D445630303030317F494F060A04007F00070202020203864104F571E53AA8E75C929D925081CF0F893CB5991D48BD546C1A3F22199F037E4B12D601ACD91C67C88D3C5B3D04C08EC0A372485F7A248E080EE0C6237C1B075E1C5F201045535049434F48534D54525A474E50327F4C0E060904007F0007030102025301005F25060203000300055F24060204000300045F374041BF5E970739135770DBCC5DDA81FFD8B13419A9257D44CAF8404267C644E8F435B43F5E57EB2A8CF4B198045ACD094E0CB34E6217D9C8922CFB9BBEFD4088AD')
DICA_CERT = unhexlify('7F2181E97F4E81A25F290100421045535049434F48534D434130303030317F494F060A04007F0007020202020386410421EE4A21C16A10F737F12E78E5091B266612038CDABEBB722B15BF6D41B877FBF64D9AB69C39B9831B1AE00BEF2A4E81976F7688D45189BB232A24703D8A96A55F201045535049434F48534D445630303030317F4C12060904007F000703010202530580000000005F25060202000801085F24060203000601045F37403F75C08FFFC9186B56E6147199E82BFC327CEEF72495BC567961CD54D702F13E3C2766FCD1D11BD6A9D1F4A229B76B248CEB9AF88D59A74D0AB149448705159B')

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
FROM debian:bullseye
ARG DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive
RUN apt update && apt upgrade -y
RUN apt install -y apt-utils
RUN apt autoremove -y
RUN rm -rf /var/cache/apt/archives/*
RUN apt install -y libccid \
libpcsclite-dev \
git \
autoconf \
pkg-config \
libtool \
help2man \
automake \
gcc \
make \
build-essential \
python3 \
python3-pip \
swig \
libssl-dev \
cmake \
vsmartcard-vpcd \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
RUN pip3 install pytest pycvc cryptography pyscard base58
WORKDIR /
RUN git clone https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC
WORKDIR /OpenSC
RUN git checkout tags/0.23.0
RUN ./bootstrap
RUN ./configure --enable-openssl
RUN make -j `nproc`
RUN make install
RUN make clean
RUN ldconfig
WORKDIR /
RUN git clone https://github.com/polhenarejos/pypicohsm.git
RUN pip3 install -e pypicohsm
RUN git clone https://github.com/CardContact/sc-hsm-embedded
WORKDIR /sc-hsm-embedded
RUN autoreconf -fi
RUN ./configure
RUN make -j `nproc`
RUN make install
RUN cp ./src/tests/sc-hsm-pkcs11-test /usr/local/bin/sc-hsm-pkcs11-test
RUN make clean
WORKDIR /

View File

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ RUN apt install -y libccid \
cmake \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
RUN pip3 install pytest pycvc cryptography pyscard
RUN git clone https://github.com/frankmorgner/vsmartcard.git
RUN git clone https://github.com/polhenarejos/vsmartcard.git
WORKDIR /vsmartcard/virtualsmartcard
RUN autoreconf --verbose --install
RUN ./configure --sysconfdir=/etc

20
tests/docker_env.sh Normal file → Executable file
View File

@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@
# default values, can be overridden by the environment
: ${MBEDTLS_DOCKER_GUEST:=jammy}
: ${MBEDTLS_DOCKER_GUEST:=bullseye}
DOCKER_IMAGE_TAG="pico-hsm-test:${MBEDTLS_DOCKER_GUEST}"
@@ -72,14 +72,16 @@ else
NUM_PROC="$(nproc)"
fi
# Build the Docker image
echo "Getting docker image up to date (this may take a few minutes)..."
${DOCKER} image build \
-t ${DOCKER_IMAGE_TAG} \
--cache-from=${DOCKER_IMAGE_TAG} \
--network host \
--build-arg MAKEFLAGS_PARALLEL="-j ${NUM_PROC}" \
tests/docker/${MBEDTLS_DOCKER_GUEST}
build_image() {
# Build the Docker image
echo "Getting docker image up to date (this may take a few minutes)..."
${DOCKER} image build \
-t ${DOCKER_IMAGE_TAG} \
--cache-from=${DOCKER_IMAGE_TAG} \
--network host \
--build-arg MAKEFLAGS_PARALLEL="-j ${NUM_PROC}" \
tests/docker/${MBEDTLS_DOCKER_GUEST}
}
run_in_docker()
{

Binary file not shown.

View File

@@ -18,17 +18,19 @@
"""
import pytest
from const import EF_TERMCA
def test_select(device):
device.select_applet()
def test_initialization(device):
device.initialize()
def test_termca(device):
data = device.get_termca()
assert(b'ESPICOHSMTR' == data['cv']['chr'][:11])
assert(b'ESPICOHSMDV' == data['cv']['car'][:11])
assert(b'ESPICOHSMDV' == data['dv']['chr'][:11])
assert(b'ESPICOHSMCA' == data['dv']['car'][:11])
assert(b'ESPICOHSMDV' == data['cv']['car'][:11] or b'ESPICOHSMTR' == data['cv']['car'][:11])
assert(b'ESPICOHSMDV' == data['dv']['chr'][:11] or b'ESPICOHSMTR' == data['dv']['chr'][:11])
assert(b'ESPICOHSMCA' == data['dv']['car'][:11] or b'ESPICOHSMTR' == data['dv']['car'][:11])
assert(data['cv']['car'] == data['dv']['chr'])
def test_get_version(device):

View File

@@ -18,9 +18,13 @@
"""
import pytest
from const import DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES, DEFAULT_DKEK
import hashlib
from const import DEFAULT_DKEK
from picohsm import APDUResponse, SWCodes
from picohsm.const import DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES
KEY_DOMAINS = 3
TEST_KEY_DOMAIN = 1
def test_key_domains(device):
device.initialize(key_domains=KEY_DOMAINS)
@@ -34,13 +38,28 @@ def test_key_domains(device):
assert(kd['error'] == 0x6A86)
assert(device.get_key_domains() == KEY_DOMAINS)
def test_set_key_domain(device):
kd = device.get_key_domain(key_domain=0)
def test_import_dkek_wrong_key_domain(device):
with pytest.raises(APDUResponse) as e:
device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK, key_domain=0)
assert(e.value.sw == SWCodes.SW_COMMAND_NOT_ALLOWED)
def test_import_dkek_fail(device):
with pytest.raises(APDUResponse) as e:
device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK, key_domain=TEST_KEY_DOMAIN)
assert(e.value.sw == SWCodes.SW_COMMAND_NOT_ALLOWED)
def test_set_key_domain_fail(device):
with pytest.raises(APDUResponse) as e:
device.set_key_domain(key_domain=10)
assert(e.value.sw == SWCodes.SW_INCORRECT_P1P2)
def test_set_key_domain_ok(device):
kd = device.get_key_domain(key_domain=TEST_KEY_DOMAIN)
assert('error' in kd)
assert(kd['error'] == 0x6A88)
device.set_key_domain(key_domain=0)
kd = device.get_key_domain(key_domain=0)
device.set_key_domain(key_domain=TEST_KEY_DOMAIN)
kd = device.get_key_domain(key_domain=TEST_KEY_DOMAIN)
assert('error' not in kd)
assert('dkek' in kd)
assert('total' in kd['dkek'])
@@ -48,25 +67,44 @@ def test_set_key_domain(device):
assert('missing' in kd['dkek'])
assert(kd['dkek']['missing'] == DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
def test_import_dkek_ok(device):
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK, key_domain=TEST_KEY_DOMAIN)
assert(resp[0] == DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
assert(resp[1] == DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES-1)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK, key_domain=TEST_KEY_DOMAIN)
assert(resp[1] == DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES-2)
kcv = hashlib.sha256(b'\x00'*32).digest()[:8]
assert(resp[2:] == kcv)
def test_clear_key_domain(device):
kd = device.get_key_domain(key_domain=0)
assert('error' in kd)
assert(kd['error'] == SWCodes.SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND)
kd = device.get_key_domain(key_domain=TEST_KEY_DOMAIN)
assert(kd['dkek']['total'] == DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
kd = device.get_key_domain(key_domain=0)
assert(kd['dkek']['missing'] == DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES-1)
device.clear_key_domain(key_domain=0)
kd = device.get_key_domain(key_domain=0)
device.clear_key_domain(key_domain=TEST_KEY_DOMAIN)
kd = device.get_key_domain(key_domain=TEST_KEY_DOMAIN)
assert(kd['dkek']['missing'] == DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
def test_delete_key_domain(device):
assert(device.get_key_domains() == KEY_DOMAINS)
kd = device.get_key_domain(key_domain=0)
kd = device.get_key_domain(key_domain=TEST_KEY_DOMAIN)
assert(kd['dkek']['total'] == DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
with pytest.raises(APDUResponse) as e:
device.delete_key_domain(key_domain=0)
assert(e.value.sw == SWCodes.SW_INCORRECT_P1P2)
def test_delete_key_domain(device):
assert(device.get_key_domains() == KEY_DOMAINS)
kd = device.get_key_domain(key_domain=TEST_KEY_DOMAIN)
assert(kd['dkek']['total'] == DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
device.delete_key_domain(key_domain=0)
device.delete_key_domain(key_domain=TEST_KEY_DOMAIN)
assert(device.get_key_domains() == KEY_DOMAINS)
kd = device.get_key_domain(key_domain=0)
kd = device.get_key_domain(key_domain=TEST_KEY_DOMAIN)
assert('error' in kd)
assert(kd['error'] == 0x6A88)

View File

@@ -19,8 +19,8 @@
import pytest
import hashlib
from utils import APDUResponse, SWCodes
from const import DEFAULT_PIN, DEFAULT_RETRIES, DEFAULT_DKEK, DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES
from picohsm.const import DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES, DEFAULT_PIN, DEFAULT_RETRIES
from const import DEFAULT_DKEK
def test_dkek(device):
device.initialize(retries=DEFAULT_RETRIES, dkek_shares=DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
@@ -33,5 +33,5 @@ def test_dkek(device):
assert(resp[1] == DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES-2)
kcv = hashlib.sha256(b'\x00'*32).digest()[:8]
assert(bytes(resp[2:]) == kcv)
assert(resp[2:] == kcv)

View File

@@ -18,36 +18,35 @@
"""
import pytest
from utils import APDUResponse, SWCodes
from const import DEFAULT_PIN, DEFAULT_RETRIES
from picohsm import APDUResponse, SWCodes
from picohsm.const import DEFAULT_PIN, DEFAULT_RETRIES
WRONG_PIN = '112233'
RETRIES = DEFAULT_RETRIES
def test_pin_init_retries(device):
device.initialize(retries=RETRIES)
device.initialize(retries=DEFAULT_RETRIES)
retries = device.get_login_retries()
assert(retries == RETRIES)
assert(retries == DEFAULT_RETRIES)
def test_pin_login(device):
device.initialize(retries=RETRIES)
device.initialize(retries=DEFAULT_RETRIES)
device.login(DEFAULT_PIN)
def test_pin_retries(device):
device.initialize(retries=RETRIES)
device.initialize(retries=DEFAULT_RETRIES)
device.login(DEFAULT_PIN)
for ret in range(RETRIES-1):
for ret in range(DEFAULT_RETRIES-1):
with pytest.raises(APDUResponse) as e:
device.login(WRONG_PIN)
assert(e.value.sw1 == 0x63 and e.value.sw2 == (0xC0 | (RETRIES-1-ret)))
assert(e.value.sw1 == 0x63 and e.value.sw2 == (0xC0 | (DEFAULT_RETRIES-1-ret)))
with pytest.raises(APDUResponse) as e:
device.login(WRONG_PIN)
assert(e.value.sw == SWCodes.SW_PIN_BLOCKED.value)
assert(e.value.sw == SWCodes.SW_PIN_BLOCKED)
device.initialize(retries=RETRIES)
device.initialize(retries=DEFAULT_RETRIES)
retries = device.get_login_retries()
assert(retries == RETRIES)
assert(retries == DEFAULT_RETRIES)

View File

@@ -18,20 +18,22 @@
"""
import pytest
from utils import KeyType, DOPrefixes
from picohsm import KeyType, DOPrefixes
def test_gen_initialize(device):
device.initialize()
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"curve", ['secp192r1', 'secp256r1', 'secp384r1', 'secp521r1', 'brainpoolP256r1', 'brainpoolP384r1', 'brainpoolP512r1', 'secp192k1', 'secp256k1']
"curve", ['secp192r1', 'secp256r1', 'secp384r1', 'secp521r1', 'brainpoolP256r1', 'brainpoolP384r1', 'brainpoolP512r1', 'secp192k1', 'secp256k1', 'curve25519', 'curve448', 'ed25519', 'ed448']
)
def test_gen_ecc(device, curve):
keyid = device.key_generation(KeyType.ECC, curve)
resp = device.list_keys()
assert((DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX.value, keyid) in resp)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX.value << 8 | keyid)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX.value << 8 | keyid)
assert((DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid) in resp)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX, keyid)
resp = device.list_keys()
assert((DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid) not in resp)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"modulus", [1024, 2048, 4096]
@@ -39,7 +41,7 @@ def test_gen_ecc(device, curve):
def test_gen_rsa(device, modulus):
keyid = device.key_generation(KeyType.RSA, modulus)
resp = device.list_keys()
assert((DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX.value, keyid) in resp)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX.value << 8 | keyid)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX.value << 8 | keyid)
assert((DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid) in resp)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX, keyid)

View File

@@ -20,16 +20,18 @@
import pytest
import hashlib
import os
from utils import KeyType, DOPrefixes
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import rsa, ec
from const import DEFAULT_RETRIES, DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES, DEFAULT_DKEK
from picohsm import DOPrefixes
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import rsa, ec, x25519, x448, ed25519, ed448
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.serialization import Encoding, PublicFormat
from picohsm.const import DEFAULT_RETRIES, DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES
from const import DEFAULT_DKEK
def test_prepare_dkek(device):
device.initialize(retries=DEFAULT_RETRIES, dkek_shares=DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
kcv = hashlib.sha256(b'\x00'*32).digest()[:8]
assert(bytes(resp[2:]) == kcv)
assert(resp[2:] == kcv)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"modulus", [1024, 2048, 4096]
@@ -42,8 +44,8 @@ def test_import_rsa(device, modulus):
keyid = device.import_key(pkey)
pubkey = device.public_key(keyid)
assert(pubkey.public_numbers() == pkey.public_key().public_numbers())
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX.value << 8 | keyid)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX.value << 8 | keyid)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX, keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
@@ -54,8 +56,30 @@ def test_import_ecc(device, curve):
keyid = device.import_key(pkey)
pubkey = device.public_key(keyid, param=curve().name)
assert(pubkey.public_numbers() == pkey.public_key().public_numbers())
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX.value << 8 | keyid)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX.value << 8 | keyid)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX, keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"curve", [x25519.X25519PrivateKey, x448.X448PrivateKey]
)
def test_import_montgomery(device, curve):
pkey = curve.generate()
keyid = device.import_key(pkey)
pubkey = device.public_key(keyid, param=curve)
assert(pubkey.public_bytes(Encoding.Raw, PublicFormat.Raw) == pkey.public_key().public_bytes(Encoding.Raw, PublicFormat.Raw))
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX, keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"curve", [ed25519.Ed25519PrivateKey, ed448.Ed448PrivateKey]
)
def test_import_edwards(device, curve):
pkey = curve.generate()
keyid = device.import_key(pkey)
pubkey = device.public_key(keyid, param=curve)
assert(pubkey.public_bytes(Encoding.Raw, PublicFormat.Raw) == pkey.public_key().public_bytes(Encoding.Raw, PublicFormat.Raw))
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX, keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]

View File

@@ -19,16 +19,17 @@
import pytest
import hashlib
from utils import KeyType, DOPrefixes
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import rsa, ec
from const import DEFAULT_RETRIES, DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES, DEFAULT_DKEK
from picohsm import DOPrefixes
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec, x25519, x448
from picohsm.const import DEFAULT_RETRIES, DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES
from const import DEFAULT_DKEK
def test_prepare_dkek(device):
device.initialize(retries=DEFAULT_RETRIES, dkek_shares=DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
kcv = hashlib.sha256(b'\x00'*32).digest()[:8]
assert(bytes(resp[2:]) == kcv)
assert(resp[2:] == kcv)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"curve", [ec.SECP192R1, ec.SECP256R1, ec.SECP384R1, ec.SECP521R1, ec.SECP256K1, ec.BrainpoolP256R1, ec.BrainpoolP384R1, ec.BrainpoolP512R1]
@@ -43,10 +44,31 @@ def test_exchange_ecc(device, curve):
sharedB = pkeyB.exchange(ec.ECDH(), pbkeyA)
sharedA = device.exchange(keyid, pbkeyB)
assert(bytes(sharedA) == sharedB)
assert(sharedA == sharedB)
sharedAA = pkeyA.exchange(ec.ECDH(), pbkeyB)
assert(bytes(sharedA) == sharedAA)
assert(sharedA == sharedAA)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX.value << 8 | keyid)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX.value << 8 | keyid)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX, keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"curve", [x25519.X25519PrivateKey, x448.X448PrivateKey]
)
def test_exchange_montgomery(device, curve):
pkeyA = curve.generate()
pbkeyA = pkeyA.public_key()
keyid = device.import_key(pkeyA)
pkeyB = curve.generate()
pbkeyB = pkeyB.public_key()
sharedB = pkeyB.exchange(pbkeyA)
sharedA = device.exchange(keyid, pbkeyB)
assert(sharedA == sharedB)
sharedAA = pkeyA.exchange(pbkeyB)
assert(sharedA == sharedAA)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX, keyid)

View File

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
"""
import pytest
from utils import KeyType, DOPrefixes
from picohsm import KeyType, DOPrefixes
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
@@ -26,5 +26,5 @@ from utils import KeyType, DOPrefixes
def test_gen_aes(device, size):
keyid = device.key_generation(KeyType.AES, size)
resp = device.list_keys()
assert((DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX.value, keyid) in resp)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX.value << 8 | keyid)
assert((DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid) in resp)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2023 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
from picohsm import KeyType, DOPrefixes, APDUResponse, SWCodes
from binascii import hexlify
import hashlib
from const import DEFAULT_DKEK
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import cmac
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers import algorithms, Cipher, modes
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
def test_initialize(device):
device.initialize(key_domains=1)
assert(device.get_key_domains() == 1)
device.set_key_domain(key_domain=0, total=2)
keyid_in = -1
keyid_out = -1
def test_key_generation_no_key_domain(device):
global keyid_out
keyid_out = device.key_generation(KeyType.ECC, 'brainpoolP256r1')
device.put_contents(p1=DOPrefixes.PRKD_PREFIX, p2=keyid_out, data=[0xA0])
resp = device.list_keys()
assert((DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid_out) in resp)
assert((DOPrefixes.PRKD_PREFIX, keyid_out) in resp)
def test_key_generation_with_key_domain(device):
global keyid_in
keyid_in = device.key_generation(KeyType.ECC, 'brainpoolP256r1', key_domain=0)
device.put_contents(p1=DOPrefixes.PRKD_PREFIX, p2=keyid_in, data=[0xA0])
resp = device.list_keys()
assert((DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid_in) in resp)
assert((DOPrefixes.PRKD_PREFIX, keyid_in) in resp)
def test_export_key_out(device):
with pytest.raises(APDUResponse) as e:
device.export_key(keyid_out)
assert(e.value.sw == SWCodes.SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND)
def test_export_key_in_fail(device):
with pytest.raises(APDUResponse) as e:
device.export_key(keyid_in)
assert(e.value.sw == SWCodes.SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND)
def test_export_import_dkek(device):
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK, key_domain=0)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK, key_domain=0)
def test_export_key_in_ok(device):
resp = device.export_key(keyid_in)
kcv = hashlib.sha256(b'\x00'*32).digest()[:8]
assert(kcv == resp[:8])
assert(resp[8] == 12)
assert(resp[9:21] == b"\x00\x0A\x04\x00\x7F\x00\x07\x02\x02\x02\x02\x03")
pkey = hashlib.sha256(b'\x00'*32+b'\x00\x00\x00\x02').digest()
c = cmac.CMAC(algorithms.AES(pkey))
c.update(resp[:-16])
resCMAC = c.finalize()
assert(resCMAC == resp[-16:])
def test_delete_keys_in_out(device):
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid_in)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX, keyid_in)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid_out)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX, keyid_out)
def test_export_import(device):
pkey_gen = ec.generate_private_key(ec.BrainpoolP256R1())
keyid = device.import_key(pkey_gen)
resp = device.export_key(keyid)
kcv = hashlib.sha256(b'\x00'*32).digest()[:8]
assert(kcv == resp[:8])
assert(resp[8] == 12)
assert(resp[9:21] == b"\x00\x0A\x04\x00\x7F\x00\x07\x02\x02\x02\x02\x03")
pkey = hashlib.sha256(b'\x00'*32+b'\x00\x00\x00\x02').digest()
c = cmac.CMAC(algorithms.AES(pkey))
c.update(resp[:-16])
resCMAC = c.finalize()
assert(resCMAC == resp[-16:])
iv = b'\x00'*16
pkey = hashlib.sha256(b'\x00'*32+b'\x00\x00\x00\x01').digest()
cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.CBC(iv))
decryptor = cipher.decryptor()
payload = decryptor.update(resp[27:-16]) + decryptor.finalize()
rnd = payload[:8]
ofs = 8
key_size = int.from_bytes(payload[ofs:ofs+2], 'big')
ofs += 2
A_len = int.from_bytes(payload[ofs:ofs+2], 'big')
ofs += 2+A_len
B_len = int.from_bytes(payload[ofs:ofs+2], 'big')
ofs += 2+B_len
P_len = int.from_bytes(payload[ofs:ofs+2], 'big')
ofs += 2+P_len
N_len = int.from_bytes(payload[ofs:ofs+2], 'big')
ofs += 2+N_len
G_len = int.from_bytes(payload[ofs:ofs+2], 'big')
ofs += 2+G_len
d_len = int.from_bytes(payload[ofs:ofs+2], 'big')
ofs += 2
d = payload[ofs:ofs+d_len]
ofs += d_len
Q_len = int.from_bytes(payload[ofs:ofs+2], 'big')
ofs += 2
Q = payload[ofs:ofs+Q_len]
ofs += Q_len
pkey_ex = ec.EllipticCurvePrivateNumbers(int.from_bytes(d, 'big'), ec.EllipticCurvePublicKey.from_encoded_point(ec.BrainpoolP256R1(), Q).public_numbers()).private_key()
assert(pkey_gen.private_bytes(serialization.Encoding.DER, serialization.PrivateFormat.PKCS8, serialization.NoEncryption()) == pkey_ex.private_bytes(serialization.Encoding.DER, serialization.PrivateFormat.PKCS8, serialization.NoEncryption()))
assert(pkey_gen.public_key().public_bytes(serialization.Encoding.X962, serialization.PublicFormat.UncompressedPoint) == pkey_ex.public_key().public_bytes(serialization.Encoding.X962, serialization.PublicFormat.UncompressedPoint))
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX, keyid)

View File

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
"""
import pytest
from utils import KeyType, DOPrefixes, Algorithm
from picohsm import KeyType, DOPrefixes, Algorithm
from binascii import hexlify
import hashlib
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ def test_signature_ecc(device, curve, scheme):
else:
datab = data
signature = device.sign(keyid=keyid, scheme=scheme, data=datab)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX.value << 8 | keyid)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
device.verify(pubkey, datab, signature, scheme)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
@@ -52,6 +52,15 @@ def test_signature_rsa(device, modulus, scheme):
keyid = device.key_generation(KeyType.RSA, modulus)
pubkey = device.public_key(keyid=keyid)
signature = device.sign(keyid=keyid, scheme=scheme, data=data)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX.value << 8 | keyid)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
device.verify(pubkey, data, signature, scheme)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"curve", ['ed25519', 'ed448']
)
def test_signature_edwards(device, curve):
keyid = device.key_generation(KeyType.ECC, curve)
pubkey = device.public_key(keyid=keyid)
signature = device.sign(keyid=keyid, scheme=Algorithm.ALGO_EC_RAW, data=data)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
device.verify(pubkey, data, signature)

View File

@@ -18,9 +18,8 @@
"""
import pytest
from utils import KeyType, DOPrefixes, Algorithm
from picohsm import KeyType, DOPrefixes
from binascii import hexlify
import hashlib
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import padding
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
@@ -43,6 +42,6 @@ def test_decrypt_rsa(device, modulus, pad):
message = data[:(modulus//8)-100]
ciphered = pubkey.encrypt(message, pad)
datab = device.decrypt(keyid, ciphered, pad)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX.value << 8 | keyid)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
assert(datab == message)

View File

@@ -20,8 +20,9 @@
import pytest
import os
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers import Cipher, algorithms, modes
from utils import Algorithm, DOPrefixes
from const import DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES, DEFAULT_DKEK
from picohsm import Algorithm, DOPrefixes
from picohsm.const import DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES
from const import DEFAULT_DKEK
MESSAGE = b'a secret message'
@@ -42,11 +43,11 @@ def test_cipher_aes_cipher(device, size):
encryptor = cipher.encryptor()
ctA = encryptor.update(MESSAGE) + encryptor.finalize()
ctB = device.cipher(Algorithm.ALGO_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT, keyid, MESSAGE)
assert(bytes(ctB) == ctA)
assert(ctB == ctA)
decryptor = cipher.decryptor()
plA = decryptor.update(ctA) + decryptor.finalize()
plB = device.cipher(Algorithm.ALGO_AES_CBC_DECRYPT, keyid, ctA)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX.value << 8 | keyid)
assert(bytes(plB) == plA)
assert(bytes(plB) == MESSAGE)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
assert(plB == plA)
assert(plB == MESSAGE)

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
import os
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers import aead
import cryptography.exceptions
from picohsm import APDUResponse, DOPrefixes, EncryptionMode, SWCodes
from picohsm.const import DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES
from const import DEFAULT_DKEK
from binascii import hexlify
MESSAGE = b'a secret message'
AAD = b'this is a tag for AAD'
def test_prepare_chachapoly(device):
device.initialize(dkek_shares=DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
def generate_key(device):
# ChaCha uses 32 bytes key
pkey = os.urandom(256 // 8)
keyid = device.import_key(pkey)
return pkey, keyid
def test_cipher_chachapoly_cipher(device):
iv = b'\x00'*12
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device)
ctd = device.chachapoly(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, data=MESSAGE, aad=AAD)
chacha = aead.ChaCha20Poly1305(pkey)
ctg = chacha.encrypt(iv, MESSAGE, AAD)
assert(ctd == ctg)
pld = device.chachapoly(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, data=ctd, aad=AAD)
plg = chacha.decrypt(iv, ctg, AAD)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
assert(pld == plg)
assert(pld == MESSAGE)
def test_cipher_chachapoly_random_iv(device):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device)
iv = os.urandom(12)
ctd = device.chachapoly(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, data=MESSAGE, iv=iv, aad=AAD)
chacha = aead.ChaCha20Poly1305(pkey)
ctg = chacha.encrypt(iv, MESSAGE, AAD)
assert(ctd == ctg)
pld = device.chachapoly(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, data=ctd, iv=iv, aad=AAD)
plg = chacha.decrypt(iv, ctg, AAD)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
assert(pld == plg)
assert(pld == MESSAGE)
def test_cipher_chachapoly_no_aad(device):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device)
iv = os.urandom(12)
ctd = device.chachapoly(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, data=MESSAGE, iv=iv)
chacha = aead.ChaCha20Poly1305(pkey)
ctg = chacha.encrypt(iv, MESSAGE, b'')
assert(ctd == ctg)
pld = device.chachapoly(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, data=ctd, iv=iv)
plg = chacha.decrypt(iv, ctg, b'')
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
assert(pld == plg)
assert(pld == MESSAGE)
def test_cipher_chachapoly_bad_random_iv(device):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device)
iv = os.urandom(12)
ctd = device.chachapoly(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, data=MESSAGE, iv=iv, aad=AAD)
chacha = aead.ChaCha20Poly1305(pkey)
ctg = chacha.encrypt(iv, MESSAGE, AAD)
assert(ctd == ctg)
iv = os.urandom(12)
with pytest.raises(APDUResponse) as e:
pld = device.chachapoly(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, data=ctd, iv=iv, aad=AAD)
assert (e.value.sw == SWCodes.SW_WRONG_DATA)
with pytest.raises(cryptography.exceptions.InvalidTag):
plg = chacha.decrypt(iv, ctg, AAD)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
def test_cipher_chachapoly_bad_aad(device):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device)
iv = os.urandom(12)
ctd = device.chachapoly(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, data=MESSAGE, iv=iv, aad=AAD)
chacha = aead.ChaCha20Poly1305(pkey)
ctg = chacha.encrypt(iv, MESSAGE, AAD)
assert(ctd == ctg)
with pytest.raises(APDUResponse) as e:
pld = device.chachapoly(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, data=ctd, iv=iv, aad=AAD + b'bad')
assert (e.value.sw == SWCodes.SW_WRONG_DATA)
with pytest.raises(cryptography.exceptions.InvalidTag):
plg = chacha.decrypt(iv, ctg, AAD + b'bad')
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,342 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
import os
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers import Cipher, algorithms, modes, aead
import cryptography.exceptions
from picohsm import APDUResponse, DOPrefixes, EncryptionMode, SWCodes, AES
from picohsm.const import DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES
from const import DEFAULT_DKEK
from binascii import hexlify
MESSAGE = b'a secret message'
AAD = b'this is a tag for AAD'
def test_prepare_aes(device):
device.initialize(dkek_shares=DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
def generate_key(device, size):
pkey = os.urandom(size // 8)
keyid = device.import_key(pkey)
return pkey, keyid
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
def test_aes_ecb(device, size):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device, size)
ctA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, AES.ECB, MESSAGE)
cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.ECB())
encryptor = cipher.encryptor()
ctB = encryptor.update(MESSAGE) + encryptor.finalize()
assert(ctA == ctB)
dtA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, AES.ECB, ctA)
decryptor = cipher.decryptor()
dtB = decryptor.update(ctB) + decryptor.finalize()
assert(dtA == dtB)
assert(dtA == MESSAGE)
device.delete_key(keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
def test_aes_cbc_no_iv(device, size):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device, size)
ctA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, AES.CBC, MESSAGE)
iv = b'\x00' * 16
cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.CBC(iv))
encryptor = cipher.encryptor()
ctB = encryptor.update(MESSAGE) + encryptor.finalize()
assert(ctA == ctB)
dtA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, AES.CBC, ctA)
decryptor = cipher.decryptor()
dtB = decryptor.update(ctB) + decryptor.finalize()
assert(dtA == dtB)
assert(dtA == MESSAGE)
device.delete_key(keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
def test_aes_cbc_iv(device, size):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device, size)
iv = os.urandom(16)
ctA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, AES.CBC, MESSAGE, iv=iv)
cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.CBC(iv))
encryptor = cipher.encryptor()
ctB = encryptor.update(MESSAGE) + encryptor.finalize()
assert(ctA == ctB)
dtA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, AES.CBC, ctA, iv=iv)
decryptor = cipher.decryptor()
dtB = decryptor.update(ctB) + decryptor.finalize()
assert(dtA == dtB)
assert(dtA == MESSAGE)
device.delete_key(keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
def test_aes_ofb_no_iv(device, size):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device, size)
ctA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, AES.OFB, MESSAGE)
iv = b'\x00' * 16
cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.OFB(iv))
encryptor = cipher.encryptor()
ctB = encryptor.update(MESSAGE) + encryptor.finalize()
assert(ctA == ctB)
dtA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, AES.OFB, ctA)
decryptor = cipher.decryptor()
dtB = decryptor.update(ctB) + decryptor.finalize()
assert(dtA == dtB)
assert(dtA == MESSAGE)
device.delete_key(keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
def test_aes_ofb_iv(device, size):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device, size)
iv = os.urandom(16)
ctA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, AES.OFB, MESSAGE, iv=iv)
cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.OFB(iv))
encryptor = cipher.encryptor()
ctB = encryptor.update(MESSAGE) + encryptor.finalize()
assert(ctA == ctB)
dtA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, AES.OFB, ctA, iv=iv)
decryptor = cipher.decryptor()
dtB = decryptor.update(ctB) + decryptor.finalize()
assert(dtA == dtB)
assert(dtA == MESSAGE)
device.delete_key(keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
def test_aes_cfb_no_iv(device, size):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device, size)
ctA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, AES.CFB, MESSAGE)
iv = b'\x00' * 16
cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.CFB(iv))
encryptor = cipher.encryptor()
ctB = encryptor.update(MESSAGE) + encryptor.finalize()
assert(ctA == ctB)
dtA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, AES.CFB, ctA)
decryptor = cipher.decryptor()
dtB = decryptor.update(ctB) + decryptor.finalize()
assert(dtA == dtB)
assert(dtA == MESSAGE)
device.delete_key(keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
def test_aes_cfb_iv(device, size):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device, size)
iv = os.urandom(16)
ctA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, AES.CFB, MESSAGE, iv=iv)
cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.CFB(iv))
encryptor = cipher.encryptor()
ctB = encryptor.update(MESSAGE) + encryptor.finalize()
assert(ctA == ctB)
dtA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, AES.CFB, ctA, iv=iv)
decryptor = cipher.decryptor()
dtB = decryptor.update(ctB) + decryptor.finalize()
assert(dtA == dtB)
assert(dtA == MESSAGE)
device.delete_key(keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
def test_aes_gcm_no_iv(device, size):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device, size)
ctA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, AES.GCM, MESSAGE, aad=AAD)
iv = b'\x00' * 16
encryptor = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.GCM(iv)).encryptor()
encryptor.authenticate_additional_data(AAD)
ctB = encryptor.update(MESSAGE) + encryptor.finalize()
assert(ctA == ctB + encryptor.tag)
dtA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, AES.GCM, ctA, aad=AAD)
decryptor = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.GCM(iv, encryptor.tag)).decryptor()
decryptor.authenticate_additional_data(AAD)
dtB = decryptor.update(ctB) + decryptor.finalize()
assert(dtA == dtB)
assert(dtA == MESSAGE)
device.delete_key(keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
def test_aes_gcm_iv(device, size):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device, size)
iv = os.urandom(16)
ctA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, AES.GCM, MESSAGE, iv=iv, aad=AAD)
encryptor = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.GCM(iv)).encryptor()
encryptor.authenticate_additional_data(AAD)
ctB = encryptor.update(MESSAGE) + encryptor.finalize()
assert(ctA == ctB + encryptor.tag)
dtA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, AES.GCM, ctA, iv=iv, aad=AAD)
decryptor = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.GCM(iv, encryptor.tag)).decryptor()
decryptor.authenticate_additional_data(AAD)
dtB = decryptor.update(ctB) + decryptor.finalize()
assert(dtA == dtB)
assert(dtA == MESSAGE)
device.delete_key(keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [256, 512]
)
def test_aes_xts_no_iv(device, size):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device, size)
ctA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, AES.XTS, MESSAGE)
iv = b'\x00' * 16
cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.XTS(iv))
encryptor = cipher.encryptor()
ctB = encryptor.update(MESSAGE) + encryptor.finalize()
assert(ctA == ctB)
dtA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, AES.XTS, ctA)
decryptor = cipher.decryptor()
dtB = decryptor.update(ctB) + decryptor.finalize()
assert(dtA == dtB)
assert(dtA == MESSAGE)
device.delete_key(keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [256, 512]
)
def test_aes_xts_iv(device, size):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device, size)
iv = os.urandom(16)
ctA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, AES.XTS, MESSAGE, iv=iv)
cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.XTS(iv))
encryptor = cipher.encryptor()
ctB = encryptor.update(MESSAGE) + encryptor.finalize()
assert(ctA == ctB)
dtA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, AES.XTS, ctA, iv=iv)
decryptor = cipher.decryptor()
dtB = decryptor.update(ctB) + decryptor.finalize()
assert(dtA == dtB)
assert(dtA == MESSAGE)
device.delete_key(keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
def test_aes_ctr_no_iv(device, size):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device, size)
ctA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, AES.CTR, MESSAGE)
iv = b'\x00' * 16
cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.CTR(iv))
encryptor = cipher.encryptor()
ctB = encryptor.update(MESSAGE) + encryptor.finalize()
assert(ctA == ctB)
dtA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, AES.CTR, ctA)
decryptor = cipher.decryptor()
dtB = decryptor.update(ctB) + decryptor.finalize()
assert(dtA == dtB)
assert(dtA == MESSAGE)
device.delete_key(keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
def test_aes_ctr_iv(device, size):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device, size)
iv = os.urandom(16)
ctA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, AES.CTR, MESSAGE, iv=iv)
cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(pkey), modes.CTR(iv))
encryptor = cipher.encryptor()
ctB = encryptor.update(MESSAGE) + encryptor.finalize()
assert(ctA == ctB)
dtA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, AES.CTR, ctA, iv=iv)
decryptor = cipher.decryptor()
dtB = decryptor.update(ctB) + decryptor.finalize()
assert(dtA == dtB)
assert(dtA == MESSAGE)
device.delete_key(keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
def test_aes_ccm_no_iv(device, size):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device, size)
ctA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, AES.CCM, MESSAGE, aad=AAD)
iv = b'\x00' * 12
encryptor = aead.AESCCM(pkey)
ctB = encryptor.encrypt(iv, MESSAGE, AAD)
assert(ctA == ctB)
dtA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, AES.CCM, ctA, aad=AAD)
decryptor = encryptor
dtB = decryptor.decrypt(iv, ctB, AAD)
assert(dtA == dtB)
assert(dtA == MESSAGE)
device.delete_key(keyid)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"iv_len", [7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13]
)
def test_aes_ccm_iv(device, size, iv_len):
pkey, keyid = generate_key(device, size)
iv = os.urandom(iv_len)
ctA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, AES.CCM, MESSAGE, iv=iv, aad=AAD)
encryptor = aead.AESCCM(pkey)
ctB = encryptor.encrypt(iv, MESSAGE, AAD)
assert(ctA == ctB)
dtA = device.aes(keyid, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, AES.CCM, ctA, iv=iv, aad=AAD)
decryptor = encryptor
dtB = decryptor.decrypt(iv, ctB, AAD)
assert(dtA == dtB)
assert(dtA == MESSAGE)
device.delete_key(keyid)

View File

@@ -21,8 +21,9 @@ import pytest
import os
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes, hmac, cmac
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers import algorithms
from utils import Algorithm, DOPrefixes
from const import DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES, DEFAULT_DKEK
from picohsm import DOPrefixes
from picohsm.const import DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES
from const import DEFAULT_DKEK
MESSAGE = b'a secret message'
@@ -44,8 +45,8 @@ def test_mac_hmac(device, size, algo):
h = hmac.HMAC(pkey, algo())
h.update(MESSAGE)
resB = h.finalize()
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX.value << 8 | keyid)
assert(bytes(resA) == resB)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
assert(resA == resB)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"size", [128, 192, 256]
@@ -57,6 +58,6 @@ def test_mac_cmac(device, size):
c = cmac.CMAC(algorithms.AES(pkey))
c.update(MESSAGE)
resB = c.finalize()
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX.value << 8 | keyid)
assert(bytes(resA) == resB)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
assert(resA == resB)

View File

@@ -22,8 +22,9 @@ import os
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.kdf.hkdf import HKDF
from cryptography import exceptions
from const import DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES, DEFAULT_DKEK
from utils import DOPrefixes
from picohsm.const import DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES
from const import DEFAULT_DKEK
from picohsm import DOPrefixes
INFO = b'info message'
@@ -47,7 +48,7 @@ class TestHKDF:
keyid = device.import_key(pkey)
salt = os.urandom(16)
resA = device.hkdf(algo, keyid, INFO, salt, out_len=out_len)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX.value << 8 | keyid)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
hkdf = HKDF(
algorithm=algo(),
length=out_len,
@@ -55,21 +56,21 @@ class TestHKDF:
info=INFO,
)
resB = hkdf.derive(pkey)
assert(bytes(resA) == resB)
assert(resA == resB)
hkdf = HKDF(
algorithm=algo(),
length=out_len,
salt=salt,
info=INFO,
)
hkdf.verify(pkey, bytes(resA))
hkdf.verify(pkey, resA)
def test_hkdf_fail(self, device, size, algo, out_len):
pkey = os.urandom(size // 8)
keyid = device.import_key(pkey)
salt = os.urandom(16)
resA = device.hkdf(algo, keyid, INFO, salt, out_len=out_len)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX.value << 8 | keyid)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
hkdf = HKDF(
algorithm=algo(),
length=out_len,
@@ -78,4 +79,4 @@ class TestHKDF:
)
pkey = os.urandom(size // 8)
with pytest.raises(exceptions.InvalidKey):
hkdf.verify(pkey, bytes(resA))
hkdf.verify(pkey, resA)

View File

@@ -22,8 +22,9 @@ import os
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.kdf.pbkdf2 import PBKDF2HMAC
from cryptography import exceptions
from const import DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES, DEFAULT_DKEK
from utils import DOPrefixes
from picohsm.const import DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES
from const import DEFAULT_DKEK
from picohsm import DOPrefixes
INFO = b'info message'
@@ -50,7 +51,7 @@ class TestPBKDF2:
keyid = device.import_key(pkey)
salt = os.urandom(16)
resA = device.pbkdf2(algo, keyid, salt, iterations=iterations, out_len=out_len)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX.value << 8 | keyid)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
kdf = PBKDF2HMAC(
algorithm=algo(),
length=out_len,
@@ -58,21 +59,21 @@ class TestPBKDF2:
iterations=iterations,
)
resB = kdf.derive(pkey)
assert(bytes(resA) == resB)
assert(resA == resB)
kdf = PBKDF2HMAC(
algorithm=algo(),
length=out_len,
salt=salt,
iterations=iterations,
)
kdf.verify(pkey, bytes(resA))
kdf.verify(pkey, resA)
def test_pbkdf2_fail(self, device, size, algo, out_len, iterations):
pkey = os.urandom(size // 8)
keyid = device.import_key(pkey)
salt = os.urandom(16)
resA = device.pbkdf2(algo, keyid, salt, iterations=iterations, out_len=out_len)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX.value << 8 | keyid)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
kdf = PBKDF2HMAC(
algorithm=algo(),
@@ -82,4 +83,4 @@ class TestPBKDF2:
)
pkey = os.urandom(size // 8)
with pytest.raises(exceptions.InvalidKey):
kdf.verify(pkey, bytes(resA))
kdf.verify(pkey, resA)

View File

@@ -22,8 +22,9 @@ import os
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.kdf.x963kdf import X963KDF
from cryptography import exceptions
from const import DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES, DEFAULT_DKEK
from utils import DOPrefixes
from picohsm.const import DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES
from const import DEFAULT_DKEK
from picohsm import DOPrefixes
INFO = b'shared message'
@@ -46,26 +47,26 @@ class TestX963:
pkey = os.urandom(size // 8)
keyid = device.import_key(pkey)
resA = device.x963(algo, keyid, INFO, out_len=out_len)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX.value << 8 | keyid)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
xkdf = X963KDF(
algorithm=algo(),
length=out_len,
sharedinfo=INFO,
)
resB = xkdf.derive(pkey)
assert(bytes(resA) == resB)
assert(resA == resB)
xkdf = X963KDF(
algorithm=algo(),
length=out_len,
sharedinfo=INFO,
)
xkdf.verify(pkey, bytes(resA))
xkdf.verify(pkey, resA)
def test_x963_fail(self, device, size, algo, out_len):
pkey = os.urandom(size // 8)
keyid = device.import_key(pkey)
resA = device.x963(algo, keyid, INFO, out_len=out_len)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX.value << 8 | keyid)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
xkdf = X963KDF(
algorithm=algo(),
length=out_len,
@@ -73,4 +74,4 @@ class TestX963:
)
pkey = os.urandom(size // 8)
with pytest.raises(exceptions.InvalidKey):
xkdf.verify(pkey, bytes(resA))
xkdf.verify(pkey, resA)

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2023 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
from binascii import unhexlify, hexlify
from cvc.certificates import CVC
from picohsm.utils import int_to_bytes
from picohsm import APDUResponse, SWCodes
from const import TERM_CERT, DICA_CERT
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec, utils
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
AUT_KEY = unhexlify('0A40E11E672C28C558B72C25D93BCF28C08D39AFDD5A1A2FD3BAF7A6B27F0C2E')
aut_pk = ec.derive_private_key(int.from_bytes(AUT_KEY, 'big'), ec.BrainpoolP256R1())
AUT_PUK = unhexlify('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')
term_chr = CVC().decode(TERM_CERT).chr()
def test_initialize(device):
device.initialize(puk_auts=1, puk_min_auts=1)
device.logout()
def test_register_puk(device):
status = device.get_puk_status()
assert(status == bytes([1,1,1,0]))
status = device.register_puk(AUT_PUK, TERM_CERT, DICA_CERT)
assert(status == bytes([1,0,1,0]))
assert(device.check_puk_key(term_chr) == 0)
def test_enumerate_puk_reg(device):
puks = device.enumerate_puk()
assert(len(puks) == 1)
assert(puks[0]['status'] == 0)
def test_authentication(device):
input = device.puk_prepare_signature()
signature = aut_pk.sign(input, ec.ECDSA(hashes.SHA256()))
r,s = utils.decode_dss_signature(signature)
signature = list(int_to_bytes(r) + int_to_bytes(s))
device.authenticate_puk(term_chr, signature)
status = device.get_puk_status()
assert(status == bytes([1,0,1,1]))
def test_enumerate_puk_ok(device):
puks = device.enumerate_puk()
assert(len(puks) == 1)
assert(puks[0]['status'] == 1)
def test_check_key(device):
assert(device.check_puk_key(term_chr) == 1)
bad_chr = b'XXXXX'
assert(device.check_puk_key(bad_chr) == -1)
assert(device.check_puk_key(bad_chr) != 0)
assert(device.check_puk_key(bad_chr) != 1)
def test_puk_reset(device):
device.logout()
status = device.get_puk_status()
assert(status == bytes([1,0,1,0]))
assert(device.check_puk_key(term_chr) == 0)
def test_authentication_fail(device):
input = b'this is a fake input'
signature = aut_pk.sign(input, ec.ECDSA(hashes.SHA256()))
r,s = utils.decode_dss_signature(signature)
signature = list(int_to_bytes(r) + int_to_bytes(s))
with pytest.raises(APDUResponse) as e:
device.authenticate_puk(term_chr, signature)
assert(e.value.sw == SWCodes.SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED)
status = device.get_puk_status()
assert(status == bytes([1,0,1,0]))
assert(device.check_puk_key(term_chr) == 0)
def test_enumerate_puk_1(device):
device.initialize(puk_auts=1, puk_min_auts=1)
puks = device.enumerate_puk()
assert(len(puks) == 1)
assert(puks[0]['status'] == -1)
device.register_puk(AUT_PUK, TERM_CERT, DICA_CERT)
puks = device.enumerate_puk()
assert(len(puks) == 1)
assert(puks[0]['status'] == 0)
def test_enumerate_puk_2(device):
device.initialize(puk_auts=2, puk_min_auts=1)
puks = device.enumerate_puk()
assert(len(puks) == 2)
assert(puks[0]['status'] == -1)
assert(puks[1]['status'] == -1)
device.register_puk(AUT_PUK, TERM_CERT, DICA_CERT)
puks = device.enumerate_puk()
assert(len(puks) == 2)
assert(puks[0]['status'] == 0)
assert(puks[1]['status'] == -1)
def test_register_more_puks(device):
device.initialize(puk_auts=2, puk_min_auts=1)
status = device.get_puk_status()
assert(status == bytes([2,2,1,0]))
status = device.register_puk(AUT_PUK, TERM_CERT, DICA_CERT)
assert(status == bytes([2,1,1,0]))
def test_is_pku(device):
device.initialize(puk_auts=1, puk_min_auts=1)
assert(device.is_puk() == True)
device.initialize()
assert(device.is_puk() == False)
def test_check_puk_key(device):
device.initialize(puk_auts=1, puk_min_auts=1)
status = device.check_puk_key(term_chr)
assert(status == -1)
status = device.register_puk(AUT_PUK, TERM_CERT, DICA_CERT)
status = device.check_puk_key(term_chr)
assert(status == 0)
def test_register_puk_with_no_puk(device):
device.initialize()
with pytest.raises(APDUResponse) as e:
device.register_puk(AUT_PUK, TERM_CERT, DICA_CERT)
assert(e.value.sw == SWCodes.SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND)

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2023 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
from binascii import unhexlify, hexlify
from picohsm.utils import int_to_bytes
from const import TERM_CERT, DICA_CERT
from cvc.asn1 import ASN1
from cvc.certificates import CVC
from cvc import oid
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec
from picohsm import DOPrefixes, APDUResponse, SWCodes
KDM = unhexlify(b'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')
def test_initialize(device):
device.initialize(key_domains=1)
device.logout()
def test_create_xkek(device):
with pytest.raises(APDUResponse) as e:
device.create_xkek(KDM)
assert(e.value.sw == SWCodes.SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED)
device.login()
kcv, did = device.create_xkek(KDM)
assert(kcv == b'\x00'*8)
gskcert = ASN1().decode(KDM).find(0x30).find(0x63).data()
gskQ = CVC().decode(gskcert).pubkey().find(0x86).data()
pub = ec.EllipticCurvePublicKey.from_encoded_point(ec.BrainpoolP256R1(), bytes(gskQ))
assert(did == int_to_bytes(pub.public_numbers().x)+int_to_bytes(pub.public_numbers().y))
keyid = -1
def test_derive_xkek(device):
global keyid
keyid = device.generate_xkek_key()
resp = device.list_keys()
assert((DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid) in resp)
xkek_dom = device.get_key_domain()['xkek']
pkey = ec.generate_private_key(ec.BrainpoolP256R1())
pubkey = pkey.public_key()
cert = CVC().cert(pubkey=pubkey, scheme=oid.ID_TA_ECDSA_SHA_256, signkey=pkey, signscheme=oid.ID_TA_ECDSA_SHA_256, car=b"UTCA00001", chr=b"UTCDUMMY00001", extensions=[
{
'tag': 0x73,
'oid': b'\x2B\x06\x01\x04\x01\x81\xC3\x1F\x03\x02\x02',
'contexts': {
0: xkek_dom
}
}
]).encode()
device.derive_xkek(keyid, cert)
resp = device.get_key_domain()
assert(resp['kcv'] != b'\x00'*8)
def test_delete_xkek(device):
device.delete_xkek()
resp = device.get_key_domain()
assert(resp['kcv'] == b'\x00'*8)
def test_delete_domain_with_key(device):
with pytest.raises(APDUResponse) as e:
device.delete_key_domain()
assert(e.value.sw == SWCodes.SW_FILE_EXISTS)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.KEY_PREFIX, keyid)
device.delete_file(DOPrefixes.EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX, keyid)
def test_delete_domain(device):
device.delete_key_domain()
resp = device.get_key_domain()
assert('kcv' not in resp)
assert('xkek' not in resp)
assert('error' in resp)
assert(resp['error'] == SWCodes.SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND)

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,453 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2023 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
import pytest
from binascii import unhexlify, hexlify
from picohsm.utils import int_to_bytes
from picohsm.const import DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES
from const import DEFAULT_DKEK
from cvc.asn1 import ASN1
from cvc.certificates import CVC
from cvc import oid
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
from picohsm import EncryptionMode, APDUResponse, SWCodes, PicoHSM
import hashlib
TEST_STRING = b'Pico Keys are awesome!'
def sha256_sha256(data):
return hashlib.sha256(hashlib.sha256(data).digest()).digest()
def test_initialize(device):
device.initialize(dkek_shares=DEFAULT_DKEK_SHARES)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
resp = device.import_dkek(DEFAULT_DKEK)
seeds = [
{
'name': 'secp256k1',
'id': 0,
'seed': unhexlify('000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f'),
},
{
'name': 'secp256k1',
'id': 1,
'seed': unhexlify('fffcf9f6f3f0edeae7e4e1dedbd8d5d2cfccc9c6c3c0bdbab7b4b1aeaba8a5a29f9c999693908d8a8784817e7b7875726f6c696663605d5a5754514e4b484542'),
},
{
'name': 'secp256k1',
'id': 2,
'seed': unhexlify('4b381541583be4423346c643850da4b320e46a87ae3d2a4e6da11eba819cd4acba45d239319ac14f863b8d5ab5a0d0c64d2e8a1e7d1457df2e5a3c51c73235be'),
},
{
'name': 'secp256k1',
'id': 3,
'seed': unhexlify('3ddd5602285899a946114506157c7997e5444528f3003f6134712147db19b678'),
},
{
'name': 'secp256r1',
'id': 4,
'seed': unhexlify('000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f'),
},
{
'name': 'secp256r1',
'id': 5,
'seed': unhexlify('fffcf9f6f3f0edeae7e4e1dedbd8d5d2cfccc9c6c3c0bdbab7b4b1aeaba8a5a29f9c999693908d8a8784817e7b7875726f6c696663605d5a5754514e4b484542'),
},
{
'name': 'secp256r1',
'id': 6,
'seed': unhexlify('a7305bc8df8d0951f0cb224c0e95d7707cbdf2c6ce7e8d481fec69c7ff5e9446'),
},
{
'name': 'symmetric',
'id': 7,
'seed': unhexlify('c76c4ac4f4e4a00d6b274d5c39c700bb4a7ddc04fbc6f78e85ca75007b5b495f74a9043eeb77bdd53aa6fc3a0e31462270316fa04b8c19114c8798706cd02ac8'),
},
]
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"seed", seeds
)
def test_generate_master(device, seed):
resp = device.hd_generate_master_node(curve=seed['name'], id=seed['id'], seed=seed['seed'])
def hardened(i):
return 0x80000000 + i
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"path", [
{
'path': [0],
'xpub': b'xpub661MyMwAqRbcFtXgS5sYJABqqG9YLmC4Q1Rdap9gSE8NqtwybGhePY2gZ29ESFjqJoCu1Rupje8YtGqsefD265TMg7usUDFdp6W1EGMcet8',
},
{
'path': [0, hardened(0)],
'xpub': b'xpub68Gmy5EdvgibQVfPdqkBBCHxA5htiqg55crXYuXoQRKfDBFA1WEjWgP6LHhwBZeNK1VTsfTFUHCdrfp1bgwQ9xv5ski8PX9rL2dZXvgGDnw',
},
{
'path': [0, hardened(0), 1],
'xpub': b'xpub6ASuArnXKPbfEwhqN6e3mwBcDTgzisQN1wXN9BJcM47sSikHjJf3UFHKkNAWbWMiGj7Wf5uMash7SyYq527Hqck2AxYysAA7xmALppuCkwQ',
},
{
'path': [0, hardened(0), 1, hardened(2)],
'xpub': b'xpub6D4BDPcP2GT577Vvch3R8wDkScZWzQzMMUm3PWbmWvVJrZwQY4VUNgqFJPMM3No2dFDFGTsxxpG5uJh7n7epu4trkrX7x7DogT5Uv6fcLW5',
},
{
'path': [0, hardened(0), 1, hardened(2), 2],
'xpub': b'xpub6FHa3pjLCk84BayeJxFW2SP4XRrFd1JYnxeLeU8EqN3vDfZmbqBqaGJAyiLjTAwm6ZLRQUMv1ZACTj37sR62cfN7fe5JnJ7dh8zL4fiyLHV',
},
{
'path': [0, hardened(0), 1, hardened(2), 2, 1000000000],
'xpub': b'xpub6H1LXWLaKsWFhvm6RVpEL9P4KfRZSW7abD2ttkWP3SSQvnyA8FSVqNTEcYFgJS2UaFcxupHiYkro49S8yGasTvXEYBVPamhGW6cFJodrTHy',
},
{
'path': [1],
'xpub': b'xpub661MyMwAqRbcFW31YEwpkMuc5THy2PSt5bDMsktWQcFF8syAmRUapSCGu8ED9W6oDMSgv6Zz8idoc4a6mr8BDzTJY47LJhkJ8UB7WEGuduB',
},
{
'path': [1, 0],
'xpub': b'xpub69H7F5d8KSRgmmdJg2KhpAK8SR3DjMwAdkxj3ZuxV27CprR9LgpeyGmXUbC6wb7ERfvrnKZjXoUmmDznezpbZb7ap6r1D3tgFxHmwMkQTPH',
},
{
'path': [1, 0, hardened(2147483647)],
'xpub': b'xpub6ASAVgeehLbnwdqV6UKMHVzgqAG8Gr6riv3Fxxpj8ksbH9ebxaEyBLZ85ySDhKiLDBrQSARLq1uNRts8RuJiHjaDMBU4Zn9h8LZNnBC5y4a',
},
{
'path': [1, 0, hardened(2147483647), 1],
'xpub': b'xpub6DF8uhdarytz3FWdA8TvFSvvAh8dP3283MY7p2V4SeE2wyWmG5mg5EwVvmdMVCQcoNJxGoWaU9DCWh89LojfZ537wTfunKau47EL2dhHKon',
},
{
'path': [1, 0, hardened(2147483647), 1, hardened(2147483646)],
'xpub': b'xpub6ERApfZwUNrhLCkDtcHTcxd75RbzS1ed54G1LkBUHQVHQKqhMkhgbmJbZRkrgZw4koxb5JaHWkY4ALHY2grBGRjaDMzQLcgJvLJuZZvRcEL',
},
{
'path': [1, 0, hardened(2147483647), 1, hardened(2147483646), 2],
'xpub': b'xpub6FnCn6nSzZAw5Tw7cgR9bi15UV96gLZhjDstkXXxvCLsUXBGXPdSnLFbdpq8p9HmGsApME5hQTZ3emM2rnY5agb9rXpVGyy3bdW6EEgAtqt',
},
{
'path': [2],
'xpub': b'xpub661MyMwAqRbcEZVB4dScxMAdx6d4nFc9nvyvH3v4gJL378CSRZiYmhRoP7mBy6gSPSCYk6SzXPTf3ND1cZAceL7SfJ1Z3GC8vBgp2epUt13',
},
{
'path': [2, hardened(0)],
'xpub': b'xpub68NZiKmJWnxxS6aaHmn81bvJeTESw724CRDs6HbuccFQN9Ku14VQrADWgqbhhTHBaohPX4CjNLf9fq9MYo6oDaPPLPxSb7gwQN3ih19Zm4Y',
},
{
'path': [3],
'xpub': b'xpub661MyMwAqRbcGczjuMoRm6dXaLDEhW1u34gKenbeYqAix21mdUKJyuyu5F1rzYGVxyL6tmgBUAEPrEz92mBXjByMRiJdba9wpnN37RLLAXa',
},
{
'path': [3, hardened(0)],
'xpub': b'xpub69AUMk3qDBi3uW1sXgjCmVjJ2G6WQoYSnNHyzkmdCHEhSZ4tBok37xfFEqHd2AddP56Tqp4o56AePAgCjYdvpW2PU2jbUPFKsav5ut6Ch1m',
},
{
'path': [3, hardened(0), hardened(1)],
'xpub': b'xpub6BJA1jSqiukeaesWfxe6sNK9CCGaujFFSJLomWHprUL9DePQ4JDkM5d88n49sMGJxrhpjazuXYWdMf17C9T5XnxkopaeS7jGk1GyyVziaMt',
},
]
)
def test_derive_node_bip(device, path):
resp = device.hd_derive_node(path['path'])
assert(resp == path['xpub'])
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"path", [
{
'path': [0],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('00000000'),
'chain': unhexlify('873dff81c02f525623fd1fe5167eac3a55a049de3d314bb42ee227ffed37d508'),
'public': unhexlify('0339a36013301597daef41fbe593a02cc513d0b55527ec2df1050e2e8ff49c85c2')
},
{
'path': [0, hardened(0)],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('3442193e'),
'chain': unhexlify('47fdacbd0f1097043b78c63c20c34ef4ed9a111d980047ad16282c7ae6236141'),
'public': unhexlify('035a784662a4a20a65bf6aab9ae98a6c068a81c52e4b032c0fb5400c706cfccc56')
},
{
'path': [0, hardened(0), 1],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('5c1bd648'),
'chain': unhexlify('2a7857631386ba23dacac34180dd1983734e444fdbf774041578e9b6adb37c19'),
'public': unhexlify('03501e454bf00751f24b1b489aa925215d66af2234e3891c3b21a52bedb3cd711c')
},
{
'path': [0, hardened(0), 1, hardened(2)],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('bef5a2f9'),
'chain': unhexlify('04466b9cc8e161e966409ca52986c584f07e9dc81f735db683c3ff6ec7b1503f'),
'public': unhexlify('0357bfe1e341d01c69fe5654309956cbea516822fba8a601743a012a7896ee8dc2')
},
{
'path': [0, hardened(0), 1, hardened(2), 2],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('ee7ab90c'),
'chain': unhexlify('cfb71883f01676f587d023cc53a35bc7f88f724b1f8c2892ac1275ac822a3edd'),
'public': unhexlify('02e8445082a72f29b75ca48748a914df60622a609cacfce8ed0e35804560741d29')
},
{
'path': [0, hardened(0), 1, hardened(2), 2, 1000000000],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('d880d7d8'),
'chain': unhexlify('c783e67b921d2beb8f6b389cc646d7263b4145701dadd2161548a8b078e65e9e'),
'public': unhexlify('022a471424da5e657499d1ff51cb43c47481a03b1e77f951fe64cec9f5a48f7011')
},
{
'path': [4],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('00000000'),
'chain': unhexlify('beeb672fe4621673f722f38529c07392fecaa61015c80c34f29ce8b41b3cb6ea'),
'public': unhexlify('0266874dc6ade47b3ecd096745ca09bcd29638dd52c2c12117b11ed3e458cfa9e8')
},
{
'path': [4, hardened(0)],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('be6105b5'),
'chain': unhexlify('3460cea53e6a6bb5fb391eeef3237ffd8724bf0a40e94943c98b83825342ee11'),
'public': unhexlify('0384610f5ecffe8fda089363a41f56a5c7ffc1d81b59a612d0d649b2d22355590c')
},
{
'path': [4, hardened(0), 1],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('9b02312f'),
'chain': unhexlify('4187afff1aafa8445010097fb99d23aee9f599450c7bd140b6826ac22ba21d0c'),
'public': unhexlify('03526c63f8d0b4bbbf9c80df553fe66742df4676b241dabefdef67733e070f6844')
},
{
'path': [4, hardened(0), 1, hardened(2)],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('b98005c1'),
'chain': unhexlify('98c7514f562e64e74170cc3cf304ee1ce54d6b6da4f880f313e8204c2a185318'),
'public': unhexlify('0359cf160040778a4b14c5f4d7b76e327ccc8c4a6086dd9451b7482b5a4972dda0')
},
{
'path': [4, hardened(0), 1, hardened(2), 2],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('0e9f3274'),
'chain': unhexlify('ba96f776a5c3907d7fd48bde5620ee374d4acfd540378476019eab70790c63a0'),
'public': unhexlify('029f871f4cb9e1c97f9f4de9ccd0d4a2f2a171110c61178f84430062230833ff20')
},
{
'path': [4, hardened(0), 1, hardened(2), 2, 1000000000],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('8b2b5c4b'),
'chain': unhexlify('b9b7b82d326bb9cb5b5b121066feea4eb93d5241103c9e7a18aad40f1dde8059'),
'public': unhexlify('02216cd26d31147f72427a453c443ed2cde8a1e53c9cc44e5ddf739725413fe3f4')
},
{
'path': [1],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('00000000'),
'chain': unhexlify('60499f801b896d83179a4374aeb7822aaeaceaa0db1f85ee3e904c4defbd9689'),
'public': unhexlify('03cbcaa9c98c877a26977d00825c956a238e8dddfbd322cce4f74b0b5bd6ace4a7')
},
{
'path': [1, 0],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('bd16bee5'),
'chain': unhexlify('f0909affaa7ee7abe5dd4e100598d4dc53cd709d5a5c2cac40e7412f232f7c9c'),
'public': unhexlify('02fc9e5af0ac8d9b3cecfe2a888e2117ba3d089d8585886c9c826b6b22a98d12ea')
},
{
'path': [1, 0, hardened(2147483647)],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('5a61ff8e'),
'chain': unhexlify('be17a268474a6bb9c61e1d720cf6215e2a88c5406c4aee7b38547f585c9a37d9'),
'public': unhexlify('03c01e7425647bdefa82b12d9bad5e3e6865bee0502694b94ca58b666abc0a5c3b')
},
{
'path': [1, 0, hardened(2147483647), 1],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('d8ab4937'),
'chain': unhexlify('f366f48f1ea9f2d1d3fe958c95ca84ea18e4c4ddb9366c336c927eb246fb38cb'),
'public': unhexlify('03a7d1d856deb74c508e05031f9895dab54626251b3806e16b4bd12e781a7df5b9')
},
{
'path': [1, 0, hardened(2147483647), 1, hardened(2147483646)],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('78412e3a'),
'chain': unhexlify('637807030d55d01f9a0cb3a7839515d796bd07706386a6eddf06cc29a65a0e29'),
'public': unhexlify('02d2b36900396c9282fa14628566582f206a5dd0bcc8d5e892611806cafb0301f0')
},
{
'path': [1, 0, hardened(2147483647), 1, hardened(2147483646), 2],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('31a507b8'),
'chain': unhexlify('9452b549be8cea3ecb7a84bec10dcfd94afe4d129ebfd3b3cb58eedf394ed271'),
'public': unhexlify('024d902e1a2fc7a8755ab5b694c575fce742c48d9ff192e63df5193e4c7afe1f9c')
},
{
'path': [5],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('00000000'),
'chain': unhexlify('96cd4465a9644e31528eda3592aa35eb39a9527769ce1855beafc1b81055e75d'),
'public': unhexlify('02c9e16154474b3ed5b38218bb0463e008f89ee03e62d22fdcc8014beab25b48fa')
},
{
'path': [5, 0],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('607f628f'),
'chain': unhexlify('84e9c258bb8557a40e0d041115b376dd55eda99c0042ce29e81ebe4efed9b86a'),
'public': unhexlify('039b6df4bece7b6c81e2adfeea4bcf5c8c8a6e40ea7ffa3cf6e8494c61a1fc82cc')
},
{
'path': [5, 0, hardened(2147483647)],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('946d2a54'),
'chain': unhexlify('f235b2bc5c04606ca9c30027a84f353acf4e4683edbd11f635d0dcc1cd106ea6'),
'public': unhexlify('02f89c5deb1cae4fedc9905f98ae6cbf6cbab120d8cb85d5bd9a91a72f4c068c76')
},
{
'path': [5, 0, hardened(2147483647), 1],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('218182d8'),
'chain': unhexlify('7c0b833106235e452eba79d2bdd58d4086e663bc8cc55e9773d2b5eeda313f3b'),
'public': unhexlify('03abe0ad54c97c1d654c1852dfdc32d6d3e487e75fa16f0fd6304b9ceae4220c64')
},
{
'path': [5, 0, hardened(2147483647), 1, hardened(2147483646)],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('931223e4'),
'chain': unhexlify('5794e616eadaf33413aa309318a26ee0fd5163b70466de7a4512fd4b1a5c9e6a'),
'public': unhexlify('03cb8cb067d248691808cd6b5a5a06b48e34ebac4d965cba33e6dc46fe13d9b933')
},
{
'path': [5, 0, hardened(2147483647), 1, hardened(2147483646), 2],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('956c4629'),
'chain': unhexlify('3bfb29ee8ac4484f09db09c2079b520ea5616df7820f071a20320366fbe226a7'),
'public': unhexlify('020ee02e18967237cf62672983b253ee62fa4dd431f8243bfeccdf39dbe181387f')
},
{
'path': [4],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('00000000'),
'chain': unhexlify('beeb672fe4621673f722f38529c07392fecaa61015c80c34f29ce8b41b3cb6ea'),
'public': unhexlify('0266874dc6ade47b3ecd096745ca09bcd29638dd52c2c12117b11ed3e458cfa9e8')
},
{
'path': [4, hardened(28578)],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('be6105b5'),
'chain': unhexlify('e94c8ebe30c2250a14713212f6449b20f3329105ea15b652ca5bdfc68f6c65c2'),
'public': unhexlify('02519b5554a4872e8c9c1c847115363051ec43e93400e030ba3c36b52a3e70a5b7')
},
{
'path': [4, hardened(28578), 33941],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('3e2b7bc6'),
'chain': unhexlify('9e87fe95031f14736774cd82f25fd885065cb7c358c1edf813c72af535e83071'),
'public': unhexlify('0235bfee614c0d5b2cae260000bb1d0d84b270099ad790022c1ae0b2e782efe120')
},
{
'path': [6],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('00000000'),
'chain': unhexlify('7762f9729fed06121fd13f326884c82f59aa95c57ac492ce8c9654e60efd130c'),
'public': unhexlify('0383619fadcde31063d8c5cb00dbfe1713f3e6fa169d8541a798752a1c1ca0cb20')
},
]
)
def test_derive_node_xpub(device, path):
resp = device.hd_derive_node(path['path'])
xpub = PicoHSM.hd_decode_xpub(resp)
assert(xpub['fingerprint'] == path['fingerprint'])
assert(xpub['chain'] == path['chain'])
assert(xpub['public'] == path['public'])
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"path", [
{
'path': [7],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('00000000'),
'chain': unhexlify('8F8C33732530A0417DD446097EDB6F6617D52D627C6DB28581D74D11B385D25A'),
'public': unhexlify('dbf12b44133eaab506a740f6565cc117228cbf1dd70635cfa8ddfdc9af734756')
},
{
'path': [7, b"SLIP-0021"],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('0e521cdd'),
'chain': unhexlify('446ADED06078CF950DAB737F014C7BAE81EEB6E7BEECC260A38E2E0FA9973104'),
'public': unhexlify('1d065e3ac1bbe5c7fad32cf2305f7d709dc070d672044a19e610c77cdf33de0d')
},
{
'path': [7, b"SLIP-0021", b"Master encryption key"],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('4a6e721d'),
'chain': unhexlify('7072D5593032B84A90E2E2E42996D277026FF55C1082AC82A121D775FED0ACEB'),
'public': unhexlify('ea163130e35bbafdf5ddee97a17b39cef2be4b4f390180d65b54cf05c6a82fde')
},
{
'path': [7, b"SLIP-0021", b"Authentication key"],
'fingerprint': unhexlify('4a6e721d'),
'chain': unhexlify('3D5C87DC62CE006681B8C3DF723AE50FEEA40D6C26AEF8135BD321BA390A5B42'),
'public': unhexlify('47194e938ab24cc82bfa25f6486ed54bebe79c40ae2a5a32ea6db294d81861a6')
},
]
)
def test_derive_node_slip(device, path):
resp = device.hd_derive_node(path['path'])
xpub = PicoHSM.hd_decode_xpub(resp)
assert(xpub['fingerprint'] == path['fingerprint'])
assert(xpub['chain'] == sha256_sha256(path['chain']))
assert(xpub['public'] == sha256_sha256(path['public']))
def get_master_curve(mid):
for m in seeds:
if (m['id'] == mid):
if (m['name'] == 'secp256k1'):
return ec.SECP256K1()
elif (m['name'] == 'secp256r1'):
return ec.SECP256R1()
return None
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"path", [
[0],
[0, hardened(0)],
[0, hardened(0), 1],
[0, hardened(0), 1, hardened(2)],
[0, hardened(0), 1, hardened(2), 2],
[0, hardened(0), 1, hardened(2), 2, 1000000000],
[1],
[1, 0],
[1, 0, hardened(2147483647)],
[1, 0, hardened(2147483647), 1],
[1, 0, hardened(2147483647), 1, hardened(2147483646)],
[1, 0, hardened(2147483647), 1, hardened(2147483646), 2],
[4],
[4, hardened(0)],
[4, hardened(0), 1],
[4, hardened(0), 1, hardened(2)],
[4, hardened(0), 1, hardened(2), 2],
[4, hardened(0), 1, hardened(2), 2, 1000000000],
[5],
[5, 0],
[5, 0, hardened(2147483647)],
[5, 0, hardened(2147483647), 1],
[5, 0, hardened(2147483647), 1, hardened(2147483646)],
[5, 0, hardened(2147483647), 1, hardened(2147483646), 2],
]
)
def test_signature(device, path):
pub = device.hd_derive_node(path)
xpub = PicoHSM.hd_decode_xpub(pub)
curve = get_master_curve(path[0])
pubkey = ec.EllipticCurvePublicKey.from_encoded_point(curve, xpub['public'])
resp = device.hd_signature(path, TEST_STRING)
pubkey.verify(resp, TEST_STRING, ec.ECDSA(hashes.SHA256()))
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"path", [
[7],
[7, b"SLIP-0021"],
[7, b"SLIP-0021", b"Master encryption key"],
[7, b"SLIP-0021", b"Authentication key"],
]
)
def test_signature_slip(device, path):
pub = device.hd_derive_node(path)
with pytest.raises(APDUResponse) as e:
resp = device.hd_signature(path, TEST_STRING)
assert (e.value.sw == SWCodes.SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"ask_on_encrypt", [True, False]
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"ask_on_decrypt", [True, False]
)
def test_cipher_slip(device, ask_on_encrypt, ask_on_decrypt):
MSG1 = b"testing message!"
enctext = device.hd_cipher([7, b"\x01", b"\x02"], b"test", MSG1, EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT, ask_on_encrypt, ask_on_decrypt)
resp = device.hd_cipher([7, b"\x01", b"\x02"], b"test", enctext, EncryptionMode.DECRYPT, ask_on_encrypt, ask_on_decrypt)
assert(resp == MSG1)

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,11 @@
#!/bin/bash -eu
source tests/docker_env.sh
run_in_docker ./tests/start-up-and-test.sh
if [[ $1 == "pkcs11" ]]; then
run_in_docker ./tests/start-up-and-test-pkcs11.sh
elif [[ $1 == "sc-hsm-pkcs11" ]]; then
run_in_docker ./tests/scripts/sc_hsm_test.sh
else
run_in_docker ./tests/start-up-and-test.sh
fi

38
tests/scripts/aes.sh Executable file
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#!/bin/bash
source ./tests/scripts/func.sh
reset
test $? -eq 0 || exit $?
TEST_DATA="This is a text."
echo "${TEST_DATA}" > test
sc_tool() {
pkcs11-tool --module /usr/local/lib/libsc-hsm-pkcs11.so -l --pin 648219 $@
}
aeses=("16" "24" "32")
for aes in ${aeses[*]}; do
echo " Test AES (AES:${aes})"
echo -n " Keygen... "
sc_tool --keygen --key-type "AES:${aes}" --id 1 --label "AES:${aes}" > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
e=$(sc_tool --list-object --type secrkey 2>&1)
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
grep -q "AES length ${aes}" <<< $e && echo -n "." || exit $?
grep -q "AES:${aes}" <<< $e && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
echo -n " Encryption..."
sc_tool --encrypt --id 1 --input-file test --mechanism aes-cbc > crypted.aes 2>/dev/null
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
echo -n " Decryption..."
e=$(sc_tool --decrypt --id 1 --input-file crypted.aes --mechanism aes-cbc 2>/dev/null)
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
grep -q "${TEST_DATA}" <<< $e && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
sc_tool --delete --type secrkey --id 1 > /dev/null 2>&1
done
rm -rf test crypted.aes

62
tests/scripts/asym_cipher.sh Executable file
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@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
#!/bin/bash
source ./tests/scripts/func.sh
reset
test $? -eq 0 || exit $?
rsa_encrypt_decrypt() {
openssl pkeyutl -encrypt -pubin -inkey 1.pub $2 -in $1 -out data.crypt
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
TDATA=$(tr -d '\0' < <(pkcs11-tool --id 1 --pin 648219 --decrypt $3 -i data.crypt 2>/dev/null))
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
if [[ ${TEST_STRING} != "$TDATA" ]]; then
exit 1
fi
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
}
TEST_STRING="This is a test string. Be safe, be secure."
echo ${TEST_STRING} > data
echo -n " Keygen RSA 2048..."
keygen_and_export rsa:2048
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
echo -n " Test RSA-PKCS ciphering..."
rsa_encrypt_decrypt data "-pkeyopt rsa_padding_mode:pkcs1" "--mechanism RSA-PKCS"
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
echo -n " Test RSA-X-509 ciphering..."
cp data data_pad
tlen=${#TEST_STRING}
dd if=/dev/zero bs=1 count=$((256-$tlen-1)) >> data_pad 2> /dev/null
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
rsa_encrypt_decrypt data_pad "-pkeyopt rsa_padding_mode:none" "--mechanism RSA-X-509"
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
echo -n " Test RSA-PKCS-OAEP ciphering..."
rsa_encrypt_decrypt data "-pkeyopt rsa_padding_mode:oaep -pkeyopt rsa_oaep_md:sha256 -pkeyopt rsa_mgf1_md:sha256" "--mechanism RSA-PKCS-OAEP"
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
rm -rf data* 1.*
pkcs11-tool -l --pin 648219 --delete-object --type privkey --id 1 > /dev/null 2>&1
algs=("secp192r1" "secp256r1" "secp384r1" "secp521r1" "brainpoolP256r1" "brainpoolP384r1" "brainpoolP512r1" "secp192k1" "secp256k1")
for alg in ${algs[*]}; do
echo -n " Test EC derive with ${alg}..."
keygen_and_export ec:${alg}
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
openssl ecparam -genkey -name ${alg} > bob.pem 2>/dev/null
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
openssl ec -in bob.pem -pubout -outform DER > bob.der 2>/dev/null
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
pkcs11-tool --pin 648219 --id 1 --derive -i bob.der -o mine-bob.der > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
openssl pkeyutl -derive -out bob-mine.der -inkey bob.pem -peerkey 1.pub 2>/dev/null
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
cmp bob-mine.der mine-bob.der
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
rm -rf data* 1.*
pkcs11-tool -l --pin 648219 --delete-object --type privkey --id 1 > /dev/null 2>&1
done

60
tests/scripts/backup.sh Executable file
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@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
#!/bin/bash
source ./tests/scripts/func.sh
reset
test $? -eq 0 || exit $?
sc_backup() {
for i in $(seq 1 $1); do
sc-hsm-tool --create-dkek-share dkek.${i}.pbe --password testpw > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
done
sc-hsm-tool --initialize --so-pin 3537363231383830 --pin 648219 --dkek-shares $1 > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
pkcs11-tool -l --pin 648219 -I > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
for i in $(seq 1 $1); do
e=$(sc-hsm-tool --import-dkek-share dkek.${i}.pbe --password testpw 2>&1)
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
grep -q "DKEK share imported" <<< $e && echo -n "." || exit $?
grep -q "DKEK shares[[:blank:]]*: $1" <<< $e && echo -n "." || exit $?
if [[ $i -lt $1 ]]; then
grep -q "DKEK import pending, $(( $1 - $i ))" <<< $e && echo -n "." || exit $?
fi
done
# Store DKEK, since it is not logged in
pkcs11-tool -l --pin 648219 -I > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
}
echo -n " Test single DKEK..."
sc_backup 1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
echo -n " Test multiple DKEK..."
sc_backup 3
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
rm -rf dkek.*.pbe
echo " Test backup and restore"
algs=("rsa:1024" "rsa:2048" "ec:secp192r1" "ec:secp256r1" "ec:secp384r1" "ec:secp521r1" "ec:brainpoolP256r1" "ec:brainpoolP384r1" "ec:brainpoolP512r1" "ec:secp192k1" "ec:secp256k1")
for alg in ${algs[*]}; do
echo -n " Keygen ${alg}..."
gen_and_check ${alg}
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
echo -n " Wrap key..."
sc-hsm-tool --wrap-key wrap-key.bin --key-reference 1 --pin 648219 > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
e=$(pkcs15-tool -D 2>&1)
grep -q "Key ref[[:blank:]]*: 10" <<< $e && exit $? || echo -e ".\t${OK}"
echo -n " Unwrap key..."
sc-hsm-tool --unwrap-key wrap-key.bin --key-reference 10 --pin 648219 --force > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
e=$(pkcs15-tool -D 2>&1)
grep -q "Key ref[[:blank:]]*: 10" <<< $e && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
echo -n " Cleaning..."
pkcs11-tool -l --pin 648219 --delete-object --type privkey --id 1 > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
pkcs11-tool -l --pin 648219 --delete-object --type privkey --id 1 > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
done

52
tests/scripts/func.sh Executable file
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@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
#!/bin/bash
OK="\033[32mok\033[0m"
FAIL="\033[31mfail\033[0m"
gen_and_check() {
e=$(pkcs11-tool -l --pin 648219 --keypairgen --key-type $1 --id 1 --label "TestLabel" 2>&1)
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
glabel=""
case $1 in
*"192"*)
glabel="EC_POINT 192 bits"
;;
*"256"*)
glabel="EC_POINT 256 bits"
;;
*"384"*)
glabel="EC_POINT 384 bits"
;;
*"512"*)
glabel="EC_POINT 512 bits"
;;
*"521"*)
glabel="EC_POINT 528 bits"
;;
*"rsa"*)
IFS=: read -r v1 bits <<< "$1"
glabel="RSA ${bits} bits"
;;
esac
grep -q "${glabel}" <<< $e && echo -n "." || exit $?
}
gen_and_delete() {
gen_and_check $1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
pkcs11-tool -l --pin 648219 --delete-object --type privkey --id 1 > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
}
reset() {
python3 tools/pico-hsm-tool.py --pin 648219 initialize --so-pin 57621880 --silent > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 || exit $?
}
keygen_and_export() {
gen_and_check $1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
pkcs11-tool --read-object --pin 648219 --id 1 --type pubkey > 1.der 2>/dev/null
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
IFS=: read -r mk bts <<< "$1"
openssl ${mk} -inform DER -outform PEM -in 1.der -pubin > 1.pub 2>/dev/null
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
}

49
tests/scripts/initialize.sh Executable file
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@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
#!/bin/bash
source ./tests/scripts/func.sh
reset
# Change SO-PIN
echo -n " Test SO-PIN change..."
pkcs11-tool --login --login-type so --so-pin 3537363231383830 --change-pin --new-pin 0123456789012345 > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
pkcs11-tool --login --login-type so --so-pin 0123456789012345 --change-pin --new-pin 3537363231383830 > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
# Change PIN
echo -n " Test PIN change..."
pkcs11-tool --login --pin 648219 --change-pin --new-pin 123456 > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
# Reset PIN
echo -n " Test PIN reset..."
pkcs11-tool --login --login-type so --so-pin 3537363231383830 --init-pin --new-pin 648219 > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
# Change PIN
pkcs11-tool --login --pin 648219 --change-pin --new-pin 123456 > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
pkcs11-tool --login --pin 123456 --change-pin --new-pin 648219 > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
# Wrong PIN (1st and 2nd PIN_INCORRECT, 3rd PIN_LOCKED)
echo -n " Test wrong PIN attempts..."
e=$(pkcs11-tool --login --pin 123456 -I 2>&1)
test $? -eq 1 && echo -n "." || exit $?
grep -q CKR_PIN_INCORRECT <<< $e && echo -n "." || exit $?
e=$(pkcs11-tool --login --pin 123456 -I 2>&1)
test $? -eq 1 && echo -n "." || exit $?
grep -q CKR_PIN_INCORRECT <<< $e && echo -n "." || exit $?
e=$(pkcs11-tool --login --pin 123456 -I 2>&1)
test $? -eq 1 && echo -n "." || exit $?
grep -q CKR_PIN_LOCKED <<< $e && echo -e "\t${OK}" || exit $?
# Reset PIN
echo -n " Test restore PIN..."
pkcs11-tool --login --login-type so --so-pin 3537363231383830 --init-pin --new-pin 648219 > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
pkcs11-tool --login --pin 648219 -I > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e "\t${OK}" || exit $?

13
tests/scripts/keygen.sh Executable file
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@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
#!/bin/bash
source ./tests/scripts/func.sh
reset
test $? -eq 0 || exit $?
algs=("rsa:1024" "rsa:2048" "ec:secp192r1" "ec:secp256r1" "ec:secp384r1" "ec:secp521r1" "ec:brainpoolP256r1" "ec:brainpoolP384r1" "ec:brainpoolP512r1" "ec:secp192k1" "ec:secp256k1")
for alg in ${algs[*]}; do
IFS=: read -r a s <<< "${alg}"
au=$(awk '{print toupper($0)}' <<<${a})
echo -n " Test ${au} ${s}..."
gen_and_delete ${alg} && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
done

58
tests/scripts/pkcs11.sh Executable file
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@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
#!/bin/bash
source ./tests/scripts/func.sh
echo "==== Test initialization ===="
./tests/scripts/initialize.sh
test $? -eq 0 || {
echo -e "\t${FAIL}"
exit 1
}
echo "==== Test keygen ===="
./tests/scripts/keygen.sh
test $? -eq 0 || {
echo -e "\t${FAIL}"
exit 1
}
echo "==== Test sign and verify ===="
./tests/scripts/sign_and_verify.sh
test $? -eq 0 || {
echo -e "\t${FAIL}"
exit 1
}
echo "==== Test asymmetric ciphering ===="
./tests/scripts/asym_cipher.sh
test $? -eq 0 || {
echo -e "\t${FAIL}"
exit 1
}
echo "==== Test binary storage ===="
./tests/scripts/store_binary.sh
test $? -eq 0 || {
echo -e "\t${FAIL}"
exit 1
}
echo "==== Test AES ===="
./tests/scripts/aes.sh
test $? -eq 0 || {
echo -e "\t${FAIL}"
exit 1
}
echo "==== Test PKCS11-tool ===="
./tests/scripts/pkcs11_test.sh
test $? -eq 0 || {
echo -e "\t${FAIL}"
exit 1
}
echo "==== Test backup and restore ===="
./tests/scripts/backup.sh
test $? -eq 0 || {
echo -e "\t${FAIL}"
exit 1
}

17
tests/scripts/pkcs11_test.sh Executable file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
#!/bin/bash
source ./tests/scripts/func.sh
reset
test $? -eq 0 || exit $?
echo -n " Test PKCS11 tool..."
gen_and_check rsa:2048
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
e=$(pkcs11-tool --test -l --pin 648219 2>&1)
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
grep -q "No errors" <<< $e && echo -n "." || exit $?
pkcs11-tool -l --pin 648219 --delete-object --type privkey --id 1 > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
#e=$(pkcs11-tool --test-ec -l --pin 648219 --id 1 --key-type ec:secp256r1 2>&1)
#test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
#grep -q "==> OK" <<< $e && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?

24
tests/scripts/sc_hsm_test.sh Executable file
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@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
#!/bin/bash
source ./tests/startup.sh
echo "==== Test SC HSM ===="
echo -n " Running sc-hsm-pkcs11-test..."
pkcs11-tool -l --pin 648219 --keypairgen --key-type ec:secp256r1 --id 1 --label "TestLabel" > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || {
echo -e "\t${FAIL}"
exit 1
}
e=$(/usr/local/bin/sc-hsm-pkcs11-test --module /usr/local/lib/libsc-hsm-pkcs11.so --pin 648219 --invasive 2>&1)
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || {
echo -e "\t${FAIL}"
exit 1
}
grep -q "338 tests performed" <<< $e && echo -n "." || {
echo -e "\t${FAIL}"
exit 1
}
grep -q "0 tests failed" <<< $e && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || {
echo -e "\t${FAIL}"
exit 1
}

126
tests/scripts/sign_and_verify.sh Executable file
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@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
#!/bin/bash
source ./tests/scripts/func.sh
reset
test $? -eq 0 || exit $?
TEST_DATA="This is a test string. Be safe, be secure."
echo ${TEST_DATA} > data
create_dgst() {
openssl dgst -$1 -binary -out data.$1 data > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
}
dgsts=("sha1" "sha224" "sha256" "sha384" "sha512")
for dgst in ${dgsts[*]}; do
echo -n " Create digest ${dgst}..."
create_dgst ${dgst}
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
done
# $1 sign mechanism
# $2 sign input file
# $3 sign parameters
# $4 vrfy input file
# $5 vrfy parameters
sign_and_verify() {
pkcs11-tool --id 1 --sign --pin 648219 --mechanism $1 -i $2 -o data.sig $3 > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
e=$(openssl pkeyutl -verify -pubin -inkey 1.pub -in $4 -sigfile data.sig $5 2>&1)
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
grep -q "Signature Verified Successfully" <<< $e && echo -n "." || exit $?
}
sign_and_verify_rsa_pkcs() {
dgstl=$(awk '{print tolower($0)}' <<<$1)
dgstu=$(awk '{print toupper($0)}' <<<$1)
sign_and_verify "${dgstu}-RSA-PKCS" data "" data.${dgstl} "-pkeyopt digest:${dgstl}"
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
}
sign_and_verify_rsa_pss() {
dgstl=$(awk '{print tolower($0)}' <<<$1)
dgstu=$(awk '{print toupper($0)}' <<<$1)
sign_and_verify "RSA-PKCS-PSS" data.${dgstl} "--mgf MGF1-${dgstu} --hash-algorithm ${dgstu}" data.${dgstl} "-pkeyopt rsa_padding_mode:pss -pkeyopt rsa_pss_saltlen:-1 -pkeyopt digest:${dgstl}"
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
}
sign_and_verify_rsa_pss_dgst() {
dgstl=$(awk '{print tolower($0)}' <<<$1)
dgstu=$(awk '{print toupper($0)}' <<<$1)
sign_and_verify "${dgstu}-RSA-PKCS-PSS" data "" data.${dgstl} "-pkeyopt rsa_padding_mode:pss -pkeyopt rsa_pss_saltlen:-1 -pkeyopt digest:${dgstl}"
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
}
keygen_sign_and_verify_ec() {
echo " Test ECDSA with $1"
echo -n " Keygen $1..."
keygen_and_export $1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
for dgst in ${dgsts[*]}; do
dgstu=$(awk '{print toupper($0)}' <<<${dgst})
echo -n " Test ECDSA with ${dgst} and $1..."
sign_and_verify ECDSA "data.${dgst}" "--signature-format openssl" data.${dgst}
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
echo -n " Test ECDSA-${dgstu} with $1..."
sign_and_verify "ECDSA-${dgstu}" data "--signature-format openssl" data.${dgst}
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
done
echo -n " Delete $1..."
pkcs11-tool -l --pin 648219 --delete-object --type privkey --id 1 > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
}
algs=("ec:secp192r1" "ec:secp256r1" "ec:secp384r1" "ec:secp521r1" "ec:brainpoolP256r1" "ec:brainpoolP384r1" "ec:brainpoolP512r1" "ec:secp192k1" "ec:secp256k1")
for alg in ${algs[*]}; do
keygen_sign_and_verify_ec ${alg} || exit $?
done
echo " Test RSA PKCS"
echo -n " Keygen rsa:2048..."
keygen_and_export "rsa:2048"
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
echo -n " Test RSA-PKCS..."
pkcs11-tool --id 1 --sign --pin 648219 --mechanism RSA-PKCS -i data -o data.sig > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
e=$(openssl pkeyutl -verify -pubin -inkey 1.pub -in data -sigfile data.sig 2>&1)
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
grep -q "Signature Verified Successfully" <<< $e && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
for dgst in ${dgsts[*]}; do
dgstu=$(awk '{print toupper($0)}' <<<${dgst})
echo -n " Test RSA-PKCS-${dgstu}..."
sign_and_verify_rsa_pkcs ${dgst}
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
done
echo -n " Test RSA-X-509..."
cp data data_pad
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
tlen=${#TEST_DATA}
dd if=/dev/zero bs=1 count=$((256-$tlen)) >> data_pad > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
pkcs11-tool --id 1 --sign --pin 648219 --mechanism RSA-X-509 -i data_pad -o data.sig > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
TDATA=$(tr -d '\0' < <(openssl rsautl -verify -inkey 1.pub -in data.sig -pubin -raw))
if [[ ${TEST_DATA} != "$TDATA" ]]; then
exit 1
fi
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
for dgst in ${dgsts[*]}; do
dgstu=$(awk '{print toupper($0)}' <<<${dgst})
if [[ "${dgst}" != "sha1" ]]; then
echo -n " Test RSA-PKCS-PSS with ${dgst}..."
sign_and_verify_rsa_pss ${dgst}
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
fi
echo -n " Test ${dgstu}-RSA-PKCS-PSS..."
sign_and_verify_rsa_pss_dgst ${dgst}
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
done
rm -rf data* 1.*
pkcs11-tool -l --pin 648219 --delete-object --type privkey --id 1 > /dev/null 2>&1

28
tests/scripts/store_binary.sh Executable file
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@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
#!/bin/bash
source ./tests/scripts/func.sh
reset
test $? -eq 0 || exit $?
TEST_DATA="Pico HSM is awesome!"
echo ${TEST_DATA} > test
echo -n " Test public binary storage..."
pkcs11-tool --pin 648219 --write-object test --type data --id 1 --label 'test1' > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
e=$(pkcs11-tool --read-object --type data --label 'test1' 2>&1)
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
grep -q "${TEST_DATA}" <<< $e && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
pkcs11-tool --pin 648219 --delete-object --type data --label 'test1' > /dev/null 2>&1
echo -n " Test private binary storage..."
pkcs11-tool --pin 648219 --write-object test --type data --id 1 --label 'test1' --private > /dev/null 2>&1
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
e=$(pkcs11-tool --read-object --type data --label 'test1' --pin 648219 2>&1)
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || exit $?
grep -q "${TEST_DATA}" <<< $e && echo -n "." || exit $?
e=$(pkcs11-tool --read-object --type data --label 'test1' 2>&1)
test $? -eq 1 && echo -n "." || exit $?
grep -q "error: object not found" <<< $e && echo -e ".\t${OK}" || exit $?
pkcs11-tool --pin 648219 --delete-object --type data --label 'test1' > /dev/null 2>&1

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
#!/bin/bash
source ./tests/startup.sh
chmod a+x tests/scripts/*.sh
echo "======== PKCS11 Test suite ========"
./tests/scripts/pkcs11.sh

View File

@@ -1,8 +1,5 @@
#!/bin/bash -eu
#!/bin/bash
source ./tests/startup.sh
/usr/sbin/pcscd &
sleep 2
rm -f memory.flash
tar -xf tests/memory.tar.gz
./build_in_docker/pico_hsm > /dev/null &
pytest tests -W ignore::DeprecationWarning

27
tests/startup.sh Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
#!/bin/bash
OK="\t\033[32mok\033[0m"
FAIL="\t\033[31mfail\033[0m"
fail() {
echo -e "${FAIL}"
exit 1
}
echo -n "Start PCSC..."
/usr/sbin/pcscd &
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e "${OK}" || {
echo -e "${FAIL}"
exit 1
}
sleep 2
rm -f memory.flash
tar -xf tests/memory.tar.gz
echo -n "Start Pico HSM..."
/pico_hsm > /dev/null 2>&1 &
test $? -eq 0 && echo -n "." || fail
sleep 2
ATR="3b:fe:18:00:00:81:31:fe:45:80:31:81:54:48:53:4d:31:73:80:21:40:81:07:fa"
e=$(opensc-tool -an 2>&1)
grep -q "${ATR}" <<< $e && echo -n "." || fail
test $? -eq 0 && echo -e "${OK}" || fail

View File

@@ -1,138 +0,0 @@
"""
/*
* This file is part of the Pico HSM distribution (https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm).
* Copyright (c) 2022 Pol Henarejos.
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 3.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
"""
from enum import Enum
class SWCodes(Enum):
SW_BYTES_REMAINING_00 = 0x6100
SW_WARNING_STATE_UNCHANGED = 0x6200
SW_WARNING_CORRUPTED = 0x6281
SW_WARNING_EOF = 0x6282
SW_WARNING_EF_DEACTIVATED = 0x6283
SW_WARNING_WRONG_FCI = 0x6284
SW_WARNING_EF_TERMINATED = 0x6285
SW_WARNING_NOINFO = 0x6300
SW_WARNING_FILLUP = 0x6381
SW_EXEC_ERROR = 0x6400
SW_SECURE_MESSAGE_EXEC_ERROR = 0x6600
SW_WRONG_LENGTH = 0x6700
SW_LOGICAL_CHANNEL_NOT_SUPPORTED = 0x6881
SW_SECURE_MESSAGING_NOT_SUPPORTED = 0x6882
SW_COMMAND_INCOMPATIBLE = 0x6981
SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED = 0x6982
SW_PIN_BLOCKED = 0x6983
SW_DATA_INVALID = 0x6984
SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED = 0x6985
SW_COMMAND_NOT_ALLOWED = 0x6986
SW_SECURE_MESSAGING_MISSING_DO = 0x6987
SW_SECURE_MESSAGING_INCORRECT_DO = 0x6988
SW_APPLET_SELECT_FAILED = 0x6999
SW_INCORRECT_PARAMS = 0x6A80
SW_FUNC_NOT_SUPPORTED = 0x6A81
SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND = 0x6A82
SW_RECORD_NOT_FOUND = 0x6A83
SW_FILE_FULL = 0x6A84
SW_WRONG_NE = 0x6A85
SW_INCORRECT_P1P2 = 0x6A86
SW_WRONG_NC = 0x6A87
SW_REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND = 0x6A88
SW_FILE_EXISTS = 0x6A89
SW_WRONG_P1P2 = 0x6B00
SW_CORRECT_LENGTH_00 = 0x6C00
SW_INS_NOT_SUPPORTED = 0x6D00
SW_CLA_NOT_SUPPORTED = 0x6E00
SW_UNKNOWN = 0x6F00
SW_OK = 0x900
class APDUResponse(Exception):
def __init__(self, sw1, sw2):
self.sw1 = sw1
self.sw2 = sw2
self.sw = sw1 << 8 | sw2
super().__init__(f'SW:{sw1:02X}{sw2:02X}')
class DOPrefixes(Enum):
PRKD_PREFIX = 0xC4
CD_PREFIX = 0xC8
DCOD_PREFIX = 0xC9
CA_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX = 0xCA
KEY_PREFIX = 0xCC
PROT_DATA_PREFIX = 0xCD
EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX = 0xCE
DATA_PREFIX = 0xCF
class KeyType(Enum):
RSA = 1
ECC = 2
AES = 3
class Algorithm(Enum):
ALGO_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT = 0x10
ALGO_AES_CBC_DECRYPT = 0x11
ALGO_AES_CMAC = 0x18
ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_ENCRYPT = 0x51
ALGO_EXT_CIPHER_DECRYPT = 0x52
ALGO_AES_DERIVE = 0x99
ALGO_EC_RAW = 0x70
ALGO_EC_SHA1 = 0x71
ALGO_EC_SHA224 = 0x72
ALGO_EC_SHA256 = 0x73
ALGO_EC_SHA384 = 0x74
ALGO_EC_SHA512 = 0x75
ALGO_EC_DH = 0x80
ALGO_EC_DERIVE = 0x98
ALGO_RSA_RAW = 0x20
ALGO_RSA_DECRYPT = 0x21
ALGO_RSA_DECRYPT_PKCS1 = 0x22
ALGO_RSA_DECRYPT_OEP = 0x23
ALGO_RSA_PKCS1 = 0x30
ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1 = 0x31
ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA224 = 0x32
ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256 = 0x33
ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384 = 0x34
ALGO_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512 = 0x35
ALGO_RSA_PSS = 0x40
ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA1 = 0x41
ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA224 = 0x42
ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA256 = 0x43
ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA384 = 0x44
ALGO_RSA_PSS_SHA512 = 0x45
class Padding(Enum):
RAW = 0x21
PKCS = 0x22
OAEP = 0x23
def int_to_bytes(x, length=None, byteorder='big'):
return x.to_bytes(length or (x.bit_length() + 7) // 8, byteorder=byteorder)

View File

@@ -20,17 +20,8 @@
"""
import sys
try:
from smartcard.CardType import AnyCardType
from smartcard.CardRequest import CardRequest
from smartcard.Exceptions import CardRequestTimeoutException, CardConnectionException
except ModuleNotFoundError:
print('ERROR: smarctard module not found! Install pyscard package.\nTry with `pip install pyscard`')
sys.exit(-1)
try:
from cvc.certificates import CVC
from cvc.asn1 import ASN1
from cvc.oid import oid2scheme
from cvc.utils import scheme_rsa
except ModuleNotFoundError:
@@ -47,6 +38,11 @@ except ModuleNotFoundError:
print('ERROR: cryptography module not found! Install cryptography package.\nTry with `pip install cryptography`')
sys.exit(-1)
try:
from picohsm import PicoHSM, PinType, DOPrefixes, KeyType, EncryptionMode, utils, APDUResponse, SWCodes
except ModuleNotFoundError:
print('ERROR: picohsm module not found! Install picohsm package.\nTry with `pip install pypicohsm`')
sys.exit(-1)
import json
import urllib.request
@@ -61,58 +57,16 @@ from argparse import RawTextHelpFormatter
pin = None
class APDUResponse(Exception):
def __init__(self, sw1, sw2):
self.sw1 = sw1
self.sw2 = sw2
super().__init__(f'SW:{sw1:02X}{sw2:02X}')
def hexy(a):
return [hex(i) for i in a]
def send_apdu(card, command, p1, p2, data=None, ne=None):
lc = []
dataf = []
if (data):
lc = [0x00] + list(len(data).to_bytes(2, 'big'))
dataf = data
if (ne is None):
le = [0x00, 0x00]
else:
le = list(ne.to_bytes(2, 'big'))
if (isinstance(command, list) and len(command) > 1):
apdu = command
else:
apdu = [0x00, command]
apdu = apdu + [p1, p2] + lc + dataf + le
try:
response, sw1, sw2 = card.connection.transmit(apdu)
except CardConnectionException:
card.connection.reconnect()
response, sw1, sw2 = card.connection.transmit(apdu)
if (sw1 != 0x90):
if (sw1 == 0x6A and sw2 == 0x82):
response, sw1, sw2 = card.connection.transmit([0x00, 0xA4, 0x04, 0x00, 0xB, 0xE8, 0x2B, 0x06, 0x01, 0x04, 0x01, 0x81, 0xC3, 0x1F, 0x02, 0x01, 0x0])
if (sw1 == 0x90):
response, sw1, sw2 = card.connection.transmit(apdu)
if (sw1 == 0x90):
return response
elif (sw1 == 0x69 and sw2 == 0x82):
response, sw1, sw2 = card.connection.transmit([0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x81, len(pin)] + list(pin.encode()) + [0x0])
if (sw1 == 0x90):
response, sw1, sw2 = card.connection.transmit(apdu)
if (sw1 == 0x90):
return response
raise APDUResponse(sw1, sw2)
return response
def parse_args():
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
subparser = parser.add_subparsers(title="commands", dest="command")
parser_init = subparser.add_parser('initialize', help='Performs the first initialization of the Pico HSM.')
parser.add_argument('--pin', help='PIN number')
parser_init.add_argument('--so-pin', help='SO-PIN number')
parser_init.add_argument('--silent', help='Confirms initialization silently.', action='store_true')
parser_attestate = subparser.add_parser('attestate', help='Generates an attestation report for a private key and verifies the private key was generated in the devices or outside.')
parser_attestate.add_argument('-k', '--key', help='The private key index', metavar='KEY_ID')
@@ -128,7 +82,7 @@ def parse_args():
parser_rtc = subparser.add_parser('datetime', help='Datetime operations with the integrated Real Time Clock (RTC).')
subparser_rtc = parser_rtc.add_subparsers(title='commands', dest='subcommand')
parser_rtc_set = subparser_rtc.add_parser('set', help='Sets the current datetime.')
parser_rtc_get = subparser_rtc.add_parser('set', help='Gets the current datetime.')
parser_rtc_get = subparser_rtc.add_parser('get', help='Gets the current datetime.')
parser_opts = subparser.add_parser('options', help='Manage extra options.', formatter_class=RawTextHelpFormatter)
subparser_opts = parser_opts.add_subparsers(title='commands', dest='subcommand')
@@ -215,56 +169,44 @@ def get_pki_certs(certs_dir='certs', force=False):
f.write(base64.urlsafe_b64decode(certs['dvca']['cert']))
print(f'All PKI certificates are stored at {certs_dir} folder')
def pki(card, args):
def pki(_, args):
if (args.subcommand == 'initialize'):
if (args.default is True):
get_pki_certs(certs_dir=args.certs_dir, force=args.force)
else:
print('Error: no PKI is passed. Use --default to retrieve default PKI.')
def login(card, args):
global pin
pin = args.pin
try:
response = send_apdu(card, 0x20, 0x00, 0x81, list(args.pin.encode()))
except APDUResponse:
pass
def initialize(picohsm, args):
if (not args.silent):
print('********************************')
print('* PLEASE READ IT CAREFULLY *')
print('********************************')
print('')
print('This tool will erase and reset your device. It will delete all '
'private and secret keys.')
print('Are you sure?')
_ = input('[Press enter to confirm]')
def initialize(card, args):
print('********************************')
print('* PLEASE READ IT CAREFULLY *')
print('********************************')
print('')
print('This tool will erase and reset your device. It will delete all '
'private and secret keys.')
print('Are you sure?')
_ = input('[Press enter to confirm]')
send_apdu(card, 0xA4, 0x04, 0x00, [0xE8, 0x2B, 0x06, 0x01, 0x04, 0x01, 0x81, 0xC3, 0x1F, 0x02, 0x01])
if (args.pin):
pin = args.pin.encode()
try:
response = send_apdu(card, 0x20, 0x00, 0x81, list(pin))
picohsm.login(args.pin)
except APDUResponse:
pass
pin = args.pin
else:
pin = b'648219'
pin = '648219'
if (args.so_pin):
so_pin = args.so_pin.encode()
try:
response = send_apdu(card, 0x20, 0x00, 0x82, list(so_pin))
picohsm.login(args.so_pin, who=PinType.SO_PIN)
except APDUResponse:
pass
so_pin = args.so_pin
else:
so_pin = b'57621880'
so_pin = '57621880'
pin_data = [0x81, len(pin)] + list(pin)
so_pin_data = [0x82, len(so_pin)] + list(so_pin)
reset_data = [0x80, 0x02, 0x00, 0x01] + pin_data + so_pin_data + [0x91, 0x01, 0x03]
response = send_apdu(card, [0x80, 0x50], 0x00, 0x00, reset_data)
response = send_apdu(card, 0xB1, 0xCE, 0x00, [0x54, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00])
picohsm.initialize(pin=pin, sopin=so_pin)
response = picohsm.get_contents(DOPrefixes.EE_CERTIFICATE_PREFIX, 0x00)
cert = bytearray(response)
Y = CVC().decode(cert).pubkey().find(0x86).data()
@@ -275,14 +217,10 @@ def initialize(card, args):
j = get_pki_data('cvc', data=data)
print('Device name: '+j['devname'])
dataef = base64.urlsafe_b64decode(
j['cvcert']) + base64.urlsafe_b64decode(j['dvcert'])
j['cvcert']) + base64.urlsafe_b64decode(j['dvcert']) + base64.urlsafe_b64decode(j['cacert'])
response = send_apdu(card, 0xa4, 0x00, 0x00, [0x2f, 0x02])
response = send_apdu(card, 0x20, 0x00, 0x81, list(pin))
apdu_data = [0x54, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00] + \
list(ASN1.make_tag(0x53, dataef))
response = send_apdu(card, 0xd7, 0x00, 0x00, apdu_data)
picohsm.select_file(0x2f02)
response = picohsm.put_contents(0x0000, data=dataef)
print('Certificate uploaded successfully!')
print('')
@@ -291,22 +229,11 @@ def initialize(card, args):
print('Now you can initialize the device as usual with your chosen PIN '
'and configuration options.')
def attestate(card, args):
def attestate(picohsm, args):
kid = int(args.key)
try:
response = send_apdu(card, 0xB1, 0x2F, 0x02, [0x54, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00])
except APDUResponse as a:
print('ERROR: There is an error with the device certificate.')
sys.exit(1)
devcert = ASN1().decode(response).find(0x7f21, pos=0).data(return_tag=True)
try:
cert = send_apdu(card, 0xB1, 0xCE, kid, [0x54, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00])
except APDUResponse as a:
if (a.sw1 == 0x6a and a.sw2 == 0x82):
print('ERROR: Key not found')
sys.exit(1)
termca = picohsm.get_termca()
devcert = termca['cv']['data']
cert = picohsm.get_contents(0xCE, kid)
print(hexlify(bytearray(cert)))
print(f'Details of key {kid}:\n')
@@ -345,42 +272,41 @@ def attestate(card, args):
else:
print(f'Key {kid} is NOT generated by device {chr.decode()}')
def rtc(card, args):
def rtc(picohsm, args):
if (args.subcommand == 'set'):
now = datetime.now()
_ = send_apdu(card, [0x80, 0x64], 0x0A, 0x00, list(now.year.to_bytes(2, 'big')) + [now.month, now.day, now.weekday(), now.hour, now.minute, now.second ])
_ = picohsm.send(cla=0x80, command=0x64, p1=0x0A, data=list(now.year.to_bytes(2, 'big')) + [now.month, now.day, now.weekday(), now.hour, now.minute, now.second ])
elif (args.subcommand == 'get'):
response = send_apdu(card, [0x80, 0x64], 0x0A, 0x00)
response = picohsm.send(cla=0x80, command=0x64, p1=0x0A)
dt = datetime(int.from_bytes(response[:2], 'big'), response[2], response[3], response[5], response[6], response[7])
print(f'Current date and time is: {dt.ctime()}')
def opts(card, args):
def opts(picohsm, args):
opt = 0x0
if (args.opt == 'button'):
opt = 0x1
elif (args.opt == 'counter'):
opt = 0x2
current = send_apdu(card, [0x80, 0x64], 0x6, 0x0)[0]
current = picohsm.send(cla=0x80, command=0x64, p1=0x6)[0]
if (args.subcommand == 'set'):
if (args.onoff == 'on'):
newopt = current | opt
else:
newopt = current & ~opt
send_apdu(card, [0x80, 0x64], 0x6, 0x0, [newopt])
picohsm.send(cla=0x80, command=0x64, p1=0x6, data=[newopt])
elif (args.subcommand == 'get'):
print(f'Option {args.opt.upper()} is {"ON" if current & opt else "OFF"}')
class SecureLock:
def __init__(self, card):
self.card = card
def __init__(self, picohsm):
self.picohsm = picohsm
def mse(self):
sk = ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())
pn = sk.public_key().public_numbers()
self.__pb = sk.public_key().public_bytes(Encoding.X962, PublicFormat.UncompressedPoint)
ret = send_apdu(self.card, [0x80, 0x64], 0x3A, 0x01, list(self.__pb))
ret = self.picohsm.send(cla=0x80, command=0x64, p1=0x3A, p2=0x01, data=list(self.__pb))
pk = ec.EllipticCurvePublicKey.from_encoded_point(ec.SECP256R1(), bytes(ret))
shared_key = sk.exchange(ec.ECDH(), pk)
@@ -402,7 +328,7 @@ class SecureLock:
def unlock_device(self):
ct = self.get_skey()
send_apdu(self.card, [0x80, 0x64], 0x3A, 0x03, list(ct))
self.picohsm.send(cla=0x80, command=0x64, p1=0x3A, p2=0x03, data=list(ct))
def _get_key_device(self):
if (platform.system() == 'Windows' or platform.system() == 'Linux'):
@@ -421,15 +347,14 @@ class SecureLock:
def enable_device_aut(self):
ct = self.get_skey()
send_apdu(self.card, [0x80, 0x64], 0x3A, 0x02, list(ct))
self.picohsm.send(cla=0x80, command=0x64, p1=0x3A, p2=0x02, data=list(ct))
def disable_device_aut(self):
ct = self.get_skey()
send_apdu(self.card, [0x80, 0x64], 0x3A, 0x04, list(ct))
self.picohsm.send(cla=0x80, command=0x64, p1=0x3A, p2=0x04, p3=list(ct))
def secure(card, args):
slck = SecureLock(card)
def secure(picohsm, args):
slck = SecureLock(picohsm)
if (args.subcommand == 'enable'):
slck.enable_device_aut()
elif (args.subcommand == 'unlock'):
@@ -437,120 +362,63 @@ def secure(card, args):
elif (args.subcommand == 'disable'):
slck.disable_device_aut()
def cipher(card, args):
def cipher(picohsm, args):
if (args.subcommand == 'keygen'):
ksize = 0xB2
if (args.key_size == 24):
ksize = 0xB1
elif (args.key_size == 16):
ksize = 0xB0
ret = send_apdu(card, 0x48, int(args.key), ksize)
ret = picohsm.key_generation(KeyType.AES, param=args.key_size * 8)
else:
enc = None
aad = None
if (args.file_in):
fin = open(args.file_in, 'rb')
else:
fin = sys.stdin.buffer
enc = fin.read()
fin.close()
iv = args.iv
if (args.iv and args.hex):
iv = unhexlify(iv)
aad = args.aad
if (args.aad and args.hex):
aad = unhexlify(aad)
mode = EncryptionMode.ENCRYPT if args.subcommand[0] == 'e' else EncryptionMode.DECRYPT
if (args.alg == 'CHACHAPOLY'):
oid = b'\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x0D\x01\x09\x10\x03\x12'
ret = picohsm.chachapoly(args.key, mode, data=enc, iv=iv, aad=aad)
elif (args.alg == 'HMAC-SHA1'):
oid = b'\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x0D\x02\x07'
ret = picohsm.hmac(hashes.SHA1, args.key, data=enc)
elif (args.alg == 'HMAC-SHA224'):
oid = b'\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x0D\x02\x08'
ret = picohsm.hmac(hashes.SHA224, args.key, data=enc)
elif (args.alg == 'HMAC-SHA256'):
oid = b'\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x0D\x02\x09'
ret = picohsm.hmac(hashes.SHA256, args.key, data=enc)
elif (args.alg == 'HMAC-SHA384'):
oid = b'\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x0D\x02\x0A'
ret = picohsm.hmac(hashes.SHA384, args.key, data=enc)
elif (args.alg == 'HMAC-SHA512'):
oid = b'\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x0D\x02\x0B'
ret = picohsm.hmac(hashes.SHA512, args.key, data=enc)
elif (args.alg == 'HKDF-SHA256'):
oid = b'\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x0D\x01\x09\x10\x03\x1D'
ret = picohsm.hkdf(hashes.SHA256, args.key, data=enc, salt=iv, out_len=args.output_len)
elif (args.alg == 'HKDF-SHA384'):
oid = b'\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x0D\x01\x09\x10\x03\x1E'
ret = picohsm.hkdf(hashes.SHA384, args.key, data=enc, salt=iv, out_len=args.output_len)
elif (args.alg == 'HKDF-SHA512'):
oid = b'\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x0D\x01\x09\x10\x03\x1F'
elif (args.alg in ['PBKDF2-SHA1', 'PBKDF2-SHA224', 'PBKDF2-SHA256', 'PBKDF2-SHA384', 'PBKDF2-SHA512']):
if ('PBKDF2' in args.alg):
oid = b'\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x0D\x01\x05\x0C'
salt = b'\x04' + bytes([len(args.iv)//2]) + unhexlify(args.iv)
iteration = b'\x02' + bytes([len(int_to_bytes(int(args.iteration)))]) + int_to_bytes(int(args.iteration))
prf = b'\x30\x0A\x06\x08\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x0D\x02'
if (args.alg == 'PBKDF2-SHA1'):
prf += b'\x07'
elif (args.alg == 'PBKDF2-SHA224'):
prf += b'\x08'
elif (args.alg == 'PBKDF2-SHA256'):
prf += b'\x09'
elif (args.alg == 'PBKDF2-SHA384'):
prf += b'\x0A'
elif (args.alg == 'PBKDF2-SHA512'):
prf += b'\x0B'
enc = list(salt + iteration + prf)
elif (args.alg in 'X963-SHA1', 'X963-SHA224', 'X963-SHA256', 'X963-SHA384', 'X963-SHA512'):
oid = b'\x2B\x81\x05\x10\x86\x48\x3F'
enc = b'\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x0D\x02'
if (args.alg == 'X963-SHA1'):
enc += b'\x07'
elif (args.alg == 'X963-SHA224'):
enc += b'\x08'
elif (args.alg == 'X963-SHA256'):
enc += b'\x09'
elif (args.alg == 'X963-SHA384'):
enc += b'\x0A'
elif (args.alg == 'X963-SHA512'):
enc += b'\x0B'
'''
# To be finished: it does not work with AES (only supported by HSM)
elif (args.alg in ['PBES2-SHA1', 'PBES2-SHA224', 'PBES2-SHA256', 'PBES2-SHA384', 'PBES2-SHA512']):
oid = b'\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x0D\x01\x05\x0D'
if (not args.iv):
sys.stderr.buffer.write(b'ERROR: --iv required')
sys.exit(-1)
salt = b'\x04' + bytes([len(args.iv)//2]) + unhexlify(args.iv)
iteration = b'\x02' + bytes([len(int_to_bytes(int(args.iteration)))]) + int_to_bytes(int(args.iteration))
prf = b'\x30\x0A\x06\x08\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x0D\x02'
if (args.alg == 'PBES2-SHA1'):
prf += b'\x07'
elif (args.alg == 'PBES2-SHA224'):
prf += b'\x08'
elif (args.alg == 'PBES2-SHA256'):
prf += b'\x09'
elif (args.alg == 'PBES2-SHA384'):
prf += b'\x0A'
elif (args.alg == 'PBES2-SHA512'):
prf += b'\x0B'
oid_kdf = b'\x06\x09\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x0D\x01\x05\x0C'
aad = hexlify(oid_kdf + b'\x30' + bytes([len(salt)+len(iteration)+len(prf)]) + salt + iteration + prf)
args.hex = True
'''
ret = picohsm.hkdf(hashes.SHA512, args.key, data=enc, salt=iv, out_len=args.output_len)
elif (args.alg == 'PBKDF2-SHA1'):
ret = picohsm.pbkdf2(hashes.SHA1, args.key, salt=iv, iterations=args.iteration, out_len=args.output_len)
elif (args.alg == 'PBKDF2-SHA224'):
ret = picohsm.pbkdf2(hashes.SHA224, args.key, salt=iv, iterations=args.iteration, out_len=args.output_len)
elif (args.alg == 'PBKDF2-SHA256'):
ret = picohsm.pbkdf2(hashes.SHA256, args.key, salt=iv, iterations=args.iteration, out_len=args.output_len)
elif (args.alg == 'PBKDF2-SHA384'):
ret = picohsm.pbkdf2(hashes.SHA384, args.key, salt=iv, iterations=args.iteration, out_len=args.output_len)
elif (args.alg == 'PBKDF2-SHA512'):
ret = picohsm.pbkdf2(hashes.SHA512, args.key, salt=iv, iterations=args.iteration, out_len=args.output_len)
elif (args.alg == 'X963-SHA1'):
ret = picohsm.x963(hashes.SHA1, args.key, data=enc, out_len=args.output_len)
elif (args.alg == 'X963-SHA224'):
ret = picohsm.x963(hashes.SHA224, args.key, data=enc, out_len=args.output_len)
elif (args.alg == 'X963-SHA256'):
ret = picohsm.x963(hashes.SHA256, args.key, data=enc, out_len=args.output_len)
elif (args.alg == 'X963-SHA384'):
ret = picohsm.x963(hashes.SHA384, args.key, data=enc, out_len=args.output_len)
elif (args.alg == 'X963-SHA512'):
ret = picohsm.x963(hashes.SHA512, args.key, data=enc, out_len=args.output_len)
if (args.subcommand[0] == 'e' or args.subcommand == 'hmac' or args.subcommand == 'kdf'):
alg = 0x51
elif (args.subcommand[0] == 'd'):
alg = 0x52
if (not enc):
if (args.file_in):
fin = open(args.file_in, 'rb')
else:
fin = sys.stdin.buffer
enc = fin.read()
fin.close()
data = [0x06, len(oid)] + list(oid) + [0x81, len(enc)] + list(enc)
if (args.iv and not 'PBKDF2' in args.alg and not 'PBES2' in args.alg):
data += [0x82, len(args.iv)//2] + list(unhexlify(args.iv))
if (not aad):
aad = args.aad
if (aad):
if (args.hex):
data += [0x83, len(aad)//2] + list(unhexlify(aad))
else:
data += [0x83, len(aad)] + list(aad)
ne = int(args.output_len) if 'output_len' in args and args.output_len else None
ret = send_apdu(card, [0x80, 0x78], int(args.key), alg, data=data, ne=ne)
if (args.file_out):
fout = open(args.file_out, 'wb')
else:
@@ -562,19 +430,16 @@ def cipher(card, args):
if (args.file_out):
fout.close()
def int_to_bytes(x: int) -> bytes:
return x.to_bytes((x.bit_length() + 7) // 8, 'big')
def x25519(card, args):
def x25519(picohsm, args):
if (args.command == 'x25519'):
P = b'\x7f\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xed'
A = int_to_bytes(0x01DB42)
A = utils.int_to_bytes(0x01DB42)
N = b'\x10\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x14\xDE\xF9\xDE\xA2\xF7\x9C\xD6\x58\x12\x63\x1A\x5C\xF5\xD3\xED'
G = b'\x04\x09\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xd9\xd3\xce\x7e\xa2\xc5\xe9\x29\xb2\x61\x7c\x6d\x7e\x4d\x3d\x92\x4c\xd1\x48\x77\x2c\xdd\x1e\xe0\xb4\x86\xa0\xb8\xa1\x19\xae\x20'
h = b'\x08'
elif (args.command == 'x448'):
P = b'\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff'
A = int_to_bytes(0x98AA)
A = utils.int_to_bytes(0x98AA)
N = b'\x3f\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x7c\xca\x23\xe9\xc4\x4e\xdb\x49\xae\xd6\x36\x90\x21\x6c\xc2\x72\x8d\xc5\x8f\x55\x23\x78\xc2\x92\xab\x58\x44\xf3'
G = b'\x04\x05\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x1a\x5b\x7b\x45\x3d\x22\xd7\x6f\xf7\x7a\x67\x50\xb1\xc4\x12\x13\x21\x0d\x43\x46\x23\x7e\x02\xb8\xed\xf6\xf3\x8d\xc2\x5d\xf7\x60\xd0\x45\x55\xf5\x34\x5d\xae\xcb\xce\x6f\x32\x58\x6e\xab\x98\x6c\xf6\xb1\xf5\x95\x12\x5d\x23\x7d'
h = b'\x04'
@@ -589,45 +454,33 @@ def x25519(card, args):
cdata += b'\x42\x0C\x55\x54\x44\x55\x4D\x4D\x59\x30\x30\x30\x30\x31'
cdata += b'\x7f\x49\x81' + bytes([len(oid)+len(p_data)+len(a_data)+len(g_data)+len(n_data)+len(h_data)]) + oid + p_data + a_data + g_data + n_data + h_data
cdata += b'\x5F\x20\x0C\x55\x54\x44\x55\x4D\x4D\x59\x30\x30\x30\x30\x31'
ret = send_apdu(card, 0x46, int(args.key), 0x00, list(cdata))
ret = picohsm.send(command=0x46, p1=args.key, data=list(cdata))
def main(args):
sys.stderr.buffer.write(b'Pico HSM Tool v1.8\n')
sys.stderr.buffer.write(b'Pico HSM Tool v1.10\n')
sys.stderr.buffer.write(b'Author: Pol Henarejos\n')
sys.stderr.buffer.write(b'Report bugs to https://github.com/polhenarejos/pico-hsm/issues\n')
sys.stderr.buffer.write(b'\n\n')
cardtype = AnyCardType()
try:
# request card insertion
cardrequest = CardRequest(timeout=10, cardType=cardtype)
card = cardrequest.waitforcard()
# connect to the card and perform a few transmits
card.connection.connect()
except CardRequestTimeoutException:
raise Exception('time-out: no card inserted during last 10s')
if (args.pin):
login(card, args)
picohsm = PicoHSM(args.pin)
# Following commands may raise APDU exception on error
if (args.command == 'initialize'):
initialize(card, args)
initialize(picohsm, args)
elif (args.command == 'attestate'):
attestate(card, args)
attestate(picohsm, args)
elif (args.command == 'pki'):
pki(card, args)
pki(picohsm, args)
elif (args.command == 'datetime'):
rtc(card, args)
rtc(picohsm, args)
elif (args.command == 'options'):
opts(card, args)
opts(picohsm, args)
elif (args.command == 'secure'):
secure(card, args)
secure(picohsm, args)
elif (args.command == 'cipher'):
cipher(card, args)
cipher(picohsm, args)
elif (args.command == 'x25519' or args.command == 'x448'):
x25519(card, args)
x25519(picohsm, args)
def run():

View File

@@ -51,7 +51,9 @@ def get_secure_key():
try:
backend = get_backend(False)
key = backend.get_password(DOMAIN, USERNAME)[0]
except keyring.errors.KeyringError:
if (key is None):
raise TypeError
except (keyring.errors.KeyringError, TypeError):
try:
key = generate_secure_key(False)[0] # It should be True, but secure enclave causes python segfault
except keyring.errors.PasswordSetError:

View File

@@ -39,6 +39,8 @@ def get_secure_key():
key = None
try:
key = keyring.get_password(DOMAIN, USERNAME)
except keyring.errors.KeyringError:
if (key is None):
raise TypeError
except (keyring.errors.KeyringError, TypeError):
key = generate_secure_key()
return get_d(key.encode())